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## IN FOUR VOLUMES
## THE SEVENTH EDITION
## VOLUME II

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13

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

SOME

# CONSIDERATIONS

OF THE

# CONSEQUENCES

OF THE

# LOWERING of INTEREST,

AND

# RAISING the VALUE

OF

# MONEY.

In a Letter ſent to a Member of Parliament,
1691.

SOME

# CONSIDERATIONS

AND

# RAISING the VALUE

OF

# MONEY.

SIR,

THESE notions concerning coinage having, for the main, as you know, been put into writing above twelve months ſince; as thoſe other, concerning intereſt, a great deal above ſo many years: I put them now again into your hands, with a liberty (ſince you will needs have it ſo) to communicate them farther, as you pleaſe. If, upon a review, you continue your favourable opinion of them, and nothing leſs than publiſhing will ſatisfy you, I muſt deſire you to remember, that you muſt be anſwerable to the world for the ſtyle, which is ſuch as a man writes careleſly to his friend, when he ſeeks truth, not ornament; and ſtudies only to be in the right, and to be underſtood. I have, ſince you ſaw them laſt year, met with ſome objections in print, which I have endeavoured to remove; and particularly I have taken into conſideration a printed ſheet, entitled, "Remarks upon a paper given in to the lords, &c." Becauſe one may naturally ſuppoſe, that he that was ſo much a patron of that cauſe, would omit nothing, that could be ſaid in favour of it. To this I muſt here add, That I am juſt now told from Holland, "That the States, finding themſelves abuſed, by coining a vaſt "quantity of their baſe [Schillings] money, made of their own Ducatoons, and other finer ſilver, melted down, have put a ſtop to the minting of any but fine ſilver coin, till they ſhould ſettle their mint upon a new foot."

I know the ſincere love and concern you have for your country, puts you conſtantly upon caſting about, on all hands, for any means to ſerve it; and will not ſuffer you to overlook any thing you conceive, may be of any the leaſt uſe, though offered you from the meaneſt capacities: you could not elſe have put me upon looking out my old papers, concerning the reducing of intereſt to 4 per cent. which have ſo long lain by, forgotten. Upon this new ſurvey of them, I find not my thoughts now to differ from thoſe I had near twenty years ſince; they have to me

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SIR,

Nov. 7, 1691.

Your moſt humble ſervant.

SIR,

I HAVE ſo little concern in paying or receiving of "intereſt," that were I in no more danger to be miſled by inability and ignorance, than I am to be biaſſed by intereſt and inclination, I might hope to give you a very perfect and clear account, of the conſequences of a law to reduce intereſt to 4 per cent. But, ſince you are pleaſed to aſk my opinion, I ſhall endeavour fairly to ſtate this matter of uſe, with the beſt of my ſkill.

THE firſt thing to be conſidered is, "Whether the price of the hire of "money can be regulated by law?" And to that I think, generally ſpeaking, one may ſay, it is manifeſt it cannot. For ſince it is impoſſible to make a law, that ſhall hinder a man from giving away his money, or eſtate to whom he pleaſes, it will be impoſſible, by any contrivance of law, to hinder men, ſkilled in the power they have, over their own goods, and the ways of conveying them to others, to purchaſe money to be lent them, at what rate ſoever their occaſions ſhall make it neceſſary for them to have it. For it is to be remembered, that no man borrows money, or pays uſe, out of mere pleaſure: it is the want of money drives men to that trouble and charge of borrowing; and proportionably to this want, ſo will every one have it, whatever price it coſt him. Wherein the ſkilful, I ſay, will always ſo manage it, as to avoid the prohibition of your law, and keep out of its penalty, do what you can. What then will be the unavoidable conſequences of ſuch a law?

1. IT will make the difficulty of borrowing and lending much greater; whereby trade (the foundation of riches) will be obſtructed.

2. IT will be a prejudice to none, but thoſe who moſt need aſſiſtance and help; I mean widows and orphans, and others uninſtructed in the arts and management of more ſkilful men, whoſe eſtates lying in money, they will be ſure, eſpecially orphans, to have no more profit of their money, than what intereſt the law barely allows.

3. IT will mightily increaſe the advantage of bankers and ſcriveners, and other ſuch expert brokers; who ſkilled in the arts of putting out money, according to the true and natural value, which the preſent ſtate of trade, money, and debts, ſhall always raiſe intereſt to; they will infallibly get what the true value of intereſt ſhall be above the legal. For, men finding the convenience of lodging their money in hands, where they can be ſure of it, at ſhort warning, the ignorant and lazy will be forwardeſt to put it into theſe men's hands, who are known willingly to receive it, and where they can readily have the whole, or part, upon any ſudden occaſion, that may call for it.

4. I **FEAR**, I may reckon it as one of the probable conſequences of ſuch a law, that it is likely to cauſe great perjury in the nation; a crime, than which nothing is more carefully to be prevented by law-makers, not only by penalties, that ſhall attend apparent and proved perjury, but by avoiding and leſſening, as much as may be, the temptations to it. For where thoſe are ſtrong, (as they are, where men ſhall ſwear for their own advantage) there the fear of penalties to follow, will have little reſtraint, eſpecially if the crime be hard to be proved. All which, I ſuppoſe, will happen in this caſe, where ways will be found out to receive money upon other pretences than for uſe, to evade the rule and rigor of the law; and there will be ſecret truſts and colluſions amongſt men, that though they may be ſuſpected, can never be proved, without their own confeſſion. I have heard very ſober and obſerving perſons complain of the danger men's lives and properties are in, by the frequency and faſhionableneſs of perjury amongſt us. Faith and truth, eſpecially in all occaſions of atteſting it, upon the ſolemn appeal to heaven by an oath, is the great bond of ſociety: this it becomes the wiſdom of magiſtrates carefully to ſupport, and render as ſacred and awful, in the minds of the people, as they can. But, if ever frequency of oaths ſhall make them be looked on as formalities of law, or the cuſtom of ſtraining of truth, (which men's ſwearing in their own caſes is apt to lead them to) has once dipped men in perjury, and the guilt, with the temptation, has ſpread itſelf very wide, and made it almoſt faſhionable in ſome caſes; it will be impoſſible for the ſociety (theſe bonds being diſſolved) to ſubſiſt. All muſt break in pieces, and run to confuſion. That ſwearing in their own caſes is apt by degrees to lead men into as little regard of ſuch oaths, as they have of their ordinary talk, I think there is reaſon to ſuſpect, from what has been obſerved, in ſomething of that kind. Maſters of ſhips are a ſort of men generally induſtrious and ſober, and I ſuppoſe may be thought, for their number and rank, to be equally honeſt to any other ſort of men; and yet, by the diſcourſe I have had with merchants in other countries, I find that they think, in thoſe parts, they take a great liberty in their cuſtom-houſe oaths, to that degree, that I remember I was once told, in a trading town beyond ſea, of a maſter of a veſſel, there eſteemed a ſober and fair man, who yet could not hold ſaying, "God forbid that a cuſtom-houſe "oath ſhould be a ſin." I ſay not this to make any reflection upon a ſort of men, that I think as uncorrupt as any other; and who, I am ſure, ought in England to be cheriſhed and eſteemed, as the moſt induſtrious and moſt beneficial of any of its ſubjects: but I could not forbear to give this here, as an inſtance how dangerous a temptation it is, to bring men cuſtomarily to ſwear, where they may have any concernment of their own. And it will always be worthy the care and conſideration of law-makers, to keep up the opinion of an oath, high and ſacred, as it ought to be, in the minds of the people: which can never be done, where frequency of oaths, biaſſed by intereſt, has eſtabliſhed a neglect of them; and faſhion (which it ſeldom fails to do) has given countenance to what profit rewards.

**BUT**, that law cannot keep men from taking more uſe, than you ſet (the want of money being that alone which regulates its price) will perhaps appear, if we conſider how hard it is to ſet a price upon wine, or ſilks, or other unneceſſary commodities; but how impoſſible it is to ſet a rate upon victuals, in a time of famine. For, money being an univerſal commodity, and as neceſſary to trade as food is to life, every body muſt have it, at what rate they can get it; and unavoidably pay dear, when it is ſcarce; and debts, no leſs than trade, have made borrowing in faſhion. The bankers are a clear inſtance of this: for ſome years ſince, the ſcarcity of money having made it in England worth really more than ſix per cent. moſt of thoſe that had not the ſkill to let it for more than ſix per cent. and ſecure themſelves from the penalty of the law, put it in the bankers hands, where it was ready at their call, when they had an opportunity of greater improvement. So that the rate you ſet, profits not the lenders, and very few of the borrowers, who are fain to pay the price for money, that commodity would bear, were it left free; and the gain is only to the banker. And ſhould you leſſen the uſe to four per cent. the merchant or tradeſman that borrows, would not have it one jot cheaper than he has now; but probably theſe two ill effects would follow: Firſt, That he would pay dearer; and, Secondly, That there would be leſs money left in the country, to drive the trade. For the bankers, paying at moſt but four per cent. and receiving from ſix to ten per cent. or more, at that low rate could be content to have more money lie dead by them, than now, when it is higher: by which means there would be leſs money ſtirring in trade, and a greater ſcarcity; which would raiſe it upon the borrower, by this monopoly. And what a part of our treaſure their ſkill and management, joined with others lazineſs, or want of ſkill, is apt to draw into their hands, is to be known by thoſe vaſt ſums of money, they were found to owe, at ſhutting up of the Exchequer: and though it be very true, yet it is almoſt beyond belief, that one private goldſmith of London ſhould have credit, upon his ſingle ſecurity, (being uſually nothing but a note, under one of his ſervant's hands) for above eleven hundred thouſand pounds at once. The ſame reaſons, I ſuppoſe, will ſtill keep on the ſame trade; and, when you have taken it down by law, to that rate, no body will think of having more than four per cent. of the banker; though thoſe, who have need of money, to employ it in trade, will not then, any more than now, get it under five or ſix, or, as ſome pay, ſeven or eight. And if they had then, when the law permitted men to make more profit of their money, ſo large a proportion of the caſh of the nation in their hands, who can think, but that, by this law, it ſhould be more driven into Lombard-ſtreet now? there being many now, who lend them at four or five per cent. who would not lend to others at ſix. It would therefore, perhaps, bring down the rate of money to the borrower, and certainly diſtribute it better to the advantage of trade in the country, if the legal uſe were kept pretty near to the natural; (by natural uſe, I mean that rate of money, which the preſent ſcarcity of it makes it naturally at, upon an equal diſtribution of it) for then men, being licenſed by the law to take near the full natural uſe, will not be forward to carry it to London, to put it into the banker's hands; but will lend it to their neighbours in the country, where it is convenient for trade it ſhould be. But, if you leſſen the rate of uſe, the lender, whoſe intereſt it is to keep up the rate of money, will rather lend it to the banker, at the legal intereſt, than to the tradeſman, or gentleman, who, when the law is broken, ſhall be ſure to pay the full natural intereſt, or more; becauſe of the ingroſſing by the banker, as well as the riſque in tranſgreſſing the law: whereas, were the natural uſe, ſuppoſe ſeven per cent. and the legal ſix; firſt, the owner would not venture the penalty of the law, for the gaining one in ſeven, that being the utmoſt his money would yield: nor would the banker venture to borrow, where his gains would be but one per cent. nor the moneyed man lend him, what he could make better profit of legally, at home. All the danger lies in this, That your trade ſhould ſuffer, if your being behind-hand has made the natural uſe ſo high, that your tradeſman cannot live upon his labour, but that your rich neighbours will ſo underſell you, that the return you make, will not amount to pay the uſe, and afford a livelihood. There is no way to recover from this, but by a general frugality and induſtry; or by being maſters of the trade of ſome commodity, which the world muſt have from you at your rate, becauſe it cannot be otherwhere ſupplied.

Now, I think, the natural intereſt of money is raiſed two ways: firſt, When the money of a country is but little, in proportion to the debts of the inhabitants, one amongſt other. For, ſuppoſe ten thouſand pounds were ſufficient to manage the trade of Bermudas, and that the ten firſt planters carried over twenty thouſand pounds, which they lent to the ſeveral tradeſmen and inhabitants of the country, who living above their gains, had ſpent ten thouſand pounds of this money, and it were gone out of the iſland; it is evident, that, ſhould all the creditors at once call in their money, there would be a great ſcarcity of money, when that, employed in trade, muſt be taken out of the tradeſmens hands to pay debts; or elſe the debtors want money, and be expoſed to their creditors, and ſo intereſt will be high. But this ſeldom happening, that all, or the greateſt part, of the creditors do at once call for their money, unleſs it be in ſome great and general danger, is leſs and ſeldomer felt than the following, unleſs where the debts of the people are grown to a greater proportion; for that, conſtantly cauſing more borrowers than there can be lenders, will make money ſcarce, and conſequently intereſt high. Secondly, That, which conſtantly raiſes the natural intereſt of money, is, when money is little, in proportion to the trade of a country. For in trade every body calls for money, according as he wants it, and this diſproportion is always felt. For, if Engliſhmen owed in all but one million, and there were a million of money in England, the money would be well enough proportioned to the debts: but, if two millions were neceſſary to carry on the trade, there would be a million wanting, and the price of money would be raiſed, as it is of any other commodity in a market, where the merchandize will not ſerve half the cuſtomers, and there are two buyers for one ſeller.

It is in vain, therefore, to go about effectually to reduce the price of intereſt by a law; and you may as rationally hope to ſet a fixed rate upon the hire of houſes, or ſhips, as of money. He that wants a veſſel, rather than loſe his market, will not ſtick to have it at the market-rate, and find ways to do it with ſecurity to the owner, though the rate were limited by law: and, he that wants money, rather than loſe his voyage, or his trade, will pay the natural intereſt for it; and ſubmit to ſuch ways of conveyance, as ſhall keep the lender out of the reach of the law. So that your act, at beſt, will ſerve only to increaſe the arts of lending, but not at all leſſen the charge of the borrower: he, it is likely, ſhall, with more trouble, and going farther about, pay alſo the more for his money; unleſs you intend to break in, only upon mortgages and contracts already made, and (which is not to be ſuppoſed) by a law, *poſt factum*, void bargains lawfully made, and give to Richard what is Peter's due, for no other reaſon, but becauſe one was borrower, and the other lender.

But, ſuppoſing the law reached the intention of the promoters of it; and that this act be ſo contrived, that it fixed the natural price of money, and hindered its being, by any body, lent at a higher uſe than four per cent. which is plain it cannot: let us, in the next place, ſee what will be the conſequences of it.

1. It will be a loſs to widows, orphans, and all thoſe, who have their eſtates in money, one third of their eſtates; which will be a very hard caſe upon a great number of people: and it is warily to be conſidered, by the wiſdom of the nation, whether they will thus, at one blow, fine and impoveriſh a great and innocent part of the people, who having their eſtates in money, have as much right to make as much of the money as it is worth, (for more they cannot) as the landlord has to let his land for as much as it will yield. To fine men one third of their eſtates, without any crime, or offence committed, ſeems very hard.

2. As it will be a conſiderable loſs and injury to the moneyed man, ſo it will be no advantage at all to the kingdom. For, ſo trade be not cramped, and exportation of our native commodities and manufactures not hindered, it will be no matter to the kingdom, who amongſt ourſelves gets or loſes: only common charity teaches, that thoſe ſhould be moſt taken care of by the law, who are leaſt capable of taking care for themſelves.

3. It will be a gain to the borrowing merchant. For if he borrow at four per cent. and his returns be twelve per cent. he will have eight per cent. and the lender four: whereas now they divide the profit equally at ſix per cent. But this neither gets, nor loſes, to the kingdom, in your trade, ſuppoſing the merchant and lender to be both Engliſhmen: only it will, as I have ſaid, transfer a third part of the moneyed man's eſtate, who had nothing elſe to live on, into the merchant's pocket; and that without any merit in the one, or tranſgreſſion in the other. Private mens intereſts ought not thus to be neglected, nor ſacrificed to any thing, but the manifeſt advantage of the publick. But, in this caſe, it will be quite the contrary. This loſs to the moneyed men will be a prejudice to trade: ſince it will diſcourage lending at ſuch a diſproportion of profit, to riſque; as we ſhall ſee more by and by, when we come to conſider of what conſequence it is to encourage lending, that ſo none of the money of the nation may lie dead, and thereby prejudice trade.

4. It will hinder trade. For, there being a certain proportion of money, neceſſary for driving ſuch a proportion of trade, ſo much money of this as lies ſtill, leſſens ſo much of the trade. Now it cannot be rationally expected, but

that, where the venture is great, and the gains ſmall, (as it is in lending in England, upon low intereſt) many will chuſe rather to hoard up their money, than venture it abroad, on ſuch terms. This will be a loſs to the kingdom, and ſuch a loſs as, here in England, ought chiefly to be looked after: for, we having no mines, nor any other way of getting, or keeping of riches amongſt us, but by trade; ſo much of our trade as is loſt, ſo much of our riches muſt neceſſarily go with it; and the over-balancing of trade, between us and our neighbours, muſt inevitably carry away our money, and quickly leave us poor, and expoſed. Gold and ſilver, though they ſerve for few, yet they command all the conveniencies of life, and therefore in a plenty of them conſiſts riches.

Every one knows that mines alone furniſh theſe: but withal it is obſervable, that moſt countries, ſtored with them by nature, are poor. The digging and refining of theſe metals taking up the labour, and waſting the number of the people. For which reaſon the wiſe policy of the Chineſe will not ſuffer the mines, they have, to be wrought. Nor indeed, things rightly conſidered, do gold and ſilver, drawn out of the mine, equally enrich, with what is got by trade. He that would make the lighter ſcale preponderate to the oppoſite, will not ſo ſoon do it, by adding increaſe of new weight to the emptier, as if he took out of the heavier what he adds to the lighter, for then half ſo much will do it. Riches do not conſiſt in having more gold and ſilver, but in having more in proportion than the reſt of the world, or than our neighbours, whereby we are enabled to procure to ourſelves a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life, than comes within the reach of neighbouring kingdoms and ſtates, who, ſharing the gold and ſilver of the world in a leſs proportion, want the means of plenty and power, and ſo are poorer. Nor would they be one jot the richer, if, by the diſcovery of new mines, the quantity of gold and ſilver in the world becoming twice as much as it is, their ſhares of them ſhould be doubled. By gold and ſilver in the world, I muſt be underſtood to mean, not what lies hid in the earth; but what is already out of the mine, in the hands and poſſeſſions of men. This, if well conſidered, would be no ſmall encouragement to trade, which is a ſurer and ſhorter way to riches, than any other, where it is managed with ſkill and induſtry.

In a country not furniſhed with mines, there are but two ways of growing rich, either conqueſt, or commerce. By the firſt the Romans made themſelves maſters of the riches of the world; but I think that, in our preſent circumſtances, no body is vain enough to entertain a thought of our reaping the profits of the world with our ſwords, and making the ſpoil and tribute of vanquiſhed nations, the fund for the ſupply of the charges of the government, with an overplus for the wants, and equally craving luxury, and faſhionable vanity of the people.

Commerce, therefore, is the only way left to us, either for riches, or ſubſiſtence: for this the advantages of our ſituation, as well as the induſtry and inclination of our people, bold and ſkilful at ſea, do naturally fit us: by this the nation of England has been hitherto ſupported, and trade left almoſt to itſelf, and aſſiſted only by the natural advantages above mentioned, brought us in plenty and riches, and always ſet this kingdom in a rank equal, if not ſuperior to any of its neighbours; and would, no doubt, without any difficulty have continued it ſo, if the more enlarged, and better underſtood intereſt of trade, ſince the improvement of navigation, had not raiſed us many rivals; and the amazing politicks of ſome late reigns, let in other competitors with us for the ſea, who will be ſure to ſeize to themſelves whatever parts of trade, our miſmanagement, or want of money, ſhall let ſlip out of our hands: and when it is once loſt, it will be too late to hope, by a miſ-timed care, eaſily to retrieve it again. For the currents of trade, like thoſe of waters, make themſelves channels, out of which they are afterwards as hard to be diverted, as rivers that have worn themſelves deep within their banks.

TRADE, then, is neceſſary to the producing of riches, and money neceſſary to the carrying on of trade. This is principally to be looked after, and taken care of. For if this be neglected, we ſhall in vain by contrivances amongſt ourſelves, and ſhuffling the little money we have, from one another's hands, endeavour to prevent our wants: decay of trade will quickly waſte all the remainder; and then the landed-man, who thinks, perhaps, by the fall of intereſt to raiſe the value of his land, will find himſelf cruelly miſtaken; when the money being gone, (as it will be, if our trade be not kept up) he can get neither farmer to rent, nor purchaſer to buy his land. Whatſoever, therefore, hinders the lending of money, injures trade: and ſo the reducing of money to four per cent. which will diſcourage men from lending, will be a loſs to the kingdom, in ſtopping ſo much of the current of money, which turns the wheels of trade. But all this upon a ſuppoſition, that the lender and borrower are both Engliſhmen.

IF the lender be a foreigner, by leſſening intereſt from ſix to four, you get to the kingdom one third part of the intereſt we pay yearly to foreigners: which let any one, if he pleaſe, think conſiderable. But then, upon leſſening intereſt to four per cent. it is likely one of theſe things will happen: that either you fall the price of your native commodities, or leſſen your trade, or elſe prevent not the high uſe, as you intended. For, at the time of leſſening your intereſt, you want money for your trade, or you do not. If you do not, there is no need to prevent borrowing at a high rate of your neighbours. For no country borrows of its neighbours, but where there is need of money for trade: no body will borrow more of a foreigner to let it lie ſtill. And, if you do want money, neceſſity will ſtill make you borrow where you can, and at the rates your neceſſity, not your laws, ſhall ſet: or elſe, if there be a ſcarcity of money, it muſt hinder the merchant's buying and exportation, and the artizan's manufacture. Now the kingdom gets, or loſes by this (for no queſtion the merchant, by low intereſt, gets all the while) only proportionably (allowing the conſumption of foreign commodities to be ſtill the ſame) as the paying of uſe to foreigners carries away more, or leſs, of our money, than want of money, and ſtopping our trade keeps us from bringing in, by hindering our gains, which can be only eſtimated by thoſe, who know how much money we borrow of foreigners, and at what rates; and too, what profit in trade we make of that money.

Borrowing of foreigners upon intereſt, it is true, carries away ſome of our gain: but yet, upon examination it will be found, that our growing rich, or poor, depends not at all upon our borrowing upon intereſt, or not; but only, which is greater or leſs, our importation, or exportation of conſumable commodities. For, ſuppoſing two millions of money will drive the trade of England, and that we have money enough of our own to do it; if we conſume of our own product and manufacture, and what we purchaſe by it of foreign commodities, one million, but of the other million conſume nothing, but make a return of ten per cent. per annum, we muſt then every year be one hundred thouſand pounds richer, and our ſtock be ſo much increaſed: but, if we import more conſumable commodities, than we export, our money muſt go out to pay for them, and we grow poorer. Suppoſe, therefore, ill huſbandry hath brought us to one million ſtock, and we borrow the other million (as we muſt, or loſe half our trade) at ſix per cent. If we conſume one moiety, and make ſtill ten per cent. per ann. return of the other million, the kingdom gets forty thouſand pounds per ann. though it pay ſixty thouſand pounds per ann. uſe. So that, if the merchant's return be more than his uſe, (which it is certain it is, or elſe he will not trade) and all that is ſo traded for, on borrowed money, be but the over-balance of our exportation to our importation; the kingdom gets, by this borrowing, ſo much as the merchant's gain is above his uſe. But, if we borrow only for our own expences, we grow doubly poor, by paying money for the commodity we conſume, and uſe for that money; though the merchant gets all this while, by making returns greater than his uſe. And therefore, borrowing of foreigners, in itſelf, makes not the kingdom rich, or poor; for it may do either: but ſpending more than our fruits, or manufactures will pay for, brings in poverty, and poverty borrowing.

For money as neceſſary to trade, may be doubly conſidered. Firſt, as in his hands that pays the labourer and landholder, (for here its motion terminates, and through whoſe hands ſoever it paſſes between theſe, he is but a broker) and if this man want money, (as for example, the clothier) the manufacture is not made; and ſo the trade ſtops, and is loſt. Or, ſecondly, money may be conſidered as in the hands of the conſumer, under which name I here reckon the merchant who buys the commodity, when made, to export: and, if he want money, the value of the commodity, when made, is leſſened, and ſo the kingdom loſes in the price. If therefore, uſe be leſſened, and you cannot tie foreigners to your terms, then the ill effects fall only upon your landholders and artizans: if foreigners can be forced, by your law, to lend you money, only at your own rate, or not lend at all, is it not more likely they will rather take it home, and think it ſafer in their own country at four per cent. than abroad, in a decaying country? Nor can their overplus of money bring them to lend to you, on your terms: for, when your merchants want of money ſhall have ſunk the price of your market, a Dutchman will find it more gains, to buy your commodity himſelf, than lend his money at four per cent. to an Engliſh merchant to trade with. Nor will the act of navigation hinder their coming, by making them come empty, ſince even already there are thoſe who think, that many, who go for Engliſh merchants, are but Dutch factors, and trade for others in their own names. The kingdom, therefore, will loſe by this lowering of intereſt, if it makes foreigners withdraw any of their money, as well as if it hinders any of your people from lending theirs, where trade has need of it.

In a treatiſe, writ on purpoſe for the bringing down of intereſt, I find this argument, of foreigners calling away their money, to the prejudice of our trade, thus anſwered. “That the money of foreigners, is not brought into “the land by ready coin, or bullion, but by goods, or bills of exchange, and, “when it is paid, muſt be returned by goods, or bills of exchange; and there “will not be the leſs money in the land.” I could not but wonder to ſee a man, who undertook to write of money and intereſt, talk ſo directly beſides the matter, in the buſineſs of trade. “Foreigner's money, he ſays, is not “brought into the land by ready coin, or bullion, but by goods, or bills of “exchange.” How then do we come by bullion, or money? For gold grows not, that I know, in our country, and ſilver ſo little, that one hundred thouſandth part of the ſilver we have now in England, was not drawn out of any mines in this iſland. If he means that the monied man in Holland, who puts out his money at intereſt here, did not ſend it over in bullion, or ſpecie hither: that may be true, or falſe; but either way helps not that author's purpoſe. For, if he paid his money to a merchant, his neighbour, and took his bills for it here in England, he did the ſame thing, as if he had ſent over that money; ſince he does but make that merchant leave in England the money, which he has due to him there, and otherwiſe would carry away. “No, “ſays our author, he cannot carry it away; for, ſays he, when it is paid, it “muſt be returned by goods, or bills of exchange.” It muſt not be paid and exported in ready money, ſo ſays our law indeed, but that is a law to hedge in the cuckoo, and ſerves to no purpoſe. For, if we export not goods, for which our merchants have money due to them in Holland, how can it be paid by bills of exchange? And for goods, one hundred pounds worth of goods can no where pay two hundred pounds in money. This being that which I find many men deceive themſelves with, in trade, it may be worth while to make it a little plainer.

Let us ſuppoſe England peopled, as it is now; and its woollen manufacture in the ſame ſtate and perfection, that it is at preſent; and that we, having no money at all, trade with this our woollen manufacture, for the value of two hundred thouſand pounds yearly to Spain, where there actually is a million in money: farther, let us ſuppoſe that we bring back from Spain yearly in oil, wine, and fruit, to the value of one hundred thouſand pounds, and continue to do this ten years together: it is plain that we have had for our two millions value in woollen manufacture, carried thither, one million returned in wine, oil, and fruit: but what is become of the other million? Will the merchants be content to loſe it? That you may be ſure they would not, nor have traded on, if they had not, every year, returns made, anſwering their exportation. How then were the returns made? In money it is evident. For the Spaniards having, in ſuch a trade, no debts, nor the poſſibility of any debts in England, cannot pay one farthing of that other million, by bills of exchange:

and having no commodities, that we will take off, above the value of one hundred thouſand pounds per ann. they cannot pay us in commodities. From whence it neceſſarily follows, that the hundred thouſand pounds per ann. wherein we over-balance them in trade, muſt be paid us in money; and ſo, at the ten years end, their million of money, (though their law make it death to export it) will be all brought into England; as, in truth by this over-balance of trade, the greateſt part of our money hath been brought into England, out of Spain.

Let us ſuppoſe ourſelves now poſſeſſed of this million of money; and exporting yearly out of England, to the ſeveral parts of the world, conſumable commodities, to the value of a million, but importing yearly in commodities, which we conſume amongſt us, to the value of eleven hundred thouſand pounds. If ſuch a trade as this be managed amongſt us, and continue ten years, it is evident, that our million of money will at the end of the ten years, be inevitably all gone from us to them, by the ſame way that it came to us; that is, by their over-balance of trade: for we, importing every year one hundred thouſand pounds worth of commodities, more than we export, and there being no foreigners that will give us one hundred thouſand pounds every year for nothing, it is unavoidable, that one hundred thouſand pounds of our money muſt go out every year, to pay for that over-plus, which our commodities do not pay for. It is ridiculous to ſay, that bills of exchange ſhall pay our debts abroad: that cannot be, till ſcrips of paper can be made current coin. The Engliſh merchant who has no money owing him abroad, cannot expect to have his bills paid there. Or, if he has credit enough with a correſpondent, to have his bills anſwered; this pays none of the debt of England, but only changes the creditor. And if, upon the general balance of trade, Engliſh merchants owe to foreigners one hundred thouſand pounds, or a million; if commodities do not, our money muſt go out to pay it, or elſe our credit be loſt, and our trade ſtop, and be loſt too.

A kingdom grows rich, or poor, juſt as a farmer doth, and no otherwiſe. Let us ſuppoſe the whole iſle of Portland one farm; and that the owner beſides what ſerves his family, carries to market to Weymouth and Dorcheſter, &c. cattle, corn, butter, cheeſe, wooll or cloth, lead and tin, all commodities, produced and wrought within his farm of Portland, to the value of a thouſand pounds yearly; and for this brings home in ſalt, wine, oil, ſpice, linnen, and ſilks, to the value of nine hundred pounds, and the remaining hundred pounds in money. It is evident he grows every year a hundred pounds richer, and ſo at the end of ten years will have clearly got a thouſand pounds. If the owner be a better huſband, and contenting himſelf with his native commodities, buy leſs wine, ſpice, and ſilk, at market, and ſo bring home five hundred pounds in money yearly, inſtead of a thouſand pounds; at the end of ten years, he will have five thouſand pounds by him, and be ſo much richer. He dies, and his ſon ſucceeds, a faſhionable young gentleman, that cannot dine without Champagne and Burgundy, nor ſleep but in a damaſk bed; whoſe wife muſt ſpread a long train of brocard, and his children be always in the neweſt French cut and ſtuff. He, being come to the eſtate, keeps on a very buſy family; the markets are weekly frequented, and the commodities of his farm carried out, and ſold, as formerly, but the returns are made ſomething different; the faſhionable way of eating, drinking, furniture, and clothing, for himſelf and family, requires more ſugar and ſpice, wine and fruit, ſilk and ribbons, than in his father's time; ſo that inſtead of nine hundred pounds per annum, he now brings home of conſumable commodities, to the value of eleven hundred pounds yearly. What comes of this? He lives in ſplendor, it is true, but this unavoidably carries away the money his father got, and he is every year an hundred pounds poorer. To his expences, beyond his income, add debauchery, idleneſs, and quarrels amongſt his ſervants, whereby his manufactures are diſturbed, and his buſineſs neglected, and a general diſorder and confuſion through his whole family and farm: this will tumble him down the hill the faſter, and the ſtock, which the induſtry, frugality, and good order of his father had laid up, will be quickly brought to an end, and he faſt in priſon. A farm and a kingdom in this reſpect differ no more, than as greater or leſs. We may trade, and be buſy, and grow poor by it, unleſs we regulate our expences; if to this we are idle, negligent, diſhoneſt, malicious, and diſturb the ſober and induſtrious in their buſineſs, let it be upon what pretence it will, we ſhall ruin the faſter.

So that, whatever this author, or any one elſe may ſay, money is brought into England, by nothing but ſpending here leſs of foreign commodities, than what we carry to market, can pay for; nor can debts, we owe to foreigners, be paid by bills of exchange, till our commodities exported, and ſold beyond ſea, have produced money, or debts, due there to ſome of our merchants. For nothing will pay debts, but money, or money's worth, which three or four lines writ in paper, cannot be. If ſuch bills have an intrinſick value, and can ſerve inſtead of money, why do we not ſend them to market, inſtead of our cloth, lead and tin, and at an eaſier rate purchaſe the commodities we want? All, that a bill of exchange can do, is to direct to whom money due, or taken up upon credit, in a foreign country, ſhall be paid: and if we trace it, we ſhall find, that what is owing already, became ſo for commodities, or money carried from hence: and, if it be taken upon credit, it muſt (let the debt be ſhifted from one creditor to another, as often as you will) at laſt be paid by money, or goods, carried from hence, or elſe the merchant here muſt turn bankrupt.

We have ſeen how riches and money are got, kept or loſt, in any country; and that is by conſuming leſs of foreign commodities, than what, by commodities, or labour, is paid for. This is in the ordinary courſe of things: but where great armies and alliances are to be maintained abroad, by ſupplies ſent out of any country, there often, by a ſhorter and more ſenſible way, the treaſure is diminiſhed. But this, ſince the holy war, or at leaſt ſince the improvement of navigation and trade, ſeldom happening to England, whoſe princes have found the enlarging their power by ſea, and the ſecuring our navigation and trade, more the intereſt of this kingdom than wars, or conqueſts, on the continent: expences in arms beyond ſea, have had little influence on our riches or poverty. The next thing to be conſidered, is, how money is neceſſary to trade.

THE neceſſity of a certain proportion of money to trade (I conceive) lies in this, That money, in its circulation, driving the ſeveral wheels of trade, whilſt it keeps in that channel (for ſome of it will unavoidably be drained into ſtanding pools) is all ſhared between the landholder, whoſe land affords the materials; the labourer, who works them; the broker, i. e. the merchant and ſhopkeeper, who diſtributes them to thoſe that want them; and the conſumer who ſpends them. Now money is neceſſary to all theſe ſorts of men, as ſerving both for counters and for pledges, and ſo carrying with it even reckoning, and ſecurity, that he, that receives it, ſhall have the ſame value for it again, of other things that he wants, whenever he pleaſes. The one of theſe it does by its ſtamp and denomination; the other by its intrinſick value, which is its quantity.

FOR mankind, having conſented to put an imaginary value upon gold and ſilver, by reaſon of their durableneſs, ſcarcity, and not being very liable to be counterfeited; have made them, by general conſent, the common pledges, whereby men are aſſured, in exchange for them, to receive equally valuable things, to thoſe they parted with, for any quantity of theſe metals. By which means it comes to paſs, that the intrinſick value, regarded in theſe metals, made the common barter, is nothing but the quantity, which men give, or receive of them. For they having, as money, no other value, but as pledges to procure what one wants, or deſires; and they procuring what we want, or deſire, only by their quantity, it is evident, that the intrinſick value of ſilver, and gold, uſed in commerce, is nothing but their quantity.

THE neceſſity, therefore, of a proportion of money to trade, depends on money, not as counters, for the reckoning may be kept, or transferred by writing; but on money as a pledge, which writing cannot ſupply the place of: ſince the bill, bond, or other note of debt, I receive from one man, will not be accepted as ſecurity by another, he not knowing that the bill, or bond is true or legal, or that the man, bound to me is honeſt, or reſponſible; and ſo is not valuable enough to become a current pledge, nor can by publick authority, be well made ſo, as in the caſe of aſſigning of bills. Becauſe a law cannot give to bills that intrinſick value, which the univerſal conſent of mankind has annexed to ſilver and gold. And hence foreigners can never be brought to take your bills or writings, for any part of payment, though perhaps, they might paſs as valuable conſiderations among your own people, did not this very much hinder it, viz. That they are liable to unavoidable doubt, diſpute, and counterfeiting, and require other proofs, to aſſure us that they are true and good ſecurity, than our eyes, or a touchſtone. And at beſt, this courſe, if practicable, will not hinder us from being poor, but may be ſuſpected to help to make us ſo, by keeping us from feeling our poverty, which, in diſtreſs, will be ſure to find us with greater diſadvantage. Though it be certain it is better than letting any part of our trade fall for want of current pledges; and better too than borrowing money of our neighbours upon uſe, if this way of aſſigning bills can be made ſo eaſy, ſafe, and univerſal at home, as to hinder it.

To return to the buſineſs in hand, and ſhew the neceſſity of a proportion of money to trade. Every man muſt have at leaſt ſo much money, or ſo timely recruits, as may in hand, or in a ſhort diſtance of time, ſatisfy his creditor who ſupplies him with the neceſſaries of life, or of his trade. For no body has any longer theſe neceſſary ſupplies, than he has money, or credit, which is nothing elſe but an aſſurance of money, in ſome ſhort time. So that it is requiſite to trade, that there ſhould be ſo much money, as to keep up the landholder's, labourer's, and broker's credit: and therefore ready money muſt be conſtantly exchanged for wares and labour, or follow within a ſhort time after.

This ſhews the neceſſity of ſome proportion of money to trade: but what proportion that is, is hard to determine; becauſe it depends not barely on the quantity of money, but the quickneſs of its circulation. The very ſame ſhilling may, at one time, pay twenty men in twenty days: at another, reſt in the ſame hands one hundred days together. This makes it impoſſible exactly to eſtimate the quantity of money needful in trade; but to make ſome probable gueſs, we are to conſider, how much money it is neceſſary to ſuppoſe muſt reſt conſtantly in each man's hands, as requiſite to the carrying on of trade.

First, therefore, the labourers, living generally but from hand to mouth; and, indeed, conſidered as labourers in order to trade, may well enough carry on their part, if they have but money enough to buy victuals, cloaths, and tools: all which may very well be provided, without any great ſum of money, lying ſtill in their hands. The labourers, therefore, being uſually paid once a week, (if the times of payment be ſeldomer, there muſt be more money for the carrying on this part of trade) we may ſuppoſe there is conſtantly amongſt them, one with another, or thoſe who are to pay them, always one week's wages in ready money. For it cannot be thought, that all, or moſt of the labourers pay away all their wages conſtantly, as ſoon as they receive it, and live upon truſt till next pay-day. This the farmer and tradeſman could not well bear, were it every labourer's caſe, and every one to be truſted: and, therefore, they muſt of neceſſity keep ſome money in their hands, to go to market for victuals, and to other tradeſmen as poor as themſelves, for tools; and lay up money too to buy cloaths, or pay for thoſe they bought upon credit. Which money, thus neceſſarily reſting in their hands, we cannot imagine to be, one with another, much leſs than a week's wages, that muſt be in their pockets, or ready in the farmer's hands. For he, who employs a labourer at a ſhilling per day, and pays him on Saturday nights, cannot be ſuppoſed conſtantly to receive that ſix ſhillings, juſt the ſame Saturday: it muſt ordinarily be in his hands one time with another, if not a whole week, yet ſeveral days before.

This was the ordinary courſe, whilſt we had money running, in the ſeveral channels of commerce: but that now very much failing, and the farmer, not having money to pay the labourer, ſupplies him with corn, which, in this great plenty, the labourer will have at his own rate, or elſe not take it off his hands for wages. And as for the workmen, who are employed in our manufactures, eſpecially the woollen one, theſe the clothier, not having ready money to pay, furniſhes with the neceſſaries of life, and ſo trucks commodities for work; which, ſuch as they are, good, or bad, the workman muſt take at his maſter's rate, or ſit ſtill and ſtarve: whilſt by this means, this new ſort of ingroſſers, or foreſtallers, having the feeding and ſupplying this numerous body of workmen out of their warehouſes, (for they have now magazines of all ſorts of wares) ſet the price upon the poor landholder. So that the markets, now being deſtroyed, and the farmer not finding vent there for his butter, cheeſe, bacon, and corn, &c. for which he was wont to bring home ready money, muſt ſell it to theſe ingroſſers, on their own terms of time and rate; and allow it to their own-day-labourers, under the true market-price. What kind of influence this is like to have upon land, and how this way rents are like to be paid at quarter-day, is eaſy to apprehend: and it is no wonder to hear every day, of farmers breaking and running away. For, if they cannot receive money for their goods at market, it will be impoſſible for them, to pay their landlord's rent. If any one doubt whether this be ſo, I deſire him to enquire how many farmers in the weſt are broke, and gone, ſince Michaelmas laſt. Want of money, being to this degree, works both ways upon the landholder. For, firſt, the ingroſſing foreſtaller lets not the money come to market; but ſupplying the workman, who is employed by him in manufacture, with neceſſaries, impoſes his price, and forbearance on the farmer, who cannot ſell to the others. And the labourer who is employed by the landholder in huſbandry, impoſes alſo his rate on him, for the commodities he takes. For there being a want of day-labourers in the country, they muſt be humoured, or elſe they will neither work for you, nor take your commodities for their labour.

Secondly, As for the landholder, ſince his tenants cannot coin their rent juſt at quarter-day, but muſt gather it up by degrees, and lodge it with them 'till pay-day; or borrow it of thoſe, who have it lying by them, or do gather it up by degrees, which is the ſame thing, and muſt be neceſſarily ſo much money for ſome time lying ſtill. For all that is paid in great ſums, muſt ſomewhere be gathered up by the retail incomes of a trade, or elſe lie ſtill too in great ſums, which is the ſame ſtop of money, or a greater. Add to this, That to pay the creditor, that lent him his rent, he muſt gather up money by degrees, as the ſale of his commodities ſhall bring it in, and ſo makes a greater ſtop, and greater want of money: ſince the borrowed money, that paid the landholder the 25th of March, muſt be ſuppoſed to lie ſtill ſome time, in the creditor's hand, before he lent it the tenant; and the money that pays the creditor three months after, muſt lie ſtill ſome time in the tenant's. Nor does the landlord pay away his rent uſually, as ſoon as he receives it, but by degrees, as his occaſions call for it. All this conſidered, we cannot but ſuppoſe, that, between the landlord and tenant, there muſt neceſſarily be at leaſt a quarter of the yearly revenue of the land, conſtantly in their hands. Indeed conſidering, that moſt part of the rents of England are paid at Lady-day and Michaelmas, and that the ſame money, which pays me my rent from my tenant the 25th of March, or thereabouts, cannot pay my next neighbour his rent from his tenant at the ſame time, much leſs one more remote in another country, it might ſeem requiſite to ſuppoſe half the yearly revenue of the land to be neceſſarily employed in paying of rent. For to ſay that ſome tenants break, and pay not their rent at all, and others pay not till two, three, four, five, ſix, &c. months after quarter-day, and ſo the rent is not all paid at one time, is no more than to ſay, that there is money wanting to the trade. For, if the tenant fail the landlord, he muſt fail his creditor, and he his, and ſo on, till ſomebody break, and ſo trade decay, for want of money. But ſince a conſiderable part of the land of England is in the owner's hands, who neither pay nor receive great ſums for it at a certain day; becauſe too, (which is the chief reaſon) we are not to conſider here, how much money is in any one man's, or any one ſort of men's hands, at one time; for that at other times may be diſtributed into other hands, and ſerve other parts of trade; but how much money is neceſſary to be in each man's hands all the year round, taking one time with another, i. e. having three hundred pounds in his hand one month, is to be reckoned as one hundred pounds in his hand three months, (and ſo proportionably) I think we may well ſuppoſe a quarter of the yearly revenue to be conſtantly in the landlord's, or tenant's hands.

HERE, by the by, we may obſerve, that it were better for trade, and conſequently for every body, (for more money would be ſtirring, and leſs would do the buſineſs) if rents were paid by ſhorter intervals than ſix months. For, ſuppoſing I lett a farm at fifty-two pounds per ann. if my rent be paid half yearly, there is required twenty-ſix pounds to be employed in the payment of it in one entire ſum, (if it be paid well, and if it be not paid well, for want of ſo much money to be ſpared to that purpoſe, there is ſo much want of money, and trade is ſtill endamaged by it) a great part whereof muſt neceſſarily lie ſtill, before it come out of my tenant's cheſt to my hands; if it be paid once a quarter, thirteen pounds alone will do it, and leſs money is laid up for it, and ſtopped a leſs while in its courſe: but, ſhould it be paid every week, one ſingle twenty ſhillings will pay the rent of fifty-two pounds per ann. whence would follow this double benefit. Firſt, That a great deal leſs money would ſerve for the trade of a country. And, ſecondly, That leſs of the money would lie ſtill; the contrary whereof muſt needs happen, where growing debts are to be paid at larger diſtances, and in greater ſums.

THIRDLY, As for the brokers, ſince they too muſt lay up the money, coming in by retail, either to go to market, and buy wares, or to pay at the day appointed, which is often ſix months, for thoſe wares which they have already; we cannot ſuppoſe them to have leſs by them, one with another, than one twentieth part of their yearly returns. Whether the money be their own, or they be indebted ſo much, or more, it matters not, if it be neceſſary they ſhould have conſtantly by them, comparing one time with another, at leaſt one twentieth part of their yearly return.

INDEED, in ſome great towns, where the bankers are ready at hand to buy bills, or any other way to lend money, for ſhort time at great intereſt, there perhaps the merchant is not forced to keep ſo much money by him, as in other places, where they have not ſuch a ſupply: but if you conſider what money to do this muſt neceſſarily be conſtantly lodged in the banker's hands, the caſe will be much the ſame.

To theſe ſums, if you add, what part of the money of a country, ſcholars of all ſorts, women, gameſters, and great men's menial ſervants, and all ſuch that do not contribute at all to trade, either as landholders, labourers, or brokers, will unavoidably have conſtantly in their hands; it cannot well be thought, that leſs than one fiftieth part of the labourer's wages, one fourth part of the landholder's yearly revenue, and one twentieth part of the broker's yearly returns in ready money, will be enough to drive the trade of any country. At leaſt to put it beyond exception low enough, it cannot be imagined that leſs than one moiety of this, i. e. leſs than one hundredth part of the labourer's yearly wages, one eighth part of the landholder's yearly revenue, and one fortieth part of the broker's yearly returns, in ready money, can be enough to move the ſeveral wheels of trade, and keep up commerce, in that life and thriving poſture it ſhould be; and how much the ready caſh of any country is ſhort of this proportion, ſo much muſt the trade be impaired and hindered for want of money.

BUT however theſe meaſures may be miſtaken, this is evident, that the multiplying of brokers hinders the trade of any country, by making the circuit, which the money goes, larger; and in that circuit more ſtops, ſo that the returns muſt neceſſarily be ſlower and ſcantier, to the prejudice of trade: beſides that, they eat up too great a ſhare of the gains of trade: by that means ſtarving the labourer, and impoveriſhing the landholder, whoſe intereſt is chiefly to be taken care of, it being a ſettled, unmoveable concernment in the commonwealth.

If this be ſo, it is paſt queſtion, that all encouragement ſhould be given to artificers; and things ſo ordered, as much as might be, that thoſe, who make, ſhould alſo vend and retail out of their own commodities, and they be hindred, as much as poſſible, from paſſing here at home, through divers hands to the laſt buyer. Lazy and unworking ſhopkeepers in this being worſe than gameſters, that they do not only keep ſo much of the money of a country conſtantly in their hands, but alſo make the publick pay them for their keeping of it. Though gaming too, upon the account of trade (as well as other reaſons) may well deſerve to be reſtrained; ſince gameſters, in order to their play, keep great ſums of money by them, which there lies dead. For, though gameſter's money ſhift maſters oftener than any, and is tumbled up and down with every caſt of a die, yet, as to the publick, it lies perfectly ſtill, and no more of it comes into trade, than they ſpend in eating, or wearing.

HERE too we may obſerve, how much manufacture deſerves to be encouraged; ſince that part of trade, though the moſt conſiderable, is driven with the leaſt money, eſpecially if the workmanſhip be more worth than the materials. For to the trade, that is driven by labour and handicraftſmen, one two and fiftieth part of the yearly money paid them will be ſufficient: but to a trade of our commodities, of our bare, native growth, much greater proportion of money is required.

Perhaps it will be wondered, why, having given ſome eſtimate (how wide I know not) of the money, neceſſary in the hands of the landholder, labourer, and broker, to carry on trade, I have ſaid nothing of the conſumer, whom I had mentioned before. To this I anſwer, There are ſo few conſumers, who are not either labourers, brokers, or landholders, that they make a very inconſiderable part in the account. For thoſe, who immediately depend on the landholder, as his children and ſervants, come in under that title, being maintained by the rent of his lands; and ſo of the reſt.

By what has been ſaid, we may ſee what injury the lowering of intereſt is like to do us, by hindering trade, when it ſhall either make the foreigner call home his money, or your own people backward to lend, the reward not being judged proportionable to the riſque.

There is another ſeeming conſequence, of the reducing of money to a low price, which at firſt ſight has ſuch an appearance of truth in it, that I have known it to impoſe upon very able men, and I gueſs it has no ſmall influence, at this time, in the promoting this alteration; and that is, that the lowering of intereſt will raiſe the value of all other things in proportion. For money being the counter-balance to all other things purchaſeable by it, and lying, as it were, in the oppoſite ſcale of commerce, it looks like a natural conſequence, that as much as you take off from the value of money, ſo much you add to the price of other things which are exchanged for it; the raiſing of the price of any thing being no more but the addition to its value in reſpect of money, or, which is all one, leſſening the value of money. For example: ſhould the value of gold be brought down to that of ſilver, one hundred guineas would purchaſe little more corn, wooll or land, than one hundred ſhillings; and ſo, the value of money being brought lower, ſay they, the price of other things will riſe, and the the falling of intereſt from ſix pounds to four pounds per cent. is taking away ſo much of the price of money, and ſo conſequently the leſſening its value.

The miſtake of this plauſible way of reaſoning will be eaſily diſcovered, when we conſider that the meaſure of the value of money, in proportion to any thing purchaſeable by it, is the quantity of the ready money we have in compariſon with the quantity of that thing, and its vent; or, which amounts to the ſame thing, the price of any commodity riſes or falls, by the proportion of the number of buyers and ſellers: this rule holds univerſally in all things that are to be bought and ſold, bating now and then an extravagant fancy of ſome particular perſon, which never amounts to ſo conſiderable a part of trade, as to make any thing in the account, worthy to be thought an exception to this rule.

The vent of any thing depends upon its neceſſity or uſefulneſs; as convenience, or opinion, guided by fancy, or faſhion, ſhall determine.

The vent of any commodity comes to be increaſed, or decreaſed, as a greater part of the running caſh of the nation is deſigned to be laid out, by ſeveral people at the ſame time, rather in that, than another; as we ſee in the change of faſhions.

I SHALL begin firſt with the neceſſaries, or conveniencies of life, and the conſumable commodities ſubſervient thereunto; and ſhew, that the value of money, in reſpect of thoſe, depends only on the plenty, or ſcarcity of money, in proportion to the plenty and ſcarcity of thoſe things; and not on what intereſt ſhall, by neceſſity, law, or contract, be at that time laid on the borrowing of money: and then afterwards I ſhall ſhew that the ſame holds in land.

THERE is nothing more confirmed, by daily experience, than that men give any portion of money, for whatſoever is abſolutely neceſſary, rather than go without it. And in ſuch things, the ſcarcity of them alone makes their prices. As for example: let us ſuppoſe half an ounce of ſilver, or half a crown now in England, is worth a buſhel of wheat: but ſhould there be next year a great ſcarcity of wheat in England, and a proportionable want of all other food, five ounces of ſilver would, perhaps, in exchange purchaſe but one buſhel of wheat: ſo that money would be then nine tenths leſs worth in reſpect of food, though at the ſame value it was before, in reſpect of other things, that kept their former proportion, in their quantity and conſumption.

BY the like proportions, of increaſe and decreaſe, does the value of things, more or leſs convenient, riſe and fall, in reſpect of money; only with this difference, that things abſolutely neceſſary for life muſt be had at any rate; but things convenient will be had only as they ſtand in preference with other conveniencies: and therefore in any one of theſe commodities, the value riſes only as its quantity is leſs, and vent greater, which depends upon its being preferred to other things, in its conſumption. For ſuppoſing that, at the ſame time that there is a great ſcarcity of wheat, and other grain, there were a conſiderable quantity of oats, men, no queſtion, would give far more for wheat than oats, as being the healthier, pleaſanter, and more convenient food: but, ſince oats would ſerve to ſupply that abſolute neceſſity of ſuſtaining life, men would not rob themſelves of all other coveniencies of life, by paying all their money for wheat, when oats, that are cheaper, though with ſome inconvenience, would ſupply that defect. It may then ſo happen at the ſame time, that half an ounce of ſilver, that the year before would buy one buſhel of wheat, will this year buy but one tenth of a buſhel: half an ounce of ſilver, that the year before would have bought three buſhels of oats, will this year ſtill buy one: and at the ſame time half an ounce of ſilver, that would the year before have bought fifteen pounds of lead, will ſtill buy the ſame quantity. So that at the ſame time ſilver, in reſpect of wheat, is nine tenths leſs worth than it was, in reſpect of oats two thirds leſs worth, and in reſpect of lead as much worth as before.

THE fall, therefore, or riſe of intereſt, making immediately, by its change, neither more, nor leſs land, money, or any ſort of commodity in England, than there was before, alters not at all the value of money, in reference to commodities. Becauſe the meaſure of that is only the quantity and vent, which are not immediately changed by the change of intereſt. So far as the change of intereſt conduces, in trade, to the bringing in, or carrying out money, or commodities, and ſo in time to the varying their proportions here in England, from what it was before; ſo far the change of intereſt, as all other things that promote, or hinder trade, may alter the value of money, in reference to commodities. But that is not in this place to be conſidered.

This is perfectly the value of money, in reſpect of conſumable commodities: but the better to underſtand it, in its full latitude, in reſpect both of conſumable commodities, and land too, we muſt conſider, firſt, That the value of land conſiſts in this, that, by its conſtant production of ſaleable commodities, it brings in a certain yearly income. Secondly, The value of commodities conſiſts in this, that as portable and uſeful things, they, by their exchange or conſumption, ſupply the neceſſaries, or conveniencies of life. Thirdly, In money there is a double value, anſwering to both of theſe, firſt, as it is capable, by its intereſt, to yield us ſuch a yearly income: and in this it has the nature of land, (the income of one being called rent, of the other uſe) only with this difference, that the land, in its ſoil being different, as ſome fertile, ſome barren, and the products of it very various, both in their ſorts, goodneſs, and vent, is not capable of any fixed eſtimate by its quantity: but money being conſtantly the ſame, and by its intereſt giving the ſame ſort of product, through the whole country, is capable of having a fixed yearly rate ſet upon it by the magiſtrate; but land is not. But though, in the uniformity of its legal worth, one hundred pounds of lawful money being all through England equal in its current value, to any other one hundred pounds of lawful money, (becauſe by virtue of the law it will every where paſs for as much ware, or debt, as any other hundred pounds) is capable to have its yearly hire valued better than land: yet in reſpect of the varying need, and neceſſity of money, (which changes with the increaſe, or decay of money, or trade, in a country) it is as little capable to have its yearly hire fixed by law, as land itſelf. For were all the land in Rumney-marſh, acre for acre, equally good, that is, did conſtantly produce the ſame quantity of equally good hay, or graſs, one as another, the rent of it, under that conſideration, of every acre being of an equal worth, would be capable of being regulated by law; and one might as well enact, that no acre of land in Rumney-marſh ſhall be lett for above forty ſhillings per annum, as that no hundred pounds ſhall be lett for above four pounds per annum. But no body can think it fit (ſince by reaſon of the equal value of that land it can) that therefore the rent of the land in Rumney-marſh ſhould be regulated by law. For ſuppoſing all the land in Rumney-marſh, or in England, were all of ſo equal a worth, that any one acre, compared at the ſame time to any one other, were equally good, in reſpect of its product; yet the ſame acre, compared with itſelf in different times, would not, in reſpect of rent, be of equal value. And therefore, it would have been an unreaſonable thing, if in the time of Henry VII. the rent of land in Rumney-marſh had been ſettled by a law, according to the judged value of it at that time, and the ſame law, limiting the rent perhaps to 5 s. per acre, have continued ſtill. The abſurdity and impracticableneſs of this every one ſees, at the firſt propoſal, and readily concludes within himſelf, that things muſt be left to find their own price; and it is impoſſible, in this their conſtant mutability, for human foreſight to ſet rules and bounds to their conſtantly varying proportion and uſe, which will always regulate their value.

THEY, who conſider things beyond their names, will find, that money, as well as all other commodities, is liable to the ſame changes and inequalities: nay, in this reſpect of the variety of its value, brought in by time, in the ſucceſſion of affairs, the rate of money is leſs capable of being regulated by a law, in any country, than the rent of land. Becauſe, to the quick changes, that happen in trade, this too muſt be added, that money may be brought in, or carried out of the kingdom, which land cannot; and ſo that be truly worth ſix or eight per cent. this year, which would yield but four the laſt.

2. MONEY has a value, as it is capable, by exchange, to procure us the neceſſaries, or conveniencies of life, and in this it has the nature of a commodity; only with this difference, that it ſerves us commonly by its exchange, never almoſt by its conſumption. But though the uſe men make of money be not in its conſumption, yet it has not at all a more ſtanding, ſettled value, in exchange with any other thing, than any other commodity has; but a more known one, and better fixed by name, number, and weight, to enable us to reckon what the proportion of ſcarcity and vent of one commodity is to another. For ſuppoſing, as before, that half an ounce of ſilver would laſt year exchange for one buſhel of wheat, or for 15lb. weight of lead; if this year wheat be ten times ſcarcer, and lead in the ſame quantity to its vent, as it was, is it not evident, that half an ounce of ſilver will ſtill exchange for 15lb. of lead, though it will exchange but for one tenth of a buſhel of wheat? and he that has uſe of lead will as ſoon take 15lb. weight of lead, as half an ounce of ſilver, for one tenth of a buſhel of wheat, and no more. So that if you ſay, that money now is nine tenths leſs worth than it was the former year, you muſt ſay ſo of lead too, and all other things, that keep the ſame proportion to money which they had before. The variation, indeed, is firſt and moſt taken notice of in money: becauſe that is the univerſal meaſure, by which people reckon, and uſed by every body in the valuing of all things. For calling that half ounce of ſilver half a crown, they ſpeak properly, and are readily underſtood, when they ſay, half a crown, or two ſhillings and ſix-pence, will now buy one tenth of a buſhel of wheat, but do not ſay, that 15lb. of lead will now buy one tenth of a buſhel of wheat, becauſe it is not generally uſed to this ſort of reckoning: nor do they ſay, lead is leſs worth than it was, though, in reſpect of wheat, lead, as well as ſilver, be nine tenths worſe than it was, as well as ſilver; only by the tale of ſhillings, we are better enabled to judge of it: becauſe theſe are meaſures, whoſe ideas by conſtant uſe are ſettled in every Engliſhman's mind.

THIS, I ſuppoſe, is the true value of money, when it paſſes from one to another, in buying and ſelling; where it runs the ſame changes of higher, or lower, as any other commodity doth: for one equal quantity whereof, you ſhall receive in exchange more, or leſs of another commodity, at one time, than you do at another. For a farmer that carries a buſhel of wheat to market, and a labourer that carries a half a crown, ſhall find that the money of one, as well as corn of the other, ſhall at ſome times purchaſe him more or leſs leather, or ſalt, according as they are in greater plenty, and ſcarcity, one to another.

ther. So that in exchanging coined ſilver for any other commodity, (which is buying and ſelling) the ſame meaſure governs the proportion you receive, as if you exchanged lead, or wheat, or any other commodity. That which regulates the price, i. e. the quantity given for money (which is called buying and ſelling) for another commodity, (which is called bartering) is nothing elſe but their quantity in proportion to their vent. If then lowering of uſe makes not your ſilver more in ſpecie, or your wheat, or other commodities leſs, it will not have any influence at all to make it exchange for leſs of wheat, or any other commodity, than it will have on lead, to make it exchange for leſs wheat, or any other commodity.

Money therefore, in buying and ſelling, being perfectly in the ſame condition with other commodities, and ſubject to all the ſame laws of value, let us next ſee how it comes to be of the ſame nature with land, by yielding a certain yearly income, which we call uſe, or intereſt. For land produces naturally ſomething new and profitable, and of value to mankind; but money is a barren thing, and produces nothing; but by compact transfers that profit, that was the reward of one man's labour, into another man's pocket. That which occaſions this, is the unequal diſtribution of money; which inequality has the ſame effect too upon land, that it has upon money. For my having more money in my hand than I can, or am diſpoſed to uſe in buying and ſelling, makes me able to lend: and another's want of ſo much money as he could employ in trade, makes him willing to borrow. But why then, and for what conſideration doth he pay uſe? For the ſame reaſon, and upon as good conſideration, as the tenant pays rent for your land. For as the unequal diſtribution of land, (you having more than you can, or will manure, and another leſs) brings you a tenant for your land; and the ſame unequal diſtribution of money, (I having more than I can, or will employ, and another leſs) bring me a tenant for my money: ſo my money is apt in trade, by the induſtry of the borrower, to produce more than ſix per cent. to the borrower, as well as your land, by the labour of the tenant, is apt to produce more fruits, than his rent comes to; and therefore deſerves to be paid for, as well as land by a yearly rent. For though the uſurer's money would bring him in no yearly profit, if he did not lend it, (ſuppoſing he employs it not himſelf) and ſo his ſix per cent. may ſeem to be the fruit of another man's labour, yet he ſhares not near ſo much of the profit of another man's labour, as he that letts land to a tenant. For, without the tenant's induſtry, (ſuppoſing as before, the owner would not manage it himſelf) his land would yield him little, or no profit. So that the rent he receives is a greater portion of the fruit of his tenant's labour, than the uſe is at ſix per cent. For generally, he that borrows one thouſand pounds at ſix per cent. and ſo pays ſixty pounds per annum uſe, gets more above his uſe in one year, by his induſtry, than he that rents a farm of ſixty pounds per annum gets in two, above his rent, though his labour be harder.

It being evident therefore, that he that has ſkill in traffick, but has not money enough to exerciſe it, has not only reaſon to borrow money, to drive his trade and get a livelihood; but as much reaſon to pay uſe for that money, as he, who having ſkill in huſbandry, but no land of his own to employ it in, has not only reaſon to rent land, but to pay money for the uſe of it: it follows, that borrowing money upon uſe is not only, by the neceſſity of affairs, and the conſtitution of human ſociety, unavoidable to ſome men; but that alſo to receive profit for the loan of money, is as equitable and lawful, as receiving rent for land, and more tolerable to the borrower, notwithſtanding the opinion of ſome over ſcrupulous men.

This being ſo, one would expect, that the rate of intereſt ſhould be the meaſure of the value of land in number of years purchaſe, for which the fee is ſold; for 100 l. per annum being equal to 100 l. per annum, and ſo to perpetuity; and 100 l. per annum being the product of 1000l. when intereſt is at 10 per cent. of 1250l. when intereſt is at 8 per cent. of 1666l. or thereabouts, when intereſt is at 6 per cent. of 2000l. when money is at 5 per cent. of 2500l. when money is at 4 per cent. One would conclude, I ſay, that land ſhould ſell in proportion to uſe, according to theſe following rates, viz.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| When money is at | 10 | per cent. for | 10 | years purchaſe. |
| | 8 | | $12\frac{1}{2}$ | |
| | 6 | | $16\frac{2}{3}$ | |
| | 5 | | 20 | |
| | 4 | | 25 | |

But experience tells us, that neither in queen Elizabeth, nor king James the firſt reigns when intereſt was at ten per cent. was land ſold for ten; or when it was at eight per cent. for twelve and a half year's purchaſe, or any thing near the low rate, that high uſe required (if it were true, that the rate of intereſt governed the price of land) any more than land now yields twenty five years purchaſe, becauſe a great part of the monied men will now lett their money upon good ſecurity, at four per cent. Thus we ſee in fact how little this rule has held at home: and he that will look into Holland, will find, that the purchaſe of land was raiſed there, when their intereſt fell. This is certain, and paſt doubt, that the legal intereſt can never regulate the price of land, ſince it is plain, that the price of land has never changed with it, in the ſeveral changes have been made, in the rate of intereſt by law: nor now that the rate of intereſt is by law the ſame through all England, is the price of land every where the ſame, it being in ſome parts conſtantly ſold for four or five years purchaſe, more than in others. Whether you, or I, can tell the reaſon of this, it matters not to the queſtion in hand: but it being really ſo, this is plain demonſtration againſt thoſe, who pretend to advance and regulate the price of land by a law, concerning the intereſt of money.

But yet I will give you ſome of my gueſſes, why the price of land is not regulated (as at firſt ſight, it ſeems it ſhould be) by the intereſt of money. Why it is not regulated by the legal uſe is manifeſt, becauſe the rate of money does not follow the ſtandard of the law, but the price of the market; and men, not obſerving the legal and forced, but the natural and current intereſt of money, regulate their affairs by that. But why the rate of land does not follow the current intereſt of money, requires a farther conſideration.

All things, that are bought and ſold, raiſe and fall their price in proportion, as there are more buyers or ſellers. Where there are a great many ſellers to a few buyers, there uſe what art you will, the thing to be ſold will be cheap. On the other ſide, turn the tables, and raiſe up a great many buyers for a few ſellers, and the ſame thing will immediately grow dear. This rule holds in land, as well as all other commodities, and is the reaſon, why in England, at the ſame time, that land in ſome places is at ſeventeen or eighteen years purchaſe, it is about others, where there are profitable manufactures, at two or three and twenty years purchaſe: becauſe there (men thriving and getting money, by their induſtry, and willing to leave their eſtates to their children in land, as the ſureſt, and moſt laſting proviſion, and not ſo liable to caſualties as money in untrading or unſkilful hands) are many buyers ready always to purchaſe, but few ſellers. For, the land thereabout being already poſſeſſed by that ſort of induſtrious and thriving men, they have neither need, nor will, to ſell. In ſuch places of manufacture, the riches of the one not ariſing from the ſquandering and waſte of another, (as it doth in other places, where men live lazily upon the product of the land) the induſtry of the people, bringing in increaſe of wealth from remote parts, makes plenty of money there, without the impoveriſhing of their neighbours. And, when the thriving tradeſman has got more than he can well employ in trade, his next thoughts are to look out for a purchaſe; but it muſt be a purchaſe in the neighbourhood, where the eſtate may be under his eye, and within convenient diſtance, that the care and pleaſure of his farm may not take him off from the engagements of his calling, nor remove his children too far from him, or the trade he breeds them up in. This ſeems to me the reaſon, why in places, wherein thriving manufactures have erected themſelves, land has been obſerved to ſell quicker, and for more years purchaſe than in other places, as about Hallifax in the north, Taunton and Exeter in the weſt.

This is that then, which makes land, as well as other things, dear: plenty of buyers, and but few ſellers: and ſo, by the rule of contraries, plenty of ſellers and few buyers makes land cheap.

He, that will juſtly eſtimate the value of any thing, muſt conſider its quantity in proportion to its vent, for this alone regulates the price. The value of any thing, compared with itſelf, or with a ſtanding meaſure, is greater, as its quantity is leſs in proportion to its vent: but, in comparing it, or exchanging it with any other thing, the quantity and vent of that thing too muſt be allowed for, in the computation of their value. But, becauſe the deſire of money is conſtantly almoſt every where the ſame, its vent varies very little, but as its greater ſcarcity enhances its price, and increaſes the ſcramble: there being nothing elſe that does eaſily ſupply the want of it: the leſſening its quantity, therefore, always increaſes its price, and makes an equal portion of it exchange for a greater of any other thing. Thus it comes to paſs, that there is no manner of ſettled proportion between the value of an ounce of ſilver, and any other commodity: for, either varying its quantity in that country, or the commodity changing its quantity in proportion to its vent, their reſpective values change, i. e. leſs of one will barter for more of the other: though, in the ordinary way of ſpeaking, it is only ſaid, that the price of the commodity, not of the money, is changed. For example; half an ounce of ſilver in England,

land, will exchange ſometimes for a whole buſhel of wheat, ſometimes for half, ſometimes but a quarter, and this it does equally, whether by uſe it be apt to bring in to the owner ſix in the hundred of its own weight per annum, or nothing at all: it being only the change of the quantity of wheat to its vent, ſuppoſing we have ſtill the ſame ſum of money in the kingdom; or elſe the change of the quantity of our money in the kingdom, ſuppoſing the quantity of wheat, in reſpect to its vent be the ſame too, that makes the change in the price of wheat. For if you alter the quantity, or vent, on either ſide, you preſently alter the price, but no other way in the world.

For it is not the being, adding, increaſing, or diminiſhing of any good quality in any commodity, that makes its price greater, or leſs; but only as it makes its quantity, or vent, greater, or leſs, in proportion one to another. This will eaſily appear by two or three inſtances.

1. The being of any good, and uſeful quantity in any thing, neither increaſes its price, nor indeed makes it have any price at all, but only as it leſſens its quantity, or increaſes its vent; each of theſe in proportion to one another. What more uſe, or neceſſary things are there to the being, or well-being of men, than air and water? and yet theſe have generally no price at all, nor yield any money: becauſe their quantity is immenſly greater than their vent, in moſt places of the world. But, as ſoon as ever water (for air ſtill offers itſelf every where, without reſtraint, or incloſure, and therefore is no where of any price) comes any where to be reduced into any proportion to its conſumption, it begins preſently to have a price, and is ſometimes ſold dearer than wine. Hence it is, that the beſt, and moſt uſeful things are commonly the cheapeſt; becauſe, though their conſumption be great, yet the bounty of providence has made their production large, and ſuitable to it.

2. Nor does the adding an excellency to any commodity, raiſe its price, unleſs it increaſe its conſumption. For, ſuppoſe there ſhould be taught a way (which ſhould be publiſhed to the knowledge of every one) to make a medicine of wheat alone, that ſhould infallibly cure the ſtone: it is certain the diſcovery of this quality in that grain, would give it an excellency very conſiderable: and yet this would not increaſe the price of it one farthing in twenty buſhels, becauſe its quantity, or vent, would not hereby, to any ſenſible degree, be altered.

3. Neither does the increaſing of any good quality, in any ſort of things, make it yield more. For though teaſels be much better this year than they were laſt, they are not one jot dearer, unleſs they be fewer too, or the conſumption of them greater.

4. Nor does the leſſening the good qualities of any ſort of commodity leſſen its price; which is evident in hops, that are uſually deareſt thoſe years they are worſt. But, if it happen to be a ſpecies of commodity, whoſe defects may be ſupplied by ſome other, the making of it worſe does leſſen its price, becauſe it hinders its vent. For, if rye ſhould any year prove generally ſmutty, or grown, no queſtion it would yield leſs money than otherwiſe, becauſe the deficiency of that might be, in ſome meaſure, made up by wheat, and other grain. But, if it be a ſort of commodity, whoſe uſe no other known thing

can ſupply, it is not its being better, or worſe, but its quantity, and vent, is that alone which regulates, and determines its value.

To apply this now to money, as capable of different rates of intereeſt. To money, conſidered in its proper uſe as a commodity paſſing in exchange from one to another, all that is done by intereſt, is but the adding to it by agreement, or publick authority, a faculty, which naturally it has not, of increaſing every year ſix per cent. Now, if publick authority ſink uſe to four per cent. it is certain it diminiſhes this good quality in money one third. But yet this making the money of England not one farthing more than it was, it alters not the meaſures, upon which all changeable commodities increaſe, or ſink their price; and ſo makes not money exchange for leſs of any commodity, than it would without this alteration of its intereſt. If leſſening uſe to four per cent. ſhould at all alter the quantity of money, and make it leſs, it would make money, as it has the nature of a commodity, dearer, i. e. a leſs quantity of money would exchange for a greater quantity of another commodity, than it would before. This perhaps will appear a little plainer by theſe following particulars.

1. That the intrinſick, natural worth of any thing, conſiſts in its fitneſs to ſupply the neceſſities, or ſerve the conveniencies of human life; and the more neceſſary it is to our being, or the more it contributes to our well-being, the greater is its worth. But yet,

2. That there is no ſuch intrinſick, natural ſettled value in any thing, as to make any aſſigned quantity of it conſtantly worth any aſſigned quantity of another.

3. The marketable value of any aſſigned quantities of two, or more commodities, are (*pro hic & nunc*) equal, when they will exchange one for another. As, ſuppoſing one buſhel of wheat, two buſhels of barley, thirty pounds of lead, and one ounce of ſilver, will now in the market be taken one for another, they are then of equal worth: and, our coin being that which Engliſhmen reckon by, an Engliſhman would ſay, that now one buſhel of wheat, two buſhels of barley, thirty pounds of lead, and one ounce of ſilver, were equally worth five ſhillings.

4. The change of this marketable value of any commodity, in reſpect of another commodity, or in reſpect of a ſtanding, common meaſure, is not the altering of any intrinſick value, or quality, in the commodity; (for muſty and ſmutty corn will ſell dearer at one time, than the clean and ſweet at another) but the alteration of ſome proportion, which that commodity bears to ſomething elſe.

5. This proportion in all commodities, whereof money is one, is the proportion of their quantity to the vent. The vent is nothing elſe, but the paſſing of commodities from one owner to another, in exchange; and is then called quicker, when a greater quantity of any ſpecies of commodity, is taken off from the owners of it, in an equal ſpace of time.

6. This vent is regulated, i. e. made quicker or ſlower, as greater or leſs quantities of any ſaleable commodity are removed out of the way and courſe of trade; ſeparated from publick commerce; and no longer lie within the reach

of exchange. For, though any commodity ſhould ſhift hands ever ſo faſt, and be exchanged from one man to another; yet, if they were not thereby exempted from trade and ſale, and did not ceaſe to be any longer traffick, this would not at all make, or quicken their vent. But this, ſeldom or never happening, makes very little or no alteration.

7. THINGS are removed out of the market, or hands of commerce, and ſo their vent altered three ways; 1. By conſumption, when the commodity in its uſe is deſtroyed, as, meat, drink, and cloaths, &c. all that is ſo conſumed is quite gone out of the trade of the world. 2. By exportation; and all that is ſo carried away, is gone out of the trade of England, and concerns Engliſhmen no more in the price of their commodities among themſelves for their own uſe, than if it were out of the world. 3. By buying and laying up for a man's private uſe. For what is by any of theſe ways ſhut out of the market, and no longer moveable, by the hand of commerce, makes no longer any part of merchantable ware, and ſo, in reſpect of trade, and the quantity of any commodity, is not more conſiderable than if it were not in being. All theſe three terminating at laſt in conſumption of all commodities, (excepting only jewels and plate, and ſome few others, which wear out but inſenſibly) may properly enough paſs under that name. Ingroſſing too has ſome influence on the preſent vent: but this incloſing ſome conſiderable part of any commodity, (for if the ingroſſing be of all the commodity, and it be of general uſe, the price is at the will of the ingroſſer) out of the free common of trade, only for ſome time, and afterwards returning again to ſale, makes not uſually ſo ſenſible and general an alteration in the vent, as the others do: but yet influences the price, and the vent more, according as it extends itſelf to a larger portion of the commodity, and hoards it up longer.

8. MOST other portable commodities (excepting jewels, plate, &c.) decaying quickly in their uſe, but money being leſs conſumed, or increaſed, i. e. by ſlower degrees removed from, or brought into the free commerce of any country, than the greateſt part of other merchandize; and ſo the proportion between its quantity and vent, altering ſlower than in moſt other commodities; it is commonly looked on as a ſtanding meaſure, to judge of the value of all things, eſpecially being adapted to it by its weight and denomination in coinage.

9. MONEY, whilſt the ſame quantity of it is paſſing up and down the kingdom in trade, is really a ſtanding meaſure of the falling and riſing value of other things, in reference to one another: and the alteration of price is truly in them only. But if you increaſe, or leſſen, the quantity of money, current in traffick, in any place, then the alteration of value is in the money: and, if at the ſame time wheat keep its proportion of vent to quantity, money, to ſpeak truly, alters its worth, and wheat does not, though it ſell for a greater, or leſs price, than it did before. For money, being looked upon as the ſtanding meaſure of other commodities, men conſider and ſpeak of it ſtill, as if it were a ſtanding meaſure, though when it has varied its quantity, it is plain it is not.

10. But the value, or price of all commodities, amongſt which money paſſing in trade is truly one, conſiſting in proportion, you alter this, as you do all other proportions, whether you increaſe one, or leſſen the other.

11. In all other commodities, the owners, when they deſign them for traffick, endeavour, as much as they can, to have them vented and gone, i. e. removed out of the reach of commerce, by conſumption, exportation, or laying up: but money, never lying upon people's hands, or wanting vent, (for any one may part with it in exchange, when he pleaſes;) the provident publick, and private care, is to keep it from venting, or conſuming, i. e. from exportation, which is its proper conſumption; and from hoarding up by others, which is a ſort of ingroſſing. Hence it is that other commodities have ſometimes a quicker, ſometimes a ſlower vent: for no body lays out his money in them, but according to the uſe he has of them, and that has bounds. But, every body being ready to receive money without bounds, and keep it by him, becauſe it anſwers all things: therefore the vent of money is always ſufficient, or more than enough. This being ſo, its quantity alone is enough to regulate and determine its value, without conſidering any proportion between its quantity and vent, as in other commodities.

12. Therefore the leſſening of uſe, not bringing one penny of money more into the trade, or exchange of any country, but rather drawing it away from trade, and ſo making it leſs, does not at all ſink its value, and make it buy leſs of any commodity, but rather more.

13. That, which raiſes the natural intereſt of money, is the ſame that raiſes the rent of land, i. e. its aptneſs to bring in yearly to him that manages it, a greater overplus of income above his rent, as a reward to his labour. That which cauſes this in land, is the greater quantity of its product, in proportion to the ſame vent to that particular fruit, or the ſame quantity of product, in proportion to a greater vent of that ſingle commodity; but that which cauſes increaſe of profit to the borrower of money, is the leſs quantity of money, in proportion to trade, or to the vent of all commodities, taken together, & vice verſa.

14. The natural value of money, as it is apt to yield ſuch a yearly income by intereſt, depends on the whole quantity of the then paſſing money of the kingdom, in proportion to the whole trade of the kingdom, i. e. the general vent of all the commodities. But the natural value of money, in exchanging for any one commodity, is the quantity of the trading money of the kingdom, deſigned for that commodity, in proportion to that ſingle commodity and its vent. For though any ſingle man's neceſſity and want, either of money, or any ſpecies of commodity, being known, may make him pay dearer for money, or that commodity; yet this is but a particular caſe, that does not at the ſame time alter this conſtant and general rule.

15. That ſuppoſing wheat a ſtanding meaſure, that is, that there is conſtantly the ſame quantity of it, in proportion to its vent, we ſhall find money to run the ſame variety of changes in its value, as all other commodities do. Now that wheat in England does come neareſt to a ſtanding meaſure, is evident by comparing wheat with other commodities, money, and the yearly

income of land, in Henry the Seventh's time, and now. For ſuppoſing that primo Hen. VII. N. lett 100 acres of land to A. for 6 d. per annum per acre, rack-rent, and to B. another 100 acres of land, of the ſame ſoil and yearly worth with the former, for a buſhel of wheat per acre, rack-rent, (a buſhel of wheat about that time being probably ſold for about 6 d.) it was then an equal rent. If, therefore, theſe leaſes were for years yet to come, it is certain that he, that paid but 6 d. per acre, would pay now 50 s. per annum, and he that paid a buſhel of wheat per acre, would now pay about 25 l. per annum, which would be near about the yearly value of the land, were it to be lett now. The reaſon whereof is this, That there being ten times as much ſilver now in the world, (the diſcovery of the Weſt-Indies having made the plenty) as there was then, it is nine tenths leſs worth now, than it was at that time; that is, it will exchange for nine tenths leſs of any commodity now, which bears the ſame proportion to its vent, as it did 200 years ſince; which of all other commodities, wheat is likelieſt to do. For in England, and this part of the world, wheat being the conſtant and moſt general food, not altering with the faſhion, not growing by chance; but as the farmers ſow more, or leſs of it, which they endeavour to proportion, as near as can be gueſſed, to the conſumption, abſtracting the overplus of the precedent year, in their proviſion for the next, and vice verſa; it muſt needs fall out, that it keeps the neareſt proportion to its conſumption, (which is more ſtudied and deſigned in this, than other commodities) of any thing, if you take it for ſeven or twenty years together: though perhaps the plenty, or ſcarcity of one year, cauſed by the accidents of the ſeaſon, may very much vary it from the immediately precedent, or following. Wheat, therefore, in this part of the world, (and that grain, which is the conſtant general food of any other country) is the fitteſt meaſure to judge of the altered value of things, in any long tract of time: and therefore, wheat here, rice in Turky, &c. is the fitteſt thing to reſerve a rent in, which is deſigned to be conſtantly the ſame for all future ages. But money is the beſt meaſure of the altered value of things in a few years: becauſe its vent is the ſame, and its quantity alters ſlowly. But wheat, or any other grain, cannot ſerve inſtead of money; becauſe its bulkineſs, and too quick change of its quantity. For had I a bond, to pay me 100 buſhels of wheat next year, it might be a fourth part loſs, or gain to me; too great an inequality and uncertainty to be ventured in trade: beſides the different goodneſs of ſeveral parcels of wheat in the ſame year.

16. THAT, ſuppoſing any iſland ſeparate from the commerce of the reſt of mankind; if gold and ſilver, or whatever elſe (ſo it be laſting) be their money, if they have but a certain quantity of it, and can get no more, that will be a ſteady, ſtanding meaſure of the value of all other things.

17. THAT, if in any country they uſe for money any laſting material, whereof there is not any more to be got, and ſo cannot be increaſed; or being of no other uſe, the reſt of the world does not value it, and ſo it is not like to be diminiſhed; this alſo would be a ſteady, ſtanding meaſure of the value of other commodities.

18. THAT, in a country, where they had ſuch a ſtanding meaſure, any quantity of that money (if it were but ſo much, that every body might have ſome) would ſerve to drive any proportion of trade, whether more, or leſs; there being counters enough to reckon by, and the value of the pledges being ſtill ſufficient, as conſtantly increaſing with the plenty of the commodity. But theſe three laſt, being built on ſuppoſitions, that are not like to be found in the practice of mankind, ſince navigation and commerce have brought all parts acquainted with one another, and introduced the uſe of gold and ſilver money, into all trading parts of the world; they ſerve rather to give us ſome light into the nature of money, than to teach here a new meaſure of traffick. Though it be certain, that that part of the world, which bred moſt of our gold and ſilver, uſed leaſt of it in exchange, and uſed it not for money at all.

19. THAT therefore, in any country, that hath commerce with the reſt of the world, it is almoſt impoſſible now to be without the uſe of ſilver coin; and having money of that, and accounts kept in ſuch money, it is impoſſible to have any ſtanding, unalterable meaſure of the value of things. For, whilſt the mines ſupply to mankind more than waſtes and conſumes in its uſe, the quantity of it will daily grow greater, in reſpect of other commodities, and its value leſs.

20. THAT in a country, that hath open commerce with the reſt of the world, and uſes money, made of the ſame materials with their neighbours, any quantity of that money will not ſerve to drive any quantity of trade; but there muſt be a certain proportion between their money and trade. The reaſon whereof is this, becauſe, to keep your trade going without loſs, your commodities amongſt you muſt keep an equal, or, at leaſt, near the price of the ſame ſpecies of commodities in the neighbouring countries: which they cannot do, if your money be far leſs than in other countries: for then, either your commodities muſt be ſold very cheap, or a great part of your trade muſt ſtand ſtill, there not being money enough in the country to pay for them (in their ſhifting of hands) at that high price, which the plenty, and conſequently low value of money makes them at in another country. For the value of money, in general, is the quantity of all the money in the world, in proportion to all the trade: but the value of money in any one country, is the preſent quantity of the current money in that country, in proportion to the preſent trade. Suppoſing then, that we had now in England but half as much money, as we had ſeven years ago, and yet had ſtill as much yearly product of commodities, as many hands to work them, and as many brokers to diſperſe them, as before; and that the reſt of the world we trade with, had as much money as they had before, (for it is likely they ſhould have more by our moiety ſhared amongſt them) it is certain, that either half our rents ſhould not be paid, half our commodities not vented, and half our labourers not employed, and ſo half the trade be clearly loſt; or elſe, that every one of theſe muſt receive but half the money for their commodities and labour, they did before, and but half ſo much as our neighbours do receive, for the ſame labour, and the ſame natural product at the ſame time. Such a ſtate of po-

verty as this, though it will make no ſcarcity of our native commodities amongſt us, yet it will have theſe ill conſequences.

1. It will make our native commodities vent very cheap.

2. It will make all foreign commodities very dear, both which will keep us poor. For the merchant, making ſilver and gold his meaſure, and conſidering what the foreign commodity coſts him (i. e. how many ounces of ſilver) in the country where money is more plenty, i. e. cheaper; and conſidering too, how many ounces of ſilver it will yield him in another country; will not part with it here, but for the ſame quantity of ſilver, or as much as that ſilver will buy here of our commodity, which will be a great deal more than in another place. So that, in all our exchange of native for foreign commodities, we ſhall pay double the value that any other country does, where money is in greater plenty. This, indeed, will make a dearneſs, and, in time, a ſcarcity of foreign commodities; which is not the worſt inconveniency that it brings upon us, ſuppoſing them not abſolutely neceſſary. But,

3. It endangers the drawing away our people, both handicrafts, mariners, and ſoldiers; who are apt to go, where their pay is beſt, which will always be where there is greateſt plenty of money, and in time of war muſt needs bring great diſtreſs.

21. Upon this meaſure too it is, that the variation of exchange of money, between ſeveral countries, does ſomewhat depend. For it is certain, that one ounce of ſilver is always of equal value to another ounce of ſilver, conſidered in its intrinſick worth, or in reference to the univerſal trade of the world: but it is not of the ſame value, at the ſame time, in ſeveral parts of the world, but is of the moſt worth in that country, where there is the leaſt money, in proportion to its trade: and therefore, men may afford to give twenty ounces of ſilver in one place, to receive eighteen or nineteen ounces of ſilver in another. But this is not all: to this then, (to find out the alteration of the exchange) the over-balance of the trade muſt be taken into conſideration. Theſe two together regulate the exchange, in all the commerce of the world, and, in both, the higher rate of exchange depends upon one and the ſame thing, viz. the greater plenty of money in one country than in the other: only with this difference, that where the over-balance of trade raiſes the exchange above the par, there it is the plenty of money, which private merchants have in one country, which they deſire to remove into another: but, where the riches of the country raiſes the exchange above the par, there it is the plenty of the money in the whole country. In one, the merchant has more money (or debts, which is all one) in a foreign country, than his trade there will employ, and ſo is willing to allow upon exchange to him abroad, that ſhall pay him ready money at home, 1, 2, 3, &c. per cent. more or leſs, proportionably as his, or his countrymen's plenty of ready money abroad, the danger of leaving it there, or the difficulty of bringing it home in ſpecie, and his preſent need of money at home, is greater or leſs: in the other, the whole country has more money, than can well be employed in the trade thereof, or at leaſt, the proportion of the money to the trade is greater than in the neighbouring country, where the exchange is below the par.

For, ſuppoſing the balance of trade to be equal between England and Holland, but that there is in Holland a greater plenty of money than in England, (which will appear by the lowneſs of the natural uſe in Holland, and the height of the natural uſe in England; and alſo by the dearneſs of food and labour in general in Holland, and the cheapneſs of it in England.) If N. has 10,000 l. in Holland, which the greater advantage he could make of it in England, either by uſe or purchaſe, tempts him to transfer into England, it is probable he will give as much to a merchant in England, to pay him 10,000 l. in England, as the inſurance at that time between Holland and England is worth. If this happens to be in a country, where the exportation of bullion is prohibited, he muſt pay the more; becauſe his venture, if he carry it in ſpecie, will be greater. And upon this ground, perhaps, the prohibiting the exportation of money out of England, under penalties, may be of ſome uſe, by making the rate of the exchange greater to thoſe countries, which import upon us more than they export in commodities; and ſo retain ſome part of the money, which their over-balance of trade would carry away from us, though, after all, if we are over-balanced in trade, it muſt go.

But, ſince the Holland merchant cannot receive N's 10,000 l. in money in Holland, and pay him 10,000 l. in England, unleſs his over-balance of trade make Engliſhmen indebted to him 10,000 l. in money, which he is not like to take in commodities; I think the over-balance of trade is that, which chiefly raiſes the exchange in any country, and that plenty of money, in any country, does it only for ſo much of the money as is transferred, either to be lett out to uſe, or to be ſpent there. And, though, lending to foreigners, upon uſe, doth not at all alter the balance of trade, between thoſe countries, yet it does alter the exchange between thoſe countries for ſo much as is lent upon uſe, by not calling away the money, that ſhould follow the over-balance of trade, but letting it reſt there, as if it were accounted for; all one as if the balance of trade were for ſo much altered. But this being not much, in compariſon of the general traffick between two nations, or at leaſt varying ſlower, the merchant too regulating the exchange, and not the uſurer; I ſuppoſe it is the preſent balance of trade, on which the exchange immediately and chiefly depends, unleſs ſome accident ſhall make a great deal of money be remitted at the ſame time from one place to another, which will for that time raiſe the exchange all one as an over-balance of trade; and indeed, when examined, is generally very little different from it.

To be able to eſtimate the par, with the riſe and fall of the exchange, it is neceſſary to know the intrinſick value, i. e. how much ſilver is in the coins of the two countries, by which you reckon and charge the bill of exchange.

Sir, If I have been led a little too far from one thing to another, in the conſideration of money, I beg your pardon, hoping that theſe particulars will afford ſome light to our preſent ſubject.

To return to the price of land. It is evident by what has been above ſaid, that the years purchaſe of land do not increaſe with the fall of intereſt; and the abating that good quality in money, of yielding yearly ſix per cent. to four, does not preſently ſo ſink its value, in reſpect of land, that one third more is required in exchange: falling of intereſt from ſix to four, will not raiſe land from twenty to thirty years purchaſe; the riſing and falling of the price of land, as of other things, depends much on the quantity of land ſet to ſale, compared with the quantity of money deſigned for that traffick, or, which amounts to the ſame thing, upon the number of buyers and ſellers. For, where there are many ſellers and few purchaſers, though intereſt be leſſened, land will be cheap, as I have already ſhewed. At leaſt, this is certain, That making a law to reduce intereſt will not raiſe the price of land; it will only, by driving it more into the banker's hands, leave the country barer of money; whereby, if the price of land about London ſhould be accidentally raiſed, that of remoter countries would thereby have fewer purchaſers, and at lower rates.

This being ſo, that the low rate of land depends much on the great number of ſellers in proportion to purchaſers, the next thing to be enquired into, is, What makes plenty of ſellers? And to that the anſwer is obvious, general ill huſbandry, and the conſequence of it, debts. If a neglect of government and religion, ill examples, and depraved education, have introduced debauchery; and art, or chance, has made it faſhionable for men to live beyond their eſtates; debts will increaſe and multiply, and draw with them a neceſſity on men, firſt of encumbering, and then ſelling their eſtates. This is generally the cauſe why men part with their land: and I think there is ſcarce one in an hundred that thinks of ſelling his patrimony, till mortgages have pretty well eat into the freehold; and the weight of growing debts force a man, whether he will or no, out of his poſſeſſions. When almoſt is there ever a clear and unencumbered eſtate ſet to ſale? It is ſeldom a thriving man turns his land into money, to make the greater advantage: the examples of it are ſo rare, that they are ſcarce of any conſideration in the number of ſellers.

This, I think, may be the reaſon, why in queen Elizabeth's days (when ſobriety, frugality, and induſtry, brought in daily increaſe to the growing wealth of the kingdom) land kept up its price, and ſold for more years purchaſe, than correſponded to the intereſt of money, then buſily employed in a thriving trade, which made the natural intereſt much higher than it is now, as well as the parliament then ſet it higher by law.

On the contrary ſide, What makes ſcarcity of purchaſers?

1 The ſame reaſon, ill huſbandry. When the tradeſman lives up to the height of his income, and the vanity of expenc eseither drains the merchant's coffers, or keeps them from overflowing, he ſeldom thinks of purchaſing. Buying of land is the reſult of a full and ſatiated gain: and men in trade ſeldom think of laying out their money upon land, till their profit has brought them in more than their trade can well employ; and their idle bags, cumbering their counting-houſes, put them upon emptying them on a purchaſe.

2. Another thing that makes a ſcarcity of buyers of land, are doubtful and ill titles: where theſe are frequent and fatal, one can no more expect that men, who have money, ſhould be forward to purchaſe, than ſhips, richly laden, to venture themſelves amongſt rocks and quickſands. It is no wonder ſuch ſeas ſhould not be much frequented, where the examples, and re-

mains of daily wrecks ſhew the folly and hazard of the venture, in the number of thoſe who have miſcarried.

3. A GENERAL decay of trade diſcourages men from purchaſing: for this threatens an univerſal poverty, which is ſure to fall firſt and heavieſt upon land. The merchant, who furniſhes the improvident landholder, will not fail to have money for his wares with gain, whether the kingdom get by his trade, or no; and he will keep his money rather employed in trade, which brings him in profit, (for the merchant may get by a trade, that makes the kingdom poor) than lay it out in land, whoſe rents he ſees ſinking, and foreſees by the courſe of trade, is likely to continue to do ſo. When a nation is running to decay and ruin, the merchant and monied man, do what you can, will be ſure to ſtarve laſt: obſerve it where you will, the decays that come upon, and bring to ruin any country, do conſtantly firſt fall upon the land: and though the country gentleman, (who uſually ſecurely relies upon ſo much a year as was given in at his marriage ſettlement, and thinks his land an unmoveable fund for ſuch an income) be not very forward to think ſo; yet this nevertheleſs is an undoubted truth, that he is more concerned in trade, and ought to take a greater care, that it be well managed, and preſerved, than even the merchant himſelf. For he will certainly find, when a decay of trade has carried away one part of our money out of the kingdom, and the other is kept in the merchant and tradeſman's hands, that no laws he can make, nor any little arts of ſhifting property amongſt ourſelves, will bring it back to him again: but his rents will fall, and his income every day leſſen, till general induſtry and frugality, joined to a well-ordered trade, ſhall reſtore to the kingdom the riches and wealth it had formerly.

THIS by the way, if well conſidered, might let us ſee, that taxes, however contrived, and out of whoſe hand ſoever immediately taken, do, in a country, where their great fund is in land, for the moſt part terminate upon land. Whatſoever the people is chiefly maintained by, that the government ſupports itſelf on: nay, perhaps it will be found, that thoſe taxes which ſeem leaſt to affect land, will moſt ſurely of all other fall the rents. This would deſerve to be well conſidered, in the raiſing of taxes, leſt the neglect of it bring upon the country gentleman an evil, which he will be ſure quickly to feel, but not be able very quickly to remedy. For rents once fallen are not eaſily raiſed again. A tax laid upon land ſeems hard to the landholder, becauſe it is ſo much money going viſibly out of his pocket: and therefore, as an eaſe to himſelf, the landholder is always forward to lay it upon commodities. But, if he will thoroughly conſider it, and examine the effects, he will find he buys this ſeeming eaſe at a very dear rate: and, though he pays not this tax immediately out of his own purſe, yet his purſe will find it by a greater want of money there, at the end of the year, than that comes to, with the leſſening of his rents to boot: which is a ſettled and laſting evil, that will ſtick upon him beyond the preſent payment.

To make this clear, let us ſuppoſe in the preſent ſtate of affairs in England, that the rents of England are twelve millions, and that the charge and neceſſities of the government require a ſupply of three millions from the parliament,

ment, which is laid on land. Here is one fourth part of his yearly income goes immediately out of the landlord's and landholder's pocket. This is a burthen very apt to be felt. The country gentleman, who actually pays the money out of his pocket, or finds it deducted out of his rent at quarter-day for taxes, ſees and very ſenſibly obſerves what goes thus out of his eſtate. But though this be a quarter of his yearly income, and out of an eſtate of four hundred pounds a year, the publick tax now openly takes away one hundred; yet this influences not at all the yearly rent of the land, which the rack-renter, or under tenant, pays: it being the ſame thing to him, whether he pays all his rent to the king, or his landlord; or half, or a quarter, or none at all to the king; the caſe is all one to him, what hand receives his rent, when due: ſo trade flouriſhes, and his commodities go off well, he will be able to pay his rent on. This leſſens not any more the value of his farm, than an high or a low chief rent does, paid out of it to the lord of the fee: the tenant's bargain and profit is the ſame, whether the land be charged, or not charged, with an annuity payable to another man. We ſee this in college leaſes, where though the college tenant pays for it to the college ſome years five times as much as he does others, upon the varying rate of corn; yet the under-tenant feels not this alteration in the leaſt, nor finds a reaſon to have his rent abated, becauſe a greater part of it is diverted from his landlord. All this is but changing the hand that receives the rent, without any influence at all upon the yearly value of the eſtate; which will not be lett for one penny more, or leſs, to the renter, however, or amongſt whomſoever, the rent he pays be divided. From hence it is evident, that taxes laid on land do not in the leaſt make rents fall.

But ſuppoſe, to ſhift off the burthen from the land, ſome country gentleman ſhould think fit to raiſe theſe three millions upon commodities, to let the land go free. Firſt, it is to be conſidered, That ſince the publick wants require three millions, (for that we ſuppoſed for argument's ſake; let it be three millions, or one million, that is all one;) and ſo much muſt go into the king's coffers, or elſe the neceſſities of the government will not be ſupplied: that for raiſing theſe three millions on commodities, and bringing ſo much into the Exchequer, there muſt go a great deal more than three millions out of the ſubjects pockets. For a tax of that nature cannot be levied by officers, to watch every little rivulet of trade, without a great charge, eſpecially at firſt trial. But ſuppoſing no more charge in raiſing it, than of a land tax, and that there are only three millions to be paid, it is evident that to do this out of commodities, they muſt, to the conſumer, be raiſed a quarter in their price; ſo that every thing, to him that uſes it, muſt be a quarter dearer. Let us ſee now who, at long run, muſt pay this quarter, and where it will light. It is plain, the merchant and broker, neither will, nor can; for if he pays a quarter more for commodities than he did, he will ſell them at a price proportionably raiſed. The poor labourer and handicraftſman cannot: for he juſt lives from hand to mouth already, and all his food, clothing and utenſils, coſting a quarter more than they did before, either his wages muſt riſe with the price of things, to make him live; or elſe, not being able to maintain himſelf and family by his labour, he comes to the pariſh; and then the land bears the burthen a heavier way. If the labourer's wages be raiſed in proportion to the increaſed rates of things, the farmer who pays a quarter more for wages, as well as all other things, whilſt he ſells his corn and wooll, either at the ſame rate, or lower, at the market (ſince the tax laid upon it makes people leſs forward to buy) muſt either have his rent abated, or elſe break and run away in his landlord's debt: and ſo the yearly value of the land is brought down. And who then pays the tax at the year's end, but the landlord? when the tenant, not able to raiſe his rent by his commodities, either runs away in his landlord's debt, or cannot be continued in the farm, without abatement of rent: for, when the yearly charge in his farm is greater by the increaſe of the labourer's wages, and yet his product ſells cheaper by reaſon of the tax laid on his commodities; how will the farmer be able to make up his rent at quarter-day? For this may be worth our notice, that any tax laid on foreign commodities in England, raiſes its price, and makes the importer get more for his commodity: but, on the contrary, a tax laid on your native product, and home made commodities, leſſens their price, and makes them yield leſs to the firſt ſeller.

The reaſon whereof is plain. For the merchant importing no commodity, but what the neceſſity, or faſhionable wantonneſs, of your people gives him vent for, will not only proportion his gain to the coſt and riſque, which he has been at before landing; but will expect profit of his money paid here, for any tax laid on it; and take advantage from thence to raiſe his price, above what his tax comes to; and if he cannot do that, he will trade no more in that commodity. For it being not the product of his farm, he is not tied to bring it to market, if he finds its price not anſwer his expectation there, but turns himſelf to other wares, which he finds your markets take off better. A merchant will never continue to trade in wares, which the change of faſhion, or humour amongſt your people, has made leſs vendible, though he may be ſometimes caught by a ſudden alteration. But that ſeldom happens in the courſe of trade, ſo as to influence the great bulk of it. For things of neceſſity muſt ſtill be had, and things of faſhion will be had, as long as men have money, or credit, whatever rates they coſt, and the rather becauſe they are dear. For, it being vanity, not uſe, that makes the expenſive faſhion of your people, the emulation, who ſhall have the fineſt, that is, the deareſt things, not the moſt convenient, or uſeful. How many things do we value, or buy, becauſe they come at dear rates from Japan and China, which if they were our own manufacture, or product, common to be had, and for a little money, would be contemned and neglected? Have not ſeveral of our own commodities, offered to ſale at reaſonable rates, been deſpiſed, and the very ſame eagerly bought and bragged off, when ſold for French, at a double price? You muſt not think, therefore, that the raiſing their price will leſſen the vent of faſhionable, foreign commodities amongſt you, as long as men have any way to purchaſe them, but rather increaſe it. French wine is become a modiſh drink amongſt us, and a man is aſhamed to entertain his friend, or almoſt to dine himſelf without it. The price is in the memory of man raiſed from 6 d. to 2 s. and does this hinder the drinking of it? No, the quite contrary: a man's way of living is commended, becauſe he will give any rate for it: and a man will give any rate rather than paſs for a poor wretch, or a penurious curmudgeon, that is not able, or knows not how to live well, nor uſe his friends civilly. Faſhion is, for the moſt part, nothing but the oſtentation of riches, and therefore the high price of what ſerves to that, rather increaſes than leſſens its vent. The conteſt and glory is in the expence, not the uſefulneſs of it; and people are then thought and ſaid to live well, when they can make a ſhew of rare and foreign things, and ſuch as their neighbours cannot go to the price of.

Thus we ſee how foreign commodities fall not in their price, by taxes laid on them, becauſe the merchant is not neceſſitated to bring to your market any but faſhionable commodities, and thoſe go off the better for their high rate. But, on the contrary, your landholder being forced to bring his commodities to market, ſuch as his land and induſtry affords him, common and known things, he muſt ſell them there at ſuch price as he can get. This the buyer knows; and theſe home-bred commodities being ſeldom the favourites of your people, or any farther acceptable, than as great conveniency recommends them to the vulgar, or downright neceſſity to all; as ſoon as a tax is laid on them, every one makes as ſparing a uſe of them as he can, that he may ſave his money for other neceſſary or creditable expences. Thus the price, which our native commodities yield the firſt ſeller, is mightily abated, and ſo the yearly value of the land, which produces them, leſſened too.

If, therefore, the laying of taxes upon commodities does, as it is evident, affect the land that is out at rack-rent, it is plain it does equally affect all the other land in England too, and the gentry will, but the worſt way, increaſe their own charges, that is, by leſſening the yearly value of their eſtates, if they hope to eaſe their land, by charging commodities. It is in vain, in a country whoſe great fund is land, to hope to lay the publick charge of the government on any thing elſe; there at laſt it will terminate. The merchant (do what you can) will not bear it, the labourer cannot, and therefore the landholder muſt: and whether he were beſt do it, by laying it directly where it will at laſt ſettle, or by letting it come to him by the ſinking of his rents, which when they are once fallen, every one knows are not eaſily raiſed again, let him conſider.

Holland is brought as an inſtance of laying the charge of the publick upon trade, and it is poſſible (excepting ſome few ſmall free towns) the only place in the world that could be brought to favour this way. But yet, when examined, will be found to ſhew the quite contrary, and be a clear proof, that lay the taxes how you will, land every where, in proportion, bears the greater ſhare of the burthen. The publick charge of the government, it is ſaid, is, in the United Provinces, laid on trade. I grant it is, the greateſt part of it; but is the land excuſed, or eaſed by it? By no means; but, on the contrary, ſo loaded, that in many places half, in others a quarter, in others one eighth of the yearly value does not come into the owner's pocket: and if I have not been miſinformed, the land in ſome places will not pay the taxes: ſo that we may ſay, that the charge of the government came not upon commodities, till the land could not bear it. The burthen unavoidably ſettles upon the land firſt, and when it has preſſed it ſo, that it can yield no more, trade muſt be brought in aid, to help to ſupport the government rather than let all ſink: but the firſt ſtreſs is always upon land, and as far as that will reach, it is unavoidably carried, lay your taxes how you will. It is known what a ſhare of the publick charges of the government is ſupported by the trade of Amſterdam alone; as I remember that one town pays thirty-ſix in the hundred of all the publick taxes raiſed in the United Provinces. But are the lands of Guelderland eaſed by it? Let any one ſee, in that country of land more than trade, what they make clear of their revenues, and whether the country gentlemen there grow rich on their land, whilſt the merchant, having the taxes laid on his commerce, is impoveriſhed? On the contrary, Guelderland is ſo low and out of caſh, that Amſterdam has been fain, for many years, to lay down the taxes for them; which is, in effect, to pay the taxes of Guelderland too.

STRUGGLE and contrive as you will, lay your taxes as you pleaſe, the traders will ſhift it off from their own gain; the merchants will bear the leaſt part of it, and grow poor laſt. In Holland itſelf, where trade is ſo loaded, who, I pray, grows richeſt, the landholder, or the trader? Which of them is pinched, and wants money moſt? A country may thrive, the country gentleman grow rich, and his rents increaſe (for ſo it has been here) whilſt the land is taxed: but I challenge any one to ſhew me a country, wherein there is any conſiderable publick charge raiſed, where the land does not moſt ſenſibly feel it, and, in proportion, bear much the greater part of it.

WE muſt not, therefore, impute the falling of the rents, or of the price of land, to high intereſt; nor, if ill huſbandry has waſted our riches, hope by ſuch kind of laws to raiſe them to their former value. I humbly conceive we ſhall in vain endeavour it, by the fall of intereſt. The number of buyers muſt be increaſed, and ſellers leſſened, which muſt be done by other ways, than regulating of intereſt, or elſe the landed-man will neither find chapmen for his land, nor for the corn that grows on it, at the rate he deſires.

BUT, could an act of parliament bring down intereſt to four per cent. and the lowering of that immediately raiſe the purchaſer's fine from 20 to 25 years purchaſe; yet it may be doubted, whether this be fit to be made into a law, becauſe it would be of no advantage to the kingdom. For what profit would it be to the nation to make a law, that he who ſells land, ſhould inſtead of four have five hundred pounds of the purchaſer? This, indeed, a little alters the diſtribution of the money we have amongſt us Engliſhmen here at home, but neither helps to continue what we have, nor brings in more from abroad: which, being the only concernment of the kingdom, in reference to its wealth, is apt to be ſuppoſed by us without doors to be the only care of a parliament. For it matters not, ſo it be here amongſt us, whether the money be in Thomas, or Richard's hands, provided it be ſo ordered, that whoever has it may be encouraged to let it go into the current of trade, for the improvement of the general ſtock and wealth of the nation.

As this increaſe of the fine, in the purchaſe of land, is not an advantage to the kingdom; ſo neither is it to the landholder, who is the perſon, that bearing the greateſt part of the burthens of the kingdom, ought, I think, to have the greateſt care taken of him, and enjoy as many privileges, and as much wealth, as the ſavour of the law can (with regard to the publick-weal) confer upon him. But pray conſider: the raiſing the price of land in ſale, by increaſing the number of years purchaſe to be paid for it, gives the advantage, not to the landholder, but to him that ceaſes to be ſo. He that has no longer the land, has the more money: and he, who has the land, is the poorer. The true advantage of the landholder is, that his corn, fleſh, and wooll, ſell better, and yield a greater price; this, indeed, is a profit that benefits the owner of the land, and goes along with it: it is this alone raiſes the rent, and makes the poſſeſſor richer: and this can only be done by increaſing our wealth, and drawing more money into England. Which the falling of intereſt, and thereby (if it could effect it) raiſing the purchaſe of land, is ſo far from doing, that it does viſibly and directly one way hinder our increaſe of wealth, that is, by hindering foreigners to come here, and buy land, and ſettle amongſt us. Whereby we have this double loſs; firſt, we loſe their perſons, increaſe of people being the increaſe both of ſtrength and riches. Secondly, we loſe ſo much money; for, though whatever an Engliſhman gives to another for land, though raiſed to forty years purchaſe, be not one farthing advantage to the kingdom; yet whatever a foreigner, who purchaſes land here, gives for it, is ſo much every farthing clear gain to the nation: for that money comes clear in, without carrying out any thing for it, and is every farthing of it as perfect gain to the nation, as if it dropped down from the clouds.

But farther, if conſideration be to be had only of ſellers of land, the lowering of intereſt to four per cent. will not be in their favour, unleſs by it you can raiſe land to thirty years purchaſe, which is not at all likely: and I think nobody, by falling of intereſt to four per cent. hopes to get chapmen for their land at that rate. Whatſoever they have leſs, if law can regulate intereſt, they loſe of their value of land, money being thus abaſed. So that the landed-man will ſcarce find his account neither, by this law, when it comes to trial. And at laſt, I imagine, this will be the reſult of all ſuch attempts, that experience will ſhew that the price of things will not be regulated by laws, though the endeavours after it will be ſure to prejudice and inconvenience trade, and put your affairs out of order.

If this be ſo, that intereſt cannot be regulated by law, or that if it could, yet the reducing of it to four per cent. would do more harm than good: what then ſhould there (you will ſay) be no law at all to regulate intereſt? I ſay not ſo. For,

1. It is neceſſary that there ſhould be a ſtated rate of intereſt, and in debts and forbearances, where contract has not ſettled it between the parties, the law might give a rule, and courts of judicature might know what damages to allow. This may, and therefore ſhould, be regulated.

2. That in the preſent current of running caſh, which now takes its courſe almoſt all to London, and is ingroſſed by a very few hands in compa-

riſon, young men, and thoſe in want, might not too eaſily be expoſed to extortion and oppreſſion; and the dextrous and combining money-jobbers not have too great and unbounded a power, to prey upon the ignorance, or neceſſity of borrowers. There would not be much danger of this, if money were more equally diſtributed into the ſeveral quarters of England, and into a greater number of hands, according to the exigencies of trade.

If money were to be hired, as land is; or to be had as corn, or wooll, from the owner himſelf, and known good ſecurity be given for it, it might then probably be had at the market (which is the true) rate, and that rate of intereſt would be a conſtant gauge of your trade and wealth. But, when a kind of monopoly, by conſent, has put this general commodity into a few hands, it may need regulation, though what the ſtated rate of intereſt ſhould be, in the conſtant change of affairs, and flux of money, is hard to determine. Poſſibly it may be allowed, as a reaſonable propoſal, that it ſhould be within ſuch bounds, as ſhould not, on the one ſide, quite eat up the merchant's and tradeſmen's profit, and diſcourage their induſtry; nor, on the other hand, ſo low, as ſhould hinder men from riſquing their money in other men's hands, and ſo rather chuſe to keep it out of trade, than venture it upon ſo ſmall profit. When it is too high, it ſo hinders the merchant's gain, that he will not borrow; when too low, it ſo hinders the monied-man's profit, that he will not lend; and both theſe ways it is an hindrance to trade.

But this being, perhaps, too general and looſe a rule, let me add, that if one would conſider money and land alone, in relation one to another, perhaps it is now at ſix per cent. in as good a proportion as is poſſible; ſix per cent. being a little higher than land at twenty years purchaſe, which is the rate pretty near, that land has generally carried in England, it never being much over, nor under. For ſuppoſing 100l. in money, and land of 5l. per ann. be of equal value, which is land at twenty years purchaſe; it is neceſſary for the making their value truly equal, that they ſhould produce an equal income, which the 100l. at 5l. per cent. intereſt is not likely to do.

1. Because of the many, and ſometimes long intervals of barrenneſs, which happen to money more than land. Money at uſe, when returned into the hands of the owner, uſually lies dead there, till he gets a new tenant for it, and can put it out again; and all this time it produces nothing. But this happens not to land, the growing product whereof turns to account to the owner, even when it is in his hands, or is allowed for by the tenant, antecedently to his entering upon the farm. For though a man, that borrows money at Midſummer, never begins to pay his intereſt from our Lady-day, or one moment backwards; yet he, who rents a farm at Midſummer, may have as much reaſon to begin his rent from our Lady-day, as if he had then entered upon it.

2. Besides the dead intervals of ceaſing profit, which happen to money more than land, there is another reaſon why the profit and income of money lett out, ſhould be a little higher than that of land; and that is, becauſe money out at intereſt, runs a greater riſque than land does. The borrower may break, and run away with the money, and then not only the intereſt due, but

all the future profit, with the principal, is loſt for ever. But in land a man can loſe but the rent due, for which uſually too the ſtock upon the land is ſufficient ſecurity: and, if a tenant run away in arrear of ſome rent, the land remains; that cannot be carried away or loſt. Should a man purchaſe good land in Middleſex of 5l. per ann. at twenty years purchaſe, and other land in Rumney-marſh, or elſewhere, of the ſame yearly value, but ſo ſituated, that it were in danger to be ſwallowed of the ſea, and be utterly loſt, it would not be unreaſonable, that he ſhould expect to have it under twenty years purchaſe; ſuppoſe ſixteen and an half: this is to bring it to juſt the caſe of land at twenty years purchaſe; and money at ſix per cent. where the uncertainty of ſecuring one's money may well be allowed that advantage of greater profit; and therefore, perhaps, the legal intereſt now in England at ſix per cent. is as reaſonable and convenient a rate as can well be ſet by a ſtanding rule, eſpecially if we conſider that the law requires not a man to pay ſix per cent. but ties up the lender from taking more. So that if ever it falls of itſelf, the monied-man is ſure to find it, and his intereſt will be brought down to it.

HIGH intereſt is thought by ſome a prejudice to trade: but if we look back, we ſhall find, that England never throve ſo well, nor was there ever brought into England ſo great an increaſe of wealth ſince, as in queen Elizabeth's and king James I. and king Charles I. time, when money was at ten and eight per cent. I will not ſay high intereſt was the cauſe of it. For I rather think that our thriving trade was the cauſe of high intereſt, every one craving money to employ in a profitable commerce. But this, I think, I may reaſonably infer from it, That lowering of intereſt is not a ſure way to improve either our trade or wealth.

TO this I hear ſome ſay, That the Dutch, ſkilful in all arts of promoting trade, to out-do us in this, as well as all other advancements of it, have obſerved this rule, viz. That when we fell intereſt in England from ten to eight, they preſently ſunk intereſt in Holland to four per cent. And again, when we lowered it to ſix, they fell it to three per cent. thereby to keep the advantage, which the lowneſs of intereſt gives to trade. From whence theſe men readily conclude, That the falling of intereſt will advance trade in England. To which I anſwer,

1. THAT this looks like an argument rather made for the preſent occaſion, to miſlead thoſe who are credulous enough to ſwallow it, than ariſing from true reaſon, and matter of fact. For, if lowering of intereſt were ſo advantageous to trade, why did the Dutch ſo conſtantly take their meaſures only by us, and not as well by ſome other of their neighbours, with whom they have as great, or greater commerce than with us? This is enough, at firſt ſight, to make one ſuſpect this to be duſt, only raiſed to throw in people's eyes, and a ſuggeſtion made to ſerve a purpoſe. For,

2. IT will not be ſound true, That, when we abated intereſt here in England to eight, the Dutch ſunk it in Holland to four per cent. by law; or that there was any law made in Holland to limit the rate of intereſt to three per cent. when we reduced it in England to ſix. It is true, John de Witt, when he managed the affairs of Holland, ſetting himſelf to leſſen the publick debts,

and having actually paid ſome, and getting money in a readineſs to pay others, ſent notice to all the creditors, that thoſe, who would not take four per cent. ſhould come and receive their money. The creditors finding him in earneſt, and knowing not how otherwiſe to employ their money, accepted his terms, and changed their obligations into four per cent. whereas before they were at five, and ſo (the great loans of the country being to the ſtate) it might be ſaid in this ſenſe, That the rate of intereſt was reduced lower at that time: but that it was done by a law, forbidding to take higher intereſt than four per cent. that I deny, and require any one to ſhew. Indeed, upon good ſecurity, one might lately have borrowed money in Holland at three, and three and an half per cent. but not by virtue of any law, but the natural rate of intereſt. And I appeal to the men, learned in the law of Holland, whether laſt year (and I doubt not but it is ſo ſtill) a man might not lawfully lend his money for what intereſt he could get, and whether in the courts he ſhould not recover the intereſt he contracted for, if it were ten per cent. So that, if money be to be borrowed by honeſt and reſponſible men, at three, or three and an half per cent. it is not by the force of ſtatutes and edicts, but by the natural courſe of things; which will always bring intereſt upon good ſecurity low, where there is a great deal of money to be lent, and little good ſecurity, in proportion, to be had. Holland is a country, where the land makes a very little part of the ſtock of the country. Trade is their great fund; and their eſtates lie generally in money: ſo that all, who are not traders, generally ſpeaking, are lenders: of which there are ſo many, whoſe income depends upon intereſt, that if the States were not mightily in debt, but paid every one their principal, inſtead of the four per cent. uſe, which they give, there would be ſo much more money than could be uſed, or would be ventured in trade, that money there would be at two per cent, or under, unleſs they found a way to put it out in foreign countries.

INTEREST, I grant theſe men, is low in Holland: but it is ſo, not as an effect of law, or the politick contrivance of the government, to promote trade; but as the conſequence of great plenty of ready money, when their intereſt firſt fell. I ſay, when it firſt fell: for being once brought low, and the publick having borrowed a great part of private men's money, and continuing in debt, it muſt continue ſo, though the plenty of money, which firſt brought intereſt low, were very much decayed, and a great part of their wealth were really gone. For the debt of the ſtate affording to the creditors a conſtant yearly income, that is looked on as a ſafe revenue, and accounted as valuable as if it were in land; and accordingly they buy it one of another: and whether there be any money in the publick coffers or no, he, who has to the value of ten thouſand pounds owing him from the States, may ſell it every day in the week, and have ready money for it: this credit is ſo great an advantage to private men, who know not elſe what to do with their ſtocks, that, were the States now in a condition to begin to pay their debts, the creditors, rather than take their money out, to lie dead by them, would let it ſtay in, at lower intereſt, as they did ſome years ſince, when thev were called on to come and receive their money. This is the ſtate of intereſt in Holland: their plenty of money, and paying their publick debts, ſome time ſince lowered their intereſt. But it was not done by the command and limitation of a law, nor in conſequence of our reducing it here by law to ſix per cent. For I deny, that there is any law there yet, to forbid lending of money for above three, or ſix, or ten per cent. Whatever ſome here ſuggeſt, every one there may hire out his money, as freely as he does any thing elſe, for what rate he can get; and the bargain being made, the law will enforce the borrower to pay it.

I GRANT low intereſt, where all men conſent to it, is an advantage to trade, if merchants will regulate their gains accordingly, and men be perſuaded to lend to them: but can it be expected, when the publick gives ſeven or eight, or ten per cent. that private men, whoſe ſecurity is certainly no better, ſhall have for four? And can there be any thing ſtranger, than that the ſame men, who look on, and therefore allow high uſe as an encouragement to lending to the Chequer, ſhould think low uſe ſhould bring money into trade? The States of Holland, ſome few years ſince, paid but four per cent. for the money they owed: if you propoſe them for an example, and intereſt be to be regulated by a law, try whether you can do ſo here, and bring men to lend it to the publick at that rate. This would be a benefit to the kingdom, and abate a great part of our publick charge. If you cannot do that, confeſs, that it is not the law in Holland has brought the intereſt there ſo low, but ſomething elſe, and that which will make the States, or any body elſe, pay dearer now, if either their credit be leſs, or money there ſcarcer.

AN infallible ſign of your decay of wealth is the falling of rents, and the raiſing of them would be worth the nation's care; for in that, and not in the falling of intereſt, lies the true advantage of the landed-man, and with him of the publick. It may be therefore, not beſides our preſent buſineſs, to enquire into the cauſe of the falling of rents in England.

1. EITHER the land is grown barrener, and ſo the product is leſs, and conſequently the money to be received for that product is leſs. For it is evident, that he whoſe land was wont to produce 100 buſhels of wheat, *communibus annis*, if by long tillage and huſbandry it will now produce but 50 buſhels, the rent will be abated half. But this cannot be ſuppoſed general.

2. OR the rent of that land is leſſened. 1. Becauſe the uſe of the commodity ceaſes: as the rents muſt fall in Virginia, were taking of tobacco forbid in England. 2. Or becauſe ſomething elſe ſupplies the room of that product: as the rate of coppice lands will fall upon the diſcovery of coal mines. 3. Or, becauſe the markets are ſupplied with the ſame commodity cheaper from another place: as the breeding counties of England muſt needs fall their rents, by the importation of Iriſh cattle. 4. Or, becauſe a tax laid on your native commodities, makes what the farmer ſells cheaper; and labour, and what he buys, dearer.

3. OR, the money in the country is leſs. For the exigencies and uſes of money not leſſening with its quantity, and it being in the ſame proportion to be employed and diſtributed ſtill, in all the parts of its circulation, ſo much as its quantity is leſſened, ſo much muſt the ſhare of every one that has a

right to this money be the leſs; whether he be landholder, for his goods; or labourer, for his hire; or merchant, for his brokerage. Though the landholder uſually finds it firſt. Becauſe money failing, and falling ſhort, people have not ſo much money as formerly to lay out, and ſo leſs money is brought to market, by which the price of things muſt neceſſarily fall. The labourer feels it next. For, when the landholder's rent falls, he muſt either bate the labourer's wages, or not employ, or not pay him; which either way makes him feel the want of money. The merchant feels it laſt. For though he ſells leſs, and at a lower rate, he buys alſo our native commodities, which he exports at a lower rate too: and will be ſure to leave our native commodities unbought, upon the hands of the farmer, or manufacturer, rather than export them to a market, which will not afford him returns with profit.

If one third of the money employed in trade, were locked up, or gone out of England, muſt not the landholders neceſſarily receive one third leſs for their goods, and conſequently rents fall; a leſs quantity of money by one third being to be diſtributed amongſt an equal number of receivers? Indeed, people not perceiving the money to be gone, are apt to be jealous one of another; and each ſuſpecting another's inequality of gain to rob him of his ſhare, every one will be employing his ſkill, and power, the beſt he can, to retrieve it again, and to bring money into his pocket, in the ſame plenty as formerly. But this is but ſcrambling amongſt ourſelves, and helps no more againſt our want, than the pulling off a ſhort coverlet will, amongſt children that lie together, preſerve them all from the cold. Some will ſtarve, unleſs the father of the family provide better, and enlarge the ſcanty covering. This pulling and conteſt is uſually between the landed-man and the merchant. For the labourer's ſhare, being ſeldom more than a bare ſubſiſtence, never allows that body of men, time, or opportunity to raiſe their thoughts above that, or ſtruggle with the richer for theirs, (as one common intereſt) unleſs when ſome common and great diſtreſs, uniting them in one univerſal ferment, makes them forget reſpect, and emboldens them to carve to their wants with armed force: and then ſometimes they break in upon the rich, and ſweep all like a deluge. But this rarely happens but in the male-adminiſtration of neglected, or miſmanaged government.

The uſual ſtruggle and conteſt, as I ſaid before, in the decays of wealth and riches, is between the landed-man, and the merchant, with whom I may here join the monied-man. The landed-man finds himſelf aggrieved, by the falling of his rents, and the ſtreightning of his fortune, whilſt the monied-man keeps up his gain, and the merchant thrives and grows rich by trade. Theſe, he thinks, ſteal his income into their pockets, build their fortunes upon his ruin, and ingroſs more of the riches of the nation than comes to their ſhare. He, therefore, endeavours, by laws, to keep up the value of lands which he ſuſpects leſſened by the other's exceſs of profit: but all in vain. The cauſe is miſtaken, and the remedy too. It is not the merchant's nor monied-man's gains that makes land fall: but the want of money and leſſening of our treaſure, waſted by extravagant expences, and a miſmanaged trade, which the land always firſt feels. If the landed-gentleman will have, and by his example make it faſhionable to have, more claret, ſpice, ſilk, and other foreign conſumable wares, than our exportation of commodities does exchange for; money muſt unavoidably follow to balance the account, and pay the debt. And therefore, I fear that another propoſal I hear talked of, to hinder the exportation of money and bullion, will ſhew more our need of care to keep our money from going from us, than a way and method how to preſerve it here.

It is death in Spain to export money: and yet they, who furniſh all the world with gold and ſilver, have leaſt of it amongſt themſelves. Trade fetches it away from that lazy and indigent people, notwithſtanding all their artificial and forced contrivances to keep it there. It follows trade, againſt the rigour of their laws; and their want of foreign commodities makes it openly be carried out at noon-day. Nature has beſtowed mines on ſeveral parts of the world: but their riches are only for the induſtrious and frugal. Whomſoever elſe they viſit, it is with the diligent and ſober only they ſtay. And if the virtue and provident way of living of our anceſtors (content with our native conveniencies of life, without the coſtly itch after the materials of pride and luxury from abroad) were brought in faſhion and countenance again amongſt us; this alone would do more to keep and increaſe our wealth, and enrich our land, than all our paper helps, about intereſt, money, bullion, &c. which however eagerly we may catch at, will not, I fear, without better huſbandry, keep us from ſinking, whatever contrivances we may have recourſe to. It is with a kingdom as with a family. Spending leſs than our own commodities will pay for, is the ſure and only way for the nation to grow rich. And when that begins once ſeriouſly to be conſidered, and our faces and ſteps are in earneſt turned that way, we may hope to have our rents riſe, and the publick ſtock thrive again. Till then, we in vain, I fear, endeavour with noiſe, and weapons of law, to drive the wolf from our own to one another's doors: the breed ought to be extirpated out of the iſland. For want, brought in by ill management, and nurſed up by expenſive vanity, will make the nation poor and ſpare no body.

If three millions were neceſſary for the carrying on the trade of England, whereof one million were for the landholder to maintain him; another were for the payment of the labourer and handicraftſman: and the third were the ſhare of the brokers, coming to them for their care and pains in diſtributing; if one million of this money were gone out of the kingdom, muſt there not be one third leſs to be ſhared amongſt them for the product of their land, their labour and their diſtribution? I do not ſay they will feel it at the ſame time. But the landholder having nothing, but what the product of his land will yield; and the buyer, according to the plenty, or ſcarcity of money he has, always ſetting the price upon what is offered to ſale; the landholder muſt be content to take the market-rate for what he brings thither; which always following the ſcarcity or plenty of money, if any part of our money be gone, he is ſure firſt to find it in the price of his commodities. For the broker and merchant, though he ſell cheaper, yet he buys cheaper too: and he will be ſure to get by his returns, or let alone a commodity, which will not produce him gain: and whatſoever is ſo alone, and left upon hands, always turns to the landholder's loſs.

Supposing that of our woollen manufacture, foreign markets took off one half, and the other half were conſumed amongſt ourſelves: if a ſenſible part (as one third) of our coin were gone, and ſo men had equally one third leſs money than they had, (for, it is certain, it muſt be tantamount, and what I eſcape of one third leſs, another muſt make up) it would follow, that they would have leſs to lay out in cloaths, as well as other things, and ſo would wear them longer, or pay leſs for them. If a clothier finds a want of vent, he muſt either ſell cheaper, or not at all; if he ſell cheaper, he muſt alſo pay leſs, both for wooll and labour; and if the labourer hath leſs wages, he muſt alſo pay leſs for corn, butter, cheeſe, fleſh, or elſe forbear ſome of theſe quite. In all which caſes, the price of wooll, corn, fleſh, and the other products of land are brought down, and the land bears the greateſt part of the loſs. For where-ever the conſumption, or vent of any commodity is ſtopt, there the ſtop continues on, till it comes to the landholder. And, where-ever the price of any commodity begins to fall, how many hands ſoever there be between that and the landholder, they all take repriſals one upon another, till at laſt it comes to the landholder; and there the abatement of price, of any of his commodities, leſſens his income, and is a clear loſs. The owner of land, which produces the commodity, and the laſt buyer who conſumes it, are the two extremes in commerce. And though the falling of any ſort of commodity in the landholder's hand does not prove ſo to the laſt conſumer, the arts of intervening brokers and ingroſſers keeping up the price to their own advantage, yet, whenever want of money, or want of deſire in the conſumer, make the price low, that immediately reaches the firſt producer: nobody between having any intereſt to keep it up.

Now as to the two firſt cauſes of falling of rents, falling of intereſt has no influence at all. In the latter it has a great part, becauſe it makes the money of England leſs, by making both Engliſhmen and foreigners withdraw, or withhold their money. For that which is not let looſe into trade, is all one whilſt hoarded up, as if it were not in being.

I have heard it brought for a reaſon, why intereſt ſhould be reduced to four per cent. "That thereby the landholder, who bears the burden of the "publick charge, may be in ſome degree eaſed by the falling of intereſt."

This argument will be put right, if you ſay it will eaſe the borrower, and lay the loſs on the lender: but it concerns not the land in general, unleſs you will ſuppoſe all landholders in debt. But I hope we may yet think that men in England, who have land, have money too; and that landed-men, as well as others, by their providence and good huſbandry, accommodating their expences to their income, keep themſelves from going backwards in the world.

That which is urged, as moſt deſerving conſideration and remedy in the caſe is, "That it is hard and unreaſonable, that one, who has mortgaged

" half his land, ſhould yet pay taxes for the whole, whilſt the mortgagee " goes away with the clear profit of an high intereſt." To this I anſwer:

1. THAT, if any man has run himſelf in debt for the ſervice of his country, it is fit the publick ſhould reimburſe him, and ſet him free. This is a care that becomes the publick juſtice, That men, if they receive no rewards, ſhould at leaſt be kept from ſuffering, in having ſerved their country. But I do not remember the polity of any nation, who altered their conſtitution in favour of thoſe, whoſe miſmanagement had brought them behind-hand; poſſibly, as thinking the publick little beholden to thoſe, who had miſemployed the ſtock of their country in the exceſs of their private expences, and, by their example, ſpread a faſhion, that carries ruin with it. Men's paying taxes of mortgaged lands, is a puniſhment for ill huſbandry, which ought to be diſcouraged: but it concerns very little the frugal and the thrifty.

2. ANOTHER thing to be ſaid in reply to this, is, That it is with gentlemen in the country, as with tradeſmen in the city. If they will own titles to greater eſtates than really they have, it is their own faults, and there is no way left to help them from paying for them. The remedy is in their own hands, to diſcharge themſelves when they pleaſe. And when they have once ſold their land, and paid their debts, they will no longer pay taxes for what they own, without being really theirs. There is another way alſo, whereby they may be relieved, as well as a great many other inconveniencies remedied; and that is by a regiſtry: for if the mortgages were regiſtered, land-taxes might reach them, and order the lender to pay his proportion.

I HAVE met with patrons of four per cent. who (amongſt many other fine things they tell us of) affirm, " That if intereſt were reduced to four per " cent. then ſome men would borrow money at this low rate, and pay their " debts; others would borrow more than they now do, and improve their " land; others would borrow more, and employ it in trade and manufacture." Gilded words indeed, were there any thing ſubſtantial in them! Theſe men talk, as if they meant to ſhew us, not only the wiſdom, but the riches of Solomon, and would make gold and ſilver as common as ſtones in the ſtreet: but at laſt, I fear, it will be but wit without money, and I wiſh it amount to that. It is without queſtion, that could the countryman and the tradeſman take up money cheaper than now they do, every man would be forward to borrow, and deſire that he might have other men's money to employ to his advantage. I confeſs, thoſe who contend for four per cent. have found out a way to ſet men's mouths a watering for money at that rate, and to increaſe the number of borrowers in England; if any body can imagine it would be an advantage to increaſe them. But to anſwer all their fine projects, I have but this one ſhort queſtion to aſk them: will four per cent. increaſe the number of the lenders? If it will not, as any man at the very firſt hearing will ſhrewdly ſuſpect it will not, then all the plenty of money, theſe conjurers beſtow upon us, for improvement of land, paying of debts, and advancement of trade, is but like the gold and ſilver, which old women believe other conjurers beſtow ſometimes, by whole lapfuls, on poor credulous girls, which, when they bring to the light, is found to be nothing but withered leaves; and the poſſeſſors of it are ſtill as much in want of money as ever.

Indeed, I grant it would be well for England, and I wiſh it were ſo, that the plenty of money were ſo great amongſt us, that every man could borrow, as much as he could uſe in trade, for four per cent. nay, that men could borrow as much as they could employ for ſix per cent. But even at that rate, the borrowers already are far more than the lenders. Why elſe doth the merchant upon occaſion, pay ſix per cent. and often above that rate for brokage? And why doth the country gentleman of 1000l. per ann. find it ſo difficult, with all the ſecurity he can bring, to take up 1000l. All which proceeds from the ſcarcity of money, and bad ſecurity; two cauſes which will not be leſs powerful, to hinder borrowing, after the lowering of intereſt; and I do not ſee how any one can imagine that reducing uſe to four per cent. ſhould abate their force, or how leſſening the reward of the lender, without diminiſhing his riſque, ſhould make him more forward and ready to lend. So that theſe men, whilſt they talk, that at four per cent. men would take up and employ more money to the publick advantage, do but pretend to multiply the number of borrowers among us, of which it is certain we have too many already. While they thus ſet men a longing for the golden days of four per cent. methinks they uſe the poor indigent debtor, and needy tradeſman, as I have ſeen prating jackdaws do ſometimes their young, who kawing and fluttering about the neſt, ſet all their young ones a gaping; but, having nothing in their empty mouths but noiſe and air, leave them as hungry as before.

It is true, theſe men have found out by a cunning project, how, by the reſtraint of a law, to make the price of money one third cheaper, and then they tell John a Nokes that he ſhall have 10,000l. of it to employ in merchandize, or cloathing; and John a Stiles ſhall have 20,000l. more to pay his debts; and ſo diſtribute this money as freely as Diego did his legacies, which they are to have, even where they can get them. But till theſe men can inſtruct the forward borrowers, where they ſhall be furniſhed, they have perhaps done ſomething to increaſe men's deſire, but not made money one jot eaſier to come by. And, till they do that, all this ſweet jingling of money, in their diſcourſes, goes juſt to the tune of, "If all the world were oatmeal." Methink theſe undertakers, whilſt they have put men in hopes of borrowing more plentifully, at eaſier rates, for the ſupply of their wants and trades, had done better to have bethought themſelves of a way how men need not borrow upon uſe at all: for this would be much more advantageous, and altogether as feaſible. It is as eaſy to diſtribute twenty pair of ſhoes amongſt thirty men, if they pay nothing for them at all, as if they paid 4 s. a pair; ten of them (notwithſtanding the ſtatute-rate ſhould be reduced from 6 s. to 4 s. a pair) will be neceſſitated to ſit ſtill barefoot, as much as if they were to pay nothing for ſhoes at all. Juſt ſo it is in a country, that wants money in proportion to trade. It is as eaſy to contrive how every man ſhall be ſupplied with what money he needs (i. e. can employ in improvement of land, paying his debts, and returns of his trade) for nothing, as for four per cent. Either we have already more money than the owners will lend, or we have not. If part of the money, which is now in England, will not be lent at the rate intereſt is at preſent at, will men be more ready to lend, and borrowers be furniſhed for all thoſe brave purpoſes, more plentifully, when money is brought to four per cent.? If people do already lend all the money they have, above their own occaſions, whence are thoſe, who will borrow more at four per cent. to be ſupplied? Or is there ſuch plenty of money, and ſcarcity of borrowers, that there needs the reducing of intereſt to four per cent. to bring men to take it?

All the imaginable ways of increaſing money in any country, are theſe two: either to dig it in the mines of our own, or get it from our neighbours. That four per cent. is not of the nature of the deuſing-rod, or virgula divina, able to diſcover mines of gold and ſilver, I believe will eaſily be granted me. The way of getting from foreigners, is either by force, borrowing, or trade. And whatever ways, beſides theſe, men may fancy, or propoſe, for increaſing of money, (except they intend to ſet up for the philoſopher's ſtone) would be much the ſame with a diſtracted man's device, that I knew, who, in the beginning of his diſtemper, firſt diſcovered himſelf to be out of his wits, by getting together and boiling a great number of groats, with a deſign, as he ſaid, to make them plim, i. e. grow thicker. That four per cent. will raiſe armies, diſcipline ſoldiers, and make men valiant, and fitter to conquer countries, and enrich themſelves with the ſpoils, I think was never pretended. And that it will not bring in more of our neighbour's money upon loan, than we have at preſent among us, is ſo viſible in itſelf, that it will not need any proof; the contenders for four per cent. looking upon it as an undeniable truth, and making uſe of it as an argument, to ſhew the advantage it will be to the nation, by leſſening the uſe paid to foreigners, who upon falling of uſe will take home their money. And, for the laſt way of increaſing our money, by promoting of trade, how much lowering of intereſt is the way to that, I have, I ſuppoſe, ſhewed you already.

Having lately met with a little tract, entituled, "A Letter to "a friend concerning uſury," printed this preſent year, 1690; which gives in ſhort, the arguments of ſome treatiſes, printed many years ſince, for the lowering of intereſt; it may not be amiſs briefly to conſider them.

"1. An high intereſt decays trade. The advantage from intereſt is greater "than the profit from trade, which makes the rich merchants give "over, and put out their ſtock to intereſt, and the leſſer merchants break."

Anſw. This was printed in 1621, when intereſt was at ten per cent. And whether England had ever a more flouriſhing trade than at that time, muſt be left to the judgment of thoſe, who have conſidered the growing ſtrength and riches of this kingdom in queen Elizabeth's and king James I's reigns. Not that I impute it to high intereſt, but to other cauſes, I have mentioned, wherein uſury had nothing to do. But if this be thought an argument now in 1690, when the legal intereſt is ſix per cent. I deſire thoſe, who think fit to make uſe of it, to name thoſe rich merchants, who have given over, and put out their ſtocks to intereſt.

2. "INTEREST being at ten per cent. and in Holland at ſix, our neighbour merchants underſell us."

Anſw. THE legal intereſt being here now at ſix per cent. and in Holland not limited by law, our neighbour merchants underſell us, becauſe they live more frugally, and are content with leſs profit.

3. "INTEREST being lower in Holland than in England, their contributions to war, works of piety, and all charges of the ſtate, are cheaper to them than to us."

Anſw. THIS needs a little explication. Contributions, greater or leſs, I underſtand: but contributions cheaper or dearer, I confeſs I do not. If they manage their wars and charges cheaper than we, the blame is not to be laid on high or low intereſt.

4. "INTEREST being ſo high, prevents the building of ſhipping, which is the ſtrength and ſafety of our iſland, moſt merchant-ſhips being built in Holland."

Anſw. THOUGH this argument be now gone, ſuch ſhips being prohibited by a law, I will help the author to one as good. The Dutch buy our rapeſeed, make it into oil, bring it back to us, and ſell it with advantage. This may be as well ſaid to be from high intereſt here, and low there. But the truth is, the induſtry and frugality of that people, makes them content to work cheaper, and ſell at leſs profit than their neighbours, and ſo get the trade from them.

5. "THE high rate of uſury makes land ſell ſo cheap, being not worth more than fourteen or fifteen years purchaſe; whereas in Holland, where intereſt is at ſix, it is worth above twenty-five. So that a low intereſt raiſes the price of land. Where money is dear, land is cheap."

Anſw. THIS argument plainly confeſſes, that there is ſomething elſe regulates the price of land, beſides the rate of intereſt; elſe, when money was at ten per cent. here, ſhould land have been at ten years purchaſe, whereas he confeſſes it then to have been at fourteen or fifteen. One may ſuppoſe, to favour his hypotheſis, he was not forward to ſpeak the moſt of it. And intereſt, as he ſays, being at ſix per cent. in Holland, land there ſhould have ſold, by that rule, for ſixteen and an half years purchaſe; whereas he ſays, it was worth about twenty-five. And Mr. Manly ſays, p. 33. "That money in France being at ſeven per cent. noble land ſells for thirty-four and thirty-five years purchaſe, and ordinary land for twenty-five." So that the true concluſion from hence is, not what our author makes, but this; That it is not the legal intereſt, but ſomething elſe, that governs the rate of land. I grant his poſition, That where money is dear, land is cheap, and vice verſa. But it muſt be ſo by the natural, not legal intereſt. For, where money will be lent on good ſecurity, at four or five per cent. it is a demonſtration that there is more than will be ventured on ordinary credit in trade. And when this plenty becomes general, it is a ſign there is more money than can be employed in trade; which cannot but put many upon ſeeking purchaſes, to lay it out in land, and ſo raiſe the price of land, by making more buyers than ſellers.

6. "It is not probable lenders will call in their money, when they cannot "make greater intereſt any where. Beſides, their ſecurity upon land will be "better."

Anſw. Some unſkilful and timorous men will call in their money; others put it into the banker's hands. But the bankers and ſkilful will keep it up, and not lend it, but at the natural uſe, as we have ſhewn. But how ſecurities will be mended, by lowering of intereſt, is, I confeſs, beyond my comprehenſion.

## Of raiſing our Coin.

Being now upon the conſideration of intereſt and money, give me leave to ſay one word more on this occaſion, which may not be wholly unſeaſonable at this time. I hear a talk up and down of raiſing our money, as a means to retain our wealth, and keep our money from being carried away. I wiſh thoſe, that uſe the phraſe of raiſing our money, had ſome clear notion annexed to it; and that then they would examine, "Whether, that being "true, it would at all ſerve to thoſe ends, for which it is propoſed?"

The raiſing of money, then, ſignifies one of theſe two things; either raiſing the value of our money, or raiſing the denomination of our coin.

The raiſing the value of money, or any thing elſe, is nothing, but the making a leſs quantity of it exchange for any other thing, than would have been taken for it before, v. g. If 5 s. will exchange for, or, (as we call it) buy a buſhel of wheat; if you can make 4 s. buy another buſhel of the ſame wheat, it is plain the value of your money is raiſed, in reſpect of wheat, one fifth. But thus nothing can raiſe, or fall the value of your money, but the proportion of its plenty, or ſcarcity, in proportion to the plenty, ſcarcity, or vent of any other commodity, with which you compare it, or for which you would exchange it. And thus ſilver, which makes the intrinſick value of money, compared with itſelf, under any ſtamp, or denomination of the ſame, or different countries, cannot be raiſed. For an ounce of ſilver, whether in pence, groats, or crown-pieces, ſtivers, or ducatoons, or in bullion, is and always eternally will be, of equal value to any other ounce of ſilver, under what ſtamp, or denomination ſoever; unleſs it can be ſhewn that any ſtamp can add any new or better qualities to one parcel of ſilver, which another parcel of ſilver wants.

Silver, therefore, being always of equal value to ſilver, the value of coin, compared with coin, is greater, leſs, or equal, only as it has more, leſs, or equal ſilver in it: and in this reſpect, you can by no manner of way raiſe, or fall your money. Indeed moſt of the ſilver of the world, both in money and veſſels, being alloyed, (i. e. mixed with ſome baſer metals) fine ſilver, (i. e. ſilver ſeparated from all alloy) is uſually dearer than ſo much ſilver alloyed, or mixed with baſer metals. Becauſe, beſides the weight of the ſilver, thoſe who have need of fine (i. e. unmixed ſilver; as gilders, wire-drawers, &c.) muſt, according to their need, beſides an equal weight of ſilver, mixed with other metals, give an overplus to reward the refiner's ſkill and pains. And in this caſe, fine ſilver, and alloyed or mixed ſilver, are conſidered as two diſtinct commodities. But no money being coined here, or almoſt any where, of pure, fine ſilver, this concerns not the value of money at all; wherein an equal quantity of ſilver is always of the ſame value with an equal quantity of ſilver, let the ſtamp, or denomination be what it will.

All then, that can be done in this great myſtery of raiſing money, is only to alter the denomination, and call that a crown now, which before, by the law, was but a part of a crown. For example: ſuppoſing, according to the ſtandard of our law, 5 s. or a crown, were to weigh an ounce, (as it does now, wanting about 16 grains) whereof one twelfth were copper, and eleven twelfths ſilver, (for there-abouts it is) it is plain here, it is the quantity of ſilver gives the value to it. For let another piece be coined of the ſame weight, wherein half the ſilver is taken out, and copper, or other alloy, put into the place, every one knows it will be worth but half as much. For the value of the alloy is ſo inconſiderable as not to be reckoned. This crown now muſt be raiſed, and from henceforth our crown-pieces, coined one twentieth lighter; which is nothing but changing the denomination, calling that a crown now, which yeſterday was was but a part, viz. nineteen twentieths of a crown; whereby you have only raiſed 19 parts to the denomination formerly given to 20. For I think no body can be ſo ſenſeleſs as to imagine, that 19 grains, or ounces of ſilver can be raiſed to the value of 20; or that 19 grains, or ounces of ſilver ſhall at the ſame time exchange for, or buy as much corn, oil, or wine, as 20; which is to raiſe it to the value of 20. For if 19 ounces of ſilver can be worth 20 ounces of ſilver, or pay for as much of any other commodity, then 18, 10, or one ounce may do the ſame. For, if the abating one twentieth of the quantity of the ſilver of any coin, does not leſſen its value, the abating nineteen twentieths of the quantity of the ſilver of any coin, will not abate its value. And ſo a ſingle three-pence, or a ſingle penny, being called a crown, will buy as much ſpice, or ſilk, or any other commodity, as a crown-piece, which contains 20 or 60 times as much ſilver: which is an abſurdity ſo great, that I think no body will want eyes to ſee, and ſenſe to diſown.

Now this raiſing your money, or giving a leſs quantity of ſilver the ſtamp and denomination of a greater, may be done two ways.

1. By raiſing one ſpecies of your money.

2. By raiſing all your ſilver coin, at once, proportionably; which is the thing, I ſuppoſe, now propoſed.

1. The raiſing of one ſpecies of your coin, beyond its intrinſick value, is done by coining any one ſpecies, (which in account bears ſuch a proportion to the other ſpecies of your coin) with leſs ſilver in it, than is required by that value it bears in your money.

For example: a crown with us goes for 60 pence, a ſhilling for 12 pence, a teſter for 6 pence, and a groat for 4 pence: and accordingly, the proportion

tion of ſilver in each of them, ought to be as 60, 12, 6, and 4. Now, if in the mint there ſhould be coined groats, or teſters, that being of the ſame alloy with our other money, had but two thirds of the weight, that thoſe ſpecies are coined at now; or elſe, being of the ſame weight, were ſo alloyed, as to have one third of the ſilver, required by the preſent ſtandard, changed into copper, and ſhould thus, by law, be made current; (the reſt of your ſilver money being kept to the preſent ſtandard in weight and fineneſs) it is plain, thoſe ſpecies would be raiſed one third part; that paſſing for 6d. which had but the ſilver of 4 d. in it; and would be all one, as if a groat ſhould by law be made current for 6d. and every 6d. in payment paſs for 9d. This is truly raiſing theſe ſpecies: but is no more in effect, than if the mint ſhould coin clipped money. And has, beſides the cheat that is put by ſuch baſe, or light money, on every particular man that receives it, that he wants one third of that real value, which the publick ought to ſecure him, in the money it obliges him to receive, as lawful and current. It has, I ſay, this great and unavoidable inconvenience to the publick; that, beſides the opportunity it gives to domeſtick coiners to cheat you with lawful money, it puts it into the hands of foreigners to fetch away your money, without any commodities for it. For if they find that two-penny weight of ſilver, marked with a certain impreſſion, ſhall here in England be equivalent to 3 d. weight marked with another impreſſion, they will not fail to ſtamp pieces of that faſhion; and ſo importing that baſe and low coin, will, here in England, receive 3 d. for 2d. and quickly carry away your ſilver in exchange for copper, or barely the charge of coinage.

THIS is unavoidable in all countries, where any one ſpecies of their money is diſproportionate in its intrinſick value, (i. e. in its due proportion of ſilver to the reſt of the money of that country) an inconvenience ſo certainly attending the allowance of any baſe ſpecies of money to be current, that the king of France could not avoid it, with all his watchfulneſs. For though, by edict, he made his 4 ſols pieces (whereof 15 were to paſs for a French crown, though 20 of them had not ſo much ſilver in them, as was in a French crown-piece) paſs in the inland parts of his kingdom, 15 for a crown in all payments; yet he durſt not make them current in the ſea-port towns, for fear that ſhould give an opportunity to their importation. But yet this caution ſerved not the turn: they were ſtill imported; and by this means, a great loſs and damage brought upon his country. So that he was forced to cry them down, and ſink them to near their intrinſick value. Whereby a great many particular men, who had quantities of that ſpecies in their hands, loſt a great part of their eſtates; and every one, that had any, loſt proportionably by it.

IF we had groats, or ſix-pences, current by law amongſt us, that wanted one third of the ſilver, which they now have by the ſtandard, to make them of equal value to our other ſpecies of money; who can imagine, that our neighbours would not preſently pour in quantities of ſuch money upon us, to the great loſs and prejudice of the kingdom? The quantity of ſilver, that is in each piece, or ſpecies of coin, being that, which makes its real and intrinſick value, the due proportions of ſilver ought to be kept in each ſpecies, according to the reſpective rate, ſet on each of them by law. And, when this is ever varied from, it is but a trick to ſerve ſome preſent occaſion; but is always with loſs to the country, where the trick is played.

2. The other way of raiſing money is by raiſing all your ſilver coin at once, the proportion of a crown, a ſhilling, and a penny, in reference to one another, being ſtill kept, (viz. That a ſhilling ſhall weigh one fifth of a crown piece, and a penny weight one twelfth of a ſhilling, in ſtandard ſilver) but out of every one of theſe, you abate one twentieth of the ſilver, they were wont to have in them.

If all the ſpecies of money be, as it is called, raiſed, by making each of them to have one twentieth leſs of ſilver in them than formerly; and ſo your whole money be lighter than it was: theſe following will be ſome of the conſequences of it.

1. It will rob all creditors of one twentieth (or 5 per cent.) of their debts, and all landlords one twentieth of their quit-rents for ever; and in all other rents, as far as their former contracts reach, (of 5 per cent.) of their yearly income; and this without any advantage to the debtor, or farmer. For he, receiving no more pounds ſterling for his land, or commodities, in this new lighter coin, than he ſhould have done of your old and weightier money, gets nothing by it. If you ſay, Yes, he will receive more crown, half-crown and ſhilling pieces, for what he now ſells for new money, than he ſhould have done, if the money of the old ſtandard had continued; you confeſs your money is not raiſed in value, but in denomination: ſince what your new pieces want in weight, muſt now be made up in their number. But, which way ſoever this falls, it is certain, the publick (which moſt men think ought to be the only reaſon of changing a ſettled law, and diſturbing the common, current courſe of things) receives not the leaſt profit by it. Nay, as we ſhall ſee by and by, it will be a great charge and loſs to the kingdom. But this, at firſt ſight, is viſible; That in all payments to be received upon precedent contracts, if your money be in effect raiſed, the receiver will loſe 5 per cent. For money having been lent, and leaſes and other bargains made, when money was of the ſame weight and fineneſs, that it is now, upon confidence that under the ſame names of pounds, ſhillings, and pence, they ſhould receive the ſame value, i. e. the ſame quantity of ſilver, by giving the denomination now to leſs quantities of ſilver by one twentieth, you take from them 5 per cent. of their due.

When men go to market, to buy any other commodities with their new, but lighter money, they will find 20 s. of their new money will buy no more of any commodity than 19 would before. For it not being the denomination, but the quantity of ſilver, that gives the value to any coin, 19 grains, or parts, of ſilver, however denominated, or marked, will no more be worth, or paſs for, or buy ſo much of any other commodity, as 20 grains of ſilver will, than 19 s. will paſs for 20 s. If any one thinks a ſhilling, or a crown in name, has its value from the denomination, and not from the quantity of ſilver in it, let it be tried; and hereafter let a penny be called a ſhilling, or a ſhilling be called a crown. I believe no body would be content to receive his debts, or rents in ſuch money: which, though the law ſhould raiſe thus, yet he foreſees he ſhould loſe eleven twelfths by the one, and by the other four fifths of the value he received; and would find his new ſhilling, which had no more ſilver in it than one twelfth of what a ſhilling had before, would buy him of corn, cloth, or wine, but one twelfth of what an old ſhilling would. This is as plainly ſo in the raiſing, as you call it, your crown to 5 s. and 3 d. or (which is the ſame thing) making your crown one twentieth lighter in ſilver. The only difference is, that the loſs is ſo great, (it being eleven twelfths) that every body ſees, and abhors it at firſt propoſal; but, in the other (it being but one twentieth, and covered with the deceitful name of raiſing our money) people do not ſo readily obſerve it. If it be good to raiſe the crown-piece this way, one twentieth this week, I ſuppoſe it will be as good and profitable to raiſe it as much again the next week. For there is no reaſon, why it will not be as good to raiſe it again, another one twentieth, the next week, and ſo on; wherein, if you proceed but ten weeks ſucceſſively, you will, by new-year's day next have every half-crown raiſed to a crown, to the loſs of one half of people's debts and rents, and the king's revenue, beſides the confuſion of all your affairs: and, if you pleaſe to go on in this beneficial way of raiſing your money, you may, by the ſame art, bring a penny-weight of ſilver to be a crown.

Silver, i. e. the quantity of pure ſilver, ſeparable from the alloy, makes the real value of money. If it does not, coin copper with the ſame ſtamp and denomination, and ſee whether it will be of the ſame value. I ſuſpect your ſtamp will make it of no more worth, than the copper money of Ireland is, which is its weight in copper, and no more. That money loſt ſo much to Ireland, as it paſſed for, above the rate of copper. But yet I think no body ſuffered ſo much by it, as he, by whoſe authority it was made current.

If ſilver give the value, you will ſay, What need is there then of the charge of coinage? May not men exchange ſilver by weight, for other things; make their bargains, and keep their accounts in ſilver by weight? This might be done, but it has theſe inconveniencies:

1. The weighing of ſilver to every one we had occaſion to pay it to, would be very troubleſome, for every one muſt carry about ſcales in his pocket.

2. Scales would not do the buſineſs. For, in the next place, every one cannot diſtinguiſh between fine and mixed ſilver: ſo that though he receive the full weight, he was not ſure he received the full weight of ſilver, ſince there might be a mixture of ſome of the baſer metals, which he was not able to diſcern. Thoſe, who have had the care and government of politick ſocieties, introduced coinage, as a remedy to thoſe two inconveniencies. The ſtamp was a warrantry of the publick, that, under ſuch a denomination, they ſhould receive a piece of ſuch a weight, and ſuch a fineneſs; that is, they ſhould receive ſo much ſilver. And this is the reaſon, why the counterfeiting the ſtamp is made the higheſt crime, and has the weight of treaſon laid upon it: becauſe the ſtamp is the publick voucher of the intrinſick value.

The royal authority gives the ſtamp; the law allows and confirms the denomination: and both together give, as it were, the publick faith, as a ſecurity, that ſums of money, contracted for, under ſuch denominations, ſhall be of ſuch a value, that is, ſhall have in them ſo much ſilver. For it is ſilver, and not names, that pays debts, and purchaſes commodities. If therefore, I have contracted for twenty crowns, and the law then has required, that each of thoſe crowns ſhould have an ounce of ſilver; it is certain my bargain is not made good, I am defrauded (and whether the publick faith be not broken with me, I leave to be conſidered) if, paying me twenty crowns, the law allots them to be ſuch as have but nineteen twentieths of the ſilver they ought to have, and really had in them, when I made my contract.

2. It diminiſhes all the king's revenue 5 per cent. For though the ſame number of pounds, ſhillings, and pence are paid into the exchequer, as were wont, yet theſe names being given to coin that have each of them one twentieth leſs of ſilver in them; and that being not a ſecret concealed from ſtrangers, no more than from his own ſubjects, they will ſell the king no more pitch, tar or hemp, for 20 ſhillings, after the raiſing your money, than they would before for 19: or, to ſpeak in the ordinary phraſe, they will raiſe their commodities 5 per cent. as you have raiſed your money 5 per cent. And it is well if they ſtop there. For uſually in ſuch changes, an outcry being made of your leſſening your coin, thoſe, who have to deal with you, taking the advantage of the alarm, to ſecure themſelves from any loſs by your new trick, raiſe their price even beyond the par of your leſſening your coin.

I hear of two inconveniencies complained of, which it is propoſed by this project to remedy.

The one is, the melting down of our coin: the other, The carrying away of our bullion. Theſe are both inconveniencies which, I fear, we lie under: but neither of them will be in the leaſt removed, or prevented, by the propoſed alteration of our money.

1. It is paſt doubt that our money is melted down. The reaſon whereof is evidently the cheapneſs of coinage. For a tax on wine paying the coinage, the particular owners pay nothing for it. So that 100 ounces of ſilver coined, comes to the owner at the ſame rate, as 100 ounces of ſtandard ſilver in bullion. For delivering into the mint his ſilver in bars, he has the ſame quantity of ſilver delivered out to him again in coin, without any charges to him. Whereby, if at any time he has occaſion for bullion, it is the ſame thing to melt down our milled money, as to buy bullion from abroad, or take it in exchange for other commodities. Thus our mint, to the only advantage of our officers, but at the publick coſt, labours in vain, as will be found. But yet this makes you not have one jot leſs money in England, than you would have otherwiſe; but only makes you coin that, which otherwiſe would not have been coined, nor perhaps been brought hither: and being not brought hither by an over-balance of your exportation, cannot ſtay when it is here. It is not any ſort of coinage does, or can keep your money here; that wholly and only depends upon the balance of your trade. And had all the money in

king Charles the II. and king James the II's time, been minted, according to this new propoſal, this raiſed money would have been gone, as well as the other, and the remainder been no more, nor no leſs than it is now. Though I doubt not but the mint would have coined as much of it, as it has of our preſent milled money. The ſhort is this: an over-balance of trade with Spain brings you in bullion; cheap coinage, when it is here, carries it into the mint, and money is made of it; but, if your exportation will not balance your importation in other parts of your trade, away muſt your ſilver go again, whether monied, or not monied. For where goods do not, ſilver muſt, pay for the commodities you ſpend.

THAT this is ſo, will appear by the books of the mint, where may be ſeen how much milled money has been coined in the two laſt reigns. And in a paper I have now in my hands, (ſuppoſed written by a man not wholly ignorant in the mint) it is confeſſed, that whereas one third of the current payments were ſome time ſince of milled money, there is not now one twentieth. Gone then it is: but let not any one miſtake and think it gone, becauſe in our preſent coinage an ounce wanting about 16 grains, is denominated a crown: or that (as is now propoſed) an ounce wanting about 40 grains, being coined in one piece, and denominated a crown, would have ſtopped it, or will (if our money be ſo altered) for the future fix it here. Coin what quantity of ſilver you pleaſe, in one piece, and give it the denomination of a crown; when your money is to go, to pay your foreign debts, (or elſe it will not go out at all) your heavy money (i. e. that which is weight according to its denomination, by the ſtandard of the mint) will be that which will be melted down, or carried away in coin by the exporter, whether the pieces of each ſpecies be by the law bigger, or leſs. For, whilſt coinage is wholly paid for by a tax, whatever your ſize of money be, he that has need of bullion to ſend beyond ſea, or of ſilver to make plate, need but take milled money and melt it down, and he has it as cheap as if it were in pieces of eight, or other ſilver coming from abroad; the ſtamp, which ſo well ſecures the weight of the milled money, coſting nothing at all.

To this perhaps will be ſaid, That if this be the effect of milled money, that it is ſo apt to be melted down, it were better to return to the old way of coining by the hammer. To which I anſwer, By no means. For,

1. COINAGE by the hammer leſs ſecures you from having a great part of your money melted down. For in that way there being a greater inequality in the weight of the pieces, ſome being too heavy, and ſome too light; thoſe, who know how to make their advantage of it, cull out the heavy pieces, melt them down, and make a benefit of the over-weight.

2. COINAGE by the hammmer expoſes you much more to the danger of falſe coin. Becauſe the tools are eaſily made and concealed, and the work carried on with fewer hands, and leſs noiſe than a mill; whereby falſe coiners are leſs liable to diſcovery.

3. The pieces not being ſo round, even, and fairly ſtamped, nor marked on the edges, are expoſed to clipping, which milled money is not.

Milled money is, therefore, certainly beſt for the publick. But, whatever be the cauſe of melting down our milled money, I do not ſee how raiſing our money (as they call it) will at all hinder its being melted down. For if our crown-pieces ſhould be coined one twentieth lighter, why ſhould that hinder them from being melted down, more than now? The intrinſick value of the ſilver is not altered, as we have ſhewn already: therefore that temptation to melt them down remains the ſame as before.

"But they are lighter by one twentieth." That cannot hinder them from being melted down. For half-crowns are lighter by half, and yet that preſerves them not.

"But they are of leſs weight under the ſame denomination, and there- "fore, they will not be melted down." That is true, if any of theſe preſent crowns, that are one twentieth heavier, are current for crowns at the ſame time. For then they will no more melt down the new light crowns, than they will the old clipped ones, which are no more worth in coin and tale, than in weight and bullion. But it cannot be ſuppoſed, that men will part with their old and heavier money, at the ſame rate that the lighter, new coin goes at, and pay away their old crowns for 5 s. in tale, when at the mint they will yield them 5 s. 3 d. And then if an old milled crown goes for 5 s. 3 d. and a new milled crown (being ſo much lighter) goes for a crown, What, I pray, will be the odds of melting down the one, or the other? The one has one-twentieth leſs ſilver in it, and goes for one-twentieth leſs; and ſo being weight, they are melted down upon equal terms. If it be a convenience to melt one, it will be as much a convenience to melt the other: juſt as it is the ſame convenience to melt milled half-crowns as milled crowns, the one having, with half the quantity of ſilver, half the value. When the money is all brought to the new rate, i. e. to be one twentieth lighter, and commodities raiſed as they will proportionably, what ſhall hinder the melting down of your money then, more than now, I would fain know? If it be coined then, as it is now, gratis, a crown-piece, (let it be of what weight ſoever) will be as it is now, juſt worth its own weight in bullion of the ſame fineneſs; for the coinage which is the manufacture about it, and makes all the difference, coſting nothing, what can make the difference of value? And therefore, whoever wants bullion, will as cheaply melt down theſe new crowns, as buy bullion with them. The raiſing of your money cannot then (the act for free coinage ſtanding) hinder its being melted down.

Nor, in the next place, much leſs can it, as it is pretended, hinder the exportation of our bullion. Any denomination, or ſtamp, we ſhall give to ſilver here, will neither give ſilver a higher value in England, nor make it leſs prized abroad. So much ſilver will always be worth (as we have already ſhewed) ſo much ſilver, given in exchange one for another. Nor will it, when in your mint a leſs quantity of it is raiſed to a higher denomination (as when nineteen twentieths of an ounce has the denomination of a crown, which formerly belonged only to the whole 20) be one jot raiſed, in reſpect of any other commodity.

You have raiſed the denomination of your ſtamped ſilver one twentieth, or, which is all one, 5 per cent. And men will preſently raiſe their commodities 5 per cent. So that if yeſterday 20 crowns would exchange for twenty buſhels of wheat, or 20 yards of a certain ſort of cloth, if you will to day coin current crowns one twentieth lighter, and make them the ſtandard, you will find 20 crowns will exchange for but 19 buſhels of wheat, or 19 yards of that cloth, which will be juſt as much ſilver for a buſhel, as yeſterday. So that, ſilver being of no more real value, by your giving the ſame denomination to a leſs quantity of it; this will no more bring in, or keep your bullion here, than if you had done nothing. If this were otherwiſe, you would be beholden (as ſome people fooliſhly imagine) to the clippers for keeping your money. For if keeping the old denomination to a leſs quantity of ſilver, be raiſing your money (as in effect it is all that is, or can be done in it, by this project of making your coin lighter) the clippers have ſufficiently done that: and, if their trade go on a little while longer, at the rate it has of late, and your milled money be melted down and carried away, and no more coined; your money will, without the charge of new coinage, be, by that ſort of artificers, raiſed above five per cent. when all your current money ſhall be clipped, and made above one twentieth lighter than the ſtandard, preſerving ſtill its former denomination.

It will poſſibly be here objected to me, That we ſee 100 l. of clipped money, above 5 per cent. lighter than the ſtandard, will buy as much corn, cloth, or wine, as 100 l. in milled money, which is above one twentieth heavier: whereby it is evident that my rule fails, and that it is not the quantity of ſilver that gives the value to money, but its ſtamp and denomination. To which I anſwer, That men make their eſtimate and contracts according to the ſtandard, upon ſuppoſition they ſhall receive good and lawful money, which is that of full weight: and ſo in effect they do, whilſt they receive the current money of the country. For ſince 100 l. of clipped money will pay a debt of 100 l. as well as the weightieſt milled money, and a new crown out of the mint will pay for no more fleſh, fruit, or cloth, than five clipped ſhillings; it is evident that they are equivalent as to the purchaſe of any thing here at home. whilſt no body ſcruples to take five clipped ſhillings, in exchange for a weighty milled crown. But this will be quite otherwiſe as ſoon as you change your coin, and (to raiſe it as you call it) make your money one twentieth lighter in the mint; for then nobody will any more give an old crown of the former ſtandard for one of the new, than he will now give you 5 s. and 3 d. for a crown: for ſo much then his old crown will yield him at the mint.

Clipped and unclipped money will always buy an equal quantity of any thing elſe, as long as they will without ſcruple change one for another. And this makes, that the foreign merchant, who comes to ſell his goods to you, always counts upon the value of your money, by the ſilver that is in it, and eſtimates the quantity of ſilver by the ſtandard of your mint; though perhaps by reaſon of clipped, or worn money amongſt it, any ſum that is ordinarily received is much lighter than the ſtandard, and ſo has leſs ſilver in it than what is in a like ſum, new coined in the mint. But whilſt clipped and weighty money will equally change one for another, it is all one to him, whether he receive his money in clipped money, or no, ſo it be but current. For if he buy other commodities here with his money, whatever ſum he contracts for, clipped as well as weighty money equally pays for it. If he would carry away the price of his commodity in ready caſh, it is eaſily changed into weighty money: and then, he has not only the ſum in tale that he contracted for, but the quantity of ſilver he expected, for his commodities, according to the ſtandard of our mint. If the quantity of your clipped money be once grown ſo great, that the foreign merchant cannot (if he has a mind to it) eaſily get weight money for it, but having ſold his merchandize, and received clipped money, finds a difficulty to procure what is weight for it; he will in ſelling his goods, either contract to be paid in weighty money, or elſe raiſe the price of his commodities, according to the diminiſhed quantity of ſilver, in your current coin.

In Holland (ducatoons being the beſt money of the country, as well as the largeſt coin) men in payments received and paid thoſe indifferently with the other money of the country; till of late the coining of other ſpecies of money, of baſer alloy, and in greater quantities, having made the ducatoons, either by melting down, or exportation, ſcarcer than formerly, it became difficult to change the baſer money into ducatoons; and ſince that, nobody will pay a debt in ducatoons, unleſs he be allowed half per cent. or more, above the value they were coined for.

To underſtand this, we muſt take notice, That guilders is the denomination, that in Holland they uſually compute by, and make their contracts in. A ducatoon formerly paſſed at three guilders and three ſtuyvers, or ſixty-three ſtuyvers. There were then (ſome years ſince) began to be coined another piece, which was called a three guilders piece, and was ordered to paſs for three guilders, or ſixty ſtuyvers. But 21 three guilders pieces, which were to paſs for 63 guilders, not having ſo much ſilver in them as 20 ducatoons, which paſſed for the ſame ſum of 63 guilders, the ducatoons were either melted down in their mints (for the making of theſe three guilders pieces, or yet baſer money, with profit) or were carried away by foreign merchants; who, when they carried back the product of their ſale in money, would be ſure to receive their payment of the number of guilders they contracted for, in ducatoons, or change the money they received, into ducatoons: whereby they carried home more ſilver, than if they had taken their payment in three guilders pieces, or any other ſpecies. Thus ducatoons became ſcarce. So that now, he that will be paid in ducatoons, muſt allow half per cent. for them. And therefore the merchants, when they ſell any thing now, either make their bargain to be paid in ducatoons; or if they contract for guilders in general, (which will be ſure to be paid them in the baſer money of the country) they raiſe the price of their commodities accordingly.

By this example, in a neighbour country, we may ſee how our new milled money goes away. When foreign trade imports more than our commodities will pay for, it is certain we muſt contract debts beyond ſea, and thoſe muſt be paid with money, when either we cannot furniſh, or they will not take our goods to diſcharge them. To have money beyond ſea to pay our debts, when our commodities do not raiſe it, there is no other way but to ſend it thither. And ſince a weighty crown coſts no more here than a light one, and our coin beyond ſea is valued no otherwiſe than according to the quantity of ſilver it has in it, whether we ſend it in ſpecie, or whether we melt it down here to ſend it in bullion, (which is the ſafeſt way, as not being prohibited) the weightieſt is ſure to go. But when ſo great a quantity of your money is clipped, or ſo great a part of your weighty money is carried away, that the foreign merchant, or his factor here, cannot have his price paid in weighty money, or ſuch as will eaſily be changed into it, then every one will ſee (when men will no longer take five clipped ſhillings for a milled, or weighty crown) that it is the quantity of ſilver that buys commodities and pays debts, and not the ſtamp and denomination which is put upon it. And then too it will be ſeen what a robbery is committed on the publick by clipping. Every grain diminiſhed from the juſt weight of our money, is ſo much loſs to the nation, which will one time or other be ſenſibly felt; and which, if it be not taken care of, and ſpeedily ſtopped, will in that enormous courſe it is now in, quickly, I fear, break out into open ill effects, and at one blow deprive us of a great part (perhaps near one fourth) of our money. For that will be really the caſe, when the increaſe of clipped money makes it hard to get weighty: when men begin to put a difference of value between that which is weighty, and light money; and will not ſell their commodities, but for money that is weight, and will make their bargains accordingly.

Let the country gentlemen, when it comes to that paſs, conſider, what the decay of his eſtate will be? When, receiving his rent in the tale of clipped ſhillings, according to his bargain, he cannot get them to paſs at market for more than their weight. And he that ſells him ſalt, or ſilk, will bargain for 5 s. ſuch a quantity, if he pays him in fair, weighty coin, but in clipped money he will not take under 5 s. 3 d. Here you ſee you have your money, without this new trick of coinage, raiſed 5 per cent. But whether to any advantage of the kingdom, I leave every one to judge.

Hitherto we have only conſidered the raiſing of ſilver coin, and that has been, only by coining it, with leſs ſilver in it, under the ſame denomination. There is another way yet of raiſing money, which has ſomething more of reality, though as little good in it as the former. This too, now that we are upon the chapter of raiſing money, it may not be unſeaſonable, to open a little. The raiſing I mean, is, when either of the two richer metals, (which money is uſually made of) is by law raiſed above its natural value, in reſpect of the other. Gold and ſilver have, in almoſt all ages and parts of the world (where money was uſed) generally been thought the fitteſt materials to make it of. But there being a great diſproportion in the plenty of theſe metals in the world, one has always been valued much higher than the other; ſo that one ounce of gold has exchanged for ſeveral ounces of ſilver: as at preſent, our guinea paſſing for 21 s. 6 d. in ſilver, gold is now about fifteen and an half times more worth than ſilver; there being about fifteen and an half times more ſilver in 21 s. 6 d. than there is gold in a guinea. This being now the market rate of gold to ſilver; if by an eſtabliſhed law the rate of guineas ſhould be ſet higher, (as to 22 s. 6 d.) they would be raiſed indeed, but to the loſs of the kingdom. For by this law, gold being raiſed 5 per cent. above its natural true value, foreigners would find it worth while to ſend their gold hither, and ſo fetch away our ſilver at five per cent. profit, and ſo much loſs to us. For when ſo much gold, as would purchaſe but 100 ounces of ſilver any where elſe, will in England purchaſe the merchant 105 ounces, what ſhall hinder him from bringing his gold to ſo good a market; and either ſelling it at the mint, where it will yield ſo much, or having it coined into guineas? And then (going to market with his guineas) he may buy our commodities at the advantage of 5 per cent, in the very ſort of his money; or change them into ſilver, and carry that away with him?

On the other ſide, if by a law you would raiſe your ſilver money, and make four crowns, or 20 s. in ſilver, equal to a guinea, at which rate I ſuppoſe it was firſt coined, ſo that by your law a guinea ſhould paſs but for 20 s. the ſame inconveniency would follow. For then ſtrangers would bring in ſilver and carry away your gold, which was to be had here at a lower rate than any where elſe.

If you ſay, that this inconvenience is not to be feared; for that as ſoon as people found, that gold began to grow ſcarce, or that it was more worth than the law ſet upon it, they would not then part with it at the ſtatute rate, as we ſee the broad pieces that were coined in king James the firſt's time for 20 s. no body will now part with under 23 s. or more, according to the market value; this I grant is true, and it does plainly confeſs the fooliſhneſs of making a law, which cannot produce the effect it is made for: as indeed it will not, when you would raiſe the price of ſilver, in reſpect of gold, above its natural market value: for then, as we ſee in our gold, the price of it will raiſe itſelf. But on the other ſide, if you ſhould by a law, ſet the value of gold above its par; then people would be bound to receive it at that high rate, and ſo part with their ſilver at an under value. But ſuppoſing, that having a mind to raiſe your ſilver in reſpect of gold, you make a law to do it, what comes of that? If your law prevail, only this; that, as much as you raiſe ſilver, you debaſe gold, (for they are in the condition of two things, put in oppoſite ſcales, as much as the one riſes the other falls) and then your gold will be carried away with ſo much clear loſs to the kingdom, as you raiſe ſilver and debaſe gold by your law, below their natural value. If you raiſe gold in proportion to ſilver, the ſame effect follows.

I say, raiſe ſilver in reſpect of gold, and gold in proportion to ſilver. For, when you would raiſe the value of money, fancy what you will, it is but in reſpect of ſomething you would change it for; and is done only when you can make a leſs quantity of the metal, which your money is made of, change for a greater quantity of that thing which you would raiſe it to.

The effect indeed, and ill conſequence of raiſing either of theſe two metals, in reſpect of the other, is more eaſily obſerved, and ſooner found in raiſing gold than ſilver coin: becauſe your accounts being kept, and your reckonings all made in pounds, ſhillings, and pence, which are denominations of ſilver coins, or numbers of them; if gold be made current at a rate above the free and market value of thoſe two metals, every one will eaſily perceive the inconvenience. But there being a law for it, you cannot refuſe the gold in payment for ſo much. And all the money, or bullion, people will carry beyond ſea from you, will be in ſilver; and the money, or bullion, brought in, will be in gold. And juſt the ſame will happen, when your ſilver is raiſed and gold debaſed, in reſpect of one another, beyond their true and natural proportion: (natural proportion or value, I call that reſpective rate they find, any where, without the preſcription of law.) For then ſilver will be that which is brought in, and gold will be carried out; and that ſtill with loſs to the kingdom, anſwerable to the overvalue ſet by the law. Only as ſoon as the miſchief is felt, people will (do what you can) raiſe the gold to its natural value. For your accounts and bargains being made in the denomination of ſilver money; if, when gold is raiſed above its proportion, by the law, you cannot refuſe it in payment (as if the law ſhould make a guinea current at 22s. and 6d.) you are bound to take it at that rate in payment. But if the law ſhould make guineas current at 20s. he that has them, is not bound to pay them away at that rate, but may keep them, if he pleaſes, or get more for them if he can: yet, from ſuch a law, one of theſe three things will follow. Either 1ſt, The law forces them to go at 20s. and then being found paſſing at that rate, foreigners make their advantage of it: Or, 2dly, People keep them up, and will not part with them at the legal rate, underſtanding them really to be worth more, and then all your gold lies dead, and is of no more uſe to trade, than if it were all gone out of the kingdom: Or, 3dly, It paſſes for more than the law allows, and then your law ſignifies nothing, and had been better let alone. Which way ſoever it ſucceeds, it proves either prejudicial, or ineffectual. If the deſign of your law takes place, the kingdom loſes by it: if the inconvenience be felt and avoided, your law is eluded.

Money is the meaſure of commerce, and of the rate of every thing, and, therefore, ought to be kept (as all other meaſures) as ſteady and invariable as may be. But this cannot be, if your money be made of two metals, whoſe proportion, and, conſequently, whoſe price, conſtantly varies in repect to one another. Silver, for many reaſons, is the fitteſt of all metals to be this meaſure; and therefore, generally made uſe of for money. But then it is very unfit and inconvenient that gold, or any other metal, ſhould be made current, legal money, at a ſtanding, ſettled rate. This is to ſet a rate upon the varying value of things by law, which juſtly cannot be done; and is, as I have ſhewed, as far as it prevails, a conſtant damage and prejudice to the country, where it is practiſed. Suppoſe fiſteen to one, be now the exact par between gold and ſilver, what law can make it laſting; and eſtabliſh it ſo, that next year, or twenty years hence, this ſhall be the juſt value of gold to ſilver; and that one ounce of gold ſhall be juſt worth fiſteen ounces of ſilver, neither more or leſs? It is poſſible, the Eaſt-India trade ſweeping away great ſums of gold, may make it ſcarcer in Europe. Perhaps the Guinea trade, and mines of Peru, affording it in greater abundance, may make it more plentiful; and ſo its value in reſpect of ſilver, come on the one ſide to be as ſixteen, or, on the other, as fourteen to one. And can any law you ſhall make, alter this proportion here, when it is ſo every where elſe, round about you? If your law ſet it at fifteen, when it is at the free market rate, in the neighbouring countries, as ſixteen to one; will they not ſend hither their ſilver to fetch away your gold, at one ſixteen loſs to you? Or if you will keep its rate to ſilver as fifteen to one, when in Holland, France, and Spain its market value is but fourteen; will they not ſend hither their gold, and fetch away your ſilver, at one fifteen loſs to you? This is unavoidable, if you will make money of both gold and ſilver, at the ſame time, and ſet rates upon them by law, in reſpect of one another.

WHAT then! (Will you be ready to ſay) Would you have gold kept out of England? Or, being here, would you have it uſeleſs to trade; and muſt there be no money made of it? I anſwer, quite the contrary. It is fit the kingdom ſhould make uſe of the treaſure it has. It is neceſſary your gold ſhould be coined, and have the king's ſtamp upon it, to ſecure men in receiving it, that there is ſo much gold in each piece. But it is not neceſſary that it ſhould have a fixed value ſet on it, by publick authority: it is not convenient that it ſhould, in its varying proportion, have a ſettled price. Let gold, as other commodities, find its own rate. And when, by the king's image and inſcription, it carries with it a publick aſſurance of its weight and fineneſs; the gold money, ſo coined, will never fail to paſs at the known market rates, as readily as any other ſpecies of your money. Twenty guineas, though deſigned at firſt for 20l. go now as current for 21l. 10s. as any other money, and ſometimes for more, as the rate varies. The value, or price, of any thing, being only the reſpective eſtimate it bears to ſome other, which it comes in competition with, can only be known by the quantity of the one, which will exchange for a certain quantity of the other. There being no two things in nature, whoſe proportion and uſe does not vary, it is impoſſible to ſet a ſtanding, regular price between them. The growing plenty, or ſcarcity, of either in the market, (whereby I mean the ordinary place, where they are to be had in traffick) or the real uſe, or changing faſhion of the place, bringing either of them more into demand than formerly, preſently varies the reſpective value of any two things. You will as fruitleſly endeavour to keep two different things ſteadily at the ſame price one with another, as to keep two things in an æquilibrium, where their varying weights depend on different cauſes. Put a piece of ſpunge in one ſcale, and an exact counterpoiſe of ſilver in the other; you will be mightily miſtaken if you imagine, that becauſe they are to-day equal, they ſhall always remain ſo. The weight of the ſpunge varying with every change of moiſture in the air, the ſilver, in the oppoſite ſcale, will ſometimes riſe and ſometimes fall. This is juſt the ſtate of ſilver and gold, in regard of their mutual value. Their proportion, or uſe, may, nay, conſtantly does vary, and with it their price. For, being eſtimated one, in reference to the other, they are, as it were, put in oppoſite ſcales; and as the one riſes the other falls, and ſo on the contrary.

Farthings, made of a baſer metal, may on this account too deſerve your conſideration. For whatſoever coin you make current, above the intrinſick value, will always be damage to the publick, whoever get by it. But of this I ſhall not, at preſent, enter into a more particular enquiry; only this I will confidently affirm, that it is the intereſt of every country, that all the current money of it ſhould be of one and the ſame metal; that the ſeveral ſpecies ſhould be of the ſame alloy, and none of a baſer mixture: and that the ſtandard once thus ſettled, ſhould be inviolably and immutably kept to perpetuity. For, whenever that is altered, upon what pretence ſoever, the publick will loſe by it.

Since then it will neither bring us in more money, bullion, or trade; nor keep what we have here, nor hinder our weighty money, of what denomination ſoever, from being melted; to what purpoſe ſhould the kingdom be at the charge of coining all our money anew? For I do not ſuppoſe any body can propoſe, that we ſhould have two ſorts of money, at the ſame time, one heavier, and the other lighter, as it comes from the mint; that is very abſurd to imagine. So that if all your old money muſt be coined over again; it will indeed be ſome advantage, and that a very conſiderable one, to the officers of the mint. For they being allowed 3 s. 6 d. (it ſhould be ſixteen pence half-penny), for the coinage of every pound troy, which is very near five and an half per cent. if our money be ſix millions, and muſt be coined all over again, it will coſt the nation to the mint three hundred thirty thouſand pounds. One hundred thirty thouſand pounds, if the clipped money muſt eſcape, becauſe it is already as light as your new ſtandard; do you not own that this deſign of new coinage is juſt of the nature of clipping?

This buſineſs of money and coinage is by ſome men, and amongſt them ſome very ingenious perſons, thought a great myſtery, and very hard to be underſtood. Not that truly in itſelf it is ſo, but becauſe intereſted people, that treat of it, wrap up the ſecret, they make advantage of, in a myſtical, obſcure, and unintelligible way of talking; which men, from a pre-conceived opinion of the difficulty of the ſubject, taking for ſenſe, in a matter not eaſy to be penetrated, but by the men of art, let paſs for current, without examination. Whereas, would they look into thoſe diſcourſes, and enquire what meaning their words have, they would find, for the moſt part, either their poſitions to be falſe, their deductions to be wrong, or (which often happens) their words to have no diſtinct meaning at all. Where none of theſe be, there their plain, true, honeſt ſenſe, would prove very eaſy and intelligible, if expreſſed in ordinary and direct language.

That this is ſo, I ſhall ſhew, by examining a printed ſheet on this ſubject; entituled, "Remarks on a paper given in to the lords, &c."

Rem. "It is certain, That what place ſoever will give moſt for ſilver
" by weight, it will thither be carried and ſold: and if of the money which
" now paſſes in England, there can be 5 s. 5 d. the ounce given for ſtandard
" ſilver at the mint, when but 5 s. 4 d. of the very ſame can be given elſe-
" where for it, it will certainly be brought to the mint; and when coined, can-

"not be ſold (having one penny over-value ſet upon it by the ounce) for the ſame that other plate may be bought for, ſo will be left unmelted; at leaſt, it will be the intereſt of any exporter, to buy plate to ſend out, before money; whereas now it is his intereſt to buy money, to ſend out before plate."

Anſw. THE author would do well to make it intelligible, how, "of the money that now paſſes in England, at the mint can be given 5 s. 5 d. the ounce for ſtandard ſilver, when but 5 s. 4 d. of the ſame money can be given elſewhere for it." Next, "How it has one penny over-value ſet upon it by the ounce, ſo that, when coined, it cannot be ſold." This, to an ordinary reader, looks very myſterious; and, I fear, is ſo, as either ſignifying nothing at all, or nothing that will hold. For

1. I ASK, Who is at the mint, that "can give 5 s. 5 d. the ounce for ſtandard ſilver, when no body elſe can give above 5 s. 4 d.?" Is it the king, or is it the maſter-worker, or any of the officers? For to give 5 s. 5 d. for what will yield but 5 s. 4 d. to any body elſe, is to give one ſixty-fifth part more than it is worth. For ſo much every thing is worth, as it will yield. And I do not ſee how this can turn to account to the king, or be borne by any body elſe.

2. I ASK, How a penny over-value can be ſet upon it by the ounce, ſo "that it cannot be ſold?" This is ſo myſterious, that I think it near impoſſible. For an equal quantity of ſtandard ſilver, will always be juſt worth an equal quantity of ſtandard ſilver. And it is utterly impoſſible to make ſixty-four parts of ſtandard ſilver equal to, or worth, ſixty-five parts of the ſame ſtandard ſilver; which is meant by "ſetting a penny over-value upon it by the ounce," if that has any meaning at all. Indeed, by the workmanſhip of it, ſixty-four ounces of ſtandard ſilver may be made not only worth ſixty-five ounces, but ſeventy or eighty. But the coinage, which is all the workmanſhip here, being paid for by a tax, I do not ſee how that can be reckoned at all: or if it be, it muſt raiſe every 5 s. 4 d. coined, to above 5 s. 5 d. If I carry ſixty-four ounces of ſtandard ſilver in bullion to the mint to be coined, ſhall I not have juſt 64 ounces back again for it in coin? And if ſo, can theſe ſixty-four ounces of coined, ſtandard ſilver, be poſſibly made worth ſixty-five ounces of the ſame ſtandard ſilver uncoined, when they coſt me no more; and I can, for barely going to the mint, have ſixty-four ounces of ſtandard ſilver in bullion turned into coin? Cheapneſs of coinage in England, where it coſts nothing, will indeed make money be ſooner brought to the mint, than any where elſe; becauſe there I have the convenience of having it made into money for nothing. But this will no more keep it in England than if it were perfect bullion. Nor will it hinder it from being melted down, becauſe it coſt no more in coin than in bullion: and this equally, whether your pieces of the ſame denomination be lighter, heavier, or juſt as they were before. This being explained, it will be eaſy to ſee, whether the other things ſaid in the ſame paragraph be true or falſe, and particularly, whether "it will be the intereſt of every exporter, to buy plate to ſend out before money."

Rem. " It is only barely aſſerted, That if ſilver be raiſed at the mint, " that it will riſe elſewhere above it; but can never be known till it be " tried."

Anſw. The author tells us, in the laſt paragraph, that ſilver, that is worth " but 5 s. 2 d. per ounce at the mint, is worth 5 s. 4 d. elſewhere." This, how true, or what inconvenience it hath, I will not here examine. But, be the inconvenience of it what it will, this raiſing the money he propoſes as a remedy: and to thoſe who ſay, upon raiſing our money, ſilver will riſe too, he makes this anſwer, that " it can never be known whether it will or no, " till it be tried." To which I reply, That it may be known as certainly without trial, as it can, that two pieces of ſilver that weighed equally yeſterday, will weigh equally again to-morrow in the ſame ſcales.

" There is ſilver, (ſays our author) whereof an ounce (i. e. 480 grains) " will change for 5 s. 4 d." (i. e. 496 grains) of our ſtandard ſilver coined. To-morrow you coin your money lighter; ſo that then 5 s. 4 d. will have but 472 grains of coined ſtandard ſilver in it. Can it not then be known, without trial, whether that ounce of ſilver, which to-day will change for 496 grains of ſtandard ſilver coined, will change to-morrow but for 472 grains of the ſame ſtandard ſilver coined? Or can any one imagine that 480 grains of the ſame ſilver, which to-day are worth 496 grains of our coined ſilver, will to-morrow be worth but 472 grains of the ſame ſilver, a little differently coined? He that can have a doubt about this till it be tried, may as well demand a trial to be made, to prove, that the ſame thing is æquiponderant, or equivalent to itſelf. For I think it is as clear, that 472 grains of ſilver are æquiponderant to 496 grains of ſilver, as that an ounce of ſilver, that is today worth 496 grains of ſtandard ſilver, ſhould to-morrow be worth but 472 grains of the ſame ſtandard ſilver, all circumſtances remaining the ſame, but the different weight of the pieces ſtamped: which is that our author aſſerts, when he ſays, That it is only barely aſſerted, &c. What has been ſaid to this, may ſerve alſo for an anſwer to the next paragraph. Only I deſire it may be taken notice of, that the author ſeems to inſinuate, that ſilver goes not in England, as in foreign parts, by weight: which is a very dangerous, as well as falſe poſition; and which, if allowed, may let into our mint what corruption and debaſing of our money one pleaſes.

Rem. " That our trade hath heretofore furniſhed us with an overplus, " brought home in gold and ſilver, is true: but that we bring home from " any place more goods than we now export to it, I do not conceive to be " ſo. And more goods might be ſent to thoſe parts; but by reaſon of the " great value of ſilver in this part of the world, more money is to be got by " exporting ſilver, than by any other thing that can be ſent; and that is the " reaſon of it. And for its being melted down, and ſent out, becauſe it is " ſo heavy, is not by their paper denied."

Anſw. " That we bring home from any place more goods than we now " export, (the author tells us) he doth not conceive."

Would he had told us a reaſon for his conceit. But ſince the money of any country is not preſently to be changed, upon any private man's groundleſs

leſs conceit, I ſuppoſe this argument will not be of much weight with many men. I make bold to call it a groundleſs conceit: for if the author pleaſe to remember the great ſums of money are carried every year to the Eaſt-Indies, for which we bring home conſumable commodities; (though I muſt own it pays us again with advantage) or if he will examine, how much only two commodities, wholly conſumed here, coſt us yearly in money, (I mean Canary wine and currants) more than we pay for, with goods exported to the Canaries and Zant; beſides the over-balance of trade upon us in ſeveral other places, he will have little reaſon to ſay, "he doth not conceive we bring "home from any place more goods than we now export to it."

"As to what he ſays, concerning the melting down and exporting our "money, becauſe it is heavy:" if by heavy, he means, becauſe our crown-pieces (and the reſt of our ſpecies of money in proportion) are 23 or 24 grains heavier than he would have them coined: this whoever grants it, I deny upon grounds, which, I ſuppoſe, when examined, will be found clear and evident.

Indeed, when your debts beyond ſea, to anſwer the over-balance of foreign importations, call for your money, it is certain the heavy money, which has the full ſtandard weight, will be melted down and carried away; becauſe foreigners value not your ſtamp, or denomination, but your ſilver.

He would do well to tell us what he means by "the great value of ſilver "in this part of the world." For he ſpeaks of it as a cauſe that draws away our money more now than formerly, or elſe it might as well have been omitted as mentioned in this place: and if he mean, by this part of the world, England; it is ſcarce ſenſe to ſay, that the great value of ſilver in England ſhould draw ſilver out of England. If he means the neighbouring countries to England, he ſhould have ſaid it, and not doubtfully this part of the world. But let him, by this part of the world, mean what he will, I dare ſay every one will agree, that ſilver is not more valued in this, than any other part of the world; nor in this age, more than in our grandfathers days.

I am ſorry, if it be true, what he tells us, That "more money is to be "got by exportation of ſilver, than by any other thing that can be ſent." This is an evidence, that "we bring home more goods than we export." For, till that happens, and has brought us in debt beyond ſea, ſilver will not be exported; but the overplus of people's gain, being generally laid up in ſilver, it will be brought home in ſilver; and ſo our people will value it as much as any other, in this part of the world.

The truth of the caſe in ſhort is this. Whenever we, by a loſing trade, contract debts with our neighbours, they will put a great value on our ſilver, and "more money will be got by tranſporting ſilver than any thing can be "ſent:" which comes about thus. Suppoſe that by an over-balance of their trade (whether by a ſale of pepper, ſpices, and other Eaſt-India commodities, it matters not) we have received great quantities of goods, within theſe two or three months from Holland, and ſent but little thither; ſo that the accounts balanced, between the inhabitants of England and the United Provinces, we of England were a million in their debt; what would follow from hence? This; That theſe Dutch creditors, deſiring to have what is due to them, give order to their factors and correſpondents here, to return it to them. For enquiring as we do, what are the effects of an over-balance of trade, we muſt not ſuppoſe they inveſt their debts in commodities, and return their effects that way. A million then being to be returned from England to Holland in money, every one ſeeks bills of exchange; but Engliſhmen not having debts in Holland to anſwer this million, or any the leaſt part of it, bills are not to be got. This preſently makes the exchange very high: upon which the bankers, &c. who have the command of great quantities of money and bullion, ſend that away to Holland in ſpecie, and ſo take money here to pay it again there, upon their bills, at ſuch a rate of exchange, as gives them five, ten, fifteen, &c. per cent. profit: and thus ſometimes a 5 s. piece of our milled money may truly be ſaid to be worth 5 s. 3 d. 4 d. 6 d. 9 d. in Holland. And if this be "the great value of ſilver in this part of the world," I eaſily grant it him. But this great value is to be remedied, not by the alteration of our mint, but by the regulation and balance of our trade. For be your coin what it will, our neighbours, if they over-balance us in trade, will not only have a great value for our ſilver, but get it too; and there will be "more to be got, by exporting ſilver to them, than by any other thing "can be ſent."

Rem. "The alteration of the coins in Spain and Portugal are no way at "all like this. For there they altered in denomination near half, to deceive "thoſe they paid, with paying thoſe, to whom they owed one ounce of ſilver, "but half an ounce for it. But, in the alteration here deſigned, to whoever "an ounce of ſilver was owing, an ounce will be paid in this money; it "being here only deſigned, that an ounce of money ſhould equal an ounce "of ſilver in value, at home, as well as abroad, which now it does not."

Anſw. In this paragraph the author confeſſes the alteration of the coin in Spain and Portugal was a cheat; but the "alteration here deſigned, he ſays, "is not:" but the reaſon he gives for it is admirable: viz. "Becauſe they "there altered in denomination near half," and here denomination is altered but five per cent. for ſo in truth it is, whatever be deſigned. As if fifty per cent were a cheat, but five per cent. were not; becauſe perhaps leſs perceivable. For the two things, that are pretended to be done here by this new coinage, I fear will both fail, viz. 1. That "to whomſoever an ounce "of ſilver is owing, an ounce of ſilver ſhall be paid in this money." For when an ounce of ſilver is coined, as is propoſed, into 5 s. 5 d. (which is to make our money five per cent. lighter than it is now) I that am to receive 100 l. per ann. fee-farm rent; ſhall I in this new money receive 105 l. or barely 100 l.? The firſt I think will not be ſaid. For if by law you have made it 100 l. it is certain the tenant will pay me no more. If you do not mean that 400 crowns, or 2000 ſhillings of your new coin ſhall be 100 l. but there muſt be five per cent. in tale, added to every 100, you are at the charge of new coinage to no other purpoſe but to breed confuſion. If I muſt receive 100 l. by tale, of this new money for my fee-farm rent, it is demonſtration that I loſe five ounces per cent. of the ſilver that was due to me. This a little lower he confeſſes in theſe words, "That where a man has a rent-SEC, that "can never be more, this may ſomewhat affect it, but ſo very little, that it "will ſcarce ever at all be perceived." This very little is five per cent. and if a man be cheated of that, ſo he perceives it not, it goes for nothing. But this loſs will not affect only ſuch rents as can never be more, but all payments whatſoever, that are contracted for, before this alteration of our money.

2. IF it be true, what he affirms, "That an ounce of money doth equal "an ounce of ſilver in value abroad, but not at home;" then this part of the undertaking will alſo fail. For I deny that the ſtamp on our money does any more debaſe it here at home, than abroad, or make the ſilver in our money not equal in value to the ſame weight of ſilver every-where. The author would have done well to have made it out, and not left ſo great a paradox only to the credit of a ſingle aſſertion.

Rem. "AND for what is ſaid in this bill to prevent exportation, relates "only to the keeping in our coin and bullion, and leaves all foreign to be "exported ſtill."

Anſw. WHAT the author means by our own and foreign bullion, will need ſome explication.

Rem. "THERE is now no ſuch thing as payments made in weighty and "milled money."

Anſw. I BELIEVE there are very few in town, who do not very often receive a milled crown for 5 s. and a milled half crown for 2 s. 6 d. But he means, I ſuppoſe, in great and entire ſums of milled money. But I aſk, if all the clipped money were called in, whether then all the payments would not be in weighty money; and that not being called in, whether if it be lighter than your new milled money, the new milled money will not be melted down as much as the old? Which I think the author there confeſſes, or elſe I underſtand him not.

Rem. "NOR will this any way interrupt trade; for trade will find its "own courſe; the denomination of money in any country no way concerning "that."

Anſw. THE denomination to a certain weight of money, in all countries, concerns trade; and the alteration of that neceſſarily brings diſturbance to it.

Rem. "FOR if ſo be it occaſions the coining more money."

Anſw. HE talks as if it would be "the occaſion of coining more money." Out of what? Out of money already coined, or out of bullion? For I would be glad to know where it is.

Rem. "IT may be ſome gain to thoſe that will venture to melt down the "coin, but very ſmall loſs (if any) to thoſe that ſhall be paid in the new: "it is not to be denied, but that where any man has a rent-SEC, that can "never be more, this may ſomewhat affect it; but ſo very little, it will "ſcarce ever at all be perceived."

Anſw. As much as it will be gain to melt down their coin, ſo much loſs will it be to thoſe who are paid in new, viz. 5 per cent. which, I ſuppoſe, is more than the author would be willing to loſe, unleſs he get by it another way.

Rem. "And if the alteration deſigned ſhould have the effect of making our "native commodities any ways dearer—"

Anſw. Here our author confeſſes, that proportionably as your money is raiſed, the price of other things will be raiſed too. But to make amends, he ſays,

Rem. "It does at the ſame time make the land which produces them, "of more than ſo much more in value."

Anſw. This "more than ſo much more in value," is more than our author, or any body elſe for him, will ever be able to make out.

The price of things will always be eſtimated by the quantity of ſilver given in exchange for them. And if you make your money leſs in weight, it muſt be made up in tale. This is all this great myſtery of raiſing money, and raiſing land. For example: the manor of Blackacre would yeſterday have yielded one hundred thouſand crowns, which crown-pieces, let us ſuppoſe *numero rotundo* to weigh each of them an ounce of ſtandard ſilver. To-day your new coin comes in play, which is 5 per cent. lighter. There is your money raiſed: the land now at ſale, yields one hundred and five thouſand crowns, which is juſt the ſame one hundred thouſand ounces of ſtandard ſilver. There is the land raiſed. And is not this an admirable invention, for which the publick ought to be at above one hundred thouſand pounds charge for new coinage, and all your commerce put in diſorder? And then to recommend this invention, you are told, as a great ſecret, That, "had not money "from time to time, been raiſed in its denomination, lands had not ſo "riſen too:" which is to ſay, Had not your money been made lighter, fewer pieces of it would have bought as much land as a greater number does now.

Rem. "The loſs of payments, there ſpoken of, will, in no ſort, be ſo "great, as if the parties, to whom theſe debts are owing, were now bound "to receive them in the money now paſſes, and then to melt the ſame down; "ſo at this they will have no cauſe to complain.

Anſw. A very good argument! the clippers have robbed the publick of a good part of their money (which men will, ſome time or other, find in the payments they receive) and it is deſired the mint may have a liberty to be beforehand with thoſe, to whom debts are owing. They are told, they will have no reaſon to complain of it, who ſuffer this loſs, becauſe it is not ſo great as the other. The damage is already done to the publick, by clipping. Where at laſt it will light, I cannot tell. But men, who receive clipped money, not being forced to melt it down, do not yet receive any loſs by it. When clipped money will no longer change for weighty, then thoſe, who have clipped money in their hands, will find the loſs of it.

Rem. "It will make the cuſtoms better paid, becauſe there will be more "money."

Anſw. That there will be more money in tale, it is poſſible: that there will be more money in weight and worth, the author ought to ſhew. And whatever becomes of the cuſtoms, (which I do not hear are unpaid now) the king will loſe in the exciſe above thirty thouſand pounds per annum. For in all taxes where ſo many pounds, ſhillings, or pence are determined by the law to be paid, there the king will loſe 5 per cent. The author here, as in other places, gives a good reaſon for it: for, “ his majeſty being to pay “ away this money by tale, as he received it, it will be to him no loſs at “ all.”

As if my receiving my rents in full tale, but in money of undervalue five per cent. were not ſo much loſs to me, becauſe I was to pay it away again by tale. Try it at 50 per cent. the odds only is, That one being greater than the other, would make more noiſe. But the author's great refuge in this is, That it will not be perceived.

Rem. “ If all foreign commodities were to be purchaſed with this new ſpecies “ of money ſent out; we agree, That with 100 l. of it, there could not be “ ſo much ſilver, or other commodities bought, as with 100 l. in crown-“ pieces as now coined, becauſe they would be heavier; and all coin in any “ kingdom but where it is coined, only goes by weight; and for the ſame “ weight of ſilver, the ſame every-where ſtill will be bought; and ſo there “ will, with the ſame quantity of goods. And if thoſe goods ſhould coſt 5 “ per cent. more here in England than heretofore, and yield but the ſame “ money (we mean by the ounce abroad) the ſame money brought home “ and coined, will yield the importer 5 per cent. more at the mint than it “ heretofore could do, and ſo no damage to the trader at all.”

Anſw. Here truth forces from the author a confeſſion of two things, which demonſtrate the vanity and uſeleſſneſs of the project. 1. That upon this change of your coin, foreign goods will be raiſed. Your own goods will coſt more five per cent. So that goods of all kinds being thereupon raiſed; wherein conſiſts the raiſing of your money, when an ounce of ſtandard ſilver however minced, ſtamped, or denominated, will buy no more commodities than it did before? This confeſſion alſo ſhews the falſhood of that dangerous ſuppoſition, That money, “ in the kingdom where it is coined, goes not “ by weight,” i. e. is not valued by its weight.

Rem. “ It is true, the owners of ſilver will find a good market for it, and “ no others will be damaged; but, on the contrary, the making plenty of “ money will be an advantage to all.”

Anſw. I grant it true, That if your money were really raiſed five per cent. the owners of ſilver would get ſo much by it, by bringing it to the mint to be coined. But ſince, as is confeſſed, commodities will (upon this raiſing your money) be raiſed to five per cent. this alteration will be an advantage to no body, but the officers of the mint, and hoarders of money.

Rem. “ When ſtandard ſilver was laſt raiſed at the mint, (which it was “ from 5 s. to 5 s. and 2 d. the ounce, in the 43d of Eliz.) and, for above “ forty years after, ſilver uncoined was not worth above 4 s. 10 d. the ounce “ which occaſioned much coining; and of money, none in thoſe days was “ exported: whereas ſilver now is worth but the very ſame 5 s. 2 d. the “ ounce ſtill at the mint, and is worth 5 s. 4 d. elſewhere. So that if this

“ bill now with the Lords does not happen to paſs, there can never any ſil-“ ver be ever more coined at the mint; and all the milled money will, in a “ very little time more, be deſtroyed.”

Anſw. The reaſon of ſo much money coined in queen Elizabeth's time, and afterwards, was not the leſſening of your crown-pieces from 480 to 462 grains, and ſo proportionably all the reſt of your money, (which is that the author calls raiſing ſtandard ſilver from 5 s. to 5 s. 2 d. the ounce) but from the over-balance of your trade, bringing them in plenty of bullion, and keeping it here.

How ſtandard ſilver (for if the author ſpeaks of other ſilver, it is a fallacy) ſhould be worth its own weight in ſtandard ſilver at the mint, (i. e. 5 s. 2 d. the ounce) and be worth more than its own weight in ſtandard ſilver, i. e. 5 s. 4 d. the ounce) in Lombard-ſtreet, is a paradox that no body, I think will be able to comprehend, till it be better explained. It is time to give off coining, if the value of ſtandard ſilver be leſſened by it; as really it is, if an ounce of coined ſtandard ſilver, will not exchange for an ounce of uncoined ſtandard ſilver, unleſs you add 15 or 16 grains overplus to it: which is what the author would have taken upon his word, when he ſays, “ Silver is worth “ five ſhillings four pence elſewhere.”

Five ſhillings four pence of money coined at the mint, the author muſt allow to be at leaſt 495 grains. An ounce is but 480 grains. How then an ounce of uncoined ſtandard ſilver, can be worth five ſhillings four pence, (i. e. how 480 grains of uncoined ſtandard ſilver, can be worth 495 grains of the ſame ſtandard ſilver, coined into money) is unintelligible; unleſs the coinage of our mint leſſens the value of ſtandard ſilver.

“ SIR,

“ COIN and intereſt are two things of ſo great moment to the publick, “ and of ſo great concernment in trade, that they ought very accu-“ rately to be examined into, and very nicely weighed, upon any propoſal “ of alteration to be made in them. I pretend not to have treated of them “ here as they deſerve. That muſt be the work of an abler hand, I have “ ſaid ſomething on theſe ſubjects, becauſe you required it. And, I hope, “ the readineſs of my obedience will excuſe to you, the faults I have com-“ mitted, and aſſure you that I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

John Locke.

## SHORT

# OBSERVATIONS

### On a Printed Paper, entituled,

## For encouraging the coining ſilver money in England, and after for keeping it here.

THE author ſays, "Silver yielding the propoſed 2 d. or 3 d. more by the ounce, than it will do by being coined into money, there will be none coined into money; and matter of fact ſhews there is none."

It would be hard to know what he means, when he ſays, "ſilver yields 2 d. or 3 d. more by the ounce, than it will do by being coined into money:" but that he tells us in plain words at the bottom of the leaf, "that an ounce of ſilver uncoined, is of 2 d. more value, than after it is coined it will be;" which I take the liberty to ſay, is ſo far from being true, that I affirm it is impoſſible to be ſo. For which I ſhall only give this ſhort reaſon, viz. Becauſe the ſtamp neither does, nor can take away any of the intrinſick value of the ſilver; and, therefore, an ounce of coined, ſtandard ſilver, muſt neceſſarily be of equal value to an ounce of uncoined, ſtandard ſilver. For example; ſuppoſe a goldſmith has a round plate of ſtandard ſilver, juſt of the ſhape, ſize and weight of a coined crown-piece, which, for brevity's ſake, we will ſuppoſe to be an ounce; this ounce of ſtandard ſilver is certainly of equal value to any other ounce of unwrought, ſtandard ſilver in his ſhop; away he goes with his round piece of ſilver to the Tower, and has there the ſtamp ſet upon it, when he brings this numerical piece back again to his ſhop coined, can any one imagine, that it is now 2 d. leſs worth than it was, when he carried it out ſmooth, a quarter of an hour before; or, that it is not ſtill of equal value to any other ounce of unwrought, ſtandard ſilver in his ſhop? He that can ſay it is 2 d. leſs worth, than it was before it had the king's image and inſcription on it, may as well ſay, that 60 grains of ſilver, brought from the Tower, are worth but 58 grains of ſilver in Lombard-ſtreet.

But the author very warily limits this ill effect of coinage only to England; why it is ſo in England, and not every where, would deſerve a reaſon.

But let us grant it to be true, as our author affirms, that coined ſilver in England is one thirtieth worſe, or of leſs value, than uncoined; the natural conſequence from this, if it be true, is, that it is very unfit that the mint ſhould be employed in England, where it debaſes the ſilver one thirtieth; for, if the ſtamp leſſens the value of our ſilver this year, it will alſo do ſo the next, and ſo on to the end of the world, it always working the ſame way. Nor will the altering the denomination, as is propoſed, at all help it.

But yet he thinks he has ſome proof for his propoſition, becauſe it is matter of fact that there is no money coined at the mint. This is the great grievance, and is one indeed, but for a different reaſon from what ſeems to inſpire that paper.

The matter in ſhort is this; England ſending more conſumable commodities to Spain than it receives from thence, the merchants, who manage their trade, bring back the overplus in bullion, which, at their return, they ſell as a commodity. The chapmen, that give higheſt for this, are, as in all caſes of buying and ſelling, thoſe who can make moſt profit by it; and thoſe are the returners of our money, by exchange, into thoſe countries, where our debts, any way contracted, make a need of it: for they getting 6, 8, 10, &c. per cent. according to the want and demand of money from England there, and according to the riſque of the ſea, buy up this bullion, as ſoon as it comes in, to ſend it to their correſpondents in thoſe parts, to make good their credit for the bills they have drawn on them, and ſo can give more for it than the mint-rate, i. e. more than an equal weight of milled money for an equal weight of ſtandard bullion; they being able to make more profit of it by returns.

Suppose the balance of our trade with Holland were in all other commodities equal, but that in the laſt Eaſt-India ſale we bought of them of Eaſt-India commodities to the value of a million, to be paid in a month; within a month a million muſt be returned into Holland, this preſently raiſes the exchange, and the traders in exchange ſell their bills at high rates; but the balance of trade being (as is ſuppoſed in the caſe) equal in all other commodities, this million can no way be repaid to their correſpondents, on whom thoſe bills were drawn, but by ſending them money, or bullion, to reimburſe them.

This is the true reaſon why the bullion, brought from Spain, is not carried to the mint to be coined, but bought by traders in foreign exchange, and exported by them, to ſupply the overplus of our expences there, which are not paid for by our commmodities. Nor will the propoſed raiſing of our money, as it is called, whether we coin our money for the future one thirtieth, or one twentieth, or one half lighter than now it is, bring one ounce more to the mint than now, whilſt our affairs in this reſpect remain in the ſame poſture. And I challenge the author to ſhew that it will; for ſaying is but ſaying. Bullion can never come to the mint to be coined, whilſt the over-balance of trade and foreign expences are ſo great, that to ſatisfy them, not only the bullion, your trade in ſome parts now yearly brings in, but alſo ſome of your formerly coined money is requiſite, and muſt be ſent out: but when a change in that, brings in and lodges bullion here, (for now it ſeems it only paſſes through England) the increaſe of ſilver and gold ſtaying in England will again bring it to the mint to be coined.

This makes it eaſily intelligible, how it comes to paſs, that, when now at the mint they can give but 5s. 2d. per ounce for ſilver, they can give 5s. 4d. the ounce in Lombard-ſtreet, (which is what our author means when he ſays, "ſilver is now worth but 5s. 2d. the ounce at the mint, and is worth 5s. 4d. elſewhere.") The reaſon whereof is plain, viz. Becauſe the mint, giving weighty money for bullion, can give ſo much and no more for ſilver, than it is coined at, which is 5 s. 2 d. the ounce, the publick paying all the odds, that is between coined and uncoined ſilver, which is the manufacture of coinage: but the banker, or returner of money, having uſe for ſilver beyond ſea, where he can make his profit of it, by anſwering bills of exchange, which he ſells dear, muſt either ſend our money in ſpecie, or melt down our coin to tranſport, or elſe with it buy bullion.

The ſending our money in ſpecie, or melting it down, has ſome hazard, and therefore, if he could have bullion for 5 s. 2 d. per ounce, or a little dearer, it is like he would always rather chuſe to exchange coin for bullion, with ſome little loſs, rather than run the riſque of melting it down for exportation.

But this would ſcarce make him pay 2 d. in the crown, which is almoſt three and an half per cent. if there were not ſomething more in it, than barely the riſque of melting, or exportation; and that is the lightneſs of the greateſt part of our current coin. For example, N. has given bills for thirty thouſand pounds ſterling in Flanders, and ſo has need of ten thouſand weight of ſilver to be tranſported thither; he has thirty thouſand pounds ſterling by him in ready money, whereof five thouſand pounds is weighty milled money; what ſhall hinder him then from throwing that into his melting-pot, and ſo reducing it to bullion, to be tranſported? But what ſhall he do for the other twenty-five thouſand pounds, which, though he has by him, is yet clipped and light money, that is at leaſt twenty per cent. lighter than the ſtandard? If he tranſports or melts down this, there is ſo much clear loſs to him; it is therefore, more advantage to him to buy bullion at 5 s. 4 d. the ounce with that light money, than to tranſport, or melt it down; wherein, though the ſeller of the bullion has leſs weight in ſilver than he parts with, yet he finds his account, as much as if he received it in weighty coin, whilſt a clipped crown-piece, or ſhilling, paſſes as well in payment for any commodity here in England as a milled one. Thus our mint is kept from coining.

But this paper, For encouraging the coining, &c. would fain have the mill at work, though there be no griſt to be had, unleſs you will grind over again what is ground already, and pay toll for it a ſecond time; a propoſition fit only for the miller himſelf to make; for the meaneſt houſewife in the country would laugh at it, as ſoon as propoſed. However, the author pleaſes himſelf, and thinks he has a good argument to make it paſs, viz. becauſe the toll to be paid for it will not amount to three hundred and thirty thouſand pounds, as is ſaid in a late treatiſe about raiſing the value of money, p. 170. for, ſays he, that writer is miſtaken, in ſaying that "3 s. and 6 d. is allowed at the mint for the "coinage of every pound troy," whereas there is but ſixteen pence halfpenny there allowed for the ſame; which ſixteen pence halfpenny being above one third of 3 s. and 6 d. it follows by his own computation, that the new coining our money will coſt the nation above one hundred and ten thouſand pounds; a ſmall ſum, in this our plenty of riches, to be laid out for the purchaſing theſe following inconveniencies, without any the leaſt advantage.

1. A LOSS to the king of one thirtieth (if you coin your money 2d. per crown, one twentieth, if you coin your money 3d. per crown lighter) of all his ſtanding revenue.

2. A LIKE loſs of one twentieth, or one thirtieth, in all rents that are ſettled; for theſe have, during the term, the nature of rent-ſec: but five per cent. loſs in a man's income he thinks ſo little, it will not be perceived.

3. TROUBLE to merchants in their trade. Theſe inconveniencies he is forced to allow. He might have ſaid diſorder to all people in their trade, though he ſays it will be but a little trouble to merchants, and without any real damage to trade. The author would have done well to have made out this, and a great many other aſſertions in that paper; but ſaying is much eaſier, if that may paſs for proof.

INDEED he has, by a ſhort way, anſwered the book above-mentioned, in the concluſion of his paper, in theſe words: "And he that ſo groſly miſtakes "in ſo material points of what he would aſſert, it is plain is not free from "miſtakes." It does not appear that he, who publiſhed that book, ever thought himſelf free from miſtakes; but he, that miſtakes in two material points, may be in the right in two others, and thoſe will ſtill need an anſwer. But one of theſe material points will, I think, by what is already ſaid, appear not to be a miſtake; and for any thing the author of the paper hath ſaid, or can ſay, it will always be true, that an ounce of ſilver coined, or not coined, is, and eternally will be, of equal value to any other ounce of ſilver. As to any other miſtake, concerning the rate of coinage, it is like he had his information from ſome diſintereſted perſon, whom he thought worthy of credit. And whether it be 3s. 6d. as he was told, or only ſixteen pence halfpenny per pound troy, as the paper ſays, whether the reader will believe the one, or the other, or think it worth his more exact inquiry, this is certain, the kingdom ought not to be at that, or any other charge, where there is no advantage, as there will be none in this propoſed coinage, but quite the contrary.

IN his anſwer to

Object. 1. HE ſays from Edw. III. "Silver has from time to time (as it "grew in eſteem) been by degrees raiſed in all mints." If an ounce of ſilver now not exchanging, or paying for what one tenth of an ounce would have purchaſed in Edw. IIId's time, and ſo being ten times leſs worth now, than it was then, be growing in eſteem, this author is in the right; elſe ſilver has not ſince Edw. IIId's reign, from time to time grown in eſteem. Be that as it will, he aſſigns a wrong cauſe of raiſing of ſilver, as he calls it, in our mint. For if growing thus in requeſt, i. e. by leſſening its value, had been the reaſon of altering our money, this change of coin, or raiſing the denomination of ſilver in ours, and other mints, ought to have been greater by much, ſince Henry VII's time, than it was between that and Edward IIId's; becauſe the great change of the value of ſilver has been made, by the plenty of it poured into this part of the world from the Weſt-Indies, not diſcovered till Henry VII's reign. So that I think I may ſay, that the value of ſilver from Edward III. to Henry VII. changed not one tenth, but from Henry VII. till now it changed above ſeven tenths; and yet, money having been raiſed in our mint two thirds ſince Edward IIId's time, the far greater part of the raiſing of it was before Henry's VII's time, and a very ſmall part of it ſince; ſo that the cauſe, inſinuated by our author, it is evident, was not the the cauſe of leſſening our coin ſo often, whatever it was: and it is poſſible there wanted not men of projects in thoſe days, who for private ends, by wrong ſuggeſtions, and falſe reaſonings, covered with myſterious terms, led thoſe into miſtakes, who had not the time and will nicely to examine; though a crown-piece three times as big as one of ours now, might, for its ſize alone, deſerve to be reformed.

To Object. 2. he ſays, " The raiſing the denomination of money in " Spain and Portugal, was making it go for more when coined, than its true " value."

THIS, I ſay, is impoſſible, and deſire the author to prove it. It did in Spain and Portugal, juſt what it will do here and every-where; it made not the ſilver coined go for more than its value, in all things to be bought, but juſt ſo much as the denomination was raiſed, juſt ſo much leſs of commodity had the buyer in exchange for it: as it would be here, if you ſhould coin ſix-pences into ſhillings; if any one went to market with this new money, he would find that, whereas he had a buſhel of wheat laſt week for eight ſhillings of the former coin, he would have now but half a buſhel for eight of the new ſhillings, when the ſame denomination had but half the quantity of ſilver. Indeed thoſe, who were to receive money upon former contracts, would be defrauded of half their due, receiving in their full tale of any denomination contracted for, but half the ſilver they ſhould have; the cheat whereof they would find, when they went to market with their new money. For this I have above proved, that one ounce of ſilver is, and eternally will be, equal in value to another ounce of ſilver; and all that can poſſibly put a difference between them, is only the different value of the workmanſhip, beſtowed on one more than another, which in coinage our author tells us in this paper is but ſixteen pence halfpenny per pound troy. I demand therefore, of our author, to ſhew that any ſort of coinage, or, as he calls it, raiſing of money, can raiſe the value of coined ſilver, or make it go for more than uncoined, bating the charge of coinage; unleſs it be to thoſe who, being to receive money upon former contracts, will, by receiving the tale agreed for, receive leſs than they ſhould of ſilver, and ſo be defrauded of what they really contracted for.

WHAT effect ſuch a raiſing of their money had in one particular, I will tell our author. In Portugal they count their money by reys, a very ſmall, or rather imaginary coin, juſt as if we here ſhould count all our ſums by farthings. It pleaſed the government, poſſibly being told that it would raiſe the value of their money, to raiſe in denomination the ſeveral ſpecies, and make them go for a greater (let us ſuppoſe double the) number of reys than formerly. What was the conſequence? It not only confounded the property of the ſubject, and diſturbed affairs to no purpoſe; but treaties of commerce having ſettled the rates of the cuſtoms at ſo many reys on the ſeveral commodities, the king immediately loſt in the value half his cuſtoms. The ſame that in proportion will happen in the ſettled revenue of the crown here, upon the propoſed change.

For though our author in theſe words, "whereas all now deſired by this "act is, to keep ſilver, when coined, of the ſame value it was before," would inſinuate, that this raiſing the denomination, or leſſening our coin, as is propoſed, will do no ſuch thing; yet it is demonſtration, that when our coin is leſſened 3 d. in 5 s. the king will receive five per cent. leſs in value in his cuſtoms, exciſe, and all his ſettled revenue, and ſo proportionably, as the quantity of ſilver, in every ſpecies of our coin, ſhall be made leſs than now it is coined in thoſe of the ſame denomination.

But, whatever our author means by "making money go for more when "coined than its true value, or by keeping ſilver, when coined, of the ſame "value it was before;" this is evident, that raiſing their money thus, by coining it with leſs ſilver in it than it had before, had not the effect in Portugal and Spain, which our author propoſes from it here: for it has not brought one penny more to the mint there, nor kept their money, or ſilver, from exportation ſince, though forfeiture and death be the penalties joined in aid to this trick of raiſing to keep it in.

But our author tells us in anſwer to Object. 4. This "will ſcarce ever at "all be perceived." If of 100 guineas a man has in his pocket, 5 ſhould be picked out, ſo he ſhould not perceive it, the fraud and the loſs would not be one jot the leſs; and though he perceived it not when, or how it was done, yet he will find it in his accounts, and the going ſo much back in his eſtate at the end of the year.

To Object. 3. he ſays, The "raiſing your coin (it may be) may raiſe the "price of bullion here in England." An ounce of ſilver will always be equal in value to an ounce of ſilver every-where, bating the workmanſhip. I ſay it is impoſſible to be otherwiſe, and require our author to ſhew it poſſible in England, or any-where, or elſe hereafter to ſpare his "may be". To avoid fallacies, I deſire to be underſtood, when I uſe the word ſilver alone, to mean nothing but ſilver, and to lay aſide the conſideration of baſer metals that may be mixed with it: for I do not ſay that an ounce of ſtandard, that has almoſt one twelfth of copper in it, is of equal value with an ounce of fine ſilver that has no alloy at all; but that any two ounces of equally alloyed ſilver, will always be of equal value; the ſilver being the meaſure of commerce, it is the quantity of ſilver that is in every piece he receives, and not the denomination of it, which the merchant looks after, and values it by.

But this raiſing of the denomination our author would have paſs, becauſe it will be "better for the poſſeſſors of bullion," as he ſays, Anſw. 3. But who are they who now in England are poſſeſſed of ſo much bullion? or what private men are there in England of that conſideration, that for their advantage, all our money ſhould be new coined, and of a leſs weight, with ſo great a charge to the nation, and loſs to his majeſty's revenue?

He farther adds, Anſw. 3. It doth not thence inevitably follow, it will raiſe "the price of bullion beyond ſea."

It will as inevitably follow, as that nineteen ounces of ſilver will never be equal in weight, or worth, to twenty ounces of ſilver: ſo much as you leſſen your coin, ſo much more muſt you pay in tale, as will make the quantity of ſilver the merchant expects, for his commodity; under what denomination ſoever he receives it.

The clothier, thus buying his Spaniſh wooll, oil, and labour, at five per cent. more in denomination, ſells his woollen manufacture proportionably dearer to the Engliſh merchant, who exporting it to Spain, where their money is not changed, ſells it at the uſual market-rate, and ſo brings home the ſame quantity of bullion for it, which he was wont; which, therefore, he muſt ſell to you at the ſame raiſed value your money is at: and what then is gained by all this? The denomination is only changed, to the prejudice of the publick, but as to all the great matters of your trade, the ſame quantity of ſilver is paid for commodities as before, and they ſold in their ſeveral foreign markets for the ſame quantity of ſilver. But whatever happens in the rate of foreign bullion, the raiſing of the denomination of our money, will bring none of it to our mint to be coined; that depends on the balance of our trade, and not on leſſening our coin under the ſame denomination: for whether the pieces we call crowns be coined 16, 24, or 100 grains lighter, it will be all one as to the value of bullion, or the bringing more, or leſs of it into England, or to our mint.

What he ſays in his anſwer to Object. 4. beſides what we have already taken notice of, is partly againſt his bill, and partly miſtake.

1. He ſays, "It may be ſome (as it is now) gain to thoſe, that will venture to melt down the milled and heavy money now coined." That men do venture to melt down the milled and heavy money, is evident, from the ſmall part of milled money is now to be found of that great quantity of it that has been coined; and a farther evidence is this, that milled money will now yield four, or five more per cent. than the other, which muſt be to melt down, and uſe as bullion, and not as money in ordinary payments. The reaſon whereof is, the ſhameful and horrible debaſing (or, as our author would have it, raiſing) our unmilled money by clipping.

For the odds betwixt milled and unmilled money being now, modeſtly ſpeaking, above 20 per cent. and bullion, for reaſons elſewhere given, being not to be had, refiners, and ſuch as have need of ſilver, find it the cheapeſt way to buy milled money for clipped, at four, five, or more per cent. loſs.

I ask, therefore, this gentleman, What ſhall become of all our preſent milled and heavy money, upon the paſſing of this act? To which his paper almoſt confeſſes, what I will venture to anſwer for him, viz. that, as ſoon as ſuch a law is paſſed, the milled and heavy money will all be melted down; for it being five per cent. heavier, i. e. more worth than what is to be coined in the mint, no body will carry it thither to receive five per cent. leſs for it, but ſell it to ſuch as will give four, or four and a half per cent. more for it, and at that rate melt it down with advantage: for Lombard-ſtreet is too quick-ſighted, to give ſixty ounces of ſilver for fifty-ſeven ounces of ſilver, when bare throwing it into the melting-pot will make it change for its equal weight. So that by this law five per cent. gain on all our milled money, will be given to be ſhared between the poſſeſſor and the melter of our milled money, out of the honeſt creditor and landlord's pocket, who had the guaranty of the law, that under ſuch a tale of pieces, of ſuch a denomination as he lett his land for, he ſhould have to ſuch a value, i. e. ſuch a weight in ſilver. Now I aſk, Whether it be not a direct and unanſwerable reaſon againſt this bill, that he confeſſes, that it will be, "a gain to thoſe, who will "melt down the milled and heavy money," with ſo much loſs to the publick; and not, as he ſays, "with very ſmall loſs to thoſe, that ſhall be paid "in the new," unleſs he calls five per cent. very ſmall loſs; for juſt ſo much is it to receive but fifty-ſeven grains, or ounces of ſilver, for ſixty, which is the proportion in making your crowns 3 d. lighter. This is certain, no body will pay away milled or weighty crowns for debts, or commodities, when it will yield him four, or five per cent. more; ſo that which is now left of weighty money, being ſcattered up and down the kingdom, into private hands, which cannot tell how to melt it down, will be kept up and loſt to our trade. And, as to your clipped and light money, will you make a new act for coinage, without taking any care for that? The making a new ſtandard for your money, cannot do leſs than make all money, which is lighter than that ſtandard, unpaſſable; and thus the milled and heavy money not coming into payment, and the light, and clipped not being lawful money, according to the new ſtandard, there muſt needs be a ſudden ſtop of trade, and it is to be feared, a general confuſion of affairs; though our author ſays, "it will not any ways interrupt trade."

2. THE latter part of the ſection, about raiſing the value of land, I take the liberty to ſay is a miſtake; which, though a ſufficient reply to an aſſertion without proof, yet I ſhall not ſo far imitate this author, as barely to ſay things: and therefore, I ſhall add this reaſon for what I ſay, viz. Becauſe nothing can truly raiſe the value, i. e. the rent of land, but the increaſe of your money: but becauſe raiſing the value of land is a phraſe, which, by its uncertain ſenſe, may deceive others, we may reckon up theſe ſeveral meanings of it.

1. THE value of land is raiſed, when its intrinſick worth is increaſed, i. e. when it is fitted to bring forth a greater quantity of any valuable product. And thus the value of land is raiſed only by good huſbandry.

2. THE value of land is raiſed, when remaining of the ſame fertility, it comes to yield more rent, and thus its value is raiſed only by a greater plenty of money and treaſure.

3. OR it may be raiſed in our author's way, which is, by raiſing the rent in tale of pieces, but not in the quantity of ſilver received for it; which in truth, is no raiſing of it at all, any more than it could be accounted the raiſing of a man's rent, if he lett his land this year for forty ſixpences, which laſt year he lett for twenty ſhillings. Nor would it alter the caſe, if he ſhould call thoſe forty ſixpences forty ſhillings; for having but half the ſilver of forty ſhillings in them, they would be but of half the value, however their denomination were changed.

In his anſwer to the fifth objection, there is this dangerous inſinuation, That coin, in any country where it is coined, goes not by weight, i. e. has its value from the ſtamp and denomination, and not the quantity of ſilver in it. Indeed in contracts already made, if your ſpecies be by law coined a fifth part lighter, under the ſame denomination, the creditor muſt take a hundred ſuch light ſhillings, or twenty ſuch light crown-pieces for 5 l. if the law calls them ſo, but he loſes one fifth, in the intrinſick value of his debt. But, in bargains to be made, and things to be purchaſed, money has, and will always have its value from the quantity of ſilver in it, and not from the ſtamp and denomination, as has been already proved, and will, ſome time or other be evidenced with a witneſs, in the clipped money. And if it were not ſo, that the value of money were not according to the quantity of ſilver in it, i. e. that it goes by weight, I ſee no reaſon why clipping ſhould be ſo ſeverely puniſhed.

As to foreigners, he is forced to confeſs, that it is all one what our money is, greater or leſs, who regard only the quantity of ſilver, they ſell their goods for; how then can the leſſening our money bring more plenty of bullion into England, or to the mint?

But he ſays, "The owners and importers of ſilver will find a good market at the mint, &c." But always a better in Lombard-ſtreet, and not a grain of it will come to the mint, as long as by an under-balance of trade, or other foreign expences, we contract debts beyond ſea, which require the remitting of greater ſums thither, than are imported in bullion. "If for above forty years after ſilver was raiſed, in the forty-third year of queen Elizabeth, from 5 s. to 5 s. 2 d. the ounce, uncoined ſilver was not worth above 4 s. 10 d. per ounce;"—the cauſe was not that raiſing of ſilver in the mint, but an over-balance of trade, which bringing in an increaſe of ſilver yearly, for which men having no occaſion abroad, brought it to the mint to be coined, rather than let it lie dead by them in bullion: and whenever that is the caſe again in England, it will occaſion coining again, and not till then. "No money was in thoſe days exported," ſays he; no, nor bullion neither, ſay I; why ſhould, or how could it, when our exported merchandize paid for all the commodities we brought home, with an over-plus of ſilver and gold, which ſtaying here, ſet the mint on work. But the paſſing this bill, will not hinder the exportation of one ounce either of bullion or money, which muſt go, if you contract debts beyond ſea; and how its having been once melted in England, which is another thing propoſed in this bill, ſhall hinder its exportation, is hard to conceive, when even coining has not been able to do it, as is demonſtrable, if it be examined what vaſt ſums of milled money have been coined, in the two laſt reigns, and how little of it is now left. Beſides, if the exportation of bullion ſhould be brought under any greater difficulty than of any other commodity, it is to be conſidered whether the management of that trade, which is in ſkilful hands, will not thereupon be ſo ordered, as to divert it from coming to England for the future, and cauſe it to be ſent from Spain, directly to thoſe places, where they know Engliſh debts will make it turn to beſt account, to anſwer bills of exchange ſent thither.

# FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING RAISING the VALUE OF MONEY.

WHEREIN

Mr. LOWNDES's arguments for it, in his late report concerning "An eſſay for the amendment of the "ſilver coins," are particularly examined.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE

# Sir JOHN SOMMERS, Knt.

## Lord Keeper of the great ſeal of England, and one of his Majeſty's moſt honourable privy-council.

My LORD,

THE papers I here preſent your lordſhip, are in ſubſtance the ſame with one which I delivered to you, in obedience to the commands I received, by your lordſhip, from their excellencies, the lords juſtices; and with another, which I writ in anſwer to ſome queſtions your lordſhip was pleaſed to propoſe to me, concerning our coin. The approbation your lordſhip was pleaſed to give them then, has been an encouragement to me to reviſe them now, and put them in an order, fitter to comply with their deſires, who will needs have me print ſomething at this time on this ſubject: and could any thing of this nature be received with indifferency in this age, the allowance they have had from your lordſhip, whoſe great and clear judgment is, with general conſent and applauſe, acknowledged to be the juſt meaſure of right and wrong amongſt us, might make me hope that they might paſs in the world without any great diſlike.

HOWEVER, ſince your lordſhip thought they might be of uſe to clear ſome difficulties, and rectify ſome wrong notions, that are taken up about money, I have ventured them into the world, deſiring no mercy to any erroneous poſitions, or wrong reaſonings, which ſhall be found in them. I ſhall never knowingly be of any, but truth's and my country's ſide; the former I ſhall always gladly embrace and own, whoever ſhews it me: and in theſe papers, I am ſure, I have no other aim, but to do what little I can for the ſervice of my country. Your lordſhip's ſo evidently preferring that to all other conſiderations, does, in the eyes of all men, ſit ſo well upon you, that my ambition will not be blamed, if I in this propoſe to myſelf ſo great an example, and in my little ſphere am moved by the ſame principle.

I HAVE a long time foreſeen the miſchief and ruin coming upon us by clipped money, if it were not timely ſtopped: and had concern enough for the publick, to make me print ſome thoughts touching our coin, ſome years ſince. The principles I there went on, I ſee no reaſon to alter: they have, if I miſtake not, their foundation in nature, and will ſtand: they have their foundation in nature, and are clear; and will be ſo, in all the train of their conſequences, throughout this whole (as it is thought) myſterious buſineſs of money, to all thoſe, who will but be at the eaſy trouble of ſtripping this ſubject of hard, obſcure, and doubtful words, wherewith men are often miſled, and miſlead others. And now the diſorder is come to extremity, and can no longer be played with, I wiſh it may find a ſudden and effectual cure, not a remedy in ſound and appearance, which may flatter us on to ruin, in continuation of a growing miſchief, that calls for preſent help.

I WISH too, that the remedy may be as eaſy as poſſible; and that the cure of this evil be not ordered ſo, as to lay a great part of the burden unequally on thoſe, who have had no particular hand in it. Weſtminſter-hall is ſo great a witneſs of your lordſhip's unbiaſſed juſtice, and ſteady care to preſerve to every one their right, that the world will not wonder you ſhould not be for ſuch a leſſening our coin, as will, without any reaſon, deprive great numbers of blameleſs men of a fifth part of their eſtates, beyond the relief of Chancery. I hope this age will eſcape ſo great a blemiſh. I doubt not but there are many, who, for the ſervice of their country, and for the ſupport of the government, would gladly part with, not only one fifth, but a much larger portion of their eſtates. But, when it ſhall be taken from them, only to be beſtowed on men, in their and the common opinion, no better deſerving of their country than themſelves, unleſs growing exceedingly rich by the publick neceſſities, whilſt every body elſe finds his fortune ſtreightened by them, be a publick merit, that deſerves a publick and ſignal reward; this loſs of one fifth of their debts and income will ſit heavy on them, who ſhall feel it, without the alleviation of any profit, or credit, that will thereby accrue to the nation, by ſuch a leſſening of our coin.

IF any one aſk, how I, a retired, private man, come at this time to meddle with money and trade, for they are inſeparable? I reply, that your lordſhip, and the other great men, that put me upon it, are anſwerable for it: whether what I ſay be to the purpoſe, or no, that I myſelf am anſwerable for. This I can anſwer to all the world, that I have not ſaid any thing here, without a full perſuaſion of its truth; nor with any other motive, or purpoſe, than the clearing of this artificially perplexed, rather than in itſelf myſterious, ſubject, as far as my poor talent reaches. That which, perhaps, I ſhall not be ſo well able to anſwer to your lordſhip and myſelf, is the liberty I have taken, in ſuch an addreſs as this, to profeſs that I am,

My LORD,

Your lordſhip's moſt humble,

and moſt obedient ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

The

# The PREFACE.

THOUGH Mr. Lowndes and I differ in the way, yet, I aſſure myſelf, our end is the ſame; and that we both propoſe to ourſelves the ſervice of our country. He is a man known ſo able in the poſt he is in, to which the buſineſs of money peculiarly belongs; and has ſhewed himſelf ſo learned in the records, and matters of the mint, and ſo exact in calculations and combinations of numbers relating to our coin, either already in uſe, or deſigned by him, that I think I ſhould have troubled the publick no more on this ſubject, had not he himſelf engaged in me it; and brought it to that paſs, that either I muſt be thought to renounce my own opinion, or muſt publickly oppoſe his.

WHILST his treatiſe was yet a manuſcript, and before it was laid before thoſe great perſons, to whom it was afterwards ſubmitted, he did me the favour to ſhew it to me; and made me the compliment, to aſk me my opinion of it. Though we had ſome ſhort diſcourſe on the ſubject, yet the multiplicity of his buſineſs, whilſt I ſtaid in town, and my health, which ſoon after forced me out of it, allowed us not an occaſion to debate any one point thoroughly, and bring it to an iſſue. Before I returned to town, his book was in the preſs, and finiſhed, before I had an opportunity to ſee Mr. Lowndes again. And here he laid a new obligation on me, not only in giving me one of them, but telling me, when I received it from his hands, that it was the firſt he had parted with to any body. I then went it over a ſecond time, and having more leiſure to conſider it, I found there were a great many particulars in it drawn out of antient records, not commonly known, wherewith he had obliged the world. Theſe, which very pleaſingly entertained me, though they prevailed not on me to be of his opinion every where, yet joined with the great civilities he had ſhewn me, left me in a diſpoſition ſo little inclined to oppoſe any thing in it, that I ſhould rather have choſen to acknowledge myſelf in print, to be his convert, if his arguments had convinced me, than to have troubled the world with the reaſons why I diſſent from him.

IN this diſpoſition, my pen reſted from meddling any further with this ſubject whilſt I was in town; ſoon after, my own health, and the death of a friend, forced me into the country; and the buſineſs occaſioned thereby, and my own private affairs, took up all my time at my firſt coming thither; and had continued on to do ſo, had not ſeveral repeated intimations and inſtances from London, not without ſome reproaches of my backwardneſs, made me ſee, that the world concerned me particularly in Mr. Lowndes's poſtſcript, and expected ſomething from me on that occaſion.

THOUGH poſſibly I was not wholly out of his mind when Mr. Lowndes writ that invitation, yet I ſhall not make myſelf the compliment, to think I alone am concerned in it. The great importance of the matter, made him deſire every one to contribute what he could to the clearing of it, and ſetting it in a true light. And I muſt do him this right, to think, that he prefers the publick good to his private opinion; and therefore is willing his propoſals and arguments ſhould with freedom be examined to the bottom; that, if there be any miſtake in them, no body may be miſled by his reputation and authority, to the prejudice of his country. Thus I underſtand his poſtſcript, and thus I ſhall endeavour to comply with it. I ſhall to the beſt of my ſkill, examine his arguments with all reſpect to him, and fidelity to truth, as far as I can diſcover it. The frankneſs of his proceeding in particular with me, aſſures me he is ſo great a lover of truth and right, that he will not think himſelf injured when that is defended; and will be glad, when it is made plain, by whoſe hand ſoever it be.

THIS is what has made me publiſh theſe papers, without any derogation to Mr. Lowndes, or ſo much as a ſuſpicion that he will take it amiſs. I judge of him by myſelf. For I ſhall think myſelf obliged to any one, who ſhall ſhew me or the publick, any material miſtake in any thing I have here ſaid, whereon any part of the queſtion turns.

# FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING RAISING the VALUE OF MONEY.

SILVER is the inſtrument and meaſure of commerce in all the civilized and trading parts of the world.

IT is the inſtrument of commerce by its intrinſick value.

THE intrinſick value of ſilver, conſidered as money, is that eſtimate which common conſent has placed on it, whereby it is made equivalent to all other things, and conſequently is the univerſal barter, or exchange, which men give and receive for other things, they would purchaſe or part with, for a valuable conſideration: and thus, as the wiſe man tells us, money anſwers all things.

SILVER is the meaſure of commerce by its quantity, which is the meaſure alſo of its intrinſick value. If one grain of ſilver has an intrinſick value in it, two grains of ſilver has double that intrinſick value, and three grains treble, and ſo on proportionably. This we have daily experience of, in common buying and ſelling. For if one ounce of ſilver will buy, i. e. is of equal value to, one buſhel of wheat, two ounces of ſilver will buy two buſhels of the ſame wheat, i. e. has double the value.

HENCE it is evident, that an equal quantity of ſilver is always of equal value to an equal quantity of ſilver.

THIS, common ſenſe, as well as the market, teaches us. For ſilver being all of the ſame nature and goodneſs, having all the ſame qualities, it is impoſſible but it ſhould in the ſame quantity have the ſame value. For, if a leſs quantity of any commodity be allowed to be equal in value to a greater quantity of the ſame ſort of commodity, it muſt be for ſome good quality it has, which the other wants. But ſilver to ſilver has no ſuch difference.

HERE it will be aſked, is not ſome ſilver finer than other?

I ANSWER, one maſs of mixed metal not diſcerned by the eye to be any thing but ſilver, and therefore called ſilver, may have a leſs mixture of baſer metal in it than another, and ſo in common ſpeech is ſaid to be finer ſilver. So ducatoons, having a leſs mixture of copper in them than our Engliſh coin has, are ſaid to be finer ſilver. But the truth is, the ſilver that is in each is equally fine, as will appear when the baſer metal is ſeparate from it. And it is of this pure, or fine ſilver, I muſt be underſtood, when I mention ſilver; not regarding the copper, or lead, which may chance to be mixed with it. For example: Take an ounce of ſilver, and one fourth of an ounce of copper and melt them together, one may ſay of the whole maſs, that it is not fine ſilver; but it is true, there is an ounce of fine ſilver in it; and though this maſs, weighing one ounce and a quarter, be not of equal value to one ounce and a quarter of fine ſilver, yet the ounce of fine ſilver in it, is, when ſeparate from the copper, of equal value to any other ounce of ſilver.

By this meaſure of commerce, viz. the quantity of ſilver, men meaſure the value of all other things. Thus to meaſure what the value of lead is to wheat, and of either of them to a certain ſort of linen cloth; the quantity of ſilver, that each is valued at, or ſells for, needs only be known. For, if a yard of cloth be ſold for half an ounce of ſilver, a buſhel of wheat for one ounce, and a hundred weight of lead for two ounces; any one preſently ſees and ſays, that a buſhel of wheat is double the value of a yard of that cloth, and but half the value of an hundred weight of lead.

Some are of opinion, that this meaſure of commerce, like all other meaſures, is arbitrary, and may at pleaſure be varied, by putting more, or fewer grains of ſilver, in pieces of a known denomination, v. g. by making a penny, or a ſhilling lighter, or heavier in ſilver, in a country where theſe are known denominations of pieces of ſilver money. But they will be of another mind, when they conſider, that ſilver is a meaſure of a nature quite different from all other. The yard, or quart men meaſure by, may reſt indifferently in the buyers or ſellers, or a third perſon's hands, it matters not whoſe it is. But it is not ſo in ſilver: it is the thing bargained for, as well as the meaſure of the bargain; and in commerce paſſes from the buyer to the ſeller, as being in ſuch a quantity equivalent to the thing ſold: and ſo it not only meaſures the value of the commodity it is applied to, but is given in exchange for it, as of equal value. But this it does, (as is viſible) only by its quantity, and nothing elſe. For it muſt be remembered, that ſilver is the inſtrument, as well as meaſure, of commerce, and is given in exchange for the things traded for: and, every one deſiring to get as much as he can of it, for any commodity he ſells, it is by the quantity of ſilver, he gets for it in exchange, and by nothing elſe, that he meaſures the value of the commodity he ſells.

The coining of ſilver, or making money of it, is the aſcertaining of its quantity by a publick mark, the better to fit it for commerce.

In coined ſilver, or money, there are theſe three things, which are wanting in other ſilver. 1. Pieces of exactly the ſame weight and fineneſs. 2. A ſtamp, ſet on thoſe pieces by the publick authority of that country. 3. A known denomination given to theſe pieces by the ſame authority.

THE ſtamp is a mark, and as it were a publick voucher, that a piece of ſuch denomination is of ſuch a weight, and of ſuch a fineneſs, i. e. has ſo much ſilver in it.

THAT preciſe weight and fineneſs, by law appropriated to the pieces of each denomination, is called the ſtandard.

FINE ſilver is ſilver without the mixture of any baſer metal.

ALLOY is baſer metal mixed with it.

THE fineneſs of any metal appearing to be ſilver, and ſo called, is the proportion of ſilver in it, compared with what there is in it of baſer metals.

THE fineneſs of ſtandard ſilver in England, is eleven parts ſilver and one part copper, near: or to ſpeak more exactly, the proportion of ſilver to copper, is as 111 to 9. Whatever piece, or maſs, has in it of baſer metal, above the proportion of 9 to 111, is worſe, or coarſer than ſtandard. Whatever maſs of metal has a leſs proportion than 9 to 111, of baſer metal in it, is better, or finer than ſtandard.

SINCE ſilver is the thing ſought for, and would better ſerve for the meaſure of commerce, if it were unmixed, it will poſſibly be aſked, "why any "mixture of baſer metal is allowed in money, and what uſe is there of ſuch "alloy, which ſerves to make the quantity of ſilver leſs known, in the ſeveral "coins of different countries?"

PERHAPS it would have been better for commerce in general, and more convenient for all their ſubjects, if the princes every where, or at leaſt in this part of the world, would at firſt have agreed on the fineneſs of the ſtandard to have been juſt one twelfth alloy, in round numbers; without thoſe minuter fractions which are to be found in the alloy of moſt of the coin of the ſeveral diſtinct dominions of this part of the world. Which broken proportion of baſer metal to ſilver, in the ſtandard of the ſeveral mints, ſeems to have been introduced by the ſkill of men employed in coining, to keep that art, (as all trades are called) a myſtery; rather than for any uſe, or neceſſity there was of ſuch broken numbers. But, be that as it will, the ſtandard in our mint being now ſettled by authority, and eſtabliſhed by cuſtom, known at home and abroad, and the rules and methods of eſſaying ſuited to it; and all the wrought plate, as well as coin of England, being made by that meaſure; it is of great concernment that it ſhould remain unvariable.

BUT to the queſtion; "What need is there of any mixture of baſer metal "with ſilver in money or plate?" I anſwer, there is great reaſon for it. For,

1. COPPER mixed with ſilver makes it harder, and ſo wears and waſtes leſs in uſe, than if it were fine ſilver. 2. It melts eaſier. 3. Silver, as it is drawn and melted from the mine, being ſeldom perfectly fine, it would be a great charge by refining, to ſeparate all the baſer metals from it, and reduce it to perfectly unmixed ſilver.

THE uſe of coined ſilver, or money, is, that every man in the country, where it is current by publick authority, may, without the trouble of refining, eſſaying,

ing, or weighing, be aſſured what quantity of ſilver he gives, receives, or contracts for, under ſuch and ſuch denominations.

If this ſecurity goes not along with the publick ſtamp, coining is labour to no purpoſe, and puts no difference between coined money, and uncoined bullion. This is ſo obvious, that I think no government, where money is coined, ever overlooks it. And therefore, the laws every where, when the quantity of ſilver has been leſſened in any piece carrying the publick ſtamp, by clipping, waſhing, rounding, &c. have taken off the authority of the publick ſtamp, and declared it not to be lawful money. This is known to be ſo in England, and every one may not only refuſe any money bearing the publick ſtamp, if it be clipped, or any ways robbed of the due weight of its ſilver; but he that offers it in payment is liable to indictment, fine and impriſonment. From whence we may ſee, that the uſe and end of the publick ſtamp is only to be a guard and voucher of the quantity of ſilver, which men contract for. And the injury done to the publick faith, in this point, is that which in clipping and falſe coining heightens the robbery into treaſon.

Men in their bargains contract not for denominations, or ſounds, but for the intrinſick value; which is the quantity of ſilver, by publick authority warranted to be in pieces of ſuch denominations. And it is by having a greater quantity of ſilver, that men thrive and grow richer, and not by having a greater number of denominations; which, when they come to have need of their money, will prove but empty ſounds, if they do not carry with them the real quantity of ſilver expected.

The ſtandard once ſettled by publick authority, the quantity of ſilver eſtabliſhed under the ſeveral denominations (I humbly conceive) ſhould not be altered till there were an abſolute neceſſity ſhewn of ſuch a change, which I think can never be.

The reaſon why it ſhould not be changed, is this; becauſe the publick authority is guarantee for the performance of all legal contracts. But men are abſolved from the performance of their legal contracts, if the quantity of ſilver under ſettled and legal denominations be altered: as is evident, if borrowing 100l. or 400 ounces of ſilver, to repay the ſame quantity of ſilver (for that is underſtood by the ſame ſum, and ſo the law warrants it) or taking a leaſe of lands for years to come, at the like rent of 100l. they ſhall pay, both the one and the other, in money coined under the ſame denominations, with one fifth leſs ſilver in it, than at the time of the bargain: the landlord here and creditor are each defrauded of twenty per cent. of what they contracted for, and is their due. And I aſk, how much juſter it would be thus to diſſolve the contracts they had made, than to make a law, that from henceforth all landlords and creditors ſhould be paid their paſt debts, and the rents for leaſes already made, in clipped money, twenty per cent. lighter than it ſhould be? Both ways they loſe twenty per cent. of their due, and with equal juſtice.

The caſe would be the ſame, and legal contracts be avoided, if the ſtandard ſhould be altered, on the other ſide, and each ſpecies of our coin be made one fifth heavier. For then, he that had borrowed, or contracted for any ſum, could not be diſcharged, by paying the quantity he agreed for, but be liable to be forced to pay twenty per cent. more than he bargained for, that is, more than he ought.

On the other ſide; Whether the creditor be forced to receive leſs, or the debtor be forced to pay more, than his contract, the damage and injury is the ſame, whenever a man is defrauded of his due. And whether this will not be a publick failure of juſtice, thus arbitrarily to give one man's right and poſſeſſion to another, without any fault on the ſuffering man's ſide, and without any the leaſt advantage to the publick, I ſhall leave to be conſidered.

Raising of coin is but a ſpecious word to deceive the unwary. It only gives the uſual denomination of a greater quantity of ſilver to a leſs, (v. g. calling four grains of ſilver a penny to-day, when five grains of ſilver made a penny yeſterday) but adds no worth, or real value to the ſilver coin, to make amends for its want of ſilver. That is impoſſible to be done. For it is only the quantity of ſilver in it that is, and eternally will be, the meaſure of its value. And to convince any one of this, I aſk, whether he, that is forced to receive but 320 ounces of ſilver under the denomination of 100 l. (for 400 ounces of ſilver which he lent under the like denomination of 100l.) will think theſe 320 ounces of ſilver, however denominated, worth thoſe 400 ounces he lent? If any one can be ſuppoſed ſo ſilly, he need but go to the next market, or ſhop, to be convinced, that men value not money by the denomination, but by the quantity of ſilver there is in it. One may as rationally hope to lengthen a foot, by dividing it into fifteen parts, inſtead of twelve, and calling them inches, as to increaſe the value of the ſilver, that is in a ſhilling, by dividing it in fifteen parts inſtead of twelve, and calling them pence. This is all that is done, when a ſhilling is raiſed from twelve to fifteen pence.

Clipping of money is raiſing it without publick authority; the ſame denomination remaining to the piece, that hath now leſs ſilver in it than it had before.

Altering the ſtandard, by coining pieces under the ſame denomination with leſs ſilver in them than they formerly had, is doing the ſame thing by publick authority. The only odds is, that by clipping, the loſs is not forced on any one, (for no body is obliged to receive clipped money;) by altering the ſtandard, it is.

Altering the ſtandard, by raiſing the money, will not get to the publick, or bring to the mint to be coined, one ounce of ſilver: but will defraud the king, the church, the univerſities and hoſpitals, &c. of ſo much of their ſettled revenue, as the money is raiſed, v. g. twenty per cent. if the money (as is propoſed) be raiſed one fifth. It will weaken, if not totally deſtroy the publick faith, when all that have truſted the publick, and aſſiſted our preſent neceſſities, upon acts of parliament, in the million lottery, bank act, and other loans, ſhall be defrauded of twenty per cent. of what thoſe acts of parliament were ſecurity for. And to conclude, this raiſing our money will defraud all private men of twenty per cent. in their all debts and ſettled revenues.

Clipping, by Engliſhmen, is robbing the honeſt man who receives clipped money, and transferring the ſilver, i. e. the value is pared off from it, into the clipper's pocket. Clipping by foreigners is robbing England itſelf. And thus the Spaniards lately robbed Portugal of a great part of its treaſure, or commodities (which is the ſame thing) by importing upon them clipped money of the Portugal ſtamp.

Clipping, and clipped money, have, beſides this robbery of the publick, other great inconveniencies: as the diſordering of trade, raiſing foreign exchange, and a general diſturbance, which every one feels thereby in his private affairs.

Clipping is ſo gainful, and ſo ſecret a robbery, that penalties cannot reſtrain it, as we ſee by experience.

Nothing, I humbly conceive, can put a ſtop to clipping, now it is grown ſo univerſal, and men become ſo ſkilful in it, but making it unprofitable.

Nothing can make clipping unprofitable, but making all light money go only for its weight. This ſtops clipping in a moment, brings out all the milled and weighty money, deprives us not of any part of our clipped money for the uſe of trade, and brings it orderly, and by degrees, and without force, into the mint to be recoined.

If clipped money be called in all at once, and ſtopped from paſſing by weight, I fear it will ſtop trade, put our affairs all at a ſtand, and introduce confuſion. Whereas, if it be permitted to paſs by its weight, till it can by degrees be coined, (the ſtamp ſecuring its fineneſs, as well then as now, and the ſcales determining its weight) it will ſerve for paying of great ſums, as commodiouſly almoſt as weighty money, and the weighty money, being then brought out, will ſerve for the market trade, and leſs payments, and alſo to weigh the clipped money by.

On the other ſide; If clipped money be allowed to paſs current by tale, till it be all recoined, one of theſe two effects will apparently follow: either that we ſhall want money for trade, as the clipped money decreaſes, by being coined into weighty; (for very few, if any body, who get weighty money into their hands, will part with it, whilſt clipped money, not of half the value is current) or if they do the coiners and clippers will pick it up, and new coin and clip it, whereby clipped money will be increaſed. So that, by this way, either money will be wanting to trade, or clipped money continued. If clipped money be ſtopped all at once, there is immediately a ſtop of trade. If it be permittted to paſs in tale, as if it were lawful, weighty money, whilſt it is recoining, and till all be recoined, that way alſo there will be an end of trade, or no end of clipped money. But, if it be made to paſs for its weight, till it be all recoined, both theſe evils are avoided, and the weighty money, which we want, will be brought out to boot.

Money is neceſſary to the carrying on of trade. For where money fails, men cannot buy, and trade ſtops.

Credit will ſupply the defect of it to ſome ſmall degree, for a little while. But, credit being nothing but the expectation of money within ſome limited time, money muſt be had, or credit will fail.

Money alſo is neceſſary to us, in a certain proportion to the plenty of it amongſt our neighbours. For, if any of our neighbours have it in a much greater abundance than we, we are many ways obnoxious to them. 1. They can maintain a greater force. 2. They can tempt away our people, by greater wages, to ſerve them by land, or ſea, or in any labour. 3. They can command the markets, and thereby break our trade, and make us poor. 4. They can on any occaſion ingroſs naval and warlike ſtores, and thereby endanger us.

In countries where domeſtick mines do not ſupply it, nothing can bring in ſilver but tribute, or trade. Tribute is the effect of conqueſt: trade, of ſkill and induſtry.

By commerce ſilver is brought in, only by an over-balance of trade.

An over-balance of trade, is when the quantity of commodities, which we ſend to any country, do more than pay for thoſe we bring from thence: for then the overplus is brought home in bullion.

Bullion is ſilver, whoſe workmanſhip has no value. And thus foreign coin hath no value here for its ſtamp, and our coin is bullion in foreign dominions.

It is uſeleſs and labour in vain, to coin ſilver, imported into any country, where it is not to ſtay.

Silver imported cannot ſtay in any country in which, by an over-balance of their whole trade, it is not made theirs, and doth not become a real increaſe of their wealth.

If, by a general balance of its trade, England yearly ſends out commodities to the value of four hundred thouſand ounces of ſilver, more than the commodities we bring home from abroad coſt us; there is one hundred thouſand pound every year clear again: which will come home in money, by a real increaſe of our wealth, and will ſtay here.

On the other ſide, if, upon a general balance of our whole trade, we yearly import commodities from other parts, to the value of an hundred thouſand pound more than our commodities exported pay for, we every year grow an hundred thouſand pound poorer. And if, beſides that, we ſhould alſo import a million in bullion from Spain every year, yet it is not ours; it is no increaſe to our wealth, nor can it ſtay here; but muſt be exported again, every grain of it, with an hundred thouſand pound of our own money to boot.

I have heard it propoſed, as a way to keep our money here, that we ſhould pay our debts contracted beyond ſeas, by bills of exchange.

The idleneſs of ſuch a propoſition will appear, when the nature of exchange is a little conſidered.

Foreign exchange is the paying of money in one country, to receive it in another.

The exchange is high, when a man pays for bills of exchange above the par. It is low, when he pays leſs than the par.

The par is a certain numbers of pieces of the coin of one country, containing in them an equal quantity of ſilver to that in another number of pieces, of the coin of another country: v. g. ſuppoſing 36 ſkillings of Holland to have juſt as much ſilver in them as 20 Engliſh ſhillings. Bills of exchange drawn from England to Holland at the rate of 36 ſkillings Dutch for each pound ſterling, is according to the par. He that pays the money here, and receives it there, neither gets nor loſes by the exchange; but receives juſt the ſame quantity of ſilver in the one place, that he parts with in the other. But, if he pays one pound ſterling to receive but 30 ſkillingsin Holland, he pays one ſixth more than the par, and ſo pays one ſixth more ſilver for the exchange, let the ſum be what it will.

The reaſon of high exchange, is the buying much commodities in any foreign country, beyond the value of what that country takes of ours. This makes Engliſhmen have need of great ſums there, and this raiſes the exchange, or price of bills. For what grows more into demand, increaſes preſently in price.

Returning money by exchange, into foreign parts, keeps not one farthing from going out: it only prevents the more troubleſome and hazardous way of ſending money in ſpecie, forwards and backwards. Bills of exchange more commodiouſly, by ſcrips of paper, even the accounts between particular debtors and creditors, in different countries, as far as the commerce between thoſe two places is equivalent: but where the over-balance, on either ſide, demands payment, there bills of exchange can do nothing; but bullion, or money in ſpecie muſt be ſent. For in a country where we owe money, and have no debts owing to us, bills will not find credit, but for a ſhort time, till money can be ſent to reimburſe thoſe that paid them; unleſs we can think men beyond ſea will part with their money for nothing. If the traders of England owe their correſpondents of Holland a hundred thouſand pounds, their accounts with all the reſt of the world ſtanding equal, and remaining ſo, one farthing of this hundred thouſand pounds cannot be paid by bills of exchange. For example, I owe a thouſand pounds of it; and to pay that, buy a bill of N. here, drawn on John de Wit of Amſterdam, to pay P. Van Lore, my correſpondent there. The money is paid accordingly, and thereby I am out of Van Lore's debt; but one farthing of the debt of England to Holland is not thereby paid; for N. of whom I bought the bill of exchange, is now as much indebted to John de Wit, as I was before to P. Van Lore. Particular debtors and creditors are only changed by bills of exchange; but the debt, owing from one country to the other, cannot be paid without real effects ſent thither to that value, either in commodities, or money. Where the balance of trade barely pays for commodities with commodities, there money muſt be ſent, or elſe the debt cannot be paid.

I have ſpoke of ſilver coin alone, becauſe that makes the money of account, and meaſure of trade, all through the world. For all contracts are, I think, every where made, and accounts kept in ſilver coin. I am ſure they are ſo in England and the neighbouring countries.

Silver therefore, and ſilver alone, is the meaſure of commerce. Two metals, as gold and ſilver, cannot be the meaſure of commerce both together, in any country: becauſe the meaſure of commerce muſt be perpetually the ſame, invariable, and keeping the ſame proportion of value in all its parts. But ſo only one metal does, or can do to itſelf: ſo ſilver is to ſilver, and gold to gold. An ounce of ſilver is always of equal value to an ounce of ſilver, and an ounce of gold to an ounce of gold; and two ounces of the one, or the other, of double the value to an ounce of the ſame. But gold and ſilver change their value one to another: for ſuppoſing them to be in value as ſixteen to one now; perhaps the next month they may be as fifteen and three quarters, or fifteen and ſeven eighths to one. And one may as well make a meaſure, v. g. a yard, whoſe parts lengthen and ſhrink, as a meaſure of trade of materials that have not always a ſettled, unvariable value to one another.

One metal, therefore, alone can be the money of account and contract, and the meaſure of commerce in any country. The fitteſt for this uſe, of all other, is ſilver, for many reaſons, which need not here be mentioned. It is enough that the world has agreed in it, and made it their common money; and as the Indians rightly call it, meaſure. All other metals, gold, as well as lead, are but commodities.

Commodities are moveables, valuable by money, the common meaſure.

Gold, though not the money of the world, and the meaſure of commerce, nor fit to be ſo, yet may, and ought to be coined, to aſcertain its weight and fineneſs; and ſuch coin may ſafely have a price, as well as a ſtamp ſet upon it, by publick authority; ſo the value ſet be under the market-price. For then ſuch pieces coined, will be a commodity as paſſable as ſilver money, very little varying in their price: as guineas, which were coined at the value of 20 s. but paſſed uſually for between 21 or 22 s. according to the current rate; but not having ſo high a value put upon them by the law, no body could be forced to take them to their loſs at 21 s. 6 d. if the price of gold ſhould happen at any time to be cheaper.

From what has been ſaid, I think it appears,

1. That ſilver is that which mankind have agreed on, to take and give in exchange for all other commodities, as an equivalent.

2. That it is by the quantity of ſilver they give, or take, or contract for, that they eſtimate the value of other things, and ſatisfy for them; and thus, by its quantity, ſilver becomes the meaſure of commerce.

3. Hence it neceſſarily follows, that a greater quantity of ſilver has a greater value; a leſs quantity of ſilver has a leſs value; and an equal quantity an equal value.

4. That money differs from uncoined ſilver only in this, that the quantity of ſilver in each piece of money, is aſcertained by the ſtamp it bears; which is ſet there to be a publick voucher of its weight and fineneſs.

5. That gold is treaſure, as well as ſilver, becauſe it decays not in keeping, and never ſinks much in its value.

6. That gold is fit to be coined, as well as ſilver; to aſcertain its quantity to thoſe who have a mind to traffick in it; but not fit to be joined with ſilver, as a meaſure of commerce.

7. That jewels too are treaſure, becauſe they keep without decay; and have conſtantly a great value, in proportion to their bulk: but cannot be uſed

for money, becauſe their value is not meaſured by their quantity, nor can they, as gold and ſilver, be divided, and keep their value.

8. The other metals are not treaſure, becauſe they decay in keeping, and becauſe of their plenty; which makes their value little in a great bulk; and ſo unfit for money, commerce and carriage.

9. That the only way to bring treaſure into England, is the well ordering our trade.

10. That the only way to bring ſilver and gold to the mint, for the increaſe of our ſtock of money and treaſure, which ſhall ſtay here, is an overbalance of our whole trade. All other ways, to increaſe our money and riches, are but projects that will fail us.

These things premiſed, I ſhall now proceed to ſhew wherein I differ from Mr. Lowndes, and upon what grounds I do ſo.

Mr. Lowndes propoſes, that our money ſhould be raiſed (as it is called) one fifth: that is, That all our preſent denominations of money, as penny, ſhilling, half-crown, crown, &c. ſhould each have one fifth leſs ſilver in it, or be anſwered with coin, of one fifth leſs value. How he propoſes to have it done, I ſhall conſider hereafter. I ſhall at preſent only examine the reaſons he gives for it.

His firſt reaſon, p. 68. he gives us in theſe words, "The value of the "ſilver in the coin ought to be raiſed to the foot of ſix ſhillings three pence "in every crown; becauſe the price of ſtandard ſilver in bullion is riſen to ſix "ſhillings five pence an ounce."

This reaſon ſeems to me to labour under ſeveral great miſtakes; as

1. That ſtandard ſilver can riſe in reſpect of itſelf.

2. That ſtandard bullion is now, or ever was worth, or ſold to the traders in it for 6 s. 5 d. the ounce, of lawful money of England. For if that matter of fact holds not to be ſo, that an ounce of ſterling bullion is worth 6 s. 5 d. of our milled weighty money, this reaſon ceaſes: and our weighty crown-pieces ought not to be raiſed to 6 s. 3 d. becauſe our light, clipped money will not purchaſe an ounce of ſtandard bullion, under the rate of 6 s. 5 d. of that light money. And let me add here, nor for that rate neither. If therefore, the author means here, that an ounce of ſtandard ſilver is riſen to 6 s. 5 d. of our clipped money, I grant it him, and higher too. But then, that has nothing to do with the raiſing our lawful coin, which remains unclipped; unleſs he will ſay too, that ſtandard bullion is ſo riſen, as to be worth, and actually to ſell for, 6 s. 5 d. the ounce, of our weighty milled money. This I not only deny, but farther add, that it is impoſſible to be ſo. For 6 s. 5 d. of milled money, weighs an ounce and a quarter near. Can it therefore be poſſible, that one ounce of any commodity, ſhould be worth an ounce and a quarter of the ſelf ſame commodity, and of exactly the ſame goodneſs? for ſo is ſtandard ſilver to ſtandard ſilver. Indeed one has a mark upon it, which the other has not? but it is a mark that makes it rather more, than leſs valuable: or if the mark, by hindering its exportation, makes it leſs valuable for that purpoſe, the melting-pot can eaſily take it off.

THE complaint made of melting down our weighty money, anſwers this reaſon evidently. For can it be ſuppoſed, that a goldſmith will give one ounce and a quarter of coined ſilver, for one ounce of bullion; when by putting it into his melting-pot, he can, for leſs than a penny charge, make it bullion? (For it is always to be remembered, what I think is made clear, that the value of ſilver, conſidered as it is money, and the meaſure of commerce, is nothing but its quantity.) And thus a milled ſhilling, which has double the weight of ſilver in it to a current ſhilling, whereof half the ſilver is clipped away, has double the value. And to ſhew that this is ſo, I will undertake, that any merchant, who has bullion to ſell, ſhall ſell it for a great deal leſs number of ſhillings in tale, to any one who will contract to pay him in milled money, than if he be paid in the current, clipped money.

THOSE who ſay bullion is riſen, I deſire to tell me, what they mean by riſen? Any commodity, I think, is properly ſaid to be riſen, when the ſame quantity will exchange for a greater quantity of another thing; but more particularly of that thing, which is the meaſure of commerce in the country. And thus corn is ſaid to be riſen among the Engliſh in Virginia, when a buſhel of it will ſell, or exchange for more pounds of tobacco; amongſt the Indians, when it will ſell for more yards of wampompeak, which is their money; and amongſt the Engliſh here, when it will exchange for a greater quantity of ſilver than it would before. Riſing and falling of commodities, is always between ſeveral commodities of diſtinct worths. But no body can ſay, that tobacco (of the ſame goodneſs) is riſen in reſpect of itſelf. One pound of the ſame goodneſs will never exchange for a pound and a quarter of the ſame goodneſs. And ſo it is in ſilver: an ounce of ſilver, will always be of equal value to an ounce of ſilver: nor can it ever riſe, or fall, in reſpect of itſelf: an ounce of ſtandard ſilver can never be worth an ounce and a quarter of ſtandard ſilver; nor one ounce of uncoined ſilver, exchange for an ounce and a quarter of coined ſilver: the ſtamp cannot ſo much debaſe its value. Indeed the ſtamp, hindering its free exportation, may make the goldſmith (who profits by the return of money) give one hundred and twentieth, or one ſixtieth, or perhaps, ſometimes, one thirtieth more, that is 5 s. 2 d. $\frac{1}{2}$ 5 s. 3 d. or 5 s. 4 d. the ounce of coined ſilver for uncoined, when there is need of ſending ſilver beyond ſeas; as there always is, when the balance of trade will not ſupply our wants, and pay our debts there. But much beyond this, the goldſmith will never give for bullion; ſince he can make it out of coined money at a cheaper rate.

IT is ſaid, bullion is riſen to 6 s. 5 d. the ounce, i. e. that an ounce of uncoined ſilver will exchange for an ounce and a quarter of coined ſilver. If any one can believe this, I will put this ſhort caſe to him. He has of bullion, or ſtandard, uncoined ſilver, two round plates, each of an exact ſize and weight of a crown-piece: he has beſides, of the ſame bullion, a round plate of the weight and ſize of a ſhilling, and another yet leſs, of an exact weight and ſize of a three-pence. The two great plates being of equal weight and fineneſs, I ſuppoſe he will allow to be of equal value, and that the two leſs, joined to either of them, make it one fifth more worth than the other is by itſelf, they having all three together one fifth more ſilver in them. Let us ſuppoſe then, one of the greater, and the two leſs plates to have received the next moment, (by miracle, or by the mill, it matters not how) the mark, or ſtamp, of our crown, our ſhilling, and our three-pence: can any body ſay, that now they have got the ſtamp of our mint upon them, they are ſo fallen in value, or the other unſtamped piece ſo riſen, that that unſtamped piece, which a moment before was worth only one of the other pieces, is now worth them all three? Which is to ſay, that an ounce of uncoined ſilver, is worth an ounce and a quarter of coined. This is what men would perſuade us, when they ſay, that bullion is raiſed to 6 s. 5 d. (of lawful money) the ounce, which I ſay is utterly impoſſible. Let us conſider this a little further, in another inſtance. The preſent milled crown-piece, ſay they, will not exchange for an ounce of bullion, without the addition of a ſhilling and a three-pence of weighty coin added to it. Coin but that crown-piece into 6 s. 3 d. and then they ſay it will buy an ounce of bullion, or elſe they give up their reaſon and meaſure of raiſing the money. Do that which is allowed to be equivalent to coining of a preſent milled crown-piece into 6 s. 3 d. viz. call it 75 pence, and then alſo it muſt by this rule of raiſing buy an ounce of bullion. If this be ſo, the ſelf-ſame milled crown-piece will, and will not exchange for an ounce of bullion. Call it 60 pence and it will not: the very next moment call it 75 pence, and it will. I am afraid no body can think, change of denomination has ſuch power.

Mr. Lowndes ſupports this his firſt reaſon with theſe words, p. 68. "This "reaſon, which I humbly conceive will appear irrefragable, is grounded upon "a truth ſo apparent, that it may well be compared to an axiom, even in mathe-"matical reaſoning; to wit, that whenſoever the intrinſick value of ſilver in "the coin hath been, or ſhall be, leſs than the price of ſilver in bullion, the "coin hath, and will be melted down."

This I think, though it be allowed Mr. Lowndes for as apparent a truth, and as certain a maxim as he could wiſh, yet ſerves not at all to his purpoſe of leſſening the coin. For when the coin is, as it ſhould be, according to the ſtandard (let the ſtandard be what it will) weighty and unclipped, it is impoſſible that the value of coined ſilver ſhould be leſs than the value, or price of uncoined; becauſe, as I have ſhewn, the value and quantity of ſilver are the ſame: and where the quantities are equal, the values are equal, excepting only the odds that may be between bullion that may be freely exported, and coined ſilver that may not; the odds whereof ſcarce ever amounts to above 2 d. per ounce, and rarely to above a penny, or an half-penny. And this odds (whatever it be) will equally belong to his raiſed, milled money, which cannot be exported, as it will to our preſent milled money, which cannot be exported, as I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew more particularly hereafter. All this diſorder, and a thouſand others, comes from light and unlawful money being current. For then it is no wonder that bullion ſhould be kept up to the value of your clipped money; that is, that bullion ſhould not be ſold by the ounce for leſs than 6 s. 5 d. when that 6 s. 5 d. clipped money, paid for it, does not weigh above an ounce. This inſtance therefore,

fore, of the preſent price of bullion, proves nothing but that the quantity of ſilver in money governs the value of it, and not the denomination; as appears, when clipped money is brought to buy bullion. This is a fair trial: ſilver is ſet againſt ſilver, and by that is ſeen, whether clipped money be of the ſame value with weighty of the ſame denomination, or whether it be not the quantity of ſilver in it that regulates its value.

I CANNOT but wonder that Mr. Lowndes, a man ſo well ſkilled in the law, eſpecially of the mint, the exchequer, and of our money, ſhould all along in this argument ſpeak of clipped money, as if it were the lawful money of England; and ſhould propoſe by that (which is in effect by the clipper's ſheers) to regulate a new ſort of coin to be introduced into England. And if he will ſtand to that meaſure, and leſſen the new coin to the rate of bullion ſold in exchange for preſent, current, clipped money, to prevent its being melted down, he muſt make it yet much lighter than he propoſes; ſo that raiſing it, or to give it its due name, that leſſening of it one fifth will not ſerve the turn: for I will be bold to ſay, that bullion now in England, is no where to be bought by the ounce for 6 s. 5 d. of our preſent, current, clipped money. So that if his rule be true, and nothing can ſave the weighty coin from melting down, but reducing it to the weight that clipped money is brought to, he muſt leſſen the money in his new coin much more than one fifth; for an ounce of ſtandard bullion will always be worth an ounce of clipped money, whether that in tale amount to 6 s. 5 d. 6 s. 6 d. 10 s. or any other number of ſhillings, or pence, of the nick-named clipped money. For a piece of ſilver, that was coined for a ſhilling, but has half the ſilver clipped off, in the law, and in propriety of ſpeech, is no more a ſhilling than a piece of wood, which was once a ſealed yard, is ſtill a yard, when one half of it is broke off.

LET us conſider this maxim a little farther: which out of the language of the mint, in plain Engliſh, I think amounts to thus much, viz. "That "when an ounce of ſtandard bullion coſts a greater number of pence in tale, "than an ounce of that bullion can be coined into, by the ſtandard of the "mint, the coin will be melted down." I grant it, if bullion ſhould riſe to 15 pence the ounce above 5 s. 2 d. as is now pretended; which is to ſay, that an ounce of bullion cannot be bought for leſs than an ounce and a quarter of the like ſilver coined. But that, as I have ſhewed, is impoſſible to be: and every one would be convinced of the contrary, if we had none now but lawful money current. But it is no wonder, if the price and value of things be confounded and uncertain, when the meaſure itſelf is loſt. For we have now no lawful ſilver money current amongſt us; and therefore cannot talk, nor judge right, by our preſent, uncertain, clipped money, of the value and price of things, in reference to our lawful, regular coin, adjuſted and kept to the unvarying ſtandard of the mint. The price of ſilver in bullion above the value of ſilver in coin, when clipping has not defaced our current caſh (for then the odds is very rarely above a penny, or two pence the ounce) is ſo far from being a cauſe of melting down our coin, that this price, which is given above the value of the ſilver in our coin, is given only to preſerve our coin from being melted down: for no body buys bullion at above 5 s. 2 d. the ounce, (which is juſt the value) for any other reaſon, but to avoid the crime and hazard of melting down our coin.

I THINK it will be agreed on all hands, that no body will melt down our money, but for profit. Now profit can be made by melting down our money but only in two caſes.

FIRST, When the current pieces of the ſame denomination are unequal, and of different weights, ſome heavier, ſome lighter: for then the traders in money cull out the heavier, and melt them down with profit. This is the ordinary fault of coining by the hammer, wherein it uſually ſufficed, That a bar of ſilver was cut into as many half-crowns, or ſhillings, as anſwered its whole weight; without being very exact in making each particular piece of its due weight; whereby ſome pieces came to be heavier, and ſome lighter, than by the ſtandard they ſhould. And then the heavier pieces were culled out, and there was profit to be made (as one eaſily perceives) in melting them down. But this cauſe of melting down our money is eaſily prevented, by the exacter way of coining by the mill, in which each ſingle piece is brought to its juſt weight. This inequality of pieces of the ſame denomination, is to be found in our money, more than ever, ſince clipping has been in faſhion: and therefore, it is no wonder, that in this irregular ſtate of our money, one complaint is, that the heavy money is melted down. But this alſo the making clipped money go at preſent for its weight, (which is a ſudden reducing of it to the ſtandard) and then, by degrees, recoining it into milled money, (which is the ultimate and more complete reducing it to the ſtandard) perfectly cures.

THE other caſe, wherein our money comes to be melted down, is a loſing trade; or, which is the ſame thing in other words, an over-great conſumption of foreign commodities. Whenever the over-balance of foreign trade makes it difficult for our merchants to get bills of exchange, the exchange preſently riſes, and the returns of money raiſe them in proportion to the want of money Engliſhmen have in any parts beyond ſeas. They, who thus furniſh them with bills, not being able to ſatisfy their correſpondents, on whom thoſe bills are drawn, with the product of our commodities there, muſt ſend ſilver from hence to reimburſe them, and repay the money they have drawn out of their hands. Whilſt bullion may be had for a ſmall price more than the weight of our current caſh, theſe exchangers generally chuſe rather to buy bullion, than run the riſque of melting down our coin, which is criminal by the law. And thus the matter for the moſt part went, whilſt milled and clipped money paſſed promiſcuouſly in payment: for ſo long a clipped half-crown was as good here as a milled one, ſince one paſſed, and could be had as freely as the other. But as ſoon as there began to be a diſtinction between clipped and unclipped money, and weighty money could no longer be had for the light, bullion (as was natural) aroſe; and it would fall again to-morrow to the price it was at before, if there were none but weighty money to pay for it. In ſhort, whenever the whole of our foreign trade and conſumption exceeds our exportation of commodities, our money muſt go to pay our debts ſo contracted whether melted or not melted down. If the law makes the exportation of our coin penal, it will be melted down; if it leaves the exportation of our coin free, as in Holland, it will be carried out in ſpecie. One way, or other, go it muſt, as we ſee in Spain; but whether melted down, or not melted down, it matters little: our coin and treaſure will be both ways equally diminiſhed, and can be reſtored, only by an over-balance of our whole exportation, to our whole importation of conſumable commodities. Laws, made againſt exportation of money, or bullion, will be all in vain. Reſtraint, or liberty in that matter, makes no country rich or poor: as we ſee in Holland, which had plenty of money under the free liberty of its exportation, and Spain, in great want of money under the ſevereſt penalties againſt carrying of it out. But the coining, or not coining our money, on the ſame foot it was before, or in bigger, or leſs pieces, and under whatſoever denominations you pleaſe, contributes nothing to, or againſt its melting down, or exportation, ſo our money be all kept, each ſpecies in its full weight of ſilver, according to the ſtandard: for if ſome be heavier, and ſome lighter, allowed to be current, ſo under the ſame denomination the heavier will be melted down, where the temptation of profit is conſiderable, which in well regulated coin kept to the ſtandard, cannot be. But this melting down carries not away one grain of our treaſure out of England. The coming and going of that depends wholly upon the balance of our trade; and therefore it is a wrong concluſion which we find, p. 71. "That "continuing either old, or new coins on the preſent foot, will be nothing "elſe but furniſhing a ſpecies to melt down at an extravagant profit, and will "encourage a violent exportation of our ſilver, for ſake of the gain only, till "we ſhall have little or none left." For example: let us ſuppoſe all our light money new coined, upon the foot that this gentleman would have it, and all our old milled crowns going for 75 pence as he propoſes, and the reſt of the old milled money proportionably; I deſire it to be ſhewed how this would hinder the exportation of one ounce of ſilver, whilſt our affairs are in the preſent poſture. Again, on the other ſide, ſuppoſing all our money were now milled coin upon the preſent foot, and our balance of trade changing, our exportation of commodities were a million more than our importation, and like to continue ſo yearly; whereof one half was to Holland, and the other to Flanders, there being an equal balance between England and all other parts of the world we trade to; I aſk, what poſſible gain could any Engliſhman make, by melting down and carrying out our money to Holland and Flanders, when a million was to come thence hither, and Engliſhmen had more there already than they knew how to uſe there, and could not get home without paying dear there for bills of exchange? If that were the caſe of our trade, the exchange would preſently fall here, and riſe there beyond the par of their money to ours, i. e. an Engliſh merchant muſt give in Holland more ſilver, for the bills he bought there, than he ſhould receive upon thoſe bills here, if the two ſums were weighed one againſt the other: or run the riſque of bringing it home in ſpecie. And what then could any Engliſhman get by exporting money, or ſilver thither?

**These** are the only two caſes wherein our coin can be melted down with profit; and I challenge any one living to ſhew me any other. The one of them is removed only by a regular juſt coin, kept equal to the ſtandard; be that what it will, it matters not, as to the point of melting down of the money. The other is to be removed only by the balance of our trade kept from running us behind-hand, and contracting debts in foreign countries by an over-conſumption of their commodities.

To thoſe who ſay, that the exportation of our money, whether melted down, or not melted down, depends wholly upon our conſumption of foreign commodities, and not at all upon the ſizes of the ſeveral ſpecies of our money, which will be equally exported or not exported, whether coined upon the old, or the propoſed new foot: Mr. Lowndes replies:

1. THAT "the neceſſity of foreign expence, and exportation to anſwer "the balance of trade, may be diminiſhed, but cannot in any ſenſe be aug-"mented, by raiſing the value of our money."

I BEG his pardon, if I cannot aſſent to this. Becauſe the neceſſity of our exportation of money, depending wholly upon the debts which we contract in foreign parts, beyond what our commodities exported can pay; the coining our money in bigger, or leſs pieces, under the ſame, or different denominations, or on the preſent, or propoſed foot, in itſelf neither increaſing thoſe debts, nor the expences that make them, can neither augment, nor diminiſh the exportation of our money.

2. HE replies, p. 72. That melters of the coin "will have leſs profit by "fourteen pence halfpenny in the crown," when the money is coined upon the new foot.

To this I take liberty to ſay, that there will not be a farthing more profit in melting down the money, if it were all new milled money, upon the preſent foot, than if it were all new coined, as is propoſed, one fifth lighter. For whence ſhould the profit ariſe more in the one, than the other? But Mr. Lowndes goes upon this ſuppoſition; That ſtandard bullion is now worth ſix ſhillings and five-pence an ounce of milled money, and would continue to ſell for ſix ſhillings five-pence the ounce, if our money were all weighty milled money: both which I take to be miſtakes, and think I have proved them to be ſo.

3. HE ſays, "It is hoped that the exchange to Holland may be kept at a "ſtand, or at leaſt from falling much lower." I hope ſo too. But how that concerns this argument, or the coining of the money upon a new foot, I do not ſee.

4. HE ſays, p. 73. "There is a great difference, with regard to the ſervice "or diſſervice of the publick, between carrying out bullion, or coin for ne-"ceſſary uſes, or for prohibited commodities." The gain to the exporters, which is that which makes them melt it down and export it, is the ſame in both caſes. And the neceſſity of exporting it is the ſame. For it is to pay debts, which there is an equal neceſſity of paying, when once contracted, though for uſeleſs things. They are the goldſmiths and dealers in ſilver, that uſually export what ſilver is ſent beyond ſea, to pay the debts they have contracted by their bills of exchange. But thoſe dealers in exchange ſeldom know, or conſider, how they, to whom they give their bills, have, or will employ

the money, they receive upon thoſe bills. Prohibited commodities it is true, ſhould be kept out, and uſeleſs ones impoveriſh us by being brought in. But this is the fault of our importation: and there the miſchief ſhould be cured, by laws, and our way of living. For the exportation of our treaſure is not the cauſe of their importation, but the conſequence. Vanity and luxury ſpends them: that gives them vent here: that vent cauſes their importation: and when our merchants have brought them, if our commodities will not be enough, our money muſt go to pay for them. But what this paragraph has in it againſt continuing our coin upon the preſent foot, or for making our coin lighter, I confeſs here again, I do not ſee.

It is true what Mr. Lowndes obſerves here, the importation of gold, and the going of guineas at 30s. has been a great prejudice and loſs to the kingdom. But that has been wholly owing to our clipped money, and not at all to our money being coined at five ſhillings two-pence the ounce; nor is the coining our money lighter, the cure of it. The only remedy for that miſchief, as well as a great many others, is the putting an end to the paſſing of clipped money by tale, as if it were lawful coin.

5. His fifth head, p. 74. is to anſwer thoſe, who hold, that by the leſſening our money one fifth, all people, who are to receive money upon contracts already made, will be defrauded of twenty per cent. of their due: and thus all men will loſe one fifth of their ſettled revenues, and all men, that have lent money, one fifth of their principal and uſe. To remove this objection, Mr. Lowndes ſays, that ſilver in England is grown ſcarce, and conſequently dearer, and ſo is of higher price. Let us grant for the preſent, it is of higher price (which how he makes out, I ſhall examine by and by.) This, if it were ſo, ought not to annul any man's bargain, nor make him receive leſs in quantity than he lent. He was to receive again the ſame ſum, and the publick authority was guarantee, that the ſame ſum ſhould have the ſame quantity of ſilver, under the ſame denomination. And the reaſon is plain, why in juſtice he ought to have the ſame quantity of ſilver again, notwithſtanding any pretended riſe of its value. For if ſilver had grown more plentiful, and by conſequence (by our author's rule) cheaper, his debtor would not have been compelled, by the publick authority, to have paid him, in conſideration of its cheapneſs, a greater quantity of ſilver than they contracted for. Cacao-nuts were the money of a part of America, when we firſt came thither. Suppoſe then you had lent me laſt year 300, or fifteen ſcore cacao-nuts, to be repaid this year, would you be ſatisfied and think yourſelf paid your due, if I ſhould tell you, cacao-nuts were ſcarce this year, and that fourſcore were of as much value this year as an hundred the laſt; and that therefore, you were well and fully paid, if I reſtored to you only 240 for the 300 I borrowed? Would you not think yourſelf defrauded of two thirds of your right, by ſuch a payment? Nor would it make any amends for this to juſtice, or reparation to you, that the publick had (after your contract, which was made for fifteen ſcore) altered the denomination of ſcore, and applied it to ſixteen inſtead of twenty. Examine it, and you will find this juſt the caſe, and the loſs proportionable in them both; that is, a real loſs of twenty per cent. As to Mr. Lowndes's proofs, that ſilver is now one

fifth more value than it was, and therefore a man has right done him, if he receive one fifth leſs than his contract, I fear none of them will reach Mr. Lowndes's point. He ſaith, p. 77. "By daily experience nineteen penny "weight, and three tenths of a penny weight of ſterling ſilver, which is juſt "the weight of a crown-piece, will purchaſe more coined money than five "unclipped ſhillings." I wiſh he had told us where this daily experience he ſpeaks of, is to be found: for I dare ſay no body hath ſeen a ſum of unclipped ſhillings paid for bullion any where theſe twelve months, to go no further back.

In the next place, I wiſh he had told us how much more than five lawful milled ſhillings, bullion of the weight of a crown-piece will purchaſe. If he had ſaid it would purchaſe ſix ſhillings and three-pence weighty money, he had proved the matter in queſtion. And whoever has the weight of a crown in ſilver paid him in Mr. Lowndes's new coin inſtead of ſix ſhillings and three-pence of our preſent money, has no injury done him, if it will certainly purchaſe him ſix ſhillings and three-pence all unclipped, of our preſent money. But every one at firſt ſight perceives this to be impoſſible, as I have already proved it. I have in this the concurrence of Mr. Lowndes's new ſcheme, to prove it to be ſo. For, p. 62. he propoſes that his ſilver unit having the weight and fineneſs of a preſent unclipped crown-piece, ſhould go for 75 pence; and that the preſent ſhilling ſhould go for 15 pence; by which eſtabliſhment there will be 75 pence in his unit, and 93 pence three farthings in ſix ſhillings three-pence, weighty money of the preſent coin; which is an undeniable confeſſion, that it is as impoſſible for his ſilver unit, having no more ſilver in it than a preſent unclipped crown) to be worth, and ſo to purchaſe, ſix unclipped ſhillings and three-pence of our preſent money; as it is for 75 pence to be worth 93 of the ſame pence, or 75 to be equal to 93.

If he means by more, that his ſterling ſilver of the weight of a crown-piece will purchaſe a penny, or two-pence more than five unclipped ſhillings, which is the moſt, and which is but accidental too; what is this riſe of its value to 15 pence? And what amends will one ſixtieth (a little more or leſs) riſe in value, make for one fifth diminiſhed in weight, and loſt in quantity? which is all one as to ſay, that a penny, or thereabouts, ſhall make amends for fifteen pence taken away.

Another way to recommend his new coin, to thoſe who ſhall receive it, inſtead of the preſent weightier coin, he tells them, p. 77. it will pay as much debt, and purchaſe as much commodities as our preſent money which is one fifth heavier: what he ſays of debts is true. But yet I would have it well conſidered by our Engliſh gentlemen, that though creditors will loſe one fifth of their principal and uſe, and landlords will loſe one fifth of their income, yet the debtors and tenants will not get it. It will be aſked, who then will get it? Thoſe, I ſay, and thoſe only, who have great ſums of weighty money (whereof one ſees not a piece now in payments) hoarded up by them, will get by it. To thoſe, by the propoſed change of our money, will be an increaſe of one fifth, added to their riches, paid out of the pockets of the reſt of the nation. For what theſe men received for four ſhillings, they will pay again for five. This weighty money hoarded up, Mr. Lowndes, p. 105. computes at one million and ſix hundred thouſand pounds. So that by raiſing our money one fifth, there will three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds be given to thoſe, who have hoarded up our weighty money; which hoarding up of money is thought by many to have no other merit in it, than the prejudicing our trade and publick affairs, and increaſing our neceſſities, by keeping ſo great a part of our money from coming abroad, at a time when there was ſo great need of it. If the ſum of unclipped money in the nation be, as ſome ſuppoſe, much greater; then there will, by this contrivance of the raiſing our coin, be given to theſe rich hoarders, much above the aforeſaid ſum of three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds of our preſent money. No body elſe, but theſe hoarders, can get a farthing by this propoſed change of our coin; unleſs men in debt have plate by them, which they will coin to pay their debts. Thoſe too, I muſt confeſs, will get one fifth by all the plate of their own, which they ſhall coin and pay debts with, valuing their plate at bullion; but if they ſhall conſider the faſhion of their plate, what that coſt when they bought it, and the faſhion that new plate will coſt them, if they intend ever to have plate again, they will find this one fifth ſeeming preſent profit, in coining their plate to pay their debts, amounts to little, or nothing at all. No body then but the hoarders will get by this twenty per cent. And I challenge any one to ſhew, how any body elſe (but that little in the caſe of plate coined to pay debts) ſhall get a farthing by it. It ſeems to promiſe faireſt to the debtors: but to them too it will amount to nothing. For he, that takes up money to pay his debts, will receive this new money, and pay it again at the ſame rate he received it, juſt as he does now our preſent coin, without any profit at all. And though commodities (as is natural) ſhall be raiſed, in proportion to the leſſening of the money, no body will get by that, any more than they do now, when all things are grown dearer. Only he that is bound up by contract to receive any ſum, under ſuch a denomination of pounds, ſhillings and pence, will find his loſs ſenſibly, when he goes to buy commodities, and make new bargains. The markets and the ſhops will ſoon convince him, that his money, which is one fifth lighter, is alſo one fifth worſe; when he muſt pay twenty per cent. more for all the commodities he buys, with the money of the new foot, than if he bought it with the preſent coin.

THIS Mr. Lowndes himſelf will not deny, when he calls to mind what he himſelf, ſpeaking of the inconveniencies we ſuffer by our clipped money, ſays, p. 115. " Perſons before they conclude in any bargains, are neceſſitated firſt " to ſettle the price, or value of the very money, they are to receive for their " goods; and if it be in clipped, or bad money, they ſet the price of their " goods accordingly: which I think has been one great cauſe of raiſing the " price, not only of merchandize, but even of edibles, and other neceſſaries " for the ſuſtenance of the common people, to their great grievance." That every one, who receives money, after the raiſing our money, on contracts made before the change, muſt loſe twenty per cent. in all he ſhall buy, is demonſtration, by Mr. Lowndes's own ſcheme. Mr Lowndes propoſes, that there ſhould be ſhillings coined upon the new foot, one fifth lighter than our preſent ſhillings, which ſhould go for twelve-pence a-piece; and that the unclipped ſhillings of the preſent coin ſhould go for fifteen-pence a-piece; and the crown for ſeventy-five pence. A man, who has a debt of a hundred pounds owing him, upon bond, or leaſe, receives it in theſe new ſhillings, inſtead of lawful money of the preſent ſtandard; he goes to market with twenty ſhillings in one pocket of this new money, which are valued at 240 pence; and in the other pocket with four milled crown-pieces, (or twenty milled ſhillings of the preſent coin) which are valued at three hundred pence, which is one fifth more: it is demonſtration then, that he loſes one fifth, or twenty per cent. in all that he buys, by the receipt of this new money, for the preſent coin, which was his due; unleſs thoſe he deals with, will take four for five-pence, or four ſhillings for five ſhillings. He buys for example, a quart of oil for fifteen-pence: if he pay for it with the old money in one pocket, one ſhilling will do it: if with the new money in the other, he muſt add three-pence to it, or a quarter of another ſhilling; and ſo of all the reſt that he pays for, with either the old money, which he ſhould have received his debts in, or with the new, which he was forced to receive for it. Thus far, it is demonſtration, he loſes twenty per cent. by receiving his debt in a new money thus raiſed, when he uſes it to buy any thing. But to make him amends, Mr Lowndes tells him, ſilver is now dearer, and all things conſequently will be bought cheaper twenty per cent. And yet at the ſame time he tells him, in the paſſage above cited, out of p. 115. that all other things are grown dearer. I am ſure there is no demonſtration, that they will be ſold twenty per cent. cheaper. And, if I may credit houſekeepers and ſubſtantial tradeſmen, all ſorts of proviſions and commodities, are lately riſen exceſſively; and, notwithſtanding the ſcarcity of ſilver, begin to come up to the true value of our clipped money, every one ſelling their commodities ſo as to make themſelves amends, in the number of light pieces for what they want in weight. A creditor ought to think the new light money equivalent to the preſent heavier, becauſe it will buy as much commmodities. But what if it ſhould fail, as it is ten to one but it will, what ſecurity has he for it? He is told ſo, and he muſt be ſatisfied. That ſalt, wine, oil, ſilk, naval ſtores, and all foreign commodities, will none of them be ſold us by foreigners, for a leſs quantity of ſilver than before, becauſe we have given the name of more pence to it, is, I think demonſtration. All our names (if they are any more to us) are to them but bare ſounds; and our coin, as theirs to us, but mere bullion, valued only by its weight. And a Swede will no more ſell you his hemp and pitch, or a Spaniard his oil, for leſs ſilver, becauſe you tell him, ſilver is ſcarcer now in England, and therefore riſen in value one fifth; than a tradeſman of London will ſell his commodity, cheaper to the Iſle of Man, becauſe they are grown poorer, and money is ſcarce there.

All foreign commodities muſt be ſhut out of the number of thoſe that will fall, to comply with our raiſing our money. Corn, alſo, it is evident, does not riſe, or fall, by the differences of more, or leſs plenty of money, but by the plenty and ſcarcity that God gives. For our money, in appearance, remaining the ſame, the price of corn is double one year, to what it is was the precedent: and therefore, we muſt certainly make account, that ſince the money is one fifth lighter, it will buy one fifth leſs corn *communibus annis*. And this being the great expence of the poor, that takes up almoſt all their earnings, if corn be, *communibus annis*, ſold for one fifth more money in tale, than before the change of our money, they too muſt have one fifth more in tale, of the new money, for their wages than they have now; and the day-labourer muſt have, not only twelve, but fifteen-pence of the new money a day, which is the preſent ſhilling that he has now, or elſe he cannot live. So that all foreign commodities, with corn and labour, keeping up their value to the quantity of ſilver they ſell for now, and not complying, in the fall of their real price, with the nominal raiſing of our money; there is not much left, wherein landlords and creditors are to expect the recompence of twenty per cent. abatemant of price in commodities, to make up their loſs in the lightneſs of our money, they are paid their rents and debts in. It would be eaſy to ſhew the ſame thing, concerning our other native commodities, and make it clear, that we have no reaſon to expect they ſhould abate of their preſent price, any more than corn and labour: but this is enough, and any one who has a mind to it, may trace the reſt at his leiſure.

And thus I fear the hopes of cheaper penny-worths, which might beguiſe ſome men into a belief that landlords and creditors would receive no leſs by the propoſed new money, is quite vaniſhed. But if the promiſe of better penny-worths, and a fall of all commodities twenty per cent. ſhould hold true, this would not at all relieve creditors and landlords, and ſet them upon equal terms with their neighbours: becauſe the cheap penny-worths will not be for them alone, but every body elſe, as well as they, will ſhare in that advantage; ſo that their ſilver being diminiſhed one fifth in their rents and debts, which are paid them, they would ſtill be twenty per cent. greater loſers than their unhoarding neighbours, and forty per cent. greater loſers than the hoarders of money; who will certainly get twenty per cent. in the money, whatever happens in the price of things; and twenty per cent. more in the cheapneſs of commodities, if that promiſed recompence be made good to creditors and landlords. For the hoarders of money (if the price of things falls) will buy as cheap as they. So that whatever is ſaid of the cheapneſs of commodities, it is demonſtration, (whether that proves true, or no) that creditors, and landlords, and all thoſe, who are to receive money, upon bargains made before the propoſed change of our coin, will unavoidably loſe twenty per cent.

One thing Mr. Lowndes ſays in this paragraph is very remarkable, which I think decides the queſtion. His words, p. 78. are theſe, "That if the value "of the ſilver in the coins (by an extrinſick denomination) be raiſed above "the value, or market-price, of the ſame ſilver reduced to bullion, the ſub-"jects would be proportionably injured or defrauded, as they were formerly "in the caſe of baſe monies, coined by publick authority." It remains therefore only to ſhew, that the market price of ſtandard bullion is not one fifth above our coin that is to be raiſed, and then we have Mr. Lowndes of our ſide too againſt its raiſing. I think it is abundantly proved already, that ſtandard bullion neither is, nor can be, worth one fifth more than our lawful weighty money: and if it be not, by Mr. Lowndes's confeſſion, there is no need of raiſing our preſent, legal, milled money to that degree; and it is only our clipped money that wants amendment: and when that is recoined and reduced all to milled and lawful money, that then too will have no need of raiſing. This I ſhall now prove out of Mr. Lowndes's own words here.

Mr. Lowndes, in the forecited words, compares the value of ſilver in our coin, to the value of the ſame ſilver reduced to bullion; which he ſuppoſing to be as four to five, makes that the meaſure of the raiſing our money. If this be the difference of value between ſilver in bullion, and ſilver in coin; and if it be true, that four ounces of ſtandard bullion be worth five ounces of the ſame ſilver coined; or, which is the ſame thing, that bullion, will ſell by the ounce for ſix ſhillings and five-pence unclipped money; I will take the boldneſs to adviſe his majeſty to buy, or to borrow any where ſo much bullion, or, rather than be without it, melt down ſo much plate, as is equal in weight to twelve hundred pounds ſterling of our preſent milled money. This let him ſell for milled money. And, according to our author's rule, it will yield fifteen hundred pounds. Let that fifteen hundred pounds be reduced into bullion, and ſold again, and it will produce eighteen hundred and ſixty pounds; which eighteen hundred and ſixty pounds of weighty money being reduced into bullion, will ſtill produce one fifth more in weight of ſilver, being ſold for weighty money. And thus his majeſty may get at leaſt three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds by ſelling of bullion for weighty money, and melting that down into bullion, as faſt as he receives it; till he has brought into his hands the million and ſix hundred thouſand pounds, which Mr. Lowndes computes there is of weighty money left in England.

I doubt not but every one, who reads it, will think this a very ridiculous propoſition. But he muſt think it ridiculous for no other reaſon, but becauſe he ſees it is impoſſible that bullion ſhould ſell for one fifth above its weight of the ſame ſilver coined; that is, that an ounce of ſtandard ſilver ſhould ſell for ſix ſhillings five-pence of our preſent weighty money. For if it will, it is no ridiculous thing that the king ſhould melt down, and make that profit of his money.

If our author's rule (p. 78. where he ſays, "That the only juſt and " reaſonable foot, upon which the coins ſhould be current, is the very price " of the ſilver thereof, in caſe it be molten in the ſame place where " coins are made current") be to be obſerved; our money is to be raiſed but an halfpenny, or at moſt a penny in five ſhillings: for that was the ordinary odds in the price between bullion and coined ſilver, before clipping had deprived us, in commerce, of all our milled and weighty money. And ſilver in ſtandard bullion would not be in value one jot above the ſame ſilver in coin, if clipped money were not current by tale, and coined ſilver (as Mr. Lowndes propoſes, p. 73.) as well as bullion, had the liberty of exportation. For when we have no clipped money, but all our current coin is weight, according to the ſtandard, all the odds of value that ſilver in bullion has to ſilver in coin, is only owing to the prohibition of its exportation in money;

and never riſes, nor can riſe, above what the goldſmith ſhall eſtimate the riſque and trouble of melting it down; which is ſo little, that the importers of ſilver could never raiſe it to above a penny an ounce, but at ſuch times as the Eaſt-India company, or ſome foreign ſale, calling for a great quantity of ſilver at a time, made the goldſmiths ſcramble for it; and ſo the importers of bullion raiſe its price upon them, according to the preſent need of great quantities of ſilver which every goldſmith (eager to ingroſs to himſelf as much as he could) was content to pay high for, rather than go without: his preſent gains from thoſe whom he furniſhed, and whom otherwiſe he could not furniſh, making him amends.

The natural value then, between ſilver in bullion, and in coin, is (I ſay) every where equal; bating the charge of coinage, which gives the advantage to the ſide of the coin. The ordinary odds here in England, between ſilver in bullion, and the ſame in our coin, is, by reaſon that the ſtamp hinders its free exportation, about a penny in the crown. The accidental difference, by reaſon of ſudden occaſions, is ſometimes (but rarely) two-pence in five ſhillings, or ſomewhat more in great urgencies. And ſince the ordinary rate of things is to be taken as the meaſure of their price, and Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 78. "That if the value of the ſilver in their coins, ſhould be raiſed "above the value, or market-price, of the ſame ſilver reduced to bullion, the "ſubject would be proportionably injured and defrauded;" I leave him to make the inference, what will be the conſequence in England, if our coin be raiſed here one fifth, or twenty per cent.

Mr. Lowndes ſays farther, p. 80. That ſilver has a price. I anſwer; ſilver to ſilver can have no other price, but quantity for quantity. If there be any other difference in value, it is, or can be nothing, but one of theſe two: firſt, either the value of the labour employed about one parcel of ſilver more than another, makes a difference in their price; and thus faſhioned plate ſells for more than its weight of the ſame ſilver; and in countries where the owners pay for the coinage, ſilver in coin is more worth than its weight in bullion; but here, where the publick pays the coinage, they are of very near equal value, when there is no need of exportation: for then there is no more odds than the trouble of carrying the bullion to the mint, and fetching again, is worth; or the charge of refining ſo much of it, as will bring it to ſtandard, if it be worſe than ſtandard.

Or ſecondly, ſome privilege belonging to one parcel of ſilver, which is denied to another, viz. here in England a liberty of exportation allowed to ſilver in bullion, denied to ſilver ſtamped. This when there is need of exportation of ſilver, gives ſome ſmall advantage of value to uncoined ſilver here, above coined; but that is ordinarily very inconſiderable; and can never reach to one fifth, nor half one fifth, as has been already ſhewn. And this I think will anſwer all that is ſaid about the price of ſilver in that place.

It is true what Mr. Lowndes ſays, in the next words, p. 81. "That five "ſhillings coined upon the foot propoſed, will actually contain more real "and intrinſick value of ſilver by a great deal, than is in the current money, "now commonly applied to the payment of the ſaid rents, revenues and "debts."

“ debts.” But will he hence conclude, becauſe there is now loſt in thoſe rents, revenues and debts, a great deal more than twenty per cent. under the preſent irregularity of our coin, and the robbery in clipped money, without any the leaſt neglect, or miſcarriage in the owner, that entitled him to that loſs, that therefore, it is juſt that the loſs of twenty per cent. be eſtabliſhed on him by law for the future, in the reforming of our coin?

Mr. Lowndes's ſecond reaſon for leſſening of our coin, we have, p. 82. in theſe words, “ The value of the ſilver in the coin ought to be raiſed, to en- “ courage the bringing of bullion to the mint to be coined.” This raiſing of money is in effect, as has been ſeen, nothing but giving a denomination of more pence to the ſame quantity of ſilver, viz. That the ſame quantity of ſilver ſhall hereafter be called ſeventy-five pence, which is now called but ſixty-pence. For that is all is done, as is manifeſt, when a crown-piece, which now but goes for ſixty-pence, ſhall be made to go for ſeventy-five pence; for it is plain, it contains nothing of ſilver, or worth in it, more than it did before. Let us ſuppoſe, that all our ſilver coin now in England were ſix-pences, ſhillings, half-crowns and crowns, all milled money, full weight, according to the preſent ſtandard; and that it ſhould be ordered, that for the future, the crown-piece, inſtead of going for ſixty-pence, ſhould go for ſeventy-five pence, and ſo proportionably, of all the other pieces; I aſk then, how ſuch a change of denomination ſhall bring bullion to the mint to be coined, and from whence? I ſuppoſe this change of names, or aſcribing to it more imaginary parts of any denomination, has no charms in it to bring bullion to the mint to be coined: for whether you call the piece coined twelve-pence, or fifteen-pence, or ſixty, or ſeventy-five, a crown or a ſceptre, it will buy no more ſilk, ſalt, or bread than it would before. That therefore cannot tempt people to bring it to the mint. And if it will pay more debts, that is perfect defrauding, and ought not to be permitted. Next, I aſk, from whence ſhall this raiſing fetch it? For bullion cannot be brought hither to ſtay here, whilſt the balance of our trade requires all the bullion we bring in, to be exported again, and more ſilver out of our former ſtock with it, to anſwer our exigencies beyond ſeas. And whilſt it is ſo the goldſmiths and returners of money will give more for bullion to export, than the mint can give for it to coin; and ſo none of that will come to the mint.

But ſays our author, p. 83. “ An halfpenny an ounce profit, which will “ be in the propoſed coin, above the preſent price of ſterling bullion, will be “ an encouragement to thoſe who have Engliſh plate, to bring it in to be “ coined.” I doubt whether there will be any ſuch profit; for I imagine, that ſtandard bullion cannot now be bought per ounce, for ſix ſhillings and five-pence of our clipped, running caſh, which is the meaſure, whereby Mr. Lowndes determines of the price of ſterling ſilver. But, taking this halfpenny an ounce profit for granted, it will not bring to the mint any plate, whoſe faſhion is valued by the owner at above an halfpenny per ounce; and how much then it is like to bring to the mint is eaſy to gueſs.

The true and only good reaſon, that brings bullion to the mint to be coined, is the ſame that brings it to England to ſtay there, viz. The gain we make by an over-balance of trade. When our merchants carry commodities abroad, to a greater value than thoſe they bring home, the overplus comes to them in foreign coin, or bullion, which will ſtay here, when we gain by the balance of our whole trade. For then we can have no debts beyond ſea to be paid with it. In this thriving poſture of our trade, thoſe to whoſe ſhare this bullion falls, not having any uſe of it, whilſt it is in bullion, chuſe to carry it to the mint to have it coined there, whereby it is of more uſe to them for all the buſineſs of ſilver in trade, or purchaſing land; the mint having aſcertained the weight and fineneſs of it: ſo that on any occaſion every one is ready to take it at its known value, without any ſcruple; a convenience that is wanting in bullion. But when our trade runs on the other ſide, and our exported commodities will not pay for thoſe foreign ones we conſume, our treaſure muſt go; and then it is in vain to beſtow the labour of coining on bullion, that muſt be exported again. To what purpoſe is it, to make it paſs through our mint, when it will away? The leſs pains and charge it coſts us, the better.

His third reaſon, p. 83. is, that this raiſing our coin, by making it "more "in tale, will make it more commenſurate to the general need thereof," and thereby hinder the increaſe of hazardous paper-credit, and the inconveniency of bartering.

Just as the boy cut his leather into five quarters (as he called them) to cover his ball, when cut into four quarters it fell ſhort; but after all his pains, as much of his ball lay bare as before: if the quantity of coined ſilver, employed in England, fall ſhort, the arbitrary denomination of a greater number of pence given to it, or, which is all one, to the ſeveral coined pieces of it, will not make it commenſurate to the ſize of our trade, or the greatneſs of our occaſions. This is as certain, as that if the quantity of a board, which is to ſtop a leak of a ſhip fifteen inches ſquare, be but twelves inches ſquare, it will not be made to do it, by being meaſured by a foot, that is divided into fifteen inches, inſtead of twelve, and ſo having a larger tale, or number of inches in denomination given to it.

This, indeed, would be a convincing reaſon, if ſounds would give weight to ſilver, and the noiſe of a greater number of pence (leſs in quantity proportionably as they are more in number) were a larger ſupply of money, which our author, p. 84. ſays our occaſions require, and which he by an increaſe of the tale of pence hopes to provide. But that miſtake is very viſible, and ſhall be farther ſhewn in the buſineſs of bartering.

The neceſſity of truſt and bartering is one of the many inconveniencies ſpringing from the want of money. This inconvenience, the multiplying arbitrary denominations will no more ſupply, nor any ways make our ſcarcity of coin commenſurate to the need there is of it, than if the cloth which was provided for cloathing the army, falling ſhort, one ſhould hope to make it commenſurate to that need there is of it, by meaſuring it by a yard one fifth ſhorter than the ſtandard, or changing the ſtandard of the yard, and ſo getting the full denomination of yards, neceſſary according to the preſent meaſure. For this is all will be done by raiſing our coin, as is propoſed. All it amounts to is no more but this, viz. That each piece, and conſequently our whole ſtock of money, ſhould be meaſured and denominated by a penny, one fifth leſs than the ſtandard.

Where there is not coined ſilver, in proportion to the value of the commodities, that daily change owners in trade, there is a neceſſity of truſt or bartering, i. e. changing commodities for commodities, without the intervention of money. For example; let us ſuppoſe in Bermudas but an hundred pounds in ready money, but that there is every day there, a transferring of commodities from one owner to another, to the value of double as much. When the money is all got into hands, that have already bought all that they have need of, for that day, whoever has need of any thing elſe that day, muſt either go on tick, or barter for it, i. e. give the commodities he can beſt ſpare for the commodities he wants, v. g. ſugar for bread, &c. Now it is evident here, that changing the denomination of the coin, they already have in Bermudas, or coining it over again under new denominations, will not contribute in the leaſt towards the removing this neceſſity of truſt, or bartering. For the whole ſilver they have in coin, being but four hundred ounces; and the exchange of the commodities made in a diſtance of time, wherein this money is paid not above once, being to the value of eight hundred ounces of ſilver; it is plain, that one half of the commodities, that ſhift hands, muſt of neceſſity be taken upon credit, or exchanged by barter; thoſe who want them, having no money to pay for them. Nor can any alteration of the coin, or denomination of theſe four hundred ounces of ſilver, help this; becauſe the value of the ſilver, in reſpect of other commodities, will not thereby be at all increaſed; and the commodities changed, being (as in the caſe) double in value to the four hundred ounces of coined ſilver to be laid out in them, nothing can ſupply this want but a doubly quantity, i. e. eight hundred ounces of coined ſilver; how denominated, it matters not, ſo there be a fit proportion of ſmall pieces to ſupply ſmall payments.

Suppose the commodities paſſing every day in England, in markets and fairs, between ſtrangers, or ſuch as truſt not one another, were to the value of a million of ounces of ſilver; and there was but half a million of ounces of coined ſilver in the hands of thoſe, who wanted thoſe commodities; it is demonſtration they muſt truck for them, or go without them. If then the coined ſilver of England be not ſufficient to anſwer the value of commodities moving in trade amongſt us, credit, or barter muſt do it. Where the credit and money fail, barter alone muſt do it: which being introduced by the want of a greater plenty of coined ſilver, nothing but a greater plenty of coined ſilver can remove it. The increaſe of denomination does, or can do nothing in the caſe; for it is ſilver by its quantity, and not denomination, that is the price of things, and meaſure of commerce; and it is the weight of ſilver in it, and not the name of the piece, that men eſtimate commodities by, and exchange them for.

If this be not ſo, when the neceſſity of our affairs abroad, or ill huſbandry at home, has carried away half our treaſure, and a moiety of our money is gone out of England; it is but to iſſue a proclamation, that a penny ſhall go for two-pence, ſix-pence for a ſhilling, half a crown for a crown, &c. and imme-

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immediately, without any more ado, we are as rich as before. And when half the remainder is gone, it is but doing the ſame thing again, and raiſing the denomination anew, and we are where we were, and ſo on: where, by ſuppoſing the denomination raiſed $\frac{15}{16}$, every man will be as rich with an ounce of ſilver in his purſe, as he was before, when he had ſixteen ounces there; and in as great plenty of money, able to carry on his trade, without bartering; his ſilver by this ſhort way of raiſing, being changed into the value of gold: for when ſilver will buy ſixteen times as much wine, oil and bread, &c. to day, as it would yeſterday, (all other things remaining the ſame, but the denomination) it hath the real worth of gold.

This, I gueſs, every body ſees cannot be ſo And yet this muſt be ſo, if it be true that raiſing the denomination one fifth can ſupply the want, or one jot raiſe the value of ſilver in reſpect of other commodities, i. e. make a leſs quantity of it to day, buy a greater quantity of corn, oil and cloth, and all other commodities, than it would yeſterday, and thereby remove the neceſſity of bartering. For, if raiſing the denomination can thus raiſe the value of coin, in exchange for other commodities, one fifth, by the ſame reaſon it can raiſe it two fifths, and afterwards three fifths, and again, if need be, four fifths, and as much farther as you pleaſe. So that, by this admirable contrivance of raiſing our coin, we ſhall be as rich, and as well able to ſupport the charge of the government, and carry on our trade without bartering, or any other inconvenience, for want of money, with ſixty thouſand ounces of coined ſilver in England, as if we had ſix, or ſixty millions. If this be not ſo, I deſire any one to ſhew me, why the ſame way of raiſing the denomination, which can raiſe the value of money in reſpect of other commodities, one fifth, cannot, when you pleaſe, raiſe it another fifth, and ſo on? I beg to be told where it muſt ſtop, and why at ſuch a degree, without being able to go farther.

It muſt be taken notice of, that the raiſing I ſpeak of here, is the raiſing of the value of our coin in reſpect of other commodities (as I call it all along), in contradiſtinction to raiſing the denomination. The confounding of theſe in diſcourſes concerning money, is one great cauſe, I ſuſpect, that this matter is ſo little underſtood, and ſo often talked of with ſo little information of the hearers.

A penny is a denomination no more belonging to eight than to eighty, or to one ſingle grain of ſilver: and ſo it is not neceſſary that there ſhould be ſixty ſuch pence, no more, nor leſs, in an ounce of ſilver, i. e. twelve in a piece called a ſhilling, and ſixty in a piece called a crown: ſuch like diviſions being only extrinſical denominations, are every where perfectly arbitrary. For here in England there might as well have been twelve ſhillings in a penny, as twelve-pence in a ſhilling, i. e. the denomination of the leſs piece might have been a ſhilling, and of the bigger a penny. Again, the ſhilling might have been coined ten times as big as the penny, and the crown ten times as big as the ſhilling; whereby the ſhilling would have but ten-pence in it, and the crown an hundred. But this, however ordered, alters not one jot the value of the ounce of ſilver, in reſpect of other things, any more than it does its weight.

This raiſing being but giving of names at pleaſure to aliquot parts of any piece, viz. that now the ſixtieth part of an ounce of ſilver ſhall be called a penny, and to-morrow that the ſeventy-fifth part of an ounce ſhall be called a penny, may be done with what increaſe you pleaſe. And thus it may be ordered by a proclamation, that a ſhilling ſhall go for twenty-four pence, an half-crown for ſixty inſtead of thirty-pence, and ſo of the reſt. But that an half-crown ſhould be worth, or contain, ſixty ſuch pence, as the pence were, before this change of denomination was made, that no power on earth can do. Nor can any power (but that which can make the plenty, or ſcarcity of commodities, raiſe the value of our money thus double, in reſpect of other commodities, and make that the ſame piece, or quantity of ſilver, under a double denomination, ſhall purchaſe double the quantity of pepper, wine or lead, an inſtant after ſuch proclamation, to what it would do an inſtant before. If this could be, we might, as every one ſees, raiſe ſilver to the value of gold, and make ourſelves as rich as we pleaſed. But it is but going to market with an ounce of ſilver of one hundred and twenty-pence, to be convinced that it will purchaſe no more than an ounce of ſilver of ſixty-pence. And the ringing of the piece will as ſoon purchaſe more commodities, as its change of denomination, and the multiplied name of pence, when it is called ſix ſcore inſtead of ſixty.

It is propoſed, that the twelve-pence ſhould be raiſed to fifteen-pence, and the crown to ſeventy-five pence, and ſo proportionably of the reſt: but yet that the pound ſterling ſhould not be raiſed. If there be any advantage in raiſing, why ſhould not that be raiſed too? And, as the crown-piece is raiſed from ſixty to ſeventy-five pence, why ſhould not the pound ſterling be raiſed in the ſame proportion, from two hundred and forty-pence, to three hundred pence?

Further, If this raiſing our coin can ſo ſtretch our money, and enlarge our pared remainder of it, as "to make it more commenſurate to the general "need thereof, for carrying on the common traffick and commerce of the na-"tion, and to anſwer occaſions requiring a larger ſupply of money," as Mr. Lowndes tells us in his third reaſon, p. 83. why are we ſo niggardly to ourſelves in this time of occaſion, as to ſtop at one fifth? Why do we not raiſe it one full moiety, and thereby double our money? If Mr. Lowndes's rule, p. 78. "That if the value of the ſilver in the coin, ſhould be raiſed above the mark-"et price of the ſame ſilver, reduced to bullion, the ſubject would be propor-"tionably injured and defrauded," muſt keep us from theſe advantages, and the publick care of juſtice ſtop the raiſing of the money at one fifth; becauſe, if our money be raiſed beyond the market-price of bullion, it will be ſo much defrauding of the ſubject: I then ſay, it muſt not be raiſed one fifth, nor half one fifth, that is, it muſt not be raiſed fifteen-pence in the crown; no, nor five-pence. For I deny that the market-price of ſtandard bullion ever was, or ever can be five ſhillings ſeven-pence, of lawful weighty money, the ounce: ſo that if our preſent milled money be raiſed one fifth, the ſubjects will, by Mr. Lowndes's rule, be defrauded ſixteen per cent. nay, above eighteen per cent. For the market price of ſtandard bullion being ordinarily under five ſhillings four-pence the ounce, when ſold for weighty money (which is but one thirtieth) whatever our preſent milled money is raiſed above one thirtieth, it is by Mr. Lowndes's rule ſo much defrauding the ſubject. For the market-price of any thing, and ſo of bullion, is to be taken from its ordinary rate all the year round, and not from the extraordinary riſe of two or three market-days in a year. And that the market-price of ſtandard ſilver was not found, nor pretended to be above five ſhillings and four-pence the ounce, before clipping had left none but light, running caſh to pay for bullion, or any thing elſe, is evident from a paper then publiſhed, which I took the liberty to examine in my "conſiderations of the conſequences of raiſing the value of money," &c. printed 1692. The author of that paper, it is manifeſt, was not ignorant of the price of ſilver, nor had a deſign to leſſen its rate, but ſet down the higheſt price it then bore.

If then Mr. Lowndes's rule of juſtice, and care of the ſubject, be to regulate the riſe of our milled money, it muſt not be raiſed above one thirtieth part. If the advantages he promiſes, of making our money, by raiſing it one fifth, "more commenſurate to the general need thereof," be to be laid hold on, it is reaſonable to raiſe it higher, "to make it yet more commenſurate "to the general need there is of it." Which ever of the two Mr. Lowndes will prefer, either reaſon of ſtate, or rule of juſtice, one fifth muſt not be his meaſure of raiſing our preſent milled money. If the advantage of making our money more proportionate to our trade and other neceſſities, be to govern its propoſed raiſing, every one will cry out to Mr. Lowndes, If your way will do what you ſay, the raiſing it one half will be much better than one fifth, and therefore pray let an half-crown be raiſed to a crown, and ſix-pence to a ſhilling. If equity and the conſideration of the ſubjects property ought to govern in the caſe, you muſt not raiſe our milled crown to above five ſhillings and four-pence.

If it be here ſaid to me, that I do then allow that our money may be raiſed one thirtieth, i. e. that the crown-piece ſhould be raiſed to five ſhillings and two-pence, and ſo proportionably of the other ſpecies of our coin; I anſwer, he that infers ſo, makes his inference a little too quick.

But let us for once allow the ordinary price of ſtandard ſilver to be five ſhillings four-pence the ounce, to be paid for in weighty coin (for that muſt always be remembered, when we talk of the rate of bullion) and that the rate of bullion is the juſt meaſure of raiſing our money. This I ſay is no reaſon for the raiſing our milled crown now, to five ſhillings four-pence, and recoining all our clipped money upon that foot; unleſs we intend, as ſoon as that is done, to new raiſe and coin it again. For, whilſt our trade and affairs abroad require the exportation of ſilver and the exportation of our coined ſilver is prohibited, and made penal by our law, ſtandard bullion will always be ſold here for a little more than its weight of coined ſilver. So that, if we ſhall endeavour to equal our weighty coined ſilver to ſtandard bullion, by raiſing it, whilſt there is a neceſſity of the exportation of ſilver, we ſhall do no otherwiſe than a child, who runs to overtake and get up to the top of his ſhadow, which ſtill advances at the ſame rate that he does. The privilege that bullion has, to be exported freely, will give it a little advance in price above our coin, let the denomination of that be raiſed, or fallen as you pleaſe, whilſt there is need of its exportation, and the exportation of our coin is prohibited by law. But this advance will be but little, and will always keep within the bounds, which the riſque and trouble of melting down our coin ſhall ſet to it, in the eſtimate of the exporter. He that will rather venture to throw an hundred pounds into his melting-pot, when no body ſees him, and reduce it to bullion, than give an hundred and five pounds, for the ſame weight of the like bullion, will never give five ſhillings and five-pence of milled money for an ounce of ſtandard bullion; nor buy at that price, what he can have near five per cent. cheaper, without any riſque, if he will not accuſe himſelf. And I think it may be concluded, that very few, who have furnaces, and other conveniencies ready for melting ſilver, will give one per cent. for ſtandard bullion, which is under five ſhillings and three-pence per ounce, who can only for the trouble of melting it, reduce our coin to as good bullion.

THE odds of the price in bullion to coin on this account (which is the only one, where the coin is kept to the ſtandard) can never be a reaſon for raiſing our coin to preſerve it from melting down: becauſe this price above its weight is given for bullion, only to avoid melting down our coin; and ſo this difference of price between ſtandard bullion and our coin, can be no cauſe of its melting down.

THESE three reaſons which I have examined, contain the great advantages, which our author ſuppoſes the propoſed raiſing of our coin will produce. And therefore I have dwelt longer upon them. His remaining ſix reaſons being of leſs moment, and offering moſt of them but ſome circumſtantial conveniencies, as to the computation of our money, &c. I ſhall more briefly paſs over. Only before I proceed to them, I ſhall here ſet down the different value of our money, collected from our author's hiſtory of the ſeveral changes of our coin, ſince Edward the firſt's reign, quite down to this preſent time. A curious hiſtory indeed, for which I think myſelf, and the world, indebted to Mr. Lowndes's great learning in this ſort of knowledge, and his great exactneſs in relating the particulars.

I SHALL remark only the quantity of ſilver was in a ſhilling, in each of thoſe changes; that ſo the reader may at firſt ſight, without farther trouble, compare the leſſening, or increaſe of the quantity of ſilver upon every change. For in propriety of ſpeech, the adding to the quantity of ſilver in our coin, is the true raiſing of its value; and the diminiſhing the quantity of ſilver in it, is the ſinking of its value; however they come to be tranſpoſed, and uſed in the quite contrary ſenſe.

IF my calculations, from the weight and fineneſs I find ſet down in Mr. Lowndes's extract out of the indentures of the mint, have not miſled me, the quantity of ſilver to a grain, which was in a ſhilling in every change of our money, is ſet down in the following table.

One ſhilling contained of fine ſilver

| | | | Grains. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | Edw. | 1 | 264 |
| 18 | Edw. | 3 | 236 |
| 27 | Edw. | 3 | 213 |
| 9 | Hen. | 5 | 176 |
| 1 | Hen. | 6 | 142 |
| 4 | Hen. | 6 | 176 |
| 49 | Hen. | 6 | 142 |
| 1 | Hen. | 8 | 118 |
| 34 | Hen. | 8 | 100 |
| 36 | Hen. | 8 | 60 |
| 37 | Hen. | 8 | 40 |
| 3 | Edw. | 6 | 40 |
| 5 | Edw. | 6 | 20 |
| 6 | Edw. | 6 | 88 |
| 2 | Eliz. | | 89 |
| 43 | Eliz. | | 86 |

And ſo it has remained from the 43d year of queen Elizabeth to this day.

Mr. Lowndes's 69

Mr. Lowndes having given us the fineneſs of the ſtandard ſilver in every reign, and the number of pieces a pound troy was coined into, cloſes this hiſtory with words to this purpoſe, p. 56. "By this deduction it doth evidently appear, that it hath been a policy, conſtantly practiſed in the mints of "England, to raiſe the value of the coin, in its extrinſick denomination, "from time to time, as any exigence, or occaſion required, and more eſpecially to encourage the bringing of bullion into the realm to be coined." This indeed, is roundly to conclude for his hypotheſis. But I could wiſh, that from the hiſtories of thoſe times, wherein the ſeveral changes were made, he had ſhewed us the exigencies and occaſions, that produced the raiſing of the coin, and what effects it had.

If I miſtake not, Henry the VIIIth's ſeveral raiſings of our coin, brought little increaſe of ſilver into England. As the ſeveral ſpecies of our coin leſſened in their reſpective quantities of ſilver, ſo the treaſure of the realm decreaſed too: and he, that found the kingdom rich, did not, as I remember, by all his raiſing our coin, leave it ſo.

Another thing, that (from this hiſtory) makes me ſuſpect, that the raiſing the denomination was never found effectively to draw ſilver into England, is the lowering the denomination, or adding more ſilver to the ſeveral ſpecies of our coin; as in Hen. VI's time, the ſhilling was increaſed from one hundred forty-two grains of ſilver, to one hundred ſeventy-ſix: and in the ſixth of Edw. VI. in whoſe time raiſing the denomination ſeems to have been tried to the utmoſt, when a ſhilling was brought to twenty grains of ſilver. And the great alteration, that was then quickly made on the other hand, from twenty to eighty grains at one leap, ſeems to ſhew that this leſſening the ſilver in our coin had proved prejudicial: for this is a greater change in ſinking of the denomination in proportion, than ever was made at once in raiſing it; a ſhilling being made four times weightier in ſilver, the ſixth, than it was in the fifth year of Edw. VI's reign.

KINGDOMS are ſeldom found weary of the riches they have, or averſe to the increaſe of their treaſure. If therefore, the raiſing the denomination did in reality bring ſilver into the realm, it cannot be thought that they would at any time ſink the denomination, which, by the rule of contraries, ſhould be at leaſt ſuſpected to drive, or keep it out.

SINCE, therefore, we are not from matter of fact informed, what were the true motives, that cauſed thoſe ſeveral changes in the coin; may we not with reaſon ſuſpect, that they were owing to that policy of the mint, ſet down by our author, p. 83. in theſe words, "That the propoſed advance is agree-"able to the policy, that in paſt ages hath been practiſed, not only in our "mint, but in the mints of all politick governments; namely, to raiſe the "value of ſilver in the coin, to promote the work of the mint?" As I remember, ſuitable to this policy of the mint, there was, ſome two years ſince, a complaint of a worthy gentleman, not ignorant of it, that the mill in the mint ſtood ſtill; and therefore, there was a propoſal offered for bringing griſt to the mill.

THE buſineſs of money, as in all times, even in this our quick-ſighted age, hath been thought a myſtery: thoſe employed in the mint muſt, by their places, be ſuppoſed to penetrate deepeſt into it. It is no impoſſible thing, then, to imagine, that it was not hard, in the ignorance of paſt ages, when money was little, and ſkill in the turns of trade leſs, for thoſe verſed in the buſineſs and policy of the mint, to perſuade a prince, eſpecially if money were ſcarce, that the fault was in the ſtandard of the mint, and that the way to increaſe the plenty of money, was to raiſe (a well-ſounding word) the value of the coin. This could not but be willingly enough hearkened to; when, beſides the hopes of drawing an increaſe of ſilver into the realm, it brought preſent gain, by the part which the king got of the money, which was hereupon all coined anew, and the mint officers loſt nothing, ſince it promoted the work of the mint.

THIS opinion Mr. Lowndes himſelf gives ſufficient grounds for in his book, particularly p. 29. where we read theſe words, "Although the former debaſe-"ments of the coins, by publick authority, eſpecially thoſe in the reigns of "king Henry VIII. and king Edward VI. might be projected for the profit "of the crown, and the projectors might meaſure that profit by the ex-"ceſſive quantities of alloy, that were mixed with the ſilver and the gold" (and let me add, or by the quantity of ſilver leſſened in each ſpecie, which is the ſame thing.) "And though this was enterprized by a prince, who "could ſtretch his prerogative very far upon his people; and was done in times, "when the nation had very little commerce, inland or foreign, to be injured "and prejudiced thereby, yet experience preſently ſhewed, that the projectors

" were miſtaken, and that it was abſolutely neceſſary to have the baſe money " reformed." This, at leaſt, they were not miſtaken in, that they brought work to the mint, and a part of the money coined to the crown for ſeniorage: in both which there was profit. Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 45. " That " Henry VIII. had to the value of fifty ſhillings for every pound weight of " gold coined." I have met with it ſomewhere, that formerly the king might take what he pleaſed for coinage. I know not too, but the flattering name of raiſing money might prevail then, as it does now; and impoſe ſo far on them, as to make them think, the raiſing, i. e. diminiſhing the ſilver in their coin, would bring it into the realm, or ſtay it here, when they found it going out. For if we may gueſs at the other, by Henry VIII's raiſing, it was probably when, by reaſon of expence in foreign wars, or ill managed trade, they found money begin to grow ſcarce.

THE having the ſpecies of our coin one fifth bigger, or one fifth leſs, than they are at preſent, would be neither good, nor harm to England, if they had always been ſo. Our ſtandard has continued in weight and fineneſs, juſt as it is now, for very near this hundred years laſt paſt: and thoſe, who think the denomination and ſize of our money have any influence on the ſtate of our wealth, have no reaſon to change the preſent ſtandard of our coin; ſince under that we have had a greater increaſe, and longer continuance of plenty of money, than perhaps any other country can ſhew: I ſee no reaſon to think, that a little bigger, or leſs ſize of the pieces coined, is of any moment, one way or the other. The ſpecies of money in any country, of whatſoever ſizes, fit for coining, if their proportions to one another be ſuited to arithmetick and calculations, in whole numbers, and the ways of accounts in that country; if they are adapted to ſmall payments, and carefully kept to their juſt weight and fineneſs, can have no harm in them. The harm comes by the change, which unreaſonably and unjuſtly gives away and transfers men's properties, diſorders trade, puzzles accounts, and needs a new arithmetick to caſt up reckonings, and keep accounts in; beſides a thouſand other inconveniencies; not to mention the charge of recoining the money. For this may be depended on, that, if our money be raiſed as is propoſed, it will enforce the recoining of all our money, both old and new, (except the new ſhillings) to avoid the terrible difficulty and confuſion there will be in keeping accounts in pounds, ſhillings, and pence, (as they muſt be) when the ſpecies of our money are ſo ordered, as not to anſwer thoſe denominations in round numbers.

THIS conſideration leads me to Mr. Lowndes's fifth and ſixth reaſons, p. 85. wherein he recommends the raiſing our money in the proportion propoſed, for its convenience, to our accounting by pounds, ſhillings, and pence. And for obviating perplexity among the common people, he propoſes the preſent weighty crown to go at ſix ſhillings three-pence; and the new ſcepter, or unit, to be coined of the ſame weight, to go at the ſame rate; and half-crowns, half-ſcepters, or half-units, of the weight of the preſent half-crown, to go for two ſhillings ſeven-pence halfpenny: by no number of which pieces can there be made an even pound ſterling, or any number of even ſhillings under a pound; but they always fall into fractions of pounds and ſhillings, as may be ſeen by this following table.

| | l. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Half-crown, half-ſcepter, or half-unit piece | | 3 | 1½ |
| 1 Crown, ſcepter, or unit piece | | 6 | 3 |
| 3 Half-crown pieces | | 9 | 4½ |
| 2 Crown pieces | | 12 | 6 |
| 5 Half-crown pieces | | 15 | 7½ |
| 3 Crown pieces | | 18 | 9 |
| 7 Half-crown pieces | 1 | 1 | 10½ |
| 4 Crown pieces | 1 | 5 | |

The preſent ſhilling, and new teſtoon, going for fifteen-pence, no number of them make any number of even ſhillings; but five ſhillings, ten ſhillings, fifteen ſhillings, and twenty ſhillings; but in all the reſt, they always fall into fractions.

The like may be ſaid of the preſent ſix-pences, and future half teſtoons, going for ſeven-pence half-penny; the quarter teſtoons, which are to go for three-pence three farthings; and the groſs and groats, which are to go for five-pence; the half groſs, or groat, which is to go for two-pence half-penny, and the prime, which is to go for a penny farthing: out of any tale of each of which ſpecies there can no juſt number of ſhillings be made, as I think, but five ſhillings, ten ſhilling, fifteen ſhillings, and twenty ſhillings; but they always fall into fractions. This new intended ſhilling alone ſeems to be ſuited to our accounting in pounds, ſhillings and pence. The great pieces, as ſcepters, and half-ſcepters, which are made to ſerve for the payment of greater ſums, and are for diſpatch in tale, will not in tale fall into even pounds. And I fear it will puzzle a better arithmetician than moſt countrymen are, to tell, without pen and ink, how many of the leſſer pieces (except the ſhillings) however combined, will make juſt ſixteen or ſeventeen ſhillings. And I imagine there is not one countryman of three, but may have it for his pains, if he can tell an hundred pounds made up of a promiſcuous mixture of the ſpecies of this new raiſed money (excluding the ſhillings) in a day's time. And that, which will help to confound him, and every body elſe, will be the old crowns, half-crowns, ſhillings, and ſix-pences current for new numbers of pence. So that I take it for granted, that if our coin be raiſed as is propoſed, not only all our clipped, but all our weighty and milled money, muſt of neceſſity be recoined too; if you would not have trade diſturbed, and people more diſeaſed with new money, which they cannot tell, nor keep accounts in, than with light and clipped money, which they are cheated with. And what a charge the new coining of all our money will be to the nation, I have computed in another place.* That I think is of ſome conſideration in our preſent circumſtances, though the confuſion that this new raiſed money, I fear, is like to introduce, and the want of money, and ſtop of trade, when the clipped is called in, and the weighty is to be recoined, be of much greater.

* Vid. Short obſervations on a paper, entituled, For encouraging coining, &c. p. 76. of this Vol.

His fourth, eighth, and ninth reaſons, p. 84, and 86. are taken from the ſaving our preſent milled money from being cut and recoined. The end I confeſs to be good: it is very reaſonable, that ſo much excellent coin, as good as ever was in the world, ſhould not be deſtroyed. But there is, I think, a ſurer and eaſier way to preſerve it, than what Mr. Lowndes propoſes. It is paſt doubt, it will be in no danger of recoining, if our money be kept upon the preſent foot: but if it be raiſed, as Mr. Lowndes propoſes, all the preſent milled money will be in danger, and the difficulty of counting it, upon the new propoſed foot, will enforce it to be recoined into new pieces of crowns, half-crowns, ſhillings, and ſix-pences, that may paſs for the ſame number of pence the preſent do, viz. 60, 30, 12, and 6, as I have above ſhewn. He ſays in his fourth reaſon, that " if pieces having the ſame bigneſs ſhould have different va-" lues, it might be difficult for the common people (eſpecially thoſe not ſkilled " in arithmetick) to compute how many of one kind will be equal to the ſum of " another." Such difficulties and confuſion in counting money, I agree with him, ought carefully to be avoided. And therefore, ſince if pieces having the ſame bigneſs and ſtamp, which the people are acquainted with, ſhall have new values different from thoſe which people are accuſtomed to; and theſe new values ſhall in numbers of pence not anſwer our way of accounting by pounds and ſhillings, " it will be difficult for the common people (eſpeci-" ally thoſe not ſkilled in arithmetick) to compute how many of any one " kind will make any ſum they are to pay, or receive;" eſpecially when the numbers of any one kind of pieces will be brought into ſo few even ſums of pounds and ſhillings. And thus Mr. Lowndes's argument here turns upon himſelf, and is againſt raiſing our coin to the value propoſed by him, from the confuſion it will produce.

His 8th reaſon, p. 86. we have in theſe words: " It is difficult to conceive " how any deſign of amending the clipped money can be compaſſed, without " raiſing the value of the ſilver remaining in them, becauſe of the great defi-" ciency of the ſilver clipped away, which (upon recoining) muſt neceſſarily " be defrayed and borne, one way or other."

It is no difficulty to conceive, that clipped money, being not lawful money, ſhould be prohibited to paſs for more than its weight. Next, it is no difficulty to conceive that clipped money, paſſing for no more than its weight, and ſo being in the ſtate of ſtandard bullion, which cannot be exported, ſhould be brought to the mint, and there exchanged for weighty money. By this way, " it is no difficulty to conceive how the amending the clipped money may be " compaſſed, becauſe this way the deficiency of the ſilver, clipped away, will " certainly be defrayed and borne, one way or other."

And thus I have gone over all Mr. Lowndes's reaſons for raiſing our coin; wherein, though I ſeem to differ from him, yet I flatter myſelf, it is not altogether ſo much as at firſt ſight may appear; ſince by what I find in another part of his book, I have reaſon to judge he is a great deal of my mind. For he has five very good arguments for continuing the preſent ſtandard of fineneſs, each of which is as ſtrong for continuing alſo the preſent ſtandard of weight, i. e. continuing a penny of the ſame weight of ſtandard ſilver, which at preſent it has He, that has a mind to be ſatisfied of this, may read Mr. Lowndes's firſt five reaſons, for continuing the preſent ſtandard of fineneſs, which he will find in his 29, 30, 31, 32 pages of his report. And when Mr. Lowndes himſelf has again conſidered, what there is of weight in them, and how far it reaches, he will at leaſt not think it ſtrange, if they appear to me and others, good arguments againſt putting leſs ſilver into our coin of the ſame denominations, let that diminution be made what way it will.

What Mr. Lowndes ſays about gold coins, p. 88, &c. appears to me highly rational, and I perfectly agree with him; excepting only that I do not think gold is in regard of ſilver riſen one third in England; which I think may be thus made out. A guinea weighing five penny-weight and nine grains, or one hundred and twenty-nine grains; and a pound ſterling weighing one thouſand eight hundred and ſixty grains; a guinea at twenty ſhillings, is as one hundred and twenty-nine, to one thouſand eight hundred and ſixty; that is, as one to fourteen and an half.

A guinea at two and twenty ſhillings, is as one hundred and twenty-nine, to two thouſand forty-two, i. e. as one to ſixteen.

A guinea at thirty ſhillings, is as one hundred twenty-nine, to two thouſand ſeven hundred eighty-four, i. e. as one to twenty one and an half, near.

He therefore, that receives twenty ſhillings milled money for a guinea, receives one thouſand eight hundred and ſixty grains ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty-nine grains of ſtandard gold, i. e. fourteen and an half for one.

He who receives two and twenty ſhillings milled money for a guinea, has two thouſand forty-two grains ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty-nine grains ſtandard gold, i. e. ſixteen for one.

He who receives thirty ſhillings milled money for a guinea, has two thouſand ſeven hundred eighty-four grains ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty-nine grains of gold, i. e. twenty-one and an half for one.

But the current caſh being (upon trials made about Midſummer laſt) computed by Mr. Lowndes, p. 108. to want half its ſtandard weight, and not being mended ſince, it is evident, he who receives thirty ſhillings of our preſent clipped money, for a guinea, has but one thouſand three hundred ninety-two grains of ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty-nine grains of gold, i. e. has but ten and three quarters of ſilver for one of gold.

I have left out the utmoſt preciſions of fractions in theſe computations, as not neceſſary in the preſent caſe, theſe whole numbers ſhewing well enough the difference of the value of guineas at thoſe ſeveral rates.

If it be true, what I here aſſert, viz. that he who receives thirty ſhillings in our current, clipped money, for a guinea, receives not eleven grains of ſilver for one of gold; whereas the value of gold to ſilver in all our neighbouring countries is about fifteen to one, which is about a third part more; it will probably be demanded, how it comes to paſs that foreigners, or others, import gold, when they do not receive as much ſilver for it here, as they may have in all other countries? The reaſon whereof is viſibly this, that they exchange it not here for ſilver, but for our commodities: and our bargains for commodities as well as all other contracts being made in pounds, ſhillings, and pence, our clipped money retains amongſt the people (who know not how to count but by current money) a part of its legal value, whilſt it paſſes for the ſatisfaction of legal contracts, as if it were lawful money. As long as the king receives it for his taxes, and the landlord for his rent, it is no wonder the farmer and tenant ſhould receive it for his commodities. And this, perhaps, would do well enough, if our money and trade were to circulate only amongſt ourſelves, and we had no commerce with the reſt of the world, and needed it not. But here lies the loſs, when foreigners ſhall bring over gold hither, and with that pay for our commodities at the rate of thirty ſhillings the guinea, when the ſame quantity of gold that is in a guinea, is not beyond ſea worth more ſilver than is in twenty, or one and twenty and ſix-pence of our milled and lawful money: by which way of paying for our commodities, England loſes near one third of the value of all the commodities it thus ſells. And it is all one as if foreigners paid for them in money coined and clipped beyond ſea, wherein was one third leſs ſilver than there ought to be. And thus we loſe near one third in all our exportation, whilſt foreign gold imported is received in payment for thirty ſhillings a guinea. To make this appear, we need but trace this way of commerce a little, and there can be no doubt of the loſs we ſuffer by it.

LET us ſuppoſe, for example, a bale of Holland linnen worth there one hundred and eighty ounces of our ſtandard ſilver; and a bale of ſerge here, worth alſo the ſame weight of one hundred and eighty ounces of the ſame ſtandard ſilver; it is evident theſe two bales are exactly of the ſame value. Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 88. "That at this time the gold that is in a guinea "(if it were carried to Spain, Italy, Barbary, and ſome other places,) would "not purchaſe ſo much ſilver there, as is equal to the ſtandard of twenty of "our ſhillings," i. e. would be in value there to ſilver, ſcarce as one to fourteen and an half: and I think I may ſay, that gold in Holland is, or lately was, as one to fifteen, or not much above. Taking then, ſtandard gold in Holland to be in proportion to ſtandard ſilver, as one to about fifteen, or a little more; twelve ounces of our ſtandard gold, or as much gold as is in forty-four guineas and an half, muſt be given for that bale of Holland linnen, if any one will pay for it there in gold: but if he buys that bale of ſerge here for one huundred and eighty ounces of ſilver, which is forty-eight pounds ſterling, if he pays for it in gold at thirty ſhillings the guinea, two and thirty guineas will pay for it. So that in all the goods, that we ſell beyond ſeas for gold imported, and coined into guineas, unleſs the owners raiſe them one third above what they would ſell them for in milled money, we loſe twelve in forty-four and an half, which is very near one third.

THIS loſs is wholly owing to the permitting clipped money in payment. And this loſs we muſt unavoidably ſuffer, whilſt clipped money is current amongſt us. And this robbing of England of near one third of the value of the commodities we ſend out, will continue, whilſt people had rather receive guineas at thirty ſhillings, than ſilver coin (no other being to be had) that is not worth half what they take it for. And yet this clipped money, as bad as it is, and however unwilling people are to be charged with it, will always have credit enough to paſs, whilſt the goldſmiths and bankers receive it; and they will always receive it, whilſt they can paſs it over again to the king with advantage, and can have hopes to prevail, that at laſt when it can be borne no longer, but muſt be called in, no part of the loſs of light money, which ſhall be found in their hands ſhall fall upon them, though they have for many years dealt in it, and by reaſon of its being clipped, have had all the running caſh of the kingdom in their hands, and made profit of it. I ſay, clipped money, however bad it be, will always paſs whilſt the king's receivers, the bankers of any kind, and at laſt the exchequer, take it. For who will not receive clipped money, rather than have none for his neceſſary occaſions, whilſt he ſees the great receipt of the exchequer admits it, and the bank and goldſmiths will take it of him, and give him credit for it, ſo that he needs keep no more of it by him than he pleaſes? In this ſtate, whilſt the exchequer receives clipped money, I do not ſee how it can be ſtopped from paſſing. A clipped half-crown, that goes at the exchequer, will not be refuſed by any one, who has hopes by his own, or others hands to convey it thither; and who, unleſs he take it, cannot trade, or ſhall not be paid. Whilſt therefore, the exchequer is open to clipped money, it will paſs, and whilſt clipped money paſſes, clippers will certainly be at work; and what a gap this leaves to foreigners, if they will make uſe of it to pour in clipped money upon us (as its neighbours did into Portugal) as long as we have either goods, or weighty money, left to be carried away at fifty per cent. or greater profit, it is eaſy to ſee.

I WILL ſuppoſe the king receives clipped money in the exchequer, and at half, or three quarters loſs, coins it into milled money. For if he receives all, how much ſoever clipped, I ſuppoſe the clippers ſhears are not ſo ſqueamiſh as not to pare away above half. It will be a wonderful conſcientiouſneſs in them, no where that I know to be paralleled, if they will content themſelves with leſs profit than they can make, and will leave ſeven pennyworth of ſilver in an half-crown, if ſix pennyworth and the ſtamp be enough to make it paſs for half a crown. When his majeſty hath coined this into milled money of ſtandard weight, and paid it out again to the bankers, goldſmiths or others, what ſhall then become of it? Either they will lay it up to get rid of their clipped money, for no body will part with heavy money, whilſt he has any light; nor will any heavy money come abroad, whilſt there is light left; for whoever has clipped money by him, well ſell good bargains, or borrow at any rate of thoſe, who are willing to part with any weighty, to keep that by him, rather than the clipped money he has in his hands. So that, as far as this reaches, no milled money, how much ſoever be coined, will appear abroad; or if it does, will it long eſcape the coiners and clippers hands, who will be at work preſently upon it, to furniſh the exchequer with more clipped money at fifty, ſixty, ſeventy, or I know not what advantage? Though this be enough to cut off the hopes of milled money appearing in payments, whilſt any clipped is current; yet to this we may add, that gold, imported at an over-value, will ſweep it away, as faſt as it is coined, whilſt clipped money keeps up the rate of guineas above their former value. This will be the circulation of our money, whilſt clipped is permitted any way to be current. And if ſtore enough of clipped money at home, or from abroad, can be but provided (as it is more than probable it may, now the trade is ſo univerſal, and has been ſo long practiſed with great advantage, and no great danger, as appears by the few have ſuffered, in regard to the great numbers it is evident are engaged in the trade, and the vent of it here in England is ſo known and ſure) I do not ſee how in a little while we ſhall have any money, or goods at all left in England, if clipping be not immediately ſtopped. And how clipping can be ſtopped, but by an immediate, poſitive prohibition, whereby all clipped money ſhall be forbid to paſs, in any payment whatſoever, or to paſs for more than its weight, I would be glad to learn. Clipping is the great leak, which for ſome time paſt has contributed more to ſink us, than all the forces of our enemies could do. It is like a breach in the ſea-bank, which widens every moment till it be ſtopped. And my timorous temper muſt be pardoned, if I am frighted with the thoughts of clipped money being current, one moment longer, at any other value but of warranted, ſtandard bullion. And therefore, there can be nothing more true and reaſonable, nor that deſerves better to be conſidered, than what Mr. Lowndes ſays in his corollary, p. 90.

WHOEVER deſires to know the different ways of coining money, by the hammer and by the mill, may inform himſelf in the exact account Mr. Lowndes has given of both, under his ſecond general head; where he may alſo ſee the probableſt gueſs that has been made of the quantity of our clipped money, and the ſilver deficient in it; and an account of what ſilver money was coined in the reigns of Q. Elizabeth, K. James Iſt, and Charles Iſt, more exact than it is to be had any where elſe. There is only one thing which I ſhall mention, ſince Mr. Lowndes does it here again under this head, p. 100. and that is, melting down our coin; concerning which I ſhall venture humbly to propoſe theſe following queſtions.

1. WHETHER bullion be any thing but ſilver, whoſe workmanſhip has no value?

2. WHETHER that workmanſhip, which can be had for nothing, has, or can have any value?

3. WHETHER, whilſt the money in our mint is coined for the owners, without any coſt to them, our coin can ever have any value above any ſtandard bullion?

4. WHETHER, whilſt our coin is not of value above ſtandard bullion, goldſmiths and others, who have need of ſtandard ſilver, will not take what is by the free labour of the mint ready eſſayed and adjuſted to their uſe, and melt that down, than be at the trouble of melting, mixing and aſſaying of ſilver for the uſes they have?

5. WHETHER the only cure for this wanton, though criminal melting down our coin, be not, that the owners ſhould pay one moiety of the ſixteen-pence half-penny which is paid per pound troy for coinage of ſilver, which the king now pays all?

6. WHETHER, by this means ſtandard ſilver in coin will not be more worth than ſtandard ſilver in bullion, and ſo be preſerved from this wanton melting down, as ſoon as an over-balance of our trade ſhall bring us ſilver to ſtay here?

For till then, it is in vain to think of preſerving our coin from melting down, and therefore to no purpoſe till then to change that law.

7. WHETHER any laws, or any penalties, can keep our coin from being carried out, when debts contracted beyond ſeas call for it?

8. WHETHER it be any odds to England, whether it be carried out, melted down into bullion, or in ſpecie?

9. WHETHER, whilſt the exigencies of our occaſions and trade call for it abroad, it will not always be melted down for the conveniency of exportation, ſo long as the law prohibits its exportation in ſpecie?

10. WHETHER ſtandard ſilver in coin and in bullion, will not immediately be of the ſame value, as ſoon as the prohibition of carrying our money in ſpecie is taken off?

11. WHETHER an ounce of ſilver the more would be carried out in a year, if that prohibition were taken off?

12. WHETHER ſilver in our coin, will not always, during the prohibition of its exportation, be a little leſs worth than ſilver in bullion, whilſt the conſumption of foreign commodities beyond what ours pay for, makes the exportation of ſilver neceſſary? And ſo, during ſuch a ſtate, raiſe your money as much, and as you will, "ſilver in the coin will never fetch as much as "the ſilver in bullion," as Mr. Lowndes expreſſes it, p. 110.

As to the inconveniencies and damages we ſuſtain, by clipped money paſſing by tale, as if it were lawful; nothing can be more true, more judicious, nor more weighty, than what Mr. Lowndes ſays, under his third general head; wherein I perfectly agree with him, excepting only, where he builds any thing upon the propoſed raiſing our coin one fifth. And to what he ſays, p. 114. concerning our being "deprived of the uſe of our heavy money, by "men's hoarding it, in proſpect that the ſilver, contained in thoſe weighty "pieces, will turn more to their profit, than lending it at intereſt, purchaſing, or trading therewith;" I crave leave to add, That thoſe hoarders of money, a great many of them, drive no leſs, but rather a greater trade, by hoarding the weighty money, than if they let it go abroad. For, by that means all the current caſh being light, clipped, and hazardous money, it is all tumbled into their hands, which gives credit to their bills, and furniſhes them to trade for as much as they pleaſe, whilſt every body elſe ſcarce trades at all, (but juſt as neceſſity forces) and is ready to ſtand ſtill.

WHERE he ſays, p. 114. "It is not likely the weighty monies will ſoon "appear abroad, without raiſing their value, and recoining the clipped monies:" I ſhould agree with him, if it ran thus: without recoining the clipped, and in the mean time making it go for its weight. For that will, I humbly conceive, bring out the heavy money, without raiſing its value, as effectually and ſooner; for it will do it immediately: his will take up ſome time. And I fear, if clipped money be not ſtopped, all at once and preſently, from paſſing any way in tale, the damage it will bring will be irreparable.

"MR. Lowndes's fourth general head is, to propoſe the means, that muſt "be obſerved, and the proper methods to be uſed in, and for the re-eſtabliſhment of the ſilver coins."

The firſt is, "That the work ſhould be finiſhed in as little time as may "be; not only to obviate a farther damage by clipping in the interim, but "alſo that the needful advantages of the new money may be ſooner obtained "for the ſervice of the nation."

These, I agree with him, are very good and neceſſary ends; but they are both to be attained, I conceive, much ſooner by making clipped money go for its weight, than by the method Mr. Lowndes propoſes. For this immediately puts an end to clipping, and obviates all farther damage thereby. Next, it immediately brings out all the hoarded, weighty money, and ſo that advantage will be ſooner obtained for the ſervice of the nation, than it can any other way beſides. Next, it preſerves the uſe of clipped money for the ſervice of the nation, in the interim, till it can be recoined all at the Tower.

His ſecond propoſition is, "That the loſs, or the greateſt part of it, ought "to be borne by the publick, and not by particulars, who being very nu"merous will be prejudiced againſt a reformation for the publick benefit, if "it be to be effected at the coſt of particular men."

A tax given to make good the defect of ſilver in clipped money, will be paid by particulars; and ſo the loſs will be borne by particular men: and whether theſe particulars be not more numerous, or at leaſt a great number of innocent men of them more ſenſibly burdened that way, than if it takes its chance in the hands of thoſe men, who have profited by the having it in their hand, will be worth conſidering. And I wiſh it here well weighed, which of the two ways, the greater number of men would be moſt dangerouſly prejudiced againſt this reformation. But as Mr. Lowndes orders the matter, every body will, I fear, be prejudiced againſt this reformation, when (as he divides it, p. 133, 134.) the owners will bear near one half of the loſs, in the price of his clipped money, and every body elſe his part of the remainder, in a tax levied on them for it. I wiſh a remedy could be found without any body's loſs. Moſt of thoſe ways I have heard propoſed, to make reparation to every particular man, for the clipped money ſhall be found in his hands, do ſo delay the remedy, if not entail clipping upon us, that I fear ſuch a care of particulars endangers the whole. And if that ſuffer, it will go but ill with particulars. I am not for hindering thoſe who have clipped money, from any recompence which can be provided and made them. The queſtion here, is not whether the honeſt countryman ſhall bear the loſs of his clipped money, without any more ado, or pay a tax to recompenſe himſelf. That, which I humbly conceive, the nation is moſt concerned in, is that clipping ſhould be finally ſtopped, and that the money, which remains, ſhould go according to its true value, for the carrying on of commerce, and the preſent ſupply of people's exigencies, till that part of it, which is defaced, can by the mint be brought to its legal and due form. And therefore I think it will be the rational deſire of all particulars, that the ſhorteſt and ſureſt way, not interfering with law, or equity, ſhould be taken to put an effectual end to an evil, which every moment it continues, works powerfully towards a general ruin.

His fourth propoſition is, “That no room muſt be left for jealouſy,” I acknowledge to be a good one, if there can be a way found to attain it.

I cannot but wonder to find the words, p. 124. “That no perſon whatſoever ſhall hereafter be obliged to accept, in legal payments, any money whatſoever, that is already clipped, or may hereafter be clipped, or diminiſhed; and that no perſon ſhall tender, or receive, any ſuch money in payment, under ſome ſmall penalty to be made eaſily recoverable, &c.”

As if any man now were obliged to receive clipped money in legal payment, and there were not already a law, with ſevere penalties, againſt thoſe who tendered clipped money in payment?

It is a doubt to me, whether the warden, maſter-worker, &c. of the mint at the Tower, could find fit and ſkilful perſons enough to ſet nine other mints at work, in other parts of England, in a quarter of a year, as Mr. Lowndes propoſes, p. 127. Beſides, Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 96. that the engines, which “put the letters upon the edges of the larger ſilver pieces, and mark the edges of the reſt with a graining, are wrought ſecretly.” And indeed, this is ſo great a guard againſt counterfeiting, as well as clipping our money, that it deſerves well to be kept a ſecret, as it has been hitherto. But how that can be, if money be to be coined in nine other mints, ſet up in ſeveral parts, is hard to conceive. And laſtly, perhaps, ſome may apprehend it may be of ill conſequence to have ſo many men inſtructed and employed in the art of coining, only for a ſhort job, and then turned looſe again to ſhift for themſelves, by their own ſkill and induſtry, as they can.

The proviſion made in his fourth rule, p. 136. to prevent the gain of “ſubtle dealers by culling out the heavieſt of the clipped pieces,” though it be the product of great ſagacity and foreſight, exactly calculated, and as well contrived, as in that caſe it can be; yet I fear is too ſubtle for the apprehenſion and practice of countrymen, who many of them, with their little quickneſs in ſuch matters, have alſo but ſmall ſums of money by them, and ſo neither having arithmetick, nor choice of clipped money, to adjuſt it to the weight there required, will be hardly made to underſtand it. But I think the clippers have, or will take care that there ſhall not be any great need of it.

To conclude; I confeſs myſelf not to ſee the leaſt reaſon, why our preſent milled money ſhould be at all altered in fineneſs, weight or value. I look upon it to be the beſt and ſafeſt from counterfeiting, adulterating, or any ways being fraudulently diminiſhed, of any that ever was coined. It is adjuſted to our legal payments, reckonings and accounts, to which our money muſt be reduced: the raiſing its denomination will neither add to its worth, nor make the ſtock we have more proportionate to our occaſions, nor bring one grain of ſilver the more into England, nor one farthing advantage to the publick: it will only ſerve to defraud the king, and a great number of his ſubjects, and perplex all; and put the kingdom to a needleſs charge of recoining all, both milled as well as clipped money.

If I might take upon me to offer any thing new, I would humbly propoſe, that ſince market and retail trade requires leſs diviſions than ſix-pences, a ſufficient quantity of four-penny, four-penny halfpenny, and five-penny pieces ſhould be coined. Theſe in change will anſwer all the fractions between ſix-pence and a farthing, and thereby ſupply the want of ſmall monies, whereof I believe no body ever ſaw enough common to anſwer the neceſſity of ſmall payments; whether, either becauſe there was never a ſufficient quantity of ſuch pieces coined, or whether becauſe of their ſmallneſs they are apter to be loſt out of any hands, or becauſe they oftener falling into children's hands, they loſe them, or lay them up; ſo it is, there is always a viſible want of them; to ſupply which, without the inconveniencies attending very ſmall coin, the propoſed pieces, I humbly conceive will ſerve.

If it be thought fit for this end to have four-pence, four-pence halfpenny, and five-penny pieces, coined, it will, I ſuppoſe, be convenient that they ſhould be diſtinguiſhed from ſix-pences, and from one another, by a deep and very large plain difference in the ſtamp on both ſides, to prevent miſtakes, and loſs of time in telling of money. The four-pence halfpenny has already the harp for a known diſtinction, which may be fit to be continued; the five-pence may have the feathers, and the four-pence this mark IV. of four on the reverſe: and on the other ſide they may each have the king's head with a crown on it, to ſhew on that ſide too, that the piece ſo coined, is one of thoſe under a ſix-pence; and with that they may each, on that ſide alſo, have ſome marks of diſtinction one from another, as the five-pence this mark of V. the four-pence halfpenny a little harp, and the four-pence nothing.

These, or any other better diſtinctions, which his majeſty ſhall order, will in tale readily diſcover them, if by chance any of them fall into larger payments, for which they are not deſigned.

And thus I have, with as much brevity and clearneſs as I could, complied with what Mr. Lowndes's profeſſes to be the end of printing his report in theſe words, viz. "That any perſons, who have conſidered an affair of this nature, "may (if they pleaſe) communicate their thoughts for rendering the deſign "here aimed at more perfect, or more agreeable to the publick ſervice." It muſt be confeſſed, that my conſiderations have led me to thoughts, in ſome parts of this affair, quite oppoſite to Mr. Lowndes's: but how far this has been from any deſire to oppoſe him, or to have a diſpute with a man, no otherwiſe known to me but by his civilities, and whom I have a very great eſteem for, will appear by what I printed about raiſing the value of money, about three years ſince. All that I have ſaid here, in anſwer to him, being nothing but the applying the principles I then went on, particularly now, to Mr. Lowndes's arguments, as they came in my way; that ſo thereby others may judge what will, or will not, be the conſequences of ſuch a change of our coin, as he propoſes; the only way, I think, of rendering his deſign more agreeable to the publick ſervices.

One ſhilling contained of fine ſilver.

| | Gr. |
|---|---|
| 28 Edw. 1 | 264 |
| 18 Edw. 3 | 236 |
| 27 Edw. 3 | 213 |
| 9 Hen. 5 | 176 |
| 1 Hen. 6 | 142 |
| 4 Hen. 6 | 176 |
| 49 Hen. 6 | 142 |
| 1 Hen. 8 | 118 |
| 34 Hen. 8 | 100 |
| 36 Hen. 8 | 60 |
| 37 Hen. 8 | 40 |

The fineneſs increaſed, but the weight leſſened.

| | Gr. |
|---|---|
| 3 Edw. 6 | 40 |
| 5 Edw. 6 | 20 |
| 6 Edw. 6 | 88 |
| 2 Eliz.— | 89 |
| 43 Eliz.— | 86 |

i. e. $7\frac{1}{3}$ gr. in a penny.

WILLIAM III.

1 l. troy of ſterling ſilver is coined in 62s. the remedy over or under is $2\frac{1}{12}$ pwt. or 6d. $\frac{1}{4}$, which is the 124 part fere v. pl. 8 Aug. 99.

| SPECIES. | oz. | pwt. | gr. | Juſt ſtd. | oz. | pwt. | ſh. | pen. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mexico real | — | 17 | 12 | better | — | — | 4 | $4\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Ducatoon of Flanders | 1 | — | 22 | — | — | $4\frac{1}{2}$ | 5 | 4 |
| Sevil real | — | 17 | 12 | worſe | — | 1 | 4 | $4\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Holland dollar | — | 18 | 5 | — | — | 10 | 4 | 4 |
| Lyon dollar | — | 17 | $18\frac{1}{2}$ | — | 2 | 3 | 3 | $4\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Rixdollar of the Empire | — | 18 | 15 | — | — | $7\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | $5\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Old cardecu | — | 6 | $3\frac{1}{2}$ | — | — | 1 | 1 | $6\frac{1}{4}$ |
| French lewis | — | 17 | 11 | — | — | — $\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | $4\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Double milrez of Portugal | — | 14 | 4 | — | — | $1\frac{1}{2}$ | 3 | $6\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Single milrez of Portugal | — | 7 | 2 | — | — | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| St. Mark of Venice | — | 10 | 4 | — | — | $1\frac{1}{2}$ | 2 | 6 |
| Double Dutch ſtyver | — | 1 | — | — | 4 | 6 | — | $1\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Croſs dollar | — | 18 | — | — | — | 12 | 4 | $2\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Zealand dollar | — | 13 | — | — | 2 | — | 2 | 3 |
| Old Philip dollar | 1 | 2 | — | — | 1 | — | 5 | — |
| Ferdinando dollar 1623 | — | 18 | 6 | — | — | $12\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | 3 |
| Prince of Orange dollar 1624 | — | 18 | 6 | — | — | $10\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | $3\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Leopoldus dollar 1624 | — | 18 | 2 | — | — | $9\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | $3\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Rodolphus dollar 1607 | — | 18 | 7 | — | — | 10 | 4 | 4 |
| Maximilian dollar 1616 | — | 18 | 2 | — | — | $4\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | $4\frac{3}{4}$ |
| Daniſh dollar 1620 | — | 13 | — | — | — | 13 | 2 | $11\frac{1}{4}$ |
| Portugal teſtoon | — | 5 | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | $2\frac{3}{4}$ |
| The quarter of a new French lewis | — | 4 | 9 | — | — | — $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | 1 |

A pound weight of troy ſtandard gold is cut into guineas $44\frac{1}{2}$, one guinea weighs gr. $129\frac{2}{3}$, i. e. 5 pw. 9 gr. $\frac{2}{3}$.

# TWO
# TREATISES
# OF
# GOVERNMENT.

In the former,
The falſe PRINCIPLES and FOUNDATION of
Sir ROBERT FILMER, and his Followers,
Are DETECTED and OVERTHROWN:
The Latter, is an

# ESSAY

CONCERNING
The TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, and END, of
# CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

# THE
# PREFACE.

READER,

THOU haſt here the beginning and end of a diſcourſe concerning government; what fate has otherwiſe diſpoſed of the papers that ſhould have filled up the middle, and were more than all the reſt, it is not worth while to tell thee. Theſe, which remain, I hope are ſufficient to eſtabliſh the throne of our great reſtorer, our preſent king William; to make good his title, in the conſent of the people; which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in Chriſtendom; and to juſtify to the world the people of England, whoſe love of their juſt and natural rights, with their reſolution to preſerve them, ſaved the nation when it was on the very brink of ſlavery and ruin. If theſe papers have that evidence, I flatter myſelf is to be found in them, there will be no great miſs of thoſe which are loſt, and my reader may be ſatisfied without them. For I imagine, I ſhall have neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting part of my anſwer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the windings and obſcurities, which are to be met with in the ſeveral branches of his wonderful ſyſtem. The king, and body of the nation, have ſince ſo thoroughly confuted his hypotheſis, that I ſuppoſe no body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear againſt our common ſafety, and be again an advocate for ſlavery; or the weakneſs to be deceived with contradictions dreſſed up in a popular ſtile, and well turned periods. For if any one will be at the pains himſelf, in thoſe parts, which are here untouched, to ſtrip Sir Robert's diſcourſes of the flouriſh of doubtful expreſſions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, poſitive, intelligible propoſitions, and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be ſatisfied, there was never ſo much glib nonſenſe put together in well ſounding Engliſh. If he think it not worth while to examine his works all through, let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of uſurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his ſkill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and conſiſtent with himſelf, or common ſenſe. I ſhould not ſpeak ſo plainly of a gentleman, long ſince paſt anſwering, had not the pulpit, of late years, publickly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of the times. It is neceſſary thoſe men, who taking on them to be teachers, have ſo dangerouſly miſled others, ſhould be openly ſhewed of what authority this their patriarch is, whom they have ſo blindly followed, that ſo they may either retract what upon ſo ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; or elſe juſtify thoſe principles which they have preached up for goſpel, though they had no better an author than an Engliſh courtier. For I ſhould not have writ againſt Sir Robert, or taken the pains to ſhew his miſtakes, inconſiſtencies, and want of (what he ſo much boaſts of, and pretends wholly to build on) ſcripture-proofs, were there not men amongſt us, who, by crying up his books, and eſpouſing his doctrine, ſave me from the reproach of writing againſt a dead adverſary. They have been ſo zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope they ſhould ſpare me. I wiſh, where they have done the truth and the publick wrong, they would be as ready to redreſs it, and allow its juſt weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greater miſchief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning government; that ſo at laſt all times might not have reaſon to complain of the "drum eccleſiaſtick." If any one, concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation of my hypotheſis, I promiſe him either to recant my miſtake, upon fair conviction; or to anſwer his difficulties. But he muſt remember two things,

Firſt, THAT cavilling here and there, at ſome expreſſion, or little incident of my diſcourſe, is not an anſwer to my book.

Secondly, THAT I ſhall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of theſe worth my notice: though I ſhall always look on myſelf as bound to give ſatisfaction to any one, who ſhall appear to be conſcientiouſly ſcrupulous in the point, and ſhall ſhew any juſt grounds for his ſcruples.

I HAVE nothing more, but to advertiſe the reader, that A. ſtands for our author, O. for his Obſervations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. And that a bare quotation of pages, always means pages of his Patriarcha, edit. 1680.

# OF
# GOVERNMENT.

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## BOOK I.

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### CHAP. I.

§. 1. SLAVERY is ſo vile and miſerable an eſtate of man, and ſo directly oppoſite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived, that an Engliſhman, much leſs a gentleman, ſhould plead for it. And truly, I ſhould have taken Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, as any other treatiſe, which would perſuade all men, that they are ſlaves, and ought to be ſo, for ſuch another exerciſe of wit, as was his who writ the encomium of Nero; rather than for a ſerious diſcourſe, meant in earneſt: had not the gravity of the title and epiſtle, the picture in the front of the book, and the applauſe that followed it, required me to believe, that the author and publiſher were both in earneſt. I therefore took it into my hands with all the expectation, and read it through with all the attention due to a treatiſe that made ſuch a noiſe at its coming abroad; and cannot but confeſs myſelf mightily ſurprized, that in a book, which was to provide chains for all mankind, I ſhould find nothing but a rope of ſand; uſeful perhaps to ſuch, whoſe ſkill and buſineſs it is to raiſe a duſt, and would blind the people, the better to miſlead them; but in truth is not of any force to draw thoſe into bondage, who have their eyes open, and ſo much ſenſe about them, as to conſider, that chains are but an ill wearing, how much care ſoever hath been taken to file and poliſh them.

§. 2. IF any one think I take too much liberty in ſpeaking ſo freely of a man, who is the great champion of abſolute power, and the idol of thoſe who worſhip it; I beſeech him to make this ſmall allowance for once, to one, who, even after the reading of Sir Robert's book, cannot but think himſelf, as the laws allow him, a freeman: and I know no fault it is to do ſo, unleſs any one better ſkilled in the fate of it, than I, ſhould have it revealed to him, that this treatiſe, which has lain dormant ſo long, was, when it appeared in the world, to carry by ſtrength of its arguments, all liberty out of it; and that, from thenceforth, our author's ſhort model was to be the pattern in the mount, and the perfect ſtandard of politicks for the future. His ſyſtem lies in a little compaſs, it is no more but this,

"That all government is abſolute monarchy."

And the ground he builds on, is this,

"That no man is born free."

§. 3. In this laſt age a generation of men has ſprung up amongſt us, that would flatter princes with an opinion, that they have a divine right to abſolute power, let the laws by which they are conſtituted, and are to govern, and the conditions under which they enter upon their authority, be what they will; and their engagements to obſerve them, ever ſo well ratified, by ſolemn oaths and promiſes. To make way for this doctrine, they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom; whereby they have not only, as much as in them lies, expoſed all ſubjects to the utmoſt miſery of tyranny and oppreſſion, but have alſo unſettled the titles, and ſhaken the thrones of princes: (for they too, by theſe men's ſyſtem, except only one, are all born ſlaves, and by divine right are ſubjects to Adam's right heir;) as if they had deſigned to make war upon all government, and ſubvert the very foundations of human ſociety, to ſerve their preſent turn.

§. 4. However we muſt believe them upon their own bare words, when they tell us, "We are all born ſlaves, and we muſt continue ſo;" there is no remedy for it; life and thraldom we entered into together, and can never be quit of the one, till we part with the other. Scripture or reaſon, I am ſure, do not any where ſay ſo, notwithſtanding the noiſe of divine right, as if divine authority hath ſubjected us to the unlimited will of another. An admirable ſtate of mankind, and that which they have not had wit enough to find out till this latter age. For, however Sir Robert Filmer ſeems to condemn the novelty of the contrary opinion, Patr. p. 3. yet I believe it will be hard for him to find any other age, or country of the world, but this, which has aſſerted monarchy to be jure divino. And he confeſſes, Patr. p. 4. That "Heyward, "Blackwood, Barclay, and others, that have bravely vindicated the right of "kings, in moſt points, never thought of this; but, with one conſent, ad-"mitted the natural liberty and equality of mankind."

§. 5. By whom this doctrine came at firſt to be broached, and brought in faſhion amongſt us, and what ſad effects it gave riſe to, I leave to hiſtorians to relate, or to the memory of thoſe, who were contemporaries with Sibthorp and Manwering, to recollect. My buſineſs at preſent is, only to conſider what Sir Robert Filmer, who is allowed to have carried this argument fartheſt, and is ſuppoſed to have brought it to perfection, has ſaid in it: for from him every one, who would be as faſhionable as French was at court, has learned, and runs away with this ſhort ſyſtem of politicks, viz. "Men are not born free, "and therefore could never have the liberty to chuſe either governors, or forms "of government." Princes have their power abſolute, and by divine right; for ſlaves could never have a right to compact or conſent. Adam was an abſolute monarch, and ſo are all princes ever ſince.

CHAP.

# CHAP. II.

## Of paternal and regal power.

§. 6. SIR Robert Filmer's great poſition is, that “men are not naturally free.” This is the foundation on which his abſolute monarchy ſtands, and from which it erects itſelf to an height, that its power is above every power: “caput inter nubila,” ſo high above all earthly and human things, that thought can ſcarce reach it; that promiſes and oaths, which tie the infinite Deity, cannot confine it. But if this foundation fails, all his fabrick falls with it, and governments muſt be left again to the old way of being made by contrivance, and the conſent of men (’Ανθρωπίνη κτίσις) making uſe of their reaſon to unite together into ſociety. To prove this grand poſition of his, he tells us, p. 12. “Men are born in ſubjection to their parents,” and therefore cannot be free. And this authority of parents, he calls, “royal authority, p. 12, 14. “fatherly authority, right of fatherhood,” p. 12, 20. One would have thought he would, in the beginning of ſuch a work as this, on which was to depend the authority of princes, and the obedience of ſubjects, have told us expreſsly, what that fatherly authority is, have defined it, though not limited it, becauſe in ſome other treatiſes of his, he tells us, it is unlimited, and * unlimitable; he ſhould at leaſt have given us ſuch an account of it, that we might have had an entire notion of this fatherhood, or fatherly authority, whenever it came in our way, in his writings: this I expected to have found in the firſt chapter of his Patriarcha. But inſtead thereof, having, 1. En paſſant, made his obeiſance to the arcana imperii, p. 5. 2. Made his compliment to the “rights and liberties of this, or any other nation,” p. 6. which he is going preſently to null and deſtroy; and 3. Made his leg to thoſe learned men, who did not ſee ſo far into the matter as himſelf, p. 7. He comes to fall on Bellarmine, p. 8. and by a victory over him, eſtabliſhes his fatherly authority beyond any queſtion. Bellarmine being routed by his own confeſſion, p. 11. the day is clear got, and there is no more need of any forces: for, having done that, I obſerve not that he ſtates the queſtion, or rallies up any arguments, to make good his opinion, but rather tells us the ſtory, as he thinks fit, of this ſtrange kind of domineering phantom, called the fatherhood, which whoever could catch, preſently got empire, and unlimited, abſolute power. He aſſures us, how this fatherhood began in Adam, continued its courſe, and kept the world in order all the time of the patriarchs, till the flood; got out of the ark with Noah and his ſons, made and ſupported all the kings of the earth, till the captivity of the Iſraelites in Egypt; and then the poor fatherhood was under hatches, till “God, by giving the Iſraelites kings, re-eſta-

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* “In grants and gifts that have their original from God, or nature, as the power of the father “hath, no inferior power of man can limit, nor make any law of preſcription againſt them.” O. 158. “The ſcripture teaches, that ſupreme power was originally in the father, without any limitation.” O. 245.

“ bliſhed the ancient and prime right of the lineal ſucceſſion in paternal government.” This is his buſineſs from p. 12, to 19. And then, obviating an objection, and clearing a difficulty or two with one half reaſon, p. 23. “ to confirm the natural right of regal power,” he ends the firſt chapter. I hope it is no injury to call an half quotation an half reaſon; for God ſays, “ Honour thy father and mother;” but our author contents himſelf with half, leaves out “ thy mother” quite, as little ſerviceable to his purpoſe. But of that more in another place.

§. 7. I do not think our author ſo little ſkilled in the way of writing diſcourſes of this nature, nor ſo careleſs of the point in hand, that he, by overſight commits the fault, that he himſelf, in his “ anarchy of a mixed monarchy,” p. 239. objects to Mr. Hunton in theſe words: “ Where firſt I charge the A. that he hath not given us any definition, or deſcription of monarchy in general; for by the rules of method he ſhould have firſt defined.” And by the like rule of method, Sir Robert ſhould have told us, what his fatherhood, or fatherly authority, is, before he had told us, in whom it was to be found, and talked ſo much of it. But, perhaps, Sir Robert found, that this fatherly authority, this power of fathers, and of kings, for he makes them both the ſame, p. 24. would make a very odd and frightful figure, and very diſagreeing with what either children imagine of their parents, or ſubjects of their kings, if he ſhould have given us the whole draught together, in that gigantick form, he had painted it in his own fancy; and therefore, like a wary phyſician, when he would have his patient ſwallow ſome harſh or corroſive liquor, he mingles it with a large quantity of that which may dilute it; that the ſcattered parts may go down with leſs feeling, and cauſe leſs averſion.

§. 8. Let us then endeavour to find, what account he gives us of this fatherly authority, as it lies ſcattered in the ſeveral parts of his writings. And firſt, as it was veſted in Adam, he ſays, “ Not only Adam, but the ſucceeding patriarchs, had by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children, p. 12. This lordſhip, which Adam by command had over the whole world, and by right deſcending from him the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample as the abſolute dominion of any monarch, which hath been ſince the creation, p. 13. Dominion of life and death, making war, and concluding peace, p. 13. Adam and the patriarchs had abſolute power of life and death, p. 35. Kings, in the right of parents, ſucceed to the exerciſe of ſupreme juriſdiction, p. 19. As kingly power is by the law of God, ſo it hath no inferior law to limit it; Adam was lord of all, p. 40. The father of a family governs by no other law, than by his own will, p. 78. The ſuperiority of princes is above laws, p. 79. The unlimited juriſdiction of kings is ſo amply deſcribed by Samuel, p. 80. Kings are above the laws,” p. 93. And to this purpoſe ſee a great deal more, which our A. delivers in Bodin's words: “ It is certain, that all laws, privileges, and grants of princes, have no force, but during their life; if they be not ratified by the expreſs conſent, or by ſufferance of the prince following, eſpecially privileges, O. p. 279. The reaſon why laws have been alſo made by kings, was this;

" when kings were either buſied with wars, or diſtracted with publick cares, " ſo that every private man could not have acceſs to their perſons, to learn " their wills and pleaſure, then were laws of neceſſity invented, that ſo every " particular ſubject might find his prince's pleaſure decyphered unto him " in the tables of his laws, p. 92. In a monarchy, the king muſt by neceſ- " ſity be above the laws, p. 100. A perfect kingdom is that, wherein the " king rules all things according to his own will, p. 100. Neither com- " mon nor ſtatute laws, are, or can be, any diminution of that general pow- " er, which kings have over their people by right of fatherhood, p. 115. " Adam was the father, king, and lord over his family; a ſon, a ſubject, and " a ſervant or ſlave, were one and the ſame thing at firſt. The father had " power to diſpoſe or ſell his children or ſervants; whence we find, that the " firſt reckoning up of goods in ſcripture, the man-ſervant and the maid- " ſervant, are numbered, among the poſſeſſions and ſubſtance of the owner, " as other goods were, O. pref. God alſo hath given to the father a right " or liberty, to alien his power over his children to any other; whence we " find the ſale and gift of children to have been much in uſe in the begin- " ning of the world, when men had their ſervants for a poſſeſſion and an in- " heritance, as well as other goods; whereupon we find the power of caſtrat- " ing and making eunuchs, much in uſe in old times, O. p. 155. Law is " nothing elſe but the will of him that hath the power of the ſupreme fa- " ther, O. p. 223. It was God's ordinance that the ſupremacy ſhould be " unlimited in Adam, and as large as all the acts of his will; and as in him, " ſo in all others that have ſupreme power, O. p. 245."

§. 9. I HAVE been fain to trouble my reader with theſe ſeveral quotations in our A.'s own words, that in them might be ſeen his own deſcription of his fatherly authority, as it lies ſcattered up and down in his writings, which he ſuppoſes was firſt veſted in Adam, and by right belongs to all princes ever ſince. This fatherly authority then, or right of fatherhood, in our A.'s ſenſe, is a divine unalterable right of ſovereignty, whereby a father or a prince hath an abſolute, arbitrary, unlimited, and unlimitable power over the lives, liberties, and eſtates of his children and ſubjects; ſo that he may take or alienate their eſtates, ſell, caſtrate, or uſe their perſons as he pleaſes, they being all his ſlaves, and he lord or proprietor of every thing, and his unbounded will their law.

§. 10. OUR A. having placed ſuch a mighty power in Adam, and upon that ſuppoſition founded all government, and all power of princes, it is reaſonable to expect, that he ſhould have proved this with arguments clear and evident, ſuitable to the weightineſs of the cauſe. That ſince men had nothing elſe left them, they might in ſlavery have ſuch undeniable proofs of its neceſſity, that their conſciences might be convinced, and oblige them to ſubmit peaceably to that abſolute dominion, which their governors had a right to exerciſe over them. Without this, what good could our A. do, or pretend to do, by erecting ſuch an unlimited power, but flatter the natural vanity and ambition of men, too apt of itſelf to grow and increaſe with the poſſeſſion of any power? And by perſuading thoſe, who, by the conſent of their fellow-men, are advanced to great, but limited degrees of it, that by that part which is given them, they have a right to all that was not ſo; and therefore may do what they pleaſe, becauſe they have authority to do more than others, and ſo tempt them to do what is neither for their own, nor the good of thoſe under their care; whereby great miſchiefs cannot but follow.

§. 11. THE ſovereignty of Adam, being that on which, as a ſure baſis, our A. builds his mighty abſolute monarchy, I expected, that in his Patriarcha, this his main ſuppoſition would have been proved, and eſtabliſhed with all that evidence of arguments, that ſuch a fundamental tenet required; and that this, on which the great ſtreſs of the buſineſs depends, would have been made out, with reaſons ſufficient to juſtify the confidence with which it was aſſumed. But in all that treatiſe, I could find very little tending that way; the thing is there ſo taken for granted, without proof, that I could ſcarce believe myſelf, when, upon attentive reading that treatiſe, I found there ſo mighty a ſtructure raiſed upon the bare ſuppoſition of this foundation. For it is ſcarce credible, that in a diſcourſe, where he pretends to confute the erroneous principle of man's natural freedom, he ſhould do it by a bare ſuppoſition of Adam's authority, without offering any proof for that authority. Indeed he confidently ſays, that Adam had "royal authority, p. 12, and 13. Abſolute lordſhip and dominion of life and death, p. 13. An univerſal monarchy, p. 33. Abſolute power of life and death, p. 35." He is very frequent in ſuch aſſertions; but, what is ſtrange, in all his whole Patriarcha, I find not one pretence of a reaſon, to eſtabliſh this his great foundation of government; not any thing that looks like an argument, but theſe words: "To confirm this natural right of regal power, we find in the decalogue, that the law which enjoins obedience to kings, is delivered in the terms, Honour thy father; as if all power were originally in the father." And why may I not add as well, that in the decalogue, the law that enjoins obedience to queens, is delivered in the terms of "Honour thy mother," as if all power were originally in the mother? The argument, as Sir Robert puts it, will hold as well for one as the other: but of this, more in its due place.

§. 12. ALL that I take notice of here, is, that this is all our A. ſays, in this firſt, or any of the following chapters, to prove the abſolute power of Adam, which is his great principle: and yet, as if he had there ſettled it upon ſure demonſtration, he begins his ſecond chapter with theſe words, "By conferring theſe proofs and reaſons, drawn from the authority of the ſcripture." Where thoſe proofs and reaſons for Adam's ſovereignty are, bating that of Honour thy father, above-mentioned, I confeſs, I cannot find; unleſs what he ſays, p. 11. "In theſe words we have an evident confeſſion," viz. of Bellarmine, "that creation made man prince of his poſterity," muſt be taken for proofs and reaſons drawn from ſcripture, or for any ſort of proof at all: though from thence by a new way of inference, in the words immediately following, he concludes, the royal authority of Adam ſufficiently ſettled in him.

§. 13. IF he has in that chapter, or any where in the whole treatiſe, given any other proofs of Adam's royal authority, other than by often repeating it, which, among ſome men, goes for argument, I deſire any body for him to ſhew me the place and page, that I may be convinced of my miſtake, and acknowledge my overſight. If no ſuch arguments are to be found, I beſeech thoſe men, who have ſo much cried up this book, to conſider, whether they do not give the world cauſe to ſuſpect, that it is not the force of reaſon and argument, that makes them for abſolute monarchy, but ſome other by intereſt, and therefore are reſolved to applaud any author, that writes in favour of this doctrine, whether he ſupport it with reaſon or no. But I hope they do not expect, that rational and indifferent men ſhould be brought over to their opinion, becauſe this their great doctor of it, in a diſcourſe made on purpoſe, to ſet up the abſolute monarchical power of Adam, in oppoſition to the natural freedom of mankind, has ſaid ſo little to prove it, from whence it is rather naturally to be concluded, that there is little to be ſaid.

§. 14. But that I might omit no care to inform myſelf in our author's full ſenſe, I conſulted his "Obſervations on Ariſtotle, Hobbes, &c." to ſee whether in diſputing with others he made uſe of any arguments for this his darling tenet of Adam's ſovereignty; ſince in his treatiſe of the "natural power of "kings," he hath been ſo ſparing of them. In his Obſervations on Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan, I think he has put, in ſhort, all thoſe arguments for it together, which in his writings I find him any where to make uſe of: his words are theſe: "If God created only Adam, and of a piece of him made "the woman, and if by generation from them two, as parts of them, all "mankind be propagated: if alſo God gave to Adam not only the dominion "over the woman and the children that ſhould iſſue from them, but alſo over "all the earth to ſubdue it, and over all the creatures on it, ſo that as long "as Adam lived, no man could claim or enjoy any thing but by donation, "aſſignation or permiſſion from him, I wonder &c." Obſervations, 165. Here we have the ſum of all his arguments, for Adam's ſovereignty, and againſt natural freedom, which I find up and down in his other treatiſes: and they are theſe following; "God's creation of Adam, the dominion he gave him "over Eve, and the dominion he had as father over his children:" all which I ſhall particularly conſider.

## CHAP. III.

## Of Adam's title to ſovereignty by creation.

§. 15. SIR Robert, in his preface to his Obſervations on Ariſtotle's politicks, tells us, "A natural freedom of mankind cannot be ſuppoſed, with- "out the denial of the creation of Adam:" but how Adam's being created, which was nothing but his receiving a being, immediately from omnipotency, and the hand of God, gave Adam a ſovereignty over any thing, I cannot ſee; nor conſequently underſtand, how a ſuppoſition of natural freedom, is a denial of Adam's creation; and would be glad any body elſe (ſince our A. did not vouchſaſe us the favour) would make it out for him. For I find no difficulty to ſuppoſe the freedom of mankind, though I have always believed the creation

tion of Adam. He was created, or began to exiſt, by God's immediate power, without the intervention of parents, or the pre-exiſtence of any of the ſame ſpecies to beget him, when it pleaſed God he ſhould; and ſo did the lion, the king of beaſts, before him, by the ſame creating power of God: and if bare exiſtence by that power, and in that way, will give dominion, without any more ado, our A. by this argument, will make the lion have as good a title to it, as he, and certainly the ancienter. No! for Adam had his title "by the appointment of God," ſays our A. in another place. Then bare creation gave him not dominion, and one might have ſuppoſed mankind free, without the denying the creation of Adam, ſince it was God's appointment made him monarch.

§. 16. But let us ſee, how he puts his creation and this appointment together. "By the appointment of God, ſays Sir Robert, as ſoon as Adam was "created, he was monarch of the world, though he had no ſubjects; for "though there could not be actual government till there were ſubjects, yet "by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his poſterity: though not in act, yet at leaſt in habit, Adam was a king from his "creation." I wiſh he had told us here, what he meant by God's appointment. For whatſoever providence orders, or the law of nature directs, or poſitive revelation declares, may be ſaid to be by God's appointment: but I ſuppoſe it cannot be meant here in the firſt ſenſe, i. e. by providence; becauſe that would be to ſay no more, but that as ſoon as Adam was created, he was *de facto* monarch, becauſe by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his poſterity. But he could not, *de facto*, be by providence conſtituted the governor of the world, at a time when there was actually no government, no ſubjects to be governed, which our A. here confeſſes. Monarch of the world is alſo differently uſed by our A. for ſometimes he means by it a proprietor of all the world, excluſive of the reſt of mankind, and thus he does in the ſame page of his preface before cited: "Adam, ſays "he, being commanded to multiply and people the earth, and ſubdue it, "and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the "monarch of the whole world; none of his poſterity had any right to poſſeſs "any thing but by his grant or permiſſion, or by ſucceſſion from him." 2. Let us underſtand then by monarch, proprietor of the world, and by appointment, God's actual donation, and revealed poſitive grant made to Adam, Gen. i. 28. as we ſee Sir Robert himſelf does in this parallel place; and then his argument will ſtand thus, "by the poſitive grant of God: as ſoon "as Adam was created, he was proprietor of the world, becauſe by the "right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his poſterity." In which way of arguing there are two manifeſt falſhoods. Firſt, it is falſe, that God made that grant to Adam, as ſoon as he was created, ſince, though it ſtands in the text immediately after his creation, yet it is plain it could not be ſpoken to Adam, till after Eve was made and brought to him; and how then could he be monarch by appointment as ſoon as created, eſpecially ſince he calls, if I miſtake not, that which God ſays to Eve, Gen. iii. 16. the original grant of government, which not being till after the fall, when

Adam was ſomewhat, at leaſt in time, and very much diſtant in condition, from his creation, I cannot ſee, how our A. can ſay in this ſenſe, that "by "God's appointment, as ſoon as Adam was created, he was monarch of the "world." Secondly, were it true, that God's actual donation "appointed "Adam monarch of the world, as ſoon as he was created," yet the reaſon here given for it would not prove it; but it would always be a falſe inference, that God, by a poſitive donation, "appointed Adam monarch of the world, "becauſe by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his "poſterity:" for having given him the right of government by nature, there was no need of a poſitive donation; at leaſt it will never be a proof of ſuch a donation.

§. 17. On the other ſide the matter will not be much mended, if we underſtand by God's appointment the law of nature, (though it be a pretty harſh expreſſion for it in this place) and by monarch of the world, ſovereign ruler of mankind: for then the ſentence under conſideration muſt run thus: "By "the law of nature, as ſoon as Adam was created he was governor of mankind, for by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his "poſterity;" which amounts to this, he was governor by right of nature, becauſe he was governor by right of nature. But ſuppoſing we ſhould grant, that a man is by nature governor of his children, Adam could not hereby be monarch as ſoon as created: for this right of nature being founded in his being their father, how Adam could have a natural right to be governor, before he was a father, when by being a father only he had that right, is, methinks, hard to conceive, unleſs he would have him to be a father before he was a father, and have a title before he had it.

§. 18. To this foreſeen objection, our A. anſwers very logically, "He was "governor in habit, and not in act:" a very pretty way of being a governor without government, a father without children, and a king without ſubjects. And thus Sir Robert was an author before he writ his book; not in act it is true, but in habit; for when he had once publiſhed it, it was due to him by the right of nature, to be an author, as much as it was to Adam to be governor of his children, when he had begot them: and if to be ſuch a monarch of the world, an abſolute monarch in habit, but not in act, will ſerve the turn, I ſhould not much envy it to any of Sir Robert's friends, that he thought fit graciouſly to beſtow it upon, though even this of act and habit, if it ſignified any thing but our A.'s ſkill in diſtinctions, be not to his purpoſe in this place. For the queſtion is not here about Adam's actual exerciſe of government, but actually having a title to be governor. Government, ſays our A. was "due to Adam by the right of nature:" what is this right of nature? A right fathers have over their children by begetting them; "generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos," ſays our A. out of Grotius, O. 223. The right then follows the begetting as ariſing from it; ſo that, according to this way of reaſoning or diſtinguiſhing of our A. Adam, as ſoon as he was created, had a title only in habit, and not in act, which in plain Engliſh is, he had actually no title at all.

§. 19. To ſpeak leſs learnedly, and more intelligibly, one may ſay of Adam, he was in a poſſibility of being governor, ſince it was poſſible he might beget children, and thereby acquire that right of nature, be it what it will, to govern them, that accrues from thence: but what connection has this with Adam's creation, to make him ſay, that "as ſoon as he was created, he was monarch of the world?" For it may as well be ſaid of Noah, that as ſoon as he was born he was monarch of the world, ſince he was in poſſibility (which in our A.'s ſenſe is enough to make a monarch, "a monarch in habit,") to outlive all mankind but his own poſterity. What ſuch neceſſary connection there is betwixt Adam's creation and his right to government, ſo that a "natural freedom of mankind cannot be ſuppoſed without the denial of the creation of Adam," I confeſs for my part I do not ſee; nor how thoſe words, "by the appointment, &c." Obſervations, 254. however explained, can be put together, to make any tolerable ſenſe, at leaſt to eſtabliſh this poſition, with which they end, viz. "Adam was a king from his creation;" a king, ſays our author, "not in act, but in habit," i. e. actually no king at all.

§. 20. I FEAR I have tired my reader's patience, by dwelling longer on this paſſage, than the weightineſs of any argument in it ſeems to require: but I have unavoidably been engaged in it by our author's way of writing, who, huddling ſeveral ſuppoſitions together, and that in doubtful and general terms, makes ſuch a medley and confuſion, that it is impoſſible to ſhew his miſtakes, without examining the ſeveral ſenſes wherein his words may be taken, and without ſeeing how, in any of theſe various meanings, they will conſiſt together, and have any truth in them: for in this preſent paſſage before us, how can any one argue againſt this poſition of his, "that Adam was a king from his creation," unleſs one examine, whether the words, "from his creation," be to be taken as they may, for the time of the commencement of his government, as the foregoing words import, "as ſoon as he was created he was monarch;" or, for the cauſe of it, as he ſays, p. 11. "creation made man prince of his poſterity?" How farther can one judge of the truth of his being thus king, till one has examined whether king be to be taken, as the words in the beginning of this paſſage would perſuade, on ſuppoſition of his private dominion, which was, by God's poſitive grant, "monarch of the world by appointment;" or king on ſuppoſition of his fatherly power over his offspring, which was by nature, "due by the right of nature;" whether, I ſay, king be to be taken in both, or one only of theſe two ſenſes, or in neither of them, but only this, that creation made him prince, in a way different from both the other? For though this aſſertion, that "Adam was king from his creation," be true in no ſenſe, yet it ſtands here as an evident concluſion draw from the preceding words, though in truth it be but a bare aſſertion joined to other aſſertions of the ſame kind, which confidently put together in words of undetermined and dubious meaning, look like a ſort of arguing, when there is indeed neither proof nor connection: a way very familiar with our author: of which having given the reader a taſte here, I ſhall, as much as the argument will permit me, avoid touching on hereafter;

and ſhould not have done it here, were it not to let the world ſee, how incoherences in matter, and ſuppoſitions without proofs put handſomely together in goods words and a plauſible ſtile, are apt to paſs for ſtrong reaſon and good ſenſe, till they come to be looked into with attention.

## CHAP. IV.

## Of Adam's title to ſovereignty, by donation, Gen. i. 28.

§. 21. HAVING at laſt got through the foregoing paſſage, where we have been ſo long detained, not by the force of arguments and oppoſition, but by the intricacy of the words, and the doubtfulneſs of the meaning; let us go on to his next argument, for Adam's ſovereignty. Our author tells us in the words of Mr. Selden, that "Adam by donation from "God, Gen. i. 28. was made the general lord of all things, not without "ſuch a private dominion to himſelf, as without his grant did exclude his "children. This determination of Mr. Selden, ſays our author, is conſo-"nant to the hiſtory of the Bible, and natural reaſon," Obſervations, 210. And in his Pref. to his Obſervations on Ariſtotle, he ſays thus, "The firſt "government in the world was monarchical in the father of all fleſh, Adam "being commanded to multiply and people the earth, and to ſubdue it, and "having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch "of the whole world: none of his poſterity had any right to poſſeſs any thing, "but by his grant or permiſſion, or by ſucceſſion from him: the earth, ſaith "the Pſalmiſt, hath he given to the children of men, which ſhew the title "comes from fatherhood."

§. 22. BEFORE I examine this argument, and the text on which it is founded, it is neceſſary to deſire the reader to obſerve, that our author, according to his uſual method, begins in one ſenſe, and concludes in another; he begins here with Adam's propriety, or private dominion, by donation; and his concluſion is, "which ſhew the title comes from fatherhood."

§. 23. BUT let us ſee the argument. The words of the text are theſe; "And God bleſſed them, and God ſaid unto them, be fruitful and multiply, "and repleniſh the earth and ſubdue it, and have dominion over the fiſh of "the ſea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that "moveth upon the earth, Gen i. 28." from whence our author concludes, "that Adam, having here dominion given him over all creatures, was there-"by the monarch of the whole world:" whereby muſt be meant, that either this grant of God gave Adam property, or as our author calls it, private dominion over the earth, and all inferior or irrational creatures, and ſo conſequently that he was thereby monarch; or 2dly, that it gave him rule and dominion over all earthly creatures whatſoever, and thereby over his children; and ſo he was monarch: for, as Mr. Selden has properly worded it, "Adam

“ was made general lord of all things,” one may very clearly underſtand him, that he means nothing to be granted to Adam here but property, and therefore he ſays not one word of Adam's monarchy. But our author ſays, “ Adam was hereby monarch of the world,” which, properly ſpeaking, ſignifies ſovereign ruler of all the men in the world; and ſo Adam, by this grant, muſt be conſtituted ſuch a ruler. If our author means otherwiſe, he might with much clearneſs have ſaid, that “ Adam was hereby proprietor of “ the whole world.” But he begs your pardon in that point: clear diſtinct ſpeaking not ſerving every where to his purpoſe, you muſt not expect it in him, as in Mr. Selden, or other ſuch writers.

§. 24. In oppoſition therefore to our author's doctrine, that “ Adam was “ monarch of the whole world,” founded on this place, I ſhall ſhew,

1. That by this grant, Gen. i. 28. God gave no immediate power to Adam over men, over his children, over thoſe of his own ſpecies; and ſo he was not made ruler, or monarch, by this charter.

2. That by this grant God gave him not private dominion over the inferior creatures, but right in common with all mankind; ſo neither was he monarch, upon the account of the property here given him.

§. 25. 1. That this donation, Gen. i. 28. gave Adam no power over men, will appear if we conſider the words of it: for ſince all poſitive grants convey no more than the expreſs words they are made in will carry, let us ſee which of them here will comprehend mankind, or Adam's poſterity; and thoſe, I imagine, if any, muſt be theſe, “ every living thing that moveth:” the words in Hebrew are, חיה הרמשת i. e. “ beſtiam reptantem,” of which words the ſcripture itſelf is the beſt interpreter: God having created the fiſhes and fowls the 5th day, the beginning of the 6th, he creates the irrational inhabitants of the dry land, which, ver. 24. are deſcribed in theſe words, “ Let “ the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind; cattle and creeping “ things, and beaſts of the earth, after his kind, and, ver. 2. and God made “ the beaſts of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every “ thing that creepeth on the earth after his kind:” here, in the creation of the brute inhabitants of the earth, he firſt ſpeaks of them all under one general name, of living creatures, and then afterwards divides them into three ranks, 1. Cattle, or ſuch creatures as were or might be tame, and ſo be the private poſſeſſion of particular men; 2. חיה which, ver. 24, 25. in our Bible, is tranſlated beaſts, and by the Septuagint θηρία, wild beaſts, and is the ſame word, that here in our text, ver. 28. where we have this great charter to Adam, is tranſlated living thing, and is alſo the ſame word uſed, Gen. ix. 2. where this grant is renewed to Noah, and there likewiſe tranſlated beaſt. 3. The third rank were the creeping animals, which ver. 24, 25. are comprized under the word, הרמשת, the ſame that is uſed here, ver. 28. and is tranſlated moving, but in the former verſes creeping, and by the Septuagint in all theſe places, ἑρπετά, or reptiles; from whence it appears, that the words which we tranſlate here in God's donation, ver. 28. “ living creatures “ moving,” are the ſame, which in the hiſtory of the creation, ver. 24, 25.

ſignify two ranks of terreſtrial creatures, viz. wild beaſts and reptiles, and are ſo underſtood by the Septuagint.

§. 26. WHEN God had made the irrational animals of the world, divided into three kinds, from the places of their habitation, viz. fiſhes of the ſea, fowls of the air, and living creatures of the earth, and theſe again into cattle, wild beaſts, and reptiles; he conſiders of making man, and the dominion he ſhould have over the terreſtrial world, ver. 26. and then he reckons up the inhabitants of theſe three kingdoms, but in the terreſtrial, leaves out the ſecond rank חיה or wild beaſts: but here, ver. 28. where he actually exerciſes this deſign, and gives him this dominion, the text mentions the fiſhes of the ſea, and fowls of the air, and the terreſtrial creatures in the words that ſignify the wild beaſts and reptiles, though tranſlated living thing that moveth, leaving out cattle. In both which places, though the word that ſignifies wild beaſts be omitted in one, and that which ſignifies cattle in the other, yet, ſince God certainly executed in one place, what he declares he deſigned in the other, we cannot but underſtand the ſame in both places, and have here only an account, how the terreſtrial irrational animals, which were already created and reckoned up at their creation, in three diſtinct ranks of cattle, wild beaſts, and reptiles, were here, ver. 28. actually put under the dominion of man, as they were deſigned, ver. 26. nor do theſe words contain in them the leaſt appearance of any thing that can be wreſted to ſignify God's giving to one man dominion over another, to Adam over his poſterity.

§. 27. AND this further appears from Gen. ix. 2. where God renewing this charter to Noah and his ſons, he gives them dominion over the fowls of the air, and the fiſhes of the ſea, and the terreſtrial creatures, expreſſed by דרמש חיה wild beaſts and reptiles, the ſame words that in the text before us, Gen. i. 28. are tranſlated every moving thing, that moveth on the earth, which by no means can comprehend man, the grant being made to Noah and his ſons, all the men then living, and not to one part of men over another: which is yet more evident from the very next words, ver. 3. where God gives every רמש "every moving thing," the very words uſed, ch. i. 28. to them for food. By all which it is plain that God's donation to Adam, ch. i. 28. and his deſignation, ver. 26. and his grant again to Noah and his ſons; refer to, and contain in them, neither more nor leſs than the works of the creation the fifth day, and the beginning of the ſixth, as they are ſet down from the 20th to 26th ver. incluſively of the 1ſt ch. and ſo comprehend all the ſpecies of irrational animals of the terraqueous globe; though all the words, whereby they are expreſſed in the hiſtory of their creation, are no where uſed in any of the following grants, but ſome of them omitted in one, and ſome in another. From whence I think it is paſt all doubt, that man cannot be comprehended in this grant, nor any dominion over thoſe of his own ſpecies be conveyed to Adam. All the terreſtrial irrational creatures are enumerated at their creation, ver. 25. under the names "beaſts of the earth, cattle and "creeping things;" but man, being not then created, was not contained under any of thoſe names; and therefore, whether we underſtand the Hebrew words right or no, they cannot be ſuppoſed to comprehend man, in the very ſame hiſtory, and the very next verſes following, eſpecially ſince that Hebrew word רמש which, if any in this donation to Adam, ch. i. 28. muſt comprehend man, is ſo plainly uſed in contradiſtinction to him, as Gen. vi. 20. vii. 14, 21, 23. Gen. viii. 17, 19. And if God made all mankind ſlaves to Adam and his heirs, by giving Adam dominion over "every living thing that moveth on the earth," ch. i. 28. as our author would have it; methinks Sir Robert ſhould have carried his monarchical power one ſtep higher, and ſatisfied the world, that princes might eat their ſubjects too, ſince God gave as full power to Noah and his heirs, ch. ix. 2. to eat "every living thing that moveth," as he did to Adam to have dominion over them; the Hebrew words in both places being the ſame.

§. 28. DAVID, who might be ſuppoſed to underſtand the donation of God in this text, and the right of kings too, as well as our author in his comment on this place, as the learned and judicious Ainſworth calls it, in the 8th Pſalm, finds here no ſuch charter of monarchical power; his words are, "Thou haſt made him, i. e. man, the ſon of man, a little lower than the angels; thou madeſt him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou haſt put all things under his feet, all ſheep and oxen, and the beaſts of the field, and fowls of the air, and fiſh of the ſea, and whatſoever paſſeth through the paths of the ſea." In which words, if any one can find out, that there is meant any monarchical power of one man over another, but only the dominion of the whole ſpecies of mankind, over the inferior ſpecies of creatures, he may for ought I know, deſerve to be one of Sir Robert's monarchs in habit, for the rareneſs of the diſcovery. And by this time, I hope it is evident, that he that gave "dominion over every living thing that moveth on the earth", gave Adam no monarchical power over thoſe of his own ſpecies, which will yet appear more fully in the next thing I am to ſhew.

§. 29. 2. WHATEVER God gave by the words of this grant, Gen. i. 28. it was not to Adam in particular, excluſive of all other men: whatever dominion he had thereby, it was not a private dominion, but a dominion in common with the reſt of mankind. That this donation was not made in particular to Adam, appears evidently from the words of the text, it being made to more than one; for it was ſpoken in the plural number, God bleſſed them, and ſaid unto them, have dominion. God ſays unto Adam and Eve, have dominion; thereby, ſays our author, "Adam was monarch of the world:" but the grant being to them, i. e. ſpoke to Eve alſo, as many interpreters think with reaſon, that theſe words were not ſpoken till Adam had his wife, muſt not ſhe thereby be lady, as well as he lord of the world? If it be ſaid, that Eve was ſubjected to Adam, it ſeems ſhe was not ſo ſubjected to him, as to hinder her dominion over the creatures, or property in them: for ſhall we ſay that God ever made a joint grant to two, and one only was to have the benefit of it?

§. 30. BUT perhaps it willl be ſaid, Eve was not made till afterward: grant it ſo, what advantage will our author get by it? The text will be only the more directly againſt him, and ſhew that God, in this donation, gave the world to mankind in common, and not to Adam in particular. The word them in the text muſt include the ſpecies of man, for it is certain them can by no means ſignify Adam alone. In the 26th verſe, where God declares his intention to give this dominion, it is plain he meant, that he would make a ſpecies of creatures, that ſhould have dominion over the other ſpecies of this terreſtrial globe: the words are, "And God ſaid, let us make man in our "image, after our likeneſs, and let them have dominion over the fiſh," &c. They then were to have dominion. Who? even thoſe who were to have the image of God, the individuals of that ſpecies of man, that he was going to make; for that them ſhould ſignify Adam ſingly, excluſive of the reſt that ſhould be in the world with him, is againſt both ſcripture and all reaſon: and it cannot poſſibly be made ſenſe, if man in the former part of the verſe do not ſignify the ſame with them in the latter; only man there, as is uſual, is taken for the ſpecies, and them the individuals of that ſpecies: and we have a reaſon in the very text. God makes him "in his own image, after his own like-"neſs;" makes him an intellectual creature, and ſo capable of dominion: for wherein ſoever elſe the image of God conſiſted, the intellectual nature was certainly a part of it, and belonged to the whole ſpecies, and enabled them to have dominion over the inferior creatures; and therefore David ſays in the 8th Pſalm above cited, "Thou haſt made him little lower than the angels, "thou haſt made him to have dominion." It is not of Adam king David ſpeaks here, for verſe 4. it is plain it is of man, and the ſon of man, of the ſpecies of mankind.

§. 31. And that this grant ſpoken to Adam was made to him, and the whole ſpecies of man, is clear from our author's own proof out of the Pſalmiſt, "The earth, ſaith the Pſalmiſt, hath he given to the children of men; which "ſhews the title comes from fatherhood." Theſe are Sir Robert's words in the preface before cited, and a ſtrange inference it is he makes; "God hath "given the earth to the children of men, ergo the title comes from father-"hood." It is pity the propriety of the Hebrew tongue had not uſed fathers of men, inſtead of children of men, to expreſs mankind: then indeed our author might have had the countenance of the ſound of the words, to have placed the title in the fatherhood. But to conclude, that the fatherhood had the right to the earth, becauſe God gave it to the children of men, is a way of arguing peculiar to our author: and a man muſt have a great mind to go contrary to the ſound as well as ſenſe of the words, before he could light on it. But the ſenſe is yet harder, and more remote from our author's purpoſe: for as it ſtands in his preface, it is to prove Adam's being monarch, and his reaſoning is thus, "God gave the earth to the children of men, ergo Adam "was monarch of the world." I defy any man to make a more pleaſant concluſion than this, which cannot be excuſed from the moſt obvious abſurdity, till it can be ſhewn, that by children of men, he who had no father, Adam alone is ſignified; but whatever our author does, the ſcripture ſpeaks not nonſenſe.

§. 32. To maintain this property and private dominion of Adam, our author labours in the following page to deſtroy the community granted to Noah and his ſons, in that parallel place, Gen. ix. 1, 2, 3. and he endeavours to do it two ways.

1. Sir Robert would perſuade us againſt the expreſs words of the ſcripture, that what was here granted to Noah, was not granted to his ſons in common with him. His words are, "As for the general community between Noah "and his ſons, which Mr. Selden will have to be granted to them, Gen. ix. "2. the text doth not warrant it." What warrant our author would have, when the plain expreſs words of ſcripture, not capable of another meaning, will not ſatisfy him, who pretends to build wholly on ſcripture, is not eaſy to imagine. The text ſays, "God bleſſed Noah and his ſons, and ſaid unto "them, i. e. as our author would have it, unto him: for, ſaith he, although "the ſons are there mentioned with Noah in the bleſſing, yet it may beſt "be underſtood, with a ſubordination or benediction in ſucceſſion," Obſervations, 211. That indeed is beſt, for our author to be underſtood, which beſt ſerves to his purpoſe; but that truly may beſt be underſtood by any body elſe, which beſt agrees with the plain conſtruction of the words, and ariſes from the obvious meaning of the place; and then with ſubordination and in ſucceſſion, will not be beſt underſtood, in a grant of God, where he himſelf put them not, nor mentions any ſuch limitation. But yet, our author has reaſons, why it may beſt be underſtood ſo. "The bleſſing, ſays he in the following words, might truly be fulfilled, if the ſons, either under or after "their father, enjoyed a private dominion," Obſervations, 211. which is to ſay, that a grant, whoſe expreſs words give a joint title in preſent (for the text ſays, into your hands they are delivered) may beſt be underſtood with a ſubordination or in ſucceſſion; becauſe it is poſſible, that in ſubordination, or in ſucceſſion, it may be enjoyed. Which is all one as to ſay, that a grant of any thing in preſent poſſeſſion may beſt be underſtood of reverſion; becauſe it is poſſible one may live to enjoy it in reverſion. If the grant be indeed to a father and to his ſons after him, who is ſo kind as to let his children enjoy it preſently in common with him, one may truly ſay, as to the event one will be as good as the other; but it can never be true, that what the expreſs words grant in poſſeſſion, and in common, may beſt be underſtood, to be in reverſion. The ſum of all his reaſoning amounts to this: God did not give to the ſons of Noah the world in common with their father, becauſe it was poſſible they might enjoy it under, or after him. A very good ſort of argument againſt an expreſs text of ſcripture: but God muſt not be believed, though he ſpeaks it himſelf, when he ſays he does any thing, which will not conſiſt with Sir Robert's hypotheſis.

§. 33. For it is plain, however he would exclude them, that part of this benediction, as he would have it in ſucceſſion, muſt needs be meant to the ſons, and not to Noah himſelf at all: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and repleniſh "the earth," ſays God in this bleſſing. This part of the benediction, as appears by the ſequel, concerned not Noah himſelf at all; for we read not of any children he had after the flood; and in the following chapter, where his poſterity is reckoned up, there is no mention of any; and ſo this benediction in ſucceſſion was not to take place till 350 years after: and to ſave our author's imaginary monarchy, the peopling of the world muſt be deferred 350 years; for this part of the benediction cannot be underſtood with ſubordination, unleſs our author will ſay, that they muſt aſk leave of their father Noah to lie with their wives. But in this one point our author is conſtant to himſelf in all his diſcourſes, he takes great care there ſhould be monarchs in the world, but very little that there ſhould be people; and indeed his way of government is not the way to people the world: for how much abſolute monarchy helps to fulfil this great and primary bleſſing of God Almighty, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and repleniſh the earth," which contains in it the improvement too of arts and ſciences, and the conveniencies of life; may be ſeen in thoſe large and rich countries which are happy under the Turkiſh government, where are not now to be found one third, nay in many, if not moſt parts of them, one thirtieth, perhaps I might ſay not one hundredth of the people, that were formerly, as will eaſily appear to any one, who will compare the accounts we have of it at this time, with ancient hiſtory. But this by the by.

§. 34. THE other parts of this benediction, or grant, are ſo expreſſed, that they muſt needs be underſtood to belong equally to them all; as much to Noah's ſons as to Noah himſelf, and not to his ſons with a ſubordination, or in ſuceſſion. "The fear of you, and the dread of you, ſays God, ſhall be "upon every beaſt," &c. Will any body but our author ſay, that the creatures feared and ſtood in awe of Noah only, and not of his ſons without his leave, or till after his death? And the following words, "into your hands "they are delivered," are they to be underſtood as our author ſays, if your father pleaſe, or they ſhall be delivered into your hands hereafter? If this be to argue from ſcripture, I know not what may not be proved by it; and I can ſcarce ſee how much this differs from that fiction and fancy, or how much a ſurer foundation it will prove, than the opinions of philoſophers and poets, which our author ſo much condemns in his preface.

§. 35. BUT our author goes on to prove, that "it may beſt be underſtood "with a ſubordination, or a benedicton in ſucceſſion; for, ſays he, it is not "probable that the private dominion which God gave to Adam, and by his "donation, aſſignation, or ceſſion to his children, was abrogated, and a "community of all things inſtituted between Noah and his ſons——Noah was "left the ſole heir of the world; why ſhould it be thought that God would "diſinherit him of his birth-right, and make him of all men in the world "the only tenant in common with his children?" Obſervations, 211.

§. 36. THE prejudices of our own ill-grounded opinions, however by us called probable, cannot authorize us to underſtand ſcripture contrary to the direct and plain meaning of the words. I grant, it is not probable, that Adam's private dominion was here abrogated: becauſe it is more than improbable, (for it will never be proved) that Adam had any ſuch private dominion: and ſince parallel places of ſcripture are moſt probable to make us know how they may be beſt underſtood, there needs but the comparing this bleſſing here to Noah and his ſons, after the flood, with that to Adam after the creation. Gen. i. 28. to aſſure any one that God gave Adam no ſuch private dominion. It is probable, I confeſs, that Noah ſhould have the ſame title, the ſame property and dominion after the flood, that Adam had before it: but ſince private dominion cannot conſiſt with the bleſſing and grant God gave to him and his ſons in common, it is a ſufficient reaſon to conclude, that Adam had none, eſpecially ſince in the donation made to him, there are no words that expreſs it, or do in the leaſt favour it; and then let my reader judge whether it may beſt be underſtood, when in the one place there is not one word for it, not to ſay what has been above proved, that the text itſelf proves the contrary; and in the other, the words and ſenſe are directly againſt it.

§. 37. BUT our author ſays, "Noah was the ſole heir of the world; why "ſhould it be thought that God would diſinherit him of his birth-right?" Heir, indeed, in England, ſignifies the eldeſt ſon, who is by the law of England to have all his father's land; but where God ever appointed any ſuch heir of the world, our author would have done well to have ſhewed us; and how God diſinherited him of his birth-right, or what harm was done him if God gave his ſons a right to make uſe of a part of the earth for ſupport of themſelves and families, when the whole was not only more than Noah himſelf, but infinitely more than they all could make uſe of, and the poſſeſſions of one could not at all prejudice, or, as to any uſe, ſtreighten that of the other.

§. 38. OUR author probably foreſeeing he might not be very ſucceſsful in perſuading people out of their ſenſes, and, ſay what he could, men would be apt to believe the plain words of ſcripture, and think, as they ſaw, that the grant was ſpoken to Noah and his ſons jointly; he endeavours to inſinuate, as if this grant to Noah conveyed no property, no dominion; becauſe, "ſubduing the earth and dominion over the creatures are therein omitted, "nor the earth once named." And therefore, ſays he, "there is a conſiderable "difference between theſe two texts; the firſt bleſſing gave Adam a dominion "over the earth and all creatures; the latter allows Noah liberty to uſe the "living creatures for food: here is no alteration or diminiſhing of his title "to a property of all things, but an enlargement only of his commons," Obſervations, 211. So that in our author's ſenſe, all that was ſaid here to Noah and his ſons, gave them no dominion, no property, but only enlarged the commons; their commons, I ſhould ſay, ſince God ſays, "to you are "they given," though our author ſays his; for as for Noah's ſons, they, it ſeems, by Sir Robert's appointment, during their father's life-time, were to keep faſting days.

§. 39. ANY one but our author would be mightily ſuſpected to be blinded with prejudice, that in all this bleſſing to Noah and his ſons, could ſee nothing but only an enlargement of commons: for as to dominion, which our author thinks omitted, "the fear of you, and the dread of you, ſays God, ſhall be "upon every beaſt," which I ſuppoſe expreſſes the dominion, or ſuperiority was deſigned man over the living creatures, as fully as may be; for in that fear and dread ſeems chiefly to conſiſt what was given to Adam over the inferior animals, who, as abſolute a monarch as he was, could not make bold with a lark or rabbet to ſatisfy his hunger, and had the herbs but in common with the beaſts, as is plain from Gen. i. 2, 9, and 30. In the next place, it is manifeſt that in this bleſſing to Noah and his ſons, property is

not

not only given in clear words, but in a larger extent than it was to Adam. "Into your hands they are given," ſays God to Noah and his ſons; which words, if they give not property, nay, property in poſſeſſion, it will be hard to find words that can; ſince there is not a way to expreſs a man's being poſſeſſed of any thing more natural, nor more certain, than to ſay, it is delivered into his hands. And ver. 3. to ſhew, that they had then given them the utmoſt property man is capable of, which is to have a right to deſtroy any thing by uſing it; "Every moving thing that liveth, ſaith God, ſhall "be meat for you;" which was not allowed to Adam in his charter. This our author calls, "a liberty of uſing them for food, and only an enlargement "of commons, but no alteration of property," Obſervations, 211. What other property man can have in the creatures, but the "liberty of uſing them," is hard to be underſtood: ſo that if the firſt bleſſing, as our author ſays, gave Adam "dominion over the creatures," and the bleſſing to Noah and his ſons, gave them "ſuch a liberty to uſe them," as Adam had not; it muſt needs give them ſomething that Adam with all his ſovereignty wanted, ſomething that one would be apt to take for a greater property; for certainly he has no abſolute dominion over even the brutal part of the creatures; and the property he has in them is very narrow and ſcanty, who cannot make that uſe of them, which is permitted to another. Should any one who is abſolute lord of a country, have bidden our author ſubdue the earth, and given him dominion over the creatures in it, but not have permitted him to have taken a kid or a lamb out of the flock, to ſatisfy his hunger, I gueſs, he would ſcarce have thought himſelf lord or proprietor of that land, or the cattle on it; but would have found the difference between "having dominion," which a ſhepherd may have, and having full property as an owner. So that, had it been his own caſe, Sir Robert, I believe, would have thought here was an alteration, nay, an enlarging of property; and that Noah and his children had by this grant, not only property given them, but ſuch a property given them in the creatures, as Adam had not: for however, in reſpect of one another, men may be allowed to have propriety in their diſtinct portions of the creatures; yet in reſpect of God the maker of heaven and earth, who is ſole lord and proprietor of the whole world, man's propriety in the creatures is nothing but that "liberty to uſe them," which God has permitted; and ſo man's property may be altered and enlarged, as we ſee it here, after the flood, when other uſes of them are allowed, which before were not. From all which I ſuppoſe it is clear, that neither Adam, nor Noah, had any "private "dominion," any property in the creatures, excluſive of his poſterity, as they ſhould ſucceſſively grow up into need of them, and come to be able to make uſe of them.

§. 40. Thus we have examined our author's argument for Adam's monarchy, founded on the bleſſing pronounced, Gen. i. 28. Wherein I think it is impoſſible for any ſober reader, to find any other but the ſetting of mankind above the other kinds of creatures, in this habitable earth of ours. It is nothing but the giving to man, the whole ſpecies of man, as the chief inhabitant, who is the image of his Maker, the dominion over the other creatures.

tures. This lies ſo obvious in the plain words, that any one, but our author, would have thought it neceſſary to have ſhewn, how theſe words, that ſeemed to ſay the quite contrary, gave "Adam monarchical abſolute power" over other men, or the ſole property in all the creatures; and methinks in a buſineſs of this moment, and that whereon he builds all that follows, he ſhould have done ſomething more than barely cite words, which apparently make againſt him; for I confeſs, I cannot ſee any thing in them, tending to Adam's monarchy, or private dominion, but quite the contrary. And I the leſs deplore the dulneſs of my apprehenſion herein, ſince I find the apoſtle ſeems to have as little notion of any ſuch "private dominion of Adam" as I, when he ſays, "God gives us all things richly to enjoy;" which he could not do, if it were all given away already, to monarch Adam, and the monarchs his heirs and ſucceſſors. To conclude, this text is ſo far from proving Adam ſole proprietor, that, on the contrary, it is a confirmation of the original community of all things amongſt the ſons of men, which appearing from this donation of God, as well as other places of ſcripture, the ſovereignty of Adam, built upon his "private dominion," muſt fall, not having any foundation to ſupport it.

§. 41. But yet, if after all, any one will needs have it ſo, that by this donation of God, Adam was made ſole proprietor of the whole earth, what will this be to his ſovereignty? and how will it appear, that propriety in land gives a man power over the life of another? or how will the poſſeſſion even of the whole earth, give any one a ſovereign arbitrary authority over the perſons of men? The moſt ſpecious thing to be ſaid, is, that he that is proprietor of the whole world, may deny all the reſt of mankind food, and ſo at his pleaſure ſtarve them, if they will not acknowledge his ſovereignty, and obey his will. If this were true, it would be a good argument to prove, that there never was any ſuch property, that God never gave any ſuch private dominion; ſince it is more reaſonable to think, that God, who bid mankind increaſe and multiply, ſhould rather himſelf give them all a right to make uſe of the food and raiment, and other conveniencies of life, the materials whereof he had ſo plentifully provided for them; than to make them depend upon the will of a man for their ſubſiſtence, who ſhould have power to deſtroy them all when he pleaſed, and who, being no better than other men, was in ſucceſſion likelier, by want and the dependence of a ſcanty fortune, to tie them to hard ſervice, than by liberal allowance of the conveniencies of life to promote the great deſign of God, "increaſe and multiply:" he that doubts this, let him look into the abſolute monarchies of the world, and ſee what becomes of the conveniencies of life, and the multitudes of people.

§. 42. But we know God hath not left one man ſo to the mercy of another, that he may ſtarve him if he pleaſe: God the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his children ſuch a property in his peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right to the ſurpluſage of his goods; ſo that it cannot juſtly be denied him, when his preſſing wants call for it: and therefore no man could ever have a juſt power over the life of another by right of property in land or poſſeſſions; ſince it would always be a ſin, in any man of eſtate, to let his brother periſh for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As juſtice gives every man a title to the product of his honeſt induſtry, and the fair acquiſitions of his anceſtors deſcended to him; ſo charity gives every man a title to ſo much out of another's plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to ſubſiſt otherwiſe: and a man can no more juſtly make uſe of another's neceſſity, to force him to become his vaſſal, by with-holding that relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has more ſtrength can ſeize upon a weaker, maſter him to his obedience, and with a dagger at his throat offer him death or ſlavery.

§. 43. Should any one make ſo perverſe an uſe of God's bleſſings poured on him with a liberal hand; ſhould any one be cruel and uncharitable to that extremity, yet all this would not prove that propriety in land, even in this caſe, gave any authority over the perſons of men, but only that compact might; ſince the authority of the rich proprietor, and the ſubjection of the needy beggar, began not from the poſſeſſion of the lord, but the conſent of the poor man, who preferred being his ſubject to ſtarving. And the man he thus ſubmits to, can pretend to no more power over him, than he has conſented to, upon compact. Upon this ground a man's having his ſtores filled in a time of ſcarcity, having money in his pocket, being in a veſſel at ſea, being able to ſwim, &c. may as well be the foundation of rule and dominion, as being poſſeſſor of all the land in the world: any of theſe being ſufficient to enable me to ſave a man's life, who would periſh, if ſuch aſſiſtance were denied him; and any thing, by this rule, that may be an occaſion of working upon another's neceſſity, to ſave his life, or any thing dear to him, at the rate of his freedom, may be made a foundation of ſovereignty, as well as property. From all which it is clear, that though God ſhould have given Adam private dominion, yet that private dominion could give him no ſovereignty: but we have already ſufficiently proved, that God gave him no "private dominion."

## CHAP. V.

## Of Adam's title to ſovereignty, by the ſubjection of Eve.

§. 44. THE next place of ſcripture we find our author builds his monarchy of Adam on, is Gen. iii. 26. "And thy deſire ſhall be "to thy huſband, and he ſhall rule over thee. Here we have (ſays he) the "original grant of government," from whence he concludes, in the following part of the page, Obſervations, 244. "That the ſupreme power is ſettled "in the fatherhood, and limited to one kind of government, that is, to monarchy." For let his premiſes be what they will, this is always the concluſion; let rule, in any text, be but once named, and preſently abſolute monarchy is by divine right eſtabliſhed. If any one will but carefully read our author's own reaſoning from theſe words, Obſervations, 244. and conſider, among other things, "the line and poſterity of Adam," as he there brings them in, he will find ſome difficulty to make ſenſe of what he ſays; but we will allow this at preſent to his peculiar way of writing, and conſider the force of the text in hand. The words are the curſe of God upon the woman, for having been the firſt and forwardeſt in the diſobedience; and if we will conſider the occaſion of what God ſays here to our firſt parents, that he was denouncing judgment, and declaring his wrath againſt them both, for their diſobedience, we cannot ſuppoſe that this was the time, wherein God was granting Adam prerogatives and privileges, inveſting him with dignity and authority, elevating him to dominion and monarchy: for though, as a helper in the temptation, Eve was laid below him, and ſo he had accidentally a ſuperiority over her, for her greater puniſhment; yet he too had his ſhare in the fall, as well as the ſin, and was laid lower, as may be ſeen in the following verſes: and it would be hard to imagine, that God, in the ſame breath, ſhould make him univerſal monarch over all mankind, and a day-labourer for his life; turn him out of "paradiſe to till the ground," ver. 23. and at the ſame time advance him to a throne, and all the privileges and eaſe of abſolute power.

§. 45. This was not a time, when Adam could expect any favours, any grant of privileges, from his offended Maker. If this be "the original grant "of government," as our author tells us, and Adam was now made monarch, whatever Sir Robert would have him, it is plain, God made him but a very poor monarch, ſuch an one, as our author himſelf would have counted it no great privilege to be. God ſets him to work for his living, and ſeems rather to give him a ſpade into his hand, to ſubdue the earth, than a ſceptre to rule over its inhabitants. "In the ſweat of thy face thou ſhalt eat thy bread," ſays God to him, ver. 19. This was unavoidable, may it perhaps be anſwered, becauſe he was yet without ſubjects, and had no body to work for him; but afterwards, living as he did above 900 years, he might have people enough, whom he might command to work for him; no, ſays God, not only whilſt thou art without other help, ſave thy wife, but as long as thou liveſt, ſhalt thou live by thy labour, "In the ſweat of thy face, ſhalt thou eat thy bread, "till thou return unto the ground, for out of it waſt thou taken, for duſt "thou art, and unto duſt ſhalt thou return," ver 19. It will perhaps be anſwered again in favour of our author, that theſe words are not ſpoken perſonally to Adam, but in him, as their repreſentative, to all mankind, this being a curſe upon mankind, becauſe of the fall.

§. 46. God, I believe, ſpeaks differently from men, becauſe he ſpeaks with more truth, more certainty: but when he vouchſafes to ſpeak to men, I do not think he ſpeaks differently from them, in croſſing the rules of language in uſe amongſt them: this would not be to condeſcend to their capacities, when he humbles himſelf to ſpeak to them, but to loſe his deſign in ſpeaking what, thus ſpoken, they could not underſtand. And yet thus muſt we think of God, if the interpretations of ſcripture, neceſſary to maintain our author's doctrine, muſt be received for good: for by the ordinary rules of language, it will be very hard to underſtand what God ſays, if what he ſpeaks here, in the ſingular number, to Adam, muſt be underſtood to be ſpoken to all mankind; and what he ſays in the plural number, Gen. i. 26, and 28. muſt be underſtood of Adam alone, excluſive of all others; and what he ſays to Noah and his ſons jointly, muſt be underſtood to be meant to Noah alone, Gen. ix.

§. 47. Farther it is to be noted, that theſe words here of Gen. iii. 16. which our author calls "the original grant of government," were not ſpoken to Adam, neither indeed was there any grant in them made to Adam, but a puniſhment laid upon Eve: and if we will take them as they were directed in particular to her, or in her, as their repreſentative, to all other women, they will at moſt concern the female ſex only, and import no more, but that ſubjection they ſhould ordinarily be in to their huſbands: but there is here no more law to oblige a woman to ſuch a ſubjection, if the circumſtances either of her condition, or contract with her huſband, ſhould exempt her from it, than there is, that ſhe ſhould bring forth her children in ſorrow and pain, if there could be found a remedy for it, which is alſo a part of the ſame curſe upon her: for the whole verſe runs thus, "Unto the woman he "ſaid, I will greatly multiply thy ſorrow and thy conception; in ſorrow thou "ſhalt bring forth children, and thy deſire ſhall be to thy huſband, and he "ſhall rule over thee." It would, I think, have been a hard matter for any body, but our author, to have found out a grant of "monarchical government "to Adam," in theſe words, which were neither ſpoke to, nor of him: neither will any one, I ſuppoſe, by theſe words, think the weaker ſex, as by a law, ſo ſubjected to the curſe contained in them, that it is their duty not to endeavour to avoid it. And will any one ſay, that Eve, or any other woman, ſinned, if ſhe were brought to bed without thoſe multiplied pains God threatens her here with? or that either of our queens, Mary or Elizabeth, had they married any of their ſubjects, had been by this text put into a political ſubjection to him? or that he thereby ſhould have had monarchical rule over her? God, in this text, gives not, that I ſee, any authority to Adam over Eve, or to men over their wives, but only foretels what ſhould be the woman's lot; how by his providence he would order it ſo, that ſhe ſhould be ſubject to her huſband, as we ſee that generally the laws of mankind and cuſtoms of nations have ordered it ſo: and there is, I grant, a foundation in nature for it.

§. 48. Thus when God ſays of Jacob and Eſau, "that the elder ſhould "ſerve the younger," Gen. xxv. 23. no body ſuppoſes that God hereby made Jacob Eſau's ſovereign, but foretold what ſhould de facto come to paſs.

But if theſe words here ſpoke to Eve muſt needs be underſtood as a law to bind her and all other women to ſubjection, it can be no other ſubjection than what every wife owes her huſband; and then if this be the "original "grant of government and the foundation of monarchical power," there will be as many monarchs as there are huſbands: if therefore theſe words give any power to Adam, it can be only a conjugal power, not political; the power that every huſband hath to order the things of private concernment in his family, as proprietor of the goods and land there, and to have his will take place before that of his wife in all things of their common concernment; but not a political power of life and death over her, much leſs over any body elſe.

§. 49. THIS I am ſure: if our author will have this text to be a “grant, “the original grant of government,” political government, he ought to have proved it by ſome better arguments than by barely ſaying, that “thy deſire “ſhall be unto thy huſband,” was a law whereby Eve, and “all that ſhould “come of her,” were ſubjected to the abſolute monarchical power of Adam and his heirs. “Thy deſire ſhall be to thy huſband,” is too doubtful an expreſſion, of whoſe ſignification interpreters are not agreed, to build ſo confidently on, and in a matter of ſuch moment, and ſo great and general concernment: but our author, according to his way of writing, having once named the text, concludes preſently without any more ado, that the meaning is as he would have it. Let the words rule and ſubject be but found in the text or margin, and it immediately ſignifies the duty of a ſubject to his prince; the relation is changed, and though God ſays huſband, Sir Robert will have it king; Adam has preſently abſolute monarchical power over Eve, and not only over Eve, but “all that ſhould come of her,” though the ſcripture ſays not a word of it, nor our author a word to prove it. But Adam muſt for all that be an abſolute monarch, and ſo down to the end of the chapter. And here I leave my reader to conſider, whether my bare ſaying, without offering any reaſons to evince it, that this text gave not Adam that abſolute monarchical power, our author ſuppoſes, be not as ſufficient to deſtroy that power, as his bare aſſertion is to eſtabliſh it, ſince the text mentions neither prince nor people, ſpeaks nothing of abſolute or monarchical power, but the ſubjection of Eve to Adam, a wife to her huſband. And he that would trace our author ſo all through, would make a ſhort and ſufficient anſwer to the greateſt part of the grounds he proceeds on, and abundantly confute them by barely denying; it being a ſufficient anſwer to aſſertions without proof, to deny them without giving a reaſon. And therefore ſhould I have ſaid nothing but barely denied, that by this text “the ſupreme power was ſettled and founded by God “himſelf, in the fatherhood, limited to monarchy, and that to Adam's per- “ſon and heirs,” all which our author notably concludes from theſe words, as may be ſeen in the ſame page, Obſervations, 244. it had been a ſufficient anſwer: ſhould I have deſired any ſober man only to have read the text, and conſidered to whom, and on what occaſion it was ſpoken, he would no doubt have wondered how our author found out monarchical abſolute power in it, had he not had an exceeding good faculty to find it himſelf, where he could not ſhew it others. And thus we have examined the two places of ſcripture, all that I remember our author brings to prove Adam's ſovereignty, that ſupremacy, which he ſays, “it was God's ordinance ſhould be unlimited in Adam, “and as large as all the acts of his will,” Obſervations, 254. viz. Gen. i. 28. and Gen. iii. 16. one whereof ſignifies only the ſubjection of the inferior ranks of creatures to mankind, and the other the ſubjection that is due from a wife to her huſband; both far enough from that which ſubjects owe the governors of political ſocieties.

# CHAP. VI.

## Of Adam's title to ſovereignty by fatherhood.

§. 50. THERE is one thing more, and then I think I have given you all that our author brings for proof of Adam's ſovereignty, and that is a ſuppoſition of a natural right of dominion over his children, by being their father: and this title of fatherhood he is ſo pleaſed with, that you will find it brought in almoſt in every page; particularly he ſays, "not only Adam, "but the ſucceeding patriarchs had by right of fatherood, royal authority over "their children," p. 12. And in the ſame page, "this ſubjection of chil-"dren being the fountain of all regal authority," &c. This being, as one would think by his ſo frequent mentioning it, the main baſis of all his frame, we may well expect clear and evident reaſon for it, ſince he lays it down as a poſition neceſſary to his purpoſe, that "every man that is born is ſo far from "being free, that by his very birth he becomes a ſubject of him that begets "him," Obſervations, 156. So that Adam being the only man created, and all ever ſince being begotten, no body has been born free. If we aſk how Adam comes by this power over his children, he tells us here it is by begetting them: and ſo again, Obſervations, 223. "This natural dominion of "Adam, ſays he, may be proved out of Grotius himſelf, who teacheth, "that generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos." And indeed the act of begetting being that which makes a man a father, his right of a father over his children can naturally ariſe from nothing elſe.

§. 51. Grotius tells us not here how far this "jus in liberos," this power of parents over their children extends; but our author, always very clear in the point, aſſures us, it is ſupreme power, and like that of abſolute monarchs over their ſlaves, abſolute power of life and death. He that ſhould demand of him, how, or for what reaſon it is, that begetting a child gives the father ſuch an abſolute power over him, will find him anſwer nothing: we are to take his word for this, as well as ſeveral other things, and by that the laws of nature and the conſtitutions of government muſt ſtand or fall. Had he been an abſolute monarch, this way of talking might have ſuited well enough; "pro ratione voluntas," might have been of force in his mouth; but in the way of proof or argument is very unbecoming, and will little advantage his plea for abſolute monarchy. Sir Robert has too much leſſened a ſubject's authority to leave himſelf the hopes of eſtabliſhing any thing by his bare ſaying it; one ſlave's opinion without proof, is not of weight enough to diſpoſe of the liberty and fortunes of all mankind. If all men are not, as I think they are, naturally equal, I am ſure all ſlaves are; and then I may without preſumption oppoſe my ſingle opinion to his; and be confident that my ſaying, "that begetting of children makes "them not ſlaves to their fathers," as certainly ſets all mankind free, as his affirming the contrary makes them all ſlaves. But that this poſition, which is the foundation of all their doctrine, who would have monarchy to be “ jure divino,” may have all fair play, let us hear what reaſons others give for it, ſince our author offers none.

§. 52. THE argument, I have heard others make uſe of, to prove that fathers, by begetting them, come by an abſolute power of their children, is this; that “ fathers have a power over the lives of their children, becauſe “ they give them life and being,” which is the only proof it is capable of: ſince there can be no reaſon, why naturally one man ſhould have any claim or pretence of right over that in another, which was never his, which he beſtowed not, but was received from the bounty of another. . 1. I anſwer, that every one who gives another any thing, has not always thereby a right to take it away again. But, 2. They who ſay the father gives life to children, are ſo dazzled with the thoughts of monarchy, that they do not, as they ought, remember God, who is “ the author and giver of life: it is in him “ alone we live, move, and have our being.” How can he be thought to give life to another, that knows not wherein his own life conſiſts? Philoſophers are at a loſs about it after their moſt diligent enquiries; and anatomiſts, after their whole lives and ſtudies ſpent in diſſections, and diligent examining the bodies of men, confeſs their ignorance in the ſtructure and uſe of many parts of man's body, and in that operation wherein life conſiſts in the whole. And doth the rude ploughman, or the more ignorant voluptuary, frame or faſhion ſuch an admirable engine as this is, and then put life and ſenſe into it? Can any man ſay, he formed the parts that are neceſſary to the life of his child? or can he ſuppoſe himſelf to give the life, and yet not know what ſubject is fit to receive it, nor what actions or organs are neceſſary for its reception or preſervation?

§. 53. To give life to that which has yet no being, is to frame and make a living creature, faſhion the parts, and mould and ſuit them to their uſes; and having proportioned and fitted them together, to put into them a living ſoul. He that could do this, might indeed have ſome pretence to deſtroy his own workmanſhip. But is there any one ſo bold, that dares thus far arrogate to himſelf the incomprehenſible works of the Almighty? Who alone did at firſt, and continues ſtill to make a living ſoul, he alone can breathe in the breath of life. If any one thinks himſelf an artiſt at this, let him number up the parts of his child's body which he hath made, tell me their uſes and operations, and when the living and rational ſoul began to inhabit this curious ſtructure, when ſenſe began, and how this engine, which he has framed, thinks and reaſons: if he made it, let him, when it is out of order, mend it, at leaſt tell wherein the defects lie. “ Shall he that made the eye not ſee?” ſays the Pſalmiſt, Pſalm xciv. 9. See theſe men's vanities! the ſtructure of that one part is ſufficient to convince us of an all-wiſe Contriver, and he has ſo viſible a claim to us as his workmanſhip, that one of the ordinary appellations of God in ſcripture is, “ God our maker,” and “ the Lord our maker.” And therefore though our author, for the magnifying his fatherhood, be pleaſed to ſay, Obſervations, 159. “ That even the power which God himſelf exerciſeth “ over mankind is by right of fatherhood,” yet this fatherhood is ſuch an one as utterly excludes all pretence of title in earthly parents; for he is king, becauſe he is indeed maker of us all, which no parents can pretend to be of their children.

§. 54. BUT had men ſkill and power to make their children, it is not ſo ſlight a piece of workmanſhip, that it can be imagined, they could make them without deſigning it. What father of a thouſand, when he begets a child, thinks farther than the ſatisfying his preſent appetite? God in his infinite wiſdom has put ſtrong deſires of copulation into the conſtitution of men, thereby to continue the race of mankind, which he doth moſt commonly without the intention, and often againſt the conſent and will of the begetter. And indeed thoſe who deſire and deſign children, are but the occaſions of their being, and when they deſign and wiſh to beget them, do little more towards their making, than Deucalion and his wife in the fable did towards the making of mankind, by throwing pebbles over their heads.

§. 55. BUT grant that the parents made their children, gave them life and being, and that hence there followed an abſolute power. This would give the father but a joint dominion with the mother over them: for no body can deny but that the woman hath an equal ſhare, if not the greater, as nouriſhing the child a long time in her own body out of her own ſubſtance: there it is faſhioned, and from her it receives the materials and principles of its conſtitution: and it is ſo hard to imagine the rational ſoul ſhould preſently inhabit the yet unformed embrio, as ſoon as the father has done his part in the act of generation, that if it muſt be ſuppoſed to derive any thing from the parents, it muſt certainly owe moſt to the mother. But be that as it will, the mother cannot be denied an equal ſhare in begetting of the child, and ſo the abſolute authority of the father will not ariſe from hence. Our author indeed is of another mind; for he ſays, "we know that God at the "creation gave the ſovereignty to the man over the woman, as being the "nobler and principal agent in generation," Obſervations, 172. I remember not this in my Bible; and when the place is brought where God at the creation gave the ſovereignty to man over the woman, and that for this reaſon, becauſe "he is the nobler and principal agent in generation," it will be time enough to conſider, and anſwer it. But it is no new thing for our author to tell us his own fancies for certain and divine truths, though there be often a great deal of difference between his and divine revelations; for God in the ſcripture ſays, "his father and his mother that begot him."

§. 56. THEY who alledge the practice of mankind, for expoſing or ſelling their children, as a proof of their power over them, are with Sir Robert happy arguers; and cannot but recommend their opinion, by founding it on the moſt ſhameful action, and moſt unnatural murder, human nature is capable of. The dens of lions and nurſeries of wolves know no ſuch cruelty as this: theſe ſavage inhabitants of the deſert obey God and nature in being tender and careful of their offspring: they will hunt, watch, fight, and almoſt ſtarve for the preſervation of their young; never part with them; never forſake them, till they are able to ſhift for themſelves. And is it the privilege of man alone to act more contrary to nature than the wild and moſt untamed part of the creation? doth God forbid us under the ſevereſt penalty, that of death, to take away the life of any man, a ſtranger, and upon provocation? and does he permit us to deſtroy thoſe, he has given us the charge and care of; and by the dictates of nature and reaſon, as well as his revealed command, requires us to preſerve? He has in all the parts of the creation taken a peculiar care to propagate and continue the ſeveral ſpecies of creatures, and makes the individuals act ſo ſtrongly to this end, that they ſometimes neglect their own private good for it, and ſeem to forget that general rule, which nature teaches all things, of ſelf-preſervation; and the preſervation of their young, as the ſtrongeſt principle in them, over-rules the conſtitution of their particular natures. Thus we ſee, when their young ſtand in need of it, the timorous become valiant, the fierce and ſavage kind, and the ravenous tender and liberal.

§. 57. But if the example of what hath been done, be the rule of what ought to be, hiſtory would have furniſhed our author with inſtances of this abſolute fatherly power in its height and perfection, and he might have ſhewed us in Peru, people that begot children on purpoſe to fatten and eat them. The ſtory is ſo remarkable, that I cannot but ſet it down in the author's words. "In ſome provinces, ſays he, they were ſo liquoriſh after man's fleſh, that "they would not have the patience to ſtay till the breath was out of the body, "but would ſuck the blood as it ran from the wounds of the dying man; "they had publick ſhambles of man's fleſh, and their madneſs herein was "to that degree that they ſpared not their own children, which they had "begot on ſtrangers taken in war: for they made their captives their miſtreſſes, "and choicely nouriſhed the children they had by them, till about thirteen "years old they butchered and eat them; and they ſerved the mothers after "the ſame faſhion, when they grew paſt child-bearing, and ceaſed to bring "them any more roaſters." Garcilaſſo de la Vega Hiſt. des Yncas de Peru, l. i. c. 12.

§. 58. Thus far can the buſy mind of man carry him to a brutality below the level of beaſts, when he quits his reaſon, which places him almoſt equal to angels. Nor can it be otherwiſe in a creature, whoſe thoughts are more than the ſands, and wider than the ocean, where fancy and paſſion muſt needs run him into ſtrange courſes, if reaſon, which is his only ſtar and compaſs, be not that he ſteers by. The imagination is always reſtleſs, and ſuggeſts variety of thoughts, and the will, reaſon being laid aſide, is ready for every extravagant project; and in this ſtate, he that goes fartheſt out of the way, is thought fitteſt to lead, and is ſure of moſt followers: and when faſhion hath once eſtabliſhed what folly or craft began, cuſtom makes it ſacred, and it will be thought impudence, or madneſs, to contradict or queſtion it. He that will impartially ſurvey the nations of the world, will find ſo much of their religions, governments and manners, brought in and continued amongſt them by theſe means, that he will have but little reverence for the practices which are in uſe and credit amongſt men; and will have reaſon to think, that the woods and foreſts, where the irrational untaught inhabitants keep right by following nature, are fitter to give us rules, than cities and palaces, where thoſe that call themſelves civil and rational, go out of their way, by the authority of example. If precedents are ſufficient to eſtabliſh a rule in this caſe, our author might have found in holy writ children ſacrificed by their parents, and this amongſt the people of God themſelves: the Pſalmiſt tells us, Pſal. cvi. 38. "They ſhed innocent blood, even the blood of their ſons and of "their daughters, whom they ſacrificed unto the idols of Canaan." But God judged not of this by our author's rule, nor allowed of the authority of practice againſt his righteous law; but as it follows there, "the land was polluted "with blood; therefore was the wrath of the Lord kindled againſt his people, "inſomuch that he abhorred his own inheritance." The killing of their children, though it were faſhionable, was charged on them as innocent blood, and ſo had in the account of God the guilt of murder, as the offering them to idols had the guilt of idolatry.

§. 59. Be it then, as Sir Robert ſays, that anciently it was uſual for men "to ſell and caſtrate their children," Obſervations, 155. Let it be, that they expoſed them; add to it, if you pleaſe, for this is ſtill greater power, that they begat them for their tables, to fat and eat them: if this proves a right to do ſo, we may, by the ſame argument, juſtify adultery, inceſt and ſodomy, for there are examples of theſe too, both ancient and modern; ſins, which I ſuppoſe have their principal aggravation from this, that they croſs the main intention of nature, which willeth the increaſe of mankind, and the continuation of the ſpecies in the higheſt perfection, and the diſtinction of families, with the ſecurity of the marriage-bed, as neceſſary thereunto.

§. 60. In confirmation of this natural authority of the father, our author brings a lame proof from the poſitive command of God in ſcripture: his words are, "To confirm the natural right of regal power, we find in the decalogue, "that the law which enjoins obedience to kings, is delivered in the terms, "Honour thy father, p. 23. Whereas many confeſs, that government only "in the abſtract, is the ordinance of God, they are not able to prove any "ſuch ordinance in the ſcripture, but only in the fatherly power; and there-"fore we find the commandment, that enjoins obedience to ſuperiors, given "in the terms, Honour thy father; ſo that not only the power and right of "government, but the form of the power governing, and the perſon having "the power, are all the ordinances of God. The firſt father had not only "ſimply power, but power monarchical, as he was father immediately from "God," Obſervations, 254. To the ſame purpoſe, the ſame law is cited by our author in ſeveral other places, and juſt after the ſame faſhion; that is, "and mother," as apochryphal words, are always left out; a great argument of our author's ingenuity, and the goodneſs of his cauſe, which required in its defender zeal to a degree of warmth, able to warp the ſacred rule of the word of God, to make it comply with his preſent occaſion; a way of proceeding not unuſual to thoſe who embrace not truths becauſe reaſon and revelation offer them, but eſpouſe tenets and parties for ends different from truth, and then reſolve at any rate to defend them; and ſo do with the words and ſenſe of authors, they would fit to their purpoſe, juſt as Procruſtes did with his gueſts, lop or ſtretch them, as may beſt fit them to the ſize of their notions: and they always prove like thoſe ſo ſerved, deformed, lame, and uſeleſs.

§. 61. For had our author ſet down this command without garbling, as God gave it, and joined mother to father, every reader would have ſeen, that it had made directly againſt him; and that it was ſo far from eſtabliſhing the "monarchical power of the father," that it ſet up the mother equal with him, and enjoined nothing but was due in common, to both father and mother: for that is the conſtant tenor of the ſcripture, "Honour thy father and thy "mother, Exod. xx. He that ſmiteth his father or mother, ſhall ſurely be "put to death, xxi. 15. He that curſeth his father or mother, ſhall ſurely "be put to death, ver. 17. repeated Lev. xx. 9. and by our Saviour, Matt. "xv. 4. Ye ſhall fear every man his mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3. "If any man have a rebellious ſon, which will not obey the voice of his "father or the voice of his mother; then ſhall his father and his mother lay "hold on him, and ſay, This our ſon is ſtubborn and rebellious, he will not "obey our voice, Deut. xxi. 18, 19, 20, 21. Curſed be he that ſetteth "light by his father or his mother, xxviii. 16. My ſon hear the inſtructions "of thy father, and forſake not the law of thy mother," are the words of Solomon, a king who was not ignorant of what belonged to him as a father or a king; and yet he joins father and mother together, in all the inſtructions he gives children quite through his book of Proverbs. "Woe unto him, that "ſaith unto his father, What begetteſt thou, or to the woman, What "haſt thou brought forth? Iſa. xi. ver. 10. In thee have they ſet light "by father or mother, Ezek. xxviii. 2. And it ſhall come to paſs, that "when any ſhall yet propheſy, then his father and his mother that "begat him, ſhall ſay unto him, Thou ſhalt not live, and his father and "his mother that begat him, ſhall thruſt him through when he pro"pheſieth," Zech. xiii. 3. Here not the father only, but the father and mother jointly, had power in this caſe of life and death. Thus ran the law of the Old Teſtament, and in the New they are likewiſe joined, in the obedience of their children, Eph. vi. 1. The rule is, "Children, "obey your parents;" and I do not remember, that I any where read, "Children, obey your father," and no more: the ſcripture joins mother too in that homage, which is due from children; and had there been any text, where the honour or obedience of children had been directed to the father alone, it is not likely that our author, who pretends to build all upon ſcripture, would have omitted it: nay, the ſcripture makes the authority of father and mother, in reſpect of thoſe they have begot, ſo equal, that in ſome places it neglects even the priority of order, which is thought due to the father, and the mother is put firſt, as Lev. xix. 3. from which ſo conſtantly joining father and mother together, as is found quite through ſcripture, we may conclude that the honour they have a title to from their children, is one common right belonging ſo equally to them both, that neither can claim it wholly, neither can be excluded.

§. 62. One would wonder then how our author infers from the 5th commandment, that all "power was originally in the father;" how he finds "monarchical power of government ſettled and fixed by the commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother." If all the honour due by the commandment,

mandment, be it what it will, be the only right of the father, becauſe he, as our author ſays, " has the ſovereignty over the woman, as being the nobler " and principal agent in generation," why did God afterwards all along join the mother with him, to ſhare in his honour ? can the father by this ſovereignty of his, diſcharge the child from paying this honour to his mother ? The ſcripture gave no ſuch licence to the Jews, and yet there were often breaches wide enough betwixt huſband and wife, even to divorce and ſeparation : and, I think, no body will ſay a child may with-hold honour from his mother, or, as the ſcripture terms it, ſet light by her, though his father ſhould command him to do ſo ; no more than the mother could diſpenſe with him for neglecting to honour his father : whereby it is plain, that this command of God gives the father no ſovereignty, no ſupremacy.

§. 63. I agree with our author that the title to this honour is veſted in the parents by nature, and is a right which accrues to them by their having begotten their children, and God by many poſitive declarations has confirmed it to them : I alſo allow our author's rule, " that in grants and gifts, that have " their original from God and nature, as the power of the father," (let me add " and mother," for whom God hath joined together let no man put aſunder) " no inferior power of men can limit, nor make any law of preſcription " againſt them," Obſervations, 158. ſo that the mother having, by this law of God, a right to honour from her children, which is not ſubject to the will of her huſband, we ſee this " abſolute monarchical power of the father," can neither be founded on it, nor conſiſt with it ; and he has a power very far from monarchical, very far from that abſoluteneſs our author contends for, when another has over his ſubjects the ſame power he hath, and by the ſame title : and therefore he cannot forbear ſaying himſelf that " he cannot ſee how " any man's children can be free from ſubjection to their parents," p. 12. which, in common ſpeech, I think, ſignifies mother as well as father, or if parents here ſignifies only father, it is the firſt time I ever yet knew it to do ſo, and by ſuch an uſe of words one may ſay any thing.

§. 64. By our author's doctrine, the father having abſolute juriſdiction over his children, has alſo the ſame over their iſſue ; and the conſequence is good, were it true, that the father had ſuch a power : and yet I aſk our author whether the grandfather, by his ſovereignty, could diſcharge the grandchild from paying to his father the honour due to him by the 5th commandment. If the grandfather hath, by " right of fatherhood," ſole ſovereign power in him, and that obedience which is due to the ſupreme magiſtrate, be commanded in theſe words, " Honour thy father," it is certain the grandfather might diſpenſe with the grandſon's honouring his father, which ſince it is evident in common ſenſe he cannot, it follows from hence, that " honour " thy father and mother," cannot mean an abſolute ſubjection to a ſovereign power, but ſomething elſe. The right therefore which parents have by nature, and which is confirmed to them by the 5th commandment, cannot be that political dominion, which our author would derive from it : for that being in every civil ſociety ſupreme ſomewhere, can diſcharge any ſubject from any political obedience to any one of his fellow ſubjects. But what law of the magiſtrate can give a child liberty, not to "honour his father and mother?" It is an eternal law, annexed purely to the relation of parents and children, and ſo contains nothing of the magiſtrate's power in it, nor is ſubjected to it.

§. 65. OUR author ſays, "God hath given to a father a right or liberty to "alien his power over his children to any other," Obſervations, 155. I doubt whether he can alien wholly the right of honour that is due from them: but be that as it will, this I am ſure, he cannot alien, and retain the ſame power. If therefore the magiſtrate's ſovereignty be, as our author would have it, "nothing but the authority of a ſupreme father," p. 23. it is unavoidable, that if the magiſtrate hath all this paternal right, as he muſt have if fatherhood be the fountain of all authority; then the ſubjects, though fathers, can have no power over their children, no right to honour from them: for it cannot be all in another's hands, and a part remain with the parents. So that, according to our author's own doctrine, "Honour thy father and "mother" cannot poſſibly be underſtood of political ſubjection and obedience; ſince the laws both in the Old and New Teſtament, that commanded children to "honour and obey their parents," were given to ſuch, whoſe fathers were under civil government, and fellow ſubjects with them in political ſocieties; and to have bid them "honour and obey their parents," in our author's ſenſe, had been to bid them be ſubjects to thoſe who had no title to it; the right to obedience from ſubjects, being all veſted in another; and inſtead of teaching obedience, this had been to foment ſedition, by ſetting up powers that were not. If therefore this command, "Honour thy father and mother," concern political dominion, it directly overthrows our author's monarchy; ſince it being to be paid by every child to his father, even in ſociety, every father muſt neceſſarily have political dominion, and there will be as many ſovereigns as there are fathers: beſides that the mother too hath her title, which deſtroys the ſovereignty of one ſupreme monarch. But if "Honour "thy father and mother" mean ſomething diſtinct from political power, as neceſſarily it muſt, it is beſides our author's buſineſs, and ſerves nothing to his purpoſe.

§. 66. "THE law that enjoins obedience to kings is delivered, ſays our au"thor, in the terms, Honour thy father, as if all power were originally in "the father," Obſervations, 254: and that law is alſo delivered, ſay I, in the terms, "Honour thy mother," as if all power were originally in the mother. I appeal whether the argument be not as good on one ſide as the other, father and mother being joined all along in the Old and New Teſtament whereever honour or obedience is injoined children. Again our author tells us, Obſervations, 254. "that this command, Honour thy father, gives the right "to govern, and makes the form of government monarchical." To which I anſwer, that if by "Honour thy father" be meant obedience to the political power of the magiſtrate, it concerns not any duty we owe to our natural fathers, who are ſubjects; becauſe they, by our author's doctrine, are diveſted of all that power, it being placed wholly in the prince, and ſo being equally ſubjects and ſlaves with their children, can have no right, by that title, to any ſuch honour or obedience, as contains in it political ſubjection: if "Honour thy

" father and mother" ſignifies the duty we owe our natural parents, as by our Saviour's interpretation, Matth. xv. 4. and all the other mentioned places, it is plain it does; then it cannot concern political obedience, but a duty that is owing to perſons, who have no title to ſovereignty, nor any political authority as magiſtrates over ſubjects. For the perſon of a private father, and a title to obedience, due to the ſupreme magiſtrate, are things inconſiſtent; and therefore this command, which muſt neceſſarily comprehend the perſons of our natural fathers, muſt mean a duty we owe them diſtinct from our obedience to the magiſtrate, and from which the moſt abſolute power of princes cannot abſolve us. What this duty is, we ſhall in its due place examine.

§. 67. AND thus we have at laſt got through all, that in our author looks like an argument for that abſolute unlimited ſovereignty deſcribed, ſect. 8. which he ſuppoſes in Adam; ſo that mankind ever ſince have been all born ſlaves, without any title to freedom. But if creation, which gave nothing but a being, made not Adam prince of his poſterity: if Adam, Gen. i. 28. was not conſtituted lord of mankind, nor had a private dominion given him excluſive of his children, but only a right and power over the earth, and inferior creatures in common with the children of men; if alſo Gen. iii. 16. God gave not any political power to Adam over his wife and children, but only ſubjected Eve to Adam, as a puniſhment, or foretold the ſubjection of the weaker ſex, in the ordering the common concernments of their families, but gave not thereby to Adam, as to the huſband, power of life and death, which neceſſarily belongs to the magiſtrate: if fathers by begetting their children acquire no ſuch power over them; and if the command, " Honour thy father and mother," give it not, but only enjoins a duty owing to parents equally, whether ſubjects or not, and to the mother as well as the father: if all this be ſo, as I think, by what has been ſaid, is very evident; then man has a natural freedom, notwithſtanding all our author confidently ſays to the contrary; ſince all that ſhare in the ſame common nature, faculties and powers, are in nature equal, and ought to partake in the ſame common rights and privileges, till the manifeſt appointment of God, who is " Lord over all, bleſſed for ever," can be produced to ſhew any particular perſon's ſupremacy; or a man's own conſent ſubjects him to a ſuperiour. This is ſo plain, that our author confeſſes, that Sir John Hayward, Blackwood and Barclay, " the great vindicators of " the right of kings," could not deny it, " but admit with one conſent the " natural liberty and equality of mankind," for a truth unqueſtionable. And our author hath been ſo far from producing any thing, that may make good his great poſition, " that Adam was abſolute monarch," and ſo " men are not " naturally free," that even his own proofs make againſt him; ſo that to uſe his own way of arguing, " the firſt erroneous principle failing, the whole fa- " brick of this vaſt engine of abſolute power and tyranny drops down of itſelf," and there needs no more to be ſaid in anſwer to all that he builds upon ſo falſe and frail a foundation.

§. 68. BUT to ſave others the pains, were there any need, he is not ſparing himſelf to ſhew, by his own contradictions, the weakneſs of his own doctrine. Adam's abſolute and ſole dominion is that, which he is every where full of,

and

and all along builds on, and yet he tells us, p. 12. "that as Adam was lord "of his children, ſo his children under him had a command and power over "their own children." The unlimited and undivided ſovereignty of Adam's fatherhood, by our author's computation, ſtood but a little while, only during the firſt generation, but as ſoon as he had grandchildren, Sir Robert could give but a very ill account of it. "Adam, as father of his children, "ſaith he, hath an abſolute, unlimited royal power over them, and by virtue "thereof over thoſe that they begot, and ſo to all generations;" and yet his children, viz. Cain and Seth, have a paternal power over their children at the ſame time; ſo that they are at the ſame time abſolute lords, and yet vaſſals and ſlaves; Adam has all the authority, as "grandfather of the "people," and they have a part of it as fathers of a part of them: he is abſolute over them and their poſterity, by having begotten them, and yet they are abſolute over their children by the ſame title. "No, ſays our author, "Adam's children under him had power over their own children, but ſtill "with ſubordination to the firſt parent." A good diſtinction that ſounds well, and it is pity it ſignifies nothing, nor can be reconciled with our author's words. I readily grant, that ſuppoſing Adam's abſolute power over his poſterity, any of his children might have have from him a delegated, and ſo a ſubordinate power over a part, or all the reſt: but that cannot be the power our author ſpeaks of here; it is not a power by grant and commiſſion, but the natural paternal power he ſuppoſes a father to have over his children. For 1. he ſays, "As Adam was lord of his children, ſo his children under "him had a power over their own children:" they were then lords over their own children after the ſame manner, and by the ſame title, that Adam was, i. e. by right of generation, by right of fatherhood. 2. It is plain he means the natural power of fathers, becauſe he limits it to be only "over their own "children;" a delegated power has no ſuch limitation, as only over their own children, it might be over others, as well as their own children. 3. If it were a delegated power, it muſt appear in ſcripture; but there is no ground in ſcripture to affirm, that Adam's children had any other power over theirs, than what they naturally had as fathers.

§. 69. But that he means here paternal power, and no other, is paſt doubt, from the inference he makes in theſe words immediately following, "I ſee not "then how the children of Adam, or of any man elſe, can be free from ſub"jection to their parents." Whereby it appears that the power on one ſide and the ſubjection on the other, our author here ſpeaks of, is that natural power and ſubjection between parents and children: for that which every man's children owed, could be no other; and that our author alway affirms to be abſolute and unlimited. This natural power of parents over their children, Adam had over his poſterity, ſays our author; and this power of parents over their children, his children had over theirs in his life-time, ſays our author alſo; ſo that Adam by a natural right of father, had an abſolute unlimited power over all his poſterity, and at the ſame time his children had by the ſame right abſolute unlimited power over theirs. Here then are two abſolute unlimited powers exiſting together, which I would have any body reconcile one to another, or to common ſenſe. For the ſalvo he has put in of ſubordination, makes it more abſurd: to have one abſolute, unlimited, nay unlimitable power in ſubordination to another, is ſo manifeſt a contradiction, that nothing can be more. "Adam is abſolute prince with the unlimited authority of father-"hood over all his poſterity;" all his poſterity are then abſolutely his ſubjects; and, as our author ſays, his ſlaves, children, and grandchildren, are equally in this ſtate of ſubjection and ſlavery; and yet, ſays our author, "the chil-"dren of Adam have paternal, i. e. abſolute unlimited power over their own "children:" which in plain Engliſh is, they are ſlaves and abſolute princes at the ſame time, and in the ſame government; and one part of the ſubjects have an abſolute unlimited power over the other by the natural right of parentage.

§. 70. If any one will ſuppoſe, in favour of our author, that he here meant, that parents, who are in ſubjection themſelves to the abſolute authority of their father, have yet ſome power over their children; I confeſs he is ſomething nearer the truth: but he will not at all hereby help our author: for he no where ſpeaking of the paternal power, but as an abſolute unlimited authority, cannot be ſuppoſed to underſtand any thing elſe here, unleſs he himſelf had limited it, and ſhewed how far it reached. And that he means here paternal authority in that large extent, is plain from the immediate following words; "This ſubjection of children being, ſays he, the foundation "of all regal authority," p. 12. The ſubjection then that in the former line, he ſays, "every man is in to his parents," and conſequently what Adam's grandchildren were in to their parents, was that which was the fountain of all regal authority, i. e. according to our author, abſolute unlimitable authority. And thus Adam's children had regal authority over their children, whilſt they themſelves were ſubjects to their father, and fellow-ſubjects with their children. But let him mean as he pleaſes, it is plain he allows "Adam's "children to have paternal power," p. 12. as alſo all other fathers to have "paternal power over their children," Obſervations, 156. From whence one of theſe two things will neceſſarily follow, that either Adam's children, even in his life-time, had, and ſo all other fathers have, as he phraſes it, p. 12. "by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children," or elſe that Adam, "by right of fatherhood, had not royal authority." For it cannot be but that paternal power does, or does not, give royal authority to them that have it: if it does not, then Adam could not be ſovereign by this title, nor any body elſe; and then there is an end of all our author's politicks at once: if it does give royal authority, then every one that has paternal power has royal authority; and then, by our author's patriarchal government, there will be as many kings as there are fathers.

§. 71. And thus what a monarchy he hath ſet up, let him and his diſciples conſider. Princes certainly will have great reaſon to thank him for theſe new politicks, which ſet up as many abſolute kings in every country as there are fathers of children. And yet who can blame our author for it, it lying unavoidably in the way of one diſcourſing upon our author's principles? For having placed an "abſolute power in fathers by right of begetting," he could not eaſily reſolve how much of this power belonged to a ſon over the children he had begotten; and ſo it fell out to be a very hard matter to give all the power, as he does, to Adam, and yet allow a part in his life-time to his children, when they were parents, and which he knew not well how to deny them. This makes him ſo doubtful in his expreſſions, and ſo uncertain where to place this abſolute natural power, which he calls fatherhood. Sometimes Adam alone has it all, as p. 13. Obſervations, 244, 245. and Pref.

Sometimes parents have it, which word ſcarce ſignifies the father alone, p. 12, 19.

Sometimes children during their father's life-time, as p. 12.

Sometimes fathers of families, as p. 78, 79.

Sometimes fathers indefinitely, Obſervations, 155.

Sometimes the heir to Adam, Obſervations, 253.

Sometimes the poſterity of Adam, 244, 246.

Sometimes prime fathers, all ſons or grandchildren of Noah, Obſervations, 244.

Sometimes the eldeſt parents, p. 12.

Sometimes all kings, p. 19.

Sometimes all that have ſupreme power, Obſervations, 245.

Sometimes heirs to thoſe firſt progenitors, who were at firſt the natural parents of the whole people, p. 19.

Sometimes an elective king, p. 23.

Sometimes thoſe, whether a few or a multitude, that govern the commonwealth, p. 23.

Sometimes he that can catch it, an uſurper, p. 23. Obſervations, 155.

§. 72. Thus this new nothing, that is to carry with it all power, authority, and government; this fatherhood, which is to deſign the perſon, and eſtabliſh the throne of monarchs, whom the people are to obey; may, according to Sir Robert, come into any hands, any how, and ſo by his politicks give to democracy royal authority, and make an uſurper a lawful prince. And if it will do all theſe fine feats, much good do our author and all his followers with their omnipotent fatherhood, which can ſerve for nothing but to unſettle and deſtroy all the lawful governments in the world, and to eſtabliſh in their room diſorder, tyranny, and uſurpation.

## CHAP. VII.

## Of fatherhood and property conſidered together as fountains of ſovereignty.

§. 73. IN the foregoing chapters we have ſeen what Adam's monarchy was, in our author's opinion, and upon what titles he founded it. The foundations which he lays the chief ſtreſs on, as thoſe from which he thinks he may beſt derive monarchical power to future princes, are two, viz. "fatherhood

“ and property:” and therefore the way he propoſes to “ remove the abſurdities “ and inconveniencies of the doctrine of natural freedom, is, to maintain the “ natural and private dominion of Adam,” Obſervations, 222. Conformable hereunto, he tells us, the “ grounds and principles of government neceſſarily “ depend upon the original of property, Obſervations, 108. The ſubjection “ of children to their parents is the fountain of all regal authority, p. 12. “ And all power on earth is either derived or uſurped from the fatherly power, “ there being no other original to be found of any power whatſoever.” Obſervations, 158. I will not ſtand here to examine how it can be ſaid without a contradiction, that the “ firſt grounds and principles of government neceſſarily depend upon the original of property,” and yet, “ that there is no “ other original of any power whatſoever, but that of the father:” it being hard to underſtand how there can be “ no other original but fatherhood,” and yet that the “ grounds and principles of government depend upon the original “ of property;” property and fatherhood being as far different as lord of a manor and father of children. Nor do I ſee how they will either of them agree with what our author ſays, Obſervations, 244. of God's ſentence againſt Eve, Gen. iii. 16. “ that it is the original grant of government:” ſo that if that were the original, government had not its original, by our author's own confeſſion, either from property or fatherhood; and this text, which he brings as a proof of Adam's power over Eve, neceſſarily contradicts what he ſays of the fatherhood, that it is the “ ſole fountain of all power:” for if Adam had any ſuch regal power over Eve, as our author contends for, it muſt be by ſome other title than that of begetting.

§. 74. BUT I leave him to reconcile theſe contradictions, as well as many others, which may plentifully be found in him by any one, who will but read him with a little attention; and ſhall come now to conſider, how theſe two originals of government, “ Adam's natural and private dominion,” will conſiſt and ſerve to make out and eſtabliſh the titles of ſucceeding monarchs, who, as our author obliges them, muſt all derive their power from theſe fountains. Let us then ſuppoſe Adam made, “ by God's donation,” lord and ſole proprietor of the whole earth, in as large and ample a manner as Sir Robert could wiſh; let us ſuppoſe him alſo, “ by right of fatherhood,” abſolute ruler over his children with an unlimited ſupremacy; I aſk then, upon Adam's death what becomes of both his natural and private dominion? and I doubt not it will be anſwered, that they deſcended to his next heir, as our author tells us in ſeveral places. But this way, it is plain, cannot poſſibly convey both his natural and private dominion to the ſame perſon: for ſhould we allow, that all the property, all the eſtate of the father, ought to deſcend to the eldeſt ſon, (which will need ſome proof to eſtabliſh it) and ſo he has by that title all the private dominion of the father, yet the father's natural dominion, the paternal power cannot deſcend to him by inheritance: for it being a right that accrues to a man only by begetting, no man can have this natural dominion over any one he does not beget; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed, that a man can have a right to any thing, without doing that upon which that right is ſolely founded: for if a father by begetting, and no other title, has natural dominion over his children, he that does not beget them cannot have this natural dominion over them; and therefore be it true or falſe, that our author ſays, Obſervations, 156. That "every man that is born, by his very birth becomes "a ſubject to him that begets him," this neceſſarily follows, viz. That a man by his birth cannot become a ſubject to his brother, who did not beget him; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed that a man by the very ſame title can come to be under the "natural and abſolute dominion" of two different men at once; or it be ſenſe to ſay, that a man by birth is under the natural dominion of his father, only becauſe he begat him, and a man by birth alſo is under the natural dominion of his eldeſt brother, though he did not beget him.

§. 75. If then the private dominion of Adam, i. e. his property in the creatures, deſcended at his death all entirely to his eldeſt ſon, his heir; (for, if it did not, there is preſently an end of all Sir Robert's monarchy) and his natural dominion, the dominion a father has over his children by begetting them, belonged immediately, upon Adam's deceaſe, equally to all his ſons who had children, by the ſame title their father had it, the ſovereignty founded upon property, and the ſovereignty founded upon fatherhood, come to be divided; ſince Cain, as heir, had that of property alone; Seth, and the other ſons, that of fatherhood equally with him. This is the beſt can be made of our author's doctrine, and of the two titles of ſovereignty he ſets up in Adam: one of them will either ſignify nothing; or, if they both muſt ſtand, they can ſerve only to confound the rights of princes, and diſorder government in his poſterity: for by building upon two titles to dominion, which cannot deſcend together, and which he allows may be ſeparated, (for he yields that "Adam's children had their diſtinct territories by right of private dominion," Obſervations, 210. p. 40.) he makes it perpetually a doubt upon his principles where the ſovereignty is, or to whom we owe our obedience; ſince fatherhood and property are diſtinct titles, and began preſently upon Adam's death to be in diſtinct perſons. And which then was to give way to the other?

§. 76. Let us take the account of it, as he himſelf gives it us. He tells us out of Grotius, that "Adam's children by donation, aſſignation, or ſome "kind of ceſſion before he was dead, had their diſtinct territories by right "of private dominion; Abel had his flocks and paſtures for them: Cain had "his fields for corn, and the land of Nod, where he built him a city," Obſervations, 210. Here it is obvious to demand, which of theſe two after Adam's death was ſovereign? Cain, ſays our author, p. 19. By what title? "As heir; for heirs to progenitors, who were natural parents of their people, "are not only lords of their own children, but alſo of their brethren," ſays our author, p. 19. What was Cain heir to? Not the entire poſſeſſions, not all that which Adam had private dominion in; for our author allows that Abel, by a title derived from his father, "had his diſtinct territory for paſture "by right of private dominion." What then Abel had by private dominion, was exempt from Cain's dominion: for he could not have private dominion over that which was under the private dominion of another; and therefore his ſovereignty over his brother is gone with this private dominion, and ſo there are preſently two ſovereigns, and his imaginary title of fatherhood is out of doors, and Cain is no prince over his brother: or elſe, if Cain retain his ſovereignty over Abel, notwithſtanding his private dominion, it will follow, that the "firſt grounds and principles of government" have nothing to do with property, whatever our author ſays to the contrary. It is true, Abel did not outlive his father Adam; but that makes nothing to the argument, which will hold good againſt Sir Robert in Abel's iſſue, or in Seth, or any of the poſterity of Adam, not deſcended from Cain.

§. 77. The ſame inconvenience he runs into about the three ſons of Noah, who, as he ſays, p. 13. "had the whole world divided amongſt them by "their father." I aſk then, in which of the three ſhall we find "the eſta-"bliſhment of regal power" after Noah's death? If in all three, as our author there ſeems to ſay; then it will follow, that regal power is founded in property of land, and follows private dominion, and not in paternal power, or natural dominion; and ſo there is an end of paternal power as the fountain of regal authority, and the ſo much magnified fatherhood quite vaniſhes. If the regal power deſcended to Shem as eldeſt, and heir to his father, then "Noah's diviſion of the world by lot to his ſons, or his ten years ſailing about "the Mediterranean to appoint each ſon his part," which our author tells of, p. 15. was labour loſt; his diviſion of the world to them, was to ill, or to no purpoſe: for his grant to Cham and Japhet was little worth, if Shem, notwithſtanding this grant, as ſoon as Noah was dead, was to be lord over them. Or, if this grant of private dominion to them, over their aſſigned territories, were good, here were ſet up two diſtinct ſorts of power, not ſubordinate one to the other, with all thoſe inconveniencies which he muſters up againſt the "power of the people," Obſervations, 158. which I ſhall ſet down in his own words, only changing property for people. "All power "on earth is either derived or uſurped from the fatherly power, there being "no other original to be found of any power whatſoever: for if there ſhould "be granted two ſorts of power, without any ſubordination of one to the "other, they would be in perpetual ſtrife which ſhould be ſupreme, for "two ſupremes cannot agree: if the fatherly power be ſupreme, then the "power grounded on private dominion muſt be ſubordinate, and depend on "it; and if the power grounded on property be ſupreme, then the fatherly "power muſt ſubmit to it, and cannot be exerciſed without the licence of "the proprietors, which muſt quite deſtroy the frame and courſe of nature." This is his own arguing againſt two diſtinct independent powers, which I have ſet down in his own words, only putting power riſing from property, for power of the people; and when he has anſwered what he himſelf has urged here againſt two diſtinct powers, we ſhall be better able to ſee how, with any tolerable ſenſe, he can derive all regal authority "from the natural "and private dominion of Adam," from fatherhood and property together, which are diſtinct titles, that do not always meet in the ſame perſon; and it is plain, by his own confeſſion, preſently ſeparated as ſoon both as Adam's and Noah's death made way for ſucceſſion: though our author frequently in his writings jumbles them together, and omits not to make uſe of either, where he thinks it will ſound beſt to his purpoſe. But the abſurdities of this will more fully appear in the next chapter, where we ſhall examine the ways of conveyance of the ſovereignty of Adam, to princes that were to reign after him.

## CHAP. VIII.

## Of the conveyance of Adam's ſovereign monarchical power.

§. 78. SIR Robert, having not been very happy in any proof he brings for the ſovereignty of Adam, is not much more fortunate in conveying it to future princes; who, if his politicks be true, muſt all derive their titles from that firſt monarch. The ways he has aſſigned, as they lie ſcattered up and down in his writings, I will ſet down in his own words: in his preface he tells us, that "Adam being monarch of the whole world, none "of his poſterity had any right to poſſeſs any thing, but by his grant or per-"miſſion, or by ſucceſſion from him." Here he makes two ways of conveyance of any thing Adam ſtood poſſeſſed of; and thoſe are grants or ſucceſſion. Again he ſays, "All kings either are, or are to be reputed, the next heirs to "thoſe firſt progenitors, who were at firſt the natural parents of the whole "people," p. 19. "There cannot be any multitude of men whatſoever, "but that in it, conſidered by itſelf, there is one man amongſt them, that "in nature hath a right to be the king of all the reſt, as being the next heir "to Adam," Obſervations, 253. Here in theſe places inheritance is the only way he allows of conveying monarchical power to princes. In other places he tells us, Obſervations, 155. "All power on earth is either derived "or uſurped from the fatherly power," Obſervations, 158. "All kings "that now are, or ever were, are or were either fathers of their people, or "heirs of ſuch fathers, or uſurpers of the right of ſuch fathers," Obſervations, 253. And here he makes inheritance or uſurpation the only way whereby kings come by this original power: but yet he tells us, "this fatherly "empire, as it was of itſelf hereditary, ſo it was alienable by patent, and "ſeizable by an uſurper," Obſervations, 190. So then here inheritance, grant, or uſurpation, will convey it. And laſt of all, which is moſt admirable, he tells us, p. 100. "It ſkills not which way kings come by their "power, whether by election, donation, ſucceſſion, or by any other means; "for it is ſtill the manner of the government by ſupreme power, that makes "them properly kings, and not the means of obtaining their crowns." Which I think is a full anſwer to all his whole hypotheſis and diſcourſe about Adam's royal authority, as the fountain from which all princes were to derive theirs: and he might have ſpared the trouble of ſpeaking ſo much as he does, up and down, of heirs and inheritance, if to make any one properly a king, needs no more but "governing by ſupreme power, and it matters not by "what means he came by it."

§. 79. BY this notable way, our author may make Oliver as properly king, as any one elſe he could think of: and had he had the happineſs to live under Maſſaniello's government, he could not by this his own rule have forborn to have done homage to him, with "O king live for ever," ſince the manner of his government by ſupreme power, made him properly king, who was but the day before properly a fiſherman. And if Don Quixote had taught his ſquire to govern with ſupreme authority, our author no doubt could have made a moſt loyal ſubject in Sancho Pancha's iſland; he muſt needs have deſerved ſome preferment in ſuch governments, ſince I think he is the firſt politician, who, pretending to ſettle government upon its true baſis, and to eſtabliſh the thrones of lawful princes, ever told the world, that he was "properly a king, whoſe manner of government was by ſupreme power, by "what means ſoever he obtained it;" which in plain Engliſh is to ſay, that regal and ſupreme power is properly and truly his, who can by any means ſeize upon it: and if this be to be properly a king, I wonder how he came to think of, or where he will find, an uſuper.

§. 80. THIS is ſo ſtrange a doctrine, that the ſurprize of it hath made me paſs by, without their due reflection, the contradictions he runs into, by making ſometimes inheritance alone, ſometimes only grant or inheritance, ſometimes only inheritance or uſurpation, ſometimes all theſe three, and at laſt election, or any other means, added to them, the ways whereby Adam's royal authority, that is, his right to ſupreme rule, could be conveyed down to future kings and governors, ſo as to give them a title to the obedience and ſubjection of the people. But theſe contradictions lie ſo open that the very reading of our author's own words will diſcover them to any ordinary underſtanding; and though what I have quoted out of him (with abundance more of the ſame ſtrain and coherence, which might be found in him) might well excuſe me from any farther trouble in this argument, yet having propoſed to myſelf, to examine the main parts of his doctrine, I ſhall a little more particularly conſider how inheritance, grant, uſurpation or election, can any way make out government in the world upon his principles; or derive to any one a right of empire, from this regal authority of Adam, had it been ever ſo well proved, that he had been abſolute monarch, and lord of the whole world.

## CHAP. IX.

## Of monarchy, by inheritance from Adam.

§. 81. THOUGH it be ever ſo plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, ſhould all men be of our author's mind that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, ſince men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though ever ſo perfect, though ever ſo right, cannot give laws, nor preſcribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the ſettling of order, and eſtabliſhment of government in its exerciſe and uſe amongſt men, unleſs there were a way alſo taught how to know the perſon, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exerciſe this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of ſubjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I ever ſo fully perſuaded that there ought to be magiſtracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the leſs at liberty ſtill, till it appears who is the perſon that hath right to my obedience; ſince, if there be no marks to know him by, and diſtinguiſh him that hath right to rule from other men, it may be myſelf, as well as any other. And therefore, though ſubmiſſion to government be every one's duty, yet ſince that ſignifies nothing but ſubmitting to the direction and laws of ſuch men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a ſubject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there muſt be ways of deſigning, and knowing the perſon to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conſcience to ſubmit to any power, unleſs he can be ſatisfied who is the perſon who has a right to exerciſe that power over him. If this were not ſo, there would be no diſtinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and ſcepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they do their phyſicians, if the perſon cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whoſe preſcriptions I am bound to follow. To ſettle therefore men's conſciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is neceſſary that they know not only, that there is a power ſomewhere in the world, but the perſon who by right is veſted with this power over them.

§. 82. How ſucceſsful our author has been in his attempts, to ſet up a monarchical abſolute power in Adam, the reader may judge by what has been already ſaid; but were that abſolute monarchy as clear as our author would deſire it, as I preſume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no uſe to the government of mankind now in the world, unleſs he alſo make out theſe two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decaſee coveyed intire to ſome other perſon, and ſo on to poſterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are poſſeſſed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived to them.

§. 83. If the firſt of theſe fail, the power of Adam, were it ever ſo great, ever ſo certain, will ſignify nothing to the preſent government and ſocieties in the world; but we muſt ſeek out ſome other original of power for the government of polities than this of Adam, or elſe there will be none at all in the world. If the latter fail, it will deſtroy the authority of the preſent governors, and abſolve the people from ſubjection to them, ſince they, having no better a claim than others to that power, which is alone the fountain of all authority, can have no title to rule over them.

§. 84. Our author, having fancied an abſolute ſovereignty in Adam, mentions ſeveral ways of its conveyance to princes, that were to be his ſucceſſors; but that which he chiefly inſiſts on, is that of inheritance, which occurs ſo often in his ſeveral diſcourſes; and I having in the foregoing chapter quoted ſeveral of theſe paſſages, I ſhall not need here again to repeat them. This ſovereignty he erects, as has been ſaid, upon a double foundation, viz. that of property, and that of fatherhood. One was the right he was ſuppoſed to have in all creatures, a right to poſſeſs the earth with the beaſts, and other inferior ranks of things in it, for his private uſe, excluſive of all other men. The other was the right he was ſuppoſed to have, to rule and govern men, all the reſt of mankind.

§. 85. In both theſe rights, there being ſuppoſed an excluſion of all other men, it muſt be upon ſome reaſon peculiar to Adam, that they muſt both be founded.

That of his property our author ſuppoſes to riſe from God's immediate donation, Gen. i. 28. and that of fatherhood from the act of begetting: now in all inheritance, if the heir ſucceed not to the reaſon upon which his father's right was founded, he cannot ſucceed to the right which followeth from it. For example, Adam had a right of property in the creatures upon the donation and grant of God almighty, who was lord and proprietor of them all: let this be ſo as our author tells us, yet upon his death his heir can have no title to them, no ſuch right of property in them, unleſs the ſame reaſon, viz. God's donation, veſted a right in the heir too: for if Adam could have had no property in, nor uſe of the creatures, without this poſitive donation from God, and this donation were only perſonally to Adam, his heir could have no right by it; but upon his death it muſt revert to God, the lord and owner again; for poſitive grants give no title farther than the expreſs words convey it, and by which only it is held. And thus, if as our author himſelf contends, that donation, Gen. i. 28. were made only to Adam perſonally, his heir could not ſucceed to his property in the creatures: and if it were a donation to any but Adam, let it be ſhewn, that it was to his heir in our author's ſenſe, i. e. to one of his children, excluſive of all the reſt.

§. 86. But not to follow our author too far out of the way, the plain of the caſe is this. God having made man, and planted in him, as in all other animals, a ſtrong deſire of ſelf-preſervation; and furniſhed the world with things fit for food and raiment, and other neceſſaries of life, ſubſervient to his deſign, that man ſhould live and abide for ſome time upon the face of the earth, and not that ſo curious and wonderful a piece of workmanſhip, by his own negligence, or want of neceſſaries, ſhould periſh again, preſently after a few moments continuance; God, I ſay, having made man and the world thus, ſpoke to him, (that is) directed him by his ſenſes and reaſon, as he did the inferior animals by their ſenſe and inſtinct, which were ſerviceable for his ſubſiſtence, and given him as the means of his preſervation. And therefore I doubt not, but before theſe words were pronounced, Gen. i. 28, 29. (if they muſt be underſtood literally to have been ſpoken) and without any ſuch verbal donation, man had a right to an uſe of the creatures, by the will and grant of God: for the deſire, ſtrong deſire of preſerving his life and being, having been planted in him as a principle of action by God himſelf, reaſon, "which was the voice of God in him," could not but teach him and aſſure him, that purſuing that natural inclination he had to preſerve his being, he followed the will of his maker, and therefore had a right to make uſe of thoſe creatures, which by his reaſon or ſenſes he could diſcover would be ſerviceable thereunto. And thus man's property in the creatures was founded upon the right he had to make uſe of thoſe things that were neceſſary or uſeful to his being

§. 87. This being the reaſon and foundation of Adam's property, gave the ſame title, on the ſame ground, to all his children, not only after his death, but in his life-time: ſo that here was no privilege of his heir above his other children, which could exclude them from an equal right to the uſe of the inferior creatures, for the comfortable preſervation of their beings, which is all the property man hath in them; and ſo Adam's ſovereignty built on property, or as our author calls it, private dominion, comes to nothing. Every man had a right to the creatures, by the ſame title Adam had, viz. by the right every one had to take care of, and provide for their ſubſiſtence: and thus men had a right in common, Adam's children in common with him. But if any one had began, and made himſelf a property in any particular thing, (which how he, or any one elſe, could do, ſhall be ſhewn in another place) that thing, that poſſeſſion, if he diſpoſed not otherwiſe of it by his poſitive grant, deſcended naturally to his children, and they had a right to ſucceed to it, and poſſeſs it.

§. 88. It might reaſonably be aſked here, how come children by this right of poſſeſſing, before any other, the properties of their parents upon their deceaſe? for it being perſonally the parents, when they die, without actually transferring their right to another, why does it not return again to the common ſtock of mankind? It will perhaps be anſwered, that common conſent hath diſpoſed of it to their children. Common practice, we ſee indeed, does ſo diſpoſe of it; but we cannot ſay, that it is the common conſent of mankind; ſo that hath never been aſked, nor actually given; and if common tacit conſent hath eſtabliſhed it, it would make but a poſitive, and not a natural right of children to inherit the goods of their parents: but where the practice is univerſal, it is reaſonable to think the cauſe is natural. The ground then I think to be this. The firſt and ſtrongeſt deſire God planted in men, and wrought into the very principles of their nature, being that of ſelf-preſervation, that is the foundation of a right to the creatures for the particular ſupport and uſe of each individual perſon himſelf. But, next to this, God planted in men a ſtrong deſire alſo of propagating their kind, and continuing themſelves in their poſterity; and this gives children a title to ſhare in the property of their parents, and a right to inherit their poſſeſſions. Men are not proprietors of what they have, meerly for themſelves; their children have a title to part of it, and have their kind of right joined with their parents in the poſſeſſion which comes to be wholly theirs, when death, having put an end to their parents uſe of it, hath taken them from their poſſeſſions; and this we call inheritance: men being by a like obligation bound to preſerve what they have begotten, as to preſerve themſelves, their iſſue come to have a right in the goods they are poſſeſſed of. That children have ſuch a right, is plain from the laws of God; and that men are convinced that children have ſuch a right, is evident from the law of the land; both which laws require parents to provide for their children.

§. 89. For children being by the courſe of nature, born weak, and unable to provide for themſelves, they have by the appointment of God himſelf, who hath thus ordered the courſe of nature, a right to be nouriſhed and maintained by their parents; nay, a right not only to a bare ſubſiſtence, but to the conveniencies and comforts of life, as far as the conditions of their parents can afford it. Hence it comes, that when their parents leave the world, and ſo the care due to their children ceaſes, the effects of it are to extend as far as poſſibly they can, and the proviſions they have made in their life-time, are underſtood to be intended, as nature requires they ſhould, for their children, whom, after themſelves, they are bound to provide for: though the dying parents, by expreſs words, declare nothing about them, nature appoints the deſcent of their property to their children, who thus come to have a title, and natural right of inheritance to their fathers goods, which the reſt of mankind cannot pretend to.

§. 90. Were it not for this right of being nouriſhed and maintained by their parents, which God and nature has given to children, and obliged parents to as a duty, it would be reaſonable, that the father ſhould inherit the eſtate of his ſon, and be preferred in the inheritance before his grandchild: for to the grandfather there is due a long ſcore of care and expences laid out upon the breeding and education of his ſon, which one would think in juſtice ought to be paid. But that having been done in obedience to the ſame law, whereby he received nouriſhment and education from his own parents; this ſcore of education, received from a man's father, is paid by taking care, and providing for his own children; is paid, I ſay, as much as is required of payment by alteration of property, unleſs preſent neceſſity of the parents require a return of goods for their neceſſary ſupport and ſubſiſtence: for we are not now ſpeaking of that reverence, acknowledgment, reſpect and honour, that is always due from children to their parents; but of poſſeſſions and commodities of life valuable by money. But though it be incumbent on parents to bring up and provide for their children, yet this debt to their children does not quite cancel the ſcore to their parents; but only is made by nature preferable to it: for the debt a man owes his father takes place, and gives the father a right to inherit the ſon's goods, where, for want of iſſue, the right of iſſue doth not exclude that title. And therefore a man having a right to be maintained by his children, where he needs it, and to enjoy alſo the comforts of life from them, when the neceſſary proviſion due to them and their children will afford it; if his ſon die without iſſue, the father has a right in nature to poſſeſs his goods and inherit his eſtate, (whatever the municipal laws of ſome countries may abſurdly direct otherwiſe;) and ſo again his children and their iſſue from him; or, for want of ſuch, his father and his iſſue.

But where no ſuch are to be found, i. e. no kindred, there we ſee the poſſeſſions of a private man revert to the community, and ſo in politick ſocieties come into the hands of the publick magiſtrate; but in the ſtate of nature become again perfectly common, no body having a right to inherit them: nor can any one have a property in them, otherwiſe than in other things common by nature; of which I ſhall ſpeak in its due place.

§. 91. I HAVE been the larger, in ſhewing upon what ground children have a right to ſucceed to the poſſeſſion of their fathers properties, not only becauſe by it, it will appear, that if Adam had a property (a titular, inſignificant, uſeleſs property; for it could be no better, for he was bound to nouriſh and maintain his children and poſterity out of it) in the whole earth and its product, yet all his children coming to have, by the law of nature, and right of inheritance, a joint title, and right of property in it after his death, it could convey no right of ſovereignty to any one of his poſterity over the reſt: ſince every one having a right of inheritance to his portion, they might enjoy their inheritance, or any part of it in common, or ſhare it, or ſome parts of it, by diviſion, as it beſt liked them. But no one could pretend to the whole inheritance, or any ſovereignty ſuppoſed to accompany it; ſince a right of inheritance gave every one of the reſt, as well as any one, a title to ſhare in the goods of his father. Not only upon this account, I ſay, have I been ſo particular in examining the reaſon of children's inheriting the property of their fathers, but alſo becauſe it will give us farther light in the inheritance of rule and power, which in countries where their particular municipal laws give the whole poſſeſſion of land entirely to the firſt-born, and deſcent of power has gone ſo to men by this cuſtom, ſome have been apt to be deceived into an opinion, that there was a natural or divine right of primogeniture, to both eſtate and power; and that the inheritance of both rule over men, and property in things, ſprang from the ſame original, and were to deſcend by the ſame rules.

§. 92. PROPERTY, whoſe original is from the right a man has to uſe any of the inferior creatures, for the ſubſiſtence and comfort of his life, is for the benefit and ſole advantage of the proprietor, ſo that he may even deſtroy the thing, that he has property in by his uſe of it, where need requires: but government being for the preſervation of every man's right and property, by preſerving him from the violence or injury of others, is for the good of the governed: for the magiſtrate's ſword being for a "terror to evil doers," and by that terror to inforce men to obſerve the poſitive laws of the ſociety, made conformable to the laws of nature, for the publick good, i. e. the good of every particular member of that ſociety, as far as by common rules it can be provided for; the ſword is not given the magiſtrate for his own good alone.

§. 93. CHILDREN therefore, as has been ſhewed, by the dependance they have on their parents for ſubſiſtence, have a right of inheritance to their fathers property, as that which belongs to them for their proper good and behoof, and therefore are fitly termed good, wherein the firſt-born has not a ſole or peculiar right by any law of God and nature, the younger children having an equal title with him, founded on that right they all have to maintenance, ſupport, and comfort from their parents, and on nothing elſe. But government

ment being for the benefit of the governed, and not the ſole advantage of the governors, (but only for their's with the reſt, as they make a part of that politick body, each of whoſe parts and members are taken care of, and directed in its peculiar functions for the good of the whole, by the laws of ſociety) cannot be inherited by the ſame title, that children have to the goods of their father. The right a ſon has to be maintained and provided with the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life out of his father's ſtock, gives him a right to ſucceed to his father's property for his own good; but this can give him no right to ſucceed alſo to the rule, which his father had over other men. All that a child has right to claim from his father is nouriſhment and education, and the things nature furniſhes for the ſupport of life: but he has no right to demand rule or dominion from him: he can ſubſiſt and receive from him the portion of good things, and advantages of education naturally due to him, without empire and dominion. That (if his father hath any) was veſted in him, for the good and behoof of others: and therefore the ſon cannot claim or inherit it by a title, which is founded wholly on his own private good and advantage.

§. 94. We muſt know how the firſt ruler, from whom any one claims, came by his authority, upon what ground any one has empire, what his title is to it, before we can know who has a right to ſucceed him in it, and inherit it from him: if the agreement and conſent of men firſt gave a ſcepter into any one's hand, or put a crown on his head, that alſo muſt direct its deſcent and conveyance; for the ſame authority, that made the firſt a lawful ruler, muſt make the ſecond too, and ſo give right of ſucceſſion: in this caſe inheritance, or primogeniture, can in itſelf have no right, no pretence to it, any farther than that conſent, which eſtabliſhed the form of the government, hath ſo ſettled the ſucceſſion. And thus we ſee, the ſucceſſion of crowns, in ſeveral countries, places it on different heads, and he comes by right of ſucceſſion to be a prince in one place, who would be a ſubject in another.

§. 95. If God, by his poſitive grant and revealed declaration, firſt gave rule and dominion to any man, he that will claim by that title, muſt have the ſame poſitive grant of God for his ſucceſſion: for if that has not directed the courſe of its deſcent and conveyance down to others, no body can ſucceed to this title of the firſt ruler. Children have no right of inheritance to this; and primogeniture can lay no claim to it, unleſs God, the author of this conſtitution, hath ſo ordained it. Thus we ſee, the pretenſions of Saul's family, who received his crown from the immediate appointment of God, ended with his reign; and David, by the ſame title that Saul reigned, viz. God's appointment, ſucceeded in his throne, to the excluſion of Jonathan, and all pretenſions of paternal inheritance: and if Solomon had a right to ſucceed his father, it muſt be by ſome other title, than that of primogeniture. A cadet, or ſiſter's ſon, muſt have the preference in ſucceſſion, if he has the ſame title the firſt lawful prince had: and in dominion that has its foundation only in the poſitive appointment of God himſelf, Benjamin, the youngeſt, muſt have the inheritance of the crown, if God ſo direct, as well as one of that tribe had the firſt poſſeſſion.

§. 96. If paternal right, the act of begetting, give a man rule and dominion, inheritance or primogeniture can give no title: for he that cannot ſucceed to his father's title, which was begetting, cannot ſucceed to that power over his brethren, which his father had by paternal right over them. But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſay more in another place. This is plain in the mean time, that any government, whether ſuppoſed to be at firſt founded in paternal right, conſent of the people, or the poſitive appointment of God himſelf, which can ſuperſede either of the other, and ſo begin a new government upon a new foundation; I ſay, any government began upon either of theſe, can by right of ſucceſſion come to thoſe only, who have the title of him they ſucceed to: power founded on contract can deſcend only to him, who has right by that contract: power founded on begetting, he only can have that begets; and power founded on the poſitive grant or donation of God, he only can have by right of ſucceſſion, to whom that grant directs it.

§. 97. From what I have ſaid, I think this is clear, that a right to the uſe of the creatures, being founded originally in the right a man has to ſubſiſt and enjoy the conveniencies of life; and the natural right children have to inherit the goods of their parents, being founded in the right they have to the ſame ſubſiſtence and commodities of life, out of the ſtock of their parents, who are therefore taught by natural love and tenderneſs to provide for them, as a part of themſelves; and all this being only for the good of the proprietor, or heir; it can be no reaſon for children's inheriting of rule and dominion, which has another original and a different end. Nor can primogeniture have any pretence to a right of ſolely inheriting either property or power, as we ſhall, in its due place, ſee more fully. It is enough to have ſhewed here, that Adam's property or private dominion, could not convey any ſovereignty or rule to his heir, who not having a right to inherit all his father's poſſeſſions, could not thereby come to have any ſovereignty over his brethren: and therefore, if any ſovereignty on account of his property had been veſted in Adam, which in truth there was not, yet it would have died with him.

§. 98. As Adam's ſovereignty, if, by virtue of being proprietor of the world, he had any authority over men, could not have been inherited by any of his children over the reſt, becauſe they had the ſame title to divide the inheritance, and every one had a right to a portion of his father's poſſeſſions: ſo neither could Adam's ſovereignty by right of fatherhood, if any ſuch he had, deſcend to any one of his children: for it being, in our author's account, a right acquired by begetting, to rule over thoſe he had begotten, it was not a power poſſible to be inherited, becauſe the right being conſequent to, and built on, an act perfectly perſonal, made that power ſo too, and impoſſible to be inherited: for paternal power, being a natural right riſing only from the relation of father and ſon, is as impoſſible to be inherited as the relation itſelf; and a man may pretend as well to inherit the conjugal power the huſband, whoſe heir he is, had over his wife, as he can to inherit the paternal power of a father over his children: for the power of the huſband being founded on contract, and the power of the father on begetting, he may as well inherit the power obtained by the conjugal contract, which was only perſonal, as he may the power obtained by begetting, which could reach no farther than the perſon of the begetter, unleſs begetting can be a title to power in him that does not beget.

§. 99. Which makes it a reaſonable queſtion to aſk, whether Adam, dying before Eve, his heir, (ſuppoſe Cain or Seth) ſhould have by right of inheriting Adam's fatherhood, ſovereign power over Eve his mother: for Adam's fatherhood being nothing but a right he had to govern his children, becauſe he begot them, he that inherits Adam's fatherhood, inherits nothing, even in our author's ſenſe, but the right Adam had to govern his children, becauſe he begot them: ſo that the monarchy of the heir would not have taken in Eve; or if it did, it being nothing but the fatherhood of Adam deſcended by inheritance, the heir muſt have right to govern Eve, becauſe Adam begot her; for fatherhood is nothing elſe.

§. 100. Perhaps it will be ſaid with our author, that a man can alien his power over his child; and what may be transferred by compact, may be poſſeſſed by inheritance. I anſwer, a father cannot alien the power he has over his child: he may perhaps to ſome degrees forfeit it, but cannot transfer it; and if any other man acquire it, it is not by the father's grant, but by ſome act of his own. For example, a father, unnaturally careleſs of his child, ſells or gives him to another man; and he again expoſes him; a third man finding him, breeds him up, cheriſhes, and provides for him as his own: I think in this caſe, no body will doubt, but that the greateſt part of filial duty and ſubjection was here owing, and to be paid to this foſter-father; and if any thing could be demanded from the child, by either of the other, it could be only due to his natural father, who perhaps might have forfeited his right to much of that duty comprehended in the command, "Honour your parents," but could transfer none of it to another. He that purchaſed, and neglected the child, got by his purchaſe and grant of the father, no title to duty or honour from the child; but only he acquired it, who by his own authority, performing the office and care of a father, to the forlorn and periſhing infant, made himſelf, by paternal care, a title to proportionable degrees of paternal power. This will be more eaſily admitted upon conſideration of the nature of paternal power, for which I refer my reader to the ſecond book.

§. 101. To return to the argument in hand; this is evident, That paternal power ariſing only from begetting, for in that our author places it alone, can neither be transferred nor inherited: and he that does not beget, can no more have paternal power, which ariſes from thence, than he can have a right to any thing, who performs not the condition, to which only it is annexed. If one ſhould aſk, by what law has a father power over his children? it will be anſwered, no doubt, by the law of nature, which gives ſuch a power over them, to him that begets them. If one ſhould aſk likewiſe, by what law does our author's heir come by a right to inherit? I think it would be anſwered, by the law of nature too: for I find not that our author brings one word of ſcripture to prove the right of ſuch an heir he ſpeaks of. Why then the law of nature gives fathers paternal power over their children, becauſe they did beget them; and the ſame law of nature gives the paternal power to the heir over his brethren, who did not beget them: whence it follows, that either the father has not his paternal power by begetting, or elſe that the heir has it not at all; for it is hard to underſtand how the law of nature, which is the law of reaſon, can give the paternal power to the father over his children, for the only reaſon of begetting; and to the firſt-born over his brethren without this only reaſon, i. e. for no reaſon at all: and if the eldeſt, by the law of nature, can inherit this paternal power, without the only reaſon that gives a title to it, ſo may the youngeſt as well as he, and a ſtranger as well as either; for where there is no reaſon for any one, as there is not, but for him that begets, all have an equal title. I am ſure our author offers no reaſon; and when any body does, we ſhall ſee whether it will hold or no.

§. 102. IN the mean time it is as good ſenſe to ſay, that by the law of nature a man has right to inherit the property of another, becauſe he is of kin to him, and is known to be of his blood; and therefore, by the ſame law of nature, an utter ſtranger to his blood has right to inherit his eſtate; as to ſay that, by the law of nature, he that begets them has paternal power over his children, and therefore, by the law of nature, the heir that begets them not, has this paternal power over them: or ſuppoſing the law of the land gave abſolute power over their children, to ſuch only who nurſed them, and fed their children themſelves, could any body pretend, that this law gave any one, who did no ſuch thing, abſolute power over thoſe, who were not his children?

§. 103. WHEN therefore it can be ſhewed, that conjugal power can belong to him that is not an huſband, it will alſo I believe be proved, that our author's paternal power, acquired by begetting, may be inherited by a ſon; and that a brother, as heir to his father's power, may have paternal power over his brethren, and by the ſame rule conjugal power too: but till then, I think we may reſt ſatisfied, that the paternal power of Adam, this ſovereign authority of fatherhood, were there any ſuch, could not deſcend to, nor be inherited by, his next heir. Fatherly power, I eaſily grant our author, if it will do him any good, can never be loſt, becauſe it will be as long in the world as there are fathers: but none of them will have Adam's paternal power, or derive their's from him; but every one will have his own, by the ſame title Adam had his, viz. by begetting, but not by inheritance, or ſucceſſion, no more than huſbands have their conjugal power by inheritance from Adam. And thus we ſee, as Adam had no ſuch property, no ſuch paternal power, as gave him ſovereign juriſdiction over mankind; ſo likewiſe his ſovereignty built upon either of theſe titles, if he had any ſuch, could not have deſcended to his heir, but muſt have ended with him. Adam therefore, as has been proved, being neither monarch, nor his imaginary monarchy hereditable, the power which is now in the world, is not that which was Adam's; ſince all that Adam could have upon our author's grounds, either of property or fatherhood, neceſſarily died with him, and could not be conveyed to poſterity by inheritance. In the next place we will conſider, whether Adam had any ſuch heir, to inherit his power, as our author talks of.

# CHAP. X.

## Of the heir to Adam's monarchical power.

§. 104. OUR author tells us, Obſervations, 253. "That it is a truth "undeniable, that there cannot be any multitude of men what"ſoever, either great or ſmall, though gathered together from the ſeveral "corners and remoteſt regions of the world, but that in the ſame multitude, "conſidered by itſelf, there is one man amongſt them, that in nature hath "a right to be king of all the reſt, as being the next heir to Adam, and all the "other ſubjects to him: every man by nature is a king or a ſubject." And again, p. 20. "If Adam himſelf were ſtill living, and now ready to die, it is certain that "there is one man, and but one in the world, who is next heir." Let this multitude of men be, if our author pleaſes, all the princes upon the earth, there will then be, by our author's rule, "one amongſt them, that in nature hath a right to "be king of all the reſt, as being the right heir to Adam;" an excellent way to eſtabliſh the thrones of princes, and ſettle the obedience of their ſubjects, by ſetting up an hundred, or perhaps a thouſand titles (if there be ſo many princes in the world) againſt any king now reigning, each as good, upon our author's grounds, as his who wears the crown. If this right of heir carry any weight with it, if it be the ordinance of God, as our author ſeems to tell us, Obſervations, 244. muſt not all be ſubject to it, from the higheſt to the loweſt? Can thoſe who wear the name of princes, without having the right of being heirs to Adam, demand obedience from their ſubjects by this title, and not be bound to pay it by the ſame law? Either governments in the world are not to be claimed, and held by this title of Adam's heir; and then the ſtarting of it is to no purpoſe, the being or not being Adam's heir ſignifies nothing as to the title of dominion: or if it really be, as our author ſays, the true title to government and ſovereignty; the firſt thing to be done, is to find out this true heir of Adam, ſeat him in his throne, and then all the kings and princes of the world ought to come and reſign up their crowns and ſcepters to him, as things that belong no more to them, than to any of their ſubjects.

§. 105. For either this right in nature, of Adam's heir, to be king over all the race of men, (for all together they make one multitude) is a right not neceſſary to the making of a lawful king, and ſo there may be lawful kings without it, and then kings titles and power depend not on it; or elſe all the kings in the world but one, are not lawful kings, and ſo have no right to obedience: either this title of heir to Adam is that whereby kings hold their crowns, and have a right to ſubjection from their ſubjects, and then one only can have it, and the reſt being ſubjects can require no obedience from other men, who are but their fellow ſubjects; or elſe it is not the title whereby kings rule, and have a right to obedience from their ſubjects, and then kings are kings without it, and this dream of the natural ſovereignty of Adam's heir is of no uſe to obedience and government: for if kings have a right to dominion, and the obedience of their ſubjects, who are not, nor can poſſibly be, heirs to Adam, what uſe is there of ſuch a title, when we are obliged to obey without it? If kings, who are not heirs to Adam, have no right to ſovereignty, we are all free, till our author, or any body for him, will ſhew us Adam's right heir. If there be but one heir of Adam, there can be but one lawful king in the world, and no body in conſcience can be obliged to obedience till it be reſolved who that is; for it may be any one, who is not known to be of a younger houſe, and all others have equal titles. If there be more than one heir of Adam, every one is his heir, and ſo every one has regal power: for if two ſons can be heirs together, then all the ſons equally are heirs, and ſo all are heirs, being all ſons, or ſons ſons of Adam. Betwixt theſe two the right of heir cannot ſtand; for by it either but one only man, or all men are kings. Take which you pleaſe, it diſſolves the bonds of government and obedience; ſince if all men are heirs, they can owe obedience to no body; if only one, no body can be obliged to pay obedience to him, till he be known, and his title made out.

## CHAP. XI.

## Who heir?

§. 106. THE great queſtion which in all ages has diſturbed mankind, and brought on them the greateſt part of thoſe miſchiefs which have ruined cities, depopulated countries, and diſordered the peace of the world, has been, not whether there be power in the world, nor whence it came, but who ſhould have it. The ſettling of this point being of no ſmaller moment than the ſecurity of princes, and the peace and welfare of their eſtates and kingdoms, a reformer of politicks, one would think, ſhould lay this ſure, and be very clear in it: for if this remain diſputable, all the reſt will be to very little purpoſe; and the ſkill uſed in dreſſing up power with all the ſplendor and temptation abſoluteneſs can add to it, without ſhewing who has a right to have it, will ſerve only to give a greater edge to man's natural ambition, which of itſelf is but too keen. What can this do but ſet men on the more eagerly to ſcramble, and ſo lay a ſure and laſting foundation of endleſs contention and diſorder, inſtead of that peace and tranquillity, which is the buſineſs of government, and the end of human ſociety?

§. 107. This deſignation of the perſon our author is more than ordinary obliged to take care of, becauſe he, affirming that the “the aſſignment of civil power is by divine inſtitution,” hath made the conveyance as well as the power itſelf ſacred: ſo that no conſideration, no act or art of man, can divert it from that perſon, to whom, by this divine right, it is aſſigned; no neceſſity or contrivance can ſubſtitute another perſon in his room: for if the “aſſignment of civil power be by divine inſtitution,” and Adam's heir be he to whom it is thus aſſigned, as int he foregoing chapter our author tells us, it would be as much ſacrilege for any one to be king, who was not Adam's heir, as it would have been amongſt the Jews, for any one to have been prieſt, who had not been of Aaron's poſterity: for not only the prieſthood "in general "being by divine inſtitution, but the aſſignment of it" to the ſole line and poſterity of Aaron, made it impoſſible to be enjoyed or exerciſed by any one, but thoſe perſons who were the offspring of Aaron: whoſe ſucceſſion therefore was carefully obſerved, and by that the perſons who had a right to the prieſthood certainly known.

§. 108. LET us ſee then what care our author has taken, to make us know who is "this heir, who by divine inſtitution has a right to be king over all men." The firſt account of him we meet with is, p. 12. in theſe words: "This ſubjection of children, being the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himſelf; it follows, that civil power, not only in general, is "by divine inſtitution, but even the aſſignment of it, ſpecifically to the eldeſt "parents." Matters of ſuch conſequence as this is, ſhould be in plain words, as little liable, as might be, to doubt or equivocation; and I think, if language be capable of expreſſing any thing diſtinctly and clearly, that of kindred, and the ſeveral degrees of nearneſs of blood, is one. It were therefore to be wiſhed, that our author had uſed a little more intelligible expreſſions here, that we might have better known, who it is, to whom the aſſignment of civil power is made by divine inſtitution; or at leaſt would have told us what he meant by eldeſt parents: for I believe, if land had been aſſigned or granted to him, and the eldeſt parents of his family, he would have thought it had needed an interpreter; and it would ſcarce have been known to whom next it belonged.

§. 109. IN propriety of ſpeech, (and certainly propriety of ſpeech is neceſſary in a diſcourſe of this nature) eldeſt parents ſignifies either the eldeſt men and women that have had children, or thoſe who have longeſt had iſſue; and then our author's aſſertion will be, that thoſe fathers and mothers, who have been longeſt in the world, or longeſt fruitful, have by divine inſtitution a right to civil power. If there be any abſurdity in this, our author muſt anſwer for it: and if his meaning be different from my explication, he is to be blamed, that he would not ſpeak it plainly. This I am ſure, parents cannot ſignify heirs male, nor eldeſt parents an infant child: who yet may ſometimes be the true heir, if there can be but one. And we are hereby ſtill as much at a loſs, who civil power belongs to, notwithſtanding this "aſſignment by divine inſtitution," as if there had been no ſuch aſſignment at all, or our author had ſaid nothing of it. This of eldeſt parents leaving us more in the dark, who by divine inſtitution has a right to civil power, than thoſe who never heard any thing at all of heir, or deſcent, of which our author is ſo full. And though the chief matter of his writing be to teach obedience to thoſe, who have a right to it, which he tells us is conveyed by deſcent, yet who thoſe are, to whom this right by deſcent belongs, he leaves, like the philoſophers ſtone in politicks, out of the reach of any one to diſcover from his writings.

§. 110. THIS obſcurity cannot be imputed to want of language in ſo great a maſter of ſtyle as Sir Robert is, when he is reſolved with himſelf what he would ſay: and therefore, I fear, finding how hard it would be to ſettle rules of deſcent by divine inſtitution, and how little it would be to his purpoſe, or conduce to the clearing and eſtabliſhing the titles of princes, if ſuch rules of deſcent were ſettled, he choſe rather to content himſelf with doubtful and general terms, which might make no ill ſound in mens ears, who were willing to be pleaſed with them; rather than offer any clear rules of deſcent of this fatherhood of Adam, by which mens conſciences might be ſatisfied to whom it deſcended, and know the perſons who had a right to regal power, and with it to their obedience.

§. 111. How elſe is it poſſible, that laying ſo much ſtreſs, as he does, upon deſcent, and Adam's heir, next heir, true heir, he ſhould never tell us what heir means, nor the way to know who the next or true heir is? This, I do not remember, he does any where expreſly handle; but, where it comes in his way, very warily and doubtfully touches; though it be ſo neceſſary, that without it all diſcourſes of government and obedience upon his principles, would be to no purpoſe, and fatherly power, ever ſo well made out, will be of no uſe to any body. Hence he tells us, Obſervations, 244. "That not only the "conſtitution of power in general, but the limitation of it to one kind, i. e. "monarchy, and the determination of it to the individual perſon and line of "Adam, are all three ordinances of God; neither Eve nor her children could "either limit Adam's power, or join others with him; and what was given "unto Adam was given in his perſon to his poſterity". Here again our author informs us, that the divine ordinance hath limited the deſcent of Adam's monarchical power. To whom? "To Adam's line and poſterity," ſays our author. A notable limitation, a limitation to all mankind: for if our author can find any one amongſt mankind, that is not of the line and poſterity of Adam, he may perhaps tell him, who this next heir of Adam is; but for us, I deſpair how this limitation of Adam's empire to his line and poſterity will help us to find out one heir. This limitation indeed of our author, will ſave thoſe the labour, who would look for him amongſt the race of brutes, if any ſuch there were; but will very little contribute to the diſcovery of one next heir amongſt men, though it make a ſhort and eaſy determination of the queſtion about the deſcent of Adam's regal power, by telling us, that the line and poſterity of Adam is to have it, that is, in plain Engliſh, any one may have it, ſince there is no perſon living that hath not the title of being of the line and poſterity of Adam; and while it keeps there, it keeps within our author's limitation by God's ordinance. Indeed, p. 19. he tells us, that "ſuch heirs are "not only lords of their own children, but of their brethren;" whereby, and by the words following, which we ſhall conſider anon, he ſeems to inſinuate, that the eldeſt ſon is heir; but he no where, that I know, ſays it in direct words, but by the inſtances of Cain and Jacob, that there follow, we may allow this to be ſo far his opinion concerning heirs, that where there are divers children, the eldeſt ſon has the right to be heir. That primogeniture cannot give any title to paternal power, we have already ſhewed. That a father may have a natural right to ſome kind of power over his children, is eaſily granted; but that an elder brother has ſo over his brethren, remains to be proved: God or nature has not any where, that I know, placed ſuch juriſdiction in the firſt-born; nor can reaſon find any ſuch natural ſuperiority amongſt brethren. The law of Moſes gave a double portion of the goods and poſſeſſions to the eldeſt; but we find not any where that naturally, or by God's inſtitution, ſuperiority or dominion belonged to him; and the inſtances there brought by our author are but ſlender proofs of a right to civil power and dominion in the firſt-born, and do rather ſhew the contrary.

§. 112. His words are in the forecited place: "And therefore we find "God told Cain of his brother Abel, his deſire ſhall be ſubject unto thee, "and thou ſhalt rule over him." To which I anſwer,

1. These words of God to Cain, are by many interpreters, with great reaſon, underſtood in a quite different ſenſe than what our author uſes them in.

2. Whatever was meant by them, it could not be, that Cain, as elder, had a natural dominion over Abel; for the words are conditional, "If thou "doſt well;" and ſo perſonal to Cain: and whatever was ſignified by them, did depend on his carriage, and not follow his birth-right; and therefore could by no means be an eſtabliſhment of dominion in the firſt-born in general: for before this Abel had his "diſtinct territories by right of private dominion," as our author himſelf confeſſes, Obſervations, 210. which he could not have had to the prejudice of the heir's title, "if by divine inſtitution," Cain as heir were to inherit all his father's dominion.

3. If this were intended by God as the charter of primogeniture, and the grant of dominion to the elder brothers in general as ſuch, by right of inheritance; we might expect it ſhould have included all his brethren: for we may well ſuppoſe, Adam, from whom the world was to be peopled, had by this time, that theſe were grown up to be men, more ſons than theſe two: whereas Abel himſelf is not ſo much as named; and the words in the original can ſcarce, with any good conſtruction, be applied to him.

4. It is too much to build a doctrine of ſo mighty conſequence upon ſo doubtful and obſcure a place of ſcripture, which may be well, nay better, underſtood in a quite different ſenſe, and ſo can be but an ill proof, being as doubtful as the thing to be proved by it; eſpecially when there is nothing elſe in ſcripture or reaſon to be found, that favours or ſupports it.

§. 113. It follows, p. 19. "Accordingly when Jacob bought his bro-"ther's birth-right, Iſaac bleſſed him thus; Be lord over thy brethren, and "let the ſons of thy mother bow before thee." Another inſtance, I take it, brought by our author to evince dominion due to birth-right, and an admirable one it is: for it muſt be no ordinary way of reaſoning in a man, that is pleading for the natural power of kings, and againſt all compact, to bring for proof of it, an example, where his own account of it founds all the right upon compact, and ſettles empire in the younger brother, unleſs buying and ſelling be no compact; for he tells us, "when Jacob bought his brother's birth-right." But paſſing by that, let us conſider the hiſtory itſelf, with what uſe our author makes of it, and we ſhall find the following miſtakes about it.

1. That our author reports this, as if Iſaac had given Jacob this bleſſing, immediately upon his purchaſing the birth-right; for he ſays, "when Jacob

" bought, Iſaac bleſſed him;" which is plainly otherwiſe in the ſcripture: for it appears, there was a diſtance of time between, and if we will take the ſtory in the order it lies, it muſt be no ſmall diſtance; all Iſaac's ſojourning in Gerar, and tranſactions with Abimelech, Gen. xxvi. coming between; Rebecca being then beautiful, and conſequently young: but Iſaac, when he bleſſed Jacob, was old and decrepit: and Eſau alſo complains of Jacob, Gen. xxvii. 36. that two times he had ſupplanted him; " he took away my birth-" right, ſays he, and behold now he hath taken away my bleſſing;" words, that I think ſignify diſtance of time and difference of action.

2. Another miſtake of our author's is, that he ſuppoſes Iſaac gave Jacob the bleſſing, and bid him be " lord over his brethren," becauſe he had the birth-right; for our author brings this example to prove, that he that has the birth-right, has thereby a right to " be lord over his brethren." But it is alſo manifeſt by the text, that Iſaac had no conſideration of Jacob's having bought the birth-right; for when he bleſſed him, he conſidered him not as Jacob, but took him for Eſau. Nor did Eſau underſtand any ſuch connection between birth-right and the bleſſing; for he ſays, " He hath ſup-" planted me theſe two times, he took away my birth-right, and behold " now he hath taken away my bleſſing:" whereas had the bleſſing, which was to be " lord over his brethren," belonged to the birth-right, Eſau could not have complained of this ſecond, as a cheat, Jacob having got nothing but what Eſau had ſold him, when he ſold him his birth-right; ſo that it is plain, dominion, if theſe words ſignify it, was not underſtood to belong to the birth-right.

§. 114. And that in thoſe days of the patriarchs, dominion was not underſtood to be the right of the heir, but only a greater portion of goods, is plain from Gen. xxi. 10. for Sarah, taking Iſaac to be heir, ſays, " caſt out " this bondwoman and her ſon, for the ſon of this bondwoman ſhall not be " heir with my ſon:" whereby could be meant nothing, but that he ſhould not have a pretence to an equal ſhare of his father's eſtate after his death, but ſhould have his portion preſently, and be gone. Accordingly we read, Gen. xxv. 5, 6. " That Abraham gave all that he had unto Iſaac, but unto the " ſons of the concubines which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and ſent " them away from Iſaac his ſon, while he yet lived." That is, Abraham having given portions to all his other ſons, and ſent them away, that which he had reſerved, being the greateſt part of his ſubſtance, Iſaac as heir poſſeſſed after his death: but by being heir, he had no right to be " lord over his " brethren;" for if he had, why ſhould Sarah endeavour to rob him of one of his ſubjects, or leſſen the number of his ſlaves, by deſiring to have Iſhmael ſent away?

§. 115. Thus, as under the law, the privilege of birth-right was nothing but a double portion: ſo we ſee that before Moſes, in the patriarchs time, from whence our author pretends to take his model, there was no knowledge, no thought, that birth-right gave rule or empire, paternal or kingly authority, to any one over his brethren. If this be not plain enough in the ſtory of Iſaac and Iſhmael, he that will look into 1 Chron. v. 12. may there read theſe words: "Reuben was the firſt-born: but foraſmuch as he defiled "his father's bed, his birth-right was given unto the ſons of Joſeph, the ſon "of Iſrael: and the genealogy is not to be reckoned after the birth-right; "for Judah prevailed above his brethren, and of him came the chief ruler; "but the birth-right was Joſeph's." What this birth-right was, Jacob bleſſing Joſeph, Gen. xlviii. 22. telleth us in theſe words, "Moreover I have "given thee one portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand "of the Amorite, with my ſword and with my bow." Whereby it is not only plain that the birth-right was nothing but a double portion, but the text in Chronicles is expreſs againſt our author's doctrine, and ſhews that dominion was no part of the birth-right; for it tells us, that Joſeph had the birth-right, but Judah the dominion. One would think our author were very fond of the very name of birth-right, when he brings this inſtance of Jacob and Eſau, to prove that dominion belngs to the heir over his brethren.

§. 116. 1. Because it will be but an ill example to prove, that dominion by God's ordination belonged to the eldeſt ſon, becauſe Jacob the youngeſt here had it, let him come by it how he would: for if it prove any thing, it can only prove, againſt our author, that the "aſſignment of dominion to the "eldeſt is not by divine inſtitution," which would then be unalterable: for if by the law of God, or nature, abſolute power and empire belongs to the eldeſt ſon and his heirs, ſo that they are ſupreme monarchs, and all the reſt of their brethren ſlaves, our author gives us reaſon to doubt whether the eldeſt ſon has a power to part with it, to the prejudice of his poſterity, ſince he tells us, Obſervations, 158. "That in grants and gifts that have their original from "God or nature, no inferior power of man can limit, or make any law of "preſcription againſt them."

§. 117. 2. Because this place, Gen. xxvii. 29. brought by our author, concerns not at all the dominion of one brother over the other, nor the ſubjection of Eſau to Jacob: for it is plain in hiſtory, that Eſau was never ſubject to Jacob, but lived apart in mount Seir, where he founded a diſtinct people and government, and was himſelf prince over them, as much as Jacob was in his own family. The text, if conſidered, can never be underſtood of Eſau himſelf, or the perſonal dominion of Jacob over him: for the words brethren and ſons of thy mother, could not be uſed literally by Iſaac, who knew Jacob had only one brother; and theſe words are ſo far from being true in a literal ſenſe, or eſtabliſhing any dominion in Jacob over Eſau, that in the ſtory we find the quite contrary, for Gen. xxxii. Jacob ſeveral times calls Eſau lord, and himſelf his ſervant; and Gen. xxxiii. "he bowed himſelf ſeven times to "the ground to Eſau." Whether Eſau then were a ſubject and vaſſal (nay, as our author tells us, all ſubjects are ſlaves) to Jacob, and Jacob his ſovereign prince by birth-right, I leave the reader to judge; and to believe if he can, that theſe words of Iſaac, "be lord over thy brethren, and let thy mother's "ſons bow down to thee," confirmed Jacob in a ſovereignty over Eſau, upon the account of the birth-right he had got from him.

§. 118. He that reads the ſtory of Jacob and Eſau, will find there was never any juriſdiction, or authority, that either of them had over the other, after their father's death: they lived with the friendſhip and equality of brethren, neither lord, neither ſlave to his brother; but independent of each other, were both heads of their diſtinct families, where they received no laws from one another, but lived ſeparately, and were the roots out of which ſprang two diſtinct people under two diſtinct governments. This bleſſing then of Iſaac, whereon our author would build the dominion of the elder brother, ſignifies no more, but what Rebecca had been told from God, Gen. xxv. 23: "Two nations are in thy womb, and two manner of people ſhall be ſeparated from thy bowels, and the one people ſhall be ſtronger than the other people, and the elder ſhall ſerve the younger; and ſo Jacob bleſſed Judah," Gen. xlix. and gave him the ſcepter and dominion, from whence our author might have argued as well, that juriſdiction and dominion belongs to the third ſon over his brethren, as well as from this bleſſing of Iſaac, that it belonged to Jacob; both theſe places contain only predictions of what ſhould long after happen to their poſterities, and not any declaration of the right of inheritance to dominion in either. And thus we have our author's two great and only arguments to prove, that "heirs are lords over their brethren."

1. Because God tells Cain, Gen. iv. that however ſin might ſet upon him, he ought or might be maſter of it: for the moſt learned interpreters underſtood the words of ſin, and not of Abel, and give ſo ſtrong reaſons for it, that nothing can convincingly be inferred, from ſo doubtful a text, to our author's purpoſe.

2. Because in this of Gen. xxvii. Iſaac foretels that the Iſraelites, the poſterity of Jacob, ſhould have dominion over the Edomites, the poſterity of Eſau; therefore ſays our author, "heirs are lords of their brethren:" I leave any one to judge of the concluſion.

§. 119. And now we ſee our author has provided for the deſcending, and conveyance down of Adam's monarchical power, or paternal dominion to poſterity, by the inheritance of his heir, ſucceeding to all his father's authority, and becoming upon his death as much lord as his father was, "not only over his own children, but over his brethren," and all deſcended from his father, and ſo in infinitum. But yet who this heir is, he does not once tell us; and all the light we have from him in this ſo fundamental a point, is only, that in his inſtance of Jacob, by uſing the word birth-right, as that which paſſed from Eſau to Jacob, he leaves us to gueſs, that by heir, he means the eldeſt ſon; though I do not remember he any where mentions expreſly the title of the firſt-born, but all along keeps himſelf under the ſhelter of the indefinite term heir. But taking it to be his meaning, that the eldeſt ſon is heir, (for if the eldeſt be not, there will be no pretence why the ſons ſhould not be all heirs alike) and ſo by right of primogeniture has dominion over his brethren; this is but one ſtep towards the ſettlement of ſucceſſion, and the difficulties remain ſtill as much as ever, till he can ſhew us who is meant by right heir, in all thoſe caſes, which may happen where the preſent poſſeſſor hath no ſon. This he ſilently paſſes over, and perhaps wiſely too: for what can be wiſer, after one has affirmed, that "the perſon having that power, as well as the power and form of government, is the ordinance of

"God, and by divine inſtitution," vid. Obſervations, 254. p. 12. than to be careful, not to ſtart any queſtion concerning the perſon, the reſolution whereof will certainly lead him into a confeſſion, that God and nature hath determined nothing about him? And if our author cannot ſhew who by right of nature, or a clear poſitive law of God, has the next right to inherit the dominion of this natural monarch he has been at ſuch pains about, when he died without a ſon, he might have ſpared his pains in all the reſt, it being more neceſſary for the ſettling men's conſciences, and determining their ſubjection and allegiance, to ſhew them who by original right, ſuperior and antecedent to the will, or any act of men, hath a title to this paternal juriſdiction, than it is to ſhew that by nature there was ſuch a juriſdiction; it being to no purpoſe for me to know there is ſuch a paternal power, which I ought, and am diſpoſed to obey, unleſs, where there are many pretenders, I alſo know the perſon that is rightfully inveſted and endowed with it.

§. 120. For the main matter in queſtion being concerning the duty of my obedience, and the obligation of conſcience I am under to pay it to him that is of right my lord and ruler, I muſt know the perſon that this right of paternal power reſides in, and ſo impowers him to claim obedience from me: for let it be true what he ſays, p. 12. "That civil power not only in general is "by divine inſtitution, but even the aſſignment of it ſpecially to the eldeſt "parents;" and Obſervations, 254. "That not only the power or right of "government, but the form of the power of governing, and the perſon "having that power, are all the ordinance of God;" yet unleſs he ſhew us in all caſes who is this perſon, ordained by God, who is this eldeſt parent; all his abſtract notions of monarchical power will ſignify juſt nothing, when they are to be reduced to practice, and men are conſcientiouſly to pay their obedience: for paternal juriſdiction being not the thing to be obeyed, becauſe it cannot command, but is only that which gives one man a right which another hath not, and if it come by inheritance, another man cannot have, to command and be obeyed; it is ridiculous to ſay, I pay obedience to the paternal power, when I obey him, to whom paternal power gives no right to my obedience: for he can have no divine right to my obedience, who cannot ſhew his divine right to the power of ruling over me, as well as that by divine right there is ſuch a power in the world.

§. 121. And hence not being able to make out any prince's title to government, as heir to Adam, which therefore is of no uſe, and had been better let alone, he is fain to reſolve all into preſent poſſeſſion, and makes civil obedience as due to an uſurper, as to a lawful king; and thereby the uſurper's title as good. His words are, Obſervations, 253. and they deſerve to be remembered: "If an uſurper diſpoſſeſs the true heir, the ſubjects obedience to the "fatherly power muſt go along, and wait upon God's providence." But I ſhall leave his title of uſurpers to be examined in its due place, and deſire my ſober reader to conſider what thanks princes owe ſuch politicks as this, which can ſuppoſe paternal power, i. e. a right to goverment in the hands of a Cade, or a Cromwell; and ſo all obedience being due to paternal power, the obedience of ſubjects will be due to them, by the ſame right, and upon as good grounds, as it is to lawful princes; and yet this, as dangerous a doctrine as it is, muſt neceſſarily follow from making all political power to be nothing elſe, but Adam's paternal power by right and divine inſtitution, deſcending from him without being able to ſhew to whom it deſcended, or who is heir to it.

§. 122. To ſettle government in the world, and to lay obligations to obedience on any man's conſcience, it is as neceſſary (ſuppoſing with our author that all power be nothing but the being poſſeſſed of Adam's fatherhood) to ſatisfy him, who has a right to this power, this fatherhood, when the poſſeſſor dies, without ſons to ſucceed immediately to it; as it was to tell him, that upon the death of the father, the eldeſt ſon had a right to it: for it is ſtill to be remembered, that the great queſtion is, (and that which our author would be thought to contend for, if he did not ſometimes forget it) what perſons have a right to be obeyed, and not whether there be a power in the world, which is to be called paternal, without knowing in whom it reſides: for ſo it be a power, i. e. right to govern, it matters not, whether it be termed paternal or regal, natural or acquired; whether you call it ſupreme fatherhood, or ſupreme brotherhood, will be all one, provided we know who has it.

§. 123. I GO on then to aſk, whether in the inheriting of this paternal power, this ſupreme fatherhood, the grandſon by a daughter hath a right before a nephew by a brother? Whether the grandſon by the eldeſt ſon, being an infant, before the younger ſon, a man and able? Whether the daughter before the uncle? or any other man, deſcended by a male line? Whether a grandſon by a younger daughter, before a grand-daughter by an elder daughter? Whether the elder ſon by a concubine, before a younger ſon by a wife? From whence alſo will ariſe many queſtions of legitimation, and what in nature is the difference betwixt a wife and a concubine? for as to the municipal or poſitive laws of men, they can ſignify nothing here. It may farther be aſked, Whether the eldeſt ſon, being a fool, ſhall inherit this paternal power, before the younger, a wiſe man? and what degree of folly it muſt be that ſhall exclude him? and who ſhall be judge of it? Whether the ſon of a fool, excluded for his folly, before the ſon of his wiſe brother who reigned? Who has the paternal power whilſt the widow-queen is with child by the deceaſed king, and nobody knows whether it will be a ſon or a daughter? Which ſhall be heir of the two male-twins, who by the diſſection of the mother were laid open to the world? Whether a ſiſter by the half blood, before a brother's daughter by the whole blood?

§. 124. THESE, and many more ſuch doubts, might be propoſed about the titles of ſucceſſion, and the right of inheritance; and that not as idle ſpeculations, but ſuch as in hiſtory we ſhall find have concerned the inheritance of crowns and kingdoms; and if our's want them, we need not go farther for famous examples of it, than the other kingdom in this very iſland, which having been fully related by the ingenious and learned author of Patriarcha non Monarcha, I need ſay no more of. Till our author hath reſolved all the doubts that may ariſe about the next heir, and ſhewed that they are plainly determined by the law of nature, or the revealed law of God, all his ſuppoſitions of a monarchical, abſolute, ſupreme, paternal power in Adam, and the deſcent of that power to his heirs, would not be of the leaſt uſe to eſtabliſh the authority, or make out the title, of any one prince now on earth; but would rather unſettle and bring all into queſtion: for let our author tell us as long as he pleaſes, and let all men believe it too, that Adam had a paternal, and thereby a monarchical power; that this (the only power in the world) deſcended to his heirs; and that there is no other power in the world but this: let this be all as clear demonſtration, as it is manifeſt error, yet if it be not paſt doubt, to whom this paternal power deſcends, and whoſe now it is, nobody can be under any obligation of obedience, unleſs any one will ſay, that I am bound to pay obedience to paternal power in a man who has no more paternal power than I myſelf; which is all one as to ſay, I obey a man, becauſe he has a right to govern; and if I be aſked, how I know he has a right to govern, I ſhould anſwer, it cannot be known, that he has any at all: for that cannot be the reaſon of my obedience, which I know not to be ſo; much leſs can that be a reaſon of my obedience, which no body at all can know to be ſo.

§. 125. And therefore all this ado about Adam's fatherhood, the greatneſs of its power, and the neceſſity of its ſuppoſal, helps nothing to eſtabliſh the power of thoſe that govern, or to determine the obedience of ſubjects who are to obey, if they cannot tell whom they are to obey, or it cannot be known who are to govern, and who to obey. In the ſtate the world is now, it is irrecoverably ignorant, who is Adam's heir. This fatherhood, this monarchical power of Adam, deſcending to his heirs, would be of no more uſe to the government of mankind, than it would be to the quieting of mens conſciences, or ſecuring their healths, if our author had aſſured them, that Adam had a power to forgive ſins, or cure diſeaſes, which by divine inſtitution deſcended to his heir, whilſt this heir is impoſſible to be known. And ſhould not he do as rationally, who upon this aſſurance of our author, went and confeſſed his ſins, and expected a good abſolution; or took phyſick with expectation of health, from any one who had taken on himſelf the name of prieſt or phyſician, or thruſt himſelf into thoſe employments, ſaying, I acquieſce in the abſolving power deſcending from Adam, or I ſhall be cured by the medicinal power deſcending from Adam; as he who ſays, I ſubmit to and obey the paternal power deſcending from Adam, when it is confeſſed all theſe powers deſcend only to his ſingle heir, and that heir is unknown?

§. 126. It is true, the civil lawyers have pretended to determine ſome of theſe caſes concerning the ſucceſſion of princes; but by our author's principles they have meddled in a matter that belongs not to them: for if all political power be derived only from Adam, and be to deſcend only to his ſucceſſive heirs, by the ordinance of God and divine inſtitution, this is a right antecedent and paramount to all government; and therefore the poſitive laws of men cannot determine that, which is itſelf the foundation of all law and government, and is to receive its rule only from the law of God and nature. And that being ſilent in the caſe, I am apt to think there is no ſuch right to be conveyed this way: I am ſure it would be to no purpoſe if there were, and men would be more at a loſs concerning government, and obedience to governors, than if there were no ſuch right; ſince by poſitive laws and compact, which divine inſtitution (if there be any) ſhuts out, all theſe endleſs inextricable doubts can be ſafely provided againſt: but it can never be underſtood, how a divine natural right, and that of ſuch moment as is all order and peace in the world, ſhould be conveyed down to poſterity, without any plain natural or divine rule concerning it. And there would be an end of all civil government, if the aſſignment of civil power were by divine inſtitution to the heir, and yet by that divine inſtitution the perſon of the heir could not be known. This paternal regal power being by divine right only his, it leaves no room for human prudence, or conſent, to place it any where elſe; for if only one man hath a divine right to the obedience of mankind, no body can claim that obedience, but he that can ſhew that right; nor can men's conſciences by any other pretence be obliged to it. And thus this doctrine cuts up all government by the roots.

§. 127. Thus we ſee how our author, laying it for a ſure foundation, that the very perſon that is to rule, is the ordinance of God, and by divine inſtitution, tells us at large, only that this perſon is the heir, but who this heir is, he leaves us to gueſs; and ſo this divine inſtitution, which aſſigns it to a perſon whom we have no rule to know, is juſt as good as an aſſignment to no body at all. But whatever our author does, divine inſtitution makes no ſuch ridiculous aſſignments: nor can God be ſuppoſed to make it a ſacred law, that one certain perſon ſhould have a right to ſomething, and yet not give rules to mark out, and know that perſon by, or give an heir a divine right to power, and yet not point out who that heir is. It is rather to be thought, that an heir had no ſuch right by divine inſtitution, than that God ſhould give ſuch a right to the heir, but yet leave it doubtful and undeterminable who ſuch heir is.

§. 128. If God had given the land of Canaan to Abraham, and in general terms to ſome body after him, without naming his ſeed, whereby it might be known who that ſome body was, it would have been as good and uſeful an aſſignment, to determine the right to the land of Canaan, as it would be the determining the right of crowns, to give empire to Adam and his ſucceſſive heirs after him, without telling who his heir is: for the word heir, without a rule to know who it is, ſignifies no more than ſome body, I know not whom. God making it a divine inſtitution, that men ſhould not marry thoſe who were of near kin, thinks it not enough to ſay, "none of you ſhall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedneſs;" but moreover, gives rules to know who are thoſe near of kin, forbidden by divine inſtitution; or elſe that law would have been of no uſe, it being to no purpoſe to lay reſtraint, or give privileges to men, in ſuch general terms, as the particular perſon concerned cannot be known by. But God not having any where ſaid, the next heir ſhall inherit all his father's eſtate or dominion, we are not to wonder, that he hath no where appointed who that heir ſhould be; for never having intended any ſuch thing, never deſigned any heir in that ſenſe, we cannot expect he ſhould any where nominate, or appoint any perſon to it, as we might, had it been otherwiſe. And therefore in ſcripture, though the word heir occur, yet there is no ſuch thing as heir in our author's ſenſe, one that was by right of nature to inherit all that his father had, excluſive of his brethren. Hence Sarah ſuppoſes, that if Iſhmael ſtaid in the houſe, to ſhare in Abraham's eſtate after his death, this ſon of a bond-woman might be heir with Iſaac; and therefore, ſays ſhe, "caſt out this bond-woman and her "ſon, for the ſon of this bond-woman ſhall not be heir with my ſon:" but this cannot excuſe our author, who telling us there is, in every number of men, one who is right and next heir to Adam, ought to have told us what the laws of deſcent are: but he having been ſo ſparing to inſtruct us by rules, how to know who is heir, let us ſee in the next place, what his hiſtory out of ſcripture, on which he pretends wholly to build his government, gives us in this neceſſary and fundamental point.

§. 129. Our author, to make good the title of his book, p. 13. begins his hiſtory of the deſcent of Adam's regal power, p. 13. in theſe words: "This "lordſhip which Adam by command had over the whole world, and by "right deſcending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy, was a large," &c. How does he prove that the patriarchs by deſcent did enjoy it? for "dominion "of life and death, ſays he, we find, Judah the father pronounced ſentence "of death againſt Thamar his daughter in law for playing the harlot," p. 13. How does this prove that Judah had abſolute and ſovereign authority? "he pro-"nounced ſentence of death." The pronouncing of ſentence of death is not a certain mark of ſovereignty, but uſually the office of inferior magiſtrates. The power of making laws of life and death is indeed a mark of ſovereignty, but pronouncing the ſentence according to thoſe laws, may be done by others, and therefore this will but ill prove that he had ſovereign authority: as if one ſhould ſay, Judge Jefferies pronounced ſentence of death in the late times, therefore Judge Jefferies had ſovereign authority. But it will be ſaid, Judah did it not by commiſſion from another, and therefore did it in his own right. Who knows whether he had any right at all? heat of paſſion might carry him to do that which he had no authority to do. "Judah had "dominion of life and death:" how does that appear? He exerciſed it, he "pronounced ſentence of death againſt Thamar:" our author thinks it is very good proof, that becauſe he did it, therefore he had a right to do it: he lay with her alſo: by the ſame way of proof, he had a right to do that too. If the conſequence be good from doing, to a right of doing, Abſalom too may be reckoned amongſt our author's ſovereigns, for he pronounced ſuch a ſentence of death againſt his brother Amnon, and much upon a like occaſion, and had it executed too, if that be ſufficient to prove a dominion of life and death.

But allowing this all to be clear demonſtration of ſovereign power, who was it that had this "lordſhip by right deſcending to him from Adam, as "large and ample as the abſoluteſt dominion of any monarch?" Judah, ſays our author, Judah a younger ſon of Jacob, his father and elder brethren living; ſo that if our author's own proof be to be taken, a younger brother may, in the life of his father and elder brothers, "by right of deſcent, enjoy

“ Adam's monarchical power ;” and if one ſo qualified may be monarch by deſcent, why may not every man ? if Judah, his father and elder brother living, were one of Adam's heirs, I know not who can be excluded from this inheritance ; all men by inheritance may be monarchs as well as Judah.

§. 130. “ Touching war, we ſee that Abraham commanded an army of “ 318 ſoldiers of his own family, and Eſau met his brother Jacob with 400 “ men at arms : for matter of peace, Abraham made a league with Abimelech,” &c. p. 13. Is it not poſſible for a man to have 318 men in his family, without being heir to Adam ? A planter in the Weſt Indies has more, and might, if he pleaſed, (who doubts ?) muſter them up and lead them out againſt the Indians, to ſeek reparation upon any injury received from them ; and all this without the “ abſolute dominion of a monarch, deſcending to him “ from Adam.” Would it not be an admirable argument to prove, that all power by God's inſtitution deſcended from Adam by inheritance, and that the very perſon and power of this planter were the ordinance of God, becauſe he had power in his family over ſervants, born in his houſe, and bought with his money ? For this was juſt Abraham's caſe ; thoſe who were rich in the patriarch's days, as in the Weſt Indies now, bought men and maid ſervants, and by their increaſe, as well as purchaſing of new, came to have large and numerous families, which though they made uſe of in war or peace, can it be thought the power they had over them was an inheritance deſcended from Adam, when it was the purchaſe of their money ? A man's riding in an expedition againſt an enemy, his horſe bought in a fair, would be as good a proof that the owner “ enjoyed the lordſhip which Adam by command had “ over the whole world, by right deſcending to him,” as Abraham's leading out the ſervants of his family is, that the patriarchs enjoyed this lordſhip by deſcent from Adam : ſince the title to the power, the maſter had in both caſes, whether over ſlaves or horſes, was only from his purchaſe ; and the getting a dominion over any thing by bargain and money, is a new way of proving one had it by deſcent and inheritance.

§. 131. “ But making war and peace are marks of ſovereignty.” Let it be ſo in politick ſocieties : may not therefore a man in the Weſt Indies, who hath with him ſons of his own, friends, or companions, ſoldiers under pay, or ſlaves bought with money, or perhaps a band made up of all theſe, make war and peace, if there ſhould be occaſion, and “ ratify the articles too with “ an oath,” without being a ſovereign, an abſolute king over thoſe who went with him ? He that ſays he cannot, muſt then allow many maſters of ſhips, many private planters, to be abſolute monarchs, for as much as this they have done. War and peace cannot be made for politick ſocieties, but by the ſupreme power of ſuch ſocieties ; becauſe war and peace, giving a different motion to the force of ſuch a politick body, none can make war or peace, but that which has the direction of the force of the whole body, and that in politick ſocieties is only the ſupreme power. In voluntary ſocieties for the time, he that has ſuch a power by conſent, may make war and peace, and ſo may a ſingle man for himſelf, the ſtate of war not conſiſting in the number of partiſans, but the enmity of the parties, where they have no ſuperior to appeal to.

§. 132.

§. 132. The actual making of war or peace is no proof of any other power, but only of diſpoſing thoſe to exerciſe or ceaſe acts of enmity for whom he makes it; and this power in many caſes any one may have without any politick ſupremacy: and therefore the making of war or peace will not prove that every one that does ſo is a politick ruler, much leſs a king; for then commonwealths muſt be kings too, for they do as certainly make war and peace as monarchical government.

§. 133. But granting this a "mark of ſovereignty in Abraham," is it a proof of the deſcent to him of Adam's ſovereignty over the whole world? If it be, it will ſurely be as good a proof of the deſcent of Adam's lordſhip to others too. And then commonwealths, as well as Abraham, will be heirs of Adam, for they make war and peace, as well as he. If you ſay, that the "lordſhip of Adam" doth not by right deſcend to commonwealths, though they make war and peace, the ſame ſay I of Abraham, and then there is an end of your argument: if you ſtand to your argument, and ſay thoſe that do make war and peace, as commonwealths do without doubt, "do inherit "Adam's lordſhip," there is an end of your monarchy, unleſs you will ſay, that commonwealths "by deſcent enjoying Adam's lordſhip" are monarchies; and that indeed would be a new way of making all the governments in the world monarchical.

§. 134. To give our author the honour of this new invention, for I confeſs it is not I have firſt found it out by tracing his principles, and ſo charged it on him, it is fit my readers know that (as abſurd as it may ſeem) he teaches it himſelf, p. 23. where he ingenuouſly ſays, "In all kingdoms and common-"wealths in the world, whether the prince be the ſupreme father of the "people, or but the true heir to ſuch a father, or come to the crown by "uſurpation or election, or whether ſome few or a multitude govern the "commonwealth; yet ſtill the authority that is in any one, or in many, or in "all theſe, is the only right, and natural authority of a ſupreme father;" which right of fatherhood, he often tells us, is "regal and royal authority;" as particularly, p. 12. the page immediately preceding this inſtance of Abraham. This regal authority, he ſays, thoſe that govern commonwealths have; and if it be true, that regal and royal authority be in thoſe that govern commonwealths, it is as true that commonwealths are governed by kings; for if regal authority be in him that governs, he that governs muſt needs be a king, and ſo all commonwealths are nothing but downright monarchies; and then what need any more ado about the matter? The governments of the world are as they ſhould be, there is nothing but monarchy in it. This, without doubt, was the ſureſt way our author could have found, to turn all other governments, but monarchical, out of the world.

§. 135. But all this ſcarce proves Abraham to have been a king as heir to Adam. If by inheritance he had been king, Lot, who was of the ſame family, muſt needs have been his ſubject, by that title, before the ſervants in his family; but we ſee they lived as friends and equals, and when their herdſmen could not agree, there was no pretence of juriſdiction or ſuperiority between them, but they parted by conſent, Gen. xiii. hence he is called both by Abraham, and by the text, Abraham's brother, the name of friendſhip and equality, and not of juriſdiction and authority, though he were really but his nephew. And if our author knows that Abraham was Adam's heir, and a king, it was more, it ſeems, than Abraham himſelf knew, or his ſervant whom he ſent a wooing for his ſon; for when he ſets out the advantages of the match, Gen. xxiv. 35. thereby to prevail with the young woman and her friends, he ſays, "I am Abraham's ſervant, and the lord hath bleſſed my "maſter greatly, and he is become great; and he hath given him flocks and "herds, and ſilver and gold, and men-ſervants and maid-ſervants, and camels "and aſſes; and Sarah, my maſter's wife, bare a ſon to my maſter when ſhe "was old, and unto him hath he given all he hath." Can one think that a diſcreet ſervant, that was thus particular to ſet out his maſter's greatneſs, would have omitted the crown Iſaac was to have, if he had known of any ſuch? Can it be imagined he ſhould have neglected to have told them on ſuch an occaſion as this, that Abraham was a king, a name well known at that time, for he had nine of them his neighbours, if he or his maſter had thought any ſuch thing, the likelieſt matter of all the reſt, to make his errand ſucceſsful?

§. 136. But this diſcovery it ſeems was reſerved for our author to make 2 or 3000 years after, and let him enjoy the credit of it; only he ſhould have taken care that ſome of Adam's land ſhould have deſcended to this his heir, as well as all Adam's lordſhip: for though this lordſhip which Abraham, (if we may believe our author) as well as the other patriarchs, "by right deſcend-"ing to him, did enjoy, was as large and ample as the abſoluteſt dominion "of any monarch which hath been ſince the creation;" yet his eſtate, his territories, his dominions were very narrow and ſcanty; for he had not the poſſeſſion of a foot of land, till he bought a field and a cave of the ſons of Heth to bury Sarah in.

§. 137. The inſtance of Eſau joined with this of Abraham, to prove that the "lordſhip which Adam had over the whole world, by right deſcending "from him, the patriarchs did enjoy," is yet more pleaſant than the former. "Eſau met his brother Jacob with 400 men at arms;" he therefore was a king by right of heir to Adam. Four hundred armed men then, however got together, are enough to prove him that leads them, to be a king and Adam's heir. There have been tories in Ireland, (whatever there are in other countries) who would have thanked our author for ſo honourable an opinion of them, eſpecially if there had been no body near with a better title of 500 armed men, to queſtion their royal authority of 400. It is a ſhame for men to trifle ſo, to ſay no worſe of it, in ſo ſerious an argument. Here Eſau is brought as a proof that Adam's lordſhip, "Adam's abſolute dominion, as "large as that of any monarch, deſcended by right to the patriarchs," and in this very chap. p. 19. Jacob is brought as an inſtance of one, that by "birth-"right was lord over his brethren." So we have here two brothers abſolute monarchs by the ſame title, and at the ſame time heirs to Adam; the eldeſt, heir to Adam, becauſe he met his brother with 400 men; and the youngeſt, heir to Adam by birth-right: "Eſau enjoyed the lordſhip which Adam had "over the whole world by right deſcending to him, in as large and ample

" manner, as the abſoluteſt dominion of any monarch; and at the ſame time, " Jacob lord over him, by the right heirs have to be lords over their brethren." Riſum teneatis? I never, I confeſs, met with any man of parts ſo dextrous as Sir Robert at this way of arguing: but it was his misfortune to light upon an hypotheſis, that could not be accommodated to the nature of things, and human affairs; his principles could not be made to agree with that conſtitution and order, which God had ſettled in the world, and therefore muſt needs often claſh with common ſenſe and experience.

§. 138. In the next ſection, he tells us, " This patriarchal power continued " not only till the flood, but after it, as the name patriarch doth in part prove." The word patriarch doth more than in part prove, that patriarchal power continued in the world as long as there were patriarchs, for it is neceſſary that patriarchal power ſhould be whilſt there are patriarchs; as it is neceſſary there ſhould be paternal or conjugal power whilſt there are fathers or huſbands; but this is but playing with names. That which he would fallaciouſly inſinuate is the thing in queſtion to be proved, viz. that the " lordſhip which " Adam had over the world, the ſuppoſed abſolute univerſal dominion of " Adam by right deſcending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy." If he affirms ſuch an abſolute monarchy continued to the flood, in the world, I would be glad to know what records he has it from; for I confeſs I cannot find a word of it in my Bible: if by patriarchal power he means any thing elſe, it is nothing to the matter in hand. And how the name patriarch in ſome part proves, that thoſe, who are called by that name, had abſolute monarchical power, I confeſs, I do not ſee, and therefore I think needs no anſwer till the argument from it be made out a little clearer.

§. 139. " The three ſons of Noah had the world, ſays our author, divided " amongſt them by their father, for of them was the whole world overſpread," p. 14. The world might be overſpread by the offspring of Noah's ſons, though he never divided the world amongſt them; for the earth might be repleniſhed without being divided: ſo that all our author's argument here proves no ſuch diviſion. However, I allow it to him, and then aſk, the world being divided amongſt them, which of the three was Adam's heir? If Adam's lordſhip, Adam's monarchy, by right deſcended only to the eldeſt, then the other two could be but his ſubjects, his ſlaves: if by right it deſcended to all three brothers, by the ſame right, it will deſcend to all mankind; and then it will be impoſſible what he ſays, p. 19. that " heirs are lords of their brethren," ſhould be true; but all brothers, and conſequently all men, will be equal and independent, all heirs to Adam's monarchy, and conſequently all monarchs too, one as much as another. But it will be ſaid, Noah their father divided the world amongſt them; ſo that our author will allow more to Noah, than he will to God almighty, for Obſervations, 211. he thought it hard, that, God himſelf ſhould give the world to Noah and his ſons, to the prejudice of Noah's birth-right: his words are, " Noah was left ſole heir to the world: " why ſhould it be thought that God would diſinherit him of his birth-right, " and make him, of all men in the world, the only tenant in common with " his children?" and yet here he thinks it fit that Noah ſhould diſinherit Shem of his birth-right, and divide the world betwixt him and his brethren; ſo that his birth-right, when our author pleaſes, muſt, and when he pleaſes muſt not, be ſacred and inviolable.

§. 140. If Noah did divide the world between his ſons, and his aſſignment of dominions to them were good, there is an end of divine inſtitution; all our author's diſcourſe of Adam's heir, with whatſoever he builds on it, is quite out of doors; the natural power of kings falls to the ground; and then "the form of the power governing, and the perſon having that power, will not be (as he ſays they are, Obſervations 254.) the ordinance of God, but they will be ordinances of man:" for if the right of the heir be the ordinance of God, a divine right, no man, father or not father, can alter it: if it be not a divine right, it is only human, depending on the will of man: and ſo where human inſtitution gives it not, the firſt-born has no right at all above his brethren; and men may put government into what hands, and under what form, they pleaſe.

§. 141. He goes on, "moſt of the civileſt nations of the earth labour to fetch their original from ſome of the ſons, or nephews of Noah," p. 14. How many do moſt of the civileſt nations amount to? and who are they? I fear the Chineſe, a very great and civil people, as well as ſeveral other people of the Eaſt, Weſt, North and South, trouble not themſelves much about this matter. All that believe the Bible, which I believe are our author's "moſt of the civileſt nations," muſt neceſſarily derive themſelves from Noah; but for the reſt of the world, they think little of his ſons or nephews. But if the heralds and antiquaries of all nations, for it is theſe men generally that labour to find out the originals of nations, or all the nations themſelves, "ſhould labour to fetch their original from ſome of the ſons or nephews of Noah," what would this be to prove, that the "lordſhip which Adam had over the whole world, by a right deſcended to the patriarchs?" Whoever, nations, or races of men, "labour to fetch their original from," may be concluded to be thought by them, men of renown, famous to poſterity, for the greatneſs of their virtues and actions; but beyond theſe they look not, nor conſider who they were heirs to, but look on them as ſuch as raiſed themſelves, by their own virtue, to a degree that would give luſtre to thoſe who in future ages could pretend to derive themſelves from them. But if it were Ogyges, Hercules, Brama, Tamberlain, Pharamond; nay, if Jupiter and Saturn were the names, from whence divers races of men, both ancient and modern, have laboured to derive their original; will that prove, that thoſe men "enjoyed the lordſhip of Adam, by right deſcending to them?" If not, this is but a flouriſh of our author's to miſlead his reader, that in itſelf ſignifies nothing.

§. 142. To as much purpoſe is what he tells us, p. 15. concerning this diviſion of the world, "That ſome ſay it was by Lot, and others that Noah ſailed round the Mediterreanean in ten years, and divided the world into Aſia, Africk and Europe, portions for his three ſons." America then, it ſeems, was left to be his that could catch it. Why our author takes ſuch pains to prove the diviſion of the world by Noah to his ſons, and will not leave out an imagination, though no better than a dream, that he can find any where to favour it, is hard to gueſs, ſince ſuch a diviſion, if it prove any thing, muſt neceſſarily take away the title of Adam's heir; unleſs three brothers can all together be heirs of Adam; and therefore the following words, "howſoever "the manner of this diviſion be uncertain, yet it is moſt certain the diviſion "was by families from Noah and his children, over which the parents were "heads and princes," p. 15. if allowed him to be true, and of any force to prove, that all the power in the world is nothing but the lordſhip of Adam's deſcending by right, they will only prove, that the fathers of the children are all heirs to this lordſhip of Adam: for if in thoſe days Cham and Japhet, and other parents, beſides the eldeſt ſon, were heads and princes over their families, and had a right to divide the earth by families, what hinders younger brothers, being fathers of families, from having the ſame right? If Cham and Japhet were princes by right deſcending to them, notwithſtanding any title of heir in their eldeſt brother, younger brothers by the ſame right deſcending to them are princes now; and ſo all our author's natural power of kings will reach no farther than their own children, and no kingdom, by this natural right, can be bigger than a family: for either this lordſhip of Adam over the whole world, by right deſcends only to the eldeſt ſon, and then there can be but one heir, as our author ſays, p. 19. or elſe, it by right deſcends to all the ſons equally, and then every father of a family will have it, as well as the three ſons of Noah: take which you will, it deſtroys the preſent governments and kingdoms, that are now in the world, ſince whoever has this natural power of a king, by right deſcending to him, muſt have it, either as our author tells us Cain had it, and be lord over his brethren, and ſo be alone king of the whole world; or elſe, as he tells us here, Shem, Cham and Japhet had it, three brothers, and ſo be only prince of his own family, and all families independent one of another: all the world muſt be only one empire by the right of the next heir, or elſe every family be a diſtinct government of itſelf, by the "lordſhip of Adam's deſcending to parents of families." And to this only tend all the proofs he here gives us of the deſcent of Adam's lordſhip: for continuing his ſtory of this deſcent, he ſays,

§. 143. "In the diſperſion of Babel, we muſt certainly find the eſtabliſhment "of royal power, throughout the kingdoms of the world," p. 14. If you muſt find it pray do, and you will help us to a new piece of hiſtory: but you muſt ſhew it us before we ſhall be bound to believe, that regal power was eſtabliſhed in the world upon your principles: for, that regal power was eſtabliſhed "in the kingdoms of the world," I think no body will diſpute; but that there ſhould be kingdoms in the world, whoſe ſeveral kings enjoyed their crowns, "by right deſcending to them from Adam," that we think not only apocryphal, but alſo utterly impoſſible. If our author has no better foundation for his monarchy than a ſuppoſition of what was done at the diſperſion of Babel, the monarchy he erects thereon, whoſe top is to reach to heaven, to unite mankind, will ſerve only to divide and ſcatter them as that tower did; and, inſtead of eſtabliſhing civil government and order in the world, will produce nothing but confuſion.

§. 144. For he tells us, the nations they were divided into, "were diſtinct "families, which had fathers for rulers over them; whereby it appears, "that even in the confuſion, God was careful to preſerve the fatherly au-"thority, by diſtributing the diverſity of languages according to the diverſity "of families," p. 14. It would have been a hard matter for any one but our author to have found out ſo plainly, in the text he here brings, that all the nations in that diſperſion were governed by fathers, and that "God was "careful to preſerve the fatherly authority." The words of the text are; "Theſe are the ſons of Shem after their families, after their tongues in their "lands, after their nations;" and the ſame thing is ſaid of Cham and Japhet, after an enumeration of their poſterities: in all which there is not one word ſaid of their governors, or forms of government; of fathers, or fatherly authority. But our author, who is very quick ſighted to ſpy out fatherhood, where no body elſe could ſee any the leaſt glimpſes of it, tells us poſitively their "rulers were fathers, and God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority;" and why? Becauſe thoſe of the ſame family ſpoke the ſame language, and ſo of neceſſity in the diviſion kept together. Juſt as if one ſhould argue thus: Hannibal in his army, conſiſting of divers nations, kept thoſe of the ſame language together; therefore fathers were captains of each band, and Hannibal was careful of the fatherly authority: or in peopling of Carolina, the Engliſh, French, Scotch and Welch that are there, plant themſelves together, and by them the country is divided "in their lands after their "tongues, after their families, after their nations;" therefore care was taken of the fatherly authority: or becauſe, in many parts of America, every little tribe was a diſtinct people, with a different language, one ſhould infer, that therefore "God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority," or that therefore their rulers "enjoyed Adam's lordſhip by right deſcending to them," though we know not who were their governors, nor what their form of government, but only that they were divided into little independent ſocieties, ſpeaking different languages.

§. 145. The ſcripture ſays not a word of their rulers or forms of government, but only gives an account, how mankind came to be divided into diſtinct languages and nations; and therefore it is not to argue from the authority of ſcripture, to tell us poſitively, fathers were their rulers, when the ſcripture ſays no ſuch thing; but to ſet up fancies of one's own brain, when we confidently aver matter of fact, where records are utterly ſilent. Upon a like ground, i. e. none at all, he ſays, "That they were not confuſed multitudes "without heads and governors, and at liberty to chooſe what governors or "governments they pleaſed."

§. 146. For I demand, when mankind were all yet of one language, all congregated in the plain of Shinar, were they then all under one monarch, "who enjoyed the lordſhip of Adam by right deſcending to him?" If they were not, there were then no thoughts, it is plain, of Adam's heir, no right to government known then upon that title; no care taken, by God or man, of Adam's fatherly authority. If when mankind were but one people, dwelt all together, and were of one language, and were upon building a city together;

and when it is plain, they could not but know the right heir, for Shem lived till Iſaac's time, a long while after the diviſion at Babel; if then, I ſay, they were not under the monarchical government of Adam's fatherhood, by right deſcending to the heir, it is plain there was no regard had to the fatherhood, no monarchy acknowledged due to Adam's heir, no empire of Shem's in Aſia, and conſequently no ſuch diviſion of the world by Noah, as our author has talked of. As far as we can conclude any thing from ſcripture in this matter, it ſeems from this place, that if they had any government, it was rather a commonwealth than an abſolute monarchy: for the ſcripture tells us, Gen. xi. ‘ They ſaid:” it was not a prince commanded the building of this city and tower, it was not by the command of one monarch, but by the conſultation of many, a free people; “ let us build us a city:” they built it for themſelves as free-men, not as ſlaves for their lord and maſter: “ that we be not ſcattered abroad;” having a city once built, and fixed habitations to ſettle our abodes and families. This was the conſultation and deſign of a people, that were at liberty to part aſunder, but deſired to keep in one body, and could not have been either neceſſary or likely in men tied together under the government of one monarch, who if they had been, as our author tells us, all ſlaves under the abſolute dominion of a monarch, needed not have taken ſuch care to hinder themſelves from wandering out of the reach of his dominion. I demand whether this be not plainer in ſcripture than any thing of Adam's heir or fatherly authority?

§. 147. BUT if being, as God ſays, Gen. xi. 6. one people, they had one ruler, one king by natural right, abſolute and ſupreme over them, “ what care had God to preſerve the paternal authority of the ſupreme fatherhood,” if on a ſudden he ſuffer 72 (for ſo many our author talks of) diſtinct nations to be erected out of it, under diſtinct governors, and at once to withdraw themſelves from the obedience of their ſovereign? This is to intitle God's care how, and to what we pleaſe. Can it be ſenſe to ſay, that God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority in thoſe who had it not? for if theſe were ſubjects under a ſupreme prince, what authority had they? Was it an inſtance of God's care to preſerve the fatherly authority, when he took away the true ſupreme fatherhood of the natural monarch? Can it be reaſon to ſay, that God, for the preſervation of fatherly authority, lets ſeveral new governments with their governors ſtart up, who could not all have fatherly authority? And is it not as much reaſon to ſay, that God is careful to deſtroy fatherly authority, when he ſuffers one, who is in poſſeſſion of it, to have his government torn in pieces, and ſhared by ſeveral of his ſubjects? Would it not be an argument juſt like this, for monarchical government, to ſay, when any monarchy was ſhattered to pieces, and divided amongſt revolted ſubjects, that God was careful to preſerve monarchical power, by rending a ſettled empire into a multitude of little governments? If any one will ſay, that what happens in providence to be preſerved, God is careful to preſerve as a thing therefore to be eſteemed by men as neceſſary or uſeful, it is a peculiar propriety of ſpeech, which every one will not think fit to imitate: but this I am ſure is impoſſible to be either proper, or true ſpeaking, that Shem, for example, (for he was then alive,) ſhould have fatherly authority, or ſovereignty by right of fatherhood, over that one people at Babel, and that the next moment, Shem yet living, 72 others ſhould have fatherly authority, or ſovereignty by right of fatherhood, over the ſame people, divided into ſo many diſtinct governments: either theſe 72 fathers actually were rulers, juſt before the confuſion, and then they were not one people, but that God himſelf ſays they were; or elſe they were a commonwealth, and then where was monarchy? or elſe theſe 72 fathers had fatherly authority, but knew it not. Strange! that fatherly authority ſhould be the only original of government amongſt men, and yet all mankind not know it; and ſtranger yet, that the confuſion of tongues ſhould reveal it to them all of a ſudden, that in an inſtant theſe 72 ſhould know that they had fatherly power, and all others know that they were to obey it in them, and every one know that particular fatherly authority to which he was a ſubject. He that can think this arguing from ſcripture, may from thence make out what model of an Eutopia will beſt ſuit with his fancy or intereſt; and this fatherhood, thus diſpoſed of, will juſtify both a prince who claims an univerſal monarchy, and his ſubjects, who, being fathers of families, ſhall quit all ſubjection to him, and canton his empire into leſs governments for themſelves: for it will always remain a doubt in which of theſe the fatherly authority reſided, till our author reſolves us, whether Shem, who was then alive, or theſe 72 new princes, beginning ſo many new empires in his dominions, and over his ſubjects, had right to govern; ſince our author tells us, that both one and the other had fatherly, which is ſupreme authority, and are brought in by him as inſtances of thoſe who did "enjoy the lordſhips of Adam by right deſcending to them, which was as large and ample as the abſoluteſt dominion of any monarch." This at leaſt is unavoidable, that if "God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority, in the 72 new erected nations," it neceſſarily follows, that he was as careful to deſtroy all pretences of Adam's heir; ſince he took care, and therefore did preſerve the fatherly authority in ſo many, at leaſt 71, that could not poſſibly be Adam's heirs, when the right heir (if God had ever ordained any ſuch inheritance) could not but be known, Shem then living, and they being all one people.

§. 148. Nimrod is his next inſtance of enjoying this patriarchal power, p. 16. but I know not for what reaſon our author ſeems a little unkind to him, and ſays, that he "againſt right enlarged his empire, by ſeizing violently on the rights of other lords of families." Theſe lords of families here were called fathers of families, in his account of the diſperſion at Babel: but it matters not how they were called, ſo we know who they are; for this fatherly authority muſt be in them, either as heirs to Adam, and ſo there could not be 72, nor above one at once; or elſe as natural parents over their children, and ſo every father will have paternal authority over his children by the ſame right, and in as large extent as thoſe 72 had, and ſo be independent princes over their own offſpring. Taking his lords of families in this later ſenſe, (as it is hard to give thoſe words any other ſenſe in this place) he gives us a very pretty account of the original of monarchy, in theſe following words, p. 16. "And in this ſenſe he may be ſaid to be the author and founder of monarchy," viz. As againſt right ſeizing violently on the rights of fathers over their children; which paternal authority, if it be in them, by right of nature, (for elſe how could thoſe 72 come by it?) no body can take from them without their own conſents; and then I deſire our author and his friends to conſider, how far this will concern other princes, and whether it will not, according to his concluſion of that paragraph, reſolve all regal power of thoſe, whoſe dominions extend beyond their families, either into tyranny and uſurpation, or election and conſent of fathers of families, which will differ very little from conſent of the people.

§. 149. All his inſtances, in the next ſection, p. 17. of the 12 dukes of Edom, the nine kings in a little corner of Aſia in Abraham's days, the 31 kings in Canaan deſtroyed by Joſhua, and the care he takes to prove that theſe were all ſovereign princes, and that every town in thoſe days had a king, are ſo many direct proofs againſt him, that it was not the lordſhip of Adam by right deſcending to them, that made kings: for if they had held their royalties by that title, either there muſt have been but one ſovereign over them all, or elſe every father of a family had been as good a prince, and had as good a claim to royalty, as theſe: for if all the ſons of Eſau had each of them, the younger as well as the eldeſt, the right of fatherhood, and ſo were ſovereign princes after their fathers death, the ſame right had their ſons after them, and ſo on to all poſterity; which will limit all the natural power of fatherhood, only to be over the iſſue of their own bodies, and their deſcendents: which power of fatherhood dies with the head of each family, and makes way for the like power of fatherhood to take place in each of his ſons over their reſpective poſterities: whereby the power of fatherhood will be preſerved indeed, and is intelligible, but will not be at all to our author's purpoſe. None of the inſtances he bring are proofs of any power they had, as heirs of Adam's paternal authority by the title of his fatherhood deſcending to them; no, nor of any power they had by virtue of their own: for Adam's fatherhood being over all mankind, it could deſcend but to one at once, and from him to his right heir only, and ſo there could by that title be but one king in the world at a time: and by right of fatherhood, not deſcending from Adam, it muſt be only as they themſelves were fathers, and ſo could be over none but their own poſterity. So that if thoſe 12 dukes of Edom; if Abraham and the nine kings his neighbours; if Jacob and Eſau, and the 31 kings in Canaan, the 72 kings multilated by Adonibeſeck, the 32 kings that came to Benhadad, the 70 kings of Greece making war at Troy, were, as our author contends, all of them ſovereign princes; it is evident that kings derived their power from ſome other original than fatherhood, ſince ſome of theſe had power over more than their own poſterity; and it is demonſtration, they could not be all heirs to Adam: for I challenge any man to make any pretence to power by right of fatherhood, either intelligible or poſſible in any one, otherwiſe, than either as Adam's heir, or as progenitor over his own deſcendents, naturally ſprung from him. And if our author could ſhew that any one of theſe princes, of which he gives us here ſo large a catalogue, had his authority by either of theſe titles, I think I might yield him the cauſe; though it is manifeſt they are all impertinent, and directly contrary to what he

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brings them to prove, viz. "That the lordſhip which Adam had over the "world by right deſcended to the patriarchs."

§. 150. Having told us, p. 16. That "the patriarchal government continued in Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob, until the Egyptian bondage," p. 17. he tells us, "by manifeſt footſteps we may trace this paternal government "unto the Iſraelites coming into Egypt, where the exerciſe of the ſupreme "patriarchal government was intermitted, becauſe they were in ſubjection to "a ſtronger prince." What theſe footſteps are of paternal government, in our author's ſenſe, i. e. of abſolute monarchical power deſcending from Adam, and exerciſed by right of fatherhood, we have ſeen; that is for 2290 years no footſteps at all; ſince in all that time he cannot produce any one example of any perſon who claimed or exerciſed regal authority by right of fatherhood; or ſhew any one who being a king was Adam's heir: all that his proofs amount to, is only this, that there were fathers, patriarchs and kings, in that age of the world; but that the fathers and patriarchs had any abſolute arbitrary power, or by what titles thoſe kings had their's, and of what extent it was, the ſcripture is wholly ſilent; it is manifeſt by right of fatherhood they neither did, nor could claim any title to dominion and empire.

§. 151. To ſay, "That the exerciſe of ſupreme patriarchal government was "intermitted, becauſe they were in ſubjection to a ſtronger prince," proves nothing but what I before ſuſpected, viz. "That patriarchal juriſdiction or government" is a fallacious expreſſion, and does not in our author ſignify (what he would yet inſinuate by it) paternal and regal power, ſuch an abſolute ſovereignty as he ſuppoſes was in Adam.

§. 152. For how can he ſay that patriarchal juriſdiction was intermitted in Egypt, where there was a king, under whoſe regal government the Iſraelites were, if patriarchal were abſolute monarchical juriſdiction? And if it were not, but ſomething elſe, why does he make ſuch ado about a power not in queſtion, and nothing to the purpoſe? The exerciſe of patriarchal juriſdiction, if patriarchal be regal, was not intermitted whilſt the Iſraelites were in Egypt. It is true, the exerciſe of regal power was not then in the hands of any of the promiſed ſeed of Abraham, nor before neither that I know; but what is that to the intermiſſion of regal authority, as deſcending from Adam, unleſs our author will have it, that this choſen line of Abraham had the right of inheritance to Adam's lordſhip? and then to what purpoſe are his inſtances of the 72 rulers, in whom the fatherly authority was preſerved in the confuſion at Babel? Why does he bring the 12 princes ſons of Iſmael; and the dukes of Edom, and join them with Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob, as examples of the exerciſe of true patriarchal government, if the exerciſe of patriarchal juriſdiction were intermitted in the world, whenever the heirs of Jacob had not ſupreme power? I fear, ſupreme patriarchal juriſdiction was not only intermitted, but from the time of the Egyptian bondage quite loſt in the world, ſince it will be hard to find, from that time downwards, any one who exerciſed it as an inheritance deſcending to him from the patriarchs Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob. I imagined monarchical government would have ſerved his turn in the hands of Pharaoh, or any body. But one cannot eaſily diſcover in all places what his diſcourſe tends to, as particularly in this place it is not obvious to gueſs what he drives at, when he ſays, "the exerciſe of ſupreme patri-"archal juriſdiction in Egypt," or how this ſerves to make out the deſcent of Adam's lordſhip to the patriarchs, or any body elſe.

§. 153. For I thought he had been giving us out of ſcripture, proofs and examples of monarchical government, founded on paternal authority, deſcending from Adam; and not an hiſtory of the Jews: amongſt whom yet we find no kings, till many years after they were a people: and when kings were their rulers, there is not the leaſt mention or room for a pretence that they were heirs to Adam, or kings by paternal authority. I expected, talking ſo much as he does of ſcripture, that he would have produced thence a ſeries of monarchs, whoſe titles were clear to Adam's fatherhood, and who as heirs to him, owned and exerciſed paternal juriſdiction over their ſubjects, and that this was the true patriarchical government: whereas he neither proves, that the patriarchs were kings; nor that either kings or patriarchs were heirs to Adam, or ſo much as pretended to it: and one may as well prove, that the patriarchs were all abſolute monarchs; that the power both of patriarchs and kings was only paternal; and that this power deſcended to them from Adam: I ſay all theſe propoſitions may be as well proved by a confuſed account of a multitude of little kings in the Weſt-Indies, out of Ferdinando Soto, or any of our late hiſtories of the Northern America, or by our author's 70 kings of Greece, out of Homer, as by any thing he brings out of ſcripture, in that multitude of kings he has reckoned up.

§. 154. And methinks he ſhould have let Homer and his wars of Troy alone, ſince his great zeal to truth or monarchy carried him to ſuch a pitch of tranſport againſt philoſophers and poets, that he tells us in his preface, that "there are "too many in theſe days, who pleaſe themſelves in running after the opinions "of philoſophers and poets, to find out ſuch an original of government, as "might promiſe them ſome title to liberty, to the great ſcandal of chriſtiani-"ty, and bringing in of atheiſm." And yet theſe heathens, philoſopher Ariſtotle, and poet Homer, are not rejected by our zealous chriſtian politician, whenever they offer any thing that ſeems to ſerve his turn; whether "to the "great ſcandal of chriſtianity and bringing in of atheiſm," let him look. This I cannot but obſerve, in authors who it is viſible write not for truth, how ready zeal for intereſt and party is to entitle chriſtianity to their deſigns, and to charge atheiſm on thoſe who will not without examining ſubmit to their doctrines, and blindly ſwallow their nonſenſe.

But to return to his ſcripture hiſtory, our author farther tells us, p. 18. that "after the return of the Iſraelites out of bondage, God, out of a ſpecial care "of them, choſe Moſes, and Joſhua ſucceſſively to govern as princes in the "place and ſtead of the ſupreme fathers." If it be true, that they returned out of bondage, it muſt be into a ſtate of freedom, and muſt imply, that both before and after this bondage they were free; unleſs our author will ſay, that changing of maſters is returning out of bondage; or that a ſlave returns out of bondage, when he is removed from one gally to another. If then they returned out of bondage, it is plain that in thoſe days, whatever our author in his preface ſays to the contrary, there were difference between a ſon, a ſubject, and a ſlave; and that neither the patriarchs before, nor their rulers after this "Egyptian bondage, numbered their ſons or ſubjects amongſt their poſ-"ſeſſions," and diſpoſed of them with as abſolute a dominion, as they did their other goods.

§. 155. This is evident in Jacob, to whom Reuben offered his two ſons as pledges; and Judah was at laſt ſurety for Benjamin's ſafe return out of Egypt: which all had been vain, ſuperfluous, and but a ſort of mockery, if Jacob had had the ſame power over every one of his family, as he had over his ox or his aſs, as an owner over his ſubſtance; and the offers that Reuben or Judah made had been ſuch a ſecurity for returning of Benjamin, as if a man ſhould take two lambs out of his lord's flock, and offer one as ſecurity, that he will ſafely reſtore the other.

§. 156. When they were out of this bondage, what then? "God out of "a ſpecial care of them, the Iſraelites." It is well that once in his book he will allow God to have any care of the people; for in other places he ſpeaks of mankind, as if God had no care of any part of them, but only of their monarchs, and that the reſt of the people, the ſocieties of men, were made as ſo many herds of cattle, only for the ſervice, uſe, and pleaſure of their princes.

§. 157. "Chose Moſes and Joſhua ſucceſſively to govern as princes;" a ſhrewd argument our author has found out to prove God's care of the fatherly authority, and Adam's heirs, that here, as an expreſſion of his care of his own people, he chooſes thoſe for princes over them, that had not the leaſt pretence to either. The perſons choſen were, Moſes, of the tribe of Levi, and Joſhua of the tribe of Ephraim, neither of which had any title of fatherhood. But ſays our author, they were in the place and ſtead of the ſupreme fathers. If God had any where as plainly declared his choice of ſuch fathers to be rulers, as he did of Moſes and Joſhua, we might believe Moſes and Joſhua were in their place and ſtead: but that being the queſtion in debate, till that be better proved, Moſes being choſen by God to be ruler of his people, will no more prove that government belonged to Adam's heir, or to the fatherhood, than God's chooſing Aaron of the tribe of Levi to be prieſt, will prove that the prieſthood belonged to Adam's heir, or the prime fathers; ſince God would chooſe Aaron to be prieſt, and Moſes ruler in Iſrael, though neither of thoſe offices were ſettled on Adam's heir, or the fatherhood.

§. 158. Our author goes on, "And after them likewiſe for a time he raiſed "up judges, to defend his people in time of peril," p. 18. This proves fatherly authority to be the original of government, and that it deſcended from Adam to his heirs, juſt as well as what went before: only here our author ſeems to confeſs, that theſe judges, who were all the governors they then had, were only men of valour, whom they made their generals to defend them in time of peril; and cannot God raiſe up ſuch men, unleſs fatherhood have a title to government?

§. 159. But ſays our author, "when God gave the Iſraelites kings, he re-"eſtabliſhed the ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal go-"vernment," p. 18.

§. 160. How did God re-eſtabliſh it? by a law, a poſitive command? We find no ſuch thing. Our author means then, that when God gave them a king, in giving them a king, he re-eſtabliſhed the right, &c. To re-eſtabliſh de facto the right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government, is to put a man in poſſeſſion of that government which his fathers did enjoy, and he by lineal ſucceſſion had a right to: for, firſt, if it were another government than what his anceſtors had, it was not ſucceeding to an ancient right, but beginning a new one: for if a prince ſhould give a man, beſides his antient patrimony, which for ſome ages his family had been diſſeized of, an additional eſtate, never before in the poſſeſſion of his anceſtors, he could not be ſaid to re-eſtabliſh the right of lineal ſucceſſion to any more than what had been formerly enjoyed by his anceſtors. If therefore the power the kings of Iſrael had, were any thing more than Iſaac or Jacob had, it was not the re-eſtabliſhing in them the right of ſucceſſion to a power, but giving them a new power, however you pleaſe to call it, paternal or not: and whether Iſaac and Jacob had the ſame power that the kings of Iſrael had, I deſire any one, by what has been above ſaid, to conſider; and I do not think they will find, that either Abraham, Iſaac, or Jacob, had any regal power at all.

§. 161. Next, there can be "no re-eſtabliſhment of the prime and ancient "right of lineal ſucceſſion" to any thing, unleſs he, that is put in poſſeſſion of it, has the right to ſucceed, and be the true and next heir to him he ſucceeds to. Can that be a re-eſtabliſhment, which begins in a new family? or that the "re-eſtabliſhment of an ancient right of lineal ſucceſſion," when a crown is given to one, who has no right of ſucceſſion to it; and who, if the lineal ſucceſſion had gone on, had been out of all poſſibility of pretence to it? Saul, the firſt king God gave the Iſraelites, was of the tribe of Benjamin. Was the "ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion re-eſtabliſhed" in him? The next was David, the youngeſt ſon of Jeſſe, of the poſterity of Judah, Jacob's third ſon. Was the "ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal "government re-eſtabliſhed" in him? or in Solomon, his younger ſon and ſucceſſor in the throne? or in Jeroboam over the ten tribes? or in Athaliah, a woman who reigned ſix years an utter ſtranger to the royal blood? "If the ancient and "prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government were re-eſtabliſhed" in any of theſe or their poſterity, "the ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion "to paternal government" belongs to younger brothers as well as elder, and may be re-eſtabliſhed in any man living: for whatever younger brothers, "by "ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion," may have as well as the elder, that every man living may have a right to, by lineal ſucceſſion, and Sir Robert as well as any other. And ſo what a brave right of lineal ſucceſſion, to his paternal or regal government, our author has re-eſtabliſhed, for the ſecuring the rights and inheritance of crowns, where every one may have it, let the world conſider.

§. 162. But ſays our author however, p. 19. "Whenſoever God made "choice of any ſpecial perſon to be king, he intended that the iſſue alſo ſhould "have benefit thereof, as being comprehended ſufficiently in the perſon of the "father, although the father was only named in the grant." This yet will not help out ſucceſſion: for if, as our author ſays, the benefit of the grant be intended to the iſſue of the grantee, this will not direct the ſucceſſion; ſince, if God give any thing to a man and his iſſue in general, the claim cannot be to any one of that iſſue in particular; every one that is of his race will have an equal right. If it be ſaid, our author meant heir, I believe our author was as willing as any body to have uſed that word, if it would have ſerved his turn: but Solomon, who ſucceeded David in the throne, being no more his heir than Jeroboam, who ſucceeded him in the government of the ten tribes, was his iſſue, our author had reaſon to avoid ſaying, that God intended it to the heirs, when that would not hold in a ſucceſſion, which our author could not except againſt; and ſo he has left his ſucceſſion as undetermined, as if he had ſaid nothing about it: for if the regal power be given by God to a man and his iſſue, as the land of Canaan was to Abraham and his ſeed, muſt they not all have a title to it, all ſhare in it? And one may as well ſay, that by God's grant to Abraham and his ſeed, the land of Canaan was to belong only to one of his ſeed excluſive of all others, as by God's grant of dominion to a man and his iſſue, this dominion was to belong in peculiar to one of his iſſue excluſive of all others.

§. 163. But how will our author prove that whenſoever God made choice of any ſpecial perſon to be a king, he intended that "the (I ſuppoſe he means "his) iſſue alſo ſhould have benefit thereof?" has he ſo ſoon forgot Moſes and Joſhua, whom in this very ſection, he ſays, "God out of a ſpecial care choſe "to govern as princes," and the judges that God raiſed up? Had not theſe princes, having the ſame authority of the ſupreme fatherhood, the ſame power that the kings had; and being ſpecially choſen by God himſelf, ſhould not their iſſue have the benefit of that choice, as well as David or Solomon's? If theſe had the paternal authority put into their hands immediately by God, why had not their iſſue the benefit of this grant in a ſucceſſion to this power? Or if they had it as Adam's heirs, why did not their heirs enjoy it after them by right deſcending to them? for they could not be heirs to one another. Was the power the ſame, and from the ſame original, in Moſes, Joſhua and the Judges, as it was in David and the Kings; and was it inheritable in one, and not in the other? If it was not paternal authority, then God's own people were governed by thoſe that had not paternal authority, and thoſe governors did well enough without it: if it were paternal authority, and God choſe the perſons that were to exerciſe it, our author's rule fails, that "whenſoever God "makes choice of any perſon to be ſupreme ruler" (for I ſuppoſe the name king has no ſpell in it, it is not the title, but the power makes the difference) "he intends that the iſſue alſo ſhould have the benefit of it," ſince from their coming out of Egypt to David's time, 400 years, the iſſue was never "ſo ſufficiently comprehended in the perſon of the father," as that any ſon, after the death of his father, ſucceeded to the government amongſt all thoſe judges that judged Iſrael. If, to avoid this, it be ſaid, God always choſe the perſon of the ſucceſſor, and ſo, transferring the fatherly authority to him, excluded his iſſue from ſucceeding to it, that is manifeſtly not ſo in the ſtory of Jephtha, where he articled with the people, and they made him judge over them, as is plain, Judg. xi.

§. 164. It is in vain then to ſay, that "whenſoever God chuſes any ſpe-"cial perſon to have the exerciſe of paternal authority," (for if that be not to be king, I deſire to know the difference between a king and one having the exerciſe of paternal authority) "he intends the iſſue alſo ſhould have the benefit "of it," ſince we find the authority, the judges had, ended with them, and deſcended not to their iſſue; and if the judges had not paternal authority, I fear it will trouble our author, or any of the friends to his principles, to tell who had then the paternal authority, that is, the government and ſupreme power amongſt the Iſraelites: and I ſuſpect they muſt confeſs that the choſen people of God continued a people ſeveral hundreds of years, without any knowledge or thought of this paternal authority, or any appearance of monarchical government at all.

§. 165. To be ſatisfied of this, he need but read the ſtory of the Levite, and the war thereupon with the Benjamites, in the three laſt chapters of Judges; and when he finds, that the Levite appeals to the people for juſtice, that it was the tribes and the congregation, that debated, reſolved, and directed all that was done on that occaſion; he muſt conclude, either that God was not "care-"ful to preſerve the fatherly authority" amongſt his own choſen people; or elſe that the fatherly authority may be preſerved, where there is no monarchical government: if the latter, then it will follow, that though fatherly authority be ever ſo well proved, yet it will not infer a neceſſity of monarchical government; if the former, it will ſeem very ſtrange and improbable, that God ſhould ordain fatherly authority to be ſo ſacred amongſt the ſons of men, that there could be no power, or government without it, and yet that amongſt his own people, even whilſt he is providing a government for them, and therein preſcribes rules to the ſeveral ſtates and relations of men, this great and fundamental one, this moſt material and neceſſary of all the reſt, ſhould be concealed, and lie neglected for 400 years after.

§. 166. Before I leave this, I muſt aſk how our author knows that "when-"ſoever God makes choice of any ſpecial perſon to be king, he intends that "the iſſue ſhould have the benefit thereof?" Does God by the law of nature or revelation ſay ſo? By the ſame law alſo he muſt ſay, which of his iſſue muſt enjoy the crown in ſucceſſion, and ſo point out the heir, or elſe leave his iſſue to divide or ſcramble for the government: both alike abſurd, and ſuch as will deſtroy the benefit of ſuch grant to the iſſue. When any ſuch declaration of God's intention is produced, it will be our duty to believe God intends it ſo; but till that be done, our author muſt ſhew us ſome better warrant, before we ſhall be obliged to receive him as the authentick revealer of God's intentions.

§. 167. "The iſſue, ſays our author, is comprehended ſufficiently in the "perſon of the father, although the father only was named in the grant:" and yet God, when he gave the land of Canaan to Abraham, Gen. xiii. 15. thought fit to put his ſeed into the grant too: ſo the prieſthood was given to Aaron and his ſeed; and the crown God gave not only to David, but his ſeed alſo: and however our author aſſures us that "God intends, that the iſſue ſhould have "the benefit of it, when he chuſes any perſon to be king," yet we ſee that the kingdom which he gave to Saul, without mentioning his ſeed after him, never came to any of his iſſue: and why, when God choſe a perſon to be king, he ſhould intend, that his iſſue ſhould have the benefit of it, more than when he choſe one to be judge in Iſrael, I would fain know a reaſon; or why does a grant of fatherly authority to a king more comprehend the iſſue, than when a like grant is made to a judge? Is paternal authority by right to deſcend to the iſſue of one, and not of the other? There will need ſome reaſon to be ſhewn of this difference, more than the name, when the thing given is the ſame fatherly authority, and the manner of giving it, God's choice of the perſon, the ſame too; for I ſuppoſe our author, when he ſays, "God raiſed up "judges," will by no means allow, they were choſen by the people.

§. 168. But ſince our author has ſo confidently aſſured us of the care of God to preſerve the fatherhood, and pretends to build all he ſays upon the authority of the ſcripture, we may well expect that that people, whoſe law, conſtitution and hiſtory is chiefly contained in the ſcripture, ſhould furniſh him with the cleareſt inſtances of God's care of preſerving the fatherly authority, in that people who it is agreed he had a moſt peculiar care of. Let us ſee then what ſtate this paternal authority or government was in amongſt the Jews, from their beginning to be a people. It was omitted by our author's confeſſion, from their coming into Egypt, till their return out of that bondage, above 200 years: from thence till God gave the Iſraelites a king, about 400 years more, our author gives but a very ſlender account of it; nor indeed all that time are there the leaſt footſteps of paternal or regal government amongſt them. But then ſays our author, "God re-eſtabliſhed the ancient and prime "right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government."

§. 169. What a "lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government" was then eſtabliſhed, we have already ſeen. I only now conſider how long this laſted, and that was to their captivity, about 500 years: from thence to their deſtruction by the Romans, above 650 years after, the "ancient and prime right of "lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government" was again loſt, and they continued a people in the promiſed land without it. So that of 1750 years that they were God's peculiar people, they had hereditary kingly government amongſt them not one third of the time; and of that time there is not the leaſt footſtep of one moment of "paternal government, nor the re-eſtabliſhment of the an-"cient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to it," whether we ſuppoſe it to be derived, as from its fountain, from David, Saul, Abraham, or, which upon our author's principles is the only true, from Adam.

# OF
# CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

## BOOK II.

### CHAP. I.

§. 1. IT having been ſhewn in the foregoing diſcourſe,

1. THAT Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by poſitive donation from God, any ſuch authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended:

2. THAT if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it:

3. THAT if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor poſitive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all caſes that may ariſe, the right of ſucceſſion, and conſequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined:

4. THAT if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldeſt line of Adam's poſterity, being ſo long ſince utterly loſt, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the leaſt pretence to be the eldeſt houſe, and to have the right of inheritance:

ALL theſe premiſes having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impoſſible that the rulers now on earth ſhould make any benefit, or derive any the leaſt ſhadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, "Adam's private dominion and paternal juriſdiction;" ſo that he that will not give juſt occaſion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beaſts, where the ſtrongeſt carries it, and ſo lay a foundation for perpetual diſorder and miſchief, tumult, ſedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypotheſis ſo loudly cry out againſt) muſt of neceſſity find out another riſe of government, another original of political power, and another way of deſigning and knowing the perſons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

§. 2. To this purpoſe, I think it may not be amiſs, to ſet down what I take to be political power; that the power of a magiſtrateover a ſubject, may be diſtinguiſhed from that of a father over his children, a maſter over his ſervant, a huſband over his wife, and a lord over his ſlave. All which diſtinct powers happening ſometimes together in the ſame man, if he be conſidered under theſe different relations, it may help us to diſtinguiſh theſe powers one from another, and ſhew the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

§. 3. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and conſequently all leſs penalties for the regulating and preſerving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of ſuch laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the publick good.

## CHAP. II.

## Of the ſtate of nature.

§. 4. To underſtand political power right, and derive it from its original, we muſt conſider, what ſtate all men are naturally in, and that is, a ſtate of perfect freedom to order their actions and diſpoſe of their poſſeſſions and perſons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without aſking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state alſo of equality, wherein all the power and juriſdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the ſame ſpecies and rank, promiſcuouſly born to all the ſame advantages of nature, and the uſe of the ſame faculties, ſhould alſo be equal one amongſt another without ſubordination or ſubjection; unleſs the lord and maſter of them all ſhould, by any manifeſt declaration of his will, ſet one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and ſovereignty.

§. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as ſo evident in itſelf, and beyond all queſtion, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongſt men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of juſtice and charity. His words are,

"The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no "leſs their duty, to love others than themſelves; for ſeeing thoſe things "which are equal, muſt needs all have one meaſure; if I cannot but wiſh to "receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wiſh unto "his own ſoul, how ſhould I look to have any part of my deſire herein ſatiſfied, unleſs myſelf be careful to ſatisfy the like deſire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the ſame nature? To have any thing "offered them repugnant to this deſire, muſt needs in all reſpects grieve them "as much as me; ſo that if I do harm, I muſt look to ſuffer, there being "no reaſon that others ſhould ſhew greater meaſure of love to me, than they "have by me ſhewed unto them: my deſire therefore to be loved of my "equals in nature, as much as poſſible may be, impoſeth upon me a natural "duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection: from which relation "of equality between ourſelves and them that are as ourſelves, what ſeveral

" rules and canons natural reaſon hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is " ignorant." Eccl. Pol. lib. i.

§. 6. But though this be a ſtate of liberty, yet it is not a ſtate of licence: though man in that ſtate have an uncontroulable liberty to diſpoſe of his perſon or poſſeſſions, yet he has not liberty to deſtroy himſelf, or ſo much as any creature in his poſſeſſion, but where ſome nobler uſe than its bare preſervation calls for it. The ſtate of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reaſon, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but conſult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or poſſeſſions: for men being all the workmanſhip of one omnipotent, and infinitely wiſe Maker; all the ſervants of one ſovereign maſter, ſent into the world by his order, and about his buſineſs; they are his property, whoſe workmanſhip they are, made to laſt during his, not another's pleaſure: and being furniſhed with like faculties, ſharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be ſuppoſed any ſuch ſubordination among us, that may authorize us to deſtroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uſes, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preſerve himſelf, and not to quit his ſtation wilfully, ſo by the like reaſon, when his own preſervation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preſerve the reſt of mankind, and may not, unleſs it be to do juſtice to an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preſervation of life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

§. 7. And that all men may be reſtrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be obſerved, which willeth the peace and preſervation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that ſtate, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to puniſh the tranſgreſſors of that law to ſuch a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were no body that in the ſtate of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preſerve the innocent and reſtrain offenders. And if any one in the ſtate of nature may puniſh another for any evil he has done, every one may do ſo: for in that ſtate of perfect equality, where naturally there is no ſuperiority or juriſdiction of one over another, what any may do in proſecution of that law, every one muſt needs have a right to do.

§. 8. And thus, in the ſtate of nature, " one man comes by a power over " another;" but yet no abſolute or arbitrary power, to uſe a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the paſſionate heats, or boundleſs extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, ſo far as calm reaſon and conſcience dictate, what is proportionate to his tranſgreſſion; which is ſo much as may ſerve for reparation and reſtraint: for theſe two are the only reaſons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call puniſhment. In tranſgreſſing the law of nature, the offender declares himſelf to live by another rule than that of reaſon and common equity, which is that meaſure God has ſet to the actions of men, for their mutual ſecurity;

and ſo he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to ſecure them from injury and violence, being ſlighted and broken by him. Which being a treſpaſs againſt the whole ſpecies, and the peace and ſafety of it, provided for by the law of nature; every man upon this ſcore, by the right he hath to preſerve mankind in general, may reſtrain, or where it is neceſſary, deſtroy things noxious to them, and ſo may bring ſuch evil on any one, who hath tranſgreſſed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like miſchief. And in this caſe, and upon this ground, “ every man hath a right to puniſh the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.”

§. 9. I doubt not but this will ſeem a very ſtrange doctrine to ſome men: but before they condemn it, I deſire them to reſolve me, by what right any prince or ſtate can put to death, or puniſh an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any ſanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legiſlative, reach not a ſtranger: they ſpeak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legiſlative authority, by which they are in force over the ſubjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Thoſe who have the ſupreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the reſt of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to puniſh offences againſt it, as he ſoberly judges the caſe to require, I ſee not how the magiſtrates of any community can puniſh an alien of another country; ſince, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another.

§. 10. Besides the crime which conſiſts in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of reaſon, whereby a man ſo far becomes degenerate, and declares himſelf to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to ſome perſon or other, and ſome other man receives damage by his tranſgreſſion: in which caſe he who hath received any damage, has, beſides the right of puniſhment common to him with other men, a particular right to ſeek reparation from him that has done it: and any other perſon, who finds it juſt, may alſo join with him that is injured, and aſſiſt him in recovering from the offender ſo much as may make ſatisfaction for the harm he has ſuffered.

§. 11. From theſe two diſtinct rights, the one of puniſhing the crime for reſtraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of puniſhing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party; comes it to paſs that the magiſtrate, who by being magiſtrate hath the common right of puniſhing put into his hands, can often, where the publick good demands not the execution of the law, remit the puniſhment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the ſatisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has ſuffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified perſon has this power of appropriating to himſelf the goods or ſervice of the offender, by right of ſelf-preſervation, as every man has a power to puniſh the crime, to prevent its being committed again, "by the right he "has of preſerving all mankind," and doing all reaſonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the ſtate of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compenſate, by the example of the puniſhment that attends it from every body; and alſo to ſecure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reaſon, the common rule and meaſure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjuſt violence and ſlaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war againſt all mankind; and therefore may be deſtroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of thoſe wild ſavage beaſts, with whom men can have no ſociety nor ſecurity: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, "Whoſo ſheddeth man's blood, by man ſhall his blood be ſhed." And Cain was ſo fully convinced, that every one had a right to deſtroy ſuch a criminal, that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, "Every one "that findeth me, ſhall ſlay me;" ſo plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

§. 12. By the ſame reaſon may a man in the ſtate of nature puniſh the leſſer breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I anſwer, each tranſgreſſion may be puniſhed to that degree, and with ſo much ſeverity, as will ſuffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cauſe to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the ſtate of nature, may in the ſtate of nature be alſo puniſhed equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be beſides my preſent purpoſe, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its meaſures of puniſhment; yet, it is certain there is ſuch a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a ſtudier of that law, as the poſitive laws of common wealths: nay, poſſibly plainer; as much as reaſon is eaſier to be underſtood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden intereſts put into words; for ſo truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only ſo far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.

§. 13. To this ſtrange doctrine, viz. That "in the ſtate of nature every "one has the executive power" of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreaſonable for men to be judges in their own caſes, that ſelf-love will make men partial to themſelves and their friends: and on the other ſide, that ill nature, paſſion and revenge will carry them too far in puniſhing others; and hence nothing but confuſion and diſorder will follow: and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to reſtrain the partiality and violence of men. I eaſily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the incoveniencies of the ſtate of nature, which muſt certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own caſe, ſince it is eaſy to be imagined, that he who was ſo unjuſt as to do his brother an injury, will ſcarce be ſo juſt as to condemn himſelf for it: but I ſhall deſire thoſe who make this objection, to remember, that abſolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of thoſe evils, which neceſſarily follow from men's being judges in their own caſes, and the ſtate of nature is therefore not to be endured; I deſire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the ſtate of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own caſe, and may do to all his ſubjects whatever he pleaſes, without the leaſt liberty to any one to queſtion or controul thoſe who execute his pleaſure? and in whatſoever he doth, whether led by reaſon, miſtake or paſſion, muſt be ſubmitted to? much better it is in the ſtate of nature, wherein men are not bound to ſubmit to the unjuſt will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiſs in his own, or any other caſe, he is anſwerable for it to the reſt of mankind.

§. 14. It is often aſked as a mighty objection, "where are, or ever were "there any men in ſuch a ſtate of nature?" To which it may ſuffice as an anſwer at preſent, that ſince all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a ſtate of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that ſtate. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the ſtate of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politick; other promiſes, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet ſtill be in the ſtate of nature. The promiſes and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the deſert iſland, mentioned by Garcilaſſo de la Vega, in his hiſtory of Peru; or between a Swiſs and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a ſtate of nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of ſociety.

§. 15. To thoſe that ſay, there were never any men in the ſtate of nature, I will not only oppoſe the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. ſect. 10. where he ſays, "The laws which have been hitherto mentioned," i. e. the laws of nature, "do bind men abſolutely, even as they are men, "although they have never any ſettled fellowſhip, never any ſolemn agree-"ment amongſt themſelves what to do, or not to do: but foraſmuch as we "are not by ourſelves ſufficient to furniſh ourſelves with competent ſtore of "things, needful for ſuch a life as our nature doth deſire, a life fit for the "dignity of man; therefore to ſupply thoſe defects and imperfections which "are in us, as living ſingle and ſolely by ourſelves, we are naturally induced to "ſeek communion and fellowſhip with others: this was the cauſe of men's "uniting themſelves at firſt in politick ſocieties." But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that ſtate, and remain ſo, till by their own conſents they make themſelves members of ſome politick ſociety; and I doubt not in the ſequel of this diſcourſe, to make it very clear.

# CHAP III.

## Of the ſtate of war.

§. 16. THE ſtate of war is a ſtate of enmity and deſtruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a paſſionate and haſty, but a ſedate ſettled deſign upon another man's life, puts him in a ſtate of war with him againſt whom he has declared ſuch an intention, and ſo has expoſed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and eſpouſes his quarrel; it being reaſonable and juſt, I ſhould have a right to deſtroy that which threatens me with deſtruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preſerved as much as poſſible, when all cannot be preſerved, the ſafety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may deſtroy a man who makes war upon him, or has diſcovered an enmity to his being, for the ſame reaſon that he may kill a wolf or a lion; becauſe ſuch men are not under the ties of the common law of reaſon, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and ſo may be treated as beaſts of prey, thoſe dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be ſure to deſtroy him whenever he falls into their power.

§. 17. AND hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his abſolute power, does thereby put himſelf into a ſtate of war with him; it being to be underſtood as a declaration of a deſign upon his life: for I have reaſon to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my conſent, would uſe me as he pleaſed when he got me there, and deſtroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can deſire to have me in his abſolute power, unleſs it be to compel me by force to that which is againſt the right of my freedom, i. e. make me a ſlave. To be free from ſuch force is the only ſecurity of my preſervation; and reaſon bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preſervation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; ſo that he who makes an attempt to enſlave me, thereby puts himſelf into a ſtate of war with me. He that, in the ſtate of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that ſtate, muſt neceſſarily be ſuppoſed to have a deſign to take away every thing elſe, that freedom being the foundation of all the reſt; as he that, in the ſtate of ſociety, would take away the freedom belonging to thoſe of that ſociety or commonwealth, muſt be ſuppoſed to deſign to take away from them every thing elſe, and ſo be looked on as in a ſtate of war.

§. 18. THIS makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the leaſt hurt him, nor declared any deſign upon his life, any farther than, by the uſe of force, ſo to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleaſes, from him; becauſe uſing force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reaſon to ſuppoſe, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing elſe. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himſelf into a ſtate of war with me, i. e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he juſtly expoſe himſelf, whoever introduces a ſtate of war, and is aggreſſor in it.

§. 19. And here we have the plain "difference between the ſtate of nature "and the ſtate of war," which however ſome men have confounded, are as far diſtant, as a ſtate of peace, good will, mutual aſſiſtance and preſervation, and a ſtate of enmity, malice, violence and mutual deſtruction, are one from another. Men living together according to reaſon, without a common ſuperior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the ſtate of nature. But force, or a declared deſign of force, upon the perſon of another, where there is no common ſuperior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the ſtate of war: and it is the want of ſuch an appeal gives a man the right of war even againſt an aggreſſor, though he be in ſociety and a fellow ſubject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having ſtolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he ſets on me to rob me but of my horſe or coat; becauſe the law, which was made for my preſervation, where it cannot interpoſe to ſecure my life from preſent force, which, if loſt, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggreſſor, becauſe the aggreſſor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the deciſion of the law, for remedy in a caſe where the miſchief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a ſtate of nature: force without right, upon a man's perſon, makes a ſtate of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.

§. 20. But when the actual force is over, the ſtate of war ceaſes between thoſe that are in ſociety, and are equally on both ſides ſubjected to the fair determination of the law; becauſe then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the paſt injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no ſuch appeal is, as in the ſtate of nature, for want of poſitive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the ſtate of war once begun, continues with a right to the innocent party to deſtroy the other whenever he can, until the aggreſſor offers peace, and deſires reconciliation on ſuch terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and ſecure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and conſtituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifeſt perverting of juſtice, and a barefaced wreſting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of ſome men, or party of men; there it is hard to imagine any thing but a ſtate of war: for wherever violence is uſed, and injury done, though by hands appointed to adminiſter juſtice, it is ſtill violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redreſs the innocent, by an unbiaſſed application of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the ſufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in ſuch caſes, an appeal to heaven.

§. 21. To avoid this ſtate of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the leaſt difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reaſon of men's putting themſelves into ſociety, and quitting the ſtate of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the ſtate of war is excluded, and the controverſy is decided by that power. Had there been any ſuch court, any ſuperior juriſdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a ſtate of war: but we ſee he was forced to appeal to heaven. "The Lord the Judge (ſays he) be judge this day, between the children of "Iſrael and the children of Ammon," Judg. xi. 27. and then proſecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in ſuch controverſies, where the queſtion is put, who ſhall be judge? It cannot be meant, who ſhall decide the controverſy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that "the Lord the Judge" ſhall judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That queſtion then cannot mean, who ſhall judge, whether another hath put himſelf in a ſtate of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in it? of that I myſelf can only be judge in my own conſcience, as I will anſwer it, at the great day, to the ſupreme judge of all men.

# CHAP. IV.

## Of ſlavery.

§. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any ſuperior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legiſlative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in ſociety, is to be under no other legiſlative power, but that eſtabliſhed, by conſent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or reſtraint of any law, but what that legiſlative ſhall enact, according to the truſt put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Obſervations, A. 55. "a liberty for every one to do what he liſts, to live as he pleaſes, and "not to be tied by any laws:" but freedom of men under government is, to have a ſtanding rule to live by, common to every one of that ſociety, and made by the legiſlative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule preſcribes not; and not to be ſubject to the inconſtant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other reſtraint but the law of nature.

§. 23. THIS freedom from abſolute, arbitrary power, is ſo neceſſary to, and cloſely joined with a man's preſervation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preſervation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own conſent, enſlave himſelf to any one, nor put himſelf under the abſolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleaſes. No body can give more power than he has himſelf; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by ſome act that deſerves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make uſe of him to his own ſervice, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardſhip of his ſlavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by reſiſting the will of his maſter, to draw on himſelf the death he deſires.

§. 24. This is the perfect condition of ſlavery, which is nothing elſe, but "the ſtate of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive:" for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one ſide, and obedience on the other, the ſtate of war and ſlavery ceaſes, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been ſaid, no man can, by agreement, paſs over to another that which he hath not in himſelf, a power over his own life.

I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did ſell themſelves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to ſlavery: for, it is evident, the perſon ſold was not under an abſolute, arbitrary, deſpotical power: for the maſter could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his ſervice; and the maſter of ſuch a ſervant was ſo far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleaſure, ſo much as maim him, but the loſs of an eye, or tooth, ſet him free, Exod. xxi.

## CHAP. V.

## Of property.

§. 25. WHETHER we conſider natural reaſon, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preſervation, and conſequently to meat and drink, and ſuch other things as nature affords for their ſubſiſtence; or revelation, which gives us an account of thoſe grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his ſons; it is very clear, that God, as king David ſays, Pſal. cxv. 16. "has given the earth to the "children of men;" given it to mankind in common. But this being ſuppoſed, it ſeems to ſome a very great difficulty, how any one ſhould ever come to have a property in any thing: I will not content myſelf to anſwer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a ſuppoſition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his poſterity in common, it is impoſſible that any man, but one univerſal monarch, ſhould have any property upon a ſuppoſition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in ſucceſſion, excluſive of all the reſt of his poſterity. But I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, how men might come to have a property in ſeveral parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any expreſs compact of all the commoners.

§. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath alſo given them reaſon to make uſe of it to the beſt advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the ſupport and comfort of their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beaſts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the ſpontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, excluſive of the reſt of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural ſtate: yet being given for the uſe of men, there muſt of neceſſity be a means to appropriate them ſome way or other, before they can be of any uſe, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or veniſon, which nouriſhes the wild Indian, who knows no incloſure, and is ſtill a tenant in common, muſt be his, and ſo his, i. e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the ſupport of his life.

§. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own perſon: this no body has any right to but himſelf. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may ſay, are properly his. Whatſoever then he removes out of the ſtate that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it ſomething that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common ſtate nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour ſomething annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unqueſtionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at leaſt where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.

§. 28. He that is nouriſhed by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himſelf. No body can deny but the nouriſhment is his. I aſk then, when did they begin to be his? when he digeſted? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the firſt gathering made them not his, nothing elſe could. That labour put a diſtinction between them and common: that added ſomething to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and ſo they became his private right And will any one ſay, he had no right to thoſe acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, becauſe he had not the conſent of all mankind to make them his? was it a robbery thus to aſſume to himſelf what belonged to all in common? If ſuch a conſent as that was neceſſary, man had ſtarved, notwithſtanding the plenty God had given him. We ſee in commons, which remain ſo by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the ſtate nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no uſe. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the expreſs conſent of all the commoners. Thus the graſs my horſe has bit; the turfs my ſervant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property, without the aſſignation or conſent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common ſtate they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

§. 29. By making an explicit conſent of every commoner, neceſſary to any one's appropriating to himſelf any part of what is given in common; children or ſervants could not cut the meat, which their father or maſter had provided for them in common, without aſſigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himſelf.

§. 30. Thus this law of reaſon makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath beſtowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongſt thoſe who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied poſitive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, ſtill takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fiſh any one catches in the ocean, that great and ſtill remaining common of mankind; or what ambergriſe any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common ſtate nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongſt us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who purſues her during the chaſe: for being a beaſt that is ſtill looked upon as common, and no man's private poſſeſſion; whoever has employed ſo much labour about any of that kind, as to find and purſue her, has thereby removed her from the ſtate of nature, wherein ſhe was common, and hath begun a property.

§. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that "if gathering the acorns, "or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may "ingroſs as much as he will." To which I anſwer, Not ſo. The ſame law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does alſo bound that property too. "God has given us all things richly," 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reaſon confirmed by inſpiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make uſe of to any advantage of life before it ſpoils, ſo much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his ſhare, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to ſpoil or deſtroy. And thus, conſidering the plenty of natural proviſions there was a long time in the world, and the few ſpenders; and to how ſmall a part of that proviſion the induſtry of one man could extend itſelf, and ingroſs it to the prejudice of others; eſpecially keeping within the bounds, ſet by reaſon, of what might ſerve for his uſe; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property ſo eſtabliſhed.

§. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beaſts that ſubſiſt on it, but the earth itſelf; as that which takes in and carries with it all the reſt; I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can uſe the product of, ſo much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, incloſe it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to ſay every body elſe has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot incloſe, without the conſent of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man alſo to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reaſon commanded him to ſubdue the earth, i. e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out ſomething upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, ſubdued, tilled and ſowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it ſomething that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.

§. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, ſince there was ſtill enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could uſe. So that, in effect, there was never the leſs left for others becauſe of his incloſure for himſelf: for he that leaves as much as another can make uſe of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himſelf injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the ſame water left him to quench his thirſt: and the caſe of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the ſame.

§. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but ſince he gave it them for their benefit, and the greateſt conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be ſuppoſed he meant it ſhould always remain common and uncultivated. He gave to the uſe of the induſtrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetouſneſs of the quarrelſome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he did, it is plain he deſired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already poſſeſſed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his induſtry could reach to.

§. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can incloſe or appropriate any part, without the conſent of all his fellow-commoners; becauſe this is left common by compact, i. e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in reſpect of ſome men, it is not ſo to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this pariſh. Beſides, the remainder, after ſuch incloſure, would not be as good to the reſt of the commoners, as the whole was when they could all make uſe of the whole; whereas in the beginning and firſt peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite otherwiſe. The law man was under, was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his property which could not be taken from him wherever he had fixed it. And hence ſubduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we ſee are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to ſubdue, gave authority ſo far to appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, neceſſarily introduces private poſſeſſions.

§. 36. The meaſure of property nature has well ſet by the extent of men's labour and the conveniencies of life: no man's labour could ſubdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment conſume more than a ſmall part; ſo that it was impoſſible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himſelf a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would ſtill have room for as good, and as large a poſſeſſion (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This meaſure did confine every man's poſſeſſion to a very moderate proportion, and ſuch as he might appropriate to himſelf, without injury to any body, in the firſt ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be loſt, by wandering from their company, in the then vaſt wilderneſs of the earth, than to be ſtraitened for want of room to plant in. And the ſame meaſure may be allowed ſtill without prejudice to any body, as full as the world ſeems: for ſuppoſing a man, or family, in the ſtate they were at firſt peopling of the world by the children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in ſome inland, vacant places of America, we ſhall find that the poſſeſſions he could make himſelf, upon the meaſures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the reſt of mankind, or give them reaſon to complain, or think themſelves injured by this man's incroachment; though the race of men have now ſpread themſelves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the ſmall number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of ſo little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spain itſelf a man may be permitted to plough, ſow and reap, without being diſturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making uſe of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themſelves beholden to him, who, by his induſtry on neglected, and conſequently waſte land, has increaſed the ſtock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no ſtreſs on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the ſame rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man ſhould have as much as he could make uſe of, would hold ſtill in the world, without ſtraitening any body; ſince there is land enough in the world to ſuffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by conſent) larger poſſeſſions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I ſhall by and by ſhew more at large.

§. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the deſire of having more than man needed, had altered the intrinſick value of things, which depends only on their uſefulneſs to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without waſting or decay, ſhould be worth a great piece of fleſh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one to himſelf, as much of the things of nature, as he could uſe: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the ſame plenty was ſtill left to thoſe who would uſe the ſame induſtry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himſelf by his labour, does not leſſen, but increaſe the common ſtock of mankind: for the proviſions ſerving to the ſupport of human life, produced by one acre of incloſed and cultivated land, are (to ſpeak much within compaſs) ten times more than thoſe which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richneſs lying waſte in common. And therefore he that incloſes land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be ſaid to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now ſupplies him with proviſions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the improved

proved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for I aſk, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waſte of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or huſbandry, a thouſand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonſhire, where they are well cultivated?

Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beaſts, as he could; he that ſo employed his pains about any of the ſpontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the ſtate which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they periſhed, in his poſſeſſion, without their due uſe; if the fruits rotted, or the veniſon putrified, before he could ſpend it, he offended againſt the common law of nature, and was liable to be puniſhed; he invaded his neighbour's ſhare, for he had no right, farther than his uſe called for any of them, and they might ſerve to afford him conveniencies of life.

§. 38. The ſame meaſures governed the poſſeſſion of land too: whatſoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made uſe of, before it ſpoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatſoever he encloſed, and could feed, and make uſe of, the cattle and product was alſo his. But if either the graſs of his incloſure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting periſhed without gathering, and laying up; this part of the earth, notwithſtanding his incloſure, was ſtill to be looked on as waſte, and might be the poſſeſſion of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to Abel's ſheep to feed on; a few acres would ſerve for both their poſſeſſions. But as families increaſed, and induſtry enlarged their ſtocks, their poſſeſſions enlarged with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made uſe of, till they incorporated, ſettled themſelves together, and built cities; and then, by conſent, they came in time, to ſet out the bounds of their diſtinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours; and by laws within themſelves, ſettled the properties of thoſe of the ſame ſociety: for we ſee, that in that part of the world which was firſt inhabited, and therefore like to be beſt peopled, even as low down as Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herbs, which was their ſubſtance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a ſtranger. Whence it is plain, that at leaſt a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made uſe of. But when there was not room enough in the ſame place, for their herds to feed together, they by conſent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. ſeparated and enlarged their paſture, where it beſt liked them. And for the ſame reaſon Eſau went from his father, and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.

§. 39. And thus, without ſuppoſing any private dominion, and property in Adam, over all the world, excluſive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it; but ſuppoſing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we ſee how labour could make men diſtinct titles to ſeveral parcels of it, for their private uſes; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.

§. 40. NOR is it ſo ſtrange, as perhaps before conſideration it may appear, that the property of labour ſhould be able to overbalance the community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing; and let any one conſider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or ſugar, ſown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the ſame land lying in common, without any huſbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modeſt computation to ſay, that of the products of the earth uſeful to the life of man, nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly eſtimate things as they come to our uſe, and caſt up the ſeveral expences about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we ſhall find, that in moſt of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.

§. 41. THERE cannot be a clearer demonſtration of any thing, than ſeveral nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furniſhed as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i. e. a fruitful ſoil, apt to produce in abundance, what might ſerve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worſe than a day-labourer in England.

§. 42. To make this a little clear, let us but trace ſome of the ordinary proviſions of life, through their ſeveral progreſſes, before they come to our uſe, and ſee how much they receive of their value from human induſtry. Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily uſe, and great plenty; yet notwithſtanding, acorns, water and leaves, or ſkins, muſt be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labour furniſh us with theſe more uſeful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or ſilk, than leaves, ſkins or moſs, that is wholly owing to labour and induſtry; the one of theſe being the food and raiment which unaſſiſted nature furniſhes us with; the other, proviſions which our induſtry and pains prepare for us; which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then ſee how much labour makes the far greateſt part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is ſcarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at moſt, but a very ſmall part of it; ſo little, that even amongſt us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of paſturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waſte; and we ſhall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.

THIS ſhews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeneſs of dominions; and that the increaſe of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that prince, who ſhall be ſo wiſe and godlike, as by eſtabliſhed laws of liberty to ſecure protection and encouragement to the honeſt induſtry of mankind, againſt the oppreſſion of power and narrowneſs of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by. To return to the argument in hand,

§. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty buſhels of wheat, and another in America, which, with the ſame huſbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the ſame natural intrinſick value: but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5 l. and from the other poſſibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued, and ſold here; at leaſt, I may truly ſay, not one thouſandth. It is labour then which puts the greateſt part of the value upon land, without which it would ſcarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greateſt part of all its uſeful products; for all that the ſtraw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waſte, is all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the ploughman's pains, the reaper's and threſher's toil, and the baker's ſweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of thoſe who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and ſtones, who felled and framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utenſils, which are a vaſt number, requiſite to this corn, from its being ſeed to be ſown, to its being made bread, muſt all be charged on the account of labour, and received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furniſhed only the almoſt worthleſs materials, as in themſelves. It would be a ſtrange "catalogue of things, that in-"duſtry provided and made uſe of, about every loaf of bread," before it came to our uſe, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, ſtone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dyeing drugs, pitch, tar, maſts, ropes, and all the materials made uſe of in the ſhip, that brought any of the commodities made uſe of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work: all which it would be almoſt impoſſible, at leaſt too long, to reckon up.

§. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being maſter of himſelf, and "proprietor of "his own perſon, and the actions or labour of it, had ſtill in himſelf the "great foundation of property;" and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the ſupport or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.

§. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleaſed to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes uſe of. Men, at firſt, for the moſt part, contented themſelves with what unaſſiſted nature offered to their neceſſities: and though afterwards, in ſome parts of the world, (where the increaſe of people and ſtock, with the uſe of money, had made land ſcarce, and ſo of ſome value) the ſeveral communities ſettled the bounds of their diſtinct territories, and by laws within themſelves regulated the properties of the private men of their ſociety, and ſo, by compact and agreement, ſettled the property which labour and induſtry began: and the leagues that have been made between ſeveral ſtates and kingdoms, either expreſly or tacitly diſowning all claim and right to the land in the others poſſeſſion, have, by common conſent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they had to thoſe countries, and ſo have, by poſitive agreement, ſettled a property amongſt themſelves, in diſtinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are ſtill great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the reſt of mankind, in the conſent of the uſe of their common money) lie waſte, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make uſe of, and ſo ſtill lie in common; though this can ſcarce happen amongſt that part of mankind that have conſented to the uſe of money.

§. 46. The greateſt part of things really uſeful to the life of man, and ſuch as the neceſſity of ſubſiſting made the firſt commoners of the world look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of ſhort duration; ſuch as, if they are not conſumed by uſe, will decay and periſh of themſelves: gold, ſilver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real uſe, and the neceſſary ſupport of life. Now of thoſe good things which nature hath provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been ſaid) to as much as he could uſe, and property in all that he could effect with his labour; all that his induſtry could extend to, to alter from the ſtate nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred buſhels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as ſoon as gathered. He was only to look, that he uſed them before they ſpoiled, elſe he took more than his ſhare, and robbed others. And indeed it was a fooliſh thing, as well as diſhoneſt, to hoard up more than he could make uſe of. If he gave away a part to any body elſe, ſo that it periſhed not uſeleſly in his poſſeſſion, theſe he alſo made uſe of. And if he alſo bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would laſt good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he waſted not the common ſtock; deſtroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others, ſo long as nothing periſhed uſeleſly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleaſed with its colour; or exchange his ſheep for ſhells, or wool for a ſparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep thoſe by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of theſe durable things as he pleaſed; the exceeding of the bounds of his juſt property not lying in the largeneſs of his poſſeſſion, but the periſhing of any thing uſeleſly in it.

§. 47. And thus came in the uſe of money, ſome laſting thing that men might keep without ſpoiling, and that by mutual conſent men would take in exchange for the truly uſeful, but periſhable ſupports of life.

§. 48. And as different degrees of induſtry were apt to give men poſſeſſions in different proportions, ſo this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for ſuppoſing an iſland, ſeparate from all poſſible commerce with the reſt of the world, wherein there were but an hundred families, but there were ſheep, horſes and cows, with other uſeful animals, wholſome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thouſand times as many, but nothing in the iſland, either becauſe of its commonneſs, or periſhableneſs, fit to ſupply the place of money; what reaſon could any one have there to enlarge his poſſeſſions beyond the uſe of his family, and a plentiful ſupply to its conſumption, either in what their own induſtry produced, or they could barter for like periſhable, uſeful commodities, with others? Where there is not ſomething, both laſting and ſcarce, and ſo valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their poſſeſſions of land, were it ever ſo rich, ever ſo free for them to take: for I aſk, what would a man value ten thouſand, or an hundred thouſand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well ſtocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the ſale of the product? It would not be worth the incloſing, and we ſhould ſee him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was more than would ſupply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his family.

§. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more ſo than that is now; for no ſuch thing as money was any where known. Find out ſomething that hath the uſe and value of money amongſt his neighbours, you ſhall ſee the ſame man will begin preſently to enlarge his poſſeſſions.

§. 50. But ſince gold and ſilver, being little uſeful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the conſent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the meaſure; it is plain, that men have agreed to a diſproportionate and unequal poſſeſſion of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary conſent, found out a way how a man may fairly poſſeſs more land than he himſelf can uſe the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, gold and ſilver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one; theſe metals not ſpoiling or decaying in the hands of the poſſeſſor. This partage of things in an inequality of private poſſeſſions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of ſociety, and without compact; only by putting a value on gold and ſilver, and tacitly agreeing in the uſe of money: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the poſſeſſion of land is determined by poſitive conſtitutions.

§. 51. And thus, I think, it is very eaſy to conceive, without any difficulty, "how labour could at firſt begin a title of property" in the common things of nature, and how the ſpending it upon our uſes bounded it. So that there could then be no reaſon of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeneſs of poſſeſſion it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, ſo he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make uſe of. This left no room for controverſy about the title, nor for incroachment on the right of others; what portion a man carved to himſelf, was eaſily ſeen; and it was uſeleſs, as well as diſhoneſt, to carve himſelf too much, or take more than he needed.

# CHAP. VI.

## Of paternal power.

§. 52. IT may perhaps be cenſured as an impertinent criticiſm, in a diſcourſe of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have obtained in the world: and yet poſſibly it may not be amiſs to offer new ones, when the old are apt to lead men into miſtakes, as this of paternal power probably has done; which ſeems ſo to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no ſhare in it: whereas, if we conſult reaſon or revelation, we ſhall find, ſhe hath an equal title. This may give one reaſon to aſk, whether this might not be more properly called parental power? for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays on children, it muſt certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent cauſes of it. And accordingly we ſee the poſitive law of God every where joins them together, without diſtinction, when it commands the obedience of children. "Honour thy father and thy mother," Exod. xx. 12. "Whoſoever curſeth his father or his mother," Lev. xx. 9. "Ye ſhall fear "every man his mother and his father," Lev. xix. 3. "Children, obey your "parents," &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the ſtile of the Old and New Teſtament.

§. 53. Had but this one thing been well conſidered, without looking any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into thoſe groſs miſtakes they have made, about this power of parents; which, however it might, without any great harſhneſs, bear the name of abſolute dominion, and regal authority, when under the title of paternal power it ſeemed appropriated to the father; would yet have ſounded but oddly, and in the very name ſhewn the abſurdity, if this ſuppoſed abſolute power over children had been called parental; and thereby have diſcovered, that it belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill ſerve the turn of thoſe men, who contend ſo much for the abſolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother ſhould have any ſhare in it; and it would have but ill ſupported the monarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that that fundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of a ſingle perſon only, was not placed in one, but two perſons jointly. But to let this of names paſs.

§. 54. Though I have ſaid above, chap. ii. "That all men by nature are "equal," I cannot be ſuppoſed to underſtand all ſorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a juſt precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level: birth may ſubject ſome, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an obſervance to thoſe whom nature, gratitude, or other reſpects, may have made it due: and yet all this conſiſts with the equality, which all men are in, in reſpect of juriſdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality I there ſpoke of, as proper to the buſineſs in hand, being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being ſubjected to the will or authority of any other man.

§. 55. Children, I confeſs, are not born in this ſtate of equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a ſort of rule and juriſdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for ſome time after; but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this ſubjection are like the ſwaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and ſupported by, in the weakneſs of their infancy: age and reaſon as they grow up, looſen them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free diſpoſal.

§. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full poſſeſſion of their ſtrength and reaſon, and ſo was capable, from the firſt inſtant, of his being to provide for his own ſupport and preſervation; and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reaſon which God had implanted in him. From him the world is peopled with his deſcendants, who are all born infants, weak and helpleſs, without knowledge or underſtanding: but to ſupply the defects of this imperfect ſtate, till the improvement of growth and age hath removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law of nature, "under an obligation to preſerve, nouriſh, and educate "the children" they had begotten; not as their own workmanſhip, but the workmanſhip of their own maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them.

§. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the ſame that was to govern all his poſterity, the law of reaſon. But his offspring having another way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that produced them ignorant and without the uſe of reaſon, they were not preſently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which is not promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made known by reaſon only, he that is not come to the uſe of his reaſon, cannot be ſaid to be under this law; and Adam's children, being not preſently as ſoon as born under this law of reaſon, were not preſently free: for law, in its true notion, is not ſo much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper intereſt, and preſcribes no farther than is for the general good of thoſe under that law: could they be happier without it, the law, as an uſeleſs thing, would of itſelf vaniſh; and that ill deſerves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be miſtaken, the end of law is not to aboliſh or reſtrain, but to preſerve and enlarge freedom: for in all the ſtates of created beings capable of laws, "where "there is no law, there is no freedom:" for liberty is, to be free from reſtraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, "a liberty for every man to do what he liſts:" (for who could be free, when every other man's humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to diſpoſe, and order as he liſts, his perſon, actions, poſſeſſions, and his whole property, within the allowance of thoſe laws under which he is, and therein not to be ſubject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.

§. 58. THE power, then, that parents have over their children, ariſes from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their offspring, during the imperfect ſtate of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reaſon ſhall take its place, and eaſe them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to: for God having given man an underſtanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. But whilſt he is in an eſtate, wherein he has not underſtanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will of his own to follow: he that underſtands for him, muſt will for him too; he muſt preſcribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but when he comes to the eſtate that made his father a freeman, the ſon is a freeman too.

§. 59. THIS holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law? what gave him a free diſpoſing of his property, according to his own will, within the compaſs of that law? I anſwer, a ſtate of maturity, wherein he might be ſuppoſed capable to know that law, that ſo he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that ſtate, he is preſumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may make uſe of his freedom, and ſo comes to have it; till then, ſome body elſe muſt guide him, who is preſumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. If ſuch a ſtate of reaſon, ſuch an age of diſcretion made him free, the ſame ſhall make his ſon free too. Is a man under the law of England? What made him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty to diſpoſe of his actions and poſſeſſions according to his own will, within the permiſſion of that law? A capacity of knowing that law; which is ſuppoſed by that law, at the age of one and twenty years, and in ſome caſes ſooner. If this made the father free, it ſhall make the ſon free too. Till then we ſee the law allows the ſon to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian, who is to underſtand for him. And if the father die, and fail to ſubſtitute a deputy in his truſt; if he hath not provided a tutor, to govern his ſon, during his minority, during his want of underſtanding, the law takes care to do it; ſome other muſt govern him, and be a will to him, till he hath attained to a ſtate of freedom, and his underſtanding be fit to take the government of his will. But after that, the father and ſon are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally ſubjects of the ſame law together, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or eſtate of his ſon, whether they be only in the ſtate and under the law of nature, or under the poſitive laws of an eſtabliſhed government.

§. 60. BUT if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary courſe of nature, any one comes not to ſuch a degree of reaſon, wherein he might be ſuppoſed capable of knowing the law, and ſo living within the rules of it; he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let looſe to the diſpoſure of his own will (becauſe he knows no bounds to it, has not underſtanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and government of others, all the time his own underſtanding is uncapable of that charge. And ſo lunaticks and ideots are never ſet free from the government of their parents. “ Children, who are not as yet come unto thoſe years whereat they may have; “ and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having; “ thirdly madmen, which for the preſent cannot poſſibly have the uſe of “ right reaſon to guide themſelves, have for their guide, the reaſon that “ guideth other men which are tutors over them, to ſeek and procure their “ good for them,” ſays Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. ſect. 7. All which ſeems no more than that duty, which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preſerve their offſpring, till they can be able to ſhift for themſelves, and will ſcarce amount to an inſtance or proof, of parents regal authority.

§. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exerciſe of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we ſee how natural freedom and ſubjection to parents may conſiſt together, and are both founded on the ſame principle. A child is free by his father's title, by his father's underſtanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of diſcretion, and the ſubjection of a child to his parents, whilſt yet ſhort of that age, are ſo conſiſtent, and ſo diſtinguiſhable, that the moſt blinded contenders for monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miſs this difference; the moſt obſtinate cannot but allow their conſiſtency: for were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title ſettled a monarch in his throne, inveſted with all the abſolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of; if he ſhould die as ſoon as his heir were born, muſt not the child, notwithſtanding he were ever ſo free, ever ſo much ſovereign, be in ſubjection to his mother and nurſe, to tutors and governors, till age and education brought him reaſon and ability to govern himſelf and others? The neceſſities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his own; and yet will any one think, that this reſtraint and ſubjection were inconſiſtent with, or ſpoiled him of, that liberty or ſovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to thoſe who had the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and ſooner for it. If any body ſhould aſk me, when my ſon is of age to be free? I ſhall anſwer, juſt when his monarch is of age to govern. “ But at what time,” ſays the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. ſect. 6. “ a man may be ſaid to have attained ſo far forth the uſe of “ reaſon, as ſufficeth to make him capable of thoſe laws whereby he is then “ bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal more eaſy for ſenſe to diſcern, “ than for any one by ſkill and learning to determine.”

§. 62. Commonwealths themſelves take notice of, and allow, that there is a time when men are to begin to act like freemen, and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other publick owning of, or ſubmiſſion to, the government of their countries.

§. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will is grounded on his having reaſon, which is able to inſtruct him in that law he is to govern himſelf by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him looſe to an unreſtrained liberty, before he has reaſon to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thruſt him out amongſt brutes, and abandon him to a ſtate as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their's. This is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children. God hath made it their buſineſs to employ this care on their offspring, and hath placed in them ſuitable inclinations of tenderneſs and concern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wiſdom deſigned it, to the children's good, as long as they ſhould need to be under it.

§. 64. But what reaſon can hence advance this care of the parents due to their offspring, into an abſolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whoſe power reaches no farther, than by ſuch a diſcipline, as he finds moſt effectual, to give ſuch ſtrength and health to their bodies, ſuch vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may beſt fit his children to be moſt uſeful to themſelves and others; and, if it be neceſſary to his condition, to make them work, when they are able, for their own ſubſiſtence. But in this power the mother too has her ſhare with the father.

§. 65. Nay, this power ſo little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them, he loſes his power over them, which goes along with their nouriſhment and education, to which it is inſeparably annexed; and it belongs as much to the foſter-father of an expoſed child, as to the natural father of another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his iſſue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world, where one woman hath more than one huſband at a time? or in thoſe parts of America, where, when the huſband and wife part, which happens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and are wholly under her care and proviſion? If the father die whilſt the children are young, do they not naturally every where owe the ſame obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their father were he alive? and will any one ſay, that the mother hath a legiſlative power over her children? that ſhe can make ſtanding rules, which ſhall be of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound their liberty all the courſe of their lives? or can ſhe inforce the obſervation of them with capital puniſhments? for this is the proper power of the magiſtrate, of which the father hath not ſo much as the ſhadow. His command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not their life or property: it is but a help to the weakneſs and imperfection of their nonage, a diſcipline neceſſary to their education: and though a father may diſpoſe of his own poſſeſſions as he pleaſes, when his children are out of danger of periſhing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives or goods, which either their own induſtry, or another's bounty has made their's; nor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the infranchiſement of the years of diſcretion. The father's empire then ceaſes, and can from thence forwards no more diſpoſe of the liberty of his ſon, than that of any other man: and it muſt be far from an abſolute or perpetual juriſdiction, from which a man may withdraw himſelf, having licence from divine authority to "leave father and "mother, and cleave to his wife."

§. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from ſubjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himſelf is free from ſubjection to the will of any body elſe, and they are each under no other reſtraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law of nature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts not a ſon from that honour which he ought, by the law of God and nature, to pay his parents. God having made the parents inſtruments in his great deſign of continuing the race of mankind, and the occaſions of life to their children; as he hath laid on them an obligation to nouriſh, preſerve, and bring up their offspring; ſo he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their parents, which containing in it an inward eſteem and reverence to be ſhewn by all outward expreſſions, ties up the child from any thing that may ever injure or affront, diſturb or endanger, the happineſs or life of thoſe from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of defence, relief, aſſiſtance and comfort of thoſe, by whoſe means he entered into being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life: from this obligation no ſtate, no freedom can abſolve children. But this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or authority to make laws and diſpoſe as they pleaſe of their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe honour, reſpect, gratitude and aſſiſtance; another to require an abſolute obedience and ſubmiſſion. The honour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet this leſſens not his authority, nor ſubjects him to her government.

§. 67. The ſubjection of a minor, places in the father a temporary government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the honour due from a child, places in the parents perpetual right to reſpect, reverence, ſupport and compliance to, more or leſs, as the father's care, coſt, and kindneſs in his education, has been more or leſs. This ends not with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life. The want of diſtinguiſhing theſe two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the right of tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may perhaps have cauſed a great part of the miſtakes about this matter: for to ſpeak properly of them, the firſt of theſe is rather the privilege of children, and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The nouriſhment and education of their children is a charge ſo incumbent on parents for their children's good, that nothing can abſolve them from taking care of it: and though the power of commanding and chaſtiſing them go along with it, yet God hath woven into the principles of human nature ſuch a tenderneſs for their offspring, that there is little fear that parents ſhould uſe their power with too much rigour; the exceſs is ſeldom on the ſevere ſide, the ſtrong biaſs of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God almighty when he would expreſs his gentle dealing with the Iſraelites, he tells them, that though he chaſtened them, "he chaſtened them as a man chaſtens his ſon, Deut. viii. 5. i. e. with tenderneſs and affection, and kept them under no ſeverer diſcipline than what was abſolutely beſt for them, and had been leſs kindneſs to have ſlackened. This is that power to which children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their parents may not be increaſed, or ill rewarded.

§. 68. On the other ſide, honour and ſupport, all that which gratitude requires to return for the benefits received by and from them, is the indiſpenſible duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. This is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child's; though education, the parents duty, ſeems to have moſt power, becauſe the ignorance and infirmities of childhood ſtand in need of reſtraint and correction; which is a viſible exerciſe of rule, and a kind of dominion. And that duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires leſs obedience, though the obligation be ſtronger on grown, than younger children: for who can think the command, "Children obey your parents," requires in a man, that has children of his own, the ſame ſubmiſſion to his father, as it does in his yet young children to him; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father's commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he ſhould have the indiſcretion to treat him ſtill as a boy?

§. 69. The firſt part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which is education, belongs ſo to the father, that it terminates at a certain ſeaſon; when the buſineſs of education is over, it ceaſes of itſelf, and is alſo alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his ſon in other hands; and he that has made his ſon an apprentice to another, has diſcharged him, during that time, of a great part of his obedience both to himſelf and to his mother. But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains nevertheleſs entire to them; nothing can cancel that: it is ſo inſeparable from them both, that the father's authority cannot diſpoſſeſs the mother of this right, nor can any man diſcharge his ſon from honouring her that bore him. But both theſe are very far from a power to make laws, and inforcing them with penalties, that may reach eſtate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding ends with nonage; and though, after that, honour and reſpect, ſupport and defence, and whatſoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the higheſt benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due from a ſon to his parents; yet all this puts no ſcepter into the father's hand, no ſovereign power of commanding. He has no dominion over his ſon's property, or actions; nor any right, that his will ſhould preſcribe to his ſon's in all things; however it may become his ſon in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, to pay a deference to it.

§. 70. A man may owe honour and reſpect to an ancient, or wiſe man; defence to his child or friend; relief and ſupport to the diſtreſſed; and gratitude to a benefactor, to ſuch a degree, that all he has, all he can do, cannot ſufficiently pay it: but all theſe give no authority, no right to any one, of making laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain, all this is due not only to the bare title of father; not only becauſe, as has been ſaid, it is owing to the mother too; but becauſe theſe obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is required of children, may be varied by the different care and kindneſs, trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more than another.

§. 71. This ſhews the reaſon how it comes to paſs, that parents in ſocieties, where they themſelves are ſubjects, retain a power over their children, and have as much right to their ſubjection, as thoſe who are in the ſtate of nature. Which could not poſſibly be, if all political power were only paternal, and that in truth they were one and the ſame thing: for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the ſubject could naturally have none of it. But theſe two powers, political and paternal, are ſo perfectly diſtinct and ſeparate; are built upon ſo different foundations, and given to ſo different ends, that every ſubject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meaneſt of his ſubjects do to their's; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion, which a prince or magiſtrate has over his ſubject.

§. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, and the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power on the one hand, and ſubmiſſion on the other, which are proper to this relation, yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children; which though it be common to him with other men, yet the occaſions of ſhewing it, almoſt conſtantly happening to fathers in their private families, and the inſtances of it elſewhere being rare, and leſs taken notice of, it paſſes in the world for a part of paternal juriſdicton. And this is the power men generally have to beſtow their eſtates on thoſe who pleaſe them beſt; the poſſeſſion of the father being the expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according to the law and cuſtom of each country; yet it is commonly in the father's power to beſtow it with a more ſparing or liberal hand, according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour.

§. 73. This is no ſmall tie on the obedience of children: and there being always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a ſubmiſſion to the government of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been commonly ſuppoſed, that a father could oblige his poſterity to that government, of which he himſelf was a ſubject, and that his compact held them; whereas, it being only a neceſſary condition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an eſtate which is under that government, reaches only thoſe who will take it on that condition, and ſo is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary ſubmiſſion: for every man's children being by nature as free as himſelf, or any of his anceſtors ever were, may, whilſt they are in that freedom, chooſe what ſociety they will join themſelves to, what commonwealth they will put themſelves under. But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their anceſtors, they muſt take it on the ſame terms their anceſtors had it, and ſubmit to all the conditions annexed to ſuch a poſſeſſion. By this power indeed fathers oblige their children to obedience to themſelves, even when they are paſt minority, and moſt commonly too ſubject them to this or that politiclal power: but neither of theſe by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands to inforce and recompenſe ſuch a compliance; and is no more power than what a Frenchman has over an Engliſhman, who by the hopes of an eſtate he will leave him, will certainly have a ſtrong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy it, he muſt certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the poſſeſſion of land in that country where it lies, whether it be France or England.

§. 74. To conclude then, though the father's power of commanding extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the diſcipline and government of that age; and though that honour and reſpect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indiſpenſibly owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all eſtates, with all that ſupport and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing, i. e. making laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this he has no dominion over the property or actions of his ſon: yet it is obvious to conceive how eaſy it was, in the firſt ages of the world, and in places ſtill, where the thinneſs of people gives families leave to ſeparate into unpoſſeſſed quarters, and they have room to remove or plant themſelves in yet vacant habitations; for the father of the family to become the prince of * it; he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children: and ſince without ſome government it would be hard for them to live together, it was likelieſt it ſhould, by the expreſs or tacit conſent of the children when they were grown up, be in the father, where it ſeemed without any change barely to continue; when indeed nothing more was required to it, than the permitting the father to exerciſe alone, in his family, that executive power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally hath, and by that permiſſion reſigning up to him a monarchical power, whilſt they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right, but only by the conſent of his children, is evident from hence, that no body doubts, but if a ſtranger, whom chance or buſineſs had brought to his family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or otherwiſe have puniſhed him, as well as any of his children: which it was impoſſible he ſhould do by virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right to:

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* It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the arch-philoſopher was of, “ That the chief “ perſon in every houſhold was always, as it were, a king: ſo when numbers of houſholds joined “ themſelves in civil ſocieties together, kings were the firſt kind of governors amongſt them, which “ is alſo, as it ſeemeth, the reaſon why the name of fathers continued ſtill in them, who, of fa- “ thers, were made rulers; as alſo the ancient cuſtom of governors to do as Melchizedeck, and be- “ ing kings, to exerciſe the office of prieſts, which fathers did at the firſt, grew perhaps by the ſame “ occaſion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind of regiment that has been received in the world. “ The inconveniencies of one kind have cauſed ſundry others to be deviſed; ſo that in a word, all “ publick regiment, of what kind ſoever, ſeemeth evidently to have riſen from the deliberate advice, “ conſulation and compoſition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no “ impoſſibility in nature conſidered by itſelf, but that man might have lived without any publick re- “ giment.” Hooker's Eccl. P. lib. i. ſect. 10.

and he alone could puniſh him in his family, where the reſpect of his children had laid by the exerciſe of ſuch a power, to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing ſhould remain in him, above the reſt of his family.

§. 75. THUS it was eaſy, and almoſt natural for children, by a tacit, and ſcarce avoidable conſent, to make way for the father's authority and government. They had been accuſtomed in their childhood to follow his direction, and to refer their little differences to him; and when they were men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and leſs covetouſneſs, ſeldom afforded greater controverſies; and when any ſhould ariſe, where could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whoſe care they had every one been ſuſtained and brought up, and who had a tenderneſs for them all? It is no wonder that they made no diſtinction betwixt minority and full age; nor looked after one and twenty, or any other age that might make them the free diſpoſers of themſelves and fortunes, when they could have no deſire to be out of their pupilage: the government they had been under, during it, continued ſtill to be more their protection than reſtraint; and they could no where find a greater ſecurity to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a father.

§. 76. THUS the natural fathers of families by an inſenſible change, became the politick monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs, for ſeveral ſucceſſions, or otherwiſe; ſo they laid the foundatians of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under ſeveral conſtitutions and manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occaſions happened to mould them. But if princes have their titles in their fathers right, and it be a ſufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority, becauſe they commonly were thoſe in whoſe hands we find, de facto, the exerciſe of government: I ſay, if this argument be good, it will as ſtrongly prove, that all princes, nay princes only, ought to be prieſts, ſince it is as certain, that in the beginning, "the father of the family was prieſt, as that he was ruler "in his own houſhold."

## CHAP. VII.

## Of political or civil ſociety.

§. 77. GOD having made man ſuch a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under ſtrong obligations of neceſſity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into ſociety, as well as fitted him with underſtanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The firſt ſociety was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between maſter and ſervant came to be added: and though all theſe might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the maſter or miſtreſs of it had ſome ſort of rule proper to a family; each of theſe, or all together, came ſhort of political ſociety, as we ſhall ſee, if we conſider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of theſe.

§. 78. Conjugal ſociety is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and though it conſiſt chiefly in ſuch a communion and right in one another's bodies as is neceſſary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual ſupport and aſſiſtance, and a communion of intereſts too, as neceſſary not only to unite their care and affection, but alſo neceſſary to their common offspring, who have a right to be nouriſhed, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themſelves.

§. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the ſpecies; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to laſt, even after procreation, ſo long as is neceſſary to the nouriſhment and ſupport of the young ones, who are to be ſuſtained by thoſe that got them, till they are able to ſhift and provide for themſelves. This rule, which the infinite wiſe Maker hath ſet to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures ſteadily obey. In thoſe viviparous animals which feed on graſs, the conjunction between male and female laſts no longer than the very act of copulation; becauſe the teat of the dam being ſufficient to nouriſh the young, till it be able to feed on graſs, the male only begets, but concerns not himſelf for the female or young, to whoſe ſuſtenance he can contribute nothing. But in beaſts of prey the conjunction laſts longer: becauſe the dam not being able well to ſubſiſt herſelf, and nouriſh her numerous offſpring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on graſs; the aſſiſtance of the male is neceſſary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot ſubſiſt till they are able to prey for themſelves, but by the joint care of male and female. The ſame is to be obſerved in all birds, (except ſome domeſtick ones, where plenty of food excuſes the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whoſe young needing food in the neſt, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to uſe their wing, and provide for themſelves.

§. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reaſon, “why the “male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction” than other creatures, *viz.* becauſe the female is capable of conceiving, and *de facto* is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for ſupport on his parents help, and able to ſhift for himſelf, and has all the aſſiſtance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for thoſe he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal ſociety with the ſame woman longer than other creatures, whoſe young being able to ſubſiſt of themſelves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond diſſolves of itſelf, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his uſual anniverſary ſeaſon ſummons them again to chuſe new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wiſdom of the great Creator, who having given to man foreſight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to ſupply the preſent neceſſity, hath made it neceſſary, that ſociety of man and wife ſhould be more laſting, than of male and female amongſt other creatures; that ſo their induſtry might be encouraged, and their intereſt better united, to make proviſion and lay up goods for their common iſſue, which uncertain mixture, or eaſy and frequent ſolutions of conjugal ſociety, would mightily diſturb.

§. 81. But though theſe are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and laſting in man, than the other ſpecies of animals; yet it would give one reaſon to enquire, why this compact, where procreation and education are ſecured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by conſent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no neceſſity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it ſhould always be for life; I mean, to ſuch as are under no reſtraint of any poſitive law, which ordains all ſuch contracts to be perpetual.

§. 82. But the huſband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different underſtandings, will unavoidably ſometimes have different wills too; it therefore being neceſſary that the laſt determination, i. e. the rule, ſhould be placed ſomewhere; it naturally falls to the man's ſhare, as the abler and the ſtronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common intereſt and property, leaves the wife in the full and free poſſeſſion of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the huſband no more power over her life than ſhe has over his; the power of the huſband being ſo far from that of an abſolute monarch, that the wife has in many caſes a liberty to ſeparate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themſelves in the ſtate of nature, or by the cuſtoms or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon ſuch ſeparation fall to the father or mother's lot, as ſuch contract does determine.

§. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politick government, as well as in the ſtate of nature, the civil magiſtrate doth not abridge the right or power of either naturally neceſſary to thoſe ends, viz. procreation and mutual ſupport and aſſiſtance whilſt they are together; but only decides any controverſy that may ariſe between man and wife about them. If it were otherwiſe, and that abſolute ſovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the huſband, and were neceſſary to the ſociety between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of thoſe countries where the huſband is allowed no ſuch abſolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no ſuch power in the huſband, the condition of conjugal ſociety put it not in him, it being not at all neceſſary to that ſtate. Conjugal ſociety could ſubſiſt and attain its ends without it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual aſſiſtance and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal ſociety, might be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that ſociety, as far as may conſiſt with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could ſhift for themſelves; nothing being neceſſary to any ſociety, that is not neceſſary to the ends for which it is made.

§. 84. The ſociety betwixt parents and children, and the diſtinct rights and powers belonging reſpectively to them, I have treated of ſo largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I ſhall not here need to ſay any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a politick ſociety.

§. 85. MASTER and ſervant are names as old as hiſtory, but given to thoſe of far different condition; for a freeman makes himſelf a ſervant to another, by ſelling him, for a certain time, the ſervice he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family of his maſter, and under the ordinary diſcipline thereof; yet it gives the maſter but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another ſort of ſervants, which by a peculiar name we call ſlaves, who being captives taken in a juſt war, are by the right of nature ſubjected to the abſolute dominion and arbitrary power of their maſters. Theſe men having, as I ſay, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and loſt their eſtates; and being in the ſtate of ſlavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that ſtate be conſidered as any part of civil ſociety; the chief end whereof is the preſervation of property.

§. 86. LET us therefore conſider a maſter of a family with all theſe ſubordinate relations of wife, children, ſervants, and ſlaves, united under the domeſtick rule of a family; which, what reſemblance ſoever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very far from it, both in its conſtitution, power and end: or if it muſt be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the abſolute monarch in it, abſolute monarchy will have but a very ſhattered and ſhort power, when it is plain, by what has been ſaid before, that the maſter of the family has a very diſtinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over thoſe ſeveral perſons that are in it: for excepting the ſlave (and the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any ſlaves in his family or no) he has no legiſlative power of life and death over any of them, and none too but what a miſtreſs of a family may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no abſolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other ſociety of men, differ from that which is properly political ſociety, we ſhall beſt ſee by conſidering wherein political ſociety itſelf conſiſts.

§. 87. MAN being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preſerve his property, that is, his life, liberty and eſtate, againſt the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and puniſh the breaches of that law in others, as he is perſuaded the offence deſerves, even with death itſelf, in crimes where the heinouſneſs of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But becauſe no political ſociety can be, nor ſubſiſt, without having in itſelf the power to preſerve the property, and in order thereunto, puniſh the offences of all thoſe of that ſociety; there, and there only is political ſociety, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, reſigned it up into the hands of the community in all caſes that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law eſtabliſhed by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by ſettled ſtanding rules, indifferent, and the ſame to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of thoſe rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that ſociety concerning any matter of right; and puniſhes thoſe offences which any member hath committed againſt the ſociety, with ſuch penalties as the law has eſtabliſhed: whereby it is eaſy to diſcern, who are, and who are not, in political ſociety together. Thoſe who are united into one body, and have a common eſtabliſhed law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controverſies between them, and puniſh offenders, are in civil ſociety one with another: but thoſe who have no ſuch common people, I mean on earth, are ſtill in the ſtate of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himſelf, and executioner: which is, as I have before ſhewed it, the perfect ſtate of nature.

§. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to ſet down what puniſhment ſhall belong to the ſeveral tranſgreſſions which they think worthy of it, committed amongſt the members of that ſociety, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to puniſh any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preſervation of the property of all the members of that ſociety, as far as is poſſible. But though every man who has entered into civil ſociety, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to puniſh offences againſt the law of nature, in proſecution of his own private judgment; yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legiſlative in all caſes, where he can appeal to the magiſtrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he ſhall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himſelf, or his repreſentative. And herein we have the original of the legiſlative and executive power of civil ſociety, which is to judge by ſtanding laws, how far offences are to be puniſhed, when committed within the commonwealth; and alſo to determine, by occaſional judgments founded on the preſent circumſtances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both theſe to employ all the force of all the members, when there ſhall be need.

§. 89. Wherever therefore any number of men are ſo united into one ſociety, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to reſign it to the publick, there and there only is a political, or civil ſociety. And this is done, wherever any number of men, in the ſtate of nature, enter into ſociety to make one people, one body politick, under one ſupreme government; or elſe when any one joins himſelf to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the ſociety, or which is all one, the legiſlative thereof, to make laws for him, as the publick good of the ſociety ſhall require; to the execution whereof, his own aſſiſtance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a ſtate of nature into that of a commonwealth, by ſetting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controverſies, and redreſs the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legiſlative, or magiſtrates appointed by it. And wherever there are any number of men, however aſſociated, that have no ſuch deciſive power to appeal to, there they are ſtill in the ſtate of nature.

§. 90. HENCE it is evident, that abſolute monarchy, which by ſome men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconſiſtent with civil ſociety, and ſo can be no form of civil government at all: for the end of civil ſociety, being to avoid, and remedy thoſe inconveniencies of the ſtate of nature, which neceſſarily follow from every man's being judge in his own caſe, by ſetting up a known authority, to which every one of that ſociety may appeal upon any injury received, or controverſy that may ariſe, and which every one of the [*] ſociety ought to obey; wherever any perſons are, who have not ſuch an authority to appeal to, for the deciſion of any difference between them, there thoſe perſons are ſtill in the ſtate of nature; and ſo is every abſolute prince, in reſpect of thoſe who are under his dominion.

§. 91. FOR he being ſuppoſed to have all, both legiſlative and executive power in himſelf alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whoſe deciſion relief and redreſs may be expected of any injury or inconveniency, that may be ſuffered from the prince, or by his order: ſo that ſuch a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you pleaſe, is as much in the ſtate of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the reſt of mankind: for wherever any two men are, who have no ſtanding rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controverſies of right betwixt them, there they are ſtill in the ſtate of [†] nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the ſubject, or rather ſlave of an abſolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary ſtate of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the beſt of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as thoſe in ſociety ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common ſtate of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and ſo is expoſed to all the miſery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the unreſtrained ſtate of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.

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[*] "The publick power of all ſociety is above every ſoul contained in the ſame ſociety; and the principal uſe of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in ſuch caſes we muſt obey, unleſs there be reaſon ſhewed which may neceſſarily inforce, that the law of reaſon, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary." Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 16.

[†] "To take away all ſuch mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs," i. e. ſuch as attend men in the ſtate of nature, "there was no way but only by growing into compoſition and agreement amongſt themſelves, by ordaining ſome kind of government publick, and by yielding themſelves ſubject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquility and happy eſtate of the reſt might be procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themſelves; they knew that however men may ſeek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be ſuffered, but by all men, and all good means, to be withſtood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reaſon take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himſelf, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that ſtrifes and troubles would be endleſs, except they gave their common conſent, all to be ordered by ſome, whom they ſhould agree upon, without which conſent there would be no reaſon that one man ſhould take upon him to be lord or judge over another." Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 10.

§. 92. For he that thinks abſolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the baſeneſs of human nature, need read but the hiſtory of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been inſolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion ſhall be found out to juſtify all that he ſhall do to his ſubjects, and the ſword preſently ſilence all thoſe that dare queſtion it: for what the protection of abſolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be, and to what a degree of happineſs and ſecurity it carries civil ſociety, where this ſort of government is grown to perfection; he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may eaſily ſee.

§. 93. In abſolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the ſubjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controverſies, and reſtrain any violence that may happen betwixt the ſubjects themſelves, one amongſt another. This every one thinks neceſſary, and believes he deſerves to be thought a declared enemy to ſociety and mankind, who ſhould go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and ſociety, and ſuch a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reaſon to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatneſs, may and naturally muſt do, keep thoſe animals from hurting, or deſtroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleaſure and advantage; and ſo are taken care of, not out of any love the maſter has for them, but love of himſelf, and the profit they bring him: for if it be aſked, what ſecurity, what fence is there, in ſuch a ſtate, againſt the violence and oppreſſion of this abſolute ruler? the very queſtion can ſcarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deſerves death only to aſk after ſafety. Betwixt ſubject and ſubject, they will grant, there muſt be meaſures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and ſecurity: but as for the ruler, he ought to be abſolute, and is above all ſuch circumſtances; becauſe he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To aſk how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that ſide where the ſtrongeſt hand is to do it, is preſently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the ſtate of nature entered into ſociety, they agreed that all of them but one, ſhould be under the reſtraint of laws, but that he ſhould ſtill retain all the liberty of the ſtate of nature, increaſed with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are ſo fooliſh, that they take care to avoid what miſchiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay think it ſafety, to be devoured by lions.

§. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuſe people's underſtandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they percieve, that any man, in what ſtation ſoever, is out of the bounds of the civil ſociety which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth againſt any harm they may receive from him, they are apt to think themſelves in the ſtate of nature, in reſpect of him whom they find to be ſo; and to take care, as ſoon as they can, to have that ſafety and ſecurity in civil ſociety, for which it was inſtituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at firſt, (as ſhall be ſhewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this diſcourſe) ſome one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongſt the reſt, had this deference, paid to his goodneſs and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit conſent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the aſſurance they had of his uprightneſs and wiſdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as ſome men would perſuade us) ſacredneſs of cuſtoms, which the negligent, and unforeſeeing innocence of the firſt ages began, had brought in ſucceſſors of another ſtamp; the people finding their properties not ſecure under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preſervation of [*] property) could never be ſafe nor at reſt, nor think themſelves in civil ſocity, till the legiſlature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them ſenate, parliament, or what you pleaſe. By which means every ſingle perſon became ſubject, equally with other the meaneſt men, to thoſe laws, which he himſelf, as part of the legiſlative, had eſtabliſhed; nor could any one, by his own authority, avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of ſuperiority plead exemption, thereby to licenſe his own, or the miſcarriages of any of his dependents. [†] "No man " in civil ſociety can be exempted from the laws of it:" for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redreſs or ſecurity againſt any harm he ſhall do; I aſk, whether he be not perfectly ſtill in the ſtate of nature, and ſo can be no part or member of that civil ſociety; unleſs any one will ſay, the ſtate of nature and civil ſociety are one and the ſame thing, which I have never yet found any one ſo great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.

## CHAP VIII.

## Of the beginning of political ſocieties.

§. 95. MEN being, as has been ſaid, by nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this eſtate, and ſubjected to the political power of another, without his own conſent. The only way, whereby any one diveſts himſelf of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil ſociety, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, ſafe, and peaceable living one amongſt another, in a ſecure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater ſecurity againſt any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, becauſe it injures not the freedom of the reſt; they are left as they were in the liberty of the ſtate of nature. When any number of men have ſo conſented to make one community or government, they are thereby preſently incorporated, and make one body politick, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the reſt.

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[*] "At the firſt, when ſome certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing " was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wiſdom " and diſcretion, which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconveni- " ent, ſo as the thing which they had deviſed for a remedy, did indeed but increaſe the ſore, which " it ſhould have cured. They ſaw, that to live by one man's will, became the cauſe of all men's " miſery. This conſtrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might ſee their duty before- " hand, and know the penalties of trangreſſing them." Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 10.

[†] "Civil law being the act of the whole body politick, doth therefore over-rule each ſeveral part " of the ſame body." Hooker, ibid.

§. 96. For when any number of men have, by the conſent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the conſent of the individuals of it, and it being neceſſary to that which is one body to move one way; it is neceſſary the body ſhould move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the conſent of the majority: or elſe it is impoſſible it ſhould act or continue one body, one community, which the conſent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it ſhould; and ſo every one is bound by that conſent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we ſee, that in aſſemblies, impowered to act by poſitive laws, where no number is ſet by that poſitive law which impowers them, the act of the majority paſſes for the act of the whole, and of courſe determines; as having, by the law of nature and reaſon, the power of the whole.

§. 97. And thus every man, by conſenting with others to make one body politick under one government, puts himſelf under an obligation, to every one of that ſociety, to ſubmit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or elſe this original compact, whereby he with others incorporate into one ſociety, would ſignify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the ſtate of nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the ſociety, than he himſelf thought fit, and did actually conſent to? This would be ſtill as great a liberty, as he himſelf had before his compact, or any one elſe in the ſtate of nature hath, who may ſubmit himſelf, and conſent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.

§. 98. For if the conſent of the majority ſhall not, in reaſon, be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the conſent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but ſuch a conſent is next to impoſſible ever to be had, if we conſider the infirmities of health, and avocations of buſineſs, which in a number, though much leſs than that of a commonwealth, will neceſſarily keep many away from the publick aſſembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of intereſts, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into ſociety upon ſuch terms would be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a conſtitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a ſhorter duration, than the feebleſt creatures, and not let it outlaſt the day it was born in: which cannot be ſuppoſed, till we can think, that rational creatures ſhould deſire and conſtitute ſocieties only to be diſſolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the reſt, there they cannot act as one body, and conſequently will be immediately diſſolved again.

§. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a ſtate of nature unite into a community, muſt be underſtood to give up all the power, neceſſary to the ends for which they unite into ſociety, to the majority of the community, unleſs they expreſly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political ſociety, which is all the compact, that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually conſtitutes any political ſociety, is nothing but the conſent of any number of freemen capable of a majority, to unite and incorporate into ſuch a ſociety. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.

§. 100. To this I find two objections made.

Firſt, "That there are no inſtances to be found in ſtory, of a company " of men independent and equal one amongſt another, that met together, and " in this way began and ſet up a government."

Secondly, "It is impoſſible of right, that men ſhould do ſo, becauſe all " men being born under government, they are to ſubmit to that, and are not " at liberty to begin a new one."

§. 101. To the firſt there is this to anſwer, That it is not at all to be wondered, that hiſtory gives us but a very little account of men, that lived together in the ſtate of nature. The inconveniencies of that condition, and the love and want of ſociety, no ſooner brought any number of them together, but they preſently united and incorporated, if they deſigned to continue together. And if we may not ſuppoſe men ever to have been in the ſtate of nature, becauſe we hear not much of them in ſuch a ſtate; we may as well ſuppoſe the armies of Salmanaſſer or Xerxes were never children, becauſe we hear little of them, till they were men, and imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to records, and letters ſeldom come in amongſt a people till a long continuation of civil ſociety has, by other more neceſſary arts, provided for their ſafety, eaſe, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the hiſtory of their founders, and ſearch into their original, when they have outlived the memory of it: for it is with commonwealths as with particular perſons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it. And thoſe that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world, excepting that of the Jews, where God himſelf immediately interpoſed, and which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain inſtances of ſuch a beginning as I have mentioned, or at leaſt have manifeſt footſteps of it.

§. 102. He muſt ſhew a ſtrange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees not with his hypotheſis, who will not allow, that the beginnings of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of ſeveral men free and independent one of another, amongſt whom there was no natural ſuperiority or ſubjection. And if Joſephus Acoſta's word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of America there was no government at all. "There are great and apparent conjectures, ſays he, that theſe men, ſpeaking "of thoſe of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, "but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, thoſe "of Braſil, and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as "occaſion is offered, in peace or war, they chooſe their captains as they "pleaſe," l. i. c. 25. If it be ſaid, that every man there was born ſubject to his father, or the head of his family; that the ſubjection due from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what political ſociety he thought fit, has been already proved. But be that as it will, theſe men, it is evident, were actually free; and whatever ſuperiority ſome politicians now would place in any of them, they themſelves claimed it not, but by conſent were all equal, till by the ſame conſent they ſet rulers over themſelves. So that their politick ſocieties all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of government.

§. 103. AND I hope thoſe who went away from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by Juſtin, l. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen, independent one of another, and to have ſet up a government over themſelves, by their own conſent. Thus I have given ſeveral examples, out of hiſtory, of people free and in the ſtate of nature, that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of ſuch inſtances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not be ſo begun, I ſuppoſe the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone than urge it againſt natural liberty: for if they can give ſo many inſtances, out of hiſtory, of governments begun upon paternal right, I think (though at beſt an argument from what has been, to what ſhould of right be, has no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cauſe. But if I might adviſe them in the caſe, they would do well not to ſearch too much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto; leſt they ſhould find, at the foundation of moſt of them, ſomething very little favourable to the deſign they promote, and ſuch a power as they contend for.

§. 104. BUT to conclude, reaſon being plain on our ſide, that men are naturally free, and the examples of hiſtory ſhewing, that the governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the conſent of the people; there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the firſt erecting of governments.

§. 105. I WILL not deny, that if we look back as far as hiſtory will direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we ſhall generally find them under the government and adminiſtration of one man. And I am alſo apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to ſubſiſt by itſelf, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much land, and few people, the government commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the law of nature, the ſame power with every man elſe to puniſh, as he thought fit, any offences againſt that law, might thereby puniſh his tranſgreſſing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to ſubmit to his puniſhment, and all join with him againſt the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his ſentence againſt any tranſgreſſion, and ſo in effect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He was fitteſt to be truſted; paternal affection ſecured their property and intereſt under his care; and the cuſtom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it eaſier to ſubmit to him, rather than to any other. If therefore they muſt have one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongſt men that live together; who ſo likely to be the man as he that was their common father; unleſs negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of age, wiſdom, courage, or any other qualities, leſs fit for rule; or where ſeveral families met, and conſented to continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but they uſed their natural freedom, to ſet up him, whom they judged the ableſt, and moſt likely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering ſwords, and ſpreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, cæteris paribus, they commonly prefer the heir of their deceaſed king; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, they paſs him by, and ſet up the ſtouteſt and braveſt man for ther ruler.

§. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world, and the hiſtory of nations, we commonly find the government to be in one hand; yet it deſtroys not that which I affirm, viz. that the beginning of politick ſociety depends upon the conſent of the individuals, to join into, and make one ſociety; who, when they are thus incorporated, might ſet up what form of government they thought fit. But this having given occaſion to men to miſtake, and think, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not be amiſs here to conſider, why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form; which though perhaps the father's pre-eminency might, in the firſt inſtitution of ſome commonwealth, give a riſe to, and place in the beginning, the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reaſon, that continued the form of government in a ſingle perſon, was not any regard, or reſpect to paternal authority; ſince all petty monarchies, that is, almoſt all monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at leaſt upon occaſion, elective.

§. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father's government of the childhood of thoſe ſprung from him, having accuſtomed them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exerciſed with care and ſkill, with affection and love to thoſe under it; it was ſufficient to procure and preſerve to men all the political happineſs they ſought for in ſociety. It was no wonder that they ſhould pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their infancy they had been all accuſtomed to;

and which, by experience, they had found both eaſy and ſafe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being ſimple, and moſt obvious to men, whom neither experience had inſtructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or inſolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniencies of abſolute power, which monarchy in ſucceſſion was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them; it was not at all ſtrange, that they ſhould not much trouble themſelves to think of methods of reſtraining any exorbitancies of thoſe to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing ſeveral parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt the oppreſſion of tyrannical dominion, nor did the faſhion of the age, nor their poſſeſſions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for coveteouſneſs to ambition) give them any reaſon to apprehend or provide againſt it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themſelves into ſuch a frame of government, as was not only, as I ſaid, moſt obvious and ſimple, but alſo beſt ſuited to their preſent ſtate and condition; which ſtood more in need of defence againſt foreign invaſions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a ſimple poor way of living, confining their deſires within the narrow bounds of each man's ſmall property, made few controverſies, and ſo no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to ſuperintend the proceſs, or look after the execution of juſtice, where there were but few treſpaſſes, and few offenders. Since then thoſe, who liked one another ſo well as to join into ſociety, cannot but be ſuppoſed to have ſome acquaintance and friendſhip together, and ſome truſt one in another; they could not but have greater apprehenſions of others, than of one another: and therefore their firſt care and thought cannot but be ſuppoſed to be, how to ſecure themſelves againſt foreign force. It was natural for them to put themſelves under a frame of government which might beſt ſerve to that end, and chuſe the wiſeſt and braveſt man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out againſt their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.

§. 108. THUS we ſee, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is ſtill a pattern of the firſt ages in Aſia and Europe, whilſt the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their poſſeſſions of land, or conteſt for wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command abſolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exerciſe very little dominion, and have but a very moderate ſovereignty; the reſolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. Though the war itſelf, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king's ſole authority.

§. 109. AND thus, in Iſrael itſelf, the chief buſineſs of their judges, and firſt kings, ſeems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of their armies; which (beſides what is ſignified by "going out and in before the people," which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the ſtory of Jephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Iſrael, the Gileadites in fear ſend to Jephtha, a baſtard of their family whom they had caſt off, and article with him, if he will aſſiſt them againſt the Am-

monites,

monites, to make him their ruler; which they do in theſe words, "And the "people made him head and captain over them," Judg. xi. 11. which was, as it ſeems, all one as to be judge. "And he judged Iſrael, Judg. xii. 7. that is, "was their captain-general ſix years." So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them, "He fought for you, and adventured his life "far, and delivered you out of the hands of Midian," Judg. ix. 17. Nothing mentioned of him, but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is found in his hiſtory, or in any of the reſt of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king, though at moſt he was but their general. And when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel's ſons, the children of Iſrael deſired a king, "like all the nations to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight "their battles," 1 Sam. viii. 20. God granting their deſire, ſays to Samuel, "I will ſend thee a man, and thou ſhalt anoint him to be captain over my "people Iſrael, that he may ſave my people out of the hands of the Philiſtines," ix. 16. As if the only buſineſs of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their defence, and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that "the Lord had anointed him to be "captain over his inheritance," x. 1. And therefore thoſe, who after Saul's being ſolemnly choſen and ſaluted king by the tribes of Miſpah, were unwilling to have him their king, made no other objection but this, "How ſhall this "man ſave us?" v. 27. as if they ſhould have ſaid, this man is unfit to be our king, not having ſkill and conduct enough in war, to be able to defend us. And when God reſolved to transfer the government to David, it is in theſe words, "But now thy kingdom ſhall not continue: the Lord hath "ſought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him "to be captain over his people," xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority were nothing elſe but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who had ſtuck to Saul's family, and oppoſed David's reign, when they came to Hebron with terms of ſubmiſſion to him, they tell him, amongſt other arguments they had to ſubmit to him as to their king, that he was in effect their king in Saul's time, and therefore they had no reaſon but to receive him as their king now. "Alſo (ſay they) in time paſt, when Saul was king over us, "thou waſt he that leddeſt out and broughteſt in Iſrael, and the Lord ſaid "unto thee, Thou ſhalt feed my people Iſrael, and thou ſhalt be a captain "over Iſrael."

§. 110. THUS, whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder ſon, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly ſubmitted to it, and the eaſineſs and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquieſced, till time ſeemed to have confirmed it, and ſettled a right of ſucceſſion by preſcription: or whether ſeveral families, or the deſcendants of ſeveral families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or buſineſs brought together, uniting into ſociety: the need of a general, whoſe conduct might defend them againſt their enemies in war, and the great confidence the innocence and ſincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (ſuch as are almoſt all thoſe which begin governments, that ever come to laſt in the world) gave men one of another, made the firſt beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand, without any other expreſs limitation or reſtraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government required. Which ever of thoſe it was that at firſt put the rule into the hands of a ſingle perſon, certain it is no body was intruſted with it but for the publick good and ſafety, and to thoſe ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, thoſe who had it commonly uſed it. And unleſs they had done ſo, young ſocieties could not have ſubſiſted; without ſuch nurſing fathers tender and careful of the publick weal, all governments would have ſunk under the weakneſs and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the people had ſoon periſhed together.

§. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and " amor " ſceleratus habendi," evil concupiſcence, had corrupted men's minds into a miſtake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and conſequently better governors, as well as leſs vicious ſubjects; and there was then no ſtretching prerogative on the one ſide, to oppreſs the people; nor conſequently on the other, any diſpute about privilege, to leſſen or reſtrain the power of the magiſtrate, and ſo no conteſt betwixt rulers and people about governors or government: yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages * would retain and increaſe the power, without doing the buſineſs for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes to have diſtinct and ſeparate intereſts from their people; men found it neceſſary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government, and to find out ways to reſtrain the exorbitancies, and prevent the abuſes of that power, which they having intruſted in another's hands only for their own good, they found was made uſe of to hurt them.

§. 112. Thus we may ſee how probable it is, that people that were naturally free, and by their own conſent either ſubmitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families to make a government, ſhould generally put the rule into one man's hands, and chuſe to be under the conduct of a ſingle perſon, without ſo much as by expreſs conditions limiting or regulating his power, which they thought ſafe enough in his honeſty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being jure divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this laſt age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may ſuffice to ſhew, that as far as we have any light from hiſtory, we have reaſon to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the conſent of the people. I ſay peaceful, becauſe I ſhall have occaſion in another place to ſpeak of conqueſt, which ſome eſteem a way of beginning of governments.

" The other objection I find urged againſt the beginning of polities, in the " way I have mentioned, is this, viz.

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* " At firſt, when ſome certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be nothing was " then farther thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wiſdom " and diſcretion which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconve" nient, ſo as the thing which they had deviſed for a remedy, did indeed but increaſe the ſore which " it ſhould have cured. They ſaw, that to live by one man's will, became the cauſe of all men's " miſery. This conſtrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might ſee their duty before" hand, and know the penalties of tranſgreſſing them." Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 10.

§. 113. “THAT all men being born under government, ſome or other, it is impoſſible any of them ſhould ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government.”

IF this argument be good; I aſk, how came ſo many lawful monarchies into the world? for if any body, upon this ſuppoſition, can ſhew me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to ſhew him ten other free men at liberty, at the ſame time to unite and begin a new government under a regal, or any other form; it being demonſtration, that if any one, born under the dominion of another, may be ſo free as to have a right to command others in a new and diſtinct empire, every one that is born under the dominion of another may be ſo free too, and may become a ruler, or ſubject of a diſtinct ſeparate government. And ſo by this their own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or elſe there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do, but barely to ſhew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind will eaſily agree to pay obedience to him.

§. 114. THOUGH it be a ſufficient anſwer to their objection, to ſhew that it involves them in the ſame difficulties that it doth thoſe they uſe it againſt; yet I ſhall endeavour to diſcover the weakneſs of this argument a little farther.

“ALL men, ſay they, are born under government, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a ſubject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of ſubjection and allegiance.” It is plain mankind never owned nor conſidered any ſuch natural ſubjection that they were born in, to one or to the other, that tied them, without their own conſents, to a ſubjection to them and their heirs.

§. 115. FOR there are no examples ſo frequent in hiſtory, both ſacred and profane, as thoſe of men withdrawing themſelves, and their obedience, from the juriſdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bred up in, and ſetting up new governments in other places; from whence ſprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room enough, till the ſtronger, or more fortunate, ſwallowed the weaker; and thoſe great ones again breaking to pieces, diſſolved into leſſer dominions. All which are ſo many teſtimonies againſt paternal ſovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of the father deſcending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, ſince it was impoſſible, upon that ground, there ſhould have been ſo many little kingdoms; all muſt have been but only one univerſal monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to ſeparate themſelves from their families, and the government, be it what it will, that was ſet up in it, and go and make diſtinct commonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit.

§. 116. THIS has been the practice of the world from its firſt beginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they are born under conſtituted and ancient polities, that have eſtabliſhed laws, and ſet forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongſt the unconfined inhabitants, that run looſe in them: for thoſe, who would perſuade us, that “by being born under any government, we are naturally

" ſubjects to it," and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the ſtate of nature; have no other reaſon (bating that of paternal power, which we have already anſwered) to produce for it, but only, becauſe our fathers or progenitors paſſed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themſelves and their poſterity to a perpetual ſubjection to the government, which they themſelves ſubmitted to. It is true, that whatever engagement or promiſes any one has made for himſelf, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatſoever, bind his children or poſterity: for his ſon, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any " act of the father can no " more give away the liberty of the ſon," than it can of any body elſe: he may indeed annex ſuch conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a ſubject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his ſon to be of that community, if he will enjoy thoſe poſſeſſions which were his father's; becauſe that eſtate being his father's property, he may diſpoſe, or ſettle it, as he pleaſes.

§. 117. And this has generally given the occaſion to miſtake in this matter; becauſe commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be diſmembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but thoſe of their community, the ſon cannot ordinarily enjoy the poſſeſſions of his father, but under the ſame terms his father did, by becoming a member of the ſociety; whereby he puts himſelf preſently under the government he finds there eſtabliſhed, as much as any other ſubject of that commonwealth. And thus " the conſent of freemen, " born under government, which only makes them members of it," being given ſeparately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together; people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not neceſſary, conclude they are naturally ſubjects as they are men.

§. 118. But, it is plain, governments themſelves underſtand it otherwiſe; they claim " no power over the ſon, becauſe of that they had over the father;" nor look on children as being their ſubjects, by their fathers being ſo. If a ſubject of England have a child, by an Engliſh woman in France, whoſe ſubject is he? Not the king of England's; for he muſt have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of France's; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleaſes? and who ever was judged as a traitor or deſerter, if he left, or warred againſt a country, for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then, by the practice of governments themſelves, as well as by the law of right reaſon, that " a child is born a ſubject of no country or government." He is under his father's tuition and authority, till he comes to age of diſcretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himſelf under, what body politick he will unite himſelf to: for if an Engliſhman's ſon, born in France, be at liberty, and may do ſo, it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father's being a ſubject of this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his anceſtors. And why then hath not his ſon, by the ſame reaſon, the ſame liberty, though he be born any where elſe? Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children, is the ſame, wherever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the poſitive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.

§. 119. Every man being, as has been ſhewed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into ſubjection to any earthly power, but only his own conſent; it is to be conſidered, what ſhall be underſtood to be a ſufficient declaration of a man's conſent, to make him ſubject to the laws of any government. There is a common diſtinction of an expreſs and a tacit conſent, which will concern our preſent caſe. No body doubts but an expreſs conſent, of any man entering into any ſociety, makes him a perfect member of that ſociety, a ſubject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit conſent, and how far it binds, i. e. how far any one ſhall be looked on to have conſented, and thereby ſubmitted to any government, where he has made no expreſſions of it at all. And to this I ſay, that every man, that hath any poſſeſſions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit conſent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during ſuch enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his poſſeſſion be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.

§. 120. To underſtand this the better, it is fit to conſider, that every man, when he at firſt incorporates himſelf into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himſelf thereunto, annexed alſo, and ſubmits to the community, thoſe poſſeſſions, which he has, or ſhall acquire, that do not already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into ſociety with others for the ſecuring and regulating of property; and yet to ſuppoſe his land, whoſe property is to be regulated by the laws of the ſociety, ſhould be exempt from the juriſdiction of that government, to which he himſelf, the proprietor of the land, is a ſubject. By the ſame act therefore, whereby any one unites his perſon, which was before free, to any commonwealth; by the ſame he unites his poſſeſſions, which were before free, to it alſo: and they become, both of them, perſon and poſſeſſion, ſubject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchaſe, permiſſion, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, ſo annexed to, and under the government of that commonwealth, muſt take it with the condition it is under; that is, of ſubmitting to the government of the commonwealth, under whoſe juriſdiction it is, as far forth as any ſubject of it.

§. 121. But ſince the government has a direct juriſdiction only over the land, and reaches the poſſeſſor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himſelf in the ſociety) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of ſuch enjoyment, to "ſubmit to the government, "begins and ends with the enjoyment:" ſo that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but ſuch a tacit conſent to the government, will, by donation, ſale, or otherwiſe, quit the ſaid poſſeſſion, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himſelf into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and unpoſſeſſed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any expreſs declaration, given his conſent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually and indiſpenſibly obliged to be, and remain unalterably a ſubject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the ſtate of nature; unleſs, by any calamity, the government he was under, comes to be diſſolved, or elſe by ſome publick act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it.

§. 122 But ſubmitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that ſociety: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all thoſe, who, not being in a ſtate of war, come within the territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that ſociety, a perpetual ſubject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man a ſubject to another, in whoſe family he found it convenient to abide for ſome time; though, whilſt he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and ſubmit to the government he found there. And thus we ſee, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conſcience, to ſubmit to its adminiſtration, as far forth as any deniſon; yet do not thereby come to be ſubjects or members of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any man ſo, but his actually entering into it by poſitive engagement, and expreſs promiſe and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political ſocieties, and that conſent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth.

## CHAP. IX.

## Of the ends of political ſociety and government.

§. 123. If man in the ſtate of nature be ſo free, as has been ſaid; if he be abſolute lord of his own perſon and poſſeſſions, equal to the greateſt, and ſubject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and ſubject himſelf to the dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to anſwer, that though in the ſtate of nature he hath ſuch a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and conſtantly expoſed to the invaſion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no ſtrict obſervers of equity and juſtice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this ſtate is very unſafe, very unſecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reaſon, that he ſeeks out, and is willing to join in ſociety with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preſervation of their lives, liberties and eſtates, which I call by the general name, property.

§. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themſelves under government, is the preſervation of their property. To which in the ſtate of nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an eſtabliſhed, ſettled, known law, received and allowed by common conſent to be the ſtandard of right and wrong, and the common meaſure to decide all controverſies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biaſſed by their intereſt, as well as ignorant for want of ſtudy of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular caſes.

§. 125. Secondly, In the ſtate of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the eſtabliſhed law: for every one in that ſtate being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themſelves, paſſion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own caſes; as well as negligence, and unconcernedneſs, to make them too remiſs in other men's.

§. 126. Thirdly, In the ſtate of nature there often wants power to back and ſupport the ſentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injuſtice offended, will ſeldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injuſtice; ſuch reſiſtance many times makes the puniſhment dangerous, and frequently deſtructive, to thoſe who attempt it.

§. 127. Thus mankind, notwithſtanding all the privileges of the ſtate of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into ſociety. Hence it comes to paſs, that we ſeldom find any number of men live any time together in this ſtate. The inconveniencies that they are therein expoſed to, by the irregular and uncertain exerciſe of the power every man has of puniſhing the tranſgreſſions of others, make them take ſanctuary under the eſtabliſhed laws of government, and therein ſeek the preſervation of their property. It is this makes them ſo willingly give up every one his ſingle power of puniſhing, to be exerciſed by ſuch alone, as ſhall be appointed to it amongſt them; and by ſuch rules as the community, or thoſe authorized by them to that purpoſe, ſhall agree on. And in this we have the original right and riſe of both the legiſlative and executive power, as well as of the governments and ſocieties themſelves.

§. 128. For in the ſtate of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.

The firſt is to do whatſoever he thinks fit for the preſervation of himſelf, and others within the permiſſion of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the reſt of mankind are one community, make up one ſociety, diſtinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and vitiouſneſs of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no neceſſity that men ſhould ſeparate from this great and natural community, and by poſitive agreements combine into ſmaller and divided aſſociations.

The other power a man has in the ſtate of nature, is the power to puniſh the crimes committed againſt that law. Both theſe he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may ſo call it, or particular politick ſociety, and incorporates into any commonwealth, ſeparate from the reſt of mankind.

§. 129. THE firſt power, *viz.* "of doing whatſoever he thought for the "preſervation of himſelf," and the reſt of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the ſociety, ſo far forth as the preſervation of himſelf, and the reſt of that ſociety ſhall require; which laws of the ſociety in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.

§. 130. SECONDLY, The power of puniſhing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own ſingle authority, as he thought fit) to aſſiſt the executive power of the ſociety, as the law thereof ſhall require: for being now in a new ſtate, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, aſſiſtance, and ſociety of others in the ſame community, as well as protection from its whole ſtrength; he is to part alſo with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himſelf, as the good, proſperity, and ſafety of the ſociety ſhall require; which is not only neceſſary, but juſt, ſince the other members of the ſociety do the like.

§. 131. BUT though men, when they enter into ſociety, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the ſtate of nature, into the hands of the ſociety, to be ſo far diſpoſed of by the legiſlative, as the good of the ſociety ſhall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preſerve himſelf, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be ſuppoſed to change his condition with an intention to be worſe) the power of the ſociety, or legiſlative conſtituted by them, can never be ſuppoſed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to ſecure every one's property, by providing againſt thoſe three defects above-mentioned, that made the ſtate of nature ſo unſafe and uneaſy. And ſo whoever has the legiſlative or ſupreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by eſtabliſhed ſtanding laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controverſies by thoſe laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of ſuch laws, or abroad to prevent or redreſs foreign injuries, and ſecure the community from inroads and invaſion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, ſafety, and publick good of the people.

## CHAP. X.

## Of the forms of a commonwealth.

§. 132. THE majority having, as has been ſhewed, upon men's firſt uniting into ſociety, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing thoſe laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or elſe may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few ſelect men, and their heirs or ſucceſſors; and then it is an oligarchy: or elſe into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a ſucceſſor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And ſo accordingly of theſe the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legiſlative power be at firſt given by the majority to one or more perſons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the ſupreme power to revert to them again; when it is ſo reverted, the community may diſpoſe of it again anew into what hands they pleaſe, and ſo conſtitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the ſupreme power, which is the legiſlative, it being impoſſible to conceive that an inferior power ſhould preſcribe to a ſuperior, or any but the ſupreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed; ſuch is the form of the commonwealth.

§. 133. By commonwealth, I muſt be underſtood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the Latines ſignified by the word civitas; to which the word which beſt anſwers in our language, is commonwealth, and moſt properly expreſſes ſuch a ſociety of men, which community or city in Engliſh does not: for there may be ſubordinate communities in a government; and city amongſt us has a quite different notion from commonwealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to uſe the word commonwealth in that ſenſe, in which I find it uſed by king James the firſt; and I take it to be its genuine ſignification; which if any body diſlike, I conſent with him to change it for a better.

## CHAP. XI.

## Of the extent of the legiſlative power.

§. 134. THE great end of men's entering into ſociety, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and ſafety, and the great inſtrument and means of that being the laws eſtabliſhed in that ſociety; the firſt and fundamental poſitive law of all commonwealths is the eſtabliſhing of the legiſlative power; as the firſt and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legiſlative itſelf, is the preſervation of the ſociety, and (as far as will conſiſt with the publick good) of every perſon in it. This legiſlative is not only the ſupreme power of the commonwealth, but ſacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body elſe, in what form ſoever conceived, or by what power ſoever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its ſanction from that legiſlative which the publick has choſen and appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is abſolutely neceſſary to its being a law *, the conſent

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* "The lawful power of making laws to command whole politick ſocieties of men, belonging "ſo properly unto the ſame intire ſocieties, that for any prince or potentate of what kind ſoever "upon

conſent of the ſociety, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own conſent, and by authority received from them. And therefore all the obedience, which by the moſt ſolemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this ſupreme power, and is directed by thoſe laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatſoever, or any domeſtick ſubordinate power, diſcharge any member of the ſociety from his obedience to the legiſlative, acting purſuant to their truſt; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws ſo enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the ſociety, which is not the ſupreme.

§. 135. Though the legiſlative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the ſupreme power in every commonwealth; yet,

First, It is not, nor can poſſibly be abſolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the ſociety given up to that perſon, or aſſembly, which is legiſlator; it can be no more than thoſe perſons had in a ſtate of nature before they entered into ſociety, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himſelf; and no body has an abſolute arbitrary power over himſelf, or over any other, to deſtroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot ſubject himſelf to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the ſtate of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or poſſeſſion of another, but only ſo much as the law of nature gave him for the preſervation of himſelf, and the reſt of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legiſlative power, ſo that the legiſlative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmoſt bounds of it, is limited to the publick good of the ſociety. It is a power, that hath no other end but preſervation, and therefore can never † have a right to deſtroy, enſlave, or deſignedly to impoveriſh the ſub-

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“ upon earth, to exerciſe the ſame of himſelf, and not by expreſs commiſſion immediately and perſonally received from God, or elſe by authority derived at the firſt from their conſent, upon whoſe perſons they impoſe laws; it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which publick approbation hath not made ſo.” Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 10. “ Of this point therefore we are to note, that ſith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politick multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our conſent, we could in ſuch ſort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded we do conſent, when that ſociety, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before conſented, without revoking the ſame after by the like univerſal agreement.

“ Laws therefore human, of what kind ſoever, are available by conſent.” Ibid.

† “ Two foundations there are which bear up publick ſocieties; the one a natural inclination, whereby all men deſire ſociable life and fellowſhip; the other an order, expreſly or ſecretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a commonweal, the very ſoul of a politick body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and ſet on work in ſuch actions as the common good requireth. Laws politick, ordained for external order and regiment amongſt men, are never framed as they ſhould be, unleſs preſuming the will of man to be inwardly obſtinate, rebellious, and averſe from all obedience to the ſacred laws of his nature; in a word, unleſs preſuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beaſt, they do accordingly provide, notwithſtanding, ſo to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which ſocieties are inſtituted. Unleſs they do this, they are not perfect.” Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. ſect. 10.

jects. The obligations of the law of nature ceaſe not in ſociety, but only in many caſes are drawn cloſer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their obſervation. Thus the law of nature ſtands as an eternal rule to all men, legiſlators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's actions, muſt, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i. e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the "fundamental law of nature being the " preſervation of mankind," no human ſanction can be good, or valid againſt it.

§. 136. SECONDLY, * The legiſlative or ſupreme authority, cannot aſſume to itſelf a power to rule, by extemporary, arbitrary decrees, but is bound to diſpenſe juſtice, and to decide the rights of the ſubject, by promulgated, ſtanding laws, and known authorized judges. For the law of nature being unwritten, and ſo no where to be found, but in the minds of men; they who through paſſion, or intereſt, ſhall miſcite, or miſapply it, cannot ſo eaſily be convinced of their miſtake, where there is no eſtabliſhed judge: and ſo it ſerves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of thoſe that live under it, eſpecially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own caſe: and he that has right on his ſide, having ordinarily but his own ſingle ſtrength, hath not force enough to defend himſelf from injuries, or to puniſh delinquents. To avoid the ſeinconveniencies, which diſorder men's properties in the ſtate of nature, men unite into ſocieties, that they may have the united ſtrength of the whole ſociety to ſecure and defend their properties, and may have ſtanding rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the ſociety which they enter into, and the community put the legiſlative power into ſuch hands as they think fit; with this truſt, that they ſhall be governed by declared laws, or elſe their peace, quiet, and property will ſtill be at the ſame uncertainty, as it was in the ſtate of nature.

§. 137. ABSOLUTE arbitrary power, or governing without ſettled ſtanding laws, can neither of them conſiſt with the ends of ſociety and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the ſtate of nature for, and tie themſelves up under, were it not to preſerve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by ſtated rules of right and property to ſecure their peace and quiet. It cannot be ſuppoſed that they ſhould intend, had they a power ſo to do, to give to any one, or more, an abſolute arbitrary power over their perſons and eſtates, and put a force into the magiſtrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themſelves into a worſe condition than the ſtate of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right againſt the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain

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* "Human laws are meaſures in reſpect of men whoſe actions they muſt direct, howbeit ſuch " meaſures they are as have alſo their higher rules to be meaſured by, which rules are two, the " law of God, and the law of nature; ſo that laws human muſt be made according to the general " laws of nature, and without contradiction to any poſitive law of ſcripture, otherwiſe they are ill " made." Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. iii. ſect. 9.

"To conſtrain men to any thing inconvenient doth ſeem unreaſonable." Ibid. l. i. ſect. 10.

it, whether invaded by a ſingle man, or many in combination. Whereas by ſuppoſing they have given up themſelves to the abſolute arbitrary power and will of a legiſlator, they have diſarmed themſelves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleaſes; he being in a much worſe condition, who is expoſed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is expoſed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 ſingle men; no body being ſecure, that his will, who has ſuch a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times ſtronger. And therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined reſolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worſe condition than in the ſtate of nature, if they ſhall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleaſure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their ſudden thoughts, or unreſtrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any meaſures ſet down which may guide and juſtify their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the good of the ſociety, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleaſure, ſo it ought to be exerciſed by eſtabliſhed and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be ſafe and ſecure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to ſuch purpoſes, and by ſuch meaſures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

§. 138. Thirdly, The ſupreme power cannot take from any man part of his property without his own conſent: for the preſervation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into ſociety, it neceſſarily ſuppoſes and requires, that the people ſhould have property, without which they muſt be ſuppoſed to loſe that, by entering into ſociety, which was the end for which they entered into it; too groſs an abſurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in ſociety having property, they have ſuch right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their ſubſtance or any part of it from them, without their own conſent: without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleaſes againſt my conſent. Hence it is a miſtake to think, that the ſupreme or legiſlative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and diſpoſe of the eſtates of the ſubject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleaſure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legiſlative conſiſts, wholly or in part, in aſſemblies which are variable, whoſe members, upon the diſſolution of the aſſembly, are ſubjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the reſt. But in governments, where the legiſlative is in one laſting aſſembly always in being, or in one man, as in abſolute monarchies, there is danger ſtill, that they will think themſelves to have a diſtinct intereſt from the reſt of the community; and ſo will be apt to increaſe their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is not at all ſecure, though there be good and equitable laws to ſet the bounds of it between him and his fellow ſubjects, if he who commands thoſe ſubjects, have power to take from any private man, what part he pleaſes of his property, and uſe and diſpoſe of it as he thinks good.

§. 139. But government, into whatſoever hands it is put, being, as I have before ſhewed, intruſted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and ſecure their properties; the prince, or ſenate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the ſubjects one amongſt another, yet can never have a power to take to themſelves the whole, or any part of the ſubjects property, without their own conſent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us ſee, that even abſolute power, where it is neceſſary, is not arbitrary by being abſolute, but is ſtill limited by that reaſon, and confined to thoſe ends, which required it in ſome caſes to be abſolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial diſcipline: for the preſervation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an abſolute obedience to the command of every ſuperior officer, and it is juſtly death to diſobey or diſpute the moſt dangerous or unreaſonable of them; but yet we ſee, that neither the ſerjeant, that could command a ſoldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or ſtand in a breach, where he is almoſt ſure to periſh, can command that ſoldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deſerting his poſt, or for not obeying the moſt deſperate orders, can yet, with all his abſolute power of life and death, diſpoſe of one farthing of that ſoldier's eſtate, or ſeize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the leaſt diſobedience: becauſe ſuch a blind obedience is neceſſary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preſervation of the reſt; but the diſpoſing of his goods has nothing to do with it.

§. 140. It is true, governments cannot be ſupported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his ſhare of the protection, ſhould pay out of his eſtate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But ſtill it muſt be with his own conſent, i. e. the conſent of the majority, giving it either by themſelves, or their repreſentatives choſen by them: for if any one ſhall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without ſuch conſent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and ſubverts the end of government: for what property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleaſes, to himſelf?

§. 141. Fourthly, The legiſlative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot paſs it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by conſtituting the legiſlative, and appointing in whoſe hands that ſhall be. And when the people have ſaid, we will ſubmit to rules, and be governed by laws made by ſuch men, and in ſuch forms, no body elſe can ſay other men ſhall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but ſuch as are enacted by thoſe whom they have choſen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legiſlative being derived from the people by a poſitive voluntary grant and inſtitution, can be no other than what that poſitive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legiſlators, the legiſlative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.

§. 142. These are the bounds which the truſt, that is put in them by the ſociety, and the law of God and nature, have ſet to the legiſlative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.

First, They are to govern by promulgated eſtabliſhed laws, not to be varied in particular caſes, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.

Secondly, Theſe laws alſo ought to be deſigned for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.

Thirdly, They muſt not raiſe taxes on the property of the people, without the conſent of the people, given by themſelves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only ſuch governments where the legiſlative is always in being, or at leaſt where the people have not reſerved any part of the legiſlative to deputies, to be from time to time choſen by themſelves.

Fourthly, The legiſlative neither muſt nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body elſe, or place it any where, but where the people have.

## CHAP. XII.

## Of the legiſlative, executive, and federative power of the commonwealth.

§. 143. THE legiſlative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth ſhall be employed for preſerving the community and the members of it. But becauſe thoſe laws which are conſtantly to be executed, and whoſe force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legiſlative ſhould be always in being, not having always buſineſs to do. And becauſe it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to graſp at power, for the ſame perſons, who have the power of making laws, to have alſo in their hands the power to execute them; whereby they may exempt themſelves from obedience to the laws they make, and ſuit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a diſtinct intereſt from the reſt of the community, contrary to the end of ſociety and government: therefore in well ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is ſo conſidered, as it ought, the legiſlative power is put into the hands of divers perſons, who duly aſſembled, have by themſelves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws; which when they have done, being ſeparated again, they are themſelves ſubject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the publick good.

§. 144. But becauſe the laws, that are at once, and in a ſhort time made, have a conſtant and laſting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is neceſſary there ſhould be a power always in being, which ſhould ſee to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legiſlative and executive power come often to be ſeparated.

§. 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may call natural, becauſe it is that which anſwers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into ſociety: for though in a commonwealth, the members of it are diſtinct perſons ſtill in reference to one another, and as ſuch are governed by the laws of the ſociety; yet in reference to the reſt of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, ſtill in the ſtate of nature with the reſt of mankind. Hence it is, that the controverſies that happen between any man of the ſociety with thoſe that are out of it, are managed by the publick; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this conſideration, the whole community is one body in the ſtate of nature, in reſpect of all other ſtates or perſons out of its community.

§. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the tranſactions, with all perſons and communities without the commonwealth; and may be called federative, if any one pleaſes. So the thing be underſtood, I am indifferent as to the name.

147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really diſtinct in themſelves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the ſociety within itſelf, upon all that are parts of it; the other the management of the ſecurity and intereſt of the publick without, with all thoſe that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almoſt united. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much leſs capable to be directed by antecedent, ſtanding, poſitive laws, than the executive; and ſo muſt neceſſarily be left to the prudence and wiſdom of thoſe, whoſe hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good: for the laws that concern ſubjects one amongſt another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of deſigns, and intereſts, muſt be left in great part to the prudence of thoſe, who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the beſt of their ſkill, for the advantage of the commonwealth.

§. 148. Though, as I ſaid, the executive and federative power of every community be really diſtinct in themſelves, yet they are hardly to be ſeparated, and placed at the ſame time, in the hands of diſtinct perſons: for both of them requiring the force of the ſociety for their exerciſe, it is almoſt impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in diſtinct, and not ſubordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power ſhould be placed in perſons, that might act ſeparately, whereby the force of the publick would be under different commands: which would be apt ſome time or other to cauſe diſorder and ruin.

# CHAP. XIII.

## Of the ſubordination of the powers of the commonwealth.

§. 149. THOUGH in a conſtituted commonwealth, ſtanding upon its own baſis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preſervation of the community, there can be but one ſupreme power, which is the legiſlative, to which all the reſt are and muſt be ſubordinate; yet the legiſlative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains ſtill "in the people a ſupreme power to remove or alter the legiſlative," when they find the legiſlative act contrary to the truſt repoſed in them: for all power given with truſt for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifeſtly neglected, or oppoſed, the truſt muſt neceſſarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of thoſe that gave it, who may place it anew where they ſhall think beſt for their ſafety and ſecurity. And thus the community perpetually retains a ſupreme power of ſaving themſelves from the attempts and deſigns of any body, even of their legiſlators, whenever they ſhall be ſo fooliſh, or ſo wicked, as to lay and carry on deſigns againſt the liberties and properties of the ſubject: for no man or ſociety of men, having a power to deliver up their preſervation, or conſequently the means of it, to the abſolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one ſhall go about to bring them into ſuch a ſlaviſh condition, they will always have a right to preſerve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themſelves of thoſe, who invade this fundamental, ſacred, and unalterable law of ſelf-preſervation, for which they entered into ſociety. And thus the community may be ſaid in this reſpect to be always the ſupreme power, but not as conſidered under any form of government, becauſe this power of the people can never take place till the government be diſſolved.

§. 150. In all caſes, whilſt the government ſubſiſts, the legiſlative is the ſupreme power: for what can give laws to another, muſt needs be ſuperior to him; and ſince the legiſlative is no otherwiſe legiſlative of the ſociety, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of the ſociety, preſcribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are tranſgreſſed; the legiſlative muſt needs be the ſupreme, and all other powers, in any members or parts of the ſociety, derived from and ſubordinate to it.

§. 151. In ſome commonwealths, where the legiſlative is not always in being, and the executive is veſted in a ſingle perſon, who has alſo a ſhare in the legiſlative; there that ſingle perſon in a very tolerable ſenſe may alſo be called ſupreme: not that he has in himſelf all the ſupreme power, which is that of law-making; but becauſe he has in him the ſupreme execution, from whom all inferior magiſtrates derive all their ſeveral ſubordinate powers, or at leaſt the greateſt part of them: having alſo no legiſlative ſuperior to him, there being no law to be made without his conſent, which cannot be expected ſhould ever ſubject him to the other part of the legiſlative, he is properly enough in this ſenſe ſupreme. But yet it is to be obſerved, that though oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him, as ſupreme legiſlator, but as ſupreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others: allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwiſe than as the publick perſon veſted with the power of the law; and ſo is to be conſidered as the image, phantom, or repreſentative of the commonwealth, acted by the will of the ſociety, declared in its laws; and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits this repreſentation, this publick will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himſelf, and is but a ſingle private perſon without power, and without will, that has no right to obedience; the members owing no obedience but to the publick will of the ſociety.

§. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a perſon that has alſo a ſhare in the legiſlative, is viſibly ſubordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleaſure changed and diſplaced; ſo that it is not the ſupreme executive power, that is exempt from ſubordination, but the ſupreme executive power veſted in one, who having a ſhare in the legiſlative, has no diſtinct ſuperior legiſlative to be ſubordinate and accountable to, farther than he himſelf ſhall join and conſent; ſo that he is no more ſubordinate than he himſelf ſhall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very little. Of other miniſterial and ſubordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not ſpeak, they being ſo multiplied with infinite variety, in the different cuſtoms and conſtitutions of diſtinct commonwealths, that it is impoſſible to give a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe, we may take notice of concerning them, that they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by poſitive grant and commiſſion delegated to them, and are all of them accountable to ſome other power in the commonwealth.

§. 153. It is not neceſſary, no, nor ſo much as convenient, that the legiſlative ſhould be always in being; but abſolutely neceſſary that the executive power ſhould, becauſe there is not always need of new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the legiſlative hath put the execution of the laws they make, into other hands, they have a power ſtill to reſume it out of thoſe hands, when they find cauſe, and to puniſh for any male adminiſtration againſt the laws. The ſame holds alſo in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being both miniſterial and ſubordinate to the legiſlative, which, as has been ſhewed, in a conſtituted commonwealth is the ſupreme. The legiſlative alſo in this caſe being ſuppoſed to conſiſt of ſeveral perſons, (for if it be a ſingle perſon, it cannot but be always in being, and ſo will, as ſupreme, naturally have the ſupreme executive power, together with the legiſlative) may aſſemble, and exerciſe their legiſlature, at the times that either their original conſtitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they pleaſe; if neither of theſe hath appointed any time, or there be no other way preſcribed to convoke them: for the ſupreme power being placed in them by the people, it is always in them, and they may exerciſe it when they pleaſe, unleſs by their original conſtitution they are limited to certain ſeaſons, or by an act of their ſupreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and when that time comes, they have a right to aſſemble and act again.

§. 154. If the legiſlative, or any part of it be made up of repreſentatives choſen for that time by the people, which afterwards return into the ordinary ſtate of ſubjects, and have no ſhare in the legiſlature but upon a new choice, this power of chuſing muſt alſo be exerciſed by the people, either at certain appointed ſeaſons, or elſe when they are ſummoned to it; and in this latter caſe, the power of convoking the legiſlative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one of theſe two limitations in reſpect of time: that either the original conſtitution requires their aſſembling and acting at certain intervals, and then the executive power does nothing but miniſterially iſſue directions for their electing, and aſſembling, according to due forms; or elſe it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections, when the occaſions or exigencies of the publick require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, or the redreſs or prevention of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people.

§. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being poſſeſſed of the force of the commonwealth, ſhall make uſe of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legiſlative, when the original conſtitution, or the publick exigencies require it? I ſay, uſing force upon the people without authority, and contrary to the truſt put in him that does ſo, is a ſtate of war with the people, who have a right to reinſtate their legiſlative in the exerciſe of their power: for having erected a legiſlative, with an intent they ſhould exerciſe the power of making laws, either at certian ſet times, or when there is need of it; when they are hindered by any force from what is ſo neceſſary to the ſociety, and wherein the ſafety and preſervation of the people conſiſts, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all ſtates and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppoſe force to it. The uſe of force without authority, always puts him that uſes it into a ſtate of war, as the aggreſſor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly.

§. 156. The power of aſſembling and diſmiſſing the legiſlative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a ſuperiority over it, but is a fiduciary truſt placed in him, for the ſafety of the people, in a caſe where the uncertainty and variableneſs of human affairs could not bear a ſteady fixed rule: for it not being poſſible, that the firſt framers of the government ſhould, by any foreſight, be ſo much maſters of future events, as to be able to prefix ſo juſt periods of return and duration to the aſſemblies of the legiſlative, in all times to come, that might exactly anſwer all the exigencies of the commonwealth; the beſt remedy could be found for this defect was to truſt this to the prudence of one who was always to be preſent, and whoſe buſineſs it was to watch over the publick good. Conſtant frequent meetings of the legiſlative, and long continuations of their aſſemblies, without neceſſary occaſion, could not but be burdenſome to the people, and muſt neceſſarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairs might be ſometimes ſuch as to need their preſent help: any delay of their convening might endanger the publick; and ſometimes too their buſineſs might be ſo great, that the limited time of their ſitting might be too ſhort for their work, and rob the publick of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation. What then could be done in this caſe to prevent the community from being expoſed ſome time or other to eminent hazard, on one ſide or the other, by fixed intervals and periods, ſet to the meeting and acting of the legiſlative, but to intruſt it to the prudence of ſome, who being preſent, and acquainted with the ſtate of publick affairs, might make uſe of this prerogative for the publick good? and where elſe could this be ſo well placed as in his hands, who was intruſted with the execution of the laws for the ſame end? Thus ſuppoſing the regulation of times for the aſſembling and ſitting of the legiſlative not ſettled by the original conſtitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleaſure, but with this truſt always to have it exerciſed only for the publick weal, as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whether ſettled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legiſlative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the leaſt inconvenience attending it, it is not my buſineſs here to inquire, but only to ſhew, that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and diſſolving ſuch conventions of the legiſlative, yet it is not thereby ſuperior to it.

§. 157. Things of this world are in ſo conſtant a flux, that nothing remains long in the ſame ſtate. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change their ſtations, flouriſhing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in time neglected deſolate corners, whilſt other unfrequented places grow into populous countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not always changing equally, and private intereſt often keeping up cuſtoms and privileges, when the reaſons of them are ceaſed, it often comes to paſs, that in governments, where part of the legiſlative conſiſts of repreſentatives choſen by the people, that in track of time this repreſentation becomes very unequal and diſproportionate to the reaſons it was at firſt eſtabliſhed upon. To what groſs abſurdities the following of cuſtom, when reaſon has left it, may lead, we may be ſatisfied, when we ſee the bare name of a town, of which there remains not ſo much as the ruins, where ſcarce ſo much houſing as a ſheepcote, or more inhabitants than a ſhepherd is to be found, ſends as many repreſentatives to the grand aſſembly of law-makers, as a whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches. This ſtrangers ſtand amazed at, and every one muſt confeſs needs a remedy; though moſt think it hard to find one, becauſe the conſtitution of the legiſlative being the original and ſupreme act of the ſociety, antecedent to all poſitive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it. And therefore the people, when the legiſlative is once conſtituted, having, in ſuch a government as we have been ſpeaking of, no power to act as long as the government ſtands; this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy.

§. 158. "Salus populi ſuprema lex," is certainly ſo juſt and fundamental a rule, that he, who ſincerely follows it, cannot dangerouſly err. If therefore the executive, who has the power of convoking the legiſlative, obſerving rather the true proportion, than faſhion of repreſentation, regulates, not by old cuſtom, but true reaſon, the number of members, in all places that have a right to be diſtinctly repreſented, which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to, but in proportion to the aſſiſtance which it affords to the publick; it cannot be judged to have ſet up a new legiſlative, but to have reſtored the old and true one, and to have rectified the diſorders which ſucceſſion of time had inſenſibly, as well as inevitably introduced: For it being the intereſt as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and equal repreſentative; whoever brings it neareſt to that, is an undoubted friend to, and eſtabliſher of, the government, and cannot miſs the conſent and approbation of the community; prerogative being nothing but a power, in the hands of the prince, to provide for the publick good, in ſuch caſes, which depending upon unforeſeen and uncertain occurences, certain and unalterable laws could not ſafely direct; whatſoever ſhall be done manifeſtly for the good of the people, and the eſtabliſhing the government upon its true foundations, is, and always will be, juſt prerogative. The power of erecting new corporations, and therewith new repreſentatives, carries with it a ſuppoſition, that in time the meaſures of repreſentation might vary, and thoſe places have a juſt right to be repreſented which before had none; and by the ſame reaſon, thoſe ceaſe to have a right, and be too inconſiderable for ſuch a privilege, which before had it. It is not a change from the preſent ſtate, which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the tendency of it to injure or oppreſs the people, and to ſet up one part or party, with a diſtinction from, and an unequal ſubjection of the reſt. Whatſoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the ſociety, and people in general, upon juſt and laſting meaſures, will always, when done, juſtify itſelf; and whenever the people ſhall chuſe their repreſentatives upon juſt and undeniably equal meaſures, ſuitable to the original frame of the government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the ſociety, whoever permitted or cauſed them ſo to do.

## CHAP. XIV.

## Of prerogative.

§. 159. WHERE the legiſlative and executive power are in diſtinct hands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed governments) there the good of the ſociety requires, that ſeveral things ſhould be left to the diſcretion of him that has the executive power: for the legiſlators not being able to foreſee, and provide by laws, for all that may be uſeful to the community, the executor of the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make uſe of it for the good of the ſociety, in many caſes, where the municipal law has given no direction, till the legiſlative can conveniently be aſſembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and thoſe muſt neceſſarily be left to the diſcretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the publick good and advantage ſhall require: nay, it is fit that the laws themſelves ſhould in ſome caſes give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, viz. That as much as may be, all the members of the ſociety are to be preſerved: for ſince many accidents may happen, wherein a ſtrict and rigid obſervation of the laws may do harm; (as not to pull down an innocent man's houſe to ſtop the fire, when the next to it is burning) and a man may come ſometimes within the reach of the law, which makes no diſtinction of perſons, by an action that may deſerve reward and pardon; it is fit the ruler ſhould have a power, in many caſes, to mitigate the ſeverity of the law, and pardon ſome offenders: for the end of government being the preſervation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be ſpared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent.

§. 160. This power to act according to diſcretion, for the publick good, without the preſcription of the law, and ſometimes even againſt it, is that which is called prerogative: for ſince in ſome governments the law-making power is not always in being, and is uſually too numerous, and ſo too ſlow, for the diſpatch requiſite to execution; and becauſe alſo it is impoſſible to foreſee, and ſo by laws to provide for, all accidents and neceſſities that may concern the publick, or to make ſuch laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occaſions, and upon all perſons that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not preſcribe.

§. 161. This power, whilſt employed for the benefit of the community, and ſuitably to the truſt and ends of the government, is undoubted prerogative, and never is queſtioned: for the people are very ſeldom or never ſcrupulous or nice in the point; they are far from examining prerogative, whilſt it is in any tolerable degree employed for the uſe it was meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not manifeſtly againſt it: but if there comes to be a queſtion between the executive power and the people, about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the tendency of the exerciſe of ſuch prerogative to the good or hurt of the people, will eaſily decide that queſtion.

§. 162. It is eaſy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when commonwealths differed little from families in number of people, they differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the governors being as the fathers of them, watching over them, for their good, the government was almoſt all prerogative. A few eſtabliſhed laws ſerved the turn, and the diſcretion and care of the ruler ſupplied the reſt. But when miſtake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make uſe of this power for private ends of their own, and not for the publick good, the people were fain by expreſs laws to get prerogative determined in thoſe points wherein they found diſadvantage from it: and thus declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found neceſſary in caſes which they and their anceſtors had left, in the utmoſt latitude, to the wiſdom of thoſe princes who made no other but a right uſe of it, that is, for the good of their people.

§. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government, who ſay, that the people have incroached upon the prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be defined by poſitive laws: for in ſo doing they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his anceſtors hands, to be exerciſed for their good, was not a thing which they intended him when he uſed it otherwiſe: for the end of government being the good of the community, whatſoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an incroachment upon any body, ſince no body in government can have a right tending to any other end: and thoſe only are incroachments which prejudice or hinder the publick good. Thoſe who ſay otherwiſe, ſpeak as if the prince had a diſtinct and ſeparate intereſt from the good of the community, and was not made for it; the root and ſource from which ſpring almoſt all thoſe evils and diſorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if that be ſo, the people under his government are not a ſociety of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual good; they are not ſuch as have ſet rulers over themſelves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a maſter, who keeps them and works them for his own pleaſure or profit. If men were ſo void of reaſon, and brutiſh, as to enter into ſociety upon ſuch terms, prerogative might indeed be, what ſome men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people.

§. 164. But ſince a rational creature cannot be ſuppoſed, when free, to put himſelf into ſubjection to another, for his own harm; (though, where he finds a good and wiſe ruler, he may not perhaps think it either neceſſary or uſeful to ſet preciſe bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do ſeveral things, of their own free choice, where the law was ſilent, and ſometimes too againſt the direct letter of the law, for the publick good; and their acquieſcing in it when ſo done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the truſt put into his hands, and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to do good; ſo a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power which his predeceſſors exerciſed without the direction of the law, as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may exerciſe at his pleaſure, to make or promote an intereſt diſtinct from that of the publick; gives the people an occaſion to claim their right, and limit that power, which, whilſt it was exerciſed for their good, they were content ſhould be tacitly allowed.

§. 165. And therefore he that will look into the hiſtory of England, will find, that prerogative was always largeſt in the hands of our wiſeſt and beſt princes; becauſe the people, obſerving the whole tendency of their actions to be the publick good, conteſted not what was done without law to that end: or, if any human frailty or miſtake (for princes are but men, made as others) appeared in ſome ſmall declinations from that end; yet it was viſible, the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the publick. The people therefore, finding reaſon to be ſatisfied with theſe princes, whenever they acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquieſced in what they did, and, without the leaſt complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as they pleaſed; judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws, ſince they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws, the publick good.

§. 166. SUCH God-like princes indeed had ſome title to arbitrary power by that argument, that would prove abſolute monarchy the beſt government, as that which God himſelf governs the univerſe by; becauſe ſuch kings partake of his wiſdom and goodneſs. Upon this is founded that ſaying, That the reigns of good princes have been always moſt dangerous to the liberties of their people: for when their ſucceſſors, managing the government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of thoſe good rulers into precedent, and make them the ſtandard of their prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they ſo pleaſed; it has often occaſioned conteſt, and ſometimes publick diſorders, before the people could recover their original right, and get that to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was never ſo: ſince it is impoſſible that any body in the ſociety ſhould ever have a right to do the people harm; though it be very poſſible, and reaſonable, that the people ſhould not go about to ſet any bounds to the prerogative of thoſe kings, or rulers, who themſelves tranſgreſſed not the bounds of the publick good: for "prerogative is nothing but the power of doing publick good without a rule."

§. 167. THE power of calling parliaments in England, as to preciſe time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but ſtill with this truſt, that it ſhall be made uſe of for the good of the nation, as the exigencies of the times, and variety of occaſions, ſhall require: for it being impoſſible to foreſee which ſhould always be the fitteſt place for them to aſſemble in, and what the beſt ſeaſon; the choice of theſe was left with the executive power, as might be moſt ſubſervient to the publick good, and beſt ſuit the ends of parliaments.

§. 168. THE old queſtion will be aſked in this matter of prerogative, "But who ſhall be judge when this power is made a right uſe of?" I anſwer: between an executive power in being, with ſuch a prerogative, and a legiſlative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; as there can be none between the legiſlative and the people, ſhould either the executive or the legiſlative, when they have got the power in their hands, deſign, or go about to enſlave or deſtroy them. The people have no other remedy in this, as in all other caſes where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in ſuch attempts, exerciſing a power the people never put into their hands, (who can never be ſuppoſed to conſent that any body ſhould rule over them for their harm) do that which they have not a right to do. And where the body of the people, or any ſingle man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exerciſe of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cauſe of ſufficient moment. And therefore, though the people cannot be judge, ſo as to have, by the conſtitution of that ſociety, any ſuperior power, to determine and give effective ſentence in the caſe; yet they have, by a law antecedent and paramount to all poſitive laws of men, reſerved that ultimate determination to themſelves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have juſt cauſe to make their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a man's power ſo to ſubmit himſelf to another, as to give him a liberty to deſtroy him; God and nature never allowing a man ſo to abandon himſelf, as to neglect his own preſervation: and ſince he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation for diſorder; for this operates not, till the inconveniency is ſo great, that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a neceſſity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wiſe princes, never need come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, they have moſt need to avoid, as of all others the moſt perilous.

## CHAP. XV.

## Of paternal, political, and deſpotical power, conſidered together.

§. 169. THOUGH I have had occaſion to ſpeak of theſe ſeparately before, yet the great miſtakes of late about government, having, as I ſuppoſe, ariſen from confounding theſe diſtinct powers one with another, it may not, perhaps, be amiſs to conſider them here together.

§. 170. FIRST, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children's good, till they come to the uſe of reaſon, or a ſtate of knowledge, wherein they may be ſuppoſed capable to underſtand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themſelves by: capable, I ſay, to know it, as well as ſeveral others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and tenderneſs which God hath planted in the breaſt of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a ſevere arbitrary government, but only for the help, inſtruction, and preſervation of their offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as I have proved, no reaſon why it ſhould be thought to extend to life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body elſe; neither can there be any pretence why this parental power ſhould keep the child, when grown to a man, in ſubjection to the will of his parents, any farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges him to reſpect, honour, gratitude, aſſiſtance and ſupport, all his life, to both father and mother. And thus, it is true, the paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itſelf to the ends and juriſdictions of that which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only in his own diſpoſing.

§. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man having in the ſtate of nature, has given up into the hands of the ſociety, and therein to the governors, whom the ſociety hath ſet over itſelf, with this expreſs or tacit truſt, that it ſhall be employed for their good, and the preſervation of their property: now this power, which every man has in the ſtate of nature, and which he parts with to the ſociety in all ſuch caſes where the ſociety can ſecure him, is to uſe ſuch means, for the preſerving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to puniſh the breach of the law of nature in others, ſo as (according to the beſt of his reaſon) may moſt conduce to the preſervation of himſelf, and the reſt of mankind. So that the end and meaſure of this power, when in every man's hands in the ſtate of nature, being the preſervation of all of his ſociety, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end or meaſure, when in the hands of the magiſtrate, but to preſerve the members of that ſociety in their lives, liberties, and poſſeſſions; and ſo cannot be an abſolute, arbitrary power, over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as poſſible to be preſerved; but a power to make laws, and annex ſuch penalties to them, as may tend to the preſervation of the whole, by cutting off thoſe parts, and thoſe only, which are ſo corrupt, that they threaten the ſound and healthy, without which no ſeverity is lawful. And this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual conſent of thoſe who make up the community.

§. 172. Thirdly, Deſpotical power is an abſolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleaſes. This is a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no ſuch diſtinction between one man and another, nor compact can convey: for man not having ſuch an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man ſuch a power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which the aggreſſor makes of his own life, when he puts himſelf into the ſtate of war with another: for having quitted reaſon, which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowſhip and ſociety; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made uſe of the force of war, to compaſs his unjuſt ends upon another, where he has no right; and ſo revolting from his own kind to that of beaſts, by making force, which is their's, to be his rule of right; he renders himſelf liable to be deſtroyed by the injured perſon, and the reſt of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of juſtice, as any other wild beaſt, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither ſociety nor ſecurity *.

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* Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, "Noxious brute that is deſtructive to "their being."

And thus captives, taken in a juſt and lawful war, and ſuch only, are ſubject to a deſpotical power, which, as it ariſes not from compact, ſo neither is it capable of any, but is the ſtate of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is not maſter of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once allowed to be maſter of his own life, the deſpocal, arbitrary power of his maſter ceaſes. He that is maſter of himſelf, and his own life, has a right too to the means of preſerving it; ſo that as ſoon as compact enters, ſlavery ceaſes, and he ſo far quits his abſolute power, and puts an end to the ſtate of war, who enters into conditions with his captive.

§. 173. Nature gives the firſt of theſe, viz. paternal power to parents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to ſupply their want of ability, and underſtanding how to manage their property. (By property I muſt be underſtood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their perſons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the ſecond, viz. political power to governors for the benefit of their ſubjects, to ſecure them in the poſſeſſion and uſe of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third deſpotical power to lords for their own benefit, over thoſe who are ſtripped of all property.

§. 174. He, that ſhall conſider the diſtinct riſe and extent, and the different ends of theſe ſeveral powers, will plainly ſee, that paternal power comes as far ſhort of that of the magiſtrate, as deſpotical exceeds it; and that abſolute dominion, however placed, is ſo far from being one kind of civil ſociety, that it is as inconſiſtent with it, as ſlavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have property in their own diſpoſal; and deſpotical, over ſuch as have no property at all.

## CHAP. XVI.

## Of conqueſt.

§. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other riſe than that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the conſent of the people; yet ſuchhave been the diſorders ambition has filled the world with, that in the noiſe of war, which makes ſo great a part of the hiſtory of mankind, this conſent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have miſtaken the force of arms for the conſent of the people, and reckon conqueſt as one of the originals of government. But conqueſt is as far from ſetting up any government, as demoliſhing an houſe is from building a new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by deſtroying the former; but, without the conſent of the people, can never erect a new one.

§. 176. That the aggreſſor, who puts himſelf into the ſtate of war with another, and unjuſtly invades another man's right, can, by ſuch an unjuſt war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be eaſily agreed by all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire over whomſoever they have force enough to maſter; or that men are bound by promiſes, which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my houſe, and with a dagger at my throat make me ſeal deeds to convey my eſtate to him; would this give him any title? Juſt ſuch a title, by his ſword, has an unjuſt conqueror, who forces me into ſubmiſſion. The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of the crown, or ſome petty villain. The title of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference in the offence, unleſs it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers puniſh little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, becauſe they are too big for the weak hands of juſtice in this world, and have the power in their own poſſeſſion, which ſhould puniſh offenders. What is my remedy againſt a robber, that ſo broke into my houſe? Appeal to the law for juſtice. But perhaps juſtice is denied, or I am crippled and cannot ſtir, robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all means of ſeeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my ſon, when able, may ſeek the relief of the law, which I am denied: he or his ſon may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their anceſtors, which was, to have ſuch a legiſlative over them, as the majority ſhould approve, and freely acquieſce in. If it be objected, this would cauſe endleſs trouble; I anſwer, no more than juſtice does, where ſhe lies open to all that appeal to her. He that troubles his neighbour without a cauſe, is puniſhed for it by the juſtice of the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven muſt be ſure he has right on his ſide; and a right too that is worth the trouble and coſt of the appeal, as he will anſwer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be ſure to retribute to every one according to the miſchiefs he hath created to his fellow ſubjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain, that he that "conquers in an unjuſt war, can thereby have no title to the ſubjection "and obedience of the conquered."

§. 177. But ſuppoſing victory favours the right ſide, let us conſider a conqueror in a lawful war, and ſee what power he gets, and over whom.

First, It is plain he "gets no power by his conqueſt over thoſe that conquer-"ed with him." They that fought on his ſide cannot ſuffer by the conqueſt, but muſt at leaſt be as much freemen as they were before. And moſt commonly they ſerve upon terms, and on condition to ſhare with their leader, and enjoy a part of the ſpoil, and other advantages that attend the conquering ſword; or at leaſt have a part of the ſubdued country beſtowed upon them. And "the conquering people are not, I hope, to be ſlaves by conqueſt," and wear their laurels only to ſhew they are ſacrifices to their leaders triumph. They that found abſolute monarchy upon the title of the ſword, make their heroes, who are the founders of ſuch monarchies, arrant Drawcanſirs, and forget they had any officers and ſoldiers that fought on their ſide in the battles they won, or aſſiſted them in the ſubduing, or ſhared in poſſeſſing, the countries they maſtered.

We are told by ſome, that the Engliſh monarchy is founded in the Norman conqueſt, and that our princes have thereby a title to abſolute dominion: which if it were true, (as by the hiſtory it appears otherwiſe) and that William had a right to make war on this iſland; yet his dominion by conqueſt could reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all deſcended from them, are freemen, and no ſubjects by conqueſt; let that give what dominion it will. And if I, or any body elſe, ſhall claim freedom, as derived from them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made no diſtinction between the one and the other, intends not there ſhould be any difference in their freedom or privileges.

§. 178. But ſuppoſing, which ſeldom happens, that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people, under the ſame laws and freedom; let us ſee next "what power a lawful conqueror has over the ſubdued:" and that I ſay is purely deſpotical. He has an abſolute power over the lives of thoſe who by an unjuſt war have forfeited them; but not over the lives or fortunes of thoſe who engaged not in the war, nor over the poſſeſſions even of thoſe who were actually engaged in it.

§. 179. Secondly, I ſay then the conqueror gets no power but only over thoſe who have actually aſſiſted, concurred, or conſented to that unjuſt force that is uſed againſt him: for the people having given to their governors no power to do an unjuſt thing, ſuch as is to make an unjuſt war, (for they never had ſuch a power in themſelves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjuſtice that is committed in an unjuſt war, any farther than they actually abet it; no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppreſſion their governors ſhould uſe upon the people themſelves, or any part of their fellow ſubjects, they having impowered them no more to the one than to the other. Conquerors, it is true, ſeldom trouble themſelves to make the diſtinction, but they willingly permit the confuſion of war to ſweep all together: but yet this alters not the right; for the conquerors power over the lives of the conquered, being only becauſe they have uſed force to do, or maintain an injuſtice, he can have that power only over thoſe who have concurred in that force; all the reſt are innocent; and he has no more title over the people of that country, who have done him no injury, and ſo have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without any injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.

§. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over thoſe he overcomes in a juſt war, is perfectly deſpotical: he has an abſolute power over the lives of thoſe, who, by putting themſelves in a ſtate of war, have forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title to their poſſeſſions. This I doubt not but at firſt ſight will ſeem a ſtrange doctrine, it being ſo quite contrary to the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in ſpeaking of the dominion of countries, than to ſay ſuch an one conquered it; as if conqueſt, without any more ado, conveyed a right of poſſeſſion. But when we conſider, that the practice of the ſtrong and powerful, how univerſal ſoever it may be, is ſeldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the ſubjection of the conquered, not to argue againſt the conditions cut out to them by the conquering ſword.

§. 181. Though in all war there be uſually a complication of force and damage, and the aggreſſor ſeldom fails to harm the eſtate, when he uſes force againſt the perſons of thoſe he makes war upon; yet it is the uſe of force only that puts a man into the ſtate of war: for whether by force he begins the injury, or elſe having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he refuſes to make reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the ſame thing, as at firſt to have done it by force) it is the unjuſt uſe of force that makes the war: for he that breaks open my houſe, and violently turns me out of doors; or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the ſame thing; ſuppoſing we are in ſuch a ſtate, that we have no common judge on earth, whom I may appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to ſubmit: for of ſuch I am now ſpeaking. It is the "unjuſt uſe of force then, that puts a man "into the ſtate of war" with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life: for quitting reaſon, which is the rule given between man and man, and uſing force, the way of beaſts, he becomes liable to be deſtroyed by him he uſes force againſt, as any ſavage ravenous beaſt, that is dangerous to his being.

§. 182. But becauſe the miſcarriages of the father are no faults of the children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithſtanding the brutiſhneſs and injuſtice of the father; the father, by his miſcarriages and violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his guilt or deſtruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preſervation of all mankind as much as is poſſible, hath made to belong to the children to keep them from periſhing, do ſtill continue to belong to his children: for ſuppoſing them not to have joined in the war, either through infancy, abſence, or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any right to take them away, by the bare title of having ſubdued him that by force attempted his deſtruction; though perhaps he may have ſome right to them, to repair the damages he has ſuſtained by the war, and the defence of his own right; which how far it reaches to the poſſeſſions of the conquered, we ſhall ſee by and by. So that he that by conqueſt has a right over a man's perſon to deſtroy him if he pleaſes, has not thereby a right over his eſtate to poſſeſs and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggreſſor has uſed, that gives his adverſary a right to take away his life, and deſtroy him if he pleaſes, as a noxious creature; but it is damage ſuſtained that alone gives him title to another man's goods: for though I may kill a thief that ſets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which ſeems leſs) take away his money, and let him go: this would be robbery on my ſide. His force, and the ſtate of war he put himſelf in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his goods. The right then of conqueſt extends only to the lives of thoſe who joined in the war, not to their eſtates, but only in order to make reparation for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with reſervation of the right of the innocent wife and children.

§. 183. LET the conqueror have as much juſtice on his ſide, as could be ſuppoſed, he has no right to ſeize more than the vanquiſhed could forfeit: his life is at the victor's mercy; and his ſervice and goods he may appropriate, to make himſelf reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their ſhares in the eſtate he poſſeſſed: for example, I in the ſtate of nature (and all commonwealths are in the ſtate of nature one with another) have injured another man, and refuſing to give ſatisfaction it comes to a ſtate of war, wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjuſtly, makes me the aggreſſor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife's and children's. They made not the war, nor aſſiſted in it. I could not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a ſhare in my eſtate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children alſo, being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or ſubſtance. Here then is the caſe: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and the children have a title to their father's eſtate for their ſubſiſtence: for as to the wife's ſhare, whether her own labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her huſband could not forfeit what was her's. What muſt be done in the caſe? I anſwer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, ſhould be preſerved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to ſatisfy both, viz. for the conqueror's loſſes, and children's maintenance, he that hath, and to ſpare, muſt remit ſomething of his full ſatisfaction, and give way to the preſſing and preferable title of thoſe who are in danger to periſh without it.

§. 184. BUT ſuppoſing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror, to the utmoſt farthing; and that the children of the vanquiſhed, ſpoiled of all their father's goods, are to be left to ſtarve and periſh; yet the ſatisfying of what ſhall, on this ſcore, be due to the conqueror, will ſcarce give him a title to any country he ſhall conquer: for the damages of war can ſcarce amount to the value of any conſiderable track of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is poſſeſſed, and none lies waſte. And if I have not taken away the conqueror's land, which, being vanquiſhed, it is impoſſible I ſhould; ſcarce any other ſpoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine, ſuppoſing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming near what I had over-run of his. The deſtruction of a year's product or two (for it ſeldom reaches four or five) is the utmoſt ſpoil that uſually can be done: for as to money, and ſuch riches and treaſure taken away, theſe are none of nature's goods, they have but a fantaſtical imaginary value: nature has put no ſuch upon them: they are of no more account by her ſtandard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European prince, or the ſilver money of Europe would have been formerly to an American. And five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is poſſeſſed, and none remains waſte, to be taken up by him that is diſſeized: which will be eaſily granted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, the diſproportion being more than between five and five hundred; though, at the ſame time, half a year's product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being more land than the inhabitants poſſeſs and make uſe of, any one has liberty to make uſe of the waſte: but there conquerors take little care to poſſeſs themſelves of the lands of the vanquiſhed. No damage therefore, that men in the ſtate of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to another) ſuffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to diſpoſſeſs one the poſterity of the vanquiſhed, and turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the poſſeſſion of them and their deſcendants to all generations. The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himſelf maſter: and it is the very condition of the ſubdued not to be able to diſpute their right. But if that be all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the ſtronger over the weaker: and, by this reaſon, he that is ſtrongeſt will have a right to whatever he pleaſes to ſeize on.

§. 185. Over thoſe then that joined with him in the war, and over thoſe of the ſubdued country that oppoſed him not, and the poſterity even of thoſe that did, the conqueror, even in a juſt war, hath, by his conqueſt, no right of dominion: they are free from any ſubjection to him, and if their former government be diſſolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themſelves.

§. 186. The conqueror, it is true, uſually, by the force he has over them, compels them, with a ſword at their breaſts, to ſtoop to his conditions, and ſubmit to ſuch a government as he pleaſes to afford them; but the enquiry is, what right he has to do ſo? If it be ſaid, they ſubmit by their own conſent; then this allows their own conſent to be neceſſary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains only to be conſidered, whether promiſes extorted by force, without right, can be thought conſent, and how far they bind. To which I ſhall ſay, they bind not at all; becauſe whatſoever another gets from me by force, I ſtill retain the right of, and he is obliged preſently to reſtore. He that forces my horſe from me, ought preſently to reſtore him, and I have ſtill a right to retake him. By the ſame reaſon, he that forced a promiſe from me, ought preſently to reſtore it, i. e. quit me of the obligation of it; or I may reſume it myſelf, i. e. chuſe whether I will perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules ſhe preſcribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: ſuch is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at all alter the caſe to ſay, "I gave my promiſe," no more than it excuſes the force, and paſſes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my purſe myſelf to a thief, who demands it with a piſtol at my breaſt.

§. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror, impoſed by force on the ſubdued, againſt whom he had no right of war, or who joined not in the war againſt him, where he had right, has no obligation upon them.

§. 188. But let us ſuppoſe, that all the men of that community, being all members of the ſame body politick, may be taken to have joined in that unjuſt war wherein they are ſubdued, and ſo their lives are at the mercy of the conqueror.

§. 189. I say, this concerns not their children who are in their minority: for ſince a father hath not, in himſelf, a power over the life or liberty of his child, no act of his can poſſibly forfeit it. So that the children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the abſolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the perſons of the men that were ſubdued by him, and dies with them: and ſhould he govern them as ſlaves, ſubjected to his abſolute arbitrary power, he has no ſuch right of dominion over their children. He can have no power over them but by their own conſent, whatever he may drive them to ſay or do; and he has no lawful authority, whilſt force, and not choice, compels them to ſubmiſſion.

§. 190. Every man is born with a double right: firſt, a right of freedom to his perſon, which no other man has a power over, but the free diſpoſal of it lies in himſelf. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with his brethren his father's goods.

§. 191. By the firſt of theſe, a man is naturally free from ſubjection to any government, though he be born in a place under its juriſdiction; but if he diſclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he muſt alſo quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the poſſeſſions there deſcending to him from his anceſtors, if it were a government made by their conſent.

§. 192. By the ſecond, the inhabitants of any country, who are deſcended, and derive a title to their eſtates from thoſe who are ſubdued, and had a government forced upon them againſt their free conſents, retain a right to the poſſeſſion of their anceſtors, though they conſent not freely to the government, whoſe hard conditions were by force impoſed on the poſſeſſors of that country: for the firſt conqueror never having had a title to the land of that country, the people who are the deſcendants of, or claim under thoſe who were forced to ſubmit to the yoke of a government by conſtraint, have always a right to ſhake it off, and free themſelves from the uſurpation or tyranny which the ſword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under ſuch a frame of government as they willingly and of choice conſent to. Who doubts but the Grecian chriſtians, deſcendants of the ancient poſſeſſors of that country, may juſtly caſt off the Turkiſh yoke, which they have ſo long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely conſented to it; which they can never be ſuppoſed to do, till either they are put in a full ſtate of liberty to chuſe their government and governors, or at leaſt till they have ſuch ſtanding laws, to which they have by themſelves or their repreſentatives given their free conſent, and alſo till they are allowed their due property, which is ſo to be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own conſent, without which, men under any government are not in the ſtate of freemen, but are direct ſlaves under the force of war.

§. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a juſt war has a right to the eſtates, as well as power over the perſons, of the conquered; which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of abſolute power will follow from hence, in the continuance of the government; becauſe the deſcendants of theſe being all freemen, if he grants them eſtates and poſſeſſions to inhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing) whatſoever he grants them, they have, ſo far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that "without a man's "own conſent it cannot be taken from him."

§. 194. Their perſons are free by a native right, and their properties, be they more or leſs, are their own, and at their own diſpoſe, and not at his; or elſe it is no property. Suppoſing the conqueror gives to one man a thouſand acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he letts a thouſand acres for his life, under the rent of 50l. or 500l. per ann. has not the one of theſe a right to his thouſand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the ſaid rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and induſtry during the ſaid term, ſuppoſing it to be double the rent? Can any one ſay, the king, or conqueror, after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying the rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the ſaid land, at his pleaſure? If he can, then all free and voluntary contracts ceaſe, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to diſſolve them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promiſes of men in power are but mockery and colluſion: for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to ſay, I give you and yours this for ever, and that in the ſureſt and moſt ſolemn way of conveyance can be deviſed; and yet it is to be underſtood, that I have right, if I pleaſe, to take it away from you again to-morrow?

§. 195. I will not diſpute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country; but this I am ſure, they owe ſubjection to the laws of God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law. Thoſe are ſo great, and ſo ſtrong, in the caſe of promiſes, that omnipotency itſelf can be tied by them. Grants, promiſes, and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty: whatever ſome flatterers ſay to princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to them, are in compariſon of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a duſt on the balance, inconſiderable, nothing!

§. 196. The ſhort of the caſe in conqueſt is this: the conqueror, if he have a juſt cauſe, has a deſpotical right over the perſons of all that actually aided, and concurred in the war againſt him, and a right to make up his damage and coſt out of their labour and eſtates, ſo he injure not the right of any other. Over the reſt of the people, if there were any that conſented not to the war, and over the children of the captives themſelves, or the poſſeſſions of either, he has no power; and ſo can have, by virtue of conqueſt, no lawful title himſelf to dominion over them, or derive it to his poſterity; but is an aggreſſor, if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himſelf in a ſtate of war againſt them: and has no better a right of principality, he, nor any of his ſucceſſors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England; or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have their yoke caſt off, as ſoon as God ſhall give thoſe under their ſubjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithſtanding whatever title the kings of Aſſyria had over Judah, by the ſword, God aſſiſted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. "And the Lord was with "Hezekiah, and he proſpered; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled "againſt the king of Aſſyria, and ſerved him not," 2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that ſhaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath ſet over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that which he allows and countenances, though even promiſes and covenants, when obtained by force, have intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads the ſtory of Ahaz, and Hezekiah attentively, that the Aſſyrians ſubdued Ahaz, and depoſed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father's life-time; and that Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.

# CHAP. XVII.

## Of uſurpation.

§. 197. AS conqueſt may be called a foreign uſurpation, ſo uſurpation is a kind of domeſtick conqueſt; with this difference, that an uſurper can never have right on his ſide, it being no uſurpation, but where one is got into the poſſeſſion of what another has right to. This, ſo far as it is uſurpation, is a change only of perſons, but not of the forms and rules of the government: for if the uſurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to uſurpation.

§. 198. IN all lawful governments, the deſignation of the perſons, who are to bear rule, is as natural and neceſſary a part, as the form of the government itſelf; and is that which had its eſtabliſhment originally from the people: the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree, that it ſhall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to deſign the perſon that ſhall have the power, and be the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with the form of government eſtabliſhed, have rules alſo of appointing thoſe who are to have any ſhare in the publick authority, and ſettled methods of conveying the right to them: for the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree that it ſhall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to know or deſign the perſon that ſhall have the power, and be the monarch. Whoever gets into the exerciſe of any part of the power, by other ways than what the laws of the community have preſcribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the commonwealth be ſtill preſerved; ſince he is not the perſon the laws have appointed, and conſequently not the perſon the people have conſented to. Nor can ſuch an uſurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the people are both at liberty to conſent, and have actually conſented to allow, and confirm in him the power he hath till then uſurped.

# CHAP. XVIII.

## Of tyranny.

§. 199. AS uſurpation is the exerciſe of power, which another hath a right to; ſo tyranny is the exerciſe of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to. And this is making uſe of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of thoſe who are under it, but for his own private ſeparate advantage. When the governor, however intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not directed to the preſervation of the properties of his people but the ſatisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetouſneſs, or any other irregular paſſion.

§. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reaſon, becauſe it comes from the obſcure hand of a ſubject, I hope the authority of a king will make it paſs with him. King James the firſt, in his ſpeech to the parliament, 1603, tells them thus; "I will ever prefer the weal of the publick, and of the whole commonwealth, in making of good laws and conſtitutions, to any particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greateſt weal and worldly felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the ſpecial and greateſt point of difference that is between a rightful king and an uſurping tyrant, is this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for ſatisfaction of his deſires and unreaſonable appetites, the righteous and juſt king doth by the contrary acknowledge himſelf to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people." And again, in his ſpeech to the parliament, 1609, he hath theſe words; "The king binds himſelf by a double oath, to the obſervation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and ſo bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and expreſly, by his oath at his coronation; ſo as every juſt king, in a ſettled kingdom, is bound to obſerve that paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after the deluge. Hereafter, ſeed-time and harveſt, and cold and heat, and ſummer and winter, and day and night, ſhall not ceaſe while the earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a ſettled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as ſoon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws." And a little aſter, "Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themſelves within the limits of their laws; and they that perſuade them the contrary, are vipers, and peſts both againſt them and the commonwealth." Thus that learned king, who well underſtood the notion of things, makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to conſiſt only in this, that one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the publick, the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite.

§. 201. It is a miſtake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the preſervation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made uſe of to impoveriſh, haraſs, or ſubdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of thoſe that have it; there it preſently becomes tyranny, whether thoſe that thus uſe it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at Syracuſe; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome was nothing better.

§. 202. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be tranſgreſſed to another's harm; and whoſoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes uſe of the force he has under his command, to compaſs that upon the ſubject, which the law allows not, ceaſes in that to be a magiſtrate; and, acting without authority, may be oppoſed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in ſubordinate magiſtrates. He that hath authority to ſeize my perſon in the ſtreet, may be oppoſed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my houſe to execute a writ, notwithſtanding that I know he has ſuch a warrant, and ſuch a legal authority, as will impower him to arreſt me abroad. And why this ſhould not hold in the higheſt, as well as in the moſt inferior magiſtrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reaſonable that the eldeſt brother, becauſe he has the greateſt part of his father's eſtate, ſhould thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brother's portions? or that a rich man, who poſſeſſed a whole country, ſhould from thence have a right to ſeize, when he pleaſed, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully poſſeſſed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greateſt part of the ſons of Adam, is ſo far from being an excuſe, much leſs a reaſon, for rapine and oppreſſion, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more juſtifiable in a king than a conſtable; but is ſo much the worſe in him, in that he has more truſt put in him, has already a much greater ſhare than the reſt of his brethren, and is ſuppoſed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counſellors, to be more knowing in the meaſures of right and wrong.

§. 203. "May the commands then of a prince be oppoſed? may he be
" reſiſted as often as any one ſhall find himſelf aggrieved, and but imagine he
" has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and,
" inſtead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confuſion."

§. 204. To this I anſwer, that force is to be oppoſed to nothing, but to unjuſt and unlawful force; whoever makes any oppoſition in any other caſe, draws on himſelf a juſt condemnation both from God and man; and ſo no ſuch danger or confuſion will follow, as is often ſuggeſted: for,

§. 205. FIRST, As, in ſome countries, the perſon of the prince by the law is ſacred; and ſo, whatever he commands or does, his perſon is ſtill free from all queſtion or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial cenſure or condemnation. But yet oppoſition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or other commiſſioned by him; unleſs he will, by actually putting himſelf into a ſtate of war with his people, diſſolve the government, and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the ſtate of nature: for of ſuch things who can tell what the end will be? and a neighbour kingdom has ſhewed the world an odd example. In all other caſes the ſacredneſs of the perſon exempts him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is ſecure, whilſt the government ſtands, from all violence and harm whatſoever; than which there cannot be a wiſer conſtitution: for the harm he can do in his own perſon not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itſelf far; nor being able by his ſingle ſtrength to ſubvert the laws, nor oppreſs the body of the people, ſhould any prince have ſo much weakneſs, and ill nature as to be willing to do it, the inconveniency of ſome particular miſchiefs, that may happen ſometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompenſed by the peace of the publick, and ſecurity of the government, in the perſon of the chief magiſtrate, thus ſet out of the reach of danger: it being ſafer for the body, that ſome few private men ſhould be ſometimes in danger to ſuffer, than that the head of the republick ſhould be eaſily, and upon ſlight occaſions, expoſed.

§. 206. SECONDLY, But this privilege belonging only to the king's perſon, hinders not, but they may be queſtioned, oppoſed, and reſiſted, who uſe unjuſt force, though they pretend a commiſſion from him, which the law authorizes not; as is plain in the caſe of him that has the king's writ to arreſt a man, which is a full commiſſion from the king; and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's houſe to do it, nor execute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commiſſion have no ſuch exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if any one tranſgreſs, the king's commiſſion excuſes him not: for the king's authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower any one to act againſt the law, or juſtify him, by his commiſſion, in ſo doing; the commiſſion, or command of any magiſtrate, where he has no authority, being as void and inſignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between the one and the other, being that the magiſtrate has ſome authority ſo far, and to ſuch ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commiſſion, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and againſt the laws there can be no authority. But, notwithſtanding ſuch reſiſtance, the king's perſon and authority are ſtill both ſecured, and ſo no danger to governor or government.

§. 207. THIRDLY, Suppoſing a government wherein the perſon of the chief magiſtrate is not thus ſacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulneſs of reſiſting all unlawful exerciſes of his power, will not upon every ſlight occaſion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be uſed where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hoſtile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of ſuch an appeal; and it is ſuch force alone, that puts him that uſes it into a ſtate of war, and makes it lawful to reſiſt him. A man with a ſword in his hand demands my purſe in the highway, when perhaps I have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another I deliver 100 l. to hold only whilſt I alight, which he refuſes to reſtore me, when I am got up again, but draws his ſword to defend the poſſeſſion of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The miſchief this man does me is a hundred, or poſſibly a thouſand times more than the other perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really did me any;) and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot ſo much as hurt the other lawfully. The reaſon whereof is plain; becauſe the one uſing force, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law to ſecure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The law could not reſtore life to my dead carcaſe: the loſs was irreparable; which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to deſtroy him, who had put himſelf into a ſtate of war with me, and threatened my deſtruction. But in the other caſe, my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 l. that way.

§. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magiſtrate be maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by law, be by the ſame power obſtructed; yet the right of reſiſting, even in ſuch manifeſt acts of tyranny, will not ſuddenly, or on ſlight occaſions, diſturb the government: for if it reach no farther than ſome private men's caſes, though they have a right to defend themſelves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do ſo will not eaſily engage them in a conteſt, wherein they are ſure to periſh; it being as impoſſible for one, or a few oppreſſed men to diſturb the government, where the body of the people do not think themſelves concerned in it, as for a raving madman, or heady malecontent to overturn a well-ſettled ſtate; the people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other.

§. 209. But if either theſe illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people; or if the miſchief and oppreſſion has lighted only on ſome few, but in ſuch caſes, as the precedent and conſequences ſeem to threaten all; and they are perſuaded in their conſciences, that their laws, and with them their eſtates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from reſiſting illegal force, uſed againſt them, I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confeſs, that attends all governments whatſoever, when the governors have brought it to this paſs, to be generally ſuſpected of their people; the moſt dangerous ſtate which they can poſſibly put themſelves in; wherein they are leſs to be pitied, becauſe it is ſo eaſy to be avoided; it being as impoſſible for a governor, if he really means the good of his people, and the preſervation of them, and their laws together, not to make them ſee and feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to let his children ſee he loves, and takes care of them.

§. 210. BUT if all the world ſhall obſerve pretences of one kind, and actions of another; arts uſed to elude the law, and the truſt of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in ſome things left in the prince's hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was given: if the people ſhall find the miniſters and ſubordinate magiſtrates choſen ſuitable to ſuch ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppoſe them: if they ſee ſeveral experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, (though publickly proclaimed againſt) which is readieſt to introduce it; and the operators in it ſupported, as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved ſtill, and liked the better: if a long train of actions ſhew the councils all tending that way; how can a man any more hinder himſelf from being perſuaded in his own mind, which way things are going; or from caſting about how to ſave himſelf, than he could from believing the captain of the ſhip he was in, was carrying him, and the reſt of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always ſteering that courſe, though croſs winds, leaks in his ſhip, and want of men and proviſions did often force him to turn his courſe another way for ſome time, which he ſteadily returned to again, as ſoon as the wind, weather, and other circumſtances would let him?

## CHAP. XIX.

## Of the diſſolution of government.

§. 211. HE that will with any clearneſs ſpeak of the diſſolution of government, ought in the firſt place to diſtinguiſh between the diſſolution of the ſociety and the diſſolution of the government. That which makes the community, and brings men out of the looſe ſtate of nature, into one politick ſociety, is the agreement which every one has with the reſt to incorporate, and act as one body, and ſo be one diſtinct commonwealth. The uſual, and almoſt only way whereby this union is diſſolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conqueſt upon them: for in that caſe, (not being able to maintain and ſupport themſelves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which conſiſted therein, muſt neceſſarily ceaſe, and ſo every one return to the ſtate he was in before, with a liberty to ſhift for himſelf, and provide for his own ſafety, as he thinks fit, in ſome other ſociety. Whenever the ſociety is diſſolved, it is certain the government of that ſociety cannot remain. Thus conquerors ſwords often cut up governments by the roots, and mangle ſocieties to pieces, ſeparating the ſubdued or ſcattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence on, that ſociety which ought to have preſerved them from violence. The world is too well inſtructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way of diſſolving of governments, to need any more to be ſaid of it; and there wants not much argument to prove, that where the ſociety is diſſolved, the government cannot remain;

main; that being as impoſſible, as for the frame of a houſe to ſubſiſt when the materials of it are ſcattered and diſſipated by a whirlwind, or jumbled into a confuſed heap by an earthquake.

§. 212. Besides this overturning from without, governments are diſſolved from within,

First, When the legiſlative is altered. Civil ſociety being a ſtate of peace, amongſt thoſe who are of it, from whom the ſtate of war is excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legiſlative, for the ending all differences that may ariſe amongſt any of them; it is in their legiſlative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body. This is the ſoul that gives form, life, and unity, to the commonwealth: from hence the ſeveral members have their mutual influence, ſympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legiſlative is broken, or diſſolved, diſſolution and death follows: for the eſſence and union of the ſociety conſiſting in having one will, the legiſlative, when once eſtabliſhed by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. The conſtitution of the legiſlative is the firſt and fundamental act of ſociety, whereby proviſion is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of perſons, and bonds of laws, made by perſons authorized thereunto, by the conſent and appointment of the people; without which no one man, or number of men, amongſt them, can have authority of making laws that ſhall be binding to the reſt. When any one, or more, ſhall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed ſo to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of ſubjection, and may conſtitute to themſelves a new legiſlative, as they think beſt, being in full liberty to reſiſt the force of thoſe, who without authority would impoſe any thing upon them. Every one is at the diſpoſure of his own will, when thoſe who had, by the delegation of the ſociety, the declaring of the publick will, are excluded from it, and others uſurp the place, who have no ſuch authority or delegation.

§. 213. This being uſually brought about by ſuch in the commonwealth who miſuſe the power they have; it is hard to conſider it aright, and know at whoſe door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it happens. Let us ſuppoſe then the legiſlative placed in the concurrence of three diſtinct perſons.

1. A single hereditary perſon, having the conſtant, ſupreme, executive power, and with it the power of convoking and diſſolving the other two, within certain periods of time.

2. An aſſembly of hereditary nobility.

3. An aſſembly of repreſentatives choſen, pro tempore, by the people. Such a form of government ſuppoſed, it is evident,

§. 214. First, That when ſuch a ſingle perſon, or prince, ſets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the ſociety, declared by the legiſlative, then the legiſlative is changed: for that being in effect the legiſlative, whoſe rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are ſet up, and other rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legiſlative, conſtituted by the ſociety, have enacted, it is plain that the legiſlative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the ſociety, or ſubverts the old; diſowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and ſo ſets up a new legiſlative.

§. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legiſlative from aſſembling in its due time, or from acting freely, purſuant to thoſe ends for which it was conſtituted, the legiſlative is altered: for it is not a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unleſs they have alſo freedom of debating, and leiſure of perfecting, what is for the good of the ſociety, wherein the legiſlative conſiſts: when theſe are taken away or altered, ſo as to deprive the ſociety of the due exerciſe of their power, the legiſlative is truly altered: for it is not names that conſtitute governments, but the uſe and exerciſe of thoſe powers that were intended to accompany them; ſo that he, who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legiſlative in its due ſeaſons, in effect takes away the legiſlative, and puts an end to the government.

§. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the conſent, and contrary to the common intereſt of the people, there alſo the legiſlative is altered: for, if others than thoſe whom the ſociety hath authorized thereunto, do chuſe, or in another way than what the ſociety hath preſcribed, thoſe choſen are not the legiſlative appointed by the people.

§. 217. Fourthly, The delivery alſo of the people into the ſubjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legiſlative, is certainly a change of the legiſlative, and ſo a diſſolution of the government: for the end why people entered into ſociety being to be preſerved one intire, free, independent ſociety, to be governed by its own laws; this is loſt, whenever they are given up into the power of another.

§. 218. Why, in ſuch a conſtitution as this, the diſſolution of the government in theſe caſes is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; becauſe he, having the force, treaſure and offices of the ſtate to employ, and often perſuading himſelf, or being flattered by others, that as ſupreme magiſtrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great advances toward ſuch changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or ſuppreſs oppoſers, as factious, ſeditious, and enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legiſlative, or people, is capable by themſelves to attempt any alteration of the legiſlative, without open and viſible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of; which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign conqueſt. Beſides, the prince in ſuch a form of government, having the power of diſſolving the other parts of the legiſlative, and thereby rendering them private perſons, they can never in oppoſition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legiſlative by a law, his conſent being neceſſary to give any of their decrees that ſanction. But yet, ſo far as the other parts of the legiſlative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote or not, what lies in them, hinder ſuch deſigns; they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greateſt crime men can be guilty of one towards another.

§. 219. There is one way more whereby ſuch a government may be diſſolved, and that is, when he who has the ſupreme executive power, neglects and abandons that charge, ſo that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonſtratively to reduce all to anarchy, and ſo effectually to diſſolve the government: for laws not being made for themſelves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the ſociety, to keep every part of the body politick in its due place and function; when that totally ceaſes, the government viſibly ceaſes, and the people become a confuſed multitude, without order or connexion. Where there is no longer the adminiſtration of juſtice, for the ſecuring of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, or provide for the neceſſities of the publick; there certainly is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I ſuppoſe, a myſtery in politicks, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconſiſtent with human ſociety.

§. 220. In theſe and the like caſes, when the government is diſſolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themſelves, by erecting a new legiſlative, differing from the other, by the change of perſons, or form, or both, as they ſhall find it moſt for their ſafety and good: for the ſociety can never, by the fault of another, loſe the native and original right it has to preſerve itſelf; which can only be done by a ſettled legiſlative, and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the ſtate of mankind is not ſo miſerable that they are not capable of uſing this remedy, till it be too late to look for any. To tell people they may provide for themſelves, by erecting a new legiſlative, when by oppreſſion, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is paſt cure. This is in effect no more than to bid them firſt be ſlaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if barely ſo, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be ſecure from tyranny, if there be no means to eſcape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

§. 221. There is therefore, ſecondly, another way whereby governments are diſſolved, and that is, when the legiſlative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their truſt.

First, The legiſlative acts againſt the truſt repoſed in them, when they endeavour to invade the property of the ſubject, and to make themſelves, or any part of the community, maſters, or arbitrary diſpoſers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

§. 222. The reaſon why men enter into ſociety, is the preſervation of their property; and the end why they chuſe and authorize a legiſlative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules ſet, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the ſociety; to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the ſociety: for ſince it can never be ſuppoſed to be the will of the ſociety, that the legiſlative ſhould have a power to deſtroy that which every one deſigns to ſecure, by entering into ſociety, and for which the people ſubmitted themſelves to legiſlators of their own making; whenever the legiſlators endeavour to take away, and deſtroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to ſlavery under arbitrary power, they put themſelves into a ſtate of war with the people, who are thereupon abſolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, againſt force and violence. Whenſoever therefore the legiſlative ſhall tranſgreſs this fundamental rule of ſociety; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to graſp themſelves, or put into the hands of any other, an abſolute power over the lives, liberties, and eſtates of the people; by this breach of truſt they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to reſume their original liberty, and, by the eſtabliſhment of a new legiſlative, (ſuch as they ſhall think fit) provide for their own ſafety and ſecurity, which is the end for which they are in ſociety. What I have ſaid here, concerning the legiſlative in general, holds true alſo concerning the ſupreme executor, who having a double truſt put in him, both to have a part in the legiſlative, and the ſupreme execution of the law, acts againſt both, when he goes about to ſet up his own arbitrary will as the law of the ſociety. He acts alſo contrary to his truſt, when he either employs the force, treaſure, and offices of the ſociety to corrupt the repreſentatives, and gain them to his purpoſes; or openly pre-engages the electors, and preſcribes to their choice, ſuch, whom he has, by ſolicitations, threats, promiſes, or otherwiſe, won to his deſigns; and employs them to bring in ſuch, who have promiſed beforehand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poiſon the very fountain of publick ſecurity? for the people having reſerved to themſelves the choice of their repreſentatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely choſen, and ſo choſen, freely act, and adviſe, as the neceſſity of the commonwealth, and the publick good ſhould, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This, thoſe who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reaſons on all ſides, are not capable of doing. To prepare ſuch an aſſembly as this, and endeavour to ſet up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true repreſentatives of the people, and the law-makers of the ſociety, is certainly as great a breach of truſt, and as perfect a declaration of a deſign to ſubvert the government, as is poſſible to be met with. To which, if one ſhall add rewards and puniſhments viſibly employed to the ſame end, and all the arts of perverted law made uſe of, to take off and deſtroy all that ſtand in the way of ſuch a deſign, and will not comply and conſent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be paſt doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the ſociety, who thus employ it contrary to the truſt went along with it in its firſt inſtitution, is eaſy to determine; and one cannot but ſee, that he, who has once attempted any ſuch thing as this, cannot any longer be truſted.

§. 223. To this perhaps it will be ſaid, that the people being ignorant, and always diſcontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unſteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expoſe it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to ſubſiſt, if the people may ſet up a new legiſlative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I anſwer, quite the contrary. People are not ſo eaſily got out of their old forms, as ſome are apt to ſuggeſt. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accuſtomed to. And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an eaſy thing to get them changed, even when all the world ſees there is an opportunity for it. This ſlowneſs and averſion in the people to quit their old conſtitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been ſeen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, ſtill kept us to, or, after ſome interval of fruitleſs attempts, ſtill brought us back again to, our old legiſlative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from ſome of our princes heads, they never carried the people ſo far as to place it in another line.

§. 224. But it will be ſaid, this hypotheſis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which I anſwer,

First, No more than any other hypotheſis: for when the people are made miſerable, and find themſelves expoſed to the ill uſage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors as much as you will, for ſons of Jupiter; let them be ſacred and divine, deſcended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whom or what you pleaſe, the ſame will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occaſion to eaſe themſelves of a burden that ſits heavy upon them. They will wiſh, and ſeek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakneſs and accidents of human affairs, ſeldom delays long to offer itſelf. He muſt have lived but a little while in the world, who has not ſeen examples of this in his time; and he muſt have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it in all ſorts of governments in the world.

§. 225. Secondly, I anſwer, ſuch revolutions happen not upon every little miſmanagement in publick affairs. Great miſtakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the ſlips of human frailty, will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuſes, prevarications and artifices, all tending the ſame way, make the deſign viſible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and ſee whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, that they ſhould then rouze themſelves, and endeavour to put the rule into ſuch hands which may ſecure to them the ends for which government was at firſt erected; and without which, ancient names, and ſpecious forms, are ſo far from being better, that they are much worſe, than the ſtate of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

§. 226. Thirdly, I anſwer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their ſafety anew, by a new legiſlative, when their legiſlators have acted contrary to their truſt, by invading their property, is the beſt fence againſt rebellion, and the probableſt means to hinder it: for rebellion being an oppoſition, not to perſons, but authority, which is founded only in the conſtitutions and laws of the government; thoſe, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force juſtify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into ſociety and civil government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preſervation of property, peace, and unity amongſt themſelves; thoſe who ſet up force again in oppoſition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the ſtate of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of thoſe about them) being likelieſt to do; the propereſt way to prevent the evil, is to ſhew them the danger and injuſtice of it, who are under the greateſt temptation to run into it.

§. 227. In both the fore-mentioned caſes, when either the legiſlative is changed, or the legiſlators act contrary to the end for which they were conſtituted, thoſe who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by force takes away the eſtabliſhed legiſlative of any ſociety, and the laws by them made purſuant to their truſt, he thereby takes away the umpirage, which every one had conſented to, for a peaceable deciſion of all their controverſies, and a bar to the ſtate of war amongſt them. They, who remove, or change the legiſlative, take away this deciſive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and conſent of the people; and ſo deſtroying the authority which the people did, and no body elſe can ſet up, and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a ſtate of war, which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the legiſlative eſtabliſhed by the ſociety, (in whoſe deciſions the people acquieſced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the knot, and expoſe the people anew to the ſtate of war. And if thoſe, who by force take away the legiſlative, are rebels, the legiſlators themſelves, as has been ſhewn, can be no leſs eſteemed ſo; when they, who were ſet up for the protection, and preſervation of the people, their liberties and properties, ſhall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and ſo they putting themſelves into a ſtate of war with thoſe who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greateſt aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.

§. 228. But if they, who ſay "it lays a foundation for rebellion," mean that it may occaſion civil wars, or inteſtine broils, to tell the people they are abſolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppoſe the unlawful violence of thoſe who were their magiſtrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the truſt put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being ſo deſtructive to the peace of the world: they may as well ſay, upon the ſame ground, that honeſt men may not oppoſe robbers or pirates, becauſe this may occaſion diſorder or bloodſhed. If any miſchief come in ſuch caſes, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. If the innocent honeſt man muſt quietly quit all he has, for peace ſake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I deſire it may be conſidered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which conſiſts only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppreſſors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without reſiſtance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of ſuch a peace, and ſuch a government, wherein Ulyſſes and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to ſuffer themſelves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulyſſes, who was a prudent man, preached up paſſive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet ſubmiſſion, by repreſenting to them of what concernment peace was to mankind; and by ſhewing the inconveniencies might happen, if they ſhould offer to reſiſt Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.

§. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is beſt for mankind, that the people ſhould be always expoſed to the boundleſs will of tyranny, or that the rulers ſhould be ſometimes liable to be oppoſed, when they grow exorbitant in the uſe of their power, and employ it for the deſtruction, and not the preſervation of the properties of their people?

§. 230. Nor let any one ſay, that miſchief can ariſe from hence, as often as it ſhall pleaſe a buſy head, or turbulent ſpirit, to deſire the alteration of the government. It is true, ſuch men may ſtir, whenever they pleaſe; but it will be only to their own juſt ruin and perdition: for till the miſchief be grown general, and the ill deſigns of the rulers become viſible, or their attempts ſenſible to the greater part, the people, who are more diſpoſed to ſuffer than right themſelves by reſiſtance, are not apt to ſtir. The examples of particular injuſtice, or oppreſſion of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. But if they univerſally have a perſuaſion, grounded upon manifeſt evidence, that deſigns are carrying on againſt their liberties, and the general courſe and tendency of things cannot but give them ſtrong ſuſpicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themſelves into this ſuſpicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the ſenſe of rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwiſe than as they find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into ſuch a poſture, that they would not have them thought to be as they are? I grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have ſometimes cauſed great diſorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to ſtates and kingdoms. But whether the miſchief hath oftener begun in the peoples wantonneſs, and a deſire to caſt off the lawful authority of their rulers, or in the rulers inſolence, and endeavours to get and exerciſe an arbitrary power over their people; whether oppreſſion, or diſobedience, gave the firſt riſe to the diſorder; I leave it to impartial hiſtory to determine. This I am ſure, whoever, either ruler or ſubject, by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the conſtitution and frame of any juſt government; is highly guilty of the greateſt crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to anſwer for all thoſe miſchiefs of blood, rapine, and deſolation, which the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country. And he who does it, is juſtly to be eſteemed the common enemy and peſt of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly.

§. 231. THAT ſubjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the properties of any people, may be reſiſted with force, is agreed on all hands. But that magiſtrates, doing the ſame thing, may be reſiſted, hath of late been denied: as if thoſe who had the greateſt privileges and advantages by the law, had thereby a power to break thoſe laws, by which alone they were ſet in a better place than their brethren: whereas their offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater ſhare they have by the law, and breaking alſo that truſt, which is put into their hands by their brethren.

§. 232. WHOSOEVER uſes force without right, as every one does in ſociety, who does it without law, puts himſelf into a ſtate of war with thoſe againſt whom he ſo uſes it; and in that ſtate all former ties are cancelled, all other rights ceaſe, and every one has a right to defend himſelf, and to reſiſt the aggreſſor. This is ſo evident, that Barclay himſelf, that great aſſertor of the power and ſacredneſs of kings, is forced to confeſs, that it is lawful for the people, in ſome caſes, to reſiſt their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to ſhew, that the divine law ſhuts up the people from all manner of rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, ſince they may in ſome caſes reſiſt, all reſiſting of princes is not rebellion. His words are theſe. “ Quod ſiquis dicat, Ergone populus tyrannicæ crudelitati & furori jugulum ſemper præbebit? Ergone multitudo civitates ſuas fame, ferro, & flammâ vaſtari, ſeque, conjuges, & liberos fortunæ ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitæ pericula omneſque miſerias & moleſtias à rege deduci patientur? Num illis quod omni animantium generi eſt à naturâ tributum, denegari debet, ut ſc. vim vi repellant, ſeſeq; ab injuriâ tueantur? Huic breviter reſponſum ſit, Populo univerſo negari defenſionem, quæ juris naturalis eſt, neque ultionem quæ præter naturum eſt adverſus regem concedi debere. Quapropter ſi rex non in ſingulares tantum perſonas aliquot privatum odium exerceat, ſed corpus etiam rei publicæ, cujus ipſe caput eſt, i. e. totum populum, vel inſignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intolerandâ ſævitiâ ſeu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc caſu reſiſtendi ac tuendi ſe ab injuriâ poteſtas competit, ſed tuendi ſe tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: & reſtituendæ injuriæ illatæ, non recedendi à debitâ reverentiâ propter acceptam injuriam. Præſentem denique impetum propulſandi non vim præteritam ulciſcenti jus habet. Horum enim alterum à naturâ eſt, ut vitam ſcilicet corpuſque tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de ſuperiori ſupplicium ſumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum ſit, impedire poteſt, ne fiat, id poſtquam factum eſt, in regem authorem ſceleris vindicare non poteſt: populus igitur hoc ampliùs quam privatus quiſpiam habet: quod huic, vel ipſis adverſariis judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum niſi in patientia remedium supereſt. Cùm ille ſi intolerabilis tyrannus eſt (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) reſiſtere cum reverentiâ poſſit.” Barclay contra Monarchom. l. iii. c. 8.

In Engliſh thus.

§. 233. "But if any one ſhould aſk, Muſt the people then always lay "themſelves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Muſt they ſee their cities pillaged, and laid in aſhes, their wives and children expoſed to the tyrant's luſt and fury, and themſelves and families reduced by their king to ruin, "and all the miſeries of want and oppreſſion; and yet ſit ſtill? Muſt men "alone be debarred the common privilege of oppoſing force with force, which "nature allows ſo freely to all other creatures for their preſervation from injury? I anſwer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it be "denied the community, even againſt the king himſelf: but to revenge "themſelves upon him, muſt by no means be allowed them; it being not "agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king ſhall ſhew an hatred, not "only to ſome particular perſons, but ſets himſelf againſt the body of the "commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and ſhall, with intolerable ill "uſage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or a conſiderable part of the people, "in this caſe the people have a right to reſiſt and defend themſelves from injury: but it muſt be with this caution, that they only defend themſelves, "but do not attack their prince: they may repair the damages received, but "muſt not for any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and reſpect. "They may repulſe the preſent attempt, but muſt not revenge paſt violences: "for it is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior ſhould "puniſh a ſuperior, is againſt nature. The miſchief which is deſigned them, "the people may prevent before it be done; but when it is done, they muſt "not revenge it on the king, though author of the villainy. This therefore "is the privilege of the people in general, above what any private perſon hath; "that particular men are allowed by our adverſaries themſelves (Buchanan "only excepted) to have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the "people may with reſpect reſiſt intolerable tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it."

§. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of reſiſtance.

§. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpoſe:

First, He ſays, it muſt be with reverence.

Secondly, It muſt be without retribution, or puniſhment; and the reaſon he gives is, "Becauſe an inferior cannot puniſh a ſuperior."

First, How to reſiſt force without ſtriking again, or how to ſtrike with reverence, will need ſome ſkill to make intelligible. He that ſhall oppoſe an aſſault only with a ſhield to receive the blows, or in any more reſpectful poſture, without a ſword in his hand, to abate the confidence and force of the aſſailant, will quickly be at an end of his reſiſtance, and will find ſuch a defence ſerve only to draw on himſelf the worſe uſage. This is as ridiculous a way of reſiſting, as Juvenal thought it of fighting; "ubi tu pulſas, ego vapulo tantum." And the ſucceſs of the combat will be unavoidably the ſame he there deſcribes it:

——“ Libertas pauperis hæc eſt :
“ Pulſatus rogat, & pugnis conciſus, adorat,
“ Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.”

This will always be the event of ſuch an imaginary reſiſtance, where men may not ſtrike again. He therefore who may reſiſt, muſt be allowed to ſtrike. And then let our author, or any body elſe, join a knock on the head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and reſpect as he thinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, deſerve for his pains, a civil, reſpectful cudgeling, wherever he can meet with it.

SECONDLY, As to his ſecond, “An inferior cannot puniſh a ſuperior;” that is true, generally ſpeaking, whilſt he is his ſuperior. But to reſiſt force with force, being the ſtate of war that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, reſpect, and ſuperiority: and then the odds that remains, is, that he, who oppoſes the unjuſt aggreſſor, has this ſuperiority over him, that he has a right, when he prevails, to puniſh the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in another place, more coherently to himſelf, denies it to be lawful to reſiſt a king in any caſe. But he there aſſigns two caſes, whereby a king may un-king himſelf. His words are,

“ Quid ergo, nulline caſus incidere poſſunt quibus populo ſeſe erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure ſuo ſuâque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis id obſtat, Regem honorificato; & qui poteſtati reſiſtit, Dei ordinationi reſiſtit: non aliàs igitur in eum populo poteſtas eſt quam ſi id committat propter quod ipſo jure rex eſſe deſinat. Tunc enim ſe ipſe principatu exuit atque in privatis conſtituit liber: hoc modo populos & ſuperior efficitur, reverſo ad eum ſc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit. At ſunt paucorum generum commiſſa ejuſmodi quæ hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo perluſtrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, caſus quibus rex ipſo facto ex rege non regem ſe facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque in ſubditos poteſtate deſtituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unus eſt, Si regnum diſperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is nempe ſenatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipſam ferro flammaque vaſtare, ac novas ſibi ſedes quærere, decreviſſet. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit ſe neque civem neque principem ſenatui amplius fore, inque animo habuerit interempto utriuſque ordinis electiſſimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditatur & molitur ſerio, omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in ſubditos amittit, ut dominus ſervi pro derelicto habiti dominium.”

§. 236, “ ALTER caſus eſt, Si rex in alicujus clientelam ſe contulit, ac regnum quod liberum à majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienæ ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non eâ mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod præcipuum eſt regiæ dignitatis

“ amiſit, ut ſummus ſcilicet in regno ſecundum Deum ſit, & ſolo Deo inferior,
“ atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus libertatem
“ ſartam & tectam conſervare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem & poteſtatem
“ dedidit; hâc velut quadam regni ab alienatione efficit, ut nec
“ quod ipſe in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum
“ voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & ſuæ
“ poteſtatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici
“ ſuppeditant.” Barclay contra Monarchom. l. iii. c. 16.

Which in Engliſh runs thus.

§. 237. “ What then, can there no caſe happen wherein the people may
“ of right, and by their own authority, help themſelves, take arms, and ſet
“ upon their king, imperiouſly domineering over them? None at all, whilſt
“ he remains a king. Honour the king, and he that reſiſts the power, reſiſts
“ the ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit it.
“ The people therefore can never come by a power over him, unleſs he does
“ ſomething that makes him ceaſe to be a king: for then he diveſts himſelf
“ of his crown and dignity, and returns to the ſtate of a private man, and
“ the people become free and ſuperior, the power which they had in the interregnum,
“ before they crowned him king, devolving to them again. But
“ there are but few miſcarriages which bring the matter to this ſtate. After
“ conſidering it well on all ſides, I can find but two. Two caſes there are, I
“ ſay, whereby a king, ipſo facto, becomes no king, and loſes all power and
“ regal authority over his people; which are alſo taken notice of by Winzerus.
“ The firſt is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he
“ have a purpoſe and deſign to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth; as it
“ is recorded of Nero, that he reſolved to cut off the ſenate and people of
“ Rome, lay the city waſte with fire and ſword, and then remove to ſome
“ other place. And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be
“ no longer a head to the people or ſenate, and that he had it in his thoughts
“ to cut off the worthieſt men of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria:
“ and he wiſhed that the people had but one neck, that he might diſpatch
“ them all at a blow. Such deſigns as theſe, when any king harbours in his
“ thoughts, and ſeriouſly promotes, he immediately gives up all care and
“ thought of the commonwealth; and conſequently forfeits the power of
“ governing his ſubjects, as a maſter does the dominion over his ſlaves whom
“ he hath abandoned.”

§. 238. “ The other caſe is, When a king makes himſelf the dependent
“ of another, and ſubjects his kingdom which his anceſtors left him, and the
“ people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however
“ perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet becauſe
“ he has hereby loſt the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and
“ immediately under God, ſupreme in his kingdom; and alſo becauſe he
“ betrayed or forced his people, whoſe liberty he ought to have carefully preſerved,
“ into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as it
“ were, alienation of his kingdom, he himſelf loſes the power he had in it
“ before,

"before, without transferring any the leaſt right to thoſe on whom he would "have beſtowed it; and ſo by this act ſets the people free, and leaves them "at their own diſpoſal. One example of this is to be found in the Scottiſh "Annals."

§. 239. In theſe caſes Barclay, the great champion of abſolute monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be reſiſted, and ceaſes to be a king. That is, in ſhort, not to multiply caſes, in whatſoever he has no authority, there he is no king, and may be reſiſted: for whereſoever the authority ceaſes, the king ceaſes too, and becomes like other men who have no authority. And theſe two caſes he inſtances in, differ little from thoſe above mentioned, to be deſtructive to governments, only that he has omitted the principle from which his doctrine flows; and that is, the breach of truſt, in not preſerving the form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government itſelf, which is the publick good and preſervation of property. When a king has dethroned himſelf, and put himſelf in a ſtate of war with his people, what ſhall hinder them from proſecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himſelf into a ſtate of war with them; Barclay and thoſe of his opinion, would do well to tell us. This farther I deſire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he ſays, "The miſchief that is deſigned "them, the people may prevent before it be done: whereby he allows reſiſt-"ance when tyranny is but in deſign. Such deſigns as theſe (ſays he) when "any king harbours in his thoughts and ſeriouſly promotes, he immediately "gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth;" ſo that, according to him, the neglect of the publick good is to be taken as an evidence of ſuch deſign, or at leaſt for a ſufficient cauſe of reſiſtance. And the reaſon of all, he gives in theſe words, "Becauſe he betrayed or forced his people, whoſe "liberty he ought carefully to have preſerved." What he adds, "into the "power and dominion of a foreign nation," ſignifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loſs of their liberty, which he ought to have preſerved, and not in any diſtinction of the perſons to whoſe dominion they were ſubjected. The peoples right is equally invaded, and their liberty loſt, whether they are made ſlaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and againſt this only have they the right of defence. And there are inſtances to be found in all countries, which ſhew, that it is not the change of nations in the perſons of their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilſon, a biſhop of our church, and a great ſtickler for the power and prerogative of princes, does, if I miſtake not, in his treatiſe of Chriſtian ſubjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title to the obedience of their ſubjects; and if there needed authority in a caſe where reaſon is ſo plain, I could ſend my reader to Bracton, Forteſcue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be ſuſpected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to ſatisfy thoſe men, who relying on him for their eccleſiaſtical polity, are by a ſtrange fate carried to deny thoſe principles upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabrick, they were beſt look. This I am ſure, their civil policy is ſo new, ſo dangerous, and ſo deſtructive to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it; ſo it may be hoped, thoſe to come, redeemed from the impoſitions of theſe Egyptian under-taſk-maſters, will abhor the memory of ſuch ſervile flatterers, who, whilſt it ſeemed to ſerve their turn, reſolved all government into abſolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean ſouls fitted them for, ſlavery.

§. 240. Here, it is like, the common queſtion will be made, "Who "ſhall be judge, whether the prince or legiſlative act contrary to their truſt?" This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may ſpread amongſt the people, when the prince only makes uſe of his due prerogative. To this I reply, "The people ſhall be judge;" for who ſhall be judge whether his truſtee or deputy acts well, and according to the truſt repoſed in him, but he who deputes him, and muſt, by having deputed him, have ſtill a power to diſcard him, when he fails in his truſt? If this be reaſonable in particular caſes of private men, why ſhould it be otherwiſe in that of the greateſt moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and alſo where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redreſs very difficult, dear, and dangerous?

§. 241. But farther, this queſtion, ("Who ſhall be judge?") cannot mean, that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide controverſies amongſt men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for himſelf, as in all other caſes, ſo in this, whether another hath put himſelf into a ſtate of war with him, and whether he ſhould appeal to the ſupreme judge, as Jeptha did.

§. 242. If a controverſy ariſe betwixt a prince and ſome of the people, in a matter where the law is ſilent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great conſequence, I ſhould think the proper umpire, in ſuch a caſe, ſhould be the body of the people: for in caſes where the prince hath a truſt repoſed in him, and is diſpenſed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if any men find themſelves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that truſt, who ſo proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at firſt, lodged that truſt in him) how far they meant it ſhould extend? But if the prince, or whoever they be in the adminiſtration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between either perſons, who have no known ſuperior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a ſtate of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; and in that ſtate the injured party muſt judge for himſelf, when he will think fit to make uſe of that appeal, and put himſelf upon it.

§. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the ſociety, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the ſociety laſts, but will always remain in the community; becauſe without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: ſo alſo when the ſociety hath placed the legiſlative in any aſſembly of men, to continue in them and their ſucceſſors, with direction and authority for providing ſuch ſucceſſors, the legiſlative can never revert to the people whilſt that government laſts; becauſe having provided a legiſlative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the legiſlative, and cannot reſume it. But if they have ſet limits to the duratoin of their legiſlative, and made this ſupreme power in any perſon, or aſſembly, only temporary; or elſe, when by the miſcarriages of thoſe in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time ſet, it reverts to the ſociety, and the people have a right to act as ſupreme, and continue the legiſlative in themſelves; or erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

The

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# EPISTOLA
DE
# TOLERANTIA.

AD CLARISSIMUM VIRUM

T·A·R·P·T·O·L·A·

SCRIPTA A

P·A·P·O·I·L·A.

# EPISTOLA
# DE
# TOLERANTIA.

QUAERENTI tibi, vir clariſſime, quid exiſtimem de mutuâ inter Chriſtianos tolerantiâ, breviter reſpondeo, hoc mihi videri praecipuum verae eccleſiae criterium. Quicquid enim alii jactant de locorum, et nominum antiquitate, vel cultus ſplendore; alii de diſciplinae reformatione; omnes denique de fide orthodoxâ, nam ſibi quiſque orthodoxus eſt, haec et hujuſmodi poſſunt eſſe hominum de poteſtate, et imperio contendentium, potius quam eccleſiae Chriſti notae. Haec omnia qui poſſidet, ſi charitate deſtituatur, ſi manſuetudine, ſi benevolentiâ erga omnes in univerſum homines, nedum fidem Chriſtianam profitentes, nondum eſt Chriſtianus. “Reges gentium dominantur iis; vos autem non ſic,” Luc. xxii, dicit ſuis Salvator noſter. Alia res eſt verae religionis, non ad externam pompam, non ad dominationem eccleſiaſticam, non denique ad vim; ſed ad vitam recte pieque inſtituendam natae. Primo omnium vitiis ſuis, faſtui et libidini propriae bellum debet indicere, qui in eccleſia Chriſti velit militare; aliàs ſine vitae ſanctimoniâ, morum caſtitate, animi benignitate et manſuetudine, fruſtra quaerit ſibi nomen Chriſtianum. “Tu converſus confirma fratres tuos,” Luc. xxii, dixit Petro Dominus noſter. Vix enim quiſquam perſuadebit, ſe de alienâ ſalute mire eſſe ſolicitum, qui negligens eſt ſuae: nemo ſincerè in id totis viribus incumbere poteſt, ut alii fiant Chriſtiani, qui religionem Chriſti animo ſuo nondum ipſe reverà amplexus eſt. Si enim Evangelio, ſi Apoſtolis credendum ſit, ſine charitate, ſine fide per amorem, non per vim, operante nemo Chriſtianus eſſe poteſt. An vero illi qui religionis praetextu alios vexant, lacerant, ſpoliant, jugulant, id amico et benigno animo agant, ipſorum teſtor conſcientiam; et tum denique credam cum zelotas illos videro amicos et familiares ſuos, contra Evangelii praecepta manifeſtè peccantes, eundem in modum corrigere; ſuoſque aſſeclas vitiorum corruptelâ tactos, et ſine mutatione in meliorem frugem certò perituros, ferro et igne aggredi; et amorem ſuum atque ſalutis animarum deſiderium omni crudelitatis et tormentorum genere teſtari. Si enim, uti prae ſe ferunt, charitate, et ſtudio erga eorum animas, bonis exuant, corpora mutilent, carcere et paedore macerent, vitâ denique ipſâ privent, ut fideles, ut ſalvi fiant, cur “ſcortationem, verſutiam, malitiam,” et alia quae Ethniciſmum tam apertè ſapiunt, teſtante Apoſtolo, Rom. i, impune inter ſuos graſſari permittunt? cum haec et hujuſmodi magis adverſentur Dei gloriae, eccleſiae puritati, et ſaluti animarum, quam erronea quaevis contra deciſiones eccleſiaſticas conſcientiae perſuaſio, vel in externo cultu defectus cum vitae innocentiâ conjunctus? Cur inquam zelus ille pro Deo, pro eccleſiâ, pro ſalute animarum uſque ad vivicomburium ardens, flagitia illa et vitia moralia Chriſtianae profeſſioni, omnibus fatentibus, è diametro contraria, ſine caſtigatione, ſine animadverſione praeteriens, in corrigendis opinionibus, iiſque plerumque de rebus ſubtilibus, vulgique captum ſuperantibus, vel ceremoniis ingerendis unice haeret, et omnes nervos ſuos intendit? Quae inter diſſidentes de his rebus ſanior ſit, quaeve ſchiſmatis vel haereſeos rea, an dominatrix vel ſuccumbens pars, tum demum conſtabit, cum de cauſâ ſeparationis judicabitur. Qui enim Chriſtum ſequitur ejuſque amplectitur doctrinam, et jugum ſuſcipit, etiamſi patrem et matrem, patrios ritus, caetum publicum, et quoſcunque demum homines relinquat, non eſt haereticus.

QUOD ſi ſectarum divortia adeo adverſentur ſaluti animarum, “adulterium, “ſcortatio, immunditia, laſcivia, ſimulacrorum cultus, et his ſimilia,” non ſunt minus opera carnis, de quibus diſerte pronuntiat Apoſtolus, quod “qui “talia agunt regni Dei haeredes non erunt,” Gal. v Haec igitur non minore curâ et induſtriâ, quam ſectae, penitus extirpanda, ſi quis de regno Dei ſincere ſolicitus in ejus pomeriis ampliandis ſibi elaborandum ſerio judicaverit. Quod ſi quiſquam aliter fecerit; et dum erga diverſa ſentientes immitis, et implacabilis eſt, peccatis interim et morum vitiis, Chriſtiano nomine indignis, parcat, palam demonſtrat, quantumvis crepat eccleſiam, ſe aliud, non Dei regnum quaerere.

SI quis animam, cujus ſalutem vehementer optat, velit per cruciatus, etiam nondum converſam efflari, mirabor ſane, et mirabuntur, puto, mecum alii; ſed ita tamen, ut nemo uſpiam credat hoc ab amore, à benevolentia, à charitate poſſe proficiſci. Si homines igne et ferro ad certa dogmata amplectenda ſunt impellendi, et ad externum cultum vi cogendi, de quorum tamen moribus nulla omnino ſit quaeſtio; ſi quis heterodoxos ita convertat ad fidem, ut cogat ea profiteri, quae non credunt, et permittat ea agere, quae Evangelium Chriſtianis, fidelis ſibi non permittit; illum velle numeroſum coetum eadem ſecum profitentium non dubito; velle autem eccleſiam Chriſtianam, quis eſt qui poteſt credere? Non mirandum igitur, ſi utantur armis militiae Chriſtianae non debitis, qui, quicquid prae ſe ferunt, pro verâ religione et eccleſiâ Chriſtianâ non militant. Si, uti Dux ſalutis noſtrae, ſincere cuperent ſalutem animarum, illius inſiſterent veſtigiis, et optimum illud principis pacis ſequerentur exemplum, qui ſatellites ſuos non ferro, non gladio, non vi armatos, ſed Evangelio, ſed pacis nuntio, morum ſanctitate et exemplo inſtructos, ad ſubjugandas gentes, et in eccleſiam cogendas emiſit: Cui tamen, ſi vi et armis convertendi eſſent infideles, ſi armato milite ab erroribus revocandi caecutientes, vel obſtinati mortales, paratior erat caeleſtium legionum exercitus, quam cuivis eccleſiae patrono, quantumvis potenti, ſuae ſunt cohortes.

TOLERANTIA eorum qui de rebus religionis diverſa ſentiunt, Evangelio et rationi adeo conſona eſt, ut monſtro ſimile videatur, homines in tam clarâ luce caecutire. Nolo ego hic aliorum incuſare faſtum, et ambitionem; aliorum intemperiem, et zelum charitate et manſuetudine deſtitutum: haec ſunt vitia humanis rebus forſan non eximenda, ſed tamen ejuſmodi, ut ea nemo ſibi apertè imputari velit; nemo pene eſt, qui his in tranſverſum actus alienâ et honeſtâ ſpecie tectis non quaerat laudem. Ne quis autem perſecutioni et ſaevitiae parum Chriſtianae curam reipublicae et legum obſervantiam praetexat, et è contra ne alii religionis nomine ſibi quaerant morum licentiam et delictorum impunitatem: Ne quis, inquam, vel ut fidus principis ſubditus, vel ut ſincerus Dei cultor, ſibi vel aliis imponat; ante omnia inter res civitatis, et religionis diſtinguendum exiſtimo, limiteſque inter eccleſiam, et rempublicam ritè definiendos. Si hoc non fit, nullis litibus modus ſtatui poteſt, inter eos, quibus ſalus animarum, aut reipublicae, vel revera cordi eſt, vel eſſe ſimulatur.

RESPUBLICA mihi videtur ſocietas hominum ſolummodo ad bona civilia ſervanda promovendaque conſtituta.

BONA civilia voco, vitam, libertatem, corporis integritatem, et indolentiam, et rerum externarum poſſeſſiones, ut ſunt latifundia, pecunia, ſupellex, &c.

HARUM rerum ad hanc vitam pertinentium poſſeſſionem juſtam omni univerſim populo, et ſingulis privatim ſubditis, ſartam tectam ſervare officium eſt magiſtratus civilis, per leges ex aequo omnibus poſitas; quas ſi quis contra jus faſque violare vellet, illius comprimenda eſt audacia metu poenae; quae conſiſtit vel in ablatione, vel imminutione eorum bonorum, quibus aliàs mulctatur, nedum libertate, aut vitâ; ideo magiſtratus ad poenam alieni juris violatoribus infligendam vi armatus eſt, toto ſcilicet ſubditorum ſuorum robore.

QUÒD vero ad bona haec civilia unicè ſpectat tota magiſtratus juriſdictio, et in iis ſolis curandis promovendiſque terminatur, et circumſcribitur omne civilis poteſtatis jus et imperium; nec ad ſalutem animarum aut debet aut poteſt ullo modo extendi, ſequentia mihi videntur demonſtrare.

PRIMO. Quia animarum magiſtratui civili plus quam aliis hominibus non demandatur cura. Non à Deo; quia nuſquam apparet Deum hujuſmodi authoritatem hominibus in homines tribuiſſe, ut poſſint alios ad ſuam religionem amplectendam cogere. Non ab hominibus magiſtratui poteſt ejuſmodi tribui poteſtas; quia nemo poteſt ita ſalutis ſuae aeternae curam abjicere, ut quam alter, ſive princeps ſive ſubditus, praeſcripſerit cultum vel fidem neceſſario amplectatur. Quia nemo ex alterius praeſcripto poteſt, ſi vellet, credere; in fide autem conſiſtit verae et ſalutiferae religionis vis et efficacia. Quicquid enim ore profiteris, quicquid in cultu externo praeſtes, ſi hoc et verum eſſe, et Deo placere tibi intus in corde penitus perſuaſum non ſit, non modo non prodeſt ad ſalutem, verum è contrario obeſt; quandoquidem hoc modo aliis peccatis, religione expiandis, addatur cumuli loco ipſius religionis ſimulatio Numiniſque contemptus, cum eum Deo O. M. offers cultum quem credis ipſi diſplicere.

SECUNDO. Cura animarum non poteſt pertinere ad magiſtratum civilem: quia tota illius poteſtas conſiſtit in coactione. Cum autem vera et ſalutifera religio conſiſtit in internâ animi fide, ſine quâ nihil apud Deum valet; ea eſt humani intellectus natura, ut nullâ vi externâ cogi poſſit. Auferantur bona, carceris cuſtodiâ, vel cruciatus poenâ urgeatur corpus, fruſtra eris, ſi his ſuppliciis mentis judicium de rebus mutare velis.

SED dices, magiſtratus poteſt argumentis uti, adeoque heterodoxos in veritatem pertrahere et ſalvos facere. Eſto; ſed hoc illi cum aliis hominibus commune eſt: ſi doceat, ſi inſtruat, ſi argumentis errantem revocet, facit ſane quod virum bonum decet; non neceſſe eſt magiſtratui vel hominem vel Chriſtianum exuere. Verum aliud eſt ſuadere, aliud imperare: aliud argumentis, aliud edictis contendere. Quorum hoc eſt poteſtatis civilis, illud benevolentiae humanae. Cuivis enim mortalium integrum eſt monere, hortari, erroris arguere, rationibuſque in ſententiam ſuam adducere: ſed magiſtratus proprium eſt, edictis jubere, gladio cogere. Hoc eſt igitur quod dico, ſcilicet quod poteſtas civilis non debet articulos fidei, ſive dogmata, vel modos colendi Deum lege civili praeſcribere. Si enim nullae adjunctae ſint poenae, legum vis perit; ſi poenae intententur, eae plane ineptae ſunt et minime ad perſuadendum accommodae. Si quis ad animae ſalutem dogma aliquod, vel cultum amplecti velit, ex animo credat oportet dogma illud verum eſſe, cultum autem Deo gratum et acceptum fore; hujuſmodi vero perſuaſionem animis inſtillare poena quaevis minime poteſt. Luce opus eſt ut mutetur animi ſententia, quam nullo modo foeneratur corporis ſupplicium.

TERTIO. Cura ſalutis animarum nullo modo pertinere poteſt ad magiſtratum civilem; quia dato quod legum authoritas et poenarum vis efficax eſſet ad convertendas hominum mentes, hoc tamen nihil prodeſſet ad ſalutem animarum. Cum enim unica ſit vera religio, una quae ad beatas ducit ſedes via, quae ſpes majorem hominum illuc perventurum numerum, ſi ea mortalibus data eſſet conditio, ut quiſque poſthabito rationis et conſcientiae ſuae dictamine, deberet coecâ mente amplecti principis ſui dogmata, et eo modo Deum colere, prout patriis legibus ſtatutum eſt? Inter tot varias principum de religione opiniones neceſſe eſſet viam illam ſtrictam portamque anguſtam, quae ducit in coelum, paucis admodum eſſe apertam, idque in una ſolum regione: et, quod maxime hac in re abſurdum eſſet et Deo indignum, aeterna felicitas vel cruciatus unicè deberetur naſcendi ſorti.

HAEC inter multa alia, quae ad hanc rem afferri poterant, ſufficere mihi videntur, ut ſtatuamus omnem reipublicae poteſtatem verſari circa bona illa civilia, et intra rerum hujus ſaeculi curam contineri, neque ea quae ad futuram ſpectant vitam ullatenus attingere.

NUNC videamus quid ſit eccleſia. Eccleſia mihi videtur ſocietas libera hominum ſponte ſuâ coëuntium ut Deum publice colant eo modo quem credunt Numini acceptum fore ad ſalutem animarum.

DICO eſſe "ſocietatem liberam et voluntariam." Nemo naſcitur alicujus eccleſiae membrum, alias patris avorumque religio jure haereditario ſimul cum latifundiis ad quemque deſcenderet, et fidem quiſque deberet natalibus: quo nihil abſurdius excogitari poteſt. Ita igitur ſe res habet. Homo nulli à naturâ obſtrictus eccleſiae, nulli addictus ſectae, illi ſe ſponte adjungit ſocietati ubi veram religionem cultumque Deo gratum credit ſe inveniſſe. Spes vero ſalutis quam illic reperit, uti unica intrandi in eccleſiam cauſa, ita pariter et illic manendi menſura. Quod ſi deprehenderit aliquid vel in doctrina erroneum,

neum, vel in cultu incongruum, eadem libertate, qua ingreſſus eſt, ſemper ipſi pateat exitus neceſſe eſt; nulla enim eſſe poſſunt indiſſolubilia vincula, niſi quae cum certa vitae aeternae expectatione conjuncta ſunt. Ex membris ita ſponte ſua et hunc in finem unitis coaleſcit eccleſia.

SEQUITUR jam ut inquiramus quae ſit ejus poteſtas, quibuſque legibus ſubjecta.

QUANDOQUIDEM nulla, quantumvis libera, aut levi de cauſa inſtituta ſocietas, ſive ea fuerit literarorum, ad philoſophiam; ſive mercatorum, ad negotia; ſive denique feriatorum hominum, ad mutuos ſermones, et animi cauſa, ſubſiſtere poteſt, quin illico diſſoluta interibit, ſi omnibus deſtituta ſit legibus: ideo neceſſe eſt ut ſuas etiam habeat eccleſia; ut loci, temporiſque quibus coetus coëant, habeatur ratio; ut conditiones proponantur, quibus quiſque in ſocietatem, vel admittatur, vel ab ea excludatur; ut denique munerum diverſitas, rerumque conſtituatur ordo, et his ſimilia. Cum vero ſpontanea ſit, uti demonſtratum eſt, coalitio ab omni vi cogente libera, ſequitur neceſſario, quod jus legum condendarum penes nullum niſi ipſam ſocietatem eſſe poteſt, vel illos ſaltem, quòd eodem recidit, quos ipſa ſocietas aſſenſu ſuo comprobaverit.

SED dices, vera eſſe non poteſt eccleſia, quae Epiſcopum vel Preſbyterium non habet, gubernandi authoritate, derivata ab ipſis uſque Apoſtolis, continua et non interrupta ſucceſſione inſtructum.

PRIMO, Rogo ut edictum oſtendas, ubi hanc legem eccleſiae ſuae poſuit Chriſtus; nec vanus ero, ſi diſerta in re tanti momenti verba requiram. Aliud ſuadere videtur effatum illud: “ Ubicunque duo vel tres congregantur “ in meo nomine, ibi ergo ero in medio ipſorum.” An coetui, in cujus medio erit Chriſtus, aliquid deërit ad veram eccleſiam, ipſe videris. Nihil certe illic deëſſe poteſt ad veram ſalutem: quod ad rem noſtram ſufficit.

SECUNDO, Videas quaeſo illos, qui rectores eccleſiae à Chriſto inſtitutos et ſucceſſione continuandos volunt, in ipſo limine inter ſe diſſentientes. Lis haec neceſſario permittit eligendi libertatem, ſcilicet ut integrum ſit cuivis ad eam accedere, quam ipſe praefert eccleſiam.

TERTIO, Habeas quem tibi praeponas neceſſariumque credis hujuſmodi longa ſerie deſignatum rectorem; dum ego interim me iſti ſocietati adjungo, in qua mihi perſuaſum eſt repertum iri ea quae ad animae ſalutem ſunt neceſſaria. Itaque utrique noſtrum ſalva eſt, quam poſcis, eccleſiaſtica libertas, nec alteruter alium habet quam quem ipſe ſibi eligeret legiſlatorem.

QUANDOQUIDEM autem de vera eccleſia adeo ſolicitus es, obiter hic rogare liceat, an non verae eccleſiae Chriſti magis conveniat eas communionis conditiones ſtabilire, quibus illa, et illa ſola continentur, quae Spiritus ſanctus in Sacra Scriptura clarè, et diſertis verbis docuit, ad ſalutem eſſe neceſſaria; quam ſua vel inventa, vel interpretamenta, tanquam legem divinam obtrudere, et ea tanquam ad profeſſionem Chriſtianam omnino neceſſaria legibus eccleſiaſticis ſancire, de quibus aut nihil prorſus, aut non decretoriè ſaltem pronunciarunt eloquia divina? Qui ea poſcit ad communionem eccleſiaſticam, quae Chriſtus non poſcit ad vitam aeternam; ille ad ſuam opinionem, et utilitatem forte, ſocietatem commode conſtituit; ſed ea Chriſti quomodo dicenda, quae alienis inſtitutis ſtabilitur eccleſia; et ex qua illi excluduntur, quos olim recipiet Chriſtus in regnum coelorum? Sed cum verae eccleſiae notas indagare hujus loci non ſit, eos ſaltem qui pro ſuae ſocietatis placitis tam acriter contendunt, et nihil niſi eccleſiam, non minore ſtrepitu, et forſan eadem inſtinctu, quo olim argentarii illi Epheſii Dianam ſuam, Act. xix. continuo crepant, unum hoc monitos vellem, Evangelium ſcilicet paſſim teſtari, veros Chriſti diſcipulos expectare, et pati debere perſecutiones: veram autem Chriſti eccleſiam alios perſequi, aut inſectari debere; vel vi, ferro, et flammis ad fidem, et dogmata ſua amplectenda cogere, non memini me uſpiam in Novo Teſtamento legiſſe.

FINIS ſocietatis religioſae, uti dictum, eſt, cultus Dei publicus, et per eum vitae aeternae acquiſitio. Eo igitur collimare debet tota diſciplina; his finibus circumſcribi omnes leges eccleſiaſticae. Nihil in hac ſocietate agitur, nec agi poteſt, de bonorum civilium, vel terrenorum poſſeſſione; nulla hic, quacunque de cauſa, adhibenda vis, quae omnis ad magiſtratum civilem pertinet; bonorumque externorum poſſeſſio, et uſus illius ſubjacet poteſtati.

DICES: Quae igitur ſanctio leges eccleſiaſticas ratas habebit, ſi coactio omnis abeſſe debet? Reſp. Ea ſane quae convenit rebus, quarum externa profeſſio, et obſervantia nihil prodeſt, niſi penitus animis inſideant; plenumque conſcientiae aſſenſum in his obtineant; nempe hortationes, monita, conſilia, arma ſunt hujus ſocietatis, quibus membra in officio continenda. Si his non corrigantur delinquentes, erranteſque reducantur in viam, nihil aliud reſtat, niſi ut reluctantes, et obſtinati, nullamque melioris frugis de ſe ſpem praebentes, à ſocietate prorſus ſejuncti rejiciantur. Haec ſuprema et ultima eſt poteſtatis eccleſiaſticae vis, quae nullam aliam infert poenam, niſi quod, ceſſante relatione inter corpus membrumque abſciſſum, damnatus definit eccleſiae illius eſſe pars.

HIS ita conſtitutis, inquiramus porro quae cujuſque ſunt circa Tolerantiam officia. Primo, Dico quod nulla eccleſia tenetur tolerantiae nomine eum ſinu ſuo fovere, qui monitus obſtinatè peccat contra leges in ea ſocietate ſtabilitas; quas ſi cui impune violare licet, de ſocietate actum eſt; cum hae ſint, et communionis conditiones, et unicum ſocietatis vinculum. Veruntamen cavendum eſt, ne excommunicationis decreto adjiciatur vel verborum contumelia, vel facti violentia, qua vel corpus ejecti, vel bona quoquo modo laedantur. Vis enim tota, uti dictum, magiſtratus eſt, nec privato cuivis permiſſa, niſi ſolum ut illatam repellat. Excommunicatio nihil bonorum civilium, quae aut privatim poſſidebat, excommunicato aufert, aut auferre poteſt. Ea omnia ad civilem ſtatum pertinent, et magiſtratus tutelae ſubjiciuntur. Excommunicationis vis tota in eo unice conſiſtit, ut declaratâ ſocietatis voluntate, ſolvatur unio inter corpus et membrum aliquod, qua ceſſante relatione neceſſario ceſſat quarundam rerum communio, quas membris ſuis tribuit ſocietas; ad quas nemo jus habet civile. Nulla enim facta eſt excommunicato civilis injuria, ſi miniſter eccleſiae panem et vinum non illius, ſed alienâ pecuniâ emptum, illi non dat in celebratione coenae dominicae.

SECUNDO, Nemo privatus alterius bona civilia quoquo modo invadere, aut imminuere debet, propterea, quod à ſuâ religione ſuiſque ritibus alienum ſe profiteatur. Omnia illi tam humanitatis quam civitatis jura ſanctè conſervanda: religionis haec non ſunt: ſive Chriſtianus ſit, ſive ethnicus, ab omni vi, et injuriâ temperandum. Juſtitiae menſura benevolentiae et charitatis officiis cumulanda. Hoc jubet Evangelium; ſuadet ratio; et, quam conciliavit natura, hominum inter ipſos communis ſocietas. Si à recto tramite aberrat, ſibi ſoli errat miſer, tibi innocuus; nec igitur à te male mulctandus debet hujus vitae bonis excidere, quod in futuro ſaeculo credis periturum.

Quod de mutuâ privatorum hominum inter ſe de religione diſſidentium tolerantiâ dixi, id etiam de eccleſiis particularibus dictum volo, quae inter ſe privatae quodammodo ſunt perſonae, nec altera in alteram jus aliquod habet, ne tum quidem, ſi forte accidat, cum magiſtratus civilis hujus vel illius eccleſiae ſit: quandoquidem reſpublica nullum jus novum tribuere poteſt eccleſiae, uti nec vice verſâ eccleſia reipublicae: ſiquidem eccleſia, ſive magiſtratus ei ſe adjungat, ſive deſerat, manet ſemper eadem, quae ante, libera et voluntaria ſocietas; nec accedente magiſtratu gladii poteſtatem acquirit; nec decedente, quam prius habuit docendi excommunicandive, amittit diſciplinam. Hoc ſpontaneae ſocietatis ſemper erit immutabile jus, ut ex ſuis, quos viſum fuerit, abalienare poſſit: nullam vero quorumvis acceſſione acquirat in alienos juriſdictionem. Quare pax, aequitas, et amicitia inter diverſas eccleſias, uti inter privatos homines, ſine juris alicujus praerogativâ ſemper, et aequabiliter colenda.

Ut exemplo res clara fiat, ponamus Conſtantinopoli duas, alteram Remonſtrantium, alteram Antiremonſtrantium eccleſias. An aliquis dicat alteri earum jus competere, ut diſſentientes alios, quod diverſa habent, vel dogmata vel ritus, libertate, vel bonis ſpoliet, quod alibi factum videmus: vel exilio, vel capite puniat? tacente interim, et ridente Turcâ, dum Chriſtiani Chriſtianos crudelitate et lanienâ vexant. Si vero altera harum eccleſiarum in alteram ſaeviendi habet poteſtatem, rogo quaenam ex duabus, et que jure? Reſpondebitur ſine dubio Orthodoxa in errantem, vel haereticam. Hoc eſt magnis et ſpecioſis verbis nihil dicere. Quaelibet eccleſia ſibi orthodoxa eſt, aliis erronea, vel haeretica; ſiquidem quae credit vera eſſe credit, quae in diverſum abeunt erroris damnat. Itaque de dogmatum veritate, de cultus rectitudine, inter utramque lis aequa eſt, nullâ judicis, qui nullus aut Conſtantinopoli aut in terris eſt, ſententiâ componenda. Quaeſtionis deciſio ad ſupremum omnium hominum judicem unicè pertinet, ad quem etiam ſolum pertinet errantis caſtigatio. Interim cogitent, quanto gravius illi peccant, qui, ſi non errori, ſaltem ſuperbiae addunt injuſtitiam, dum alieni domini ſervos, ſibi minime obnoxios, temere et inſolenter dilacerant.

Quod ſi certo conſtare poſſit, quaenam inter diſſidentes recte de religione ſentiret, non inde accreſceret orthodoxae eccleſiae poteſtas alias ſpoliandi; cum eccleſiarum in res terreſtres nulla ſit juriſdictio: nec ferrum, et ignis ad errores arguendos, menteſque hominum, aut informandas, aut convertendas idonea ſunt inſtrumenta. Fac tamen alteri parti favere magiſtratum civilem, ſuumque illi praebere velle gladium; ut heterodoxos, ſe annuente, quocunque velit modo caſtiget. An à Turcâ Imperatore eccleſiae Chriſtianae in fratres jus aliquod accedere poſſe quis dixerit? Infidelis, qui ſuâ authoritate

Chriſtianos ob fidei dogmata punire non poteſt, ſocietati cuivis Chriſtianae authoritatem iſtam minime poteſt impertire, nec jus, quod ipſe non habet, dare. Eandem rationem in Chriſtiano eſſe regno cogita. Poteſtas civilis ubique eadem eſt, nec majorem poteſt tribuere eccleſiae authoritatem in manu principis Chriſtiani, quam ethnici, id eſt, nullam. Quanquam hoc obſervatu forte dignum eſt, quod animoſiores hi veritatis ſatellites, errorum oppugnatores, ſchiſmatum impatientes, zelum iſtum ſuum pro Deo, quo toti accenduntur, et ardent, nuſpiam pene expromunt, niſi ubi faventem ſibi habent magiſtratum civilem. Ubi primum gratia apud magiſtratum, adeoque viribus ſunt ſuperiores, violanda illicô pax, et charitas Chriſtiana; alias colenda eſt mutua tolerantia. Quando robore civili impares ſunt, innoxie, et patienter ferre poſſunt, à quo tantum ſibi et religioni aliàs metuunt, idololatriae, ſuperſtitionis, haereſeos in vicinia contagium: nec libenter aut fervidè arguendis erroribus, qui aulae, et magiſtratu placent, impendunt operam; quae tamen vera et ſola eſt propagandae veritatis methodus, juncto ſcilicet cum humanitate et benevolentiâ rationum et argumentorum pondere.

NULLAE igitur ſive perſonae, ſive eccleſiae, ſive demum reſpublicae, jus aliquod habere poſſunt bona civilia invicem invadendi ſeque mutuo rebus mundanis ſpoliandi, ſub praetextu religionis. Qui aliter ſentiunt, velim ſecum reputent, quam infinitam praebent humano generi litium et bellorum materiem: quantum ad rapinas et caedes et aeterna odia incitamentum: nec uſpiam ſecuritas aut pax, nedum amicitia inter homines ſtabiliri aut ſubſiſtere poteſt, ſi ea obtineat opinio, Dominium ſcilicet fundari in Gratia: et religionem vi et armis propagandam.

3. VIDEAMUS quid Tolerantiae officium exigit ab iis, qui à reliquo coetu et gente laicâ, uti loqui amant, charactere et munere aliquo eccleſiaſtico diſtinguuntur, ſive ſint epiſcopi, ſacerdotes, preſbyteri, miniſtri, vel quocunque alio nomine veniant. De origine ſive poteſtatis ſive dignitatis clericae jam non eſt inquirendi locus: hoc tamen dico; undecunque orta eſt eorum authoritas, cum ſit eccleſiaſtica, inter eccleſiae cancellos debet coërceri, nec ad res civiles quovis modo poteſt extendi: quandoquidem ipſa eccleſia à republica rebuſque civilibus prorſus ſejuncta eſt et ſeparata. Fixi et immobiles ſunt utrique limites. Coelum et terram, res disjunctiſſimas, miſcet qui has duas ſocietates, origine, fine, materia, toto coelo diverſas velit confundere. Quare nemo, quocunque demum munere eccleſiaſtico ornatus, poteſt quemvis hominum, à ſuâ eccleſiâ vel fide alienum, vitâ, libertate, aut quavis bonorum terreſtrium parte mulctare religionis cauſâ. Quod enim integrae non licitum eſt eccleſiae, id alicui ejus membro jure eccleſiaſtico licere non poteſt.

NEC viris eccleſiaſticis ſatis eſt à vi et rapina et omnimoda perſecutione abſtinere; qui ſe ſucceſſorem profitetur Apoſtolorum, et docendi munus in ſe ſuſcepit, tenetur porro monere ſuos de pacis et benevolentiae officiis erga omnes homines; tam erroneos quam orthodoxos, tam ſecum ſentientes quam à fide ſua vel ritibus alienos, et cunctos, ſive privatos ſive rempublicam gerentes, ſi qui hujuſmodi ſint in ſuâ eccleſiâ, ad charitatem, manſuetudinem, tolerantiam hortari, omnemque illam averſationem et contra heterodoxos animi ardorem compeſcere et lenire, quem aut ſuus cujuſque pro ſua religione et ſectâ feroculus zelus, aut aliorum aſtus in mentibus accenderit. Qui et quantus tam in eccleſia quam republica perciperetur fructus, ſi doctrinâ pacis et tolerantiae reſonarent pulpita, nolo dicere, nequid gravius a me dictum in eos videatur, quorum dignitatem à nemine, ne à ſeipſis quidem, imminutam vellem. Verum dico hoc ita fieri oportere, et ſi quis, qui ſe miniſtrum verbi divini profitetur, et praeconem Evangelii pacis, alia docet, negotium ſibi demandatum aut neſcit, aut negligit, cujus aliquando principi pacis reddet rationem. Si monendi ſint Chriſtiani, ut à vindictâ abſtineant, iteratis laceſſiti injuriis uſque ad ſeptuagies ſepties; quanto magis illi ab omni irâ, et inimicâ vi ſibi temperare debent, qui nihil ab alio paſſi ſunt; et cavere maxime ne illos quoquo modo laedant à quibus nulla in re fuerint laeſi; praecipuè ne aliis quodvis intentent malum, qui res ſuas ſolum agunt, et de hoc uno ſoliciti ſunt, ut Deum colant eo modo, quem, neglecta hominum opinione, ipſi Deo maxime acceptum fore credunt, et eam amplectuntur religionem, quae ipſis maximam ſpem facit ſalutis aeternae? Si de re domeſticâ et facultatibus, ſi de corporis valetudine agatur, quid è re ſua fuerit apud ſe conſulere cuivis integrum eſt, illudque ſequi permiſſum quod ſuo judicio ſit optimum: de vicini ſui re familiari male adminiſtrata nemo queritur; de ſemendis agris vel locanda filia erranti nemo iraſcitur; in popinis decoquentem nemo corrigit: diruat, aedificet, ſumptus faciat ſuo more, tacitum eſt, licitum eſt: ſi vero templum publicum non frequentet, ſi illic debito ritu corpus non flectat; ſi liberos hujus vel illius eccleſiae ſacris initiandos non tradat, fit murmur, clamor, incuſatio, quiſque tanti criminis paratus eſt vindex, et à vi et rapina vix ſibi temperant zelotae, dum in jus vocatur, et ſententia judicis vel corpus carceri necive tradat, vel bona haſtae ſubjiciat. Oratores eccleſiaſtici cujuſque ſectae aliorum errores, qua poſſunt, argumentorum vi redarguant et debellent, ſed hominibus parcant. Quod ſi deſtituantur rationum momentis, abſona et alieni fori inſtrumenta ne adſciſcant, eccleſiaſticis non tractanda; nec in ſubſidium ſuae vel eloquentiae vel doctrinae à magiſtratu faſces et ſecures mutuentur, ne forte dum prae ſe ferunt veritatis amorem, zelus eorum ferro et igne nimium efferveſcens affectatae dominionis fiat indicium. Haud facile enim perſuadebit viris cordatis, ſe vehementer et ſincerè cupere fratrem in futuro ſaeculo ab igne gehennae tutum ſalvumque fore, qui ſiccis oculis et prono animo vivum hic tradit carnifici concremandum.

4. QUAE ſunt magiſtratus partes, quae ſanè circa tolerantiam maximae ſunt, ultimo jam loco videndum.

SUPRA probavimus, ad magiſtratum non pertinere animarum curam, authoritativam, ſi ita loqui liceat, volo, quae ſcilicet legibus jubendo, poeniſque cogendo, exercetur: charitativa enim quae docendo, monendo, ſuadendo conſulit, nemini negari poteſt. Itaque penes quemque animae ſuae cura eſt, eique permittenda. Dices, Quid ſi animae ſuae curam negligit? Reſp. Quid ſi ſanitatis? quid ſi rei familiaris, quae res propius magiſtratus imperio ſubjacent? an magiſtratus edicto ad eam rem facto cavebit ne pauper vel aeger fiat? Leges quantum fieri poteſt ſubditorum bona et ſanitatem ab aliena vi vel fraude tueri conantur, non à poſſidentis incuria vel diſſipatione. Nemo ut valeat, ut diteſcat, invitus cogi poteſt. Invitos ne quidem Deus ſervabit. Fac tamen principem ſubditos ad opes acquirendas, vel corporis robur tuendum velle cogere: Anne ſolos medicos Romanos conſulendos eſſe lege ſtatutum erit, et ad eorum praeſcriptum vivere quiſque tenebitur? Numquid nullum ſumendum vel medicamentum vel obſonium, niſi quod in Vaticano paratum, aut è Genevenſi prodierit officinâ: Vel ut ſubditis domi ſuae abunde ſit et lautè, anne omnes lege tenebuntur mercaturam vel muſicam exercere? an quiſque fiet vel caupo, vel faber, quibus artibus aliqui ſatis commode familiam ſuam ſuſtentant, opibuſque augent? Sed dices, Quaeſtus mille ſunt artes, unica ſalutis via. Recte ſane dictum, ab iis praeſertim, qui ad hanc vel illam cogere vellent: nam ſi plures eſſent, ne cogendi quidem inveniretur praetextus. Quod ſi ego ſecundum geographiam ſacram rectâ Hieroſolymas totis viribus contendo, cur vapulo quod non cothurnatus forſan, vel certo modo lotus vel tonſus incedo; quod carnibus in itinere veſcor, vel victu utor ſtomacho et valetudini commodo; quod hinc inde aliqua diverticula vito, quae mihi videntur in praecipitia vel vepreta deducere? vel inter varios, qui ejuſdem viae ſunt et eodem tendentis, calles eum ſeligo qui minimè ſinuoſus coenoſuſve apparet? Quod illi minus modeſti, hi moroſiores, viſi ſunt quam quibus me libenter vellem adjungere comitem; vel quod habeo vel non habeo mitratum vel albâ ſtola indutum itineris ducem? Nam profecto ſi recte rem reputemus, hujuſmodi plerumque ſunt minoris momenti res, quae fratres Chriſtianos de ſummâ religionis eadem et recte ſentientes tam acriter committunt, et quae ſalvâ religione et animarum ſalute, modo abſit ſuperſtitio vel hypocriſis, poſſint vel obſervari vel omitti.

VERUM demus zelotis, et omnia quae ſua non ſunt damnantibus, ex his circumſtantiis diverſas et in diverſa tendentes naſci vias; quid tandem proficiemus? Unica ex his revera ſalutis ſit via. Verum inter mille, quas homines ingrediuntur, de rectâ ambigitur: nec cura reipublicae, nec legum condendarum jus, illam quae ducit ad coelum viam, magiſtratui certius detegit, quam ſuum privato ſtudium. Debile traho corpus et gravi morbo languidum, cujus unicam eamque ignotam ponamus eſſe medelam. Ideone magiſtratûs eſt praeſcribere remedium, quia unicum tantum eſt, idque inter tot varia ignotum? Ideone quia unicum quo mortem evitem mihi agendum reſtat, id quod jubet fieri magiſtratus erit tutum? Quae à ſingulis ſtudio, conſilio, judicio, cogitatione, et ſincerâ mente indaganda, ea non uni alicui hominum ſorti, tanquam ipſi propria, tribuenda ſunt. Naſcuntur principes poteſtate ſuperiores, naturâ vero aequales reliquis mortalibus, nec regnandi jus vel peritia ſecum trahit aliarum rerum certam cognitionem, nedum religionis verae; ſi enim ita eſſet, qui fit quod de rebus religionis tam in diverſum abeunt terrarum domini? Sed demus veroſimile eſſe, viam ad vitam aeternam principi eſſe quam ſubditis notiorem: vel ſaltem tutius commodiuſve eſſe in hac rerum incertitudine illius mandatis obtemperare. Dices igitur, an ſi te juberet mercaturâ victum quaerere, recuſares, quia dubitares an hac arte quaeſtum faceres? Reſp. Mercator fierem jubente principe: quia ſi male ſuccederet, ille oleum et operam mercatura perditam potens eſt alio modo abunde reſarcire; et ſi famem pauperiemque, uti prae ſe fert, à me amotam velit, id facile praeſtare poteſt, ſi mea omnia abſumpſerit infoelicis mercaturae mala ſors. Verum hoc non fit in rebus vitae futurae. Si illic male operam locavero; ſi illic ſemel ſpe excidi, magiſtratus nequaquam poteſt reſarcire damnum, levare malum, nec me in aliquam partem, multo minus in integrum reſtituere. Qua ſponſione de regno coelorum cavebitur? Dices forte, magiſtratui civili de rebus ſacris certum, quod ſequi omnes debent, non tribuimus judicium, ſed eccleſiae. Quod definivit eccleſia id magiſtratus civilis ab omnibus obſervari jubet, et nequis aliud in ſacris vel agat vel credat quam quod docet eccleſia, authoritate ſua cavet: adeo ut judicium ſit penes eccleſiam; obſequium magiſtratus ipſe praeſtat, et ab aliis exigit. Reſp. Venerandum illud Apoſtolorum tempore eccleſiae nomen, ſequioribus ſaeculis ad fucum faciendum non raro uſurpatum fuiſſe, quis non videt? praeſenti ſaltem in re nihil opis nobis affert. Ego unicam illam anguſtam quae ad coelum ducit ſemitam, magiſtratui non magis notam eſſe dico quam privatis; ideoque tuto eum non poſſum ſequi ducem, qui cum viae poteſt eſſe aeque ignarus, de mea certe ſalute non poteſt non eſſe minus ſolicitus quam ego ipſe. Inter tot gentis Hebraeae reges quotuſquiſque fuit, quem ſecutus aliquis Iſraëlita, non à vero cultu Dei deflexiſſet in idololatriam, in certam perniciem coecâ hujuſmodi obedientiâ ruiturus? Tu contrà bono me eſſe animo jubes, in tuto dicis res eſt; jam enim magiſtratus non ſua ſed eccleſiae de rebus religionis decreta populo obſervanda proponit, et ſanctione civili ſtabilit. Sed rogo cujus demum eccleſiae? Illius ſcilicet quae principi placet. Quaſi vero ille de religione ſuum non interponit judicium, qui me in hanc vel illam eccleſiam lege, ſupplicio, vi cogit? Quid intereſt ſive ipſe me ducat, ſive aliis ducendum tradat? ex illius pariter pendeo voluntate, et de meâ ſalute utrimque aeque ſtatuit. Quanto ſecurior Judaeus, qui ex edicto regis Baali ſe adjunxit, quod ipſi dictum ſit, regem ſuo arbitrio nihil in religione ſtatuere, nihil ſubditis in cultu divino injungere, niſi quod ſacerdotum concilio et illius religionis myſtis comprobatum et pro divino habitum? Si ideo vera, ideo ſalutifera ſit alicujus eccleſiae religio, quia ſectae illius antiſtites, ſacerdotes, aſſeclae eam laudant, praedicant, et quantum poſſunt ſuffragiis ſuis commendant: quae tandem erit erronea, falſa, pernicioſa? De Socinianorum fide dubito; Pontificiorum vel Lutheranorum cultus mihi ſuſpectus eſt; an igitur tutior mihi ingreſſus eſt in hanc vel illam eccleſiam, jubente magiſtratu, quod ille nihil imperat, nihil de religione ſancit, niſi ex authoritate et conſilio doctorum iſtius eccleſiae? Quanquam ſi verum dicere volumus, facilius plerumque ſe aulae accommodat eccleſia, ſi ita dicendus ſit eccleſiaſticorum decreta facientium conventus, quam aula eccleſiae. Sub principe orthodoxo vel Ariano qualis fuit eccleſia ſatis notum. Sed ſi haec nimis remota, recentiora nobis offert Anglorum hiſtoria, quam belle, quam prompte, eccleſiaſtici decreta, fidei articulos, cultum, omnia ad nutum principis componebant ſub Henrico, Eduardo, Maria, Elizabetha: qui principes tam diverſa de religione et ſentiebant et jubebant, ut nemo niſi amens, pene dixeram atheus, aſſerere audeat, quemvis virum probum et veri Dei cultorem poſſe ſalvâ conſcientia, ſalvâ erga Deum veneratione, eorum de religione decretis obtemperare. Sed quid multa? Si rex, ſive ex proprio judicio, ſive authoritate eccleſiaſticâ et ex aliorum opinione, leges alienae religioni ponere velit, perinde eſt. Eccleſiaſticorum, quorum diſſentiones et dimicationes plus ſatis notae, nec magis ſanum nec magis tutum judicium: neque aliquam vim poteſtati civili eorum undecunque collecta addere poſſunt ſuffragia. Quanquam hoc notatu dignum, quod Principes eccleſiaſticorum, ſuae fidei et cultui non faventium, opiniones et ſuffragia non ſolent aliquo in loco habere.

SED quod caput rei eſt, et rem penitus conficit; etiamſi magiſtratûs de religione potior ſit ſententia, et via quam inire jubet vere Evangelica; ſi hoc mihi ex animo non perſuaſum ſit, mihi non erit ſalutaris. Nulla, quam reclamante conſcientiâ ingredior viam, me ad beatorum ſedes unquam deducet. Arte quam averſor diteſcere poſſum, medicamentis de quibus dubito ſanus fieri; religione vero de qua dubito, cultu quem averſor, ſalvus fieri non poſſum. Incredulus externos fruſtra induit mores, cum fide et interna ſinceritate opus ſit ut Deo placeat. Medicina utcunque ſpecioſa, utcunque aliis probata, fruſtra propinatur, ſi ſtatim ſumptam rejiciet ſtomachus; nec invito infundi debet remedium, quod idioſyncraſiae vitio mutabitur in venenum. Quicquid de religione in dubium vocari poteſt, hoc demum certum eſt, quod nulla religio, quam ego non credo eſſe veram, mihi vera aut utilis eſſe poteſt. Nequicquam igitur ſalvandae animae praetextu ſubditos ad ſacra ſua cogit magiſtratus, ſi credant, ſponte venturos, ſi non credant, quamvis venerint, nihilominus perituros. Quantumvis igitur prae te fers alteri bene velle; quantumvis de ſalute ejus labores, homo ad ſalutem cogi non poteſt: poſt omnia, ſibi et conſcientiae ſuae relinquendus.

SIC tandem homines habemus in rebus religionis ab alieno domino liberos: quid jam facient? Deum publice colendum et ſciunt et agnoſcunt omnes, quorſum aliàs ad coetus publicos cogimur? Hominibus itaque in eâ libertate conſtitutis ineunda eſt ſocietas eccleſiaſtica, ut coetus celebrent, non ſolum ad mutuam aedificationem, ſed etiam ut ſe coram populo teſtentur cultores eſſe Dei, eumque ſe divino Numini cultum offere, cujus ipſos non pudet, nec Deo credunt aut indignum aut ingratum; ut doctrinae puritate, vitae ſanctimoniâ et rituum modeſto decore, alios ad religionis veritatiſque amorem pelliceant, aliaque praeſtent quae à ſingulis privatim fieri non poſſunt.

HAS ſocietates religioſas eccleſias voco, quas magiſtratus tolerare debet; quia à populo ita in coetus collecto non aliud agitur, quam quod ſingulis hominibus ſeorſim integrum eſt et licitum, ſcilicet de ſalute animarum: nec hac in re diſcrimen aliquod eſt inter eccleſiam aulicam, reliquaſque ab ea diverſas.

SED cum in omni eccleſiâ duo praecipue conſideranda ſunt, cultus ſcilicet externus, ſive ritus, et dogmata; de utriſque ſeparatim agendum eſt, ut clarius de univerſâ tolerantiae ratione conſtet.

1. MAGISTRATUS nec in ſuâ, nec, quod multo minus licet, in aliena eccleſia poteſt ritûs aliquos eccleſiaſticos, vel ceremonias in cultu Dei uſurpandas, lege civili ſancire; non ſolum quia liberae ſunt ſocietates, ſed quicquid in cultu divino Deo offertur, id eâ ſolum ratione probandum eſt, quod à colentibus

Deo acceptum fore creditur. Quicquid ea fiducia non agitur, nec licitum eſt, nec Deo acceptum. Repugnat enim, ut, cui libertas permittitur religionis, cujus finis eſt Deo placere, eum in ipſo cultu jubeas Deo diſplicere. Dices: Anne igitur negabis, quae ab omnibus conceditur, magiſtratui in res adiaphoras poteſtatem, quae ſi auferatur, nulla reſtabit legum ferendarum materia? Reſp. Concedo res indifferentes, eaſque forſan ſolas, poteſtati legiſlativae ſubjici.

1. NON inde tamen ſequitur, quod licitum ſit magiſtratui de quavis re indifferente quodcunque placuerit ſtatuere. Legum ferendarum modus et menſura eſt publicum commodum: Si quid ex uſu reipblicae non fuerit, utcunque ſit res indifferens, non poteſt illico lege ſanciri.

2. RES utcunque ſua natura indifferentes extra magiſtratus juriſdictionem poſitae ſunt, cum in eccleſiam et cultum divinum transferuntur; quia illo in uſu nullam habent cum rebus civilibus connectionem: ubi ſolum agitur de ſalute animarum, nec vicini nec reipublicae intereſt ſive hic ſive ille ritus uſurpetur. Ceremoniarum in coetibus eccleſiaſticis ſive obſervatio, ſive omiſſio, aliorum vitae, libertati, opibus, ne obeſt quidem nec obeſſe poteſt. Exempli gratia, infantem nuper natum aquâ lavare, res ſit ſua natura indifferens. Detur etiam magiſtratui licitum eſſe id lege ſtatuere, modo ſciat utilem eſſe hujuſmodi lotionem ad morbum aliquem, cui obnoxii ſunt infantes, vel ſanandum vel praecavendum, credatque etiam tanti eſſe ut de ea edicto caveatur. An igitur dicet aliquis, eodem jure licere magiſtratui lege etiam jubere, ut infantes à ſacordote ſacro fonte abluantur ad purgationem animarum? vel ut ſacris aliquibus initientur? Quis non primo aſpectu videt res haſce toto coelo differre? Supponas Judaei eſſe filium, ut res ipſa per ſe loquitur. Quid enim vetat, magiſtratum Chriſtianum Judaeos habere ſubditos? Quam injuriam, in re ſua natura indifferenti, Judaeo non faciendam agnoſcis, ſcilicet ut in cultu religioſo contra quam ipſe ſentiat aliquid agere cogatur, eam Chriſtiano homini faciendam aſſeris?

3. RES ſua natura indifferentes non poſſunt fieri pars cultus divini authoritate et arbitrio humano, et hanc ipſam ob rationem, quia ſunt indifferentes. Nam cum res indifferentes nulla virtute ſua propria aptae natae ſunt ad Numen propitiandum, nulla humana poteſtas vel authoritas eam illis conciliare valet dignitatem et excellentiam, ut Deum poſſint demereri. In communi vita rerum ſua natura indifferentium liber is et licitus eſt uſus quem Deus non prohibuerit, adeoque in iis locum habere poteſt arbitrium vel authoritas humana: ſed eadem non eſt in religione et ſacris libertas. In cultu divino res adiaphorae non alia ratione ſunt licitae, niſi quatenus à Deo inſtitutae, eamque illis certo mandato tribuerit Deus dignitatem ut fiant pars cultus, quam approbare et ab homunculis et peccatoribus accipere dignabitur ſupremi Numinis majeſtas. Nec Deo indignabunde roganti, Quis requiſivit? ſatis erit reſpondere, juſſiſſe magiſtratum. Si juriſdictio civilis eouſque extendatur, quid non licebit in religione? quae rituum farrago, quae ſuperſtitionis inventa, modo magiſtratus authoritate innixa, etiam reclamante et condemnante conſcientiâ, non erunt Dei cultoribus amplectanda, cum horum pars

maxima in religioſo rerum ſuâ naturâ indifferentium uſu conſiſtat, nec in alio peccat, quam quod Deum non habeat authorem? Aquae aſperſio, panis et vini uſus, res ſunt ſuâ naturâ, et in communi vitâ maxime indifferentes: an igitur haec in uſus ſacros introduci, et divini cultus pars fieri poterant ſine inſtituto divino? Hoc ſi potuit humana aliqua, vel civilis poteſtas, quid ni etiam et jubere poſſit tanquam partem cultus divini, in ſacra ſynaxi piſcibus et cerevisia epulari; jugulatarum beſtiarum ſanguinem in templo aſpergere; aquâ vel igne luſtrare; et hujuſmodi alia infinita, quae quamvis extra religionem indifferentia ſint, cum in ſacros ritus ſine authoritate divinâ adſciſcantur, aeque Deo exoſa ſunt ac canis immolatio: quid enim catulum inter et hircum intereſt reſpectu divinae naturae, ab omni materiae affinitate aequaliter et infinitum diſtantis, niſi quod hoc animalium genus vellet, illud nollet Deus in ſacris cultuque ſuo adhiberi? Vides igitur, quod res in medio poſitae, utcunque ſubjaceant poteſtati civili, non poſſunt tamen eo nomine in ſacros ritus introduci, et coetibus religioſis injungi: quia in ſacro cultu deſinunt protinus eſſe indifferentes. Qui Deum colit, eo colit animo, ut placeat, propitiumque reddat; quod tamen facere non poteſt is, qui jubente alio illud Deo offert, quod credit Numini, quia non juſſit, diſpliciturum. Hoc non eſt Deum placare, ſed manifeſtâ contumeliâ, quae cum cultûs ratione conſiſtere non poteſt, ſciens prudenſque laceſſere.

DICES: Si nihil in cultu divino permittatur humano arbitrio, quomodo tribuitur eccleſiis ipſis poteſtas aliquid de tempore locoque, etc. ſtatuendi? Reſp. In cultu religioſo aliud eſt pars, aliud circumſtantia. Illud pars eſt, quod creditur à Deo requiri, et ipſi placere; unde fit neceſſarium. Circumſtantiae ſunt, quae etſi in genere à cultu abeſſe non poſſunt, tamen earum certa ſpecies non definitur, adeoque ſunt indifferentes: cujuſmodi ſunt locus et tempus, cultoris habitus et corporis ſitus; cum de iis nihil mandaverit voluntas divina. v. g. Tempus locuſque et ſacra facientium habitus apud Judaeos non erant merae circumſtantiae, ſed pars cultûs, in quibus ſi quid mancum aut immutatum, ſperare non poterant ſacra ſua Deo fore grata et accepta: quae tamen Chriſtianis, quibus conſtat libertas Evangelica, purae ſunt cultûs circumſtantiae, quas prudentia cujuſque eccleſiae poteſt in morem trahere, prout eas credit hoc vel illo modo cum ordine et decoro aedificationi maxime inſervire: iis vero quibus ſub Evangelio perſuaſum eſt diem dominicum ſuo cultui à Deo ſegregatum eſſe, illis tempus hoc non eſt circumſtantia, ſed pars cultûs divini, quae nec mutari nec negligi poteſt.

2. MAGISTRATUS eccleſiae cujuſvis ritus ſacros et cultum in eâ receptum prohibere non poteſt in coetibus religioſis: quoniam ea modo ipſam tolleret eccleſiam, cujus finis eſt ut Deum ſuo more liberè colat. Dices: An igitur ſi infantem immolare; ſi, quod Chriſtianis olim falſo affictum, in promiſcua ſtupra ruere velint, an et haec et hujuſmodi, quia in coetu eccleſiaſtico fiunt, à magiſtratu ſint toleranda? Reſp. Haec domi et in civili vitâ non licita, itaque nec in coetu aut cultu religioſo. Si vero vitulum immolare vellent, id lege prohibendum, eſſe nego; Meliboeus, cujum pecus eſt, domi vitulum ſuum mactare poteſt, partemque quam velit igne cremare: nulli facta eſt injuria, alienae poſſeſſioni nihil detrahitur; in cultu igitur divino vitulum

jugulare itidem licet: an Deo placeat, ipſorum eſt videre: magiſtratûs ſolum, proſpicere nequid detrimenti reſpublica capiat, ne alterius vel vitae vel bonis fiat damnum; adeoque quod convivio poterat, poteſt et ſacrificio impendi. Quod ſi is ſit rerum ſtatus, ut è repub. foret, parcere omni boum ſanguini in ſubſidium armentorum lue aliquâ abſumptorum, quis non videt, licere magiſtratui, quamcunque vitulorum in quoſvis uſus caedem omnibus ſubditis interdicere. Sed eo in caſu non de re religionis, ſed politicâ ſit lex, nec prohibetur vituli immolatio, ſed caedes. Jam vides eccleſiam inter et rempub. quae ſit differentia. Id quod in repub. licitum eſt, in eccleſia non poteſt à magiſtratu prohiberi; quodque aliis ſubditis permiſſum in quotidiano uſu, id ne fiat in coetu eccleſiaſtico, et ab hujus vel illius ſectae myſtis ad ſacros uſus, nullo modo lege caveri poteſt aut debet. Si domi panem vel vinum diſcumbens vel flexis genibus ſumere quis licite poteſt; lex civilis vetare non debet, quo minus idem in ſacris faciat, etiamſi illic vini et panis longe diverſus ſit uſus, et in eccleſia ad cultum divinum et myſticos ſenſus transferatur. Quae per ſe civitati noxia in vitâ communi, legibus in commune bonum latis prohibentur, ea in eccleſia ſacro uſu licita eſſe non poſſunt, nec impunitatem mereri. Sed maxime cavere debent magiſtratus, ne civilis utilitatis praetextu ad opprimendam alicujus eccleſiae libertatem abutantur; è contra vero quae in vitâ communi et extra cultum Dei licita ſunt, ea in cultu divino lociſve ſacris quo minus fiant lege civili prohiberi non poſſunt.

Dices: Quid ſi eccleſia aliqua ſit idololatrica, anne illa etiam à magiſtratu toleranda? Reſp. Ecquod jus dari poteſt magiſtratui, ad ſupprimendam eccleſiam idololatricam, quod etiam ſuo tempore et loco non peſſundabit orthodoxam? Nam memineris oportet, quod eadem eſt ubique civilis poteſtas, et ſua cuique principi orthodoxa religio. Ideoque ſi in rebus religionis magiſtratui civili conceſſa ſit poteſtas quae Genevae vi et ſanguine extirpare debet religionem, quae pro falſâ vel idololatricâ habetur; in vicinia eodem jure orthodoxam opprimet, et in Indiis Chriſtianam. Poteſtas civilis vel omnia poteſt in religione ad opinionem principis mutare, vel nihil. Si aliquid liceat in rebus ſacris lege, vi, pœnis introducere, fruſtra quaeritur modus: omnia licebit ad normam veritatis, quam ſibi magiſtratus finxerit, iiſdem armis exigere. Nemo hominum religionis cauſâ bonis ſuis terreſtribus evertendus, nec Americani principi Chriſtiano ſubjecti ideo vita aut bonis exuendi, quia Chriſtianam religionem non amplectuntur. Si patriis ritibus ſe Deo placere et ſalvos fieri credant, ſibi et Deo relinquendi. Rem ab origine retexam. Venit in Ethnicorum ditionem Chriſtianorum parva et debilis turba, omnium rerum egena: poſtulant extranei ab indigenis, homines ab hominibus, uti par eſt, ſubſidia vitae: dantur neceſſaria, conceduntur ſedes, coaleſcit in unum populum utraque gens. Chriſtiana religio radices agit, diſſeminatur, ſed nondum fortior; colitur adhuc pax, amicitia, fides; et aequa ſervantur jura: tandem magiſtratu in eorum partes tranſeunte fortiores facti ſunt Chriſtiani: tum demum pacta proculcanda, violanda jura, ut amoveatur idololatria, et ni ritus ſuos antiquos relinquere, et in alienos novoſque tranſire velint, vitâ, bonis terriſque avitis exuendi innocui et juris obſervantiſſimi ethnici, utpote contra bonos mores et legem civilem non peccantes; et tum demum, quid zelus pro eccleſiâ, ſcilicet cum amore dominandi conjunctus, ſuadet apertè conſtat: et quam commodè rapinae et ambitioni praetexitur religio et ſalus animarum palam demonſtratu.

Si legibus, poenis, ferro et igne alicubi extirpandam credis eſſe idololatriam, "mutato nomine de te fabula narratur." Quandoquidem non meliore jure res ſuas in America amittunt ethnici, quam in regno aliquo Europaeo ab eccleſiâ aulicâ quovis modo diſcrepantes Chriſtiani; nec magis hic quam illic propter religionem civilia vel violanda vel mutanda jura.

Dices: Idololatria peccatum eſt, ideoque non toleranda. Reſp. Si dicas, idololatria peccatum eſt, ideoque ſtudiosè vitanda, recte admodum infers: ſi vero peccatum eſt, ideoque à magiſtratu punienda, non item: non enim magiſtratûs eſt, in omnia, quae apud Deum credit peccata eſſe, vel legibus animadvertere, vel gladium ſuum ſtringere. Avaritia, non ſubvenire aliorum indigentiae, otium, et alia hujuſmodi multa, omnium conſenſu peccata ſunt; quis autem unquam à magiſtratu caſtiganda cenſuit? quia alienis poſſeſſionibus nullum fit detrimentum, quia pacem publicam haec non perturbant, iis ipſis in locis ubi pro peccatis agnoſcuntur legum cenſurâ non coërcentur: de mendacibus, imo perjuris, ubique ſilent leges, niſi certis quibuſdam in caſibus, in quibus non reſpicitur Numinis provocatio vel criminis turpitudo, ſed intentata vel reipublicae vel vicino injuria. Et quid ſi principi ethnico vel Mahumedano videatur religio Chriſtiana falſa et Deo diſplicere, nonne eodem jure et eodem modo extirpandi etiam et Chriſtiani?

Dices: Lege Moſaicâ idololatras exterminandos. Reſp. Recte quidem Moſaicâ, quae nullo modo Chriſtianos obligat. Nec tu quidem totum illud, quod lege poſitum eſt Judaeis, in exemplum trahes; nec uſui tibi erit proferre tritam illam, ſed hâc in re futilem, legis Moralis, Judicialis et Ritualis diſtinctionem. Lex enim quaecunque poſitiva nullos obligat, niſi eos quibus ponitur. "Audi Iſraël," ſatis coërcet ad eam gentem Moſaicae legis obligationem. Hoc unicum ſufficeret contra illos, qui idololatris capitale ſupplicium ex lege Moſaicâ ſtatuere volunt. Libet tamen hoc argumentum paulo fuſius expendere.

Idololatrarum reſpectu reipublicae Judaicae duplex erat ratio: Primo eorum, qui ſacris Moſaicis initiati et iſtius reipublicae cives facti à cultu Dei Iſraëlis deſciverint. Hi tanquam proditores et rebelles laeſae majeſtatis rei agebantur. Reſpub. enim Judaeorum ab aliis longe diverſa, quippe quae in Theocratiâ fundabatur: nec, uti poſt Chriſtum natum, ulla fuit aut eſſe potuit inter eccleſiam et rempublicam diſtinctio; leges de unius inviſibiliſque Numinis cultu in eâ gente fuere civilis et politici regiminis pars, in quo ipſe Deus legiſlator. Si rempublicam eo jure conſtitutam uſpiam oſtendere potes, in eâ fatebor leges eccleſiaſticas in civiles tranſire, omneſque ſubditos etiam à cultu extraneo et ſacris alienis magiſtratûs gladio cohiberi et poſſe et debere. Sed ſub Evangelio nulla prorſus eſt reſpublica Chriſtiana. Multa fateor ſunt regna et civitates quae in fidem tranſierunt Chriſtianam, retentâ et conſervatâ veteris reipublicae et regiminis formâ, de qua Chriſtus nihil ſuâ lege ſtatuit. Quâ fide, quibus moribus vita aeterna ſingulis obtinenda ſit, docuit: veruntamen nullam rempublicam inſtituit, novam civitatis formam et ſuo populo peculiarem nullam introduxit, nullos magiſtratus gladio armavit, quo homines ad fidem vel cultum eum, quem ſuis propoſuit, cogerentur, vel ab alienae religionis inſtitutis arcerentur.

SECUNDO extranei et à republica Iſraëlis alieni non vi cogebantur ad ritus Moſaicos tranſire; verum eo ipſo paragrapho quo mors Iſraëlitis idololatris intentatur, Exod. XXII. 20, 21. nequis peregrinum vexat vel opprimat lege cautum eſt. Exſcindendae penitus fateor erant ſeptem gentes quae terram Iſraëlitis promiſſam poſſidebant, quod factum non quod idololatrae fuerint, hoc enim ſi eſſet, cur Moabitis et aliis nationibus etiam idololatris parcendum? ſed cum Deus populi Hebraei peculiari modo rex erat, venerationem alterius Numinis, quod erat propriè crimen laeſae majeſtatis, ſuo illo in regno, terrâ nempe Cananaeâ, pati non poterat: hujuſmodi aperta defectio cum Jehovae imperio iſtis in terris plane politico, nullo modo potuit conſiſtere. Expellenda erat igitur à limitibus regni omnis idololatria, quâ rex alius, alius ſcilicet Deus contra jus imperii agnoſcebatur. Expellendi etiam incolae, ut vacua et integra Iſraëlitis daretur poſſeſſio; quâ plane ratione populi Emmim et Horim exterminati ſunt ab Eſavi et Lothi poſteris, eorum territoria eodem plane jure à Deo conceſſa invadentibus: quod facile patebit caput ſecundum Deuteronomii legenti. Expulſa igitur licet è finibus terrae Cananaeae omnis idololatria, non tamen in omnes idololatras animadverſum. Rahabe toti familiae, Gibeonitarum univerſo populo pepercit Joſuah ex pacto. Captivi idololatrae paſſim inter Hebraeos. Regiones etiam ultra limites terrae promiſſae à Davide et Salomone ad Euphraten uſque ſubjugatae et in provincias redacte. Ex his tot mancipiis, tot populis poteſtati Hebraeae ſubjectis, nemo unquam, quod legimus, ob idololatriam, cujus certe omnes rei erant, caſtigatus: nemo vi et poenis ad religionem Moſaicam et veri Dei cultum coactus. Si quis proſelyta civitate donari cupierat, civitatis Iſraëliticae etiam leges, hoc eſt religionem ſimul amplexus eſt: ſed id ſponte ſuâ pronus, non imperantis vi coactus, tanquam privilegium cupidus ambivit, non invitus in obſequii teſtimonium accepit. Simul atque civis factus eſt legibus reipublicae obnoxius erat, quibus intra pomaeria et limites terrae Cananaeae prohibebatur idololatria. De exteris regionibus populiſque ultra eos terminos ſitis nihil ea lege ſtatutum.

HACTENUS de cultu externo: ſequitur ut de fide agamus.

ECCCLESIARUM dogmata alia practica, alia ſpeculativa: et quamvis utraque in veritatis cognitione conſiſtunt, haec tamen opinione et intellectu terminantur, illa aliquo modo ad voluntatem et mores ſpectant. Speculativa igitur dogmata, et, uti vocantur, articulos fidei, quod attinet, qui nihil aliud exigunt niſi ſolum ut credantur, illos lex civilis nullo modo in eccleſiam aliquam poteſt introducere: Quorſum enim attinet id lege ſancire, quod qui vellet maxime, non poteſt agere? Ut hoc vel illud verum eſſe credamus in noſtra voluntate ſitum non eſt. Sed de hoc ſatis jam dictum. Verum profiteatur ſe credere. Nimirum ut pro ſalute animae ſuae Deo et hominibus mentiatur. Bella ſane religio. Si magiſtratus ita ſervari homines velit, quae ſit via ſalutis videtur parum intelligere; ſi id non agit ut ſerventur, quare de articulis religionis tam ſolicitus, ut lege jubeat?

Deinde, opiniones quaſvis ſpeculativas quo minus in eccleſia quavis teneantur doceanturve prohibere non debet magiſtratus; quia hae ad civilia ſubditorum jura nequaquam attinent. Si quis pontificius credat id corpus Chriſti revera eſſe, quod alius panem vocaret, nullam injuriam facit vicino. Si Judaeus non credat novum teſtamentum eſſe verbum Dei, nulla mutat jura civilia: Si ethnicus de utroque dubitat teſtamento, non igitur puniendus tanquam improbus civis. Haec ſi quis credat, ſive non, ſarta tecta eſſe poſſunt magiſtratûs poteſtas et civium bona. Falſas has eſſe et abſurdas opiniones libenter concedo; caeterum de opinionum veritate non cavent leges, ſed de bonorum cujuſque et reipublicae tutelâ et incolumitate. Nec hoc plane dolendum eſt. Bene profecto cum veritate actum eſſet, ſi ſibi aliquando permitteretur. Parum opis illi attulit vel afferet unquam potentiorum dominatus, quibus nec cognita ſemper nec ſemper grata veritas: vi opus non habet, ut ad hominum mentes aditum inveniat; nec legum voce docetur. Mutuatitiis et extraneis auxiliis regnant errores. Veritas ſi ſua luce ſibi non arripiat intellectum, alieno robore non poteſt. Sed de his hactenus. Ad opiniones practicas jam pergendum.

Morum rectitudo, in qua conſiſtit non minima religionis et ſincerae pietatis pars, etiam ad vitam civilem ſpectat, et in ea verſatur animarum ſimul et reipublicae ſalus; ideoque utriuſque ſunt fori, tam externi quam interni, actiones morales; et utrique ſubjiciuntur imperio, tam moderatoris civilis quam domeſtici, ſcilicet magiſtratus et conſcientiae. Hic igitur metuendum eſt, ne alter alterius jus violet, et inter pacis et animae cuſtodem lis oriatur. Sed ſi ea, quae ſupra de utriuſque limitibus dicta ſunt, recte perpendantur, rem hanc totam facile expedient.

Quivis mortalium animam habet immortalem, aeternae beatitudinis aut miſeriae capacem, cujus ſalus cum ex eo pendeat, quod homo in hac vitâ egerit ea quae agenda, et ea crediderit quae credenda, ad Numinis conciliationem ſunt neceſſaria, et à Deo praeſcripta; inde 1. Sequitur, quod ad haec obſervanda ante omnia obligatur homo, et in his praecipue inveſtigandis peragendiſque omnem ſuam curam ſtudium et diligentiam ponere debet; quandoquidem nihil habet haec mortalis conditio quo cum illâ aeternâ ullo modo ſit aequiparanda. 2. Sequitur, quod cum homo aliorum hominum jus ſuo erroneo cultu nequaquam violet, cum alteri injuriam non faciat quod cum eo rectè de rebus divinis non ſentiat, nec illius perditio aliorum rebus proſperis fraudi ſit; ad ſingulos ſolum ſalutis ſuae curam pertinere. Hoc autem non ita dictum velim, ac ſi omnia charitatis monita, et ſtudium errores redarguentium, quae maxima ſunt Chriſtiani officia, excludere vellem. Hortationum et argumentorum quantum velit cuivis licet alterius ſaluti impendere; ſed vis omnis et coactio abeſſe debet, nihil illic faciendum pro imperio. Nemo alterius monitis vel authoritati hac in re ultra quam ipſi viſum fuerit obtemperare tenetur: ſuum cuique de ſuâ ſalute ſupremum et ultimum judicium eſt; quia ipſius ſolum res agitur, aliena inde nihil detrimenti capere poteſt.

Praeter animam immortalem vita inſuper homini eſt in hoc ſaeculo, labilis quidem et incertae durationis, ad quam ſuſtentandam terrenis commodis opus eſt, labore et induſtria conquirendis, aut jam conquiſitis. Quae enim ad bene beateque vivendum neceſſaria ſunt, non ſponte naſcuntur. Hinc homini de his rebus altera cura. Cum vero ea ſit hominum improbitas, ut plerique mallent alieno labore partis frui, quam ſuo quaerere; ideo homini parta, ut opes et facultates; vel ea quibus parantur, ut corporis libertatem et robur, tuendi gratia, ineunda eſt cum aliis ſocietas, ut mutuo auxilio et junctis viribus harum rerum ad vitam utilium ſua cuiq; privata et ſecura ſit poſſeſſio, relicta interim unicuique ſalutis ſuae aeternae cura; cum illius acquiſitio nec alterius juvari poterit induſtriâ, nec amiſſio alterius cedere in damnum, nec ſpes ulla vi abripi. Cum vero homines in civitatem coëuntes, pactâ ad rerum hujus vitae defenſionem mutuâ ope, poſſint nihilominus rebus ſuis everti, vel civium rapinâ et fraude; vel exterorum hoſtili impetu; huic malo, armis, opibus, et multitudine civium; illi, legibus quaeſitum eſt remedium; quarum omnium rerum cura et poteſtas à ſocietate magiſtratibus demandata eſt. Hanc originem habuit; ad hos uſus conſtituebatur; et his cancellis circumſcribitur legiſlativa quae ſuprema eſt reipub. cujuſvis poteſtas: ut ſcilicet proſpiciat ſingulorum privatis poſſeſſionibus, adeoque univerſo populo ejuſque publicis commodis, ut pace opibuſque floreat ac augeatur: et contra aliorum invaſionem quantum fieri poſſit ſuo robore tutus ſit.

HIS poſitis, intellectu facile eſt quibus regitur finibus magiſtratûs in legibus ferendis praerogativa, bono ſcilicet publico terreſtri ſive mundano, quod idem unicumi neundae ſocietatis argumentum, unicuſque conſtitutae reipub. finis, quaeque ex altera parte privatis reſtat in rebus ad futuram vitam ſpectantibus libertas; nempe ut quod credit placere Deo, ex cujus beneplacito pendet hominum ſalus, id quiſque agat. Primum enim debetur Deo obſequium, deinde legibus. Sed dices: Quid ſi edicto juſſerit magiſtratus quod privatae conſcientiae videatur illicitum? Reſp. Si bona fide adminiſtretur reſpub. et ad bonum commune civium revera dirigantur magiſtratus conſilia, hoc raro eventurum: quod ſi forte eveniat, dico abſtinendum privato ab actione quae ipſi dictante conſcientia eſt illicita; ſed poena quae ferenti non eſt illicita ſubeunda. Privatum enim cujuſque judicium legis in bonum publicum, et de rebus politicis latae, non tollit obligationem, nec meretur tolerantiam. Quod ſi lex ſit de rebus extra magiſtratus provinciam poſitis, ſcilicet ut populus, ejuſve pars aliqua, ad alienam religionem amplectendam, et ad alios ritus tranſire cogatur; ea lege non tenentur aliter ſentientes: quandoquidem ad rerum hujus vitae ſolummodo conſervandam privato cuique poſſeſſionem, nec alium in finem, inita eſt ſocietas politica; animae ſuae et rerum coeleſtium cura, quae ad civitatem non pertinet nec ei ſubjici potuit, privato cuique reſervata atque retenta. Vitae inde et rerum ad hanc vitam ſpectantium tutela civitatis eſt negotium, et earum poſſeſſoribus ſuis conſervatio officium magiſtratûs. Non poſſunt igitur res hae mundanae ad magiſtratûs libitum his auferri illis, tradi: nec earum, ne quidem lege, mutari inter concives privata poſſeſſio propter cauſam, quae ad concives nullo modo pertinet, nempe religionem, quae ſive vera ſive falſa, nullam facit reliquis civibus in rebut mundanis, quae ſolae reipublicae ſubjiciuntur, injuriam.

Sed Dices. Quid ſi magiſtratus credat hoc in bonum publicum fieri? Reſp. Quemadmodum privatum cujuſque judicium, ſi falſum ſit, illum à legum obligatione nequaquam eximit, ſic privatum, ut ita dicam, magiſtratûs judicium novum illi in ſubditos legum ferendarum jus non acquirit, quod ipſa reipublicae conſtitutione illi non conceſſum fuit, nec concedi quidem potuit: Multo minus, ſi id agat magiſtratus, ut ſuos aſſeclas, ſuae ſectae addictos, aliorum ſpoliis augeat et ornet. Quaeris: Quid ſi magiſtratus id quod jubet in ſua poteſtate eſſe ſitum et ad rempub. utile credat, ſubditi vero contrarium credant. Quis erit inter eos judex? Reſp. Solus Deus: quia inter legiſlatorem et populum nullus in terris eſt judex. Deus inquam hoc in caſu ſolus eſt arbiter, qui in ultimo judicio pro cujuſque meritis, prout bono publico pacique et pietati ſincere et ſecundum jus faſque conſuluit, rependet. Dices: quid interim fiet? Reſp. Prima animae cura habenda, et paci quam maxime ſtudendum; quanquam pauci ſint qui ubi ſolitudinem factam vident pacem credent. Eorum quae inter homines diſceptantur duplex eſt ratio, una jure, alia vi agentium; quorum ea eſt natura, ut ubi alterum deſinit, alterum incipiat. Quouſque jura magiſtratus apud ſingulas gentes extendantur, non meum eſt inquirere: hoc ſolum ſcio quid fieri ſolet ubi ambigitur abſente judice. Dices: Igitur magiſtratus quod è re ſua fore crediderit viribus potior efficiet. Reſp. Rem dicis; caeterum hic de recte faciendorum norma, non de dubiorum ſucceſſu quaeritur.

Sed ut ad magis particularia deſcendamus: Dico primo; nulla dogmata, humanae ſocietati vel bonis moribus ad ſocietatem civilem conſervandam neceſſariis adverſa et contraria, à magiſtratu ſunt toleranda. Sed horum rara ſunt in quavis eccleſiâ exempla: quae enim ſocietatis fundamenta manifeſtò ſubruunt, adeoque univerſi humani generis judicio damnata ſunt, nulla ſecta eo veſaniae progredi ſolet, ut ea pro religionis dogmatibus docenda judicet, quibus ſuae ipſorum res, quies, fama in tuto eſſe non poſſunt.

2. Tectius ſane, ſed et periculoſius reipub. malum eſt eorum, qui ſibi ſuaeque ſectae hominibus peculiare aliquod praerogativum contra jus civile arrogant, verborum involucris ad fucum faciendum aptis occultum. Nuſquam fere invenies, qui crudè et apertè docent, nullam fidem eſſe ſervandam; principem à quavis ſectâ è ſolio ſuo deturbari poſſe; dominium omnium rerum ad ſe ſolos pertinere. Haec enim ita unde et aperte propoſita excitarent ſtatim magiſtratus animos, et reipub. oculos curamque ad malum hoc in ſinu ſuo latens ne ultra ſerperet, illico converterent. Inveniuntur tamen qui aliis verbis idem dicunt. Quid enim aliud ſibi volunt, qui docent, nullam fidem ſervandam eſſe cum haereticis? Illud ſcilicet volunt, ſibi conceſſum eſſe fidei fallendae privilegium, quandoquidem omnes ab ipſorum communione alieni haeretici pronuntiantur, vel datâ occaſione poſſunt pronuntiari. Reges excommunicatos regno excidere, quo tendit, niſi ut reges regno ſuo exuendi poteſtatem ſibi arrogarent, cum excommunicationis jus ſuae ſoli hierarchiae vendicent? Dominium fundari in gratiâ, tribuet tandem omnium rerum poſſeſſionem hujus ſententiae propugnatoribus, qui uſque adeo ſibi non deërunt, ut credere vel profiteri nolint ſe verè pios eſſe et fideles. Hi igitur et hujuſmodi, qui fidelibus, religioſis, orthodoxis, id eſt ſibi, aliquod prae reliquis

mortalibus privilegium vel poteſtatem in rebus civilibus tribuunt; quive poteſtatem aliquam in homines à communione ſuâ eccleſiaſticâ alienos, vel quocunque modo ſeparatos, praetextu religionis ſibi vendicant, ut à magiſtratu tolerentur jus nullum habere poſſunt: uti nec ii, qui alios etiam à ſe de religione diſſentientes tolerandos eſſe docere nolunt. Quid enim aliud docent hi et hujuſmodi omnes, quam ſe quacunq; datâ occaſione reipub. jura et civium libertatem ac bona invaſuros; idq; ſolum à magiſtratu petunt, ut ſibi detur venia et libertas, uſq; dum ad id audendum ipſis copiarum et virium ſatis ſit?

3. EA eccleſia ut à magiſtratu toleretur jus habere non poteſt, in quam quicunque initiantur ipſo facto in alterius principis clientelam et obedientiam tranſeunt. Hoc enim pacto extraneae juriſdictioni, ſuis in finibus urbibuſque, locum praeberet magiſtratus; et ex ſuis civibus contra ſuam rempub. milites conſcribi pateretur. Nec huic malo remedium aliquod affert futilis illa et fallax inter aulam et eccleſiam diſtinctio; cum utraque abſoluto ejuſdem hominis imperio aeque ſubjicitur, qui quicquid libet, poteſt, vel quatenus ſpirituale vel in ordine ad ſpiritualia, ſuadere, imo injungere ſuae eccleſiae hominibus ſub poenâ ignis aeterni. Fruſtra aliquis ſe religione ſolum Mahumedanum eſſe, caetera magiſtratûs Chriſtiani fidelem ſubditum dicet, ſi fateatur ſe coecam obedientiam Mufti Coſtantinopolitano debere, qui et ipſe Imperatori Ottomano obſequentiſſimus, ad illius voluntatem conficta promit religionis ſuae oracula. Quanquam aliquanto apertius reipub. Chriſtianae renunciaret ille inter Chriſtianos Turca, ſi eundem agnoſceret eſſe eccleſiae ſuae qui et imperii caput.

4. ULTIMO, qui Numen eſſe negant nullo modo tolerandi ſunt. Athei enim nec fides, nec pactum, nec jusjurandum aliquod ſtabile et ſanctum eſſe poteſt, quae ſunt ſocietatis humanae vincula; adeo ut Deo vel ipſâ opinione ſublato haec omnia corruant. Praeterea, nullum ſibi religionis nomine vendicare poteſt tolerantiae privilegium, qui omnem funditus tollit per atheiſmum religionem. Reliquas opiniones practicas quod attinet, etiamſi non omni errore vacuas, ſi iis nulla dominatio nec impunitas civilis quaeratur eccleſiae, in quibus docentur, cur tolerari non debeant nulla dari poteſt ratio.

RESTAT ut pauca de coetibus dicam, qui maximam doctrinae de tolerantiâ afferre creduntur difficultatem, cum ſeditionum fomenta et factionum conciliabula vulgo audiant; et forte aliquando fuerunt; ſed non ſuo peculiari aliquo genio, ſed oppreſſae vel male ſtabilitae libertatis infortunio. Ceſſarent ilico hae criminationes, ſi conceſſae quibus debetur tolerantiae ea eſſet lex, ut omnes eccleſiae tenerentur docere et pro libertatis ſuae fundamenta ponere, ſcilicet quod alii etiam à ſe in ſacris diſſentientes eſſent tolerandi, et quod nemo vel lege vel vi ullâ in rebus religionis deberet coërceri; quo uno ſtabilito, omnis querelarum tumultuumque conſcientiae nomine adimeretur praetextus. His autem ſublatis motuum vel irarum cauſis, nihil reſtat quod in his quam in aliis coetibus non eſſet magis pacificum, et à rebus politicis turbandis alienum. Verum percurramus accuſationum capita.

Dices: Coetus et hominum concurſus reipub. ſunt periculoſi, et paci minantur. Reſp. Hoc ſi ita ſit, quare in foro quotidie coïtio, quare in judiciis conciones, quare in collegiis conventus, et in urbibus frequentia? Dices: Hi ſunt coetus civiles, illi vero de quibus agitur eccleſiaſtici. Reſp. Quaſi vero illi coetus, qui à rebus civilibus tractandis inter ceteros longiſſime abſunt, rebus civilibus turbandis maxime eſſent accommodi. Dices: Coetus civiles ſunt hominum de rebus religionis diverſa ſentientium. Eccleſiaſtici vero hominum qui in eadem ſunt opinione. Reſp. Quaſi vero de rebus ſacris et ſalute animae eadem ſentire eſſet contra rempub. conſpirare: nec minus, imo vero acrius conſentiunt, quo minor publice coëundi libertas. Dices: In coetus civiles cuivis liber ingreſſus, in religioſorum conciliabulis commodior tectis et clandeſtinis conſiliis locus. Reſp. Nego omnes coetus civiles, ut ſunt collegia, &c. omnibus patere: ſi vero clandeſtinae ſunt quorundam ad rem ſacram coïtiones, quinam quaeſo hac in re criminandi, qui cupiunt, an qui prohibent publicos coetus? Dices: Sacrorum communionem maxime hominum inter ſe devincire animos, ideoque maxime metuendam. Reſp. Si ita ſe res habet, quare magiſtratus à ſuâ ſibi non metuit eccleſiâ, eoſque coetus tanquam ſibi minitantes non prohibet? Dices: Quia ipſe illorum pars eſt et caput. Reſp. Quaſi vero et ipſius reipub. non ſit pars, totiuſque populi caput. Dicamus igitur quod res eſt; metuit ab aliis eccleſiis, à ſuâ vero non metuit, quia his favet et benignus eſt, aliis ſeverus et immitis: His liberorum conditio eſt, quibus indulgetur uſque ad laſciviam; illis ſervorum, quibus ergaſtulum, carcer, capitis imminutio, bonorum ſectio, frequentiores ſunt vitae inculpatae mercedes: hi foventur, illi quavis de cauſâ vapulant. Mutentur vices, vel aequo cum reliquis civibus in rebus civilibus utantur jure, ſenties ilico non amplius à coetibus religioſis metuendum eſſe: ſi quid enim factioſe meditentur homines, id non congregatis ſuadet religio, ſed oppreſſis miſeria. Juſta et temperata imperia ubique quieta, ubique tuta ſunt; injuſtis et tyrannicis gravati ſemper reluctabuntur. Scio ſeditiones ſaepe fieri, eaſque plerumque religionis nomine: verum et religionis cauſâ ſubditi plerumque male mulctantur, et iniquâ ſorte vivunt; ſed crede mihi, non ſunt ii quarundam eccleſiarum vel religioſarum ſocietatum peculiares, ſed communes ubique hominum mores, ſub iniquo onere gementium, et jugum quod gravius cervicibus ſuis inſidet ſuccutientium. Quid credis, ſi neglectâ religione et factâ à corporis habitu diſcriminatione, iis qui nigro ſunt capillo aut caeſiis oculis iniqua eſſet inter reliquos cives conditio, ut non libera illis eſſet emptio et venditio, artis exercitium prohibitum, liberorum educatio et tutela parentibus adempta, fora aut clauſa, aut tribunalia iniqua, quid, nonne exiſtimas ab his, qui ſolum crinium vel oculorum colore conjunguntur adjectâ perſecutione, aeque metuendum eſſe magiſtratui, quam ab aliis inter quos ſocietatem conciliaverit religio? Alios in ſocietatem redigit ad negotia ſumptûs lucriq; communitas, alios ad hilaritatem otium; hos conjungit urbs eadem, tectorumque vicinitas ad convictum, illos religio ad cultum divinum: ſed una eſt quae populum ad ſeditionem congregat, oppreſſio. Dices. Quid igitur

tur vis, ad ſacra celebranda coetus fieri invito magiſtratu? Reſp. Quid invito? res enim eſt licita et neceſſaria. Invito dicis magiſtratu: hoc eſt, quod queror, hoc mali fons, et fundi noſtri calamitas. Cur magis diſplicet in templo quam in theatro aut circo, hominum concurſus? Non vitioſior hic nec turbulentior multitudo. Nempe huc tandem tota res redit, quod male habiti, ideo minus ferendi. Tolle juris iniquam diſtinctionem, mutatis legibus tolle ſupplicii poenam, et omnia tuta, omnia ſecura erunt; tantoque magis à magiſtratûs religione alieni reipub. paci ſtudendum exiſtimabunt, quantum in eâ melior eorum ſit conditio quam alibi plerumque inveniatur: omneſque particulares et inter ſe diſſidentes eccleſiae, tanquam publicae quietis cuſtodes, acrius in aliarum mores invicem invigilabunt, nequid novarum rerum moliantur, nequid in regiminis formâ mutetur, cum meliora ſperare non poſſint, quam quae jam poſſident, ſcilicet ſub juſto et moderato imperio aequam cum reliquis civibus ſortem. Quod ſi maximum habetur regiminis civilis columen ea eccleſia, quae cum principe de religione conſentit, idque eam ſolam ob cauſam, uti jam probavi, quod magiſtratum habet propitium legeſque faventes; quanto magis aucto ſatellitio ſecurior erit reſpub. cum omnes boni cives ex quacunq; demum eccleſiâ, eâdem principis benignitate, eâdemque legum aequitate fruantur, nullâ habitâ ob religionem diſtinctione; ſoliſque facinoroſis et contra pacem civilem peccantibus metuenda ſit legum ſeveritas?

Ut finem aliquando faciamus, conceſſa aliis civibus jura petimus. Licetne more Romano Deum colere? Liceat et Genevenſi. Permiſſumne eſt Latinè loqui in foro? permittatur etiam quibus libet in templo. Fas eſt domi ſuae, genua flectere, ſtare, ſedere, geſticulationibus his vel illis uti, veſtibus albis vel nigris, brevibus vel talaribus indui? in eccleſia nefas ne ſit panem comedere, vinum bibere, aqua ſe abluere; reliquaque quae in communi vita lege libera ſunt, in ſacro cultu libera cuique eccleſiae permaneant. Nullius ob haec labefactetur vita, aut corpus; nullius domus aut res familiaris evertatur. Preſbyterorum apud te eccleſia permittitur diſciplinae; cur non itidem quibus placet etiam et epiſcoporum? Eccleſiaſtica poteſtas, ſive unius ſive plurimum manibus adminiſtretur, ubique eadem eſt, nec in res civiles jus, nec vim cogendi habet ullam: nec divitiae aut reditus annui ad regimen eccleſiaſticum pertinent. Licitos eſſe coetus eccleſiaſticos et conciones uſu publico comprobatur: hos unius eccleſiae vel ſectae civibus conceditis, quare non omnibus? Si quid in coetu religioſo contra pacem publicam agitatum, reprimendum eſt eodem nec diverſo modo quam ſi in nundinis acciderit. Siquid in concione eccleſiaſtica ſeditioſè vel dictum vel factum, eodem modo puniendum ac ſi in foro delictum eſſet. Haec non debent eſſe nec factioſorum nec flagitioſorum perfugia: nec è contra concurſus hominum in templo quam in curia magis illicitus, nec in his quam in illis civibus magis culpandus; quiſque ſuo ſolum crimine, non aliorum vitio, in odium vel ſuſpicionem vocandus. Seditioſi, homicidae, ſicarii, latrones, rapaces, adulteri, injuſti, conviciatores, etc. ex quacunque demum eccleſia, ſive aulica ſive non, caſtigentur reprimanturque. Quorum vero doctrina pacifica, quorum mores caſti et inculpati, eodem ſint cum reliquis civibus loco. Atque ſi aliis coetus, ſolennes conventus, feſtorum dierum celebrationes, conciones, et ſacra publica permittantur: haec omnia Remonſtranti, Antiremonſtranti, Lutherano, Anabaptiſtae, Sociniano pari jure permittenda. Imo ſi, quod verum eſt, et quod hominem erga homines decet, apertè loqui liceat, ne Ethnicus quidem, vel Mahumedanus, vel Judaeus religionis causâ à repub. arcendus; nil ſimile jubet Evangelium; id non deſiderat eccleſia, quae 1 Cor. v. 12. 13. extraneos non judicat; non poſcit reſpub. quae homines modo probos, pacificos, induſtrios, recipit et amplectitur. An Ethnicum apud te mercaturam exercere permittes, Deum vero precari vel colere prohibebis? Judaeis habitatio et tecta privata conceduntur, ſynagoga cur negatur? an eorum doctrina falſior, cultus turpior, vel concordia periculoſior, in coetu publico quam in privatis aedibus? Si haec Judaeis et Ethnicis concedenda, pejorne erit in republica Chriſtiana Chriſtianorum conditio? Dices: Imo vero, quia ad factiones, tumultus, et bella civilia magis proclives. Reſp. Anne religionis Chriſtianae hoc vitium? Si ita, peſſima certe omnium eſt religio Chriſtiana, et digna quam nec tu profitearis, nec reſpub. omnino toleret. Nam ſi hic ſit genius, haec natura ipſius religionis Chriſtianae, ut turbulenta ſit et paci civili inimica; ipſa illa quam fovet magiſtratus eccleſia aliquando non erit innocens. Sed abſit ut hoc dicatur de religione, avaritiae, ambitioni, diſſidiis, jurgiis, terreniſque cupiditatibus contrariâ, et omnium quae unquam fuerunt maxime modeſtâ et pacificâ. Alia igitur malorum quae religioni imputantur quaerenda cauſa; quae ſi recte rem reputemus, in eâ de quâ nunc agitur quaeſtione tota conſiſtere apparebit. Non opinionum diverſitas, quae vitari non poteſt, ſed negata diverſa opinantibus tolerantia, quae concedi poterat, pleraque quae in orbe Chriſtiano nata ſunt de religione jurgia et bella produxit: dum primores eccleſiae avaritiâ et dominandi libidine acti, magiſtratum ſaepe ambitione impotentem, et populum ſuperſtitione ſemper vanum, adverſus heterodoxos omnimodo excitarent et acuerent, et contra leges Evangelii, contra charitatis monita, ſchiſmaticos haereticoſque ſpoliandos exterminandoſque praedicarent; et duas res diverſiſſimas miſcerent, eccleſiam et rempub. Quod ſi, uti fit, homines rebus ſuis honeſto labore partis ſe exui haud patienter ferunt, et contra jus humanum divinumque alienae violentiae et rapinae praedam fieri; praeſertim cum alias omnino inculpati ſint, et ea res agitur quae ad jus civile minime pertinet, ſed ad ſuam cujuſque conſcientiam et animae ſalutem, cujus ratio ſoli Deo reddenda eſt: quid aliud pene expectari poteſt, quam ut homines malorum, quibus opprimuntur, pertaeſi, ſibi tandem perſuadeant, licere vim vi repellere, et jura ſibi à Deo et natura conceſſa, nec propter religionem ſed flagitia ſolum amittenda, arma quibus poterunt defendere? Haec nimirum ita hactenus fuiſſe plus ſatis teſtatur hiſtoria, et ita in poſterum fore demonſtrat ratio, quam diu illa de perſecutione propter religionem valebit ſive apud magiſtratum ſive apud populum opinio, et ita ad arma clament, et bella totis lateribus ebuccinent illi, qui debent eſſe pacis et concordiae praecones. Quod magiſtratus hujuſmodi incendarios et publicae quietis perturbatores paſſi fuerint mirandum eſſet, niſi pateret et eos in praedae ſocietatem vocatos,

cum

aliena libidine et faſtu ad ſuam augendam potentiam ſaepe uſos fuiſſe. Quis enim non videt, hos bonos viros non tam Evangelii quam imperii fuiſſe miniſtros, et principum ambitioni potentiorumque dominationi adulatos; idque omni ſtudio et opera allaboraſſe, ut in republica promoverent, quam alias fruſtra affectarent in eccleſia, tyrannidem. Haec fuit plerumque eccleſiae et reipub. concordia, inter quas, ſi utraque ſuis ſe contineret finibus, diſcordia quidem eſſe non potuit, dum haec mundanis civitatis bonis, illa animarum ſaluti unicè ſtuderet. Sed pudet haec opprobria. Faxit Deus O. M. ut aliquando Evangelium pacis praedicetur, magiſtratuſque civilis de ſua ad legem Dei conformanda multum, de aliena conſcientia legibus humanis alliganda minus ſolliciti, tanquam patres patriae ad communem liberorum ſuorum, quotquot non protervi non aliis iniqui nec maligni, faelicitatem civilem promovendam omnia ſua ſtudia et conſilia dirigant. Virique eccleſiaſtici, qui ſe Apoſtolorum ſucceſſores praedicant, Apoſtolorum veſtigiis inſiſtentes, omiſſis rebus politicis, ſaluti animarum cum pace et modeſtiâ unicè incumbant!

Vale.

Forſan abs re non fuerit pauca de Haereſi et Schiſmate hic ſubjungere. Mahumetanus Chriſtiano haereticus vel ſchiſmaticus non eſt, nec eſſe poteſt: et ſi aliquis à fide Chriſtianâ ad Iſlamiſmum deficiat, non eo haereticus vel ſchiſmaticus factus eſt, ſed Apoſtata et infidelis. De his nemo eſt qui dubitat. Unde conſtat homines diverſae religionis hominibus haereticos vel ſchiſmaticos eſſe non poſſe.

INQUIRENDUM eſt igitur quinam ſint ejuſdem religionis. Qua in re manifeſtum eſt eos eſſe ejuſdem religionis, qui unam eandemque habent fidei et cultus divini regulam: illi vero religionis ſunt diverſae, qui eandem non habent fidei et cultûs regulam. Quia cum omnia quae ad iſtam religionem pertinent in ea regula contineantur, neceſſe eſt eos qui in eadem regula conveniunt, in eadem etiam religione convenire, et viceverſa. Sic Turci et Chriſtiani diverſae ſunt religionis; quia hi S. Scripturam, illi Alcoranum pro regula religionis ſuae agnoſcunt. Eadem plane ratione ſub nomine Chriſtiano diverſae poſſunt eſſe religiones; Pontificii et Lutherani, quamvis utrique plane Chriſtiani, utpote in nomine Chriſti fidem profeſſi, non ſunt ejuſdem religionis; quia hi ſolum S. Scripturam agnoſcunt pro religionis ſuae regulâ, et fundamento; illi vero S. Scripturae adjiciunt traditiones et Pontificis decreta; et inde ſibi conficiunt religionis ſuae regulam: Chriſtiani S. Johannis, uti vocantur, et Chriſtiani Genevenſes diverſae ſunt religionis, quanquam utriq; Chriſtiani nuncupentur, quod hi S. Scripturam; illi traditiones neſcio quas pro regula religionis ſuae habent. His poſitis ſequitur.

1. QUOD haereſis ſit ſeparatio factâ in communione eccleſiaſtica inter homines ejuſdem religionis ob dogmata quae in ipſa regula non continentur.

2. QUOD apud illos, qui ſolam S. Scripturam pro regulâ fidei agnoſcunt, haereſis ſit ſeparatio facta in communione Chriſtianâ ob dogmata diſertis S. Scripturae verbis non contenta.

HAEC ſeparatio duplici modo fieri poteſt.

1. QUANDO major, vel patrocinante magiſtratu fortior pars eccleſiae ſeparat ſe ab aliis, eos è communione ejiciendo excludendoque, quia certa dogmata verbis Scripturae non concepta ſe credere profiteri nolunt. Non enim ſeparatorum paucitas, nec magiſtratus authoritas, haereſeos reum poteſt aliquem reddere: ſed ille ſolus haereticus eſt, qui ob hujuſmodi dogmata eccleſiam in partes ſcindit, diſtinctionum nomina et notas introducit, et ſponte ſuâ ſeparationem efficit.

2. QUANDO aliquis ſe ſeparat ab eccleſiae communione, quia in ea publica non ſit profeſſio quorundam dogmatum quae diſertis verbis non exhibet S. Scriptura.

HORUM utrique Haeretici ſunt: quia in fundamentalibus errant, et prudentes ſcienteſque obſtinate errant. Cum enim pro unico fundamento fidei poſuerint S. Scripturam, aliud nihilominus ponunt fundamentum, propoſitiones ſcilicet quae in S. Scripturâ nuſquam reperiuntur; et quia alii adſcititias haſce ipſorum opiniones S. Scripturae aſſutas tanquam neceſſarias et fundamentales agnoſcere et iis inniti nolunt, eos à ſe abigendo, vel ſe ab iis ſubtrahendo, ſeceſſionem faciunt. Nec attinet dicere, ſuas confeſſiones et articulos fidei S. Scripturae et analogiae fidei eſſe conſonos: ſi enim S. Scripturae verbis concipiantur, nulla poteſt eſſe queſtio: quia omnium conſenſu fundamentalia ea ſunt, et ejuſmodi omnia, quia theopneuſta. Quod ſi dicas, articulos illos tuos, quorum profeſſionem exigis, eſſe S. Scripturae poriſmata; recte quidem facis, ſi ipſe ea credas et profitearis quae tibi videntur cùm regulâ fidei, ſcilicet S. Scripturâ, conſentire: peſſime vero, ſi ea velis aliis obtrudere, quibus non videntur indubia S. Scripturae dogmata: et haereticus es, ſi ob haec quae nec fundamentalia ſunt, nec eſſe poſſunt, ſeparationem introducas. Non enim credo aliquem eo inſaniae provectum eſſe, ut audeat ſua conſectaria, ſuaque S. Scripturae interpretamenta, pro theopneuſtis venditare, et articulos fidei ad modulum mentemque ſuam concinnatos authoritati S. Scripturae aequare. Scio aliquas eſſe propoſitiones tam evidenter S. Scripturae conſonas, ut nemo dubitare poſſit eas inde ſequi: de his igitur nullum fieri poteſt diſſidium. Quod autem tibi videtur legitimâ deductione è S. Scripturâ ſequi, id tanquam neceſſarium fidei articulum alteri obtrudere non debes, quia tu ipſe regulae fidei conſonum credis; niſi tu ipſe aequum judicas, ut tibi pari jure aliorum obtrudantur opiniones, et tu cogaris admittere et profiteri diverſa et inter ſe pugnantia, Lutheranorum, Calviniſtarum, Remonſtrantium, Anabaptiſtarum, aliarumque ſectarum dogmata, quae tanquam neceſſaria et genuina S. Scripturae conſectaria aſſeclis ſuis ingerere, et depredicare ſolent Symbolorum, Syſtematum et Confeſſionum artifices. Non poſſum non mirari inauſpicatam illorum arrogantiam, qui ea, quae ad ſalutem ſunt neceſſaria, putant ſe clarius et dilucidius poſſe tradere, quam Spiritus Sanctus, infinita illa et aeterna ſapientia, tradere poſſit.

HACTENUS de Haereſi, quae vox ſecundum communem uſum ſolis dogmatibus tribuitur: jam de Schiſmate videndum, quod cognatum haereſi vitium eſt: utraque enim vox mihi videtur ſignificare ſeparationem in communione eccleſiaſtica temere et de rebus non neceſſariis factam. Sed cum uſus, quem penes arbitrium et jus et norma loquendi, obtinuerit, ut haereſis erroribus in fide, ſchiſma in cultu vel diſciplina tribueretur, de iis ſub ea diſtinctione hic agendum eſt.

SCHISMA igitur ob rationes ſupra memoratas nihil aliud eſt, quam ſeparatio in eccleſiae communione facta ob aliquod in cultu divino vel diſciplinâ eccleſiaſtica non neceſſarium. Nihil in cultu divino vel diſciplinâ eccleſiaſtica ad communionem Chriſtiano eſſe poteſt neceſſarium, niſi quod diſertis verbis juſſerit legiſlator Chriſtus, vel inſtinctu Spiritu Sancti Apoſtoli.

VERBO dicam: Qui non negat aliquid quod diſertis verbis enunciant eloquia divina, nec ſeparationem facit ob aliquod quod in ſacro textu expreſſe non continetur, haereticus vel ſchiſmaticus eſſe non poteſt, quantùmvis male audiat apud quaſvis Chriſtiani nominis ſectas, et ab iis, vel aliquibus vel omnibus, tanquam vera religione Chriſtiana deſtitutus pronuncietur.

HAEC ornatius et fuſius deduci potuiſſent, ſed tibi adeo perſpicaci indicaſſe ſufficiat.

# A
# LETTER
# CONCERNING
# TOLERATION.

# TO THE READER.

THE enſuing Letter concerning Toleration, firſt printed in Latin this very year, in Holland, has already been tranſlated both into Dutch and French. So general and ſpeedy an approbation may therefore beſpeak its favourable reception in England. I think indeed there is no nation under heaven, in which ſo much has already been ſaid upon that ſubject, as ours. But yet certainly there is no people that ſtand in more need of having ſomething further both ſaid and done amongſt them, in this point, than we do.

OUR government has not only been partial in matters of religion; but thoſe alſo who have ſuffered under that partialty, and have therefore endeavoured by their writings to vindicate their own rights and liberties, have for the moſt part done it upon narrow principles, ſuited only to the intereſts of their own ſects.

THIS narrowneſs of ſpirit on all ſides has undoubtedly been the principal occaſion of our miſeries and confuſions. But whatever have been the occaſion, it is now high time to ſeek for a thorough cure. We have need of more generous remedies than what have yet been made uſe of in our diſtemper. It is neither Declarations of Indulgence, nor Acts of Comprehenſion, ſuch as have yet been practiſed or projected amongſt us, that can do the work. The firſt will but palliate, the ſecond increaſe our evil.

ABSOLUTE LIBERTY, JUST AND TRUE LIBERTY, EQUAL AND IMPARTIAL LIBERTY, IS THE THING THAT WE STAND IN NEED OF. Now though this has indeed been much talked of, I doubt it has not been much underſtood; I am ſure not at all practiſed, either by our governors towards the people in general, or by any diſſenting parties of the people towards one another.

I CANNOT therefore but hope that this diſcourſe, which treats of that ſubject, however briefly, yet more exactly than any we have yet ſeen, demonſtrating both the equitableneſs and practicableneſs of the thing, will be eſteemed highly ſeaſonable, by all men that have ſouls large enough to prefer the true intereſt of the public, before that of a party.

IT is for the uſe of ſuch as are already ſo ſpirited, or to inſpire that ſpirit into thoſe that are not, that I have tranſlated it into our language. But the thing itſelf is ſo ſhort, that it will not bear a longer preface. I leave it therefore to the conſideration of my countrymen, and heartily wiſh they may make the uſe of it that it appears to be deſigned for.

# A
# LETTER
# CONCERNING
# TOLERATION.

Honoured SIR,

SINCE you are pleaſed to enquire what are my thoughts about the mutual Toleration of Chriſtians in their different profeſſions of religion, I muſt needs anſwer you freely, that I eſteem that Toleration to be the chief characteriſtical mark of the true church. For whatſoever ſome people boaſt of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worſhip; others, of the reformation of their diſcipline; all, of the orthodoxy of their faith, for every one is orthodox to himſelf: theſe things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men ſtriving for power and empire over one another, than of the church of Chriſt. Let any one have ever ſo true a claim to all theſe things, yet if he be deſtitute of charity, meekneſs, and good-will in general towards all mankind, even to thoſe that are not Chriſtians, he is certainly yet ſhort of being a true Chriſtian himſelf. "The "kings of the Gentiles exerciſe lordſhip over them, ſaid our Saviour to his "diſciples, but ye ſhall not be ſo," Luke xxii. The buſineſs of true religion is quite another thing. It is not inſtituted in order to the erecting an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of eccleſiaſtical dominion, nor to the exerciſing of compulſive force; but to the regulating of mens lives according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whoſoever will liſt himſelf under the banner of Chriſt, muſt, in the firſt place and above all things, make war upon his own luſts and vices. It is in vain for any man to uſurp the name of Chriſtian, without holineſs of life, purity of manners, and benignity and meekneſs of ſpirit. "Let every one that nameth the name of Chriſt, depart from ini"quity. Thou, when thou art converted, ſtrengthen thy brethren," ſaid our Lord to Peter, Luke xxii. It would indeed be very hard for one that appears careleſs about his own ſalvation, to perſuade me that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impoſſible that thoſe ſhould ſincerely and heartily apply themſelves to make other people Chriſtians, who have not really embraced the Chriſtian religion in their own hearts. If the Goſpel and the Apoſtles may be credited, no man can be a Chriſtian without charity, and without that faith which works, not by force, but by love. Now I appeal to the conſciences of thoſe that perſecute, torment, deſtroy, and kill other men upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of friendſhip and kindneſs towards them, or no: and I ſhall then indeed, and not till then, believe they do ſo, when I ſhall ſee thoſe fiery zealots correcting, in the ſame manner, their friends and familiar acquaintance, for the manifeſt ſins they commit againſt the precepts of the Goſpel; when I ſhall ſee them proſecute with fire and ſword the members of their own communion that are tainted with enormous vices, and without amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I ſhall ſee them thus expreſs their love and deſire of the ſalvation of their ſouls, by the infliction of torments, and exerciſe of all manner of cruelties. For if it be out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to mens ſouls, that they deprive them of their eſtates, maim them with corporal puniſhments, ſtarve and torment them in noiſome priſons, and in the end even take away their lives; I ſay, if all this be done merely to make men Chriſtians, and procure their ſalvation, why then do they ſuffer "whore-"dom, fraud, malice, and ſuch like enormities," which, according to the Apoſtle, Rom. i. manifeſtly reliſh of heatheniſh corruption, to predominate ſo much and abound amongſt their flocks and people? Theſe, and ſuch like things, are certainly more contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the church, and to the ſalvation of ſouls, than any conſcientious diſſent from eccleſiaſtical deciſion, or ſeparation from publick worſhip, whilſt accompanied with innocency of life. Why then does this burning zeal for God, for the church, and for the ſalvation of ſouls; burning, I ſay, literally, with fire and faggot, paſs by thoſe moral vices and wickedneſſes, without any chaſtiſement, which are acknowledged by all men to be diametrically oppoſite to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity; and bend all its nerves either to the introducing of ceremonies, or to the eſtabliſhment of opinions, which for the moſt part are about nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of ordinary underſtandings? Which of the parties contending about theſe things is in the right, which of them is guilty of ſchiſm or hereſy, whether thoſe that domineer or thoſe that ſuffer, will then at laſt be manifeſt, when the cauſe of their ſeparation comes to be judged of. He certainly that follows Chriſt, embraces his doctrine, and bears his yoke, though he forſake both father and mother, ſeparate from the publick aſſemblies and ceremonies of his country, or whomſoever, or whatſoever elſe he relinquiſhes, will not then be judged an heretick.

Now, though the diviſions that are amongſt ſects ſhould be allowed to be ever ſo obſtructive of the ſalvation of ſouls; yet nevertheleſs "adultery, forni-"cation, uncleanneſs, laſciviouſneſs, idolatry, and ſuch like things, cannot "be denied to be works of the fleſh;" concerning which the Apoſtle has expreſly declared, that "they who do them ſhall not inherit the kingdom of "God," Gal. v. Whoſoever therefore is ſincerely ſolicitous about the kingdom of God, and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongſt men, ought to apply himſelf with no leſs care and induſtry to the rooting out of theſe immoralities, than to the extirpation of ſects. But if any one do otherwiſe, and whilſt he is cruel and implacable towards thoſe that differ from him in opinion, he be indulgent to ſuch iniquities and immoralities as are unbecoming the name of a Chriſtian, let ſuch a one talk ever ſo much of the church, he plainly demonſtrates by his actions, that it is another kingdom he aims at, and not the advancement of the kingdom of God.

That any man ſhould think fit to cauſe another man, whoſe ſalvation he heartily deſires, to expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted eſtate, would, I confeſs, ſeem very ſtrange to me, and, I think, to any other alſo. But no body, ſurely, will ever believe that ſuch a carriage can proceed from charity, love, or good-will. If any one maintain that men ought to be compelled by fire and ſword to profeſs certain doctrines, and conform to this or that exterior worſhip, without any regard had unto their morals; if any one endeavour to convert thoſe that are erroneous unto the faith, by forcing them to profeſs things that they do not believe, and allowing them to practiſe things that the Goſpel does not permit; it cannot be doubted indeed, that ſuch a one is deſirous to have a numerous aſſembly joined in the ſame profeſſion with himſelf; but that he principally intends by thoſe means to compoſe a truly Chriſtian church, is altogether incredible. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if thoſe who do not really contend for the advancement of the true religion, and of the church of Chriſt, make uſe of arms that do not belong to the Chriſtian warfare. If, like the captain of our ſalvation, they ſincerely deſired the good of ſouls, they would tread in the ſteps, and follow the perfect example of that prince of peace, who ſent out his ſoldiers to the ſubduing of nations, and gathering them into his church, not armed with the ſword, or other inſtruments of force, but prepared with the Go[illegible] of peace, and with the exemplary holineſs of their converſation. This was his method. Though if infidels were to be converted by force, if thoſe that are either blind or obſtinate were to be drawn off from their errors by armed ſoldiers, we know very well that it was much more eaſy for him to do it with armies of heavenly legions, than for any ſon of the church, how potent ſoever, with all his dragoons.

The toleration of thoſe that differ from others in matters of religion, is ſo agreeable to the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt, and to the genuine reaſon of mankind, that it ſeems monſtrous for men to be ſo blind, as not to perceive the neceſſity and advantage of it, in ſo clear a light. I will not here tax the pride and ambition of ſome, the paſſion and uncharitable zeal of others. Theſe are faults from which human affairs can perhaps ſcarce ever be perfectly freed; but yet ſuch as no body will bear the plain imputation of, without covering them with ſome ſpecious colour; and ſo pretend to commendation, whilſt they are carried away by their own irregular paſſions. But however, that ſome may not colour their ſpirit of perſecution and unchriſtian cruelty, with a pretence of care of the publick weal, and obſervation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may not ſeek impunity for their libertiniſm and licentiouſneſs; in a word, that none may impoſe either upon himſelf or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or of tenderneſs and ſincerity in the worſhip of God; I eſteem it above all things neceſſary to diſtinguiſh exactly the buſineſs of civil government from that of religion, and to ſettle the juſt bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controverſies that will be always ariſing between thoſe that have, or at leaſt pretend to have, on the one ſide, a concernment for the intereſt of mens ſouls, and on the other ſide, a care of the commonwealth.

The commonwealth ſeems to me to be a ſociety of men conſtituted only for the procuring, preſerving, and advancing their own civil intereſts.

Civil intereſts I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the poſſeſſion of outward things, ſuch as money, lands, houſes, furniture, and the like.

It is the duty of the civil magiſtrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to ſecure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his ſubjects in particular, the juſt poſſeſſion of theſe things belonging to this life. If any one preſume to violate the laws of publick juſtice and equity, eſtabliſhed for the preſervation of theſe things, his preſumption is to be checked by the fear of puniſhment, conſiſting in the deprivation or diminution of thoſe civil intereſts, or goods, which otherwiſe he might and ought to enjoy. But ſeeing no man does willingly ſuffer himſelf to be puniſhed by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much leſs of his liberty or life, therefore is the magiſtrate armed with the force and ſtrength of all his ſubjects, in order to the puniſhment of thoſe that violate any other man's rights.

Now that the whole juriſdiction of the magiſtrate reaches only to theſe civil concernments; and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting theſe things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the ſalvation of ſouls, theſe following conſiderations ſeem unto me abundantly to demonſtrate.

First, Becauſe the care of ſouls is not committed to the civil magiſtrate, any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I ſay, by God; becauſe it appears not that God has ever given any ſuch authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. Nor can any ſuch power be veſted in the magiſtrate by the conſent of the people; becauſe no man can ſo far abandon the care of his own ſalvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or ſubject, to preſcribe to him what faith or worſhip he ſhall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion conſiſts in the outward and full perſuaſion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever profeſſion we make, to whatever outward worſhip we conform, if we are not fully ſatisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well pleaſing unto God, ſuch profeſſion and ſuch practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obſtacles to our ſalvation. For in this manner, inſtead of expiating other ſins by the exerciſe of religion, I ſay, in offering thus unto God Almighty ſuch a worſhip as we eſteem to be diſpleaſing unto him, we add unto the number of our other ſins, thoſe alſo of hypocriſy, and contempt of his Divine Majeſty.

IN the ſecond place. The care of ſouls cannot belong to the civil magiſtrate, becauſe his power conſiſts only in outward force: but true and ſaving religion conſiſts in the inward perſuaſion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And ſuch is the nature of the underſtanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward force. Confiſcation of eſtate, impriſonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any ſuch efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.

IT may indeed be alledged, that the magiſtrate may make uſe of arguments, and thereby draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their ſalvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other men. In teaching, inſtructing, and redreſſing the erroneous by reaſon, he may certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magiſtracy does not oblige him to put off either humanity or chriſtianity. But it is one thing to perſuade, another to command; one thing to preſs with arguments, another with penalties. This the civil power alone has a right to do; to the other goodwill is authority enough. Every man has commiſſion to admoniſh, exhort, convince another of error, and by reaſoning to draw him into truth: but to give laws, receive obedience, and compel with the ſword, belongs to none but the magiſtrate. And upon this ground I affirm, that the magiſtrate's power extends not to the eſtabliſhing of any articles of faith, or forms of worſhip, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without penalties, and penalties in this caſe are abſolutely impertinent; becauſe they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the profeſſion of any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worſhip, as has been already ſaid, can be available to the ſalvation of ſouls, unleſs the truth of the one, and the acceptableneſs of the other unto God, be thoroughly believed by thoſe that ſo profeſs and practiſe. But penalties are no ways capable to produce ſuch belief. It is only light and evidence that can work a change in mens opinions; and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal ſufferings, or any other outward penalties.

IN the third place, The care of the ſalvation of mens ſouls cannot belong to the magiſtrate; becauſe, though the rigour of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and change mens minds, yet would not that help at all to the ſalvation of their ſouls. For, there being but one truth, one way to heaven; what hopes is there that more men would be led into it, if they had no other rule to follow but the religion of the court, and were put under a neceſſity to quit the light of their own reaſon, to oppoſe the dictates of their own conſciences, and blindly to reſign up themſelves to the will of their governors, and to the religion, which either ignorance, ambition, or ſuperſtition had chanced to eſtabliſh in the countries where they were born? In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the princes of the world are as much divided as in their ſecular intereſts, the narrow way would be much ſtraitened; one country alone would be in the right, and all the reſt of the world put under an obligation of following their princes in the ways that lead to deſtruction: and that which heightens the abſurdity, and very ill ſuits the notion of a deity, men would owe their eternal happineſs or miſery to the places of their nativity.

These conſiderations, to omit many others that might have been urged to the ſame purpoſe, ſeem unto me ſufficient to conclude, that all the power of civil government relates only to mens civil intereſts, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come.

Let us now conſider what a church is. A church then I take to be a voluntary ſociety of men, joining themſelves together of their own accord, in order to the publick worſhipping of God, in ſuch a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the ſalvation of their ſouls.

I say, it is a free and voluntary ſociety. No body is born a member of any church; otherwiſe the religion of parents would deſcend unto children, by the ſame right of inheritance as their temporal eſtates, and every one would hold his faith by the ſame tenure he does his lands; than which nothing can be imagined more abſurd. Thus therefore that matter ſtands. No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or ſect, but every one joins himſelf voluntarily to that ſociety in which he believes he has found that profeſſion and worſhip which is truly acceptable to God. The hopes of ſalvation, as it was the only cauſe of his entrance into that communion, ſo it can be the only reaſon of his ſtay there. For if afterwards he diſcover any thing either erroneous in the doctrine, or incongruous in the worſhip of that ſociety to which he has joined himſelf, why ſhould it not be as free for him to go out as it was to enter? No member of a religious ſociety can be tied with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life. A church then is a ſociety of members voluntarily uniting to this end.

It follows now that we conſider what is the power of this church, and unto what laws it is ſubject.

Forasmuch as no ſociety, how free ſoever, or upon whatſoever ſlight occaſion inſtituted, (whether of philoſophers for learning, of merchants for commerce, or of men of leiſure for mutual converſation and diſcourſe) no church or company, I ſay, can in the leaſt ſubſiſt and hold together, but will preſently diſſolve and break to pieces, unleſs it be regulated by ſome laws, and the members all conſent to obſerve ſome order. Place, and time of meeting muſt be agreed on; rules for admitting and excluding members muſt be eſtabliſhed; diſtinction of officers, and putting things into a regular courſe, and ſuch like, cannot be omitted. But ſince the joining together of ſeveral members into this church-ſociety, as has already been demonſtrated, is abſolutely free and ſpontaneous, it neceſſarily follows, that the right of making its laws can belong to none but the ſociety itſelf, or at leaſt, which is the ſame thing, to thoſe whom the ſociety by common conſent has authoriſed thereunto.

Some perhaps may object, that no ſuch ſociety can be ſaid to be a true church, unleſs it have in it a biſhop, or preſbyter, with ruling authority derived from the very Apoſtles, and continued down unto the preſent times by an uninterrupted ſucceſſion.

To theſe I anſwer. In the firſt place, Let them ſhew me the edict by which Chriſt has impoſed that law upon his church. And let not any man think me impertinent, if, in a thing of this conſequence, I require that the terms of that edict be very expreſs and poſitive. For the promiſe he has made us, that " whereſoever two or three are gathered together in his name, " he will be in the midſt of them," Mat. xviii. ſeems to imply the contrary. Whether ſuch an aſſembly want any thing neceſſary to a true church, pray do you conſider. Certain I am, that nothing can be there wanting unto the ſalvation of ſouls; which is ſufficient for our purpoſe.

NEXT, pray obſerve how great have always been the diviſions amongſt even thoſe who lay ſo much ſtreſs upon the divine inſtitution, and continued ſucceſſion of a certain order of rulers in the church. Now their very diſſention unavoidably puts us upon a neceſſity of deliberating, and conſequently allows a liberty of chooſing that, which upon conſideration we prefer.

AND in the laſt place, I conſent that theſe men have a ruler of their church, eſtabliſhed by ſuch a long ſeries of ſucceſſion as they judge neceſſary, provided I may have liberty at the ſame time to join myſelf to that ſociety, in which I am perſuaded thoſe things are to be found which are neceſſary to the ſalvation of my ſoul. In this manner eccleſiaſtical liberty will be preſerved on all ſides, and no man will have a legiſlator impoſed upon him, but whom himſelf has choſen.

BUT ſince men are ſo ſolicitous about the true church, I would only aſk them here by the way, if it be not more agreeable to the church of Chriſt, to make the conditions of her communion conſiſt in ſuch things, and ſuch things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in expreſs words, to be neceſſary to ſalvation? I aſk, I ſay, whether this be not more agreeable to the church of Chriſt, than for men to impoſe their own inventions and interpretations upon others, as if they were of divine authority; and to eſtabliſh by eccleſiaſtical laws, as abſolutely neceſſary to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, ſuch things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention, or at leaſt not expreſly command? Whoſoever requires thoſe things in order to eccleſiaſtical communion, which Chriſt does not require in order to life eternal, he may perhaps indeed conſtitute a ſociety accommodated to his own opinion, and his own advantage; but how that can be called the church of Chriſt, which is eſtabliſhed upon laws that are not his, and which excludes ſuch perſons from its communion, as he will one day receive into the kingdom of heaven, I underſtand not. But this being not a proper place to enquire into the marks of the true church, I will only mind thoſe that contend ſo earneſtly for the decrees of their own ſociety, and that cry out continually the CHURCH, the CHURCH, with as much noiſe, and perhaps upon the ſame principle, as the Epheſian ſilverſmiths did for their Diana; this, I ſay, I deſire to mind them of, that the Goſpel frequently declares that the true diſciples of Chriſt muſt ſuffer perſecution; but that the church of Chriſt ſhould perſecute others, and force others by fire and ſword, to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the books of the New Teſtament.

THE end of a religious ſociety, as has already been ſaid, is the publick worſhip of God, and by means thereof the acquiſition of eternal life. All diſcipline ought therefore to tend to that end, and all eccleſiaſtical laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought, nor can be tranſacted in this ſociety, relating to the poſſeſſion of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be made uſe of, upon any occaſion whatſoever: for force belongs wholly to the civil magiſtrate, and the poſſeſſion of all outward goods is ſubject to his juriſdiction.

BUT it may be aſked, by what means then ſhall eccleſiaſtical laws be eſtabliſhed, if they muſt be thus deſtitute of all compulſive power? I anſwer, they muſt be eſtabliſhed by means ſuitable to the nature of ſuch things, whereof the external profeſſion and obſervation, if not proceeding from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind, is altogether uſeleſs and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this ſociety are to be kept within their duty, are exhortations, admonitions, and advice. If by theſe means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing farther to be done, but that ſuch ſtubborn and obſtinate perſons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, ſhould be caſt out and ſeparated from the ſociety. This is the laſt and utmoſt force of eccleſiaſtical authority: no other puniſhment can thereby be inflicted, than that the relation ceaſing between the body and the member which is cut off, the perſon ſo condemned ceaſes to be a part of that church.

THESE things being thus determined, let us inquire in the next place, how far the duty of Toleration extends, and what is required from every one by it.

AND firſt, I hold, that no church is bound by the duty of Toleration to retain any ſuch perſon in her boſom, as after admonition continues obſtinately to offend againſt the laws of the ſociety. For theſe being the condition of communion, and the bond of the ſociety, if the breach of them were permitted without any animadverſion, the ſociety would immediately be thereby diſſolved. But nevertheleſs, in all ſuch caſes care is to be taken that the ſentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with it no rough uſage, of word or action, whereby the ejected perſon may any ways be damnified in body or eſtate. For all force, as has often been ſaid, belongs only to the magiſtrate, nor ought any private perſons, at any time, to uſe force; unleſs it be in ſelf-defence againſt unjuſt violence. Excommunication neither does nor can, deprive the excommunicated perſon of any of thoſe civil goods that he formerly poſſeſſed. All thoſe things belong to the civil government, and are under the magiſtrate's protection. The whole force of excommunication conſiſts only in this, that the reſolution of the ſociety in that reſpect being declared, the union that was between the body and ſome member, comes thereby to be diſſolved; and that relation ceaſing, the participation of ſome certain things, which the ſociety communicated to its members, and unto which no man has any civil right, comes alſo to ceaſe. For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated perſon, by the church miniſter's refuſing him that bread and wine, in the celebration of the Lord's ſupper, which was not bought with his, but other men's money.

Secondly: No private perſon has any right, in any manner to prejudice another perſon in his civil enjoyments, becauſe he is of another church or religion. All the rights and franchiſes that belong to him as a man, or as a deniſon, are inviolably to be preſerved to him. Theſe are not the buſineſs of religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him, whether he be Chriſtian or Pagan. Nay, we muſt not content ourſelves with the narrow meaſures of bare juſtice: charity, bounty, and liberality muſt be added to it. This the Goſpel enjoins, this reaſon directs, and this that natural fellowſhip we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to thee: nor therefore art thou to puniſh him in the things of this life, becauſe thou ſuppoſeſt he will be miſerable in that which is to come.

What I ſay concerning the mutual toleration of private perſons differing from one another in religion, I underſtand alſo of particular churches; which ſtand as it were in the ſame relation to each other as private perſons among themſelves, nor has any one of them any manner of juriſdiction over any other, no not even when the civil magiſtrate, as it ſometimes happens, comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no new right to the church, nor the church to the civil government. So that whether the magiſtrate join himſelf to any church, or ſeparate from it, the church remains always as it was before, a free and voluntary ſociety. It neither acquires the power of the ſword by the magiſtrate's coming to it, nor does it loſe the right of inſtruction and excommunication by his going from it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a ſpontaneous ſociety, that it has power to remove any of its members who tranſgreſs the rules of its inſtitution: but it cannot, by the acceſſion of any new members, acquire any right of juriſdiction over thoſe that are not joined with it. And therefore peace, equity, and friendſhip, are always mutually to be obſerved by particular churches, in the ſame manner as by private perſons, without any pretence of ſuperiority or juriſdiction over one another.

That the thing may be made yet clearer by an example; let us ſuppoſe two churches, the one of Arminians, the other of Calviniſts, reſiding in the city of Couſtantinople. Will any one ſay, that either of theſe churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their eſtates and liberty, as we ſee practiſed elſewhere, becauſe of their differing from it in ſome doctrines or ceremonies, whilſt the Turks in the mean while ſilently ſtand by, and laugh to ſee with what inhuman cruelty Chriſtians thus rage againſt Chriſtians? But if one of theſe churches hath this power of treating the other ill, I aſk which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by what right? It will be anſwered, undoubtedly, that it is the orthodox church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is, in great and ſpecious words, to ſay juſt nothing at all. For every church is orthodox to itſelf;

ſelf; to others, erroneous or heretical. Whatſoever any church believes, it believes to be true; and the contrary thereunto, it pronounces to be error. So that the controverſy between theſe churches about the truth of their doctrines, and the purity of their worſhip, is on both ſides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Conſtantinople, or elſewhere upon earth, by whoſe ſentence it can be determined. The deciſion of that queſtion belongs only to the Supreme Judge of all men, to whom alſo alone belongs the puniſhment of the erroneous. In the mean while, let thoſe men conſider how heinouſly they ſin, who, adding injuſtice, if not to their error, yet certainly to their pride, do raſhly and arrogantly take upon them to miſuſe the ſervants of another maſter, who are not at all accountable to them.

NAY, further: if it could be manifeſt which of theſe two diſſenting churches were in the right way, there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any right of deſtroying the other. For churches have neither any juriſdiction in worldly matters, nor are fire and ſword any proper inſtruments wherewith to convince mens minds of error, and inform them of the truth. Let us ſuppoſe, nevertheleſs, that the civil magiſtrate inclined to favour one of them, and to put his ſword into their hands, that, by his conſent, they might chaſtize the diſſenters as they pleaſed. Will any man ſay, that any right can be derived unto a Chriſtian church, over its brethren, from a Turkiſh emperor? An infidel, who has himſelf no authority to puniſh Chriſtians for the articles of their faith, cannot confer ſuch an authority upon any ſociety of Chriſtans, nor give unto them a right which he has not himſelf. This would be the caſe at Conſtantinople. And the reaſon of the thing is the ſame in any Chriſtian kingdom. The civil power is the ſame in every place: nor can that power, in the hands of a Chriſtian prince, confer any greater authority upon the church, than in the hands of a heathen; which is to ſay, juſt none at all.

NEVERTHELESS, it is worthy to be obſerved, and lamented, that the moſt violent of theſe defenders of the truth, the oppoſers of errors, the exclaimers againſt ſchiſm, do hardly ever let looſe this their zeal for God, with which they are ſo warmed and inflamed, unleſs where they have the civil magiſtrate on their ſide. But ſo ſoon as ever court-favour has given them the better end of the ſtaff, and they begin to feel themſelves the ſtronger, then preſently peace and charity are to be laid aſide: otherwiſe, they are religiouſly to be obſerved. Where they have not the power to carry on perſecution, and to become maſters, there they deſire to live upon fair terms, and preach up Toleration. When they are not ſtrengthened with the civil power, then they can bear moſt patiently, and unmovedly, the contagion of idolatry, ſuperſtition, and hereſy, in their neighbourhood; of which, in other occaſions, the intereſt of religion makes them to be extremely apprehenſive. They do not forwardly attack thoſe errors which are in faſhion at court, or are countenanced by the government. Here they can be content to ſpare their arguments: which yet, with their leave, is the only right method of propagating truth, which has no ſuch way of prevailing, as when ſtrong arguments and good reaſon, are joined with the ſoftneſs of civility and good uſage.

No body therefore, in fine, neither ſingle perſons, nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any juſt title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other, upon pretence of religion. Thoſe that are of another opinion, would do well to conſider with themſelves how pernicious a ſeed of diſcord and war, how powerful a provocation to endleſs hatreds, rapines, and ſlaughters, they thereby furniſh unto mankind. No peace and ſecurity, no not ſo much as common friendſhip, can ever be eſtabliſhed or preſerved amongſt men, ſo long as this opinion prevails, "that dominion is "founded in grace, and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms."

IN the third place: Let us ſee what the duty of Toleration requires from thoſe who are diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of mankind, from the laity, as they pleaſe to call us, by ſome eccleſiaſtical character and office; whether they be biſhops, prieſts, preſbyters, miniſters, or however elſe dignified or diſtinguiſhed. It is not my buſineſs to inquire here into the original of the power or dignity of the clergy. This only I ſay, that whenceſoever their authority be ſprung, ſince it is eccleſiaſtical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the church, nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs; becauſe the church itſelf is a thing abſolutely ſeparate and diſtinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both ſides are fixed and immoveable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things moſt remote and oppoſite, who mixes theſe ſocieties; which are in their original, end, buſineſs, and in every thing, perfectly diſtinct, and infinitely different from each other. No man therefore, with whatſoever eccleſiaſtical office he be dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church and faith, either of liberty, or of any part of his worldly goods, upon the account of that difference which is between them in religion. For whatſoever is not lawful to the whole church, cannot, by any eccleſiaſtical right, become lawful to any of its members.

BUT this is not all. It is not enough that eccleſiaſtical men abſtain from violence and rapine, and all manner of perſecution. He that pretends to be a ſucceſſor of the Apoſtles, and takes upon him the office of teaching, is obliged alſo to admoniſh his hearers of the duties of peace, and good-will towards all men; as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox; towards thoſe that differ from them in faith and worſhip, as well as towards thoſe that agree with them therein: and he ought induſtriouſly to exhort all men, whether private perſons or magiſtrates, if any ſuch there be in his church, to charity, meekneſs, and toleration; and diligently endeavour to allay and temper all that heat, and unreaſonable averſeneſs of mind, which either any man's fiery zeal for his own ſect, or the craft of others, has kindled againſt diſſenters. I will not undertake to repreſent how happy and how great would be the fruit, both in church and ſtate, if the pulpits every where ſounded with this doctrine of peace and toleration; leſt I ſhould ſeem to reflect too ſeverely upon thoſe men whoſe dignity I deſire not to detract from, nor would have it diminiſhed either by others or themſelves. But this I ſay, that thus it ought to be. And if any one that profeſſes himſelf to be a miniſter of the word of God, a preacher of the goſpel of peace, teach otherwiſe;

wiſe; he either underſtands not, or neglects the buſineſs of his calling, and ſhall one day give account thereof unto the prince of peace. If Chriſtians are to be admoniſhed that they abſtain from all manner of revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries; how much more ought they who ſuffer nothing, who have had no harm done them, forbear violence, and abſtain from all manner of ill uſage towards thoſe from whom they have received none. This caution and temper they ought certainly to uſe towards thoſe who mind only their own buſineſs, and are ſolicitous for nothing but that, whatever men think of them, they may worſhip God in that manner which they are perſuaded is acceptable to him, and in which they have the ſtrongeſt hopes of eternal ſalvation. In private domeſtick affairs, in the management of eſtates, in the conſervation of bodily health, every man may conſider what ſuits his own conveniency, and follow what courſe he likes beſt. No man complains of the ill management of his neighbours affairs. No man is angry with another for an error committed in ſowing his land, or in marrying his daughter. No body corrects a ſpendthrift for conſuming his ſubſtance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or build, or make whatſoever expences he pleaſes, no body murmurs, no body controuls him; he has his liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not there conform his behaviour exactly to the accuſtomed ceremonies, or if he brings not his children to be initiated in the ſacred myſteries of this or the other congregation; this immediately cauſes an uproar, and the neighbourhood is filled with noiſe and clamour. Every one is ready to be the avenger of ſo great a crime. And the zealots hardly have patience to refrain from violence and rapine, ſo long till the cauſe be heard, and the poor man be, according to form, condemned to the loſs of liberty, goods, or life. Oh that our eccleſiaſtical orators, of every ſect, would apply themſelves with all the ſtrength of arguments that they are able, to the confounding of mens errors! But let them ſpare their perſons. Let them not ſupply their want of reaſons with the inſtruments of force, which belong to another juriſdiction, and do ill become a churchman's hands. Let them not call in the magiſtrate's authority to the aid of their eloquence, or learning; leſt perhaps, whilſt they pretend only love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing nothing but fire and ſword, betray their ambition, and ſhew that what they deſire is temporal dominion. For it will be very difficult to perſuade men of ſenſe, that he, who with dry eyes, and ſatisfaction of mind, can deliver his brother unto the executioner, to be burnt alive, does ſincerely and heartily concern himſelf to ſave that brother from the flames of hell in the world to come.

IN the laſt place. Let us now conſider what is the magiſtrate's duty in the buſineſs of toleration: which is very certainly conſiderable.

WE have already proved, that the care of ſouls does not belong to the magiſtrate: not a magiſterial care, I mean, if I may ſo call it, which conſiſts in preſcribing by laws, and compelling by puniſhments. But a charitable care, which conſiſts in teaching, admoniſhing, and perſuading, cannot be denied unto any man. The care therefore of every man's ſoul belongs unto himſelf, and is to be left unto himſelf. But what if he neglect the care of his ſoul? I anſwer, what if he neglect the care of his health, or of his eſtate, which things are nearlier related to the government of the magiſtrate than the other? Will the magiſtrate provide by an expreſs law, that ſuch an one ſhall not become poor or ſick? Laws provide, as much as is poſſible, that the goods and health of ſubjects be not injured by the fraud or violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence or ill-huſbandry of the poſſeſſors themſelves. No man can be forced to be rich or healthful, whether he will or no. Nay, God himſelf will not ſave men againſt their wills. Let us ſuppoſe, however, that ſome prince were deſirous to force his ſubjects to accumulate riches, or to preſerve the health and ſtrength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law, that they muſt conſult none but Roman phyſicians, and ſhall every one be bound to live according to their preſcriptions? What, ſhall no potion, no broth be taken, but what is prepared either in the Vatican, ſuppoſe, or in a Geneva ſhop? Or, to make theſe ſubjects rich, ſhall they all be obliged by law to become merchants, or muſicians? Or, ſhall every one turn victualler, or ſmith, becauſe there are ſome that maintain their families plentifully, and grow rich in thoſe profeſſions? But it may be ſaid, there are a thouſand ways to wealth, but one only way to heaven. It is well ſaid indeed, eſpecially by thoſe that plead for compelling men into this or the other way. For if there were ſeveral ways that lead thither, there would not be ſo much as a pretence left for compulſion. But now, if I be marching on with my utmoſt vigour, in that way which, according to the ſacred geography, leads ſtrait to Jeruſalem; why am I beaten and ill uſed by others, becauſe, perhaps, I wear not buſkins; becauſe my hair is not of the right cut; becauſe, perhaps, I have not been dipt in the right faſhion; becauſe I eat fleſh upon the road, or ſome other food which agrees with my ſtomach; becauſe I avoid certain by-ways, which ſeem unto me to lead into briars or precipices; becauſe amongſt the ſeveral paths that are in the ſame road, I chooſe that to walk in which ſeems to be the ſtreighteſt and cleaneſt; becauſe I avoid to keep company with ſome travellers that are leſs grave, and others that are more ſour than they ought to be; or in fine, becauſe I follow a guide that either is, or is not, cloathed in white, and crowned with a mitre? Certainly, if we conſider right, we ſhall find that for the moſt part they are ſuch frivolous things as theſe, that, without any prejudice to religion or the ſalvation of ſouls, if not accompanied with ſuperſtition or hypocriſy, might either be obſerved or omitted; I ſay, they are ſuch like things as theſe, which breed implacable enmities amongſt Chriſtian brethren, who are all agreed in the ſubſtantial and truly fundamental part of religion.

BUT let us grant unto theſe zealots, who condemn all things that are not of their mode, that from theſe circumſtances ariſe different ends. What ſhall we conclude from thence? There is only one of theſe which is the true way to eternal happineſs. But in this great variety of ways that men follow, it is ſtill doubted which is this right one. Now neither the care of the commonwealth, nor the right of enacting laws, does diſcover this way that leads to heaven more certainly to the magiſtrate, than every private man's ſearch and ſtudy diſcovers it unto himſelf. I have a weak body, ſunk under a languiſhing diſeaſe, for which, I ſuppoſe, there is only one remedy, but that unknown. Does it therefore belong unto the magiſtrate to preſcribe me a remedy, becauſe there is but one, and becauſe it is unknown? Becauſe there is but one way for me to eſcape death, will it therefore be ſafe for me to do whatſoever the magiſtrate ordains? Thoſe things that every man ought ſincerely to enquire into himſelf, and by meditation, ſtudy, ſearch, and his own endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked upon as the peculiar profeſſion of any one ſort of men. Princes indeed are born ſuperior unto other men in power, but in nature equal. Neither the right, nor the art of ruling, does neceſſarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of other things; and leaſt of all of the true religion. For if it were ſo, how could it come to paſs that the lords of the earth ſhould differ ſo vaſtly as they do in religious matters? But let us grant that it is probable the way to eternal life may be better known by a prince than by his ſubjects; or at leaſt, that in this incertitude of things, the ſafeſt and moſt commodious way for private perſons is to follow his dictates. You will ſay, what then? If he ſhould bid you follow merchandize for your livelihood, would you decline that courſe for fear it ſhould not ſucceed? I anſwer: I would turn merchant upon the prince's command, becauſe in caſe I ſhould have ill ſucceſs in trade, he is abundantly able to make up my loſs ſome other way. If it be true, as he pretends, that he deſires I ſhould thrive and grow rich, he can ſet me up again when unſucceſsful voyages have broke me. But this is not the caſe, in the things that regard the life to come. If there I take wrong courſe, if in that reſpect I am once undone, it is not in the magiſtrate's power to repair my loſs, to eaſe my ſuffering, or to reſtore me in any meaſure, much leſs entirely, to a good eſtate. What ſecurity can be given for the kingdom of heaven?

PERHAPS ſome will ſay, that they do not ſuppoſe this infallible judgment, that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the civil magiſtrate, but in the church. What the church has determined, that the civil magiſtrate orders to be obſerved; and he provides by his authority that no body ſhall either act or believe, in the buſineſs of religion, otherwiſe than the church teaches. So that the judgment of thoſe things is in the church. The magiſtrate himſelf yields obedience thereunto, and requires the like obedience from others. I anſwer: Who ſees not how frequently the name of the church, which was ſo venerable in the time of the Apoſtle's, has been made uſe of to throw duſt in peoples eyes, in following ages? But however, in the preſent caſe it helps us not. The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magiſtrate than to private perſons, and therefore I cannot ſafely take him for my guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myſelf, and who certainly is leſs concerned for my ſalvation than I myſelf am. Amongſt ſo many kings of the Jews, how many of them were there whom any Iſraelite, thus blindly following, had not fallen into idolatry, and thereby into deſtruction? Yet nevertheleſs, you bid me be of good courage, and tell me that all is now ſafe and ſecure, becauſe the magiſtrate does not now enjoin the obſervance, of his own decrees in matters of religion, but only the decrees of the church. Of what church I beſeech you? Of that certainly which likes him beſt. As if he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or the other church, did not interpoſe his own judgment in the matter. What difference is there whether he lead me himſelf, or deliver me over to be led by others? I depend both ways upon his will, and it is he that determines both ways of my eternal ſtate. Would an Iſraelite, that had worſhipped Baal upon the command of his king, have been in any better condition, becauſe ſome body had told him that the king ordered nothing in religion upon his own head, nor commanded any thing to be done by his ſubjects in divine worſhip, but what was approved by the counſel of prieſts, and declared to be of divine right by the doctors of their church? If the religion of any church become therefore true and ſaving, becauſe the head of that ſect, the prelates and prieſts, and thoſe of that tribe, do all of them, with all their might, extol and praiſe it; what religion can ever be accounted erroneous, falſe and deſtructive? I am doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I am ſuſpicious of the way of worſhip practiſed by the Papiſts, or Lutherans; will it be ever a jot the ſafer for me to join either unto the one or the other of thoſe churches, upon the magiſtrate's command, becauſe he commands nothing in religion but by the authority and counſel of the doctors of that church?

BUT to ſpeak the truth, we muſt acknowledge that the church, if a convention of clergymen, making canons, muſt be called by that name, is for the moſt part more apt to be influenced by the court, than the court by the church. How the church was under the viciſſitude of orthodox and Arian emperors is very well known. Or if thoſe things be too remote, our modern Engliſh hiſtory affords us freſher examples, in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how eaſily and ſmoothly the clergy changed their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of worſhip, every thing according to the inclination of thoſe kings and queens. Yet were thoſe kings and queens of ſuch different minds, in point of religion, and enjoined thereupon ſuch different things, that no man in his wits, I had almoſt ſaid none but an atheiſt, will preſume to ſay that any ſincere and upright worſhipper of God could, with a ſafe conſcience, obey their ſeveral decrees. To conclude, It is the ſame thing whether a king that preſcribes laws to another man's religion pretend to do it by his own judgment, or by the eccleſiaſtical authority and advice of others. The deciſions of church-men, whoſe differences and diſputes are ſufficiently known, cannot be any ſounder, or ſafer than his: nor can all their ſuffrages joined together add any new ſtrength unto the civil power. Though this alſo muſt be taken notice of, that princes ſeldom have any regard to the ſuffrages of eccleſiaſticks that are not favourers of their own faith and way of worſhip.

BUT after all, the principal conſideration, and which abſolutely determines this controverſy, is this. Although the magiſtrate's opinion in religion be ſound, and the way that he appoints be truly evangelical, yet if I be not thoroughly perſuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no ſafety for me in following it. No way whatſoever that I ſhall walk in againſt the dictates of my conſcience, will ever bring me to the manſions of the bleſſed. I may grow rich by an art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of ſome diſeaſe by remedies that I have not faith in; but I cannot be ſaved by a religion that I diſtruſt, and by a worſhip that I abhor. It is in vain for an unbeliever to take up the outward ſhew of another man's profeſſion. Faith only, and inward ſincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God. The moſt likely and moſt approved remedy can have no effect upon the patient, if his ſtomach reject it as ſoon as taken. And you will in vain cram a medicine down a ſick man's throat, which his particular conſtitution will be ſure to turn into poiſon. In a word: Whatſoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this at leaſt is certain, that no religion, which I believe not to be true, can be either true, or profitable unto me. In vain therefore do princes compel their ſubjects to come into their church-communion, under pretence of ſaving their ſouls. If they believe, they will come of their own accord; if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail them. How great ſoever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-will and charity, and concern for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, men cannot be forced to be ſaved whether they will or no. And therefore, when all is done, they muſt be left to their own conſciences.

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in matters of religion, let us now conſider what they are to do. All men know and acknowledge that God ought to be publickly worſhipped. Why otherwiſe do they compel one another unto the publick aſſemblies? Men therefore conſtituted in this liberty are to enter into ſome religious ſociety, that they may meet together, not only for mutual edification, but to own to the world that they worſhip God, and offer unto his divine majeſty ſuch ſervice as they themſelves are not aſhamed of, and ſuch as they think not unworthy of him, nor unacceptable to him; and finally that by the purity of doctrine, holineſs of life, and decent form of worſhip, they may draw others unto the love of the true religion, and perform ſuch other things in religion as cannot be done by each private man apart.

THESE religious ſocieties I call churches: and theſe I ſay the magiſtrate ought to tolerate. For the buſineſs of theſe aſſemblies of the people is nothing but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of; I mean the ſalvation of their ſouls: nor in this caſe is there any difference between the national church, and other ſeparated congregations.

BUT as in every church there are two things eſpecially to be conſidered; the outward form and rites of worſhip, and the doctrines and articles of faith; theſe things muſt be handled each diſtinctly; that ſo the whole matter of Toleration may the more clearly be underſtood.

CONCERNING outward worſhip, I ſay, in the firſt place, that the magiſtrate has no power to enforce by law, either in his own church, or much leſs in another, the uſe of any rites or ceremonies whatſoever in the worſhip of God. And this, not only becauſe theſe churches are free ſocieties, but becauſe whatſoever is practiſed in the worſhip of God, is only ſo far juſtifiable as it is believed by thoſe that practiſe it to be acceptable unto him. Whatſoever is not done with that aſſurance of faith, is neither well in itſelf, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impoſe ſuch things therefore upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to command them to offend God; which, conſidering that the end of all religion is to pleaſe him, and that liberty is eſſentially neceſſary to that end, appears to be abſurd beyond expreſſion.

BUT perhaps it may be concluded from hence, that I deny unto the magiſtrate all manner of power about indifferent things; which if it be not granted, the whole ſubject matter of law-making is taken away. No, I readily grant that indifferent things, and perhaps none but ſuch, are ſubjected to the legiſlative power. But it does not therefore follow that the magiſtrate may ordain whatſoever he pleaſes concerning any thing that is indifferent. The publick good is the rule and meaſure of all law-making. If a thing be not uſeful to the commonwealth, though it be ever ſo indifferent, it may not preſently be eſtabliſhed by law.

BUT further: Things ever ſo indifferent in their own nature, when they are brought into the church and worſhip of God, are removed out of the reach of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction, becauſe in that uſe they have no connection at all with civil affairs. The only buſineſs of the church is the ſalvation of ſouls: and it no ways concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that this, or the other ceremony be there made uſe of. Neither the uſe, nor the omiſſion of any ceremonies in thoſe religious aſſemblies, does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or eſtate, of any man. For example: Let it be granted, that the waſhing of an infant with water is in itſelf an indifferent thing. Let it be granted alſo, that if the magiſtrate underſtand ſuch waſhing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any diſeaſe that children are ſubject unto, and eſteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law, in that caſe he may order it to be done. But will any one therefore ſay, that the magiſtrate has the ſame right to ordain, by law, that all children ſhall be baptized by prieſts, in the ſacred font, in order to the purification of their ſouls? The extreme difference of theſe two caſes is viſible to every one at firſt ſight. Or let us apply the laſt caſe to the child of a Jew, and the thing will ſpeak itſelf. For what hinders but a Chriſtian magiſtrate may have ſubjects that are Jews? Now if we acknowledge that ſuch an injury may not be done unto a Jew, as to compel him againſt his own opinion, to practiſe in his religion a thing that is in its nature indifferent; how can we maintain that any thing of this kind may be done to a Chriſtian?

AGAIN: Things in their own nature indifferent, cannot, by any human authority, be made any part of the worſhip of God, for this very reaſon; becauſe they are indifferent. For ſince indifferent things are not capable, by any virtue if their own, to propitiate the Deity; no human power or authority can confer on them ſo much dignity and excellency as to enable them to do it. In the common affairs of life, that uſe of indifferent things which

God has not forbidden, is free and lawful: and therefore in thoſe things human authority has place. But it is not ſo in matters of religion. Things indifferent are not otherwiſe lawful in the worſhip of God than as they are inſtituted by God himſelf; and as he, by ſome poſitive command, has ordained them to be made a part of that worſhip which he will vouchſafe to accept of at the hands of poor ſinful men. Nor when an incenſed Deity ſhall aſk us, "Who has required theſe, or ſuch like things at your hands?" Will it be enough to anſwer him, that the magiſtrate commanded them. If civil juriſdiction extended thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into religion? What hodge-podge of ceremonies, what ſuperſtitious inventions, built upon the magiſtrate's authority, might not, againſt conſcience, be impoſed upon the worſhippers of God? For the greateſt part of theſe ceremonies and ſuperſtitions conſiſts in the religious uſe of ſuch things as are in their own nature indifferent: nor are they ſinful upon any other account, than becauſe God is not the author of them. The ſprinkling of water, and the uſe of bread and wine, are both in their own nature, and in the ordinary occaſions of life, altogether indifferent. Will any man therefore ſay that theſe things could have been introduced into religion, and made a part of divine worſhip, if not by divine inſtitution? If any human authority or civil power could have done this, why might it not alſo enjoin the eating of fiſh, and drinking of ale, in the holy banquet, as a part of divine worſhip? Why not the ſprinkling of the blood of beaſts in churches, and expiations by water or fire, and abundance more of this kind? But theſe things, how indifferent ſoever they be in common uſes, when they come to be annexed unto divine worſhip, without divine authority, they are as abominable to God, as the ſacrifice of a dog. And why a dog ſo abominable? What difference is there between a dog and a goat, in reſpect of the divine nature, equally and infinitely diſtant from all affinity with matter; unleſs it be that God required the uſe of the one in his worſhip, and not of the other? We ſee therefore that indifferent things, how much ſoever they be under the power of the civil magiſtrate, yet cannot upon that pretence be introduced into religion, and impoſed upon religious aſſemblies; becauſe in the worſhip of God they wholly ceaſe to be indifferent. He that worſhips God does it with deſign to pleaſe him and procure his favour. But that cannot be done by him, who, upon the command of another, offers unto God that which he knows will be diſpleaſing to him, becauſe not commanded by himſelf. This is not to pleaſe God, or appeaſe his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke him, by a manifeſt contempt; which is a thing abſolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worſhip.

BUT it will here be aſked: If nothing belonging to divine worſhip be left to human diſcretion, how is it then that churches themſelves have the power of ordering any thing about the time and place of worſhip, and the like? To this I anſwer; that in religious worſhip we muſt diſtinguiſh between what is part of the worſhip itſelf, and what is but a circumſtance. That is a part of the worſhip which is believed to be appointed by God, and to be well pleaſing to him; and therefore that is neceſſary. Circumſtances are ſuch things which, though in general they cannot be ſeparated from worſhip, yet the particular inſtances or modifications of them are not determined; and therefore they are indifferent. Of this ſort are the time and place of worſhip, the habit and poſture of him that worſhips. Theſe are circumſtances, and perfectly indifferent, where God has not given any expreſs command about them. For example: Amongſt the Jews, the time and place of their worſhip, and the habits of thoſe that officiated in it, were not mere circumſtances, but a part of the worſhip itſelf; in which if any thing were defective, or different from the inſtitution, they could not hope that it would be accepted by God. But theſe, to Chriſtians under the liberty of the Goſpel, are mere circumſtances of worſhip, which the prudence of every church may bring into ſuch uſe as ſhall be judged moſt ſubſervient to the end of order, decency, and edification. Though even under the Goſpel alſo, thoſe who believe the firſt, or the ſeventh day to be ſet apart by God, and conſecrated ſtill to his worſhip; to them that portion of time is not a ſimple circumſtance, but a real part of divine worſhip, which can neither be changed nor neglected.

IN the next place: As the magiſtrate has no power to impoſe by his laws, the uſe of any rites and ceremonies in any church, ſo neither has he any power to forbid the uſe of ſuch rites and ceremonies as are already received, approved, and practiſed by any church: becauſe if he did ſo, he would deſtroy the church itſelf; the end of whoſe inſtitution is only to worſhip God with freedom, after its own manner.

YOU will ſay, by this rule, if ſome congregations ſhould have a mind to ſacrifice infants, or, as the primitive Chriſtians were falſly accuſed, luſtfully pollute themſelves in promiſcuous uncleanneſs, or practiſe any other ſuch heinous enormities; is the magiſtrate obliged to tolerate them, becauſe they are committed in a religious aſſembly? I anſwer, No. Theſe things are not lawful in the ordinary courſe of life, nor in any private houſe; and therefore neither are they ſo in the worſhip of God, or in any religious meeting. But indeed if any people congregated upon account of religion, ſhould be deſirous to ſacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to be prohibited by a law. Meliboeus, whoſe calf it is, may lawfully kill his calf at home, and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is thereby done to any one, no prejudice to another man's goods. And for the ſame reaſon he may kill his calf alſo in a religious meeting. Whether the doing ſo be well-pleaſing to God or no, it is their part to conſider that do it. The part of the magiſtrate is only to take care that the commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any man, either in life or eſtate. And thus what may be ſpent on a feaſt, may be ſpent on a ſacrifice. But if peradventure ſuch were the ſtate of things, that the intereſt of the commonwealth required all ſlaughter of beaſts ſhould be forborn for ſome while, in order to the increaſing of the ſtock of cattle, that had been deſtroyed by ſome extraordinary murrain; who ſees not that the magiſtrate, in ſuch a caſe, may forbid all his ſubjects to kill any calves for any uſe whatſoever? Only it is to be obſerved, that in this caſe the law is not made about a religious, but a political matter: nor is the ſacrifice, but the ſlaughter of calves thereby prohibited.

BY this we ſee what difference there is between the church and the commonwealth. Whatſoever is lawful in the commonwealth, cannot be prohibited by the magiſtrate in the church. Whatſoever is permitted unto any of his ſubjects for their ordinary uſe, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any ſect of people for their religious uſes. If any man may lawfully take bread or wine, either ſitting or kneeling in his own houſe, the law ought not to abridge him of the ſame liberty in his religious worſhip; though in the church the uſe of bread and wine be very different, and be there applied to the myſteries of faith, and rites of divine worſhip. But thoſe things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their ordinary uſe, and are therefore forbidden by laws, thoſe things ought not to be permitted to churches in their ſacred rites. Only the magiſtrate ought always to be very careful that he do not miſuſe his authority, to the oppreſſion of any church, under pretence of publick good.

IT may be ſaid, what if a church be idolatrous, is that alſo to be tolerated by the magiſtrate? In anſwer, I aſk, what power can be given to the magiſtrate for the ſuppreſſion of an idolatrous church, which may not, in time and place, be made uſe of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it muſt be remembered, that the civil power is the ſame every where, and the religion of every prince is orthodox to himſelf. If therefore ſuch a power be granted unto the civil magiſtrate in ſpirituals, as that at Geneva, for example; he may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which is there reputed idolatrous; by the ſame rule, another magiſtrate, in ſome neighbouring country, may oppreſs the reformed religion; and, in India, the Chriſtian. The civil power can either change every thing in religion, according to the prince's pleaſure, or it can change nothing. If it be once permitted to introduce any thing into religion, by the means of laws and penalties, there can be no bounds put to it; but it will in the ſame manner be lawful to alter every thing, according to that rule of truth which the magiſtrate has framed unto himſelf. No man whatſoever ought therefore to be deprived of his terreſtrial enjoyments, upon account of his religion. Not even Americans, ſubjected unto a Chriſtian prince, are to be puniſhed either in body or goods, for not embracing our faith and worſhip. If they are perſuaded that they pleaſe God in obſerving the rites of their own country, and that they ſhall obtain happineſs by that means, they are to be left unto God and themſelves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: an inconſiderable and weak number of Chriſtians, deſtitute of every thing, arrive in a pagan country; theſe foreigners beſeech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would ſuccour them with the neceſſaries of life; thoſe neceſſaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they all join together, and grow up into one body of people. The Chriſtian religion by this means takes root in that country, and ſpreads itſelf; but does not ſuddenly grow the ſtrongeſt. While things are in this condition, peace, friendſhip, faith, and equal juſtice, are preſerved amongſt them. At length the magiſtrate

giſtrate becomes a Chriſtian, and by that means their party becomes the moſt powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated: and unleſs theſe innocent pagans, ſtrict obſervers of the rules of equity and the law of nature, and no ways offending againſt the laws of the ſociety, I ſay unleſs they will forſake their ancient religion, and embrace a new and ſtrange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and poſſeſſions of their forefathers, and perhaps deprived of life itſelf. Then at laſt it appears what zeal for the church, joined with the deſire of dominion, is capable to produce; and how eaſily the pretence of religion, and of the care of ſouls, ſerves for a cloak to covetouſneſs, rapine, and ambition.

NOW whoſoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by laws, puniſhments, fire and ſword, may apply this ſtory to himſelf. For the reaſon of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither pagans there, nor any diſſenting Chriſtians here, can with any right be deprived of their worldly goods, by the predominating faction of a court-church: nor are any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of religion in one place more than another.

BUT idolatry, ſay ſome, is a ſin, and therefore not to be tolerated. If they ſaid it were therefore to be avoided, the inference were good. But it does not follow, that becauſe it is a ſin it ought therefore to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. For it does not belong unto the magiſtrate to make uſe of his ſword in puniſhing every thing, indifferently, that he takes to be a ſin againſt God. Covetouſneſs, uncharitableneſs, idleneſs, and many other things are ſins, by the conſent of all men, which yet no man ever ſaid were to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. The reaſon is, becauſe they are not prejudicial to other mens rights, nor do they break the publick peace of ſocieties. Nay, even the ſins of lying and perjury are no where puniſhable by laws; unleſs in certain caſes, in which the real turpitude of the thing, and the offence againſt God, are not conſidered, but only the injury done unto mens neighbours, and to the commonwealth. And what if in another country, to a Mahometan or a pagan prince, the Chriſtian religion ſeem falſe and offenſive to God; may not the Chriſtians for the ſame reaſon, and after the ſame manner, be extirpated there?

BUT it may be urged farther, that by the law of Moſes, idolaters were to be rooted out. True indeed, by the law of Moſes; but that is not obligatory to us Chriſtians. No body pretends that every thing, generally, enjoined by the law of Moſes, ought to be practiſed by Chriſtians. But there is nothing more frivolous than that common diſtinction of moral, judicial, and ceremonial law, which men ordinarily make uſe of. For no poſitive law whatſoever can oblige any people but thoſe to whom it is given. "Hear "O Iſrael," ſufficiently reſtrains the obligation of the law of Moſes only to that people. And this conſideration alone is anſwer enough unto thoſe that urge the authority of the law of Moſes, for the inflicting of capital puniſhments upon idolaters. But however, I will examine this argument a little more particularly.

The caſe of idolaters, in reſpect of the Jewiſh commonwealth, falls under a double conſideration. The firſt is of thoſe, who, being initiated in the Moſaical rites, and made citizens of that commonwealth, did afterwards apoſtatiſe from the worſhip of the God of Iſrael. Theſe were proceeded againſt as traitors and rebels, guilty of no leſs than high treaſon. For the commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an abſolute theocracy: nor was there, or could there be, any difference between that commonwealth and the church. The laws eſtabliſhed there concerning the worſhip of one inviſible Deity, were the civil laws of that people, and a part of their political government, in which God himſelf was the legiſlator. Now if any one can ſhew me where there is a commonwealth, at this time, conſtituted upon that foundation, I will acknowledge that the eccleſiaſtical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil; and that the ſubjects of that government both may, and ought to be kept in ſtrict conformity with that church, by the civil power. But there is abſolutely no ſuch thing, under the Goſpel, as a Chriſtian commonwealth. There are, indeed, many cities and kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Chriſt, but they have retained their ancient form of government; with which the law of Chriſt hath not at all meddled. He, indeed, hath taught men how, by faith and good works, they may attain eternal life. But he inſtituted no commonwealth. He preſcribed unto his followers no new and peculiar form of government, nor put he the ſword into any magiſtrate's hand, with commiſſion to make uſe of it in forcing men to forſake their former religion, and receive his.

Secondly, Foreigners, and ſuch as were ſtrangers to the commonwealth of Iſrael, were not compelled by force to obſerve the rites of the Moſaical law. But, on the contrary, in the very ſame place where it is ordered "that "an Iſraelite that was an idolater ſhould be put to death, there it is provided "that ſtrangers ſhould not be vexed nor oppreſſed," Exod. xxii. I confeſs that the ſeven nations that poſſeſſed the land which was promiſed to the Iſraelites, were utterly to be cut off. But this was not ſingly becauſe they were idolaters. For if that had been the reaſon, why were the Moabites and other nations to be ſpared? No; the reaſon is this. God being in a peculiar manner the king of the Jews, he could not ſuffer the adoration of any other Deity, which was properly an act of high-treaſon againſt himſelf, in the land of Canaan, which was his kingdom. For ſuch a manifeſt revolt could no ways conſiſt with his dominion, which was perfectly political, in that country. All idolatry was therefore to be rooted out of the bounds of his kingdom; becauſe it was an acknowledgment of another God, that is to ſay, another king, againſt the laws of empire. The inhabitants were alſo to be driven out, that the entire poſſeſſion of the land might be given to the Iſraelites. And for the like reaſon the Emims and the Horims were driven out of their countries by the children of Eſau and Lot; and their lands, upon the ſame grounds, given by God to the invaders, Deut. ii. But though all idolatry was thus rooted out of the land of Canaan, yet every idolater was not brought to execution. The whole family of Rahab, the whole nation

tion of the Gibeonites, articled with Joſhua, and were allowed by treaty: and there were many captives amongſt the Jews, who were idolaters. David and Solomon ſubdued many countries without the confines of the Land of Promiſe, and carried their conqueſts as far as Euphrates. Amongſt ſo many captives taken, of ſo many nations reduced under their obedience, we find not one man forced into the Jewiſh religion, and the worſhip of the true God, and puniſhed for idolatry, though all of them were certainly guilty of it. If any one indeed, becoming a proſelyte, deſired to be made a deniſon of their commonwealth, he was obliged to ſubmit unto their laws; that is, to embrace their religion. But this he did willingly, on his own accord, not by conſtraint. He did not unwillingly ſubmit, to ſhew his obedience; but he ſought and ſolicited for it, as a privilege. And as ſoon as he was admitted, he became ſubject to the laws of the commonwealth, by which all idolatry was forbidden within the borders of the land of Canaan. But that law, as I have ſaid, did not reach to any of thoſe regions, however ſubjected unto the Jews, that were ſituated without thoſe bounds.

THUS far concerning outward worſhip. Let us now conſider articles of faith.

THE articles of religion are ſome of them practical, and ſome ſpeculative. Now, though both ſorts conſiſt in the knowledge of truth, yet theſe terminate ſimply in the underſtanding, thoſe influence the will and manners. Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles of faith, as they are called, which are required only to be believed, cannot be impoſed on any church by the law of the land. For it is abſurd that things ſhould be enjoined by laws, which are not in mens power to perform. And to believe this or that to be true, does not depend upon our will. But of this enough has been ſaid already. But, will ſome ſay, let men at leaſt profeſs that they believe. A ſweet religion indeed, that obliges men to diſſemble, and tell lies both to God and man, for the ſalvation of their ſouls! If the magiſtrate thinks to ſave men thus, he ſeems to underſtand little of the way of ſalvation. And if he does it not in order to ſave them, why is he ſo ſolicitous about the articles of faith as to enact them by a law?

FURTHER, The magiſtrate ought not to forbid the preaching or profeſſing of any ſpeculative opinions in any church, becauſe they have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the ſubjects. If a Roman Catholick believe that to be really the body of Chriſt, which another man calls bread, he does no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a Jew does not believe the New Teſtament to be the word of God, he does not thereby alter any thing in mens civil rights. If a heathen doubt of both Teſtaments, he is not therefore to be puniſhed as a pernicious citizen. The power of the magiſtrate, and the eſtates of the people, may be equally ſecure, whether any man believe theſe things or no. I readily grant, that theſe opinions are falſe and abſurd. But the buſineſs of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the ſafety and ſecurity of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and perſon. And ſo it ought to be. For truth certainly would do well enough, if ſhe were once left to ſhift for herſelf. She ſeldom has received, and I fear never will receive, much aſſiſtance from the power of great men, to whom ſhe is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. She is not taught by laws, nor has ſhe any need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errors indeed prevail by the aſſiſtance of foreign and borrowed ſuccours. But if truth makes not her way into the underſtanding by her own light, ſhe will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her. Thus much for ſpeculative opinions. Let us now proceed to practical ones.

A GOOD life, in which conſiſts not the leaſt part of religion and true piety, concerns alſo the civil government: and in it lies the ſafety both of mens ſouls, and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong therefore to the juriſdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and domeſtick governor; I mean, both of the magiſtrate and conſcience. Here therefore is great danger, leſt one of theſe juriſdictions intrench upon the other, and diſcord ariſe between the keeper of the publick peace and the overſeers of ſouls. But if what has been already ſaid concerning the limits of both theſe governments be rightly conſidered, it will eaſily remove all difficulty in this matter.

EVERY man has an immortal ſoul, capable of eternal happineſs or miſery; whoſe happineſs depending upon his believing and doing thoſe things in this life, which are neceſſary to the obtaining of God's favour, and are preſcribed by God to that end; it follows from thence; firſt, that the obſervance of theſe things is the higheſt obligation that lies upon mankind, and that our utmoſt care, application, and diligence, ought to be exerciſed in the ſearch and performance of them; becauſe there is nothing in this world that is of any conſideration in compariſon with eternity. Secondly, that ſeeing one man does not violate the right of another, by his erroneous opinions, and undue manner of worſhip, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs; therefore the care of each man's ſalvation belongs only to himſelf. But I would not have this underſtood, as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions, and affectionate endeavours to reduce men from errors; which are indeed the greateſt duty of a Chriſtian. Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleaſes, towards the promoting of another man's ſalvation. But all force and compulſion are to be forborn. Nothing is to be done imperiouſly. No body is obliged in that matter to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another, farther than he himſelf is perſuaded. Every man, in that, has the ſupreme and abſolute authority of judging for himſelf. And the reaſon is, becauſe no body elſe is concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

BUT beſides their ſouls, which are immortal, men have alſo their temporal lives here upon earth; the ſtate whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain; they have need of ſeveral outward conveniencies to the ſupport thereof, which are to be procured or preſerved by pains and induſtry. For thoſe things that are neceſſary to the comfortable ſupport of our lives, are not the ſpontaneous products of nature, nor do offer themſelves fit and prepared for our uſe. This part therefore draws on another care, and neceſſarily gives another employment. But the pravity of mankind being ſuch, that they had rather injuriouſly prey upon the fruits of other mens labours, than take pains to provide for themſelves; the neceſſity of preſerving men in the poſſeſſion of what honeſt induſtry has already acquired, and alſo of preſerving their liberty and ſtrength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into ſociety with one another; that by mutual aſſiſtance and joint force, that may ſecure unto each other their proprieties, in the things that contribute to the comforts and happineſs of this life; leaving in the mean while to every man the care of his own eternal happineſs, the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated by another man's induſtry, nor can the loſs of it turn to an other man's prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence. But foraſmuch as men thus entering into ſocieties, grounded upon their mutual compacts of aſſiſtance, for the defence of their temporal goods, may nevertheleſs be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of their fellow citizens, or by the hoſtile violence of foreigners: the remedy of this evil conſiſts in arms, riches and multitudes of citizens; the remedy of others in laws; and the care of all things relating both to the one and the other, is committed by the ſociety to the civil magiſtrate. This is the original, this is the uſe, and theſe are the bounds of the legiſlative, which is the ſupreme power in every commonwealth. I mean, that proviſion may be made for the ſecurity of each man's private poſſeſſions; for the peace, riches, and publick commodities of the whole people; and, as much as poſſible, for the increaſe of their inward ſtrength, againſt foreign invaſions.

THESE things being thus explained, it is eaſy to underſtand to what end the legiſlative power ought to be directed, and by what meaſures regulated; and that is the temporal good and outward proſperity of the ſociety; which is the ſole reaſon of men's entering into ſociety, and the only thing they ſeek and aim at in it. And it is alſo evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal ſalvation, and that is, that every one ſhould do what he in his conſcience is perſuaded to be acecptable to the Almighty, on whoſe good pleaſure and acceptance depends his eternal happineſs. For obedience is due in the firſt place to God, and afterwards to the laws.

BUT ſome may aſk, "What if the magiſtrate ſhould enjoin any thing by his "authority, that appears unlawful to the conſcience of a private perſon?" I anſwer, that if government be faithfully adminiſtered, and the counſels of the magiſtrate be indeed directed to the publick good, this will ſeldom happen. But if perhaps it do ſo fall out, I ſay, that ſuch a private perſon is to abſtain from the action that he judges unlawful; and he is to undergo the puniſhment, which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the private judgment of any perſon concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the publick good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deſerve a diſpenſation. But if the law indeed be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magiſtrate's authority; as for example, that the people, or any party amongſt them, ſhould be compelled to embrace a ſtrange religion, and join in the worſhip and ceremonies of another church; men are not in theſe caſes obliged by that law, againſt their conſciences. For the political ſociety is inſtituted for no other end, but only to ſecure every man's poſſeſſion of the things of this life. The care of each man's ſoul, and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong to the commonwealth, nor can be ſubjected to it, is left entirely to every man's ſelf. Thus the ſafeguard of mens lives, and of the things that belong unto this life, is the buſineſs of the commonwealth; and the preſerving of thoſe things unto their owners, is the duty of the magiſtrate. And therefore the magiſtrate cannot take away theſe worldly things from this man, or party, and give them to that; nor change property amongſt fellow-ſubjects, no not even by a law, for a cauſe that has no relation to the end of civil government; I mean for their religion; which whether it be true or falſe, does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow-ſubjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

"BUT what if the magiſtrate believe ſuch a law as this to be for the publick good?" I anſwer: as the private judgment of any particular perſon, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law, ſo the private judgment, as I may call it, of the magiſtrate, does not give him any new right of impoſing laws upon his ſubjects, which neither was in the conſtitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant: and leaſt of all, if he make it his buſineſs to enrich and advance his followers and fellow-ſectaries, with the ſpoils of others. But what if the magiſtrate believe that he has a right to make ſuch laws, and that they are for the publick good; and his ſubjects believe the contrary? Who ſhall be judge between them? I anſwer, God alone. For there is no judge upon earth between the ſupreme magiſtrate and the people. God, I ſay, is the only judge in this caſe, who will retribute unto every one at the laſt day according to his deſerts; that is, according to his ſincerity and uprightneſs in endeavouring to promote piety, and the publick weal and peace of mankind. But what ſhall be done in the mean while? I anſwer: the principal and chief care of every one ought to be of his own ſoul firſt, and in the next place, of the publick peace: though yet there are very few will think it is peace there, where they ſee all laid waſte. There are two ſorts of conteſts amongſt men; the one managed by law, the other by force: and they are of that nature, that where the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my buſineſs to enquire into the power of the magiſtrate in the different conſtitutions of nations. I only know what uſually happens where controverſies ariſe, without a judge to determine them. You will ſay then the magiſtrate being the ſtronger will have his will, and carry his point. Without doubt. But the queſtion is not here concerning the doubtfulneſs of the event, but the rule of right.

BUT to come to particulars. I ſay, Firſt, No opinions contrary to human ſociety, or to thoſe moral rules which are neceſſary to the preſervation of civil ſociety, are to be tolerated by the magiſtrate. But of thoſe indeed examples in any church are rare. For no ſect can eaſily arrive to ſuch a degree of madneſs, as that it ſhould think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, ſuch things as manifeſtly undermine the foundations of ſociety, and are therefore condemned by the judgment of all mankind: becauſe their own intereſt, peace, reputation, every thing would be thereby endangered.

ANOTHER more ſecret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themſelves, and to thoſe of their own ſect, ſome peculiar prerogative covered over with a ſpecious ſhew of deceitful words, but in effect oppoſite to the civil right of the community. For example. We cannot find any ſect that teaches expreſsly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promiſe; that princes may be dethroned by thoſe that differ from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themſelves. For theſe things, propoſed thus nakedly and plainly, would ſoon draw on them the eye and hand of the magiſtrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulneſs againſt the ſpreading of ſo dangerous an evil. But nevertheleſs, we find thoſe that ſay the ſame things, in other words. What elſe do they mean, who teach that "faith is "not to be kept with hereticks?" Their meaning, forſooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themſelves: for they declare all that are not of their communion to be hereticks, or at leaſt may declare them ſo whenſoever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their aſſerting that "kings "excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms?" It is evident that they thereby arrogate unto themſelves the power of depoſing kings: becauſe they challenge the power of excommunication as the peculiar right of their hierarchy. "That dominion is founded in grace," is alſo an aſſertion by which thoſe that maintain it do plainly lay claim to the poſſeſſion of all things. For they are not ſo wanting to themſelves as not to believe, or at leaſt as not to profeſs, themſelves to be the truly pious and faithful. Theſe therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themſelves, any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals, in civil concernments; or who, upon pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over ſuch, as are not aſſociated with them in their eccleſiaſtical communion; I ſay theſe have no right to be tolerated by the magiſtrate; as neither thoſe that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all theſe and the like doctrines ſignify, but that they may, and are ready upon any occaſion to ſeize the government, and poſſeſs themſelves of the eſtates and fortunes of their fellow-ſubjects; and that they only aſk leave to be tolerated by the magiſtrate ſo long, until they find themſelves ſtrong enough to effect it.

AGAIN: That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magiſtrate, which is conſtituted upon ſuch a bottom, that all thoſe who enter into it, do thereby ipſo facto, deliver themſelves up to the protection and ſervice of another prince. For by this means the magiſtrate would give way to the ſettling of a foreign juriſdiction in his own country, and ſuffer his own people to be liſted, as it were, for ſoldiers againſt his own government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious diſtinction between the court and the church afford any remedy to this inconvenience; eſpecially when both the one and the other are equally ſubject to the abſolute authority of the ſame perſon; who has not only power to perſuade the members of his church to whatſoever he liſts, either as purely religious, or as in order thereunto; but can alſo enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for any one to profeſs himſelf to be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in every thing elſe a faithful ſubject to a Chriſtian magiſtrate, whilſt at the ſame time he acknowledges himſelf bound to yield blind obedience to the mufti of Conſtantinople; who himſelf is intirely obedient to the Ottoman emperor, and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleaſure. But this Mahometan living amongſt Chriſtians, would yet more apparently renounce their government, if he acknowledged the ſame perſon to be head of his church, who is the ſupreme magiſtrate in the ſtate.

LASTLY, Thoſe are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promiſes, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human ſociety, can have no hold upon an atheiſt. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, diſſolves all. Beſides alſo, thoſe that by their atheiſm undermine and deſtroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration. As for other practical opinions, though not abſolutely free from all error, yet if they do not tend to eſtabliſh domination over others, or civil impunity to the church in which they are taught, there can be no reaſon why they ſhould not be tolerated.

IT remains that I ſay ſomething concerning thoſe aſſemblies, which being vulgarly called, and perhaps having ſometimes been conventicles, and nurſeries of factions and ſeditions, are thought to afford the ſtrongeſt matter of objection againſt this doctrine of toleration. But this has not happened by any thing peculiar unto the genius of ſuch aſſemblies, but by the unhappy circumſtances of an oppreſſed or ill-ſettled liberty. Theſe accuſations would ſoon ceaſe, if the law of toleration were once ſo ſettled, that all churches were obliged to lay down toleration as the foundation of their own liberty; and teach that liberty of conſcience is every man's natural right, equally belonging to diſſenters as to themſelves; and that no body ought to be compelled in matters of religion either by law or force. The eſtabliſhment of this one thing would take away all ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conſcience. And theſe cauſes of diſcontents and animoſities being once removed, there would remain nothing in theſe aſſemblies that were not more peaceable, and leſs apt to produce diſturbance of ſtate, than in any other meetings whatſoever. But let us examine particularly the heads of theſe accuſations.

YOU will ſay, that "aſſemblies and meetings endanger the publick peace, "and theaten the commonwealth." I anſwer: if this be ſo, why are there daily ſuch numerous meetings in markets, and courts of judicature? Why are crowds upon the Exchange, and a concourſe of people in cities ſuffered? You will reply; theſe are civil aſſemblies, but thoſe we object againſt, are eccleſiaſtical. I anſwer: it is a likely thing indeed, that ſuch aſſemblies as are altogether remote from civil affairs, ſhould be moſt apt to embroil them. O, but civil aſſemblies are compoſed of men that differ from one another in matters of religion; but theſe eccleſiaſtical meetings are of perſons that are all of one opinion.

nion. As if an agreement in matters of religion, were in effect a conſpiracy againſt the commonwealth: or as if men would not be ſo much the more warmly unanimous in religion, the leſs liberty they had of aſſembling. But it will be urged ſtill, that civil aſſemblies are open, and free for any one to enter into; whereas religious conventicles are more private, and thereby give opportunity to clandeſtine machinations. I anſwer, that this is not ſtrictly true: for many civil aſſemblies are not open to every one. And if ſome religious meetings be private, who are they, I beſeech you, that are to be blamed for it? thoſe that deſire, or thoſe that forbid their being publick? Again; you will ſay, that religious communion does exceedingly unite mens minds and affections to one another, and is therefore the more dangerous. But if this be ſo, why is not the magiſtrate afraid of his own church; and why does he not forbid their aſſemblies, as things dangerous to his government? You will ſay, becauſe he himſelf is a part, and even the head of them. As if he were not alſo a part of the commonwealth, and the head of the whole people.

LET us therefore deal plainly. The magiſtrate is afraid of other churches, but not of his own; becauſe he is kind and favourable to the one, but ſevere and cruel to the other. Theſe he treats like children, and indulges them even to wantonneſs. Thoſe he uſes as ſlaves; and how blameleſly ſoever they demean themſelves, recompenſes them no otherwiſe than by gallies, priſons, confiſcations and death. Theſe he cheriſhes and defends: thoſe he continually ſcourges and oppreſſes. Let him turn the tables: or let thoſe diſſenters enjoy but the ſame privileges in civils as his other ſubjects, and he will quickly find that theſe religious meetings will be no longer dangerous. For if men enter into ſeditious conſpiracies, it is not religion inſpires them to it in their meetings, but their ſufferings and oppreſſions that make them willing to eaſe themſelves. Juſt and moderate governments are every where quiet, every where ſafe. But oppreſſion raiſes ferments, and makes men ſtruggle to caſt off an uneaſy and tyrannical yoke. I know that ſeditions are very frequently raiſed upon pretence of religion. But it is as true, that, for religion, ſubjects are frequently ill treated, and live miſerably. Believe me, the ſtirs that are made, proceed not from any peculiar temper of this or that church or religious ſociety; but from the common diſpoſition of all mankind, who when they groan under any heavy burthen, endeavour naturally to ſhake off the yoke that galls their necks. Suppoſe this buſineſs of religion were let alone, and that there were ſome other diſtinction made between men and men, upon account of their different complexions, ſhapes, and features, ſo that thoſe who have black hair, for example, or grey eyes, ſhould not enjoy the ſame privileges as other citizens; that they ſhould not be permitted either to buy or ſell, or live by their callings; that parents ſhould not have the government and education of their own children; that they ſhould either be excluded from the benefit of the laws, or meet with partial judges: can it be doubted but theſe perſons, thus diſtinguiſhed from others by the colour of their hair and eyes, and united together be one common perſecution, would be as dangerous to the magiſtrate, as any others that had aſſociated themſelves merely upon the account of religion? Some enter into company for trade and profit: others, for want of buſineſs, have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins ſome, and religion others. But there is one only thing which gathers people into ſeditious commotions, and that is oppreſſion.

YOU will ſay; what, will you have people to meet at divine ſervice againſt the magiſtrate's will? I anſwer; why, I pray againſt his will? Is it not both lawful and neceſſary that they ſhould meet? Againſt his will, do you ſay? That is what I complain of. That is the very root of all the miſchief. Why are aſſemblies leſs ſufferable in a church than in a theatre or market? Thoſe that meet there are not either more vicious, or more turbulent, than thoſe that meet elſewhere. The buſineſs in that is, that they are ill uſed, and therefore they are not to be ſuffered. Take away the partiality that is uſed towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties unto which they are ſubjected, and all things will immediately become ſafe, and peaceable: nay, thoſe that are averſe to the religion of the magiſtrate, will think themſelves ſo much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth, as their condition is better in that place than elſewhere; and all the ſeveral ſeparate congregations, like ſo many guardians of the publick peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of the government: becauſe they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy; that is, an equal condition with their fellow-ſubjects, under a juſt and moderate government. Now if that church, which agrees in religion with the prince, be eſteemed the chief ſupport of any civil government, and that for no other reaſon, as has already been ſhewn, than becauſe the prince is kind, and the laws are favourable to it; how much greater will be the ſecurity of a government, where all good ſubjects, of whatſoever church they be, without any diſtinction upon account of religion, enjoying the ſame favour of the prince, and the ſame benefit of the laws, ſhall become the common ſupport and guard of it; and where none will have any occaſion to fear the ſeverity of the laws, but thoſe that do injuries to their neighbours, and offend againſt the civil peace?

THAT we may draw towards a concluſion. "The ſum of all we drive at is, "that every man enjoy the ſame rights that are granted to others." Is it permitted to worſhip God in the Roman manner? Let it be permitted to do it in the Geneva form alſo. Is it permitted to ſpeak Latin in the marketplace? Let thoſe that have a mind to it, be permitted to do it alſo in the church. Is it lawful for any man in his own houſe to kneel, ſtand, ſit, or uſe any other poſture; and to cloath himſelf in white or black, in ſhort or in long garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread, drink wine, or waſh with water in the church. In a word: whatſoever things are left free by law in the common occaſions of life, let them remain free unto every church in divine worſhip. Let no man's life, or body, or houſe, or eſtate, ſuffer any manner of prejudice upon theſe accounts. Can you allow of the Preſbyterian diſcipline? why ſhould not the Epiſcopal alſo have what they like? Eccleſiaſtical authority, whether it be adminiſtered by the hands of a ſingle perſon, or many, is every where the ſame; and neither has any juriſdiction in things civil, nor any manner of power of compulſion, nor any thing at all to do with riches and revenues.

ECCLESIASTICAL aſſemblies, and ſermons, are juſtified by daily experience, and publick allowance. Theſe are allowed to people of ſome one perſuaſion: why not to all? If any thing paſs in a religious meeting ſeditiouſly, and contrary to the publick peace, it is to be puniſhed in the ſame manner, and no otherwiſe, than as if it had happened in a fair or market. Theſe meetings ought not to be ſanctuaries of factious and flagitious fellows: nor ought it to be leſs lawful for men to meet in churches than in halls: nor are one part of the ſubjects to be eſteemed more blameable, for their meeting together, than others. Every one is to be accountable for his own actions; and no man is to be laid under a ſuſpicion, or odium, for the fault of another. Thoſe that are ſeditious, murderers, thieves, robbers, adulterers, ſlanderers, &c. of whatſoever church, whether national or not, ought to be puniſhed and ſuppreſſed. But thoſe whoſe doctrine is peaceable, and whoſe manners are pure and blameleſs, ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-ſubjects. Thus if ſolemn aſſemblies, obſervations of feſtivals, publick worſhip, be permitted to any one ſort of profeſſors; all theſe things ought to be permitted to the Preſbyterians, Independents, Anabaptiſts, Arminians, Quakers, and others, with the ſame liberty. Nay, if we may openly ſpeak the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, becauſe of his religion. The Goſpel commands no ſuch thing. The church, "which judgeth "not thoſe that are without," 1 Cor. v. wants is not. And the commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men that are honeſt, peaceable and induſtrious, requires is not. Shall we ſuffer a Pagan to deal and trade with us, and ſhall we not ſuffer him to pray unto and worſhip God? If we allow the Jews to have private houſes and dwellings amongſt us, why ſhould we not allow them to have ſynagogues? Is their doctrine more falſe, their worſhip more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered, by their meeting in publick than in their private houſes? But if theſe things may be granted to Jews and Pagans, ſurely the condition of any Chriſtians ought not to be worſe than theirs, in a Chriſtian commonwealth.

YOU will ſay, perhaps, yes, it ought to be: becauſe they are more inclinable to factions, tumults, and civil wars. I anſwer: is this the fault of the Chriſtian religion? If it be ſo, truly the Chriſtian religion is the worſt of all religions, and ought neither to be embraced by any particular perſon, nor tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be the genius, this the nature of the Chriſtian religion, to be turbulent, and deſtructive to the civil peace, that church itſelf which the magiſtrate indulges, will not always be innocent. But far be it from us to ſay any ſuch thing of that religion, which carries the greateſt oppoſition to covetouſneſs, ambition, diſcord, contention, and all manner of inordinate deſires; and is the moſt modeſt and peaceable religion that ever was. We muſt therefore ſeek another cauſe of thoſe evils that are charged upon religion. And if we conſider right, we ſhall find it conſiſt wholly in the ſubject that I am treating of. It is not the diverſity of opinions, which cannot be avoided, but the refuſal of toleration to thoſe that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced all the buſtles and wars, that have been in the Chriſtian world, upon account of religion. The heads and leaders of the church, moved by avarice and inſatiable deſire of dominion, making uſe of the immoderate ambition of magiſtrates, and the credulous ſuperſtition of the giddy multitude, have incenſed and animated them againſt thoſe that diſſent from themſelves; by preaching unto them, contrary to the laws of the Goſpel, and to the precepts of charity, that ſchiſmaticks and hereticks are to be outed of their poſſeſſions, and deſtroyed. And thus have they mixed together, and confounded two things, that are in themſelves moſt different, the church and the commonwealth. Now as it is very difficult for men patiently to ſuffer themſelves to be ſtript of the goods, which they have got by their honeſt induſtry; and contrary to all the laws of equity, both human and divine, to be delivered up for a prey to other mens violence and rapine, eſpecially when they are otherwiſe altogether blameleſs; and that the occaſion for which they are thus treated, does not at all belong to the juriſdiction of the magiſtrate, but intirely to the conſcience of every particular man; for the conduct of which he is accountable to God only; what elſe can be expected, but that theſe men, growing weary of the evils under which they labour, ſhould in the end think it lawful for them to reſiſt force with force, and to defend their natural rights, which are not forfeitable upon account of religion, with arms as well as they can? That this has been hitherto the ordinary courſe of things, is abundantly evident in hiſtory: and that it will continue to be ſo hereafter, is but too apparent in reaſon. It cannot indeed be otherwiſe, ſo long as the principle of perſecution for religion ſhall prevail, as it has done hitherto, with magiſtrate and people; and ſo long as thoſe that ought to be the preachers of peace and concord, ſhall continue, with all their art and ſtrength, to excite men to arms and ſound the trumpet of war. But that magiſtrates ſhould thus ſuffer theſe incendiaries, and diſturbers of the publick peace, might juſtly be wondered at, if it did not appear that they have been invited by them unto a participation of the ſpoil, and have therefore thought fit to make uſe of their covetouſneſs and pride, as means whereby to increaſe their own power. For who does not ſee that theſe good men are indeed more miniſters of the government, than miniſters of the Goſpel; and that by flattering the ambition, and favouring the dominion of princes and men in authority, they endeavour with all their might to promote that tyranny in the commonwealth, which otherwiſe they ſhould not be able to eſtabliſh in the church? This is the unhappy agreement that we ſee between the church and ſtate. Whereas if each of them would contain itſelf within its own bounds, the one attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the ſalvation of ſouls, it is impoſſible that any diſcord ſhould ever have happened between them. "Sed pudet "haec opprobria, etc." God Almighty grant, I beſeech him, that the Goſpel of peace may at length be preached, and that civil magiſtrates, growing more careful to conform their own conſciences to the law of God, and leſs ſolicitous about the binding of other mens conſciences by human laws, may, like fathers of their country, direct all their counſels and endeavours to promote univerſally the civil welfare of all their children; except only of ſuch as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to their brethren; and that all eccleſiaſtical men, who boaſt themſelves to be the ſucceſſors of the Apoſtles, walking peaceably and modeſtly in the Apoſtles ſteps, without intermeddling with ſtate-affairs, may apply themſelves wholly to promote the ſalvation of ſouls. Farewel.

PERHAPS it may not be amiſs to add a few things concerning hereſy and ſchiſm. A Turk is not, nor can be either heretick or ſchiſmatick, to a Chriſtian: and if any man fall off from the Chriſtian faith to Mahometiſm, he does not thereby become a heretick, or a ſchimatick, but an apoſtate and an infidel. This no body doubts of. And by this it appears that men of different religions cannot be hereticks or ſchiſmaticks to one another.

WE are to enquire therefore, what men are of the ſame religion. Concerning which, it is manifeſt that thoſe who have one and the ſame rule of faith and worſhip, are of the ſame religion: and thoſe who have not the ſame rule of faith and worſhip, are of different religions. For ſince all things that belong unto that religion are contained in that rule, it follows neceſſarily, that thoſe who agree in one rule are of one and the ſame religion: and vice verſa. Thus Turks and Chriſtians are of different religions: becauſe theſe take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their religion, and thoſe the Koran. And for the ſame reaſon, there may be different religions alſo even amongſt Chriſtians. The Papiſts and the Lutherans, though both of them profeſs faith in Chriſt, and are therefore called Chriſtians, yet are not both of the ſame religion: becauſe theſe acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be the rule and foundation of their religion; thoſe take in alſo traditions and decrees of popes, and of all theſe together make the rule of their religion. And thus the Chriſtians of St. John, as they are called, and the Chriſtians of Geneva are of different religions: becauſe theſe alſo take only the Scriptures; and thoſe, I know not what traditions; for the rule of their religion.

THIS being ſettled, it follows; Firſt, That hereſy is a ſeparation made in eccleſiaſtical communion between men of the ſame religion, for ſome opinions no way contained in the rule itſelf. And Secondly, That amongſt thoſe who acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule of faith, hereſy is a ſeparation made in their Chriſtian communion, for opinions not contained in the expreſs words of Scripture.

Now this ſeparation may be made in a twofold manner.

FIRT, When the greater part, or, by the magiſtrate's patronage, the ſtronger part, of the church ſeparates itſelf from others, by excluding them out of her communion, becauſe they will not profeſs their belief of certain opinions which are not to be found in the expreſs words of Scripture. For it is not the paucity of thoſe that are ſeparated, nor the authority of the magiſtrate, that can make any man guilty of hereſy. But he only is an heretick who divides the church into parts, introduces names and marks of diſtinction, and voluntarily makes a ſeparation becauſe of ſuch opinions.

Secondly, When any one ſeparates himſelf from the communion of a church, becauſe that church does not publickly profeſs ſome certain opinions which the Holy Scriptures do not expreſly teach.

Both theſe are "hereticks, becauſe they err in fundamentals, and they err "obſtinately againſt knowledge." For when they have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith, they nevertheleſs lay down certain propoſitions as fundamental, which are not in the Scripture; and becauſe others will not acknowledge theſe additional opinions of theirs, nor build upon them as if they were neceſſary and fundamental, they therefore make a ſeparation in the church; either by withdrawing themſelves from the others, or expelling the others from them. Nor does it ſignify any thing for them to ſay that their confeſſions and ſymbols are agreeable to Scripture, and to the analogy of faith. For if they be conceived in the expreſs words of Scripture, there can be no queſtion about them; becauſe thoſe are acknowledged by all Chriſtians to be of divine inſpiration, and therefore fundamental. But if they ſay that the articles which they require to be profeſſed, are conſequences deduced from the Scripture; it is undoubtedly well done of them to believe and profeſs ſuch things as ſeem unto them ſo agreeable to the rule of faith: but it would be very ill done to obtrude thoſe things upon others, unto whom they do not ſeem to be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture. And to make a ſeparation for ſuch things as theſe, which neither are nor can be fundamental, is to become hereticks. For I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madneſs, as that he dare give out his conſequences and interpretations of Scripture as divine inſpirations, and compare the articles of faith that he has framed according to his own fancy, with the authority of the Scripture. I know there are ſome propoſitions ſo evidently agreeable to Scripture, that no body can deny them to be drawn from thence: but about thoſe therefore there can be no difference. This only I ſay, that however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to impoſe it upon others, as a neceſſary article of faith, becauſe we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith; unleſs we would be content alſo that other doctrines ſhould be impoſed upon us in the ſame manner; and that we ſhould be compelled to receive and profeſs all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans, Calviniſts, Remonſtrants, Anabaptiſts, and other ſects, which the contrivers of ſymbols, ſyſtems, and confeſſions, are accuſtomed to deliver unto their followers as genuine and neceſſary deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant arrogance of thoſe men who think that they themſelves can explain things neceſſary to ſalvation more clearly than the Holy Ghoſt, the eternal and infinite wiſdom of God.

Thus much concerning hereſy; which word in common uſe is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion. Let us now conſider ſchiſm, which is a crime near a-kin to it. For both thoſe words ſeem unto me to ſignify an "ill-grounded ſeparation in eccleſiaſtical communion, made about things not "neceſſary." But ſince uſe, which is the ſupreme law in matter of language,

guage, has determined that hereſy, relates to errors in faith, and ſchiſm to thoſe in worſhip or diſcipline, we muſt conſider them under that diſtinction.

SCHISM then, for the ſame reaſons that have already been alledged, is nothing elſe but a ſeparation made in the communion of the church, upon account of ſomething in divine worſhip, or eccleſiaſtical diſcipline, that is not any neceſſary part of it. Now nothing in worſhip or diſcipline can be neceſſary to Chriſtian communion, but what Chriſt our legiſlator, or the Apoſtles, by inſpiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in expreſs words.

IN a word: he that denies not any thing that the Holy Scriptures teach in expreſs words, nor makes a ſeparation upon occaſion of any thing that is not manifeſtly contained in the ſacred text; however he may be nick-named by any ſect of Chriſtians, and declared by ſome, or all of them, to be utterly void of true Chriſtianity; yet in deed and in truth this man cannot be either a heretick or ſchiſmatick.

THESE things might have been explained more largely, and more advantageouſly; but it is enough to have hinted at them, thus briefly, to a perſon of your parts.

# A SECOND
# LETTER
# CONCERNING
# TOLERATION.

# A SECOND
# LETTER
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## To the Author of the Argument of the Letter, concerning Toleration, briefly conſidered and anſwered.

SIR,

YOU will pardon me if I take the ſame liberty with you, that you have done with the author of the Letter concerning Toleration; to conſider your arguments, and endeavour to ſhew you the miſtakes of them. For ſince you have ſo plainly yielded up the queſtion to him, and do own that "the ſeverities he would diſſuade Chriſtians from, are utterly unapt "and improper to bring men to embrace that truth which muſt ſave them:" I am not without ſome hopes to prevail with you, to do that yourſelf, which you ſay is the only juſtifiable aim of men differing about religion, even in the uſe of the ſevereſt methods: viz. carefully and impartially to weigh the whole matter, and thereby to remove that prejudice which makes you yet favour ſome remains of perſecution: promiſing myſelf that ſo ingenious a perſon will either be convinced by the truth which appears ſo very clear and evident to me; or elſe confeſs, that, were either you or I in authority, we ſhould very unreaſonably and very unjuſtly uſe any force upon the other, which differed from him, upon any pretence of want of examination. And if force be not to be uſed in your caſe or mine, becauſe unreaſonable, or unjuſt; you will, I hope, think fit that it ſhould be forborn in all others, where it will be equally unjuſt and unreaſonable; as I doubt not but to make it appear it will unavoidably be, wherever you will go about to puniſh men for want of conſideration. For the true way to try ſuch ſpeculations as theſe, is to ſee how they will prove when they are reduced into practice.

P. 12, 13, 14.

The firſt thing you ſeem ſtartled at, in the author's letter, is the largeneſs of the toleration he propoſes: and you think it ſtrange that he would not have ſo much as a "Pagan, Mahometan, or Jew, excluded from the civil "rights of the commonwealth, becauſe of his religion," p. 1. We pray every day for their converſion, and I think it our duty ſo to do: but it will, I fear, hardly be believed that we pray in earneſt, if we exclude them from the other ordinary and probable means of converſion; either by driving them from, or perſecuting them when they are amongſt us. Force, you allow, is improper to convert men to any religion. Toleration is but the removing that force. So that why thoſe ſhould not be tolerated as well as others, if you wiſh their converſion, I do not ſee. But you ſay, "It ſeems hard to conceive "how the author of that Letter ſhould think to do any ſervice to religion in "general, or to the Chriſtian religion, by recommending and perſuading ſuch "a toleration. For how much ſoever it may tend to the advancement of "trade and commerce, (which ſome ſeem to place above all other conſidera- "tions) I ſee no reaſon, from any experiment that has been made, to expect "that true religion would be a gainer by it; that it would be either the better "preſerved, the more widely propagated, or rendered any whit the more "fruitful in the lives of its profeſſors by it." Before I come to your doubt itſelf, "Whether true religion would be a gainer by ſuch a toleration;" give me leave to take notice, that if, by other conſiderations, you mean any thing but religion, your parentheſis is wholly beſide the matter; and that if you do not know that the author of the Letter places the advancement of trade above religion, your inſinuation is very uncharitable. But I go on. P. 2.

"YOU ſee no reaſon, you ſay, from any experiment that has been made, "to expect that true religion would be a gainer by it." True religion and Chriſtian religion are, I ſuppoſe, to you and me, the ſame thing. But of this you have an experiment in its firſt appearance in the world, and ſeveral hundreds of years after. It was then "better preſerved, more widely propagated, in proportion, and rendered more fruitful in the lives of its profeſ- "ſors," than ever ſince; though then Jews and Pagans were tolerated, and more than tolerated by the governments of thoſe places where it grew up. I hope you do not imagine the Chriſtian religion has loſt any of its firſt beauty, force, or reaſonableneſs, by having been almoſt two thouſand years in the world; that you ſhould fear it ſhould be leſs able now to ſhift for itſelf, without the help of force. I doubt not but you look upon it ſtill to be "the power "and wiſdom of God for our ſalvation;" and therefore cannot ſuſpect it leſs capable to prevail now, by its own truth and light, than it did in the firſt ages of the church, when poor contemptible men, without authority, or the countenance of authority, had alone the care of it. This, as I take it, has been made uſe of by Chriſtians generally, and by ſome of our church in particular, as an argument for the truth of the Chriſtian religion; that it grew and ſpread, and prevailed, without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being. And if it be a mark of the true religion, that it will prevail by its own light and ſtrength, but that falſe religions will not, but have need of force and foreign helps to ſupport them, nothing certainly can be more for the advantage of true religion, than to take away compulſion every where. And therefore it is no more "hard to conceive how the author "of the Letter ſhould think to do ſervice to religion in general, or to the "Chriſtian religion," than it is hard to conceive that he ſhould think there is a true religion, and that the Chriſtian religion is it; which its profeſſors have always owned not to need force, and have urged that as a good argument to prove the truth of it. The inventions of men in religion need the force and helps of men to ſupport them. A religion that is of God wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority to make it prevail. I gueſs, when this dropped from you, you had narrowed your thoughts to your own age and country: but if you will enlarge them a little beyond the confines of England, I do not doubt but you will eaſily imagine that if in Italy, Spain, Portugal, &c. the inquiſition; and in France their dragooning; and in other parts thoſe ſeverities that are uſed to keep or force men to the national religion, were taken away; and inſtead thereof the toleration propoſed by the author were ſet up; the true religion would be a gainer by it.

THE author of the Letter ſays, " Truth would do well enough, if ſhe were " once left to ſhift for herſelf. She ſeldom hath received, and he fears never " will receive, much aſſiſtance from the power of great men, to whom ſhe is " but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. Errors indeed prevail, by " the aſſiſtance of foreign and borrowed ſuccours. Truth makes way into " our underſtanding, by her own light, and is but the weaker for any borrowed force that violence can add to her." Theſe words of his, how hard ſoever they may ſeem to you, may help you to conceive how he ſhould think to do ſervice to true religion, by recommending and perſuading ſuch a Toleration as he propoſed. And now, pray tell me yourſelf, whether you do not think true religion would be a gainer by it, if ſuch a toleration eſtabliſhed there, would permit the doctrine of the church of England to be freely preached, and its worſhip ſet up, in any Popiſh, Mahometan, or Pagan country? If you do not, you have a very ill opinion of the religion of the church of England, and muſt own that it can only be propagated and ſupported by force. If you think it would gain in thoſe countries, by ſuch a toleration, you are then of the author's mind, and do not find it ſo hard to conceive how the recommending ſuch a toleration, might do ſervice to that which you think true religion. But if you allow ſuch a toleration uſeful to truth in other countries, you muſt find ſomething very peculiar in the air, that muſt make it leſs uſeful to truth in England. And it will ſavour of much partiality, and be too abſurd, I fear, for you to own, that toleration will be advantageous to true religion all the world over, except only in this iſland; though, I much ſuſpect, this, as abſurd as it is, lies at the bottom; and you build all you ſay, upon this lurking ſuppoſition, that the national religion now in England, backed by the publick authority of the law, is the only true religion, and therefore no other is to be tolerated. Which being a ſuppoſition equally unavoidable, and equally juſt in other countries, unleſs we can imagine that every where but in England men believe what at the ſame time they think to be a lie, will in other places exclude toleration, and thereby hinder truth from the means of propagating itſelf.

WHAT the fruits of Toleration are, which in the next words you complain do " remain ſtill among us," and which you ſay, " give no encouragement " to hope for any advantages from it?" what fruits, I ſay, theſe are, or whether they are owing to the want or wideneſs of Toleration among us, we ſhall then be able to judge, when you tell us what they are. In the mean time I will boldly ſay, that if the magiſtrates will ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt vice, in whomſoever it is found; and leave men to their own conſciences, in their articles of faith, and ways of worſhip; “ true religion “ will be ſpread wider, and be more fruitful in the lives of its profeſſors,” than ever hitherto it has been, by the impoſition of creeds and ceremonies.

P. 7. You tell us, “ that no man can fail of finding the way of ſalvation, who “ ſeeks it as he ought.” I wonder you had not taken notice, in the places you quote for this, how we are directed there to the right way of ſeeking. The words, John vii. 17. are, “ If any man will do his will, he ſhall know “ of the doctrine whether it be of God.” And, Pſalm xxv. 9, 12, 14. which are alſo quoted by you, tell us, “ The meek will he guide in judgment, “ and the meek will he teach his way. What man is he that feareth the “ Lord, him ſhall he teach in the way that he ſhall chuſe. The ſecret of “ the Lord is with them that fear him, and he will ſhew them his covenant.” So that theſe places, if they prove what you cite them for, “ that no man can “ fail of finding the way of ſalvation, who ſeeks it as he ought;” they do alſo prove, that a good life is the only way to ſeek as we ought, and that therefore the magiſtrates, if they would put men upon ſeeking th way of ſalvation as they ought, ſhould, by their laws and penalties, force them to a good life; a good converſation being the readieſt and ſureſt way to a right underſtanding. Puniſhments and ſeverities thus applied, we are ſure, are both practicable, juſt, and uſeful. How puniſhments will prove in the way you contend for, we ſhall ſee when we come to conſider it.

HAVING given us theſe broad marks of your good-will to Toleration, you P. 3. tell us, “ It is not your deſign to argue againſt it, but only to inquire what “ our author offers for the proof of his aſſertion.” And then you give us this ſcheme of his argument.

1. “ THERE is but one way of ſalvation, or but one true religion.
2. “ No man can be ſaved by this religion, who does not believe it to be “ the true religion.
3. “ THIS belief is to be wrought in men by reaſon and argument, not by “ outward force and compulſion.
4. “ THEREFORE all ſuch force is utterly of no uſe for the promoting true “ religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls.
5. “ AND therefore no body can have any right to uſe any force or com-“ pulſion, for the bringing men to the true religion.”

AND you tell us, “ the whole ſtrength of what that Letter urged for the “ purpoſe of it, lies in this argument,” which I think you have no more reaſon to ſay, than if you ſhould tell us, that only one beam of a houſe had any ſtrength in it, when there are ſeveral others that would ſupport the building, were that gone.

THE purpoſe of the Letter is plainly to defend Toleration, exempt from all force; eſpecially civil force, or the force of the magiſtrate. Now if it be a true conſequence “ that men muſt be tolerated, if magiſtrates have no com-

" miſſion or authority to puniſh them for matters of religion;" then the only ſtrength of that letter lies not in the unfitneſs of force to convince mens underſtanding. See Letter, p. 350.

AGAIN; if it be true that " magiſtrates being as liable to error as the reſt " of mankind, their uſing of force in matters of religion, would not at all " advance the ſalvation of mankind," allowing that even force could work upon them, and magiſtrates had authority to uſe it in religion, then the argument you mention is not " the only one in that Letter, of ſtrength to prove " the neceſſity of toleration." See Letter, p. 351. For the argument of the unfitneſs of force to convince mens minds being quite taken away, either of the other would be a ſtrong proof for toleration. But let us conſider the argument as you have put it.

" THE two firſt propoſitions, you ſay, you agree to." As to the third, you grant " that force is very improper to be uſed to induce the mind to aſ" ſent to any truth." But yet you deny, " that force is utterly uſeleſs for the " promoting true religion, and the ſalvation of mens ſouls;" which you call the author's fourth propoſition; but indeed that is not the author's fourth propoſition, or any propoſition of his, to be found in the pages you quote, or any where elſe in the whole Letter, either in thoſe terms, or in the ſenſe you take it. In page 351, which you quote, the author is ſhewing that the magiſtrate has no power, that is not right, to make uſe of force in matters of religion, for the ſalvation of mens ſouls. And the reaſon he gives for it there, is, becauſe force has no efficacy to convince mens minds; and that without a full perſuaſion of the mind, the profeſſion of the true religion itſelf is not acceptable to God. " Upon this ground, ſays he, I affirm that the magiſ" trate's power extends not to the eſtabliſhing any articles of faith, or forms " of worſhip, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all with" out penalties; and penalties in this caſe are abſolutely impertinent, becauſe " they are not proper to convince the mind." And ſo again, p. 363, which is the other place you quote, the author ſays; " Whatſoever may be doubted " in religion, yet this at leaſt is certain; that no religion which I believe not " to be true, can be either true, or profitable unto me. In vain therefore do " princes compel their ſubjects to come into their church-communion, under " the pretence of ſaving their ſouls." And more to this purpoſe. But in neither of thoſe paſſages, nor any where elſe, that I remember, does the author ſay that it is impoſſible that force ſhould any way, at any time, upon any perſon, by any accident, be uſeful towards the promoting of true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls; for that is it which you mean by " utterly of no " uſe." He does not deny that there is any thing which God in his goodneſs does not, or may not, ſometimes graciouſly make uſe of, towards the ſalvation of mens ſouls, as our Saviour did of clay and ſpittle to cure blindneſs, and that ſo, force alſo may be ſometimes uſeful. But that which he denies, and you grant, is, that force has any proper efficacy to enlighten the underſtanding, or produce belief. And from thence he infers, that therefore the magiſtrate cannot lawfully compel men in matters of religion. This P. 4.

is what the author ſays, and what I imagine will always hold true, whatever you or any one can ſay or think to the contrary.

P. 5. THAT which you ſay is, "Force indirectly, and at a diſtance may do ſome "ſervice." What you mean by doing ſervice at a diſtance, towards the bringing men to ſalvation, or to embrace the truth, I confeſs I do not underſtand; unleſs perhaps it be what others, in propriety of ſpeech, call by accident. But be it what it will, it is ſuch a ſervice as cannot be aſcribed to the direct and proper efficacy of force. And ſo, ſay you, "Force, indirectly, and at a "diſtance, may do ſome ſervice." I grant it: make your beſt of it. What do you conclude from thence, to your purpoſe? That therefore the magiſtrate may make uſe of it? That I deny, that ſuch an indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, will authorize the civil power in the uſe of it, that will never be proved. Loſs of eſtate and dignities may make a proud man humble: ſufferings and impriſonment may make a wild and debauched man ſober: and ſo theſe things may "indirectly, and at a diſtance, be ſerviceable towards "the ſalvation of mens ſouls." I doubt not but God has made ſome, or all of theſe, the occaſions of good to many men. But will you therefore infer, that the magiſtrate may take away a man's honour, or eſtate, or liberty, for the ſalvation of his ſoul; or torment him in this, that he may be happy in the other world? What is otherwiſe unlawful in itſelf, as it certainly is to puniſh a man without a fault, can never be made lawful by ſome good that, indirectly, and at a diſtance, or if you pleaſe, indirectly and by accident, may follow from it. Running a man through, may ſave his life, as it has done by chance, opening a lurking impoſthume. But will you ſay therefore, that this is lawful, juſtifiable chirurgery? The gallies, it is like, might reduce many a vain, looſe Proteſtant to repentance, ſobriety of thought, and a true ſenſe of religion: and the torments they ſuffered in the late perſecution, might make ſeveral conſider the pains of hell, and put a due eſtimate of vanity and contempt on all things of this world. But will you ſay, becauſe thoſe puniſhments might, indirectly, and at a diſtance, ſerve to the ſalvation of mens ſouls, that therefore the king of France had right and authority to make uſe of them? If your indirect and at a diſtance ſerviceableneſs, may authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force in religion, all the cruelties uſed by the Heathens againſt Chriſtians, by Papiſts againſt Proteſtants, and all the perſecuting of Chriſtians one among another, are all juſtifiable.

BUT what if I ſhould tell you now of other effects, contrary effects, that puniſhments in matters of religion may produce; and ſo may ſerve to keep men from the truth and from ſalvation? What then will become of your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs? For in all pleas for any thing becauſe of its uſefulneſs, it is not enough to ſay as you do, and is the utmoſt that can

P. 5. be ſaid for it, that it may be ſerviceable: but it muſt be conſidered not only what it may, but what it is likely to produce: and the greater good or harm like to come from it, ought to determine the uſe of it. To ſhew you what effects one may expect from force, of what uſefulneſs it is to bring

P. 13. men to embrace the truth, be pleaſed to read what you yourſelf have writ. "I cannot but remark, ſay you, that theſe methods (viz. depriving men of

“ eſtates, corporal puniſhment, ſtarving and tormenting them in priſons, and “ in the end even taking away their lives, to make them Chriſtians) are ſo “ very improper in reſpect to the deſign of them, that they uſually produce “ the quite contrary effect. For whereas all the uſe which force can have for “ the advancing true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, is (as has already “ been ſhewed) by diſpoſing men to ſubmit to inſtruction, and to give a fair “ hearing to the reaſons which are offered for the enlightning their minds, “ and diſcovering the truth to them; theſe cruelties have the misfortune to “ be commonly looked upon as ſo juſt a prejudice againſt any religion that uſes “ them, as makes it needleſs to look any farther into it; and to tempt men “ to reject it, as both falſe and deteſtable, without ever vouchſafing to con-“ ſider the rational grounds and motives of it. This effect they ſeldom fail “ to work upon the ſufferers of them. And as to the ſpectators, if they be “ not beforehand well inſtructed in thoſe grounds and motives, they will be “ much tempted likewiſe, not only to entertain the ſame opinion of ſuch a “ religion, but withal to judge much more favourably of that of the ſufferers; “ who they will be apt to think, would not expoſe themſelves to ſuch ex-“ tremities, which they might avoid by compliance, if they were not tho-“ roughly ſatisfied of the juſtice of their cauſe.” Here then you allow that taking away mens eſtates, or liberty, and corporal puniſhments, are apt to drive away both ſufferers and ſpectators from the religion that makes uſe of them, rather than to it. And ſo theſe you renounce. Now if you give up puniſhments of a man, in his perſon, liberty, and eſtate, I think we need not ſtand with you, for any other puniſhments may be made uſe of. But, by what follows, it ſeems you ſhelter yourſelf under the name of ſeverities. For moderate puniſhments, as you call them in another place, you think may be ſerviceable; indirectly, and at a diſtance ſerviceable, to bring men to the truth. And I ſay, any ſort of puniſhments diſproportioned to the offence, or where there is no fault at all, will always be ſeverity, unjuſtifiable ſeverity, and will be thought ſo by the ſufferers and by-ſtanders; and ſo will uſually produce the effects you have mentioned, contrary to the deſign they are uſed for. Not to profeſs the national faith, whilſt one believes it not to be true; not to enter into church-communion with the magiſtrate as long as one judges the doctrine there profeſſed to be erroneous, or the worſhip not ſuch as God has either preſcribed, or will accept; this you allow, and all the world with you muſt allow, not to be a fault. But yet you would have men puniſhed for not being of the national religion; that is, as you yourſelf confeſs, for no fault at all. Whether this be not ſeverity, nay ſo open and P. 14. avowed injuſtice, that it will give men a juſt prejudice againſt the religion that uſes it, and produce all thoſe ill effects you there mention, I leave you to conſider. So that the name of ſeverities, in oppoſition to the moderate puniſhments you ſpeak for, can do you no ſervice at all. For where there is no fault, there can be no moderate puniſhment: all puniſhment is immoderate, where there is no fault to be puniſhed. But of your moderate puniſhment we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more in another place. It ſuffices here to have ſhewn, that, whatever puniſhments you uſe, they are as likely to drive men from the religion that uſes them, as to bring them to the truth; and much more likely, as we ſhall ſee before we have done: and ſo by your own confeſſion, they are not to be uſed.

ONE thing in this paſſage of the author, it ſeems, appears abſurd to you; that he ſhould ſay, "That to take away mens lives, to make them Chriſtians, "was but an ill way of expreſſing a deſign of their ſalvation." I grant there is great abſurdity ſomewhere in the caſe. But it is in the practice of thoſe who, perſecuting men under a pretence of bringing them to ſalvation, ſuffer the temper of their good-will to betray itſelf, in taking away their lives. And whatever abſurdities there be in this way of proceeding, there is none in the author's way of expreſſing it; as you would more plainly have ſeen, if you had looked into the Latin original, where the words are, "Vitâ denique ipſâ "privant, ut fideles, ut ſalvi fiant," p. 317. which though more literally, might be thus rendered, "To bring them to the faith and to ſalvation;" yet the tranſlator is not to be blamed, if he choſe to expreſs the ſenſe of the author, in words that very livelily repreſented the extreme abſurdity they are guilty of, who under pretence of zeal for the ſalvation of ſouls, proceed to the taking away their lives. An example whereof we have in a neighbouring country, where the prince declares he will have all his diſſenting ſubjects ſaved, and purſuant thereunto has taken away the lives of many of them. For thither at laſt perſecution muſt come; as I fear, notwithſtanding your talk of moderate puniſhments, you yourſelf intimate in theſe words; "Not "that I think the ſword is to be uſed in this buſineſs, (as I have ſufficiently "declared already) but becauſe all coactive power reſolves at laſt into the "ſword; ſince all (I do not ſay, that will not be reformed in this matter by "leſſer penalties, but) that refuſe to ſubmit to leſſer penalties, muſt at laſt "fall under the ſtroke of it." In which words, if you mean any thing to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeem to have a reſerve for greater puniſhments, when leſſer are not ſufficient to bring men to be convinced. But let that paſs. P. 25

P. 5 YOU ſay, "If force be uſed, not inſtead of reaſon and arguments, that is, "not to convince by its own proper efficacy, which it cannot do," &c. I think thoſe who make laws, and uſe force, to bring men to church-conformity in religion, ſeek only the compliance, but concern themſelves not for the conviction of thoſe they puniſh; and ſo never uſe force to convince. For, pray tell me; when any diſſenter conforms, and enters into the church-communion, is he ever examined to ſee whether he does it upon reaſon, and conviction, and ſuch grounds as would become a Chriſtian concerned for religion? If perſecution, as is pretended, were for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, this would be done; and men not driven to take the ſacrament to keep their places, or to obtain licences to ſell ale, for ſo low have theſe holy things been proſtituted, who perhaps knew nothing of its inſtitution; and conſidered no other uſe of it but the ſecuring ſome poor ſecular advantage, which without taking of it they ſhould have loſt. So that this exception of yours, of the "uſe of force, inſtead of arguments, to convince men," I think is needleſs; thoſe who uſe it, not being, that ever I heard, concerned that men ſhould be convinced.

But you go on in telling us your way of uſing force, “only to bring men to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are proper and ſufficient to convince them; but which, without being forced, they would not conſider.” And, ſay you, “who can deny but that, indirectly, and at a diſtance, it does ſome ſervice, towards bringing men to embrace that truth, which either through negligence they would never acquaint themſelves with, or through prejudice they would reject and condemn unheard?” Whether this way of puniſhment is like to increaſe, or remove prejudice, we have already ſeen. And what that truth is, which you can poſitively ſay, any man, “without being forced by puniſhment, would through careleſſneſs never acquaint himſelf with,” I deſire you to name. Some are called at the third, ſome at the ninth, and ſome at the eleventh hour. And whenever they are called, they embrace all the truth neceſſary to ſalvation. But theſe ſlips may be forgiven, amongſt ſo many groſs and palpable miſtakes, as appear to me all through your diſcourſe. For example: you tell us that “force uſed to bring men to conſider, does indirectly, and at a diſtance ſome ſervice.” Here now you walk in the dark, and endeavour to cover yourſelf with obſcurity, by omitting two neceſſary parts. As firſt, who muſt uſe this force: which, though you tell us not here, yet by other parts of your treatiſe it is plain you mean the magiſtrate. And, ſecondly, you omit to ſay upon whom it muſt be uſed, who it is muſt be puniſhed: and thoſe, if you ſay any thing to your purpoſe, muſt be diſſenters from the national religion, thoſe who come not into church-communion with the magiſtrate. And then your propoſition, in fair plain terms, will ſtand thus. “If the magiſtrate puniſh diſſenters, only to bring them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper to convince them; who can deny but that indirectly, and at a diſtance, it may do ſervice, &c. towards bringing men to embrace that truth which otherwiſe they would never be acquainted with?” &c. In which propoſition, 1. There is ſomething impracticable. 2. Something unjuſt. And, 3. Whatever efficacy there is in force, your way applied, to bring men to conſider and be convinced, it makes againſt you. P. 5.

1. It is impracticable to puniſh diſſenters, as diſſenters, only to make them conſider. For if you puniſh them as diſſenters, as certainly you do, if you puniſh them alone, and them all without exception, you puniſh them for not being of the national religion. And to puniſh a man for not being of the national religion, is not to puniſh him only to make him conſider; unleſs not to be of the national religion, and not to conſider, be the ſame thing. But you will ſay, the deſign is only to make diſſenters conſider; and therefore they may be puniſhed only to make them conſider. To this I reply; it is impoſſible you ſhould puniſh one with a deſign only to make him conſider, whom you puniſh for ſomething elſe beſides want of conſideration; or if you puniſh him whether he conſider or no; as you do, if you lay penalties on diſſenters in general. If you ſhould make a law to puniſh all ſtammerers; could any one believe you, if you ſaid it was deſigned only to make them leave ſwearing? Would not every one ſee it was impoſſible that puniſhment ſhould be only againſt ſwearing, when all ſtammerers were under the penalty? Such a

propoſal as this, is in itſelf, at firſt ſight, monſtrouſly abſurd. But you muſt thank yourſelf for it. For to lay penalties upon ſtammerers, only to make them not ſwear, is not more abſurd and impoſſible than it is to lay penalties upon diſſenters only to make them conſider.

2. TO puniſh men out of the communion of the national church, to make them conſider, is unjuſt. They are puniſhed becauſe out of the national church: and they are out of the national church, becauſe they are not yet convinced. Their ſtanding out therefore in this ſtate, whilſt they are not convinced, not ſatisfied in their minds, is no fault; and therefore cannot juſtly be puniſhed. But your method is, "Puniſh them, to make them con-" "ſider ſuch reaſons and arguments as are proper to convince them." Which is juſt ſuch juſtice, as it would be for the magiſtrate to puniſh you for not being a Carteſian, "only to bring you to conſider ſuch reaſons and arguments" "as are proper and ſufficient to convince you:" when it is poſſible, 1. That you being ſatisfied of the truth of your own opinion in philoſophy, did not judge it worth while to conſider that of Des Cartes. 2. It is poſſible you are not able to conſider, and examine, all the proofs and grounds upon which he endeavours to eſtabliſh his philoſophy. 3. Poſſibly you have examined, and can find no reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince you.

3. WHATEVER indirect efficacy there be in force, applied by the magiſtrate your way, it makes againſt you. "Force uſed by the magiſtrate to bring men" "to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are proper and ſufficient" "to convince them, but which without being forced they would not conſider;" "may, ſay you, be ſerviceable indirectly, and at a diſtance, to make men" "embrace the truth which muſt ſave them." And thus, ſay I, it may be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace falſhood, which will deſtroy them. So that force and puniſhment, by your own confeſſion, not being able directly, by its proper efficacy, to do men any good, in reference to their future eſtate; though it be ſure directly to do them harm, in reference to their preſent condition here; and indirectly, and in your way of applying it, being proper to do at leaſt as much harm as good; I deſire to know what the uſefulneſs is which ſo much recommends it, even to a degree that you pretend it needful and neceſſary. Had you ſome new untried chymical preparation, that was as proper to kill as to ſave an infirm man, of whoſe life I hope you would not be more tender than of a weak brother's ſoul, would you give it your child, or try it upon your friend, or recommend it to the world for its rare uſefulneſs? I deal very favourably with you, when I ſay as proper to kill as to ſave. For force, in your indirect way, of the magiſtrate's "apply-" "ing it to make men conſider thoſe arguments that otherwiſe they would not;" "to make them lend an ear to thoſe who tell them they have miſtaken their" "way, and offer to ſhew them the right;" I ſay, in this way, force is much more proper, and likely, to make men receive and embrace error than the truth.

1. BECAUSE men out of the right way are as apt, I think I may ſay apter, to uſe force, than others. For truth, I mean the truth of the Goſpel, which is that of the true religion, is mild, and gentle, and meek, and apter to uſe prayers and intreaties, than force, to gain a hearing.

2. BECAUSE the magiſtrates of the world, or the civil ſovereigns, as you think it more proper to call them, being few of them in the right way; not one of ten, take which ſide you will, perhaps you will grant not one of an hundred, being of the true religion; it is likely your indirect way of uſing of force would do an hundred, or at leaſt ten times as much harm as good: eſpecially if you conſider, that as the magiſtrate will certainly uſe it to force men to hearken to the proper miniſters of his religion, let it be what it will; ſo you having ſet no time, nor bounds, to this conſideration of arguments and reaſons, ſhort of being convinced; you, under another pretence, put into the magiſtrate's hands as much power to force men to his religion, as any the openeſt perſecutors can pretend to. For what difference, I beſeech you, between puniſhing you to bring you to maſs, and puniſhing you to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince you that you ought to go to maſs? For till you are brought to conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince you; that is, till you are convinced; you are puniſhed on. If you reply, you meant reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them of the truth. I anſwer, if you meant ſo, why did you not ſay ſo? But if you had, it would in this caſe do you little ſervice. For the maſs, in France, is as much ſuppoſed the truth, as the liturgy here. And your way of applying force will as much promote popery in France, as proteſtantiſm in England. And ſo you ſee how ſerviceable it is to make men receive and embrace the truth that muſt ſave them. P. 16.

HOWEVER you tell us, in the ſame page, that "if force ſo applied, as is "above-mentioned, may in ſuch ſort as has been ſaid, i. e. indirectly, and at a "diſtance, be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace truth, you think "it ſufficient to ſhew the uſefulneſs of it in religion:" where I ſhall obſerve, 1. That this uſefulneſs amounts to no more but this, that it is not impoſſible but that it may be uſeful. And ſuch a uſefulneſs one cannot deny to auricular confeſſion, doing of penance, going of a pilgrimage to ſome ſaint, and what not. Yet our church does not think fit to uſe them: though it cannot be denied, but they may have ſome of your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs; that is, perhaps may do ſome ſervice indirectly, and by accident. P. 5.

2. FORCE, your way applied, as it may be uſeful, ſo alſo it may be uſeleſs. For, 1. Where the law puniſhes diſſenters, without telling them it is to make them conſider, they may through ignorance and overſight neglect to do it, and ſo your force proves uſeleſs. 2. Some diſſenters may have conſidered already, and then force employed upon them muſt needs be uſeleſs; unleſs you can think it uſeful to puniſh a man to make him do that which he has done already. 3. God has not directed it: and therefore we have no reaſon to expect he ſhould make it ſucceſsful.

3. IT may be hurtful: nay it is likely to prove more hurtful than uſeful. 1. Becauſe to puniſh men for that, which it is viſible cannot be known whether they have performed or no, is ſo palpable an injuſtice, that it is likelier to give them an averſion to the perſons, and religion that uſes it, than to bring them to it. 2. Becauſe the greateſt part of mankind, being not

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able to diſcern betwixt truth and falſhood, that depend upon long and many proofs, and remote conſequences; nor have ability enough to diſcover the falſe grounds, and reſiſt the captious and fallacious arguments of learned men verſed in controverſies; are ſo much more expoſed, by the force which is uſed to make them hearken to the information and inſtruction of men appointed to it by the magiſtrate, or thoſe of his religion, to be led into falſhood and error, than they are likely this way to be brought to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them; by how much the national religions of the world are, beyond compariſon, more of them falſe or erroneous, than ſuch as have God for their author, and truth for their ſtandard. And that ſeeking and examining, without the ſpecial grace of God, will not ſecure even knowing and learned men from error; we have a famous inſtance in the two Reynolds, both ſcholars, and brothers, but one a proteſtant, the other a papiſt, who upon the exchange of papers between them, were both turned; but ſo that neither of them, with all the arguments he could uſe, could bring his brother back to the religion which he himſelf had found reaſon to embrace. Here was ability to examine and judge, beyond the ordinary rate of moſt men. Yet one of theſe brothers was ſo caught by the ſophiſtry and ſkill of the other, that he was brought into error, from which he could never again be extricated. This we muſt unavoidably conclude; unleſs we can think, that wherein they differed, they were both in the right; or that truth can be an argument to ſupport a falſhood; both which are impoſſible. And now, I pray, which of theſe two brothers would you have puniſhed, to make him bethink himſelf, and bring him back to the truth? For it is certain ſome ill-grounded cauſe of aſſent alienated one of them from it. If you will examine your principles, you will find that according to your rule, the papiſt muſt be puniſhed in England, and the proteſtant in Italy. So that, in effect, by your rule, paſſion, humour, prejudice, luſt, impreſſions of education, admiration of perſons, worldly reſpect, and the like incompetent motives, muſt always be ſuppoſed on that ſide on which the magiſtrate is not.

I HAVE taken the pains here, in a ſhort recapitulation, to give you the view of the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, which you make ſuch a noiſe with, and lay ſo much ſtreſs on. Whereby I doubt not but it is viſible, that its uſefulneſs and uſeleſſneſs laid in the balance againſt each other, the pretended uſefulneſs is ſo far from outweighing, that it can neither encourage nor excuſe the uſing of puniſhments; which are not lawful to be uſed in our caſe without ſtrong probability of ſucceſs. But when to its uſefulneſs miſchief is added, and it is evident that more, much more, harm may be expected from it than good; your own argument returns upon you. For if it be reaſonable to uſe it, becauſe it may be ſerviceable to promote true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls; it is much more reaſonable to let it alone, if it may be more ſerviceable to the promoting falſhood, and the perdition of ſouls. And therefore you will do well hereafter not to build ſo much on the uſefulneſs of force, applied your way, your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, which amounts but to the ſhadow and poſſibility of uſefulneſs, but with an overbalancing weight of miſchief and harm annexed to it. For upon a juſt eſtimate, this indirect, and at a diſtance, uſefulneſs, can directly go for nothing; or rather leſs than nothing.

BUT ſuppoſe force, applied your way, were as uſeful for the promoting true religion, as I ſuppoſe I have ſhewed it to be the contrary; it does not from thence follow that it is lawful and may be uſed. It may be very uſeful in a pariſh that has no teacher, or as bad as none, that a lay-man who wanted not abilities for it, for ſuch we may ſuppoſe to be, ſhould ſometimes preach to them the doctrine of the Goſpel, and ſtir them up to the duties of a good life. And yet this, (which cannot be denied, may be at leaſt "indi-"rectly, and at a diſtance, ſerviceable towards the promoting true religion, "and the ſalvation of ſouls,") you will not, I imagine, allow, for this uſefulneſs, to be lawful: and that, becauſe he has not commiſſion and authority to do it. The ſame might be ſaid of the adminiſtration of the ſacraments, and any other function of the prieſtly office. This is juſt our caſe. Granting force, as you ſay, indirectly, and at a diſtance, uſeful to the ſalvation of mens ſouls; yet it does not therefore follow that it is lawful for the magiſtrate to uſe it: becauſe, as the author ſays, the magiſtrate has no commiſſion or authority to do ſo. For however you have put it thus, as you have framed the author's argument, "force is utterly of no uſe for the promoting of true religion, "and the ſalvation of ſouls; and therefore no body can have any right to uſe "any force or compulſion for the bringing men to the true religion;" yet the author does not, in thoſe pages you quote, make the latter of theſe propoſitions an inference barely from the former; but makes uſe of it as a truth proved by ſeveral arguments he had before brought to that purpoſe. For though it be a good argument; it is not uſeful, therefore not fit to be uſed: yet this will not be good logick; it is uſeful, therefore any one has a right to uſe it. For if the uſefulneſs makes it lawful, it makes it lawful in any hands that can ſo apply it; and ſo private men may uſe it.

"WHO can deny, ſay you, but that force indirectly, and at a diſtance, may "do ſome ſervice towards the bringing men to embrace that truth, which other-"wiſe they would never acquaint themſelves with." If this be good arguing in you, for the uſefulneſs of force towards the ſaving of mens ſouls; give me leave to argue after the ſame faſhion. 1. I will ſuppoſe, which you will not deny me, that as there are many who take up their religion upon wrong grounds, to the endangering of their ſouls; ſo there are many that abandon themſelves to the heat of their luſts, to the endangering of their ſouls. 2. I will ſuppoſe, that as force applied your way is apt to make the inconſiderate conſider, ſo force applied another way is apt to make the laſcivious chaſte. The argument then, in your form, will ſtand thus: "Who can deny but that force, "indirectly, and at a diſtance may, by caſtration, do ſome ſervice towards bring-"ing men to embrace that chaſtity, which otherwiſe they would never acquaint "themſelves with." Thus, you ſee, "caſtration may, indirectly, and at a diſ-"tance, be ſerviceable towards the ſalvation of mens ſouls." But will you ſay, from ſuch an uſefulneſs as this, becauſe it may indirectly, and at a diſtance, conduce to the ſaving of any of his ſubjects ſouls, that therefore the magiſtrate has a right to do it, and may by force make his ſubjects eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven? It is not for the magiſtrate, or any body elſe, upon an imagination of its uſefulneſs, to make uſe of any other means for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, than what the author and finiſher of our faith hath directed. You may be miſtaken in what you think uſeful. Dives thought, and ſo perhaps ſhould you and I too, if not better informed by the Scriptures, that it would be uſeful to rouze and awaken men if one ſhould come to them from the dead. But he was miſtaken. And we are told, that if men will not hearken to Moſes and the prophets, the means appointed, neither will the ſtrangeneſs nor terror of one coming from the dead, perſuade them. If what we are apt to think uſeful, were thence to be concluded ſo, we ſhould I fear, be obliged to believe the miracles pretended to by the church of Rome. For miracles, we know, were once uſeful for the promoting true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls; which is more than you ſay for your political puniſhments: but yet we muſt conclude that God thinks them not uſeful now; unleſs we will ſay, that which without impiety cannot be ſaid; that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things does not now uſe all uſeful means for promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls. I think this conſequence will hold, as well as what you draw in near the ſame words.

LET us not therefore be more wiſe than our Maker, in that ſtupendious and ſupernatural work of our ſalvation. The ſcripture, that reveals it to us, contains all that we can know, or do, in order to it: and where that is ſilent, it is in us preſumption to direct. When you can ſhew any commiſſion in ſcripture, for the uſe of force to compel men to hear, any more than to embrace, the doctrine of others that differ from them, we ſhall have reaſon to ſubmit to it, and the magiſtrate have ſome ground to ſet up this new way of perſecution, But till then, it will be fit for us to obey that precept of the goſpel, which bids us "take heed what we hear," Mark iv. 24. So that hearing is not always ſo uſeful as you ſuppoſe. If it had, we ſhould never have had ſo direct a caution againſt it. It is not any imaginary uſefulneſs, you can ſuppoſe, which can make that a puniſhable crime, which the magiſtrate was never authorized to meddle with. "Go and teach all nations," was a commiſſion of our Saviour's: but there was not added to it, puniſh thoſe that will not hear and conſider what you ſay. No, but "if they will not receive "you, ſhake off the duſt of your feet;" leave them, and apply yourſelves to ſome others. And St. Paul knew no other means to make men hear, but the preaching of the goſpel; as will appear to any one who will read Romans x. 14, &c. "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God."

P. 6. YOU go on, and in favour of your beloved force you tell us that it is not only uſeful but needful. And here, after having at large, in the four following pages, ſet out the negligence or averſion, or other hinderances that keep men from examining, with that application and freedom of judgment they ſhould, the grounds upon which they take up and perſiſt in their religion; you come to conclude force neceſſary. Your words are: "If men are generally "averſe to a due conſideration of things, where they are moſt concerned to uſe "it; if they uſually take up their religion without examining it as they ought, (P. 10.)

"and then grow ſo opinionative and ſo ſtiff in their prejudice, that neither "the gentleſt admonitions, nor the moſt earneſt intreaties, ſhall ever prevail "with them afterwards to do it; what means is there left, beſides the grace "of God, to reduce thoſe of them that are got into a wrong way, but to lay "thorns and briars in it? That ſince they are deaf to all perſuaſions, the uneaſineſs they meet with may at leaſt put them to a ſtand, and incline them "to lend an ear to thoſe who tell them they have miſtaken their way, and offer "to ſhew them the right." What means is there left, ſay you, but force. What to do? "To reduce men, who are out of it, into the right way." So you tell us here. And to that, I ſay, there is other means beſides force; that which was appointed and made uſe of from the beginning, the preaching of the goſpel.

"But, ſay you, to make them hear, to make them conſider, to make them ex"amine, there is no other means but puniſhment; and therefore it is neceſſary."

I ANSWER, 1. What if God, for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, would not have men compelled to hear; but thought the good tidings of ſalvation, and the propoſals of life and death, means and inducements enough to make them hear, and conſider, now as well as heretofore? Then your means, your puniſhments, are not neceſſary. What if God would have men left to their freedom in this point, if they will hear, or if they will forbear, will you conſtrain them? Thus we are ſure he did with his own people: and this when they were in captivity, Ezek. xi. 5, 7. And it is very like were ill treated for being of a different religion from the national, and ſo were puniſhed as diſſenters. Yet then God expected not that thoſe puniſhments ſhould force them to hearken more than at other times: as appears by Ezek. iii. 2. And this alſo is the method of the Goſpel. "We are ambaſſa"dors for Chriſt; as if God did beſeech by us, we pray in Chriſt's ſtead," ſays St. Paul, 2 Cor. v. 20. If God had thought it neceſſary to have men puniſhed to make them give ear, he could have called magiſtrates to be ſpreaders and miniſters of the goſpel, as well as poor fiſhermen, or Paul a perſecutor, who yet wanted not power to puniſh where puniſhment was neceſſary, as is evident in Ananias and Sapphira, and the inceſtuous Corinthian.

2. WHAT if God, foreſeeing this force would be in the hands of men as paſſionate, humourſome, as liable to prejudice and error as the reſt of their brethren, did not think it a proper means to bring men into the right way?

3. WHAT if there be other means? Then yours ceaſes to be neceſſary, upon the account that there is no means left. For you yourſelf allow, "That "the grace of God is another means." And I ſuppoſe you will not deny it to be both a proper and ſufficient means; and which is more, the only means; ſuch means as can work by itſelf, and without which all the force in the world can do nothing. God alone can open the ear that it may hear, and open the heart that it may underſtand: and this he does in his own good time, and to whom he is graciouſly pleaſed; but not according to the will and fancy of man, when he thinks fit, by puniſhments, to compel his brethren. If God has pronounced againſt any perſon or people, what he did

againſt the Jews, (Iſa. vi. 10.) "Make the heart of this people fat, and make "their ears heavy, and ſhut their eyes; leſt they ſee with their eyes, and hear "with their ears, and underſtand with their hearts, and convert, and be "healed:" will all the force you can uſe, be a means to make them hear and underſtand, and be converted?

BUT, Sir, to return to your argument; you ſee "no other means left (taking the world as we now find it) to make men throughly and impartially "examine a religion, which they embraced upon ſuch inducements as ought "to have no ſway at all in the matter, and with little or no examination of the "proper grounds of it." And thence you conclude the uſe of force, by the magiſtrate upon diſſenters, neceſſary. And, I ſay, I ſee no other means left (taking the world as we now find it, wherein the magiſtrates never lay penalties, for matters of religion, upon thoſe of their own church, nor is it to be expected they ever ſhould;) "to make men" of the national church, any where, "throughly and impartially examine a religion, which they embraced upon ſuch "inducements, as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with "little or no examination of the proper grounds of it." And therefore, I conclude the uſe of force by diſſenters upon conformiſts neceſſary. I appeal to the world, whether this be not as juſt and natural a concluſion as yours. Though, if you will have my opinion, I think the more genuine conſequence is, that force, to make men examine matters of religion, is not neceſſary at all. But you may take which of theſe conſequences you pleaſe. Both of them, I am ſure, you cannot avoid. It is not for you and me, out of an imagination that they may be uſeful, or are neceſſary, to preſcribe means in the great and myſterious work of ſalvation, other than what God himſelf has directed. God has appointed force as uſeful or neceſſary, and therefore it is to be uſed; is a way of arguing, becoming the ignorance and humility of poor creatures. But I think force uſeful or neceſſary, and therefore it is to be uſed; has, methinks, a little too much preſumption in it. You aſk, "What means elſe is there left?" None, ſay I, to be uſed by man, but what God himſelf has directed in th ſcriptures, wherein are contained all the means and methods of ſalvation. "Faith "is the gift of God." And we are not to uſe any other means to procure this gift to any one, but what God himſelf has preſcribed. If he has there appointed that any ſhould be forced "to hear thoſe who tell them they have miſta- "ken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right;" and that they ſhould be puniſhed by the magiſtrate if they did not; it will be paſt doubt, it is to be made uſe of. But till that can be done, it will be in vain to ſay what other means is there left. If all the means God has appointed, to make men hear and conſider, be "exhortation in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon," &c. together with prayer for them, and the example of meekneſs and a good life; this is all ought to be done, "Whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear."

BY theſe means the Goſpel at firſt made itſelf to be heard through a great part of the world; and in a crooked and perverſe generation, led away by luſts, humours, and prejudice, as well as this you complain of, prevailed with men to hear and embrace the truth, and take care of their own ſouls; without the aſſiſtance of any ſuch force of the magiſtrate, which you now think needful. But whatever neglect or averſion there is in ſome men, impartially and throughly to be inſtructed; there will upon a due examination, I fear, be found no leſs a neglect and averſion in others, impartially and throughly to inſtruct them. It is not the talking even general truths in plain and clear language; much leſs a man's own fancies in ſcholaſtick or uncommon ways of ſpeaking, an hour or two, once a week in publick; that is enough to inſtruct even willing hearers in the way of ſalvation, and the grounds of their religion. They are not politick diſcourſes which are the means of right information in the foundations of religion. For with ſuch, ſometimes venting antimonarchical principles, ſometimes again preaching up nothing but abſolute monarchy and paſſive obedience, as the one or other have been in vogue, and the way to preferment, have our churches rung in their turns, ſo loudly, that reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth in the controverted points of religion, and to direct them in the right way to ſalvation, were ſcarce any where to be heard. But how many, do you think, by friendly and chriſtian debates with them at their houſes, and by the gentle methods of the Goſpel made uſe of in private converſation, might have been brought into the church; who, by railing from the pulpit, ill and unfriendly treatment out of it, and other neglects and miſcarriages of thoſe who claimed to be their teachers, have been driven from hearing them? Paint the defects and miſcarriages frequent on this ſide, as well as you have done thoſe on the other, and then do you, with all the world, conſider whether thoſe who you ſo handſomely declaim againſt, for being miſled by "education, paſſion, humour, prejudice, obſtinacy," &c. do deſerve all the puniſhment. Perhaps it will be anſwered; if there be ſo much toil in it, that particular perſons muſt be applied to, who then will be a miniſter? And what if a layman ſhould reply: if there be ſo much toil in it, that doubts muſt be cleared, prejudices removed, foundations examined, &c. who then will be a proteſtant? the excuſe will be as good hereafter for the one as for the other.

THIS new method of yours, which you ſay "no body can deny but that indirectly, and at a diſtance, it does ſome ſervice towards bringing men to embrace "the truth;" was never yet thought on by the moſt refined perſecutors. Though indeed it is not altogether unlike the plea made uſe of to excuſe the late barbarous uſage of the proteſtants in France, deſigned to extirpate the reformed religion there; from being a perſecution for religion. The French king requires all his ſubjects to come to maſs: thoſe who do not, are puniſhed with a witneſs. For what? Not for their religion, ſay the pleaders for that diſcipline, but for diſobeying the king's laws. So by your rule, the diſſenters, for thither you would, and thither you muſt come, if you mean any thing, muſt be puniſhed. For what? Not for their religion, ſay you, not for "following the light of their own reaſon, not for obeying the dictates of their own "conſciences." That you think not fit. For what then are they to be puniſhed? "To make them, ſay you, examine the religion they have embraced, and the "religion they have rejected." So that they are puniſhed, not for having offended againſt a law: for there is no law of the land that requires them to examine. And which now is the fairer plea, pray judge. You ought, indeed, to have the credit of this new invention. All other law-makers have conſtantly taken this method; that where any thing was to be amended, the fault was firſt declared, and then penalties denounced againſt all thoſe, who, after a time ſet, ſhould be found guilty of it. This the common ſenſe of mankind, and the very reaſon of laws, which are intended not for puniſhment, but correction, has made ſo plain, that the ſubtileſt and moſt refined law-makers have not gone out of this courſe, nor have the moſt ignorant and barbarous nations miſſed it. But you have outdone Solon and Lycurgus, Moſes and our Saviour, and are reſolved to be a law-maker of a way by yourſelf. It is an old and obſolete way, and will not ſerve your turn, to begin with warnings and threats of penalties to be inflicted on thoſe who do not reform, but continue to do that which you think they fail in. To allow of impunity to the innocent, or the opportunity of amendment to thoſe who would avoid the penalties, are formalities not worth your notice. You are for a ſhorter and ſurer way. Take a whole tribe, and puniſh them at all adventures; whether guilty or no, of the miſcarriage which you would have amended; or without ſo much as telling them what it is you would have them do, but leaving them to find it out if they can. All theſe abſurdities are contained in your way of proceeding; and are impoſſible to be avoided by any one who will puniſh diſſenters, and only diſſenters, to make them "conſider and weigh "the grounds of their religion, and impartially examine whether it be true or no, "and upon what grounds they took it up, that ſo they may find and embrace the "truth that muſt ſave them." But that this new ſort of diſcipline may have all fair play, let us enquire firſt, who it is you would have be puniſhed. In the place above-cited, they are "thoſe who are got into a wrong way, and are deaf "to all perſuaſions." If theſe are the men to be puniſhed, let a law be made againſt them: you have my conſent; and that is the proper courſe to have offenders puniſhed. For you do not, I hope, intend to puniſh any fault by a law, which you do not name in the law; nor make a law againſt any fault you would not have puniſhed. And now, if you are ſincere, and in earneſt, and are, as a fair man ſhould be, for what your words plainly ſignify, and nothing elſe; what will ſuch a law ſerve for? Men in the wrong way are to be puniſhed: but who are in the wrong way is the queſtion. You have no more reaſon to determine it againſt one, who differs from you; than he has to conclude againſt you, who differ from him. No, not though you have the magiſtrate and the national church on your ſide. For, if to differ from them be to be in the wrong way; you, who are in the right way in England, will be in the wrong way in France. Every one here muſt be judge for himſelf: and your law will reach no body, till you have convinced him he is in the wrong way. And then there will be no need of puniſhment to make him conſider; unleſs you will affirm again, what you have denied, and have men puniſhed for embracing the religion they believe to be true, when it differs from yours or the publick.

P. 10.

BESIDES being in the wrong way, thoſe who you would have puniſhed muſt be ſuch as are deaf to all perſuaſions. But any ſuch, I ſuppoſe, you will hardly find, who hearken to no body, not to thoſe of their own way. If you mean by deaf to all perſuaſions, all perſuaſions of a contrary party, or of a different church; ſuch, I ſuppoſe, you may abundantly find in your own church, as well as elſewhere; and I preſume to them you are ſo charitable, that you would not have them puniſhed for not lending an ear to ſeducers. For conſtancy in the truth, and preſeverance in the faith, is, I hope, rather to be encouraged, than by any penalties checked in the orthodox. And your church, doubtleſs, as well as all others, is orthodox to itſelf in all its tenets. If you mean by all preſuaſion, all your perſuaſion, or all perſuaſion of thoſe of your communion; you do but beg the queſtion, and ſuppoſe you have a right to puniſh thoſe who differ from, and will not comply with you.

YOUR next words are, "When men fly from the means of a right informa- P. 11.
"tion, and will not ſo much as conſider how reaſonable it is, throughly and im-
"partially to examine a religion, which they embraced upon ſuch inducements
"as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no
"examination of the proper grounds of it; what human method can be uſed,
"to bring them to act like men, in an affair of ſuch conſequence, and to make
"a wiſer and more rational choice, but that of laying ſuch penalties upon them,
"as may balance the weight of thoſe prejudices which inclined them to prefer
"a falſe way before the true, and recover them to ſo much ſobriety and reflection,
"as ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves; whether it be really worth the
"while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion, which, for
"any thing they know, may be falſe, or for rejecting another (if that be the caſe)
"which, for any thing they know may be true, till they have brought it to the bar
"of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there?" Here you again bring in ſuch as prefer a falſe way before a true: to which having anſwered already, I ſhall here ſay no more, but that, ſince our church will not allow thoſe to be in a falſe way who are out of the church of Rome, becauſe the church of Rome, which pretends infallibility, declares hers to be the only true way; certainly no one of our church, nor any other, which claims not infallibility, can require any one to take the teſtimony of any church, as a ſufficient proof of the truth of her own doctrine. So that true and falſe, as it commonly happens, when we ſuppoſe them for ourſelves, or our party, in effect, ſignify juſt nothing, or nothing to the purpoſe; unleſs we can think that true or falſe in England, which will not be ſo at Rome, or Geneva: and vice verſâ. As for the reſt of the deſcription, of thoſe on whom you are here laying penalties; I beſeech you conſider whether it will not belong to any of your church, let it be what it will. Conſider, I ſay, if there be none in your church "who have embraced "her religion, upon ſuch inducements as ought to have no ſway at all in the "matter, and therefore with little or no examination of the proper grounds of "it, who have not been inclined by prejudices; who do not adhere to a religi"on, which for any thing they know may be falſe, and who have rejected ano"ther which for any thing they know may be true." If you have any ſuch in your communion, and it will be an admirable, though I fear but a little, flock that has none ſuch in it, conſider well what you have done. You have prepared rods for them, for which I imagine they will con you no thanks. For to make any tolerable ſenſe of what you here propoſe, it muſt be underſtood

that you would have men of all religions puniſhed, to make them conſider "whether it be really worth the while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies for adhering to a religion which for any thing they know may be falſe." If you hope to avoid that, by what you have ſaid of true and falſe; and pretend that the ſuppoſed preference of the true way in your church, ought to preſerve its members from your puniſhment; you manifeſtly trifle. For every church's teſtimony, that it has choſen the true way, muſt be taken for itſelf; and then none will be liable; and your new invention of puniſhment is come to nothing: or elſe the differing churches teſtimonies muſt be taken one for another; and then they will be all out of the true way, and your church need penalties as well as the reſt. So that, upon your principles, they muſt all or none be puniſhed. Chuſe which you pleaſe: one of them, I think, you cannot eſcape.

P. 11. WHAT you ſay in the next words; "Where inſtruction is ſtifly refuſed, "and all admonitions and perſuaſions prove vain and ineffectual;" differs nothing but in the way of expreſſing, from deaf to all perſuaſions: and ſo that is anſwered already.

P. 20. IN another place, you give us another deſcription of thoſe you think ought to be puniſhed, in theſe words; "Thoſe who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and "ſubmit to the ſpiritual government of the proper miniſters of religion, who by "ſpecial deſignation are appointed to exhort, admoniſh, reprove," &c. Here then, thoſe to be puniſhed, "are ſuch who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and "ſubmit to the government of the proper miniſters of religion." Whereby we are as much ſtill at uncertainty, as we were before, who thoſe are, who by your ſcheme, and laws ſuitable to it, are to be puniſhed. Since every church has, as it thinks, its proper miniſters of religion. And if you mean thoſe that rerefuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of the miniſters of another church; then all men will be guilty, and muſt be puniſhed; even thoſe of your church, as well as others. If you mean thoſe who refuſe, &c. the miniſters of their own church; very few will incur your penalties. But if, by theſe proper miniſters of religion, the miniſters of ſome particular church are intended, why do you not name it? Why are you ſo reſerved, in a matter wherein, if you ſpeak not out, all the reſt that you ſay will be to no purpoſe? Are men to be puniſhed for refuſing to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government, of the proper miniſters of the church of Geneva? For this time, ſince you have declared nothing to the contrary, let me ſuppoſe you of that church: and then, I am ſure, that is it that you would name. For of whatever church you are, if you think the miniſters of any one church ought to be hearkened to, and obeyed, it muſt be thoſe of your own. There are perſons to be puniſhed, you ſay. This you contend for, all through your book; and lay ſo much ſtreſs on it, that you make the preſervation and propagation of religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, to depend on it; and yet you deſcribe them by ſo general and equivocal marks; that, unleſs it be upon ſuppoſitions which no body will grant you, I dare ſay, neither you, nor any body elſe, will be able to find one guilty. Pray find me, if you can, a man whom you can judicially prove, for he that is to be puniſhed by law muſt be fairly tried, is in a wrong way, in reſpect of his faith; I mean, "who is deaf to "all perſuaſions, who flies from all means of a right information, who refuſes "to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of the ſpiritual paſtors." And when you have done that, I think, I may allow you what power you pleaſe to puniſh him; without any prejudice to the Toleration the author of the Letter propoſes.

BUT why, I pray, all this bogling, all this looſe talking, as if you knew not what you meant, or durſt not ſpeak it out? Would you be for puniſhing ſome body, you know not whom? I do not think ſo ill of you. Let me then ſpeak out for you. The evidence of the argument has convinced you that men ought not to be perſecuted for their religion; that the ſeverities in uſe amongſt Chriſtians cannot be defended; that the magiſtrate has not authority to compel any one to his religion. This you are forced to yield. But you would fain retain ſome power in the magiſtrate's hands to puniſh diſſenters, upon a new pretence; viz. not for having embraced the doctrine and worſhip they believe to be true and right, but for not having well conſidered their own and the magiſtrate's religion. To ſhew you that I do not ſpeak wholly without-book; give me leave to mind you of one paſſage of yours. The words are, "Penalties to put them upon a ſerious and impartial examination of P. 26.
"the controverſy between the magiſtrates and them." Though theſe words be not intended to tell us who you would have puniſhed, yet it may be plainly inferred from them. And they more clearly point out whom you aim at, than all the foregoing places, where you ſeem to, and ſhould, deſcribe them. For they are ſuch as between whom and the magiſtrate there is a controverſy: that is, in ſhort, who differ from the magiſtrate in religion. And now indeed you have given us a note by which theſe you would have puniſhed may be known. We have, with much ado, found out at laſt whom it is we may preſume you would have puniſhed. Which in other caſes is uſually not very difficult: becauſe there the faults to be mended eaſily deſign the perſons to be corrected. But yours is a new method, and unlike all that ever went before it.

IN the next place; let us ſee for what you would have them puniſhed. You tell us, and it will eaſily be granted you, that not to examine and weigh impartially, and without prejudice or paſſion, all which, for ſhortneſs-ſake, we will expreſs by this one word conſider, the religion one embraces or refuſes, is a fault very common, and very prejudicial to true religion, and the ſalvation of mens ſouls. But penalties and puniſhments are very neceſſary, ſay you, to remedy this evil.

LET us ſee now how you apply this remedy. Therefore, ſay you, let all diſſenters be puniſhed. Why? Have no diſſenters conſidered of religion? Or have all conformiſts conſidered? That you yourſelf will not ſay. Your project therefore is juſt as reaſonable, as if a lethargy growing epidemical in England; you ſhould propoſe to have a law made to bliſter and ſcarify and ſhave the heads of all who wear gowns: though it be certain that neither all who wear gowns are lethargick, nor all who are lethargick, wear gowns.

—— Dii te Damaſippe deaeque
Verum ob conſilium donent tonſore.

For there could not be certainly a more learned advice, than that one man ſhould be pulled by the ears, becauſe another is aſleep. This, when you have conſidered of it again, for I find, according to your principle, all men have now and then need to be jogged, you will, I gueſs, be convinced is not like a fair phyſician, to apply a remedy to a diſeaſe; but, like an enraged enemy, to vent one's ſpleen upon a party. Common ſenſe, as well as common juſtice, requires, that the remedies of laws and penalties ſhould be directed againſt the evil that is to be removed, wherever it be found. And if the puniſhment you think ſo neceſſary, be, as you pretend, to cure the miſchief you complain of, you muſt let it purſue and fall on the guilty, and thoſe only, in what company ſoever they are; and not, as you here propoſe, and is the higheſt injuſtice, puniſh the innocent conſidering diſſenter, with the guilty; and, on the other ſide, let the inconſiderate guilty conformiſt ſcape, with the innocent. For one may rationally preſume that the national church has ſome, nay more in proportion, of thoſe who little conſider or concern themſelves about religion, than any congregation of diſſenters. For conſcience, or the care of their ſouls, being once laid aſide; intereſt of courſe leads men into that ſociety, where the protection and countenance of the government, and hopes of preferment, bid faireſt to all their remaining deſires. So that if careleſs, negligent, inconſiderate men in matters of religion, who without being forced would not conſider, are to be rouzed into a care of their ſouls, and a ſearch after truth, by puniſhments; the national religion, in all countries, will certainly have a right to the greateſt ſhare of thoſe puniſhments; at leaſt, not to be wholly exempt from them.

THIS is that which the author of the Letter, as I remember, complains of; and that juſtly, viz. "That the pretended care of mens ſouls always expreſſes itſelf, in thoſe who would have force any way made uſe of to that end, in very unequal methods; ſome perſons being to be treated with ſeverity, whilſt others guilty of the ſame faults, are not to be ſo much as touched." Though you are got pretty well out of the deep mud, and renounce puniſhments directly for religion; yet you ſtick ſtill in this part of the mire; whilſt you would have diſſenters puniſhed to make them conſider, but would not have any thing done to conformiſts, though ever ſo negligent in this point of conſidering. The author's letter pleaſed me, becauſe it is equal to all mankind, is direct, and will, I think, hold every where; which I take to be a good mark of truth. For I ſhall always ſuſpect that neither to comport with the truth of religion, or the deſign of the Goſpel, which is ſuited to only ſome one country, or party. What is true and good in England, will be true and good at Rome too, in China, or Geneva. P. 12. But whether your great and only method for the propagating of truth, by bringing the inconſiderate by puniſhments to conſider, would, according to your way of applying your puniſhments only to diſſenters from the national religion, be of uſe in thoſe countries, or any where but where you ſuppoſe the magiſtrate to be in the right, judge you. Pray, Sir, conſider a little, whether prejudice has not ſome ſhare in your way of arguing. For this is your poſition? “Men are generally negligent in examining the grounds of their religion.” This I grant. But could there be a more wild and incoherent conſequence drawn from it, than this; “therefore diſſenters muſt be puniſhed?”

But that being laid aſide, let us now ſee to what end they muſt be puniſhed. Sometimes it is, “To bring them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments P. 5. which are proper and ſufficient to convince them.” Of what? That it is not eaſy to ſet Grantham ſteeple upon Paul's church? Whatever it be you would have them convinced of, you are not willing to tell us. And ſo it may be any thing. Sometimes it is, “To incline them to lend an ear to thoſe who tell them P. 10. they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right.” Which is, to lend an ear to all who differ from them in religion; as well crafty ſe- P. 27. ducers, as others. Whether this be for the procuring the ſalvation of their P. 23. ſouls, the end for which you ſay this force is to be uſed, judge you. But this I am ſure; whoever will lend an ear to all who will tell them they are out of the way, will not have much time for any other buſineſs.

Sometimes it is, “To recover men to ſo much ſobriety and reflection, as P. 11. ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves, whether it be really worth their while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion which, for any thing they know, may be falſe; or for rejecting another (if that be the caſe) which, for ought they know, may be true, till they have brought it to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there.” Which, in ſhort, amounts to thus much, viz. “to make them examine whether their religion be true, and ſo worth the holding, under thoſe penalties that are annexed to it.” Diſſenters are indebted to you for your great care of their ſouls. But what, I beſeech you, ſhall become of thoſe of the national church, every where, which make far the greater part of mankind, who have no ſuch puniſhments to make them conſider; who have not this only remedy provided for them; but are left in that deplorable condition you mention, “of being ſuffered quietly, and P. 27. without moleſtation, to take no care at all of their ſouls, or in doing of it to follow their own prejudices, humours, or ſome crafty ſeducers?” Need not thoſe of the national church, as well as others, “bring their religion to the bar of reaſon, and give it a fair trial there?” And if they need to do ſo, as they muſt, if all national religions cannot be ſuppoſed true, they will always P. 12. need that which, you ſay, is the only means to make them do ſo. So that if you are ſure, as you tell us, that there is need of your method; I am ſure there is as much need of it in national churches, as any other. And ſo, for ought I can ſee, you muſt either puniſh them, or let others alone; unleſs you think it reaſonable that the far greater part of mankind ſhould conſtantly be without that ſovereign and only remedy, which they ſtand in need of equally with other people.

Sometimes the end for which men muſt be puniſhed is, “to diſpoſe them P. 13. to ſubmit to inſtruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reaſons are offered for the enlightning their minds, and diſcovering the truth to them.” If their own words may be taken for it, there are as few diſſenters as conformiſts, in any country, who will not profeſs they have done, and do this. And if their own words may not be taken; who, I pray muſt be judge? You and your magiſtrates? If ſo, then it is plain you puniſh them not to diſpoſe them to ſubmit to inſtruction, but to your inſtruction; not to diſpoſe them to give a fair hearing to reaſons offered for the enlightning their minds, but to give an obedient hearing to your reaſons. If you mean this; it had been fairer and ſhorter to have ſpoken out plainly, than thus in fair words, of indefinite ſignification, to ſay that which amounts to nothing. For what ſenſe is it, to puniſh a man “to diſpoſe him to ſubmit to inſtruction, and give a fair hearing to reaſons offered for enlightning his mind, and diſcovering truth to him,” who goes two or three times a week ſeveral miles on purpoſe to do it, and that with the hazard of his liberty or purſe? Unleſs you mean your inſtructions, your reaſons, your truth: which brings us but back to what you have diſclaimed, plain perſecution for differing in religion.

P. 14. SOMETIMES this is to be done, “to prevail with men to weigh matters of religion carefully, and impartially.” Diſcountenance and puniſhment put into one ſcale, with impunity and hopes of preferment put into the other, is as ſure a way to make a man weigh impartially, as it would be for a prince to bribe and threaten a judge to make him judge uprightly.

P. 20. SOMETIMES it is, “To make men bethink themſelves, and put it out of the power of any fooliſh humour, or unreaſonable prejudice, to alienate them from truth and their own happineſs.” Add but this, to put it out of the power of any humour or prejudice of their own, or other mens; and I grant the end is good, if you can find the means to procure it. But why it ſhould not be put out of the power of other mens humour or prejudice, as well as their own, wants, and will always want, a reaſon to prove. Would it not, I beſeech you, to an indifferent bye-ſtander, appear humour or prejudice, or ſomething as bad; to ſee men, who profeſs a religion revealed from heaven, and which they own contains all in it neceſſary to ſalvation, exclude men from their communion, and perſecute them with the penalties of the civil law, for not joining in the uſe of ceremonies which are no where to be found in that revealed religion? Would it not appear humour or prejudice, or ſome ſuch thing, to a ſober impartial Heathen; to ſee Chriſtians exclude and perſecute one of the ſame faith, for things which they themſelves confeſs to be indifferent, and not worth the contending for? P. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. “Prejudice, humour, paſſion, luſts, impreſſions of education, reverence and admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, love of their own choice, and the like,” to which you juſtly impute many mens taking up, and perſiſting in their religion, are indeed good words; and ſo, on the other ſide, are theſe following; “truth the right way, enlightning reaſon, ſound judgment;” but they ſignify nothing at all to your purpoſe, till you can evidently and unqueſtionably ſhew the world that the latter, viz. “truth and the right way,” &c. are always, and in all countries, to be found only in the national church; and the former, viz. “paſſion and prejudice,” &c. only amongſt the diſſenters. But to go on:

P. 22. SOMETIMES it is, “to bring men to take ſuch care as they ought of their ſalvation.” What care is ſuch as men ought to take, whilſt they are out of your church, will be hard for you to tell me. But you endeavour to explain yourſelf,

ſelf, in the following words; "that they may not blindly leave it to the choice neither of any other perſon, nor yet of their own luſts and paſſions, to preſcribe to them what faith or what worſhip they ſhall embrace." You do well to make uſe of puniſhment to ſhut paſſion out of the choice: becauſe you know fear of ſuffering is no paſſion. But let that paſs. You would have men puniſhed, "to bring them to take ſuch care of their ſalvation, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any other perſon to preſcribe to them." Are you ſincere? Are you in earneſt? Tell me then truly: did the magiſtrate or national church, any where, or yours in particular, ever puniſh any man, to bring him to have this care, which, you ſay, he ought to take of his ſalvation? Did you ever puniſh any man, that he might not blindly leave it to the choice of his pariſh-prieſt, or biſhop, or the convocation, what faith or worſhip he ſhould embrace? It will be ſuſpected care of a party, or any thing elſe rather than care of the ſalvation of mens ſouls; if, having found out ſo uſeful, ſo neceſſary a remedy, the only method there is room left for, you will P. 12. apply it but partially, and make trial of it only on thoſe whom you have truly leaſt kindneſs for. This will, unavoidably, give one reaſon to imagine, you do not think ſo well of your remedy as you pretend, who are ſo ſparing of it to your friends; but are very free of it to ſtrangers, who in other things are uſed very much like enemies. But your remedy is like the helleboraſter, that grew in the woman's garden for the cure of worms in her neighbour's children; for truly it wrought too roughly, to give it to any of her own. Methinks your charity, in your preſent perſecution, is much what as prudent, as juſtifiable, as that good woman's. I hope I have done you no injury, that I here ſuppoſe you of the church of England. If I have, I beg your pardon. It is no offence of malice, I aſſure you: for I ſuppoſe no worſe of you, than I confeſs of myſelf.

Sometimes this puniſhment that you contend for, is "to bring men to P. 22. act according to reaſon and ſound judgment."

"Tertius è coelo cecidit Cato."

This is reformation indeed. If you can help us to it, you will deſerve ſtatues to be erected to you, as to the reſtorer of decayed religion. But if all men have not reaſon and ſound judgment, will puniſhment put it into them? Beſides, concerning this matter, mankind is ſo divided, that he acts according to reaſon and ſound judgment at Augſburg, who would be judged to do the quite contrary at Edinburgh. Will puniſhment make men know what is reaſon and ſound judgment? If it will not, it is impoſſible it ſhould make them act according to it. Reaſon and ſound judgment are the elixir itſelf, the univerſal remedy: and you may as reaſonably puniſh men to bring them to have the philoſopher's ſtone, as to bring them to act according to reaſon and ſound judgment.

Sometimes it is, "To put men upon a ſerious and impartial examination P. 26. of the controverſy between the magiſtrate and them, which is the way for them to come to the knowledge of the truth." But what if the truth be on neither ſide, as I am apt to imagine you will think it is not, where neither the magiſtrate nor the diſſenter is either of them of your church; how will the "examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and him be the way "to come to the knowledge of the truth?" Suppoſe the controverſy between a Lutheran and a Papiſt; or, if you pleaſe, between a Preſbyterian magiſtrate and a Quaker ſubject. Will the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and the diſſenting ſubject, in this caſe, bring him to the knowledge of the truth? If you ſay yes, then you grant one of theſe to have the truth on his ſide. For the examining the controverſy between a Preſbyterian and a Quaker, leaves the controverſy either of them has with the church of England, or any other church, untouched. And ſo one, at leaſt, of thoſe being already come to the knowledge of the truth, ought not to be put under your diſcipline of puniſhment; which is only to bring him to the truth. If you ſay no, and that the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and the diſſenter, in this caſe, will not bring him to the knowledge of the truth; you confeſs your rule to be falſe, and your method to no purpoſe.

To conclude, your ſyſtem is, in ſhort, this. You would have all men, laying aſide prejudice, humour, paſſion, &c. examine the grounds of their religion, and ſearch for the truth. This, I confeſs, is heartily to be wiſhed. The means that you propoſe to make men do this, is that diſſenters ſhould be puniſhed to make them do ſo. It is as if you had ſaid: Men generally are guilty of a fault; therefore let one ſect, who have the ill luck to to be of an opinion different from the magiſtrate, be puniſhed. This at firſt ſight ſhocks any who has the leaſt ſpark of ſenſe, reaſon, or juſtice. But having ſpoken of this already, and concluding that upon ſecond thoughts, you yourſelf will be aſhamed of it; let us conſider it put ſo as to be conſiſtent with common ſenſe, and with all the advantage it can bear; and then let us ſee what you can make of it. "Men are negligent in examining the religions they embrace, refuſe, or perſiſt in; therefore it is fit they ſhould be "puniſhed to make them do it." This is a conſequence indeed which may, without defiance to common ſenſe, be drawn from it. This is the uſe, the only uſe, which you think puniſhment can indirectly, and at a diſtance, have, in matters of religion. You would have men by puniſhments driven to examine. What? Religion. To what end? To bring them to the knowledge of the truth. But I anſwer,

1. EVERY one has not the ability to do this.
2. EVERY one has not the opportunity to do it.

WOULD you have every poor Proteſtant, for example, in the Palatinate, examine thoroughly whether the Pope be infallible, or head of the church; whether there be a purgatory; whether ſaints are to be prayed to, or the dead prayed for; whether the ſcripture be the only rule of faith; whether there be no ſalvation out of the church; and whether there be no church without biſhops; and an hundred other queſtions in controverſy between the Papiſts and thoſe Proteſtants; and when he had maſtered theſe, go on to fortify himſelf againſt the opinions and objections of other churches he differs from? This, which is no ſmall taſk, muſt be done; before a man can have brought his religion to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there. And if you will puniſh men till this be done; the countryman muſt leave off plowing and ſowing, and betake himſelf to the ſtudy of Greek and Latin; and the artiſan muſt ſell his tools, to buy fathers and ſchoolmen, and leave his family to ſtarve. If ſomething leſs than this will ſatiſfy you, pray tell me what is enough. Have they conſidered and examined enough, if they are ſatiſfied themſelves where the truth lies? If this be the limits of their examination, you will find few to puniſh; unleſs you will puniſh them to make them do what they have done already. For, however he came by his religion, there is ſcarce any one to be found who does not own himſelf ſatisfied that he is in the right. Or elſe, muſt they be puniſhed to make them conſider and examine till they embrace that which you chooſe for truth? If this be ſo, what do you but in effect chooſe for them, when yet you would have men puniſhed, "to bring them to ſuch a care of their P. 22. "ſouls, that no other perſon might chooſe for them?" If it be truth in general you would have them by puniſhments driven to ſeek; that is to offer matter of diſpute, and not a rule of diſcipline. For to puniſh any one to make him ſeek till he find truth, without a judge of truth, is to puniſh for you know not what; and is all one as if you ſhould whip a ſcholar to make him find out the ſquare root of a number you do not know. I wonder not therefore that you could not reſolve with yourſelf what degree of ſeverity you would have uſed, nor how long continued; when you dare not ſpeak out directly whom you would have puniſhed, and are far from being clear to what end they ſhould be under penalties.

CONSONANT to this uncertainty, of whom, or what to be puniſhed; you tell us, "that there is no queſtion of the ſucceſs of this method. Force will P. 12. "certainly do, if duly proportioned to the deſign of it."

WHAT, I pray, is the deſign of it? I challenge you, or any man living, out of what you have ſaid in your book, to tell me directly what it is. In all other puniſhments that ever I heard of yet, till now that you have taught the world a new method, the deſign of them has been to cure the crime they are denounced againſt; and ſo I think it ought to be here. What I beſeech you is the crime here? Diſſenting? That you ſay not, any where, is a fault. Beſides you tell us, "that the magiſtrate hath not authority to compel any P. 21. "one to his religion:" and that you do "not require that men ſhould have no P. 25. "rule but the religion of the country." And the power you aſcribe to the P. 26. magiſtrate is given him to bring men, "not to his own, but to the true religion." If diſſenting be not the fault; is it that a man does not examine his own religion, and the grounds of it? Is that the crime your puniſhments are deſigned to cure? Neither that dare you ſay; leſt you diſpleaſe more than you ſatiſfy with your new diſcipline. And then again, as I ſaid before, you muſt tell us how far you would have them examine, before you puniſh them for not doing it. And I imagine, if that were all we required of you, it would be long enough before you would trouble us with a law, that ſhould preſcribe to every one how far he was to examine matters of religion; wherein if he failed and came ſhort, he was to be puniſhed; if he performed, and went in his examination to the bounds ſet by the law, he was acquitted and free.

Sir, when you conſider it again, you will perhaps think this a caſe reſerved to the great day, when the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open. For I imagine it is beyond the power or judgment of man, in that variety of circumſtances, in reſpect of parts, tempers, opportunities, helps, &c. men are in, in this world, to determine what is every one's duty in this great buſineſs of ſearch, enquiry, examination, or to know when any one has done it. That which makes me believe you will be of this mind, is, that where you undertake for the ſucceſs of this method, if rightly uſed, it is with a limitation, P. 12. upon ſuch as are not altogether incurable. So that when your remedy is prepared according to art, which art is yet unknown; and rightly applied, and given in a due doſe, all which are ſecrets; it will then infallibly cure. Whom? All that are not incurable by it. And ſo will a pippin poſſet, eating fiſh in Lent, or a Preſbyterian lecture, certainly cure all that are not incurable by them. For I am ſure you do not mean it will cure all, but thoſe who are abſolutely incurable; becauſe you yourſelf allow one means left of cure, when yours will not do, viz. the grace of God. Your words P. 10. are, "what means is there left (except the grace of God) to reduce them, "but lay thorns and briars in their way." And here alſo, in the place we were P. 12. conſidering, you tell us, "the incurable are to be left to God." Whereby, if you mean they are to be left to thoſe means he has ordained for mens converſion and ſalvation, yours muſt never be made uſe of: for he indeed has preſcribed preaching and hearing of his word; but as for thoſe who will not hear, I do not find any where that he has commanded they ſhould be compelled or beaten to it.

THERE is a third thing that you are as tender and reſerved in, as either naming the criminals to be puniſhed, or poſitively telling us the end for which they ſhould be puniſhed: and that is with what ſort of penalties, what degree of puniſhment they ſhould be forced. You are indeed ſo gracious to them, that you renounce the ſeverities and penalties hitherto made P. 24. uſe of. You tell us, they ſhould be but moderate penalties. But if we aſk you what are moderate penalties, you confeſs you cannot tell us. So that by P. 15. moderate, here you yet mean nothing. You tell us, "the outward force to "be applied ſhould be duly tempered." But what that due temper is, you do not, or cannot ſay; and ſo in effect, it ſignifies juſt nothing. Yet if in this you are not plain and direct, all the reſt of your deſign will ſignify nothing. For it being to have ſome men, and to ſome end, puniſhed; yet if it cannot be found what puniſhment is to be uſed, it is, notwithſtanding all you have P. 12. ſaid, utterly uſeleſs. "You tell us modeſtly, that to determine preciſely the "juſt meaſure of the puniſhment, will require ſome conſideration." If the faults were preciſely determined, and could be proved, it would require no more conſideration to determine the meaſure of the puniſhment, in this, than it would in any other caſe, where thoſe were known. But where the fault is undefined, and the guilt not to be proved, as I ſuppoſe it will be found in this preſent buſineſs of examining, it will without doubt require conſideration to proportion the force to the deſign. Juſt ſo much conſideration as it will require to fit a coat to the moon, or proportion a ſhoe to the feet of thoſe who inhabit her. For to proportion a puniſhment to a fault that you do not name, and ſo we in charity ought to think you do not yet know, and a fault that when you have named it, will be impoſſible to be proved who are or are not guilty of it; will I ſuppoſe require as much conſideration, as to fit a ſhoe to feet whoſe ſize and ſhape are not known.

HOWEVER, you offer ſome meaſures whereby to regulate your puniſhments; which when they are looked into, will be found to be juſt as good as none; they being impoſſible to be any rule in the caſe. The firſt is, "ſo much force, P. 14. "or ſuch penalties as are ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with men of common "diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate to weigh matters of "religion carefully and impartially, and without which ordinarily they will "not do this." Where it is to be obſerved:

1. THAT who are theſe men of common diſcretion, is as hard to know, as to know what is a fit degree of puniſhment in the caſe; and ſo you do but regulate one uncertainty by another. Some men will be apt to think, that he who will not weigh matters of religion, which are of infinite concernment to him, without puniſhment, cannot in reaſon be thought a man of common diſcretion. Many women of common diſcretion enough to manage the ordinary affairs of their families, are not able to read a page in an ordinary author, or to underſtand and give an account what it means, when read to them. Many men of common diſcretion in their callings, are not able to judge when an argument is concluſive or no; much leſs to trace it through a long train of conſequences. What penalties ſhall be ſufficient to prevail with ſuch, who upon examination, I fear, will not be found to make the leaſt part of mankind, to examine and weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially? The law allows all to have common diſcretion, for whom it has not provided guardians or Bedlam. So that, in effect, your men of common diſcretion are all men, not judged ideots or madmen: and penalties ſufficient to prevail with men of common diſcretion, are penalties ſufficient to prevail with all men, but ideots and madmen. Which what a meaſure it is to regulate penalties by, let all men of common diſcretion judge.

2. YOU may be pleaſed to conſider, that all men of the ſame degree of diſcretion, are not apt to be moved by the ſame degree of penalties. Some are of a more yielding, ſome of a more ſtiff temper; and what is ſufficient to prevail on one, is not half enough to move the other; though both men of common diſcretion. So that common diſcretion will be here of no uſe to determine the meaſure of puniſhment: eſpecially when in the ſame clauſe you except men deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, who are as hard to be known, as what you ſeek, viz. the juſt proportions of puniſhments neceſſary to prevail with men to conſider, examine, and weigh matters of religion; wherein, if a man tells you he has conſidered, he has weighed, he has examined, and ſo goes on in his former courſe, it is impoſſible for you ever to know whether he has done his duty, or whether he be deſperately perverſe and obſtinate. So that this exception ſignifies juſt nothing.

THERE are many things in your uſe of force and penalties, different from any I ever met with elſewhere. One of them, this clauſe of yours concerning

ing the meaſure of puniſhments, now under conſideration, offers me: wherein you proportion your puniſhments only to the yielding and corrigible, not to the perverſe and obſtinate; contrary to the common diſcretion which has hitherto made laws in other caſes, which levels the puniſhments againſt refractory offenders, and never ſpares them becauſe they are obſtinate. This however I will not blame, as an overſight in you. Your new method, which aims at ſuch impracticable and inconſiſtent things as laws cannot bear, nor penalties be uſeful to, forced you to it. The uſefulneſs, abſurdity, and unreaſonableneſs of great ſeverities, you had acknowledged in the P. 13, 14. foregoing paragraphs. Diſſenters you would have brought to conſider by moderate penalties. They lie under them; but whether they have conſidered or no, for that you cannot tell, they ſtill continue diſſenters. What is to be done now? Why, the incurable are to be left to God, as you tell us, p. 12. Your puniſhments were not meant to prevail on the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, as you tell us here. And ſo whatever be the ſucceſs, your puniſhments are however juſtified.

YOU have given us in another place, ſomething like another boundary to your moderate penalties: but when examined, it proves juſt like the reſt, trifling only, in good words, ſo put together as to have no direct meaning; an art very much in uſe amongſt ſome ſort of learned men. The words are P. 26. theſe; "ſuch penalties as may not tempt perſons who have any concern for "their eternal ſalvation, (and thoſe who have none, ought not to be conſidered) "to renounce a religion which they believe to be true, or profeſs one which "they do not believe to be ſo." If by any concern, you mean a true concern for their eternal ſalvation, by this rule you may make your puniſhments as great as you pleaſe; and all the ſeverities you have diſclaimed may be brought in play again: for none of thoſe will be able to make a man, "who is truly "concerned for his eternal ſalvation, renounce a religion he believes to be true, "or profeſs one he does not believe to be ſo." If by thoſe who have any concern, you mean ſuch who have ſome faint wiſhes for happineſs hereafter, and would be glad to have things go well with them in the other world, but will venture nothing in this world for it; theſe the moderateſt puniſhments you can imagine, will make change their religion. If by any concern, you mean whatever may be between theſe two; the degrees are ſo infinite, that to proportion your puniſhments by that, is to have no meaſure of them at all.

ONE thing I cannot but take notice of in this paſſage, before I leave it: and that is, that you ſay here, "thoſe who have no concern for their ſalva-"tion, deſerve not to be conſidered." In other parts of your letter you pretend to have compaſſion on the careleſs, and provide remedies for them: but here, of a ſudden, your charity fails you; and you give them up to eternal perdition, without the leaſt regard, the leaſt pity, and ſay they deſerve not to be conſidered. Our Saviour's rule was, "the ſick, and not the whole need a phy-"ſician." Your rule here is, thoſe that are careleſs, are not to be conſidered, but are to be left to themſelves. This would ſeem ſtrange, if one did not obſerve what drew you to it. You perceived that if the magiſtrate was to uſe no puniſhments but ſuch as would make no body change their religion, he was to uſe none at all: for the careleſs would be brought to the national church, with any ſlight puniſhments; and when they are once there, you are, it ſeems, ſatisfied, and look no farther after them. So that by your own meaſures, "if the careleſs, and thoſe who have no concern for their eternal "ſalvation," are to be regarded and taken care of; if the ſalvation of their ſouls is to be promoted, there is to be no puniſhment uſed at all; and therefore you leave them out as not to be conſidered.

THERE remains yet one thing to be inquired into, concerning the meaſure of the puniſhments, and that is the length of their duration. Moderate puniſhments that are continued, that men find no end of, know no way out of, ſit heavy, and become immoderately uneaſy. Diſſenters you would have puniſhed, to make them conſider. Your penalties have had the effect on them you intended; they have made them conſider; and they have done their utmoſt in conſidering. What now muſt be done with them? They muſt be puniſhed on; for they are ſtill diſſenters. If it were juſt, if you had reaſon at firſt to puniſh a diſſenter, to make him conſider, when you did not know but that he had conſidered already; it is as juſt, and you have as much reaſon to puniſh him on, even when he has performed what your puniſhments were deſigned for, when he has conſidered, but yet remains a diſſenter. For I may juſtly ſuppoſe, and you muſt grant, that a man may remain a diſſenter, after all the conſideration your moderate penalties can bring him to; when we ſee greater puniſhments, even thoſe ſeverities you diſown, as too great, are not able to make men conſider ſo far as to be convinced, and brought over to the national church.

IF your puniſhments may not be inflicted on men, to make them conſider, who have or may have conſidered already for ought you know; then diſſenters are never to be once puniſhed, no more than any other ſort of men. If diſſenters are to be puniſhed, to make them conſider, whether they have conſidered or no; then their puniſhments, though they do conſider, muſt never ceaſe, as long as they are diſſenters; which whether it be to puniſh them only to bring them to conſider, let all men judge. This I am ſure; puniſhments, in your method, muſt either never begin upon diſſenters, or never ceaſe. And ſo pretend moderation as you pleaſe, the puniſhments which your method requires, muſt be either very immoderate, or none at all.

AND now, you having yielded to our author, and that upon very good reaſons which you yourſelf urge, and which I ſhall ſet down in your own words "that to proſecute men with fire and ſword, or to deprive them of "their eſtates, to maim them with corporal puniſhments, to ſtarve and tor-"ture them in noiſom priſons, and in the end even to take away their lives, "to make them Chriſtians, is but an ill way of expreſſing mens deſire of the "ſalvation of thoſe whom they treat in this manner. And that it will be "very difficult to perſuade men of ſenſe, that he who with dry eyes and ſa-"tisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner, to be burnt "alive, does ſincerely and heartily concern himſelf to ſave that brother from "the flames of hell in the world to come. And that theſe methods are ſo P. 13, 14.

very improper, in reſpect to the deſign of them, that they uſually produce the quite contrary effect. For whereas all the uſe which force can have for the advancing true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, is (as has already been ſhewed) by diſpoſing men to ſubmit to inſtruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reaſons which are offered, for the enlightning their minds, and diſcovering the truth to them; theſe cruelties have the miſfortune to be commonly looked upon as ſo juſt a prejudice againſt any religion that uſes them, as makes it needleſs to look any farther into it; and to tempt men to reject it, as both falſe and deteſtable, without ever vouchſafing to conſider the rational grounds and motives of it. This effect they ſeldom fail to work upon the ſufferers of them; and as to the ſpectators, if they be not before-hand well inſtructed in thoſe grounds and motives, they will be much tempted likewiſe, not only to entertain the ſame opinion of ſuch a religion, but withal to judge much more favourably of that of the ſufferers; who they will be apt to think, would not expoſe themſelves to ſuch extremities, which they might avoid by compliance, if they were not throughly ſatisfied of the juſtice of their cauſe.” And upon theſe reaſons you conclude, “that theſe ſeverities are utterly unapt and improper for the bringing men to embrace that truth which muſt ſave them.” Again, you having acknowledged, P. 21. “that the authority of the magiſtrate is not an authority to compel any one to P. 24. his religion.” And again, “that the rigour of laws, and force of penalties are not capable to convince and change mens minds.” And yet farther, P. 25. “that you do not require that men ſhould have no rule, but the religion of the court; or that they ſhould be put under a neceſſity to quit the light of their own reaſon, and oppoſe the dictates of their own conſciences, and blindly reſign up themſelves to the will of their governors; but that the power you aſcribe to the magiſtrate, is given him to bring men not to his own, but to the true religion.” Now you having, I ſay, granted this, whereby you directly condemn and aboliſh all laws that have been made here, or any where elſe, that ever I heard of, to compel men to conformity; I think the author, and whoſoever elſe are moſt for liberty of conſcience, might be content with the toleration you allow, by condemning the laws about religion, now in force; and reſt ſatisfied, until you had made your new method conſiſtent and practicable, by telling the world plainly and directly,

1. Who are to be puniſhed.
2. For what.
3. With what puniſhments.
4. How long.
5. What advantage to true religion it would be, if magiſtrates every where did ſo puniſh.
6. And laſtly, whence the magiſtrate had commiſſion to do ſo.

When you have done this plainly and intelligibly, without keeping in the uncertainty of general expreſſions, and without ſuppoſing all along your church in the right, and your religion the true; which can no more be allowed to you in this caſe, whatever your church or religion be, than it can be to a Papiſt or a Lutheran, a Preſbyterian, or an Anabaptiſt; nay no more to you, than it can be allowed to a Jew or a Mahometan; when I ſay, you have by ſettling theſe points, framed the parts of your new engine, ſet it together, and ſhewed that it will work, without doing more harm than good in the world; I think then men may be content to ſubmit to it. But imagining this, and an engine to ſhew the perpetual motion, will be found out together, I think toleration in a very good ſtate, notwithſtanding your anſwer; wherein you having ſaid ſo much for it, and for ought I ſee nothing againſt it; unleſs an impracticable chimera, be in your opinion, ſomething mightily to be apprehended.

WE have now ſeen and examined the main of your treatiſe; and therefore I think I might here end, without going any farther. But, that you may not think yourſelf, or any of your arguments neglected, I will go over the remainder, and give you my thoughts on every thing I ſhall meet with in it, that ſeems to need any anſwer. In one place you argue againſt the author thus: "if then the author's fourth propoſition," as you call it, viz. That force is of no uſe for promoting true religion and the ſalvation of ſouls, P. 15. "be not true " (as perhaps by this time it appears it is not) then the laſt propoſition, which " is built upon it, muſt fall with it:" which laſt propoſition is this, viz. " that no body can have any right to uſe any outward force or compulſion to " bring men to the true religion, and ſo to ſalvation." If this propoſition were built, as you alledge, upon that which you call his fourth, then indeed if the fourth fell, this built upon it would fall with it. But that not being the author's propoſition, as I have ſhewed, nor this built wholly on it, but on other reaſons, as I have already proved, and any one may ſee in ſeveral parts of his letter, particularly p. 351, 352, what you alledge falls of itſelf.

THE buſineſs of the next paragraph is to prove, That if " force be uſeful, " then ſomebody muſt certainly have a right to uſe it." The firſt argument you go about to prove it by, is this, " That uſefulneſs is as good an argument " to prove there is ſomewhere a right to uſe it, as uſeleſſneſs is to prove no " body has ſuch a right." If you conſider the things of whoſe uſefulneſs or uſeleſſneſs we are ſpeaking, you will perhaps be of another mind. It is puniſhment, or force uſed in puniſhing. Now all puniſhment is ſome evil, ſome inconvenience, ſome ſuffering; by taking away or abridging ſome good thing, which he who is puniſhed has otherwiſe a right to. Now to juſtify the bringing any ſuch evil upon any man, two things are requiſite. Firſt, That he who does it has commiſſion and power ſo to do. Secondly, That it be directly uſeful for the procuring ſome greater good. Whatever puniſhment one man uſes to another, without theſe two conditions, whatever he may pretend, proves an injury and injuſtice, and ſo of right ought to have been let alone. And therefore, though uſefulneſs, which is one of the conditions that makes puniſhments juſt, when it is away, may hinder puniſhments from being lawful in any body's hands; yet uſefulneſs, when preſent, being but one of thoſe conditions, cannot give the other, which is a commiſſion to puniſh; without which alſo puniſhment is unlawful. From whence it follows, That though uſeleſs puniſhment be unlawful from any hand; yet uſeful puniſhment from every hand is not lawful. A man may have the ſtone, and it may be uſeful, more than indirectly, and at a diſtance uſeful, to him to be cut; but yet this uſefulneſs will not juſtify the moſt ſkilful ſurgeon in the world, by force to make him endure the pain and hazard of cutting; becauſe he has no commiſſion, no right without the patient's own conſent to do ſo. Nor is it a good argument, cutting will be uſeful to him therefore there is a right ſomewhere to cut him, whether he will or no. Much leſs will there be an argument for any right, if there be only a poſſibility that it may prove uſeful indirectly and by accident.

YOUR other argument is this; "If force or puniſhment be of neceſſary uſe, "then it muſt be acknowledged, that there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it; "unleſs we will ſay (what without impiety cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and "benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things has not furniſhed mankind with "competent means for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the "good of ſouls." If your way of arguing be true; it is demonſtration, that force is not of neceſſary uſe. For I argue thus, in your form. We muſt acknowledge force not to be of neceſſary uſe; "unleſs we will ſay (what with-"out impiety cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe Diſpoſer and Governor of all things "did not, for above three hundred years after Chriſt, furniſh his church with "competent means for promoting his own honour in the world, and the good "of ſouls." It is for you to conſider whether theſe arguments be concluſive or no. This I am ſure, the one is as concluſive as the other. But if your ſuppoſed uſefulneſs places a right ſomewhere to uſe it, pray tell me in whoſe hands it places it in Turky, Perſia, or China, or any country where Chriſtians of different churches live under a Heathen or Mahometan ſovereign? And if you cannot tell me in whoſe hands it places it there, as I believe you will find it pretty hard to do, there are then it ſeems, ſome places where, upon your ſuppoſition of the neceſſary uſefulneſs of force, "the wiſe and benign Governor "and Diſpoſer of all things, has not furniſhed men with competent means for "promoting his own honour and the good of ſouls;" unleſs you will grant, "that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, hath, for the "promoting of his honour, and the good of ſouls, placed a power in Mahome-"tan or Heathen princes, to puniſh Chriſtians, to bring them to conſider rea-"ſons and arguments proper to convince them." But this is the advantage of ſo fine an invention, as that of force doing ſome ſervice indirectly and at a diſtance; which uſefulneſs, if we may believe you, places a right in Mahometan or Pagan princes hands, to uſe force upon Chriſtians; for fear leſt mankind in thoſe countries, ſhould be unfurniſhed with means for the promoting God's honour and the good of ſouls. For thus you argue; "if there be ſo great uſe P. 15. "of force, then there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it. And if there be ſuch a P. 16. "right ſomewhere, where ſhould it be but in the civil ſovereign?" Who can deny now, but that you have taken care, great care, for the promoting of truth and the Chriſtian religion? But yet it is as hard for me, I confeſs, and I believe for others, to conceive how you ſhould think to do any ſervice to truth and the Chriſtian religion, by putting a right into Mahometans or Heathens hands to puniſh Chriſtians; as it was for you to conceive how the author ſhould think "to do any ſervice to the truth, and the Chriſtian religion," by exempting the profeſſors of it from puniſhment every where, ſince there are more Pagan, Mahometan, and erroneous princes in the world, than orthodox; truth, and the Chriſtian religion, taking the world as we find it, is ſure to be more puniſhed and ſuppreſſed, than error and falſhood.

THE author having endeavoured to ſhew that no body at all, of any rank or condition, had a power to puniſh, torment, or uſe any man ill, for matters of religion; you tell us "you do not yet underſtand, why clergymen are not as "capable of ſuch power as other men." P. 17. I do not remember that the author any where, by excepting eccleſiaſticks more than others, gave you any occaſion to ſhew your concern into this point. Had he foreſeen that this would have touched you ſo nearly, and that you ſet your heart ſo much upon the clergy's power of puniſhing; it is like he would have told you, he thought eccleſiaſticks as capable of it as any men; and that if forwardneſs and diligence in the exerciſe of ſuch power may recommend any to it, clergymen in the opinion of the world ſtand faireſt for it. However, you do well to put in your claim for them, though the author excludes them no more than their neighbours. Nay, they muſt be allowed the pretence of the faireſt title. For I never read of any ſeverities that were to bring men to Chriſt, but thoſe of the law of Moſes; which is therefore called a pedagogue, (Gal. iii. 14.) And the next verſe tells us, that "after that faith is come, we are no longer "under a ſchoolmaſter." But yet if we are ſtill to be driven to Chriſt by a rod, I ſhall not envy them the pleaſure of wielding it: only I deſire them, when they have got the ſcourge into their hands, to remember our Saviour, and follow his example, who never uſed it but once; and that they would, like him, employ it only to drive vile and ſcandalous traffickers for the things of this world, out of their church, rather than to drive whoever they can into it. Whether that latter be not a proper method to make their church what our Saviour there pronounced of the Temple, they who uſe it were beſt look. For in matters of religion, none are ſo eaſy to be driven, as thoſe who have nothing of religion at all; and next to them, the vicious, the ignorant, the worldling, and the hypocrite; who care for no more of religion but the name, nor no more of any church, but its proſperity and power; and who, not unlike thoſe deſcribed by our Saviour, (Luke xx. 47.) for a ſhew come to, or cry up the prayers of the church, "that they may devour widows, and "other helpleſs people's houſes." I ſay not this of the ſerious profeſſors of any church, who are in earneſt in matters of religion. Such I value, who conſcientiouſly, and out of a ſincere perſuaſion, embrace any religion, though different from mine, and in a way, I think, miſtaken. But no body can have reaſon to think otherwiſe than what I have ſaid, of thoſe who are wrought upon to be of any church, by ſecular hopes and fears. Thoſe truly place trade above all other conſiderations, and merchandize with religion itſelf, who regulate their choice by worldly profit and loſs.

YOU endeavour to prove, againſt the author, that civil ſociety is not inſtituted only for civil ends, i. e. the procuring, preſerving, and advancing mens civil intereſts: your words are: "I muſt ſay, that our author does but beg the P. 18. "queſtion, when he affirms that the commonwealth is conſtituted only for the "procuring, preſerving, and advancing of the civil intereſts of the members "of it. That commonwealths are inſtituted for theſe ends, no man will deny. "But if there be any other ends beſides theſe, attainable by the civil ſociety and "government, there is no reaſon to affirm, that theſe are the only ends for "which they are deſigned. Doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted for the "attaining of all the benefits which political government can yield. And there- "fore, if the ſpiritual, and eternal intereſts of men may any way be procured "or advanced by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe in- "tereſts muſt in all reaſon be reckoned among the ends of civil ſocieties, and "ſo, conſequently, fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction." I have ſet down your words at large, to let the reader ſee, that you of all men had the leaſt reaſon to tell the author, he does but beg the queſtion; unleſs you mean to juſtify yourſelf by the pretence of his example. You argue thus, "If there be any other ends attainable by civil ſociety, then civil intereſts are "not the only ends for which commonwealths are inſtituted." And how do you prove there be other ends? Why thus, "Doubtleſs commonwealths "are inſtituted for the attaining of all the benefits which political government "can yield." Which is as clear a demonſtration, as doubtleſs can make it to be. The queſtion is, whether civil ſociety be inſtituted only for civil ends? You ſay, no; and your proof is, becauſe doubtleſs, it is inſtituted for other ends. If I now ſay, doubtleſs this is a good argument; is not every one bound without more ado to admit it for ſuch? If not, doubtleſs you are in danger to be thought to beg the queſtion.

BUT notwithſtanding you ſay here, that the author begs the queſtion; in the following page you tell us, "That the author offers three conſiderations "which ſeem to him abundantly to demonſtrate, that the civil power neither "can, nor ought in any manner to be extended to the ſalvation of ſouls." He does not then beg the queſtion. For the queſtion being, "Whether civil in- "tereſt be the only end of civil ſociety," he gives this reaſon for the negative; "That civil power has nothing to do with the ſalvation of ſouls;" and offers three conſiderations for the proof of it. For it will always be a good conſe- quence, that, if the civil power has nothing to do with the ſalvation of ſouls, "then civil intereſts is the only end of civil ſociety." And the reaſon of it is plain; becauſe a man having no other intereſt, but either in this world or the world to come; if the end of civil ſociety reach not to a man's intereſt in the other world, all which is comprehended in the ſalvation of his ſoul, it is plain, that the ſole end of civil ſociety is civil intereſt, under which the author com- prehends the good things of this world.

AND now let us examine the truth of your main poſition, viz. "That civil "ſociety is inſtituted for the attaining all the benefits that it may any way "yield." Which, if true, then this poſition muſt be true, viz. "That all ſo- "cieties whatſoever are inſtituted for the attaining all the benefits that they may "any way yield;" there being nothing peculiar to civil ſociety in the caſe, why that ſociety ſhould be inſtituted for the attaining all the benefits it can any way yield, and other ſocieties not. By which argument it will follow, that all ſocieties are inſtituted for one and the ſame end: i. e. "for the attain- "ing all the benefits that they can any way yield." By which account there will be no difference between church and ſtate; a commonwealth and an army; or between a family and the Eaſt-India company; all which have hitherto been thought diſtinct ſorts of ſocieties, inſtituted for different ends. If your hypotheſis hold good, one of the ends of the family muſt be to preach the Goſpel, and adminiſter the ſacraments; and one buſinſs of an army to teach languages, and propagate religion; becauſe theſe are benefits ſome way or other attainable by thoſe ſocieties: unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority to be a ſufficient impediment: and that will be ſo too in other caſes.

It is a benefit to have true knowledge and philoſophy embraced and aſſented to, in any civil ſociety or government. But will you ſay, therefore, that it is a benefit to the ſociety, or one of the ends of government, that all who are not Peripateticks ſhould be puniſhed, to make men find out the truth, and profeſs it. This indeed might be thought a fit way to make ſome men embrace the Peripatetick philoſophy, but not a proper way to find the truth. For, perhaps the Peripatetick philoſophy may not be true; perhaps a great many have not time, nor parts to ſtudy it; perhaps a great many who have ſtudied it, cannot be convinced of the truth of it: and therefore it cannot be a benefit to the commonwealth, nor one of the ends of it, that theſe members of the ſociety ſhould be diſturbed, and diſeaſed to no purpoſe, when they are guilty of no fault. For juſt the ſame reaſon, it cannot be a benefit to civil ſociety, that men ſhould be puniſhed in Denmark, for not being Lutherans; in Geneva, for not being Calviniſts; and in Vienna, for not being Papiſts; as a means to make them find out the true religion. For ſo, upon your grounds, men muſt be treated in thoſe places, as well as in England, for not being of the church of England. And then, I beſeech you, conſider the great benefit will accrue to men in ſociety by this method; and I ſuppoſe it will be a hard thing for you to prove, that ever civil governments were inſtituted to puniſh men for not being of this, or that ſect in religion; however by accident, indirectly, and at a diſtance, it may be an occaſion to one perhaps of a thouſand, or an hundred, to ſtudy that controverſy, which is all you expect from it. If it be a benefit, pray tell me what benefit it is. A civil benefit it cannot be. For mens civil intereſts are diſturbed, injured, and impaired by it. And what ſpiritual benefit that can be to any multitude of men, to be puniſhed for diſſenting from a falſe or erroneous profeſſion, I would have you find out: unleſs it be a ſpiritual benefit to be in danger to be driven into a wrong way. For if in all differing ſects, one is in the wrong, it is a hundred to one but that from which one diſſents, and is puniſhed for diſſenting from, is the wrong.

I grant it is paſt doubt, that the nature of man is ſo covetous of good, that no one would have excluded from any action he does, or from any inſtitution he is concerned in, any manner of good or benefit that it might any way yield. And if this be your meaning, it will not be denied you. But then you ſpeak very improperly, or rather very miſtakenly, if you call ſuch benefits as may any way, i. e. indirectly, and at a diſtance, or by accident, be attained by civil or any other ſociety, the ends for which it is inſtituted. Nothing can "in reaſon be reckoned amongſt the ends of any ſociety," but what may in reaſon be ſuppoſed to be deſigned by thoſe who enter into it. Now no body can in reaſon ſuppoſe, that any one entered into civil ſociety for the procuring, ſecuring, or advancing the ſalvation of his ſoul; when he, for that end, needed not the force of civil ſociety. "The procuring, therefore, ſecuring, and advancing the ſpiritual and enternal intereſt of men, cannot in "reaſon be reckoned amongſt the ends of civil ſocieties;" though perhaps it might ſo fall out, that in ſome particular inſtance, ſome man's ſpiritual intereſt might be advanced by your or any other way of applying civil force. A nobleman, whoſe chapel is decayed or fallen, may make uſe of his dining-room for praying and preaching. Yet whatever benefit were attainable by this uſe of the room, no body can in reaſon reckon this among the ends for which it was built; no more than the accidental breeding of ſome bird in any part of it, though it were a benefit it yielded, could in reaſon be reckoned among the ends of building the houſe.

BUT, ſay you, "doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted for the attaining "of all the benefits which political government can yield; and therefore if the "ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men may any way be procured or advanced "by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts, muſt "in all reaſon be reckoned amongſt the ends of civil ſociety, and ſo conſequently fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction." Upon the ſame grounds, I thus reaſon. Doubtleſs churches are inſtituted for the attaining of all the benefits which eccleſiaſtical government can yield: and therefore, if the temporal and ſecular intereſts of men may any way be procured or advanced by eccleſiaſtical polity, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts muſt in all reaſon be reckoned among the ends of religious ſocieties, and ſo conſequently fall within the compaſs of churchmens juriſdiction. The church of Rome has openly made its advantage of "ſecular intereſts to be procured or advanced, in"directly, and at a diſtance, and in ordine ad ſpiritualia;" all which ways, if I miſtake not Engliſh, are comprehended under your any way. But I do not remember that any of the reformed churches have hitherto directly profeſſed it. But there is a time for all things. And if the commonwealth once invades the ſpiritual ends of the church, by meddling with the ſalvation of ſouls, which ſhe has always been ſo tender of, who can deny, that the church ſhould have liberty to make herſelf ſome amends by repriſals?

BUT, Sir, however you and I may argue from wrong ſuppoſitions, yet unleſs the Apoſtle, Eph. iv. where he reckons up the church-officers which Chriſt hath inſtituted in his church, had told us they were for ſome other ends than "for the perfecting of the ſaints, for the work of the miniſtry, for "the edifying of the body of Chriſt;" the advancing of their ſecular intereſts will ſcarce be allowed to be their buſineſs, or within the compaſs of their juriſdiction. Nor till it can be ſhewn that civil ſociety is inſtituted for ſpiritual ends, or that the magiſtrate has commiſſion to interpoſe his authority, or uſe force in matters of religion; your ſuppoſition "of ſpiritual benefits indirectly "and at a diſtance attainable" by political government, will never prove the advancing of thoſe intereſts by force, to be the magiſtrate's buſineſs, "and to fall "within the compaſs of his juriſdiction." And till then, the force of the arguments which the author has brought againſt it, in the 351ſt and following pages of his letter, will hold good.

COMMONWEALTHS, or civil ſocieties and governments, if you will believe the judicious Mr. Hooker, are as St. Peter calls them, (1 Pet. ii. 13.) ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, the contrivance and inſtitution of man; and he ſhews there for what end; viz. "for the puniſhment of evil doers, and the praiſe of them "that do well." I do not find any where, that it is for the puniſhment of thoſe who are not in church-communion with the magiſtrate, to make them ſtudy controverſies in religion, or hearken to thoſe who will tell them "they have "miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right one." You muſt ſhew them ſuch a commiſſion, if you ſay it is from God. And in all ſocieties inſtituted by man, the ends of them can be no other than what the inſtitutors appointed; which I am ſure could not be their ſpiritual and eternal intereſt. For they could not ſtipulate about theſe one with another, nor ſubmit this intereſt to the power of the ſociety, or any ſovereign they ſhould ſet over it. There are nations in the Weſt-Indies, which have no other end of their ſociety, but their mutual defence againſt their common enemies. In theſe, their captain, or prince, is ſovereign commander in time of war; but in time of peace, neither he nor any body elſe has any authority over any of the ſociety. You cannot deny but other, even temporal ends, are attainable by theſe commonwealths, if they had been otherwiſe inſtituted and appointed to theſe ends. But all your ſaying, "doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted "for the attaining of all the benefits which they can yield," will not give authority to any one, or more, in ſuch a ſociety, by political government or force, to procure directly or indirectly other benefits than that for which it was inſtituted: and therefore, there it falls not within the compaſs of thoſe princes juriſdiction to puniſh any one of the ſociety for injuring another; becauſe he has no commiſſion ſo to do; whatever reaſon you may think there is, that that ſhould be reckoned amongſt the ends of their ſociety.

BUT to conclude: your argument has that defect in it which turns it upon yourſelf. And that is, that the procuring and advancing the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of ſouls, your way, is not a benefit to the ſociety: and ſo upon your own ſuppoſition, "the procuring and advancing the ſpiritual intereſt of "ſouls, any way, cannot be one of the ends of civil ſociety;" unleſs the procuring and advancing the ſpiritual intereſt of ſouls, in a way proper to do more harm than good towards the ſalvation of ſouls, be to be accounted ſuch a benefit as to be one of the ends of civil ſocieties. For that yours is ſuch a way, I have proved already. So that were it hard to prove that political government, whoſe only inſtrument is force, could no way by force, however applied, more advance than hinder the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt of men; yet having proved it againſt your particular new way of applying force, I have ſufficiently vindicated the author's doctrine from any thing you have ſaid againſt it. Which is enough for my preſent purpoſe.

YOUR next page tells us, that this reaſoning of the author, viz. "that the P. 19.
"power of the magiſtrate cannot be extended to the ſalvation of ſouls, becauſe "the care of ſouls is not committed to the magiſtrate; is proving the thing by "itſelf." As if you ſhould ſay, when I tell you that you could not extend your power to meddle with the money of a young gentleman you travelled with, as

tutor, becauſe the care of his money was not committed to you, were proving the thing by itſelf. For it is not neceſſary that you ſhould have the power of his money; it may be intruſted to a ſteward who travels with him; or it may be left to himſelf. If you have it, it is but a delegated power. And in all delegated powers, I thought this a fair proof; you have it not, or cannot uſe it, which is what the author means here by extended to, becauſe it is not committed to you. In the ſumming up of this argument, (P. 358.) the author ſays, " no body therefore, in fine, neither commonwealths, &c. hath any " title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of another, upon pretence " of religion." Which is an expoſition of what he means in the beginning of the argument, by " the magiſtrate's power cannot be extended to the ſalvation " of ſouls." So that if we take theſe laſt cited words equivalent to thoſe in the former place, his proof will ſtand thus, " the magiſtrate has no title to invade " the civil rights or worldly goods of any one, upon pretence of religion; be- " cauſe the care of ſouls is not committed to him." This is the ſame in the author's ſenſe with the former. And whether either this, or that, be a proving the ſame thing by itſelf, we muſt leave to others to judge.

P. 21. YOU quote the author's argument, which he brings to prove that the care of ſouls is not committed to the magiſtrate, in theſe words; " it is not com- " mitted to him by God, becauſe it appears not that God has ever given any " ſuch authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion." This, when firſt I read it, I confeſs, I thought a good argument. But you ſay, " this is quite beſide the buſineſs;" and the reaſon you give, is, " for the " authority of the magiſtrate is not an authority to compel any one to his reli- " gion, but only an authority to procure all his ſubjects the means of diſcover- " ing the way of ſalvation, and to procure withal, as much as in him lies, that " none remain ignorant of it," &c. I fear, Sir, you forget yourſelf. The author was not writing againſt your new hypotheſis, before it was known in the world. He may be excuſed if he had not the gift of prophecy, to argue againſt a notion which was not yet ſtarted. He had in view only the laws hitherto made, and the puniſhments, in matters of religion, in uſe in the world. The penalties, as I take it, are lain on men for being of different ways of religion. Which, what is it other, but to compel them to relinquiſh their own, and to conform themſelves to that from which they differ? If this be not to compel them to the magiſtrate's religion, pray tell us what is? This muſt be neceſſarily ſo underſtood; unleſs it it can be ſuppoſed that the law intends not to have that done, which with penalties it commands to be done or that puniſhments are not compulſion, not that compulſion the author complains of. The law ſays, " do this and live;" embrace this doctrine, conform to this way of worſhip, and be at eaſe, and free; or elſe be fined, impriſoned, baniſhed, burned. If you can ſhew among the laws that have been made in England, concerning religion, and I think I may ſay any where elſe, any one that puniſhes men " for not having impartially examined the " religion they have embraced, or refuſed," I think I may yield you the cauſe. Law-makers have been generally wiſer than to make laws that could not be executed: and therefore their laws were againſt non-conformiſts, which could be known; and not for impartial examination, which could not. It was not then beſides the author's buſineſs, to bring an argument againſt the perſecutions here in faſhion. He did not know that any one, who was ſo free as to acknowledge that "the magiſtrate has not authority to compel any one "to his religion," and thereby at once, as you have done, give up all the laws now in force againſt diſſenters, had yet rods in ſtore for them, and by a new trick would bring them under the laſh of the law, when the old pretences were too much exploded to ſerve any longer. Have you never heard of ſuch a thing as the religion eſtabliſhed by law? Which is, it ſeems, the lawful religion of a country, and to be complied with as ſuch. There being ſuch things, ſuch notions yet in the world, it was not quite beſides the author's buſineſs to alledge, that "God never gave ſuch authority to one man over another as to compel any one to his religion." I will grant, if you pleaſe, "religion eſtabliſhed by law" is a pretty odd way of ſpeaking in the mouth of a Chriſtian; and yet it is much in faſhion: as if the magiſtrate's authority could add any force or ſanction to any religion, whether true or falſe. I am glad to find you have ſo far conſidered the magiſtrate's authority, that you agree with the author, that "he hath none to compel men to his religion." Much leſs can he, by any eſtabliſhment of law, add any thing to the truth or validity of his own, or any religion whatſoever.

IT remains now to examine, whether the author's argument will not hold good, even againſt puniſhments in your way. "For if the magiſtrate's authority be, as you here ſay, only to procure all his ſubjects, (mark what you "ſay ALL HIS SUBJECTS) the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and "to procure withal, as much as in him lies, that NONE remain ignorant of it, "or refuſe to embrace it, either for want of uſing thoſe means, or by reaſon of "any ſuch prejudices as may render them ineffectual." If this be the magiſtrate's buſineſs, in reference to ALL HIS SUBJECTS; I deſire you, or any man elſe, to tell me how this can be done by the application of force only to a part of them; unleſs you will ſtill vainly ſuppoſe ignorance, negligence, or prejudice, only amongſt that part which any where differs from the magiſtrate. If thoſe of the magiſtrate's church may be ignorant of the way of ſalvation; if it be poſſible there may be amongſt them, thoſe "who refuſe to embrace it, "either for want of uſing thoſe means, or by reaſon of any ſuch prejudices as "may render them ineffectual:" What, in this caſe, becomes of the magiſtrate's authority to procure all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation? Muſt theſe of his ſubjects be neglected, and left without the means he has authority to procure them? Or muſt he uſe force upon them too? And then, pray, ſhew me how this can be done. Shall the magiſtrate puniſh thoſe of his own religion, "to procure them the means of diſcovering the way of "ſalvation, and to procure as much as in him lies, that they remain not ignorant of it, or refuſe not to embrace it?" Theſe are ſuch contradictions in practice, this is ſuch condemnation of a man's own religion, as no one can expect from the magiſtrate; and I dare ſay you deſire not of him. And yet this is that he muſt do, "if his authority be to procure all his ſubjects the means of "diſcovering the way to ſalvation." And if it be ſo needful, as you ſay it is, P. 21.

that he ſhould uſe it, I am ſure force cannot do that till it be applied wider, and puniſhment be laid upon more than you would have it. For "if the ma-"giſtrate be by force to procure, as much as in him lies, that none remain ig-"norant of the way of ſalvation;" muſt he not puniſh all thoſe who are ignorant of the way of ſalvation? And pray tell me how is this any way practicable, but by ſuppoſing none in the national church ignorant, and all out of it ignorant of the way of ſalvation. Which, what is it, but to puniſh men barely for not being of the magiſtrate's religion; the very thing you deny he has authority to do? So that the magiſtrate having, by your own confeſſion, no authority thus to uſe force; and it being otherways impracticable "for the pro-"curing all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation;" there is an end of force. And ſo force being laid aſide, either as unlawful, or unpracticable, the author's argument holds good againſt force, even in your way of applying it.

P. 20. BUT if you ſay, as you do in the foregoing page, that the magiſtrate has authority "to lay ſuch penalties upon thoſe who refuſe to embrace the doctrine "of the proper miniſters of religion, and to ſubmit to their ſpiritual govern-"ment, as to make them bethink themſelves ſo as not to be alienated from "the truth: (For, as for fooliſh humour, and uncharitable prejudice," &c. which are but words of courſe that oppoſite parties give one another, as marks of diſlike and preſumption, I omit them, as ſignifying nothing to the queſtion; being ſuch as will with the ſame reaſon be retorted by the other ſide;) againſt that alſo the author's argument holds, that the magiſtrate has no ſuch authority. 1. Becauſe God never gave the magiſtrate an authority to be judge of truth for another man in matters of religion: and ſo he cannot be judge whether any man be alienated from the truth or no. 2. Becauſe the magiſtrate had never authority given him "to lay any penalties on thoſe who refuſe to "embrace the doctrine of the proper miniſters of his religion, or of any other, "or to ſubmit to their ſpiritual government," more than on any other men.

To the author's argument, that the magiſtrate cannot receive ſuch authority from the people; becauſe no man has power to leave it to the choice P. 22. of any other man to chuſe a religion for him; you give this pleaſant anſwer. "As the power of the magiſtrate, in reference to religion, is ordained for the "bringing men to take ſuch care as they ought of their ſalvation, that they "may not blindly leave it to the choice, neither of any other perſon, nor yet "of their own luſts and paſſions, to preſcribe to them what faith or worſhip "they ſhall embrace: ſo if we ſuppoſe this power to be veſted in the magiſtrate "by the conſent of the people; this will not import their abandoning the care "of their ſalvation, but rather the contrary. For if men, in chuſing their re-"ligion, are ſo generally ſubject, as has been ſhewed, when left wholly to "themſelves, to be ſo much ſwayed by prejudice and paſſion, as either not at "all, or not ſufficiently to regard the reaſons and motives which ought alone "to determine their choice; then it is every man's true intereſt, not to be "left wholly to himſelf in this matter; but that care ſhould be taken, that "in an affair of ſo vaſt concernment to him, he may be brought even againſt "his own inclination, if it cannot be done otherwiſe, (which is ordinarily the "caſe) to act according to reaſon and ſound judgment. And then what better "courſe can men take to provide for this, than by veſting the power I have "deſcribed, in him who bears the ſword?"—Wherein I beſeech you conſider, 1. Whether it be not pleaſant, that you ſay—"the power of the magiſtrate is "ordained to bring men to take ſuch care;" and thence infer, "Then it is every "one's intereſt to veſt ſuch power in the magiſtrate?" For if it be the power of the magiſtrate, it is his. And what need the people veſt it in him, unleſs there be need, and it be the beſt courſe they can take, to veſt a power in the magiſtrate, which he has already? 2. Another pleaſant thing you here ſay, is; "That the power of the magiſtrate is to bring men to ſuch "a care of their ſalvation, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice "of any perſon, or their own luſts, or paſſions, to preſcribe to them what "faith or worſhip they ſhall embrace; and yet that it is their beſt courſe to "veſt a power in the magiſtrate," liable to the ſame luſts and paſſions as themſelves, to chuſe for them. For if they veſt a power in the magiſtrate to puniſh them, when they diſſent from his religion; "to bring them to act, "even againſt their own inclination, according to their reaſon and ſound judg"ment;" which is, as you explain yourſelf in another place, to bring them to conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them: How far is this from leaving it to the choice of another man to preſcribe to them what faith or worſhip they ſhall embrace? Eſpecially if we conſider that you think it a ſtrange thing, that the author would have the care of every man's ſoul left to himſelf alone. So that this care being veſted P. 27. "in the magiſtrate with a power to puniſh men to make them conſider rea"ſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them" of the truth of his religion; the choice is evidently in the magiſtrate; as much as it can be in the power of one man to chuſe for another what religion he ſhall be of; which conſiſts only in a power of compelling him by puniſhments to embrace it.

I do neither you nor the magiſtrate injury, when I ſay that the power you give the magiſtrate of "puniſhing men, to make them conſider reaſons and "arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them," is to convince them of the truth of his religion, and to bring them to it. For men will never, in his opinion, "act according to reaſon and ſound judgment," which is the thing you here ſay men ſhould be brought to by the magiſtrate, even againſt their "own inclination;" till they embrace his religion. And if you have the brow of an honeſt man, you will not ſay the magiſtrate will ever puniſh you "to bring you to conſider any other reaſons and arguments, but ſuch as are "proper to convince you" of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Thus you ſhift forwards and backwards. You ſay "the magiſtrate has no "power to puniſh men, to compel them to his religion;" but only to "com"pel them to conſider reaſons and arguments proper to convince them" of the truth of his religion, which is all one as to ſay, no body has power to chuſe your way for you to Jeruſalem; but yet the lord of the manor has power to puniſh you, "to bring you to conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſuf"ficient to convince you." Of what? That the way he goes in, is the right, and ſo to make you join in company, and go along with him. So that, in effect, what is all your going about, but to come at laſt to the ſame place again; and put a power into the magiſtrate's hands, under another pretence, to compel men to his religion; which uſe of force, the author has ſufficiently overthrown, and you yourſelf have quitted. But I am tired to follow you ſo often round the ſame circle.

You ſpeak of it here as the moſt deplorable condition imaginable, that men P. 22. “ſhould be left to themſelves, and not be forced to conſider and examine “the grounds of their religion, and ſearch impartially and diligently after “the truth.” This you make the great miſcarriage of mankind. And for this you ſeem ſolicitous, all through your treatiſe, to find out a remedy; and there is ſcarce a leaf wherein you do not offer yours. But what if after all P. 7. now, you ſhould be found to prevaricate? “Men have contrived to themſelves, “ſay you, a great variety of religions:” it is granted. “They ſeek not the truth “in this matter with that application of mind, and that freedom of judgment “which is requiſite:” it is confeſſed. “All the falſe religions now on foot “in the world, have taken their riſe from the ſlight and partial conſideration, “which men have contented themſelves with, in ſearching after the “true; and men take them up, and perſiſt in them for want of due examination:” be it ſo. “There is need of a remedy for this, and I have found “one whoſe ſucceſs cannot be queſtioned:” very well. What is it? Let us hear it. “Why, diſſenters muſt be puniſhed.” Can any body that hears you ſay ſo, believe you in earneſt; and that want of examination is the thing you would have amended, when want of examination is not the thing you would have puniſhed? If want of examination be the fault, want of examination muſt be puniſhed; if you are, as you pretend, fully ſatisfied, that puniſhment is the proper and only means to remedy it. But if, in all your treatiſe, you can ſhew me one place, where you ſay that the ignorant, the careleſs, the inconſiderate, the negligent in examining throughly the truth of their own and others religion, &c. are to be puniſhed; I will allow your remedy for a good one. But you have not ſaid any thing like this: and which is more, I tell you before hand, you dare not ſay it. And whilſt you do not, the world has reaſon to judge, that however want of examination be a general fault, which you with great vehemency have exaggerated; yet you uſe it only for a pretence to puniſh diſſenters; and either diſtruſt your remedy, that it will not cure this evil, or elſe care not to have it generally cured. This evidently appears from your whole management of the argument. And he that reads your treatiſe with attention, will be more confirmed in this opinion, when he ſhall find, that you, who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may diſcover the way to ſalvation, have not ſaid one word of conſidering, ſearching, and hearkening to the Scripture; which had been as good a rule for a Chriſtian to have ſent them to, “as to reaſons and arguments proper to convince them” of you know not what; “as to the inſtruction and government of the proper miniſters of “religion,” which who they are, men are yet far from being agreed; “or “as to the information of thoſe, who tell them they have miſtaken their “way, and offer to ſhew them the right; and to the like uncertain and dangerous guides; which were not thoſe that our Saviour and the Apoſtles ſent men to, but to the ſcriptures. "Search the Scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life," ſays our Saviour to the unbelieving perſecuting Jews, (John v. 39.) and it is the Scriptures which St. Paul ſays, "are able to make wiſe unto ſalvation, (2 Tim. iii. 15.)

TALK no more, therefore, if you have any care of your reputation, how much "it is every man's intereſt not to be left to himſelf, without moleſtation, without puniſhment in matters of religion. Talk not of bringing men to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, by putting them upon examination." Talk no more "of force and puniſhment, as the only way left to bring men to examine." It is evident you mean nothing leſs. For, though want of examination be the only fault you complain of, and puniſhment be in your opinion the only way to bring men to it; and this the whole deſign of your book; yet you have not once propoſed in it, that thoſe, who do not impartially examine, ſhould be forced to it. And, that you may not think I talk at random, when I ſay you dare not; I will, if you pleaſe, give you ſome reaſons for my ſaying ſo.

1. BECAUSE, if you propoſe that all ſhould be puniſhed, who are ignorant, who have not uſed "ſuch conſideration as is apt and proper to manifeſt the truth; but to have been determined in the choice of their religion by impreſſions of education, admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, prejudices, and the like incompetent motives; and have taken up their religion, without examining it as they ought;" you will propoſe to have ſeveral of your own church, be it what it will, puniſhed; which would be a propoſition too apt to offend too many of it, for you to venture on. For whatever need there be of reformation, every one will not thank you for propoſing ſuch an one as muſt begin at, or at leaſt reach to, the houſe of God.

2. BECAUSE, if you ſhould propoſe that all thoſe who are ignorant, careleſs, and negligent in examining, ſhould be puniſhed, you would have little to ſay in this queſtion of Toleration. For if the laws of the ſtate were made as they ought to be, equal to all the ſubjects, without diſtinction of men of different profeſſions in religion; and the faults to be amended by puniſhments, were impartially puniſhed, in all who are guilty of them; this would immediately produce a perfect toleration, or ſhew the uſeleſſneſs of force in matters of religion. If therefore you think it ſo neceſſary, as you ſay, for the "promoting of true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, that men ſhould be puniſhed to make them examine;" do but find a way to apply force to all that have not thoroughly and impartially examined, and you have my conſent. For though force be not the proper means of promoting religion; yet there is no better way to ſhew the uſeleſſneſs of it, than the applying it equally to miſcarriages, in whomſover found; and not to diſtinct parties or perſuaſions of men, for the reformation of them alone, when others are equally faulty.

3. BECAUSE, without being for as large a toleration as the author propoſes, you cannot be truly and ſincerely for a free and impartial examination. For whoever examines, muſt have the liberty to judge, and follow his judgment;

ment; or elſe you put him upon examination to no purpoſe. And whether that will not as well lead men from, as to your church, is ſo much a venture, that by your way of writing, it is evident enough you are loath to hazard it; and if you are of the national church, it is plain your brethren will not bear with you in the allowance of ſuch a liberty. You muſt therefore either change your method; and if the want of examination be that great and dangerous fault you would have corrected, you muſt equally puniſh all that are equally guilty of any neglect, in this matter, and then take your only means, your beloved force, and make the beſt of it; or elſe you muſt put off your maſk, and confeſs that you deſign not your puniſhments to bring men to examination, but to conformity. For the fallacy you have uſed, is too groſs to paſs upon this age.

What follows to p. 26. I think I have conſidered ſufficiently already. But there you have found out ſomething worth notice. In this page, out of abundant kindneſs, when the diſſenters have their heads, without any cauſe, broken, you provide them a plaiſter. P. 26. For, ſay you, "if upon ſuch examination of the matter," (i. e. brought to it by the magiſtrate's puniſhment) "they chance to find, that the truth does not lie on the magiſtrate's ſide; they have gained thus much however, even by the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power, that they know better than they did before, where the truth does lie." Which is as true, as if you ſhould ſay, upon examination I find ſuch a one is out of the way to York; therefore I know better than I did before, that I am in the right. For neither of you may be in the right. This were true indeed, if there were but two ways in all; a right and a wrong. But where there be an hundred ways, and but one right; your knowing upon examination, that that which I take is wrong, makes you not know any thing better than before, that yours is the right. But if that be the beſt reaſon you have for it, it is ninety-eight to one ſtill againſt you, that you are in the wrong. Beſides, he that has been puniſhed, may have examined before, and then you are ſure he gains nothing. However you think you do well to encourage the magiſtrate in puniſhing, and comfort the man who has ſuffered unjuſtly, by ſhewing what he ſhall gain by it. Whereas, on the contrary, in a diſcourſe of this nature, where the bounds of right and wrong are enquired into, and ſhould be eſtabliſhed, the magiſtrate was to be ſhewed the bounds of his authority, and warned of the injury he did when he miſapplies his power, and puniſhed any man who deſerved it not; and not be ſoothed into injuſtice, by conſideration of gain that might thence accrue to the ſufferer. "Shall we do evil that good may come of it?" There are a ſort of people who are very wary of touching upon the magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his power, and the injuſtice and ill conſequences of his miſapplying it; at leaſt, ſo long as it is miſapplied in favour of them, and their party. I know not whether you are of their number. But this I am ſure, you have the misfortune here to fall into their miſtake. The magiſtrate you confeſs, may in this caſe miſapply his power; and inſtead of repreſenting to him the injuſtice of it, and the account he muſt give to his ſovereign, one day, of this great truſt put into his hands, for the equal protection of all his ſubjects: you pretend advantages which the ſufferer may receive from it: and ſo inſtead of diſheartning from, you give encouragement to, the miſchief. Which, upon your principle, joined to the natural thirſt in man after arbitrary power, may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with ſome pretence of right.

FOR thus ſtands your ſyſtem. "If force, i. e. puniſhment, may be any P. 15. "way uſeful for the promoting the ſalvation of ſouls, there is a right ſome-"where to uſe it. And this right, ſay you, is in the magiſtrate." Who then, P. 16. upon your grounds, may quickly find reaſon, where it ſuits his inclination, or ſerves his turn, to puniſh men directly to bring them to his religion. For if he may uſe force, becauſe it "may be, indirectly, and at a diſtance, any way "uſeful towards the ſalvation of mens ſouls," towards the procuring any degree of glory; why may he not, by the ſame rule, uſe it where it may be uſeful, at leaſt indirectly and at a diſtance, towards the procuring a greater degree of glory? For St. Paul aſſures us, "that the afflictions of this life work for us a "far more exceeding weight of glory." So that why ſhould they not be puniſhed, if in the wrong, to bring them into the right way; if in the right, to make them by their ſufferings "gainers of a far more exceeding weight of "glory?" But whatever you ſay "of puniſhment being lawful, becauſe indi-"rectly, and at a diſtance it may be uſeful;" I ſuppoſe, upon cooler thoughts, you will be apt to ſuſpect that, however ſufferings may promote the ſalvation of thoſe who make a good uſe of them, and ſo ſet men ſurer in the right way, or higher in a ſtate of glory; yet thoſe who make men unduly ſuffer, will have the heavier account, and greater weight of guilt upon them, to ſink them deeper in the pit of perdition; and that therefore they ſhould be warned to take care of ſo uſing their power. Becauſe whoever be gainers by it, they themſelves will, without repentance and amendment, be ſure to be loſers. But by granting that the magiſtrate miſapplies his power, when he puniſhes thoſe who have the right on their ſide, whether it be to bring them to his own religion, or whether it be "to bring them to conſider reaſons and argu-"ments proper to convince them," you grant all that the author contends for. All that he endeavours, is to ſhew the bounds of civil power; and that in puniſhing others for religion, the magiſtrate miſapplies the force he has in his hands, and ſo goes beyond right, beyond the limits of his power. For I do not think the author of the letter ſo vain, I am ſure for my part I am not, as to hope by arguments, though ever ſo clear, to reform preſently all the abuſes in this matter; eſpecially whilſt men of art, and religion, endeavour ſo induſtriouſly to palliate and diſguiſe, what truth, yet, ſometimes, unawares forces from them.

Do not think I make a wrong uſe of your ſaying, "the magiſtrate miſap-"plies his power," when I ſay you therein grant all that the author contends for. For if the magiſtrate miſapplies, or makes wrong uſe of his power, when he puniſhes in matters of religion any one who is in the right, though it be but to make him conſider, as you grant he does; he alſo miſapplies, or makes wrong uſe of his power, when he puniſhes any one, whomſoever in matters of religion, to make him conſider. For every one is here judge for himſelf, what is right; and in matters of faith, and religious worſhip, another cannot judge for him. So that to puniſh any one in matters of religion, though it be but to make him conſider, is by your own confeſſion beyond the magiſtrate's power. And that puniſhing in matters of religion is beyond the magiſtrate's power, is what the author contends for.

P. 26. YOU tell us in the following words, "all the hurt that comes to them by "it, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies, for their following "the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own conſciences; "which certainly is no ſuch miſchief to mankind, as to make it more eligible, "that there ſhould be no ſuch power veſted in the magiſtrate, but the care of "every man's ſoul ſhould be left to himſelf alone (as this author demands it "ſhould be;) that is, that every man ſhould be ſuffered, quietly, and without "the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care at all of his ſoul, if he be ſo "pleaſed; or in doing it, to follow his own groundleſs prejudices, or unaccountable humour, or any crafty ſeducer, whom he may think fit to take "for his guide." Why ſhould not the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf, rather than the magiſtrate? Is the magiſtrate like to be more concerned for it? Is the magiſtrate like to take more care of it? Is the magiſtrate commonly more careful of his own, than other men are of theirs? Will you ſay the magiſtrate is leſs expoſed in matters of religion, to prejudices, humours, and crafty ſeducers, than other men? If you cannot lay your hand upon your heart, and ſay all this, what then will be got by the change? And "why may "not the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf?" Eſpecially, if a man be in ſo much danger to miſs the truth, "who is ſuffered quietly, and without "the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care of his ſoul, if he be ſo pleaſed, or "to follow his own prejudices," &c. For if want of moleſtation be the dangerous ſtate, wherein men are likelieſt to miſs the right way; it muſt be confeſſed, that of all men, the magiſtrate is moſt in danger to be in the wrong, and ſo the unfitteſt, if you take the care of mens ſouls from themſelves, of all men, to be intruſted with it. For he never meets with that great and only antidote of yours againſt error, which you here call moleſtation. He never has the benefit of your ſovereign remedy, puniſhment, to make him conſider; which you think ſo neceſſary, that you look on it as a moſt dangerous ſtate for men to be without it; and therefore tell us, "it is every man's true intereſt, "not to be left wholly to himſelf in matters of religion."

THUS, Sir, I have gone through your whole treatiſe, and as I think, have omitted nothing in it material. If I have, I doubt not but I ſhall hear of it. And now I refer it to yourſelf, as well as to the judgment of the world, whether the author of the letter, in ſaying no body hath a right; or you, in ſaying, the magiſtrate hath a right, to uſe force in matters of religion, has moſt reaſon. In the mean time, I leave this requeſt with you: that if ever you write again, about "the means of bringing ſouls to ſalvation," which certainly is the beſt deſign any one can employ his pen in, you would take care not to prejudice ſo good a cauſe, by ordering it ſo, as to make it look as if you writ for a party. I am, SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

*May 27, 1690.* Philanthropus.

# A THIRD

# LETTER

# FOR

# TOLERATION.

Vol. II. Kkk

# *A THIRD
# LETTER
# FOR
# TOLERATION.

## To the AUTHOR of the Third LETTER concerning TOLERATION.

## CHAP. I.

SIR,

THE buſineſs which your Letter concerning Toleration found me engaged in, has taken up ſo much of the time my health would allow me ever ſince, that I doubt whether I ſhould now at all have troubled you or the world with an anſwer, had not ſome of my friends, ſufficiently ſatisfied of the weakneſs of your arguments, with repeated inſtances, perſuaded me it might be of uſe to truth in a point of ſo great moment, to clear it from thoſe fallacies which might perhaps puzzle ſome unwary readers; and therefore prevailed on me to ſhew the wrong grounds and miſtaken reaſonings you make uſe of to ſupport your new way of perſecution. Pardon me, Sir, that I uſe that name, which you are ſo much offended at: for if puniſhment be puniſhment, though it come ſhort of the diſcipline of fire and faggot, it is as certain that puniſhment for religion is truly perſecution, though it be only ſuch puniſhment as you in your clemency think fit to call “moderate and convenient penalties.” But however you pleaſe to call them, I doubt not but to let you ſee, that if you will be true to your own principles, and ſtand to what you have ſaid, you muſt carry your “ſome degrees of force,” as you phraſe it, to all thoſe degrees which in words you declare againſt.

YOU have indeed in this laſt letter of yours, altered the queſtion; for page 26, you tell me the queſtion between us, is, “whether the magiſtrate hath any

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* The reader may be pleaſed to take notice, that

L. I. Stands for the Letter concerning Toleration.

A. For the Argument of the Letter concerning Toleration briefly conſidered and anſwered.

L. II. The Second Letter concerning Toleration.

P. The pages of the Third Letter concerning Toleration.

"right to uſe force to bring men to the true religion?" Whereas you yourſelf P. 76. own the queſtion to be, "whether the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force in "matters of religion?" Whether this alteration be at all to the advantage of truth, or your cauſe, we ſhall ſee. But hence you take occaſion all along to lay load on me for charging you with the abſurdities of a power in the magiſtrates to puniſh men, to bring them to their religion: whereas you here tell us they have a right to uſe force "only to bring men to the true." But whether I were more to blame to ſuppoſe you to talk coherently and mean ſenſe, or you in expreſſing yourſelf ſo doubtfully and uncertainly, where you were concerned to be plain and direct, I ſhall leave to our readers to judge; only here in the beginning, I ſhall endeavour to clear myſelf of that imputation, I ſo often meet with, of charging on you conſequences you do not own, and arguing againſt an opinion that is not yours, in thoſe places, where I ſhew how little advantage it would be to truth, or the ſalvation of mens ſouls, that all magiſtrates ſhould have a right to uſe force to bring men to embrace their religion. This I ſhall do by proving, that if upon your grounds the magiſtrate, as you pretend, be obliged to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, it will neceſſarily follow, that every magiſtrate, who believes his religion to be true, is obliged to uſe force to bring men to his.

P. 31. YOU tell us, "that by the law of nature the magiſtrate is inveſted with coactive power, and obliged to uſe it for all the good purpoſes which it might "ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful, even for the reſtraining of falſe P. 35. "and corrupt religion: and that it is the magiſtrate's duty, to which he is "commiſſioned by the law of nature, but the ſcripture does not properly give "it him."

I SUPPOSE you will grant me, that any thing laid upon the magiſtrate as a duty, is ſome way or other practicable. Now the magiſtrate being obliged to uſe force in matters of religion, but yet ſo as to bring men only to the true religion, he will not be in any capacity to perform this part of his duty, unleſs the religion he is thus to promote, be what he can certainly know, or elſe what it is ſufficient for him to believe, to be the true: either his knowledge or his opinion muſt point out that religion to him, which he is by force to promote; or elſe he may promiſcuouſly and indifferently promote any religion, and puniſh men at a venture, to bring them from that they are in, to any other. This laſt I think no body has been ſo wild as to ſay.

IF therefore it muſt be either his knowledge or his perſuaſion that muſt guide the magiſtrate herein, and keep him within the bounds of his duty; if the magiſtrates of the world cannot know, certainly know, the true religion to be the true religion, but it be of a nature to exerciſe their faith; (for where viſion, knowledge and certainty is, there faith is done away,) then that which gives them the laſt determination herein, muſt be their own belief, their own perſuaſion.

TO you and me the Chriſtian religion is the true, and that is built, to mention no other articles of it, on this, that Jeſus Chriſt was put to death at Jeruſalem, and roſe again from the dead. Now do you or I know this?

I do not aſk with what aſſurance we believe it, for that in the higheſt degree not being knowledge, is not what we now enquire after. Can any magiſtrate demonſtrate to himſelf, and if he can to himſelf, he does ill not to do it to others, not only all the articles of his church, but the fundamental ones of the Chriſtian religion? For whatever is not capable of demonſtration, as ſuch remote matters of fact are not, is not, unleſs it be ſelf-evident, capable to produce knowledge, how well grounded and great ſoever the aſſurance of faith may be wherewith it is received; but faith it is ſtill, and not knowledge; perſuaſion, and not certainty. This is the higheſt the nature of the thing will permit us to go in matters of revealed religion, which are therefore called matters of faith: a perſuaſion of our own minds, ſhort of knowledge, is the laſt reſult that determines us in ſuch truths. It is all God requires in the Goſpel for men to be ſaved: and it would be ſtrange if there were more required of the magiſtrate for the direction of another in the way to ſalvation, than is required of him for his own ſalvation. Knowledge then, properly ſo called, not being to be had of the truths neceſſary to ſalvation, the magiſtrate muſt be content with faith and perſuaſion for the rule of that truth he will recommend and enforce upon others; as well as of that whereon he will venture his own eternal condition. If therefore it be the magiſtrate's duty to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, it can be only to that religion which he believes to be true: ſo that if force be at all to be uſed by the magiſtrate in matters of religion, it can only be for the promoting that religion which he only believes to be true, or none at all. I grant that a ſtrong aſſurance of any truth ſettled upon prevalent and well-grounded arguments of probability, is often called knowledge in popular ways of talking: but being here to diſtinguiſh between knowledge and belief, to what degrees of confidence ſoever raiſed, their boundaries muſt be kept, and their names not confounded. I know not what greater pledge a man can give of a full perſuaſion of the truth of any thing, than his venturing his ſoul upon it, as he does, who ſincerely embraces any religion, and receives it for true. But to what degree ſoever of aſſurance his faith may riſe, it ſtill comes ſhort of knowledge. Nor can any one now, I think, arrive to greater evidence of the truth of the Chriſtian religion, than the firſt converts in the time of our Saviour and the apoſtles had; of whom yet nothing more was required but to believe.

BUT ſuppoſing all the truths of the Chriſtian religion neceſſary to ſalvation could be ſo known to the magiſtrate, that in his uſe of force for the bringing men to embrace theſe, he could be guided by infallible certainty; yet I fear this would not ſerve your turn, nor authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force to bring men in England, or any where elſe, into the communion of the national church, in which ceremonies of human inſtitution were impoſed, which could not be known, nor, being confeſſed things in their own nature indifferent, ſo much as thought neceſſary to ſalvation.

BUT of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak in another place; all the uſe I make of it here, is to ſhew, that the croſs in baptiſm, kneeling at the ſacrament,

crament, and ſuch like things, being impoſſible to be known neceſſary to ſalvation, a certain knowledge of the truth of the articles of faith of any church, could not authorize the magiſtrate to compel men to embrace the communion of that church, wherein any thing were made neceſſary to communion, which he did not know was neceſſary to ſalvation.

BY what has been already ſaid, I ſuppoſe it is evident, that if the magiſtrate be to uſe force only for promoting the true religion, he can have no other guide but his own perſuaſion of what is the true religion, and muſt be led by that in his uſe of force, or elſe not uſe it at all in matters of religion. If you take the latter of theſe conſequences, you and I are agreed: if the former you muſt allow all magiſtrates, of whatſoever religion, the uſe of force to bring men to theirs, and ſo be involved in all thoſe ill conſequences which you cannot it ſeems admit, and hoped to decline by your uſeleſs diſtinction of force to be uſed, not for any, but for the true religion.

" IT is the duty, you ſay, of the magiſtrate to uſe force for promoting the " true religion." And in ſeveral places you tell us, he is obliged to it. Perſuade magiſtrates in general of this, and then tell me how any magiſtrate ſhall be reſtrained from the uſe of force, for the promoting what he thinks to be the true? For he being perſuaded that it is his duty to uſe force to promote the true religion, and being alſo perſuaded his is the true religion, what ſhall ſtop his hand? Muſt he forbear the uſe of force till he be got beyond believing, into a certain knowledge that all he requires men to embrace, is neceſſary to ſalvation? If that be it you will ſtand to, you have my conſent, and I think there will be no need of any other Toleration. But if the believing his religion to be the true, be ſufficient for the magiſtrate to uſe force for the promoting of it, will it be ſo only to the magiſtrates of the religion that you profeſs? And muſt all other magiſtrates ſit ſtill, and not do their duty till they have your permiſſion? If it be your magiſtrate's duty to uſe force for the promoting the religion he believes to be the true, it will be every magiſtrate's duty to uſe force for the promoting what he believes to be the true, and he ſins if he does not receive and promote it as if it were true. If you will not take this upon my word, yet I deſire you to do it upon the ſtrong reaſon of a very judicious and reverend prelate [Dr. John Sharp, archbiſhop of York,] of the preſent church of England. In A diſcourſe concerning conſcience, printed in quarto, 1687, p. 18, you will find theſe following words, and much more to this purpoſe: " Where a man is miſtaken in his " judgment, even in that caſe it is always a ſin to act againſt it. Though we " ſhould take that for a duty which is really a ſin, yet ſo long as we are thus per- " ſuaded, it will be highly criminal in us to act in contradiction to this perſua- " ſion: and the reaſon of this is evident, becauſe by ſo doing, we wilfully act " againſt the beſt light which at preſent we have for direction of our actions. " So that when all is done, the immediate guide of our actions can be nothing " but our conſcience, our judgment and perſuaſion. If a man, for inſtance, " ſhould of a Jew become a Chriſtian, whilſt yet in his heart he believed that " the Meſſiah is not yet come, and that our Lord Jeſus was an impoſtor: or

“ if a Papiſt ſhould renounce the communion of the Roman church, and join “ with ours, whilſt yet he is perſuaded that the Roman church is the only catholick church, and that our reformed churches are heretical or ſchiſmatical; though now there is none of us that will deny that the men in both theſe “ caſes have made a good change, as having changed a falſe religion for a true “ one, yet for all that I dare ſay we ſhould all agree they were both of them “ great villains for making that change; becauſe they made it not upon honeſt principles, and in purſuance of their judgment, but in direct contradiction to both.” So that it being the magiſtrate's duty to uſe force to bring men to the true religion; and he being perſuaded his is the true, I ſuppoſe you will no longer queſtion but that he is as much obliged to uſe force to bring men to it, as if it were the true. And then, Sir, I hope you have too much reſpect for magiſtrates, not to allow them to believe the religions to be true which they profeſs. Theſe things put together, I deſire you to conſider whether if magiſtrates are obliged to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, every magiſtrate is not obliged to uſe force to bring men to that religion he believes to be true?

THIS being ſo, I hope I have not argued ſo wholly beſide the purpoſe, as you all through your letter accuſe me, for charging on your doctrine all the ill conſequences, all the prejudice it would be to the true religion, that magiſtrates ſhould have power, to uſe force to bring men to their religions: and I preſume you will think yourſelf concerned to give to all theſe places in the firſt and ſecond letter concerning Toleration, which ſhew the inconveniencies and abſurdities of ſuch an uſe of force, ſome other anſwer, than that “ you are P. 24. “ for puniſhing only ſuch as reject the true religion. That it is plain the force “ you ſpeak of is not force, my way applied, i. e. applied to the promoting the “ true religion only, but to the promoting all the national religions in the P. 29. “ world.” And again, to my arguing that force your way applied, if it can propagate any religion, it is likelier to be the falſe than the true, becauſe few of the magiſtrates of the world are in the right way; you reply, “ this would “ have been to the purpoſe, if “ you” had aſſerted that every magiſtrate may uſe “ force “ your” indirect way (or any way) to bring men to his own religion, whatever that be. But if “ you” aſſerted no ſuch thing, (as no man you think but “ an atheiſt will aſſert it) then this is quite beſide the buſineſs.” This is the P. 21. great ſtrength of your anſwer, and your refuge almoſt in every page. So that I preſume it reaſonable to expect that you ſhould clearly and directly anſwer what I have here ſaid, or elſe find ſome other anſwer than what you have done to the ſecond letter concerning Toleration; however acute you are, in your way, in ſeveral places, on this occaſion, as p. 11, 12, for my anſwer to which I ſhall refer you to another place.

To my argument againſt force, from the magiſtrates being as liable to error as the reſt of mankind, you anſwer, That I “ might have conſidered that this P. 15. “ argument concerns none but thoſe who aſſert that every magiſtrate has a right “ to uſe force to promote his own religion, whatever it be, which “ you” think “ no man that has any religion will aſſert.” I ſuppoſe you may think now this anſwer will ſcarce ſerve, and you muſt aſſert either no magiſtrate to have right to promote his religion by force, or elſe be involved in the condemnation you paſs on thoſe who aſſert it of all magiſtrates. And here I think, as to the deciſion of the queſtion betwixt us, I might leave this matter: but there being in your letter a great many other groſs miſtakes, wrong ſuppoſitions, and fallacious arguings, which in thoſe general and plauſible terms you have made uſe of in ſeveral places, as beſt ſerved your turn, may poſſibly have impoſed on yourſelf, as well as they are fitted to do ſo on others, and therefore will deſerve to have ſome notice taken of them; I ſhall give myſelf the trouble of examining your letter a little farther.

To my ſaying, "It is not for the magiſtrate, upon an imagination of its uſefulneſs, to make uſe of any other means than what the Author and Finiſher of our faith had directed;" you reply, "which how true ſoever, is not, I think very much to the purpoſe. For if the magiſtrate does only aſſiſt that miniſtry which our Lord has appointed, by uſing ſo much of his coactive power for the furthering their ſervice, as common experience diſcovers to be uſeful and neceſſary for that end; there is no manner of ground to ſay, that upon an imagination of its uſefulneſs, he makes uſe of any other means for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, than what the Author and Finiſher of our faith has directed. It is true indeed the Author and Finiſher of our faith has given the magiſtrate no new power or commiſſion, nor was there any need that he ſhould, (if himſelf had had any temporal power to give:) for he found him already, even by the law of nature, the miniſter of God to the people for good, and bearing the ſword not in vain, i. e. inveſted with coactive power, and obliged to uſe it for all the good purpoſes which it might ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful; even for the reſtraining of falſe and corrupt religion; as Job long before (perhaps before any part of the Scriptures were written) acknowledged, when he ſaid, that the worſhipping the ſun or the moon, was an iniquity to be puniſhed by the judge. But though our Saviour has given the magiſtrates no new power, yet being king of kings, he expects and requires that they ſhould ſubmit themſelves to his ſcepter, and uſe the power which always belonged to them, for his ſervice, and for the advancing his ſpiritual kingdom in the world. And even that charity which our great Maſter ſo earneſtly recommends, and ſo ſtrictly requires of all his diſciples, as it obliges all men to ſeek and promote the good of others, as well as their own, eſpecially their ſpiritual and eternal good, by ſuch means as their ſeveral places and relations enable them to uſe; ſo does it eſpecially oblige the magiſtrate to do it as a magiſtrate, i. e. by that power which enables him to do it above the rate of other men. P. 31.

"So far therefore is the Chriſtian magiſtrate, when he gives his helping hand to the furtherance of the Goſpel, by laying convenient penalties upon ſuch as reject it, or any part of it, from uſing any other means for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, than what the Author and Finiſher of our faith has directed, that he does no more than his duty to God, to his Redeemer, and to his ſubjects, requires of him."

THE ſum of your reply amounts to this, that by the law of nature the magiſtrate may make uſe of his coactive power where it is uſeful and neceſſary for the good of the people. If it be from the law of nature, it muſt be to all magiſtrates equally: and then I aſk whether this good they are to promote without any new power or commiſſion from our Saviour, be what they think to be ſo, or what they certainly know to be ſo. If it be what they think to be ſo, then all magiſtrates may uſe force to bring men to their religion: and what good this is like to be to men, or of what uſe to the true religion, we have elſewhere conſidered. If it be only that good which they certainly know to be ſo, they will be very ill enabled to do what you require of them, which you here tell us is to aſſiſt that miniſtry which our Lord has appointed. Which of the magiſtrates of your time did you know to have ſo well ſtudied the controverſies about ordination and church-government, to be ſo well verſed in church-hiſtory and ſucceſſion, that you can undertake that he certainly knew which was the miniſtry which our Lord had appointed, either that of Rome, or that of Sweden; whether the epiſcopacy in one part of this iſland, or the preſbytery in another, were the miniſtry which our Lord had appointed? If you ſay, being firmly perſuaded of it, be ſufficient to authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force; you with the atheiſts, as you call them, who do ſo, give the people up in every country to the coactive force of the magiſtrate to be employed for the aſſiſting the miniſters of his religion: and king Lewis of good right comes in with his dragoons; for it is not much doubted that he as ſtrongly believed his popiſh prieſts and Jeſuits to be the miniſtry which our Lord appointed, as either king Charles or king James the Second believed that of the church of England to be ſo. And of what uſe ſuch an exerciſe of the coactive power of all magiſtrates, is to the people, or to the true religion, you are concerned to ſhew. But it is, you know, but to tell me, I only trifle, and this is all anſwered.

WHAT in other places you tell us, is to make men "hear, conſider, ſtudy, "embrace, and bring men to the true religion," you here do very well to tell us is to aſſiſt the miniſtry: and to that it is true, "common experience diſcovers "the magiſtrate's coactive force to be uſeful and neceſſary," viz. to thoſe who taking the reward, but not over-buſying themſelves in the care of ſouls, find it for their eaſe, that the magiſtrates coactive power ſhould ſupply their want of paſtoral care, and be made uſe of to bring thoſe into an outward conformity to the national church, whom either for want of ability, they cannot, or want of due and friendly application, joined with an exemplary life, they never ſo much as endeavoured to, prevail on heartily to embrace it. That there may be ſuch neglects in the beſt-conſtituted national church in the world, the complaints of a very knowing biſhop of our church, [Dr. Gilbert Burnet, biſhop of Saliſbury,] in a late diſcourſe of the PASTORAL CARE, is too plain an evidence.

WITHOUT ſo great an authority I ſhould ſcarce have ventured, though it lay juſt in my way to have taken notice of what is ſo viſible, that it is in every one's mouth; for fear you ſhould have told me again, that "I made myſelf an

" occaſion to ſhew my good will toward the clergy." For you will not, I ſuppoſe, ſuſpect that eminent prelate to have any ill will to them.

IF this were not ſo, that ſome were negligent, I imagine the preachers of the true religion, which lies, as you tell us, ſo obvious and expoſed, as to be eaſily diſtinguiſhed from the falſe, would need or deſire no other aſſiſtance from the magiſtrate's coactive power, but what ſhould be directed againſt the irregularity of mens lives; their luſts being that alone, as you tell us, that makes force neceſſary to aſſiſt the true religion; which, were it not for our depraved nature, would by its light and reaſonableneſs have the advantage againſt all falſe religions.

YOU tell us too, that the magiſtrate may impoſe creeds and ceremonies; indeed you ſay ſound creeds, and decent ceremonies, but that helps not your cauſe: for who muſt be judge of that ſound, and that decent? If the impoſer, then thoſe words ſignify nothing at all, but that the magiſtrate may impoſe thoſe creeds and ceremonies which he thinks ſound and decent, which is in effect ſuch as he thinks fit. Indeed you telling us a little above, in the ſame page, that it is "a vice not to worſhip God in ways preſcribed by thoſe to whom God " has left the ordering of ſuch matters;" you ſeem to make other judges of what is ſound and decent, and the magiſtrate but the executor of their decrees, with the aſſiſtance of his coactive power. A pretty foundation to eſtabliſh creeds and ceremonies on, that God has left the ordering of them to thoſe who cannot order them! But ſtill the ſame difficulty returns; for after they have preſcribed, muſt the magiſtrate judge them to be ſound and decent, or muſt he impoſe them, though he judge them not ſound or decent? If he muſt judge them ſo himſelf, we are but where we were: if he muſt impoſe them when preſcribed, though he judge them not ſound nor decent, it is a pretty ſort of drudgery is put on the magiſtrate. And how far is this ſhort of implicit faith? But if he muſt not judge what is ſound and decent, he muſt judge at leaſt who are thoſe to whom God has left the ordering of ſuch matters; and then the king of France is ready again with his dragoons for the ſound doctrine and decent ceremonies of his preſcribers in the council of Trent; and that upon this ground, with as good right as any other has for the preſcriptions of any others. Do not miſtake me again, Sir; I do not ſay, he judges as right; but I do ſay, that whilſt he judges the council of Trent, or the clergy of Rome to be thoſe to whom God has left the ordering of thoſe matters, he has as much right to follow their decrees, as any other to follow the judgment of any other ſet of mortal men whom he believes to be ſo.

BUT whoever is to be judge of what is ſound or decent in the caſe, I aſk,

OF what uſe and neceſſity is it to impoſe creeds and ceremonies? for that uſe and neceſſity is all the commiſſion you can find the magiſtrate hath to uſe his coactive power to impoſe them.

1. OF what uſe and neceſſity is it among Chriſtians that own the Scripture to be the word of God and rule of faith, to make and impoſe a creed? What commiſſion for this hath the magiſtrate from the law of nature? God hath given a revelation that contains in it all things neceſſary to ſalvation, and of this his people are all perſuaded. What neceſſity now is there? How does

their good require it, that the magiſtrate ſhould ſingle out, as he thinks fit, any number of thoſe truths as more neceſſary to ſalvation than the reſt, if God himſelf has not done it?

2. BUT next, are theſe creeds in the words of the Scripture, or not? If they are, they are certainly ſound, as containing nothing but truth in them: and ſo they were before, as they lay in the Scripture. But thus though they contain nothing but ſound truths, yet they may be imperfect, and ſo unſound rules of faith, ſince they may require more or leſs than God requires to be believed as neceſſary to ſalvation. For what greater neceſſity, I pray, is there that a man ſhould believe that Chriſt ſuffered under Pontius Pilate, than that he was born at Bethlehem of Judah? Both are certainly true, and no Chriſtian doubts of either: but how comes one to be made an article of faith, and impoſed by the magiſtrate as neceſſary to ſalvation, for otherwiſe there can be no neceſſity of impoſition, and the other not?

Do not miſtake me here, as if I would lay by that ſummary of the chriſtian religion, which is contained in that which is called the Apoſtles creed; which though no body, who examines the matter, will have reaſon to conclude of the Apoſtles compiling, yet is certainly of reverend antiquity, and ought ſtill to be preſerved in the church. I mention it not to argue againſt it, but againſt your impoſition, and to ſhew that even that creed, though of that antiquity, though it contain in it all the credenda neceſſary to ſalvation, cannot yet upon your principles be impoſed by the coercive power of the magiſtrate, who even by the commiſſion you have found out for him, can uſe his force for nothing but what is abſolutely neceſſary to ſalvation.

BUT if the creed to be impoſed be not in the words of divine revelation; then it is in plainer, more clear and intelligible expreſſions, or not: If no plainer, what neceſſity of changing thoſe, which men inſpired by the Holy Ghoſt made uſe of? If you ſay, they are plainer; then they explain and determine the ſenſe of ſome obſcure and dubious places of Scripture; which explication not being of divine revelation, though ſound to one man, may be unſound to another, and cannot be impoſed as truths neceſſary to ſalvation. Beſides that, this deſtroys what you tell us of the obviouſneſs of all truths neceſſary to ſalvation. P. 29.

AND as to rites and ceremonies, are there any neceſſary to ſalvation, which Chriſt has not inſtituted? If not, how can the magiſtrate impoſe them? What commiſſion has he from the care he ought to have for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, to uſe his coactive force for the eſtabliſhment of any new ones which our Lord and Saviour, with due reverence be it ſpoken, had forgotten? He inſtituted two rites in his church; can any one add any new one to them? Chriſt commanded ſimply to baptize into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt; but the ſigning the croſs, how came that neceſſary? "Human authority which is neceſſary to aſſiſt the truth againſt the "corruption of nature," has made it ſo. But it is a "decent" ceremony. I aſk, is it ſo decent that the adminiſtration of baptiſm, ſimply, as our Saviour inſtituted, would be indecent without it? If not, then there is no reaſon to impoſe it for decency's ſake; for there can be no reaſon to alter or add any thing to the inſtitution of Chriſt, or introduce any ceremony or circumſtance into religion for decency, where the action would be decent without it. The command to "do all things decently, and in order," gave no authority to add to Chriſt's inſtitution any new ceremony; it only preſcribed the manner how, what was neceſſary to be done in the congregation, ſhould be there done, viz. after ſuch a manner, that if it were omitted, there would appear ſome indecency, whereof the congregation or collective body was to be judge, for to them that rule was given: And if that rule go beyond what I have ſaid, and gives power to men to introduce into religious worſhip whatever they ſhall think decent, and impoſe the uſe of it; I do not ſee how the greateſt part of the infinite ceremonies of the church of Rome could be complained of, or refuſed, if introduced into another church, and there impoſed by the magiſtrate. But if ſuch a power were given to the magiſtrate, that whatever he thought a decent ceremony, he might de novo impoſe, he would need ſome expreſs commiſſion from God in Scripture, ſince the commiſſion you ſay he has from the law of nature, will never give him a power to inſtitute new ceremonies in the chriſtian religion, which, be they decent, or what they will, can never be neceſſary to ſalvation.

THE Goſpel was to be preached in their aſſemblies; the rule then was, that the habit, geſture, voice, language, &c. of the preacher, for theſe were neceſſary circumſtances of the action, ſhould have nothing ridiculous or indecent in it. The praiſes of God were to be ſung; it muſt be then in ſuch poſtures and tunes as became the ſolemnity of that action. And ſo a convert was to be baptized; Chriſt inſtituted the eſſential part of that action, which was waſhing with water into the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; in which care was alſo to be had, that in the doing this nothing ſhould be omitted that preſerved a decency in all the circumſtances of the action. But no body will ſay, that if the croſs were omitted, that upon that account there would be any thing indecent in baptiſm.

WHAT is to be done in the aſſemblies of Chriſtians for the ſalvation of ſouls, is ſufficiently preſcribed in Scripture: but ſince the circumſtances of the actions were ſo various, and might in ſeveral countries and ages have different appearances, as that appears decent in one country which is quite contrary in another, concerning them there could be no other rule given than what is, viz. "decently, in order, and to edification;" and in avoiding indecencies, and not adding any new ceremonies, how decent ſoever, this rule conſiſts.

I JUDGE no man in the uſe of the croſs in baptiſm. The impoſition of that, or any other ceremony not inſtituted by Chriſt himſelf, is what I argue againſt, and ſay, is more than you upon your principles can make good.

COMMON ſenſe has ſatisfied all mankind, that it is above their reach to determine what things in their own nature indifferent, were fit to be made uſe of in religion, and would be acceptable to the ſuperior beings in their worſhip, and therefore they have every where thought it neceſſary to derive that knowledge from the immediate will and dictates of the gods themſelves, and have taught that their forms of religion, and outward modes of worſhip were founded upon revelation: no body daring to do ſo abſurd and inſolent a thing, as to take upon him to preſume with himſelf, or to preſcribe to others by his own authority, which ſhould in theſe indifferent and mean things be worthy of the Deity, and make an acceptable part of his worſhip. Indeed they all agreed in the duties of natural religion, and we find them by common conſent owning that piety and virtue, clean hands, and a pure heart not polluted with the breaches of the law of nature, was the beſt worſhip of the gods. Reaſon diſcovered to them that a good life was the moſt acceptable thing to the Deity; this the common light of nature put paſt doubt. But for their ceremonies and outward performances, for them they appeal always to a rule received from the immediate direction of the ſuperior powers themſelves, where they made uſe, and had need of revelation. A plain confeſſion of mankind that in theſe things we have neither knowledge to diſcern, nor authority to preſcribe: that men cannot by their own ſkill find out what is fit, or by their own power make any thing worthy to be a part of religious worſhip. It is not for them to invent or impoſe ceremonies that ſhall recommend men to the Deity. It was ſo obvious and viſible, that it became men to have leave from God himſelf, before they dared to offer to the divine majeſty any of theſe trifling, mean, and to him uſeleſs things, as a grateful and valuable part of his worſhip; that no body any where amongſt the various and ſtrange religions they led men into, bid ſuch open defiance to common ſenſe, and the reaſon of all mankind, as to preſume to do it without vouching the appointment of God himſelf. Plato, who of all the heathens, ſeems to have had the moſt ſerious thoughts about religion, ſays that the magiſtrate, or whoever has any ſenſe, will never introduce of his own head any new rites into his religion: for which he gives this convincing reaſon; "for, ſays he, he muſt know it is impoſſible for human nature " to know any thing certainly concerning theſe matters." Epinom. poſt medium. It cannot therefore but be matter of aſtoniſhment, that any who call themſelves Chriſtians, who have ſo ſure, and ſo full a revelation, which declares all the counſel of God concerning the way of attaining eternal ſalvation, ſhould dare by their own authority to add any thing to what is therein preſcribed, and impoſe it on others as a neceſſary part of religious worſhip, without the obſervance of which human inventions, men ſhall not be permitted the publick worſhip of God. If thoſe rites and ceremonies preſcribed to the Jews by God himſelf, and delivered at the ſame time, and by the ſame hand to the Jews that the moral law was, were called beggarly elements under the goſpel, and laid by as uſeleſs and burthenſome; what ſhall we call thoſe rites which have no other foundation, but the will and authority of men, and of men very often, who have not much thought of the purity of religion, and practiſed it leſs?

BECAUSE you think your argument for the magiſtrate's right to uſe force has not had its due conſideration; I ſhall here ſet it down in your own words, as it ſtands, and endeavour to give you ſatisfaction to it. You ſay there, "If A. p. 16. " ſuch a degree of outward force as has been mentioned, be of great and even neceſſary uſe, for the advancing thoſe ends, (as taking the world as we find

" it, I think it appears to be,) then it muſt be acknowledged that there is a " right ſomewhere to uſe it for the advancing thoſe ends, unleſs we will ſay " (what without impiety cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and benign diſpoſer " and governor of all things has not furniſhed mankind with competent means " for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls. " And if there be ſuch a right ſomewhere, where ſhould it be, but where " the power of compelling reſides? That is principally, and in reference to " the publick, in the civil ſovereign." Which words, if they have any argument in them, it in ſhort ſtands thus. Force is uſeful and neceſſary: The good and wiſe God, who without impiety cannot be ſuppoſed not to have furniſhed men with competent means for their ſalvation, has therefore given a right to ſome men to uſe it, and thoſe men are the civil ſovereigns.

To make this argument of any uſe to your purpoſe, you muſt ſpeak a little more diſtinctly, for here you, according to your laudable and ſafe way of writing, are wrapped up in the uncertainty of general terms, and muſt tell us, beſides the end for which it is uſeful and neceſſary, to whom it is uſeful and neceſſary. Is it uſeful and neceſſary to all men? That you will not ſay, for many are brought to embrace the true religion by bare preaching, without any force. Is it then neceſſary to all thoſe, and thoſe only, who, as you tell us, " reject the true religion tendered with ſufficient evidence, or " at leaſt ſo far manifeſted to them, as to oblige them to receive it, and to " leave them without excuſe if they do not?" To all therefore, who rejecting the true religion ſo tendered, are without excuſe, your moderate force is uſeful and neceſſary. But is it to all thoſe competent, i. e. ſufficient means? That, it is evident in matter of fact, it is not; for after all, many ſtand out. It is like you will ſay, which is all you have to ſay, that thoſe are ſuch, to whom, having reſiſted this laſt means, moderate force, God always refuſeth his grace to, without which no means is efficacious. So that your competent at laſt, are only ſuch means as are the utmoſt that God has appointed, and will have uſed, and which when men reſiſt, they are without excuſe, and ſhall never after have the aſſiſtance of his grace to bring them to that truth they have reſiſted, and ſo be as the Apoſtle 2 Tim. iii. 8. calls ſuch, " men of corrupt minds, reprobate concerning the faith." If then it ſhall be, that the day of grace ſhall be over to all thoſe who reject the truth manifeſted to them, with ſuch evidence, as leaves them without excuſe, and that bare preaching and exhortation ſhall be according to the good pleaſure of the benign diſpoſer of all things enough, when neglected, " to make their hearts fat, their ears " heavy, and ſhut their eyes that they ſhould not perceive nor underſtand, " nor be converted that God ſhould heal them." I ſay, if this ſhould be the caſe, then your force, whatever you imagine of it, will neither be competent, uſeful, nor neceſſary. So that it will reſt upon you to prove that your moderate degrees of force are thoſe means of grace which God will have, as neceſſary to ſalvation, tried upon every one before he will paſs that ſentence in Iſaiah, " Make his heart fat, &c." and that your degree of moderate force is that beyond which God will have no other or more powerful means uſed, but that thoſe whom that works not upon, ſhall be left reprobate concerning faith.

ſaith. And till you have proved this, you will in vain pretend your moderate force, whatever you might think of it, if you had the ordering of that matter in the place of God, to be uſeful, neceſſary, and competent means. For if preaching, exhortation, inſtruction, &c. as ſeems by the whole current of the Scripture, and it appears not that Iſaiah in the place above-cited, made their hearts fat with any thing but his words, be that means, which when rejected to ſuch a degree, as he ſees fit, God will puniſh with a reprobate mind, and that there be no other means of grace to come after; you muſt confeſs, that whatever good opinion you have of your moderate force after this ſentence is paſſed, it can do no good, have no efficacy neither directly nor indirectly, and at a diſtince, towards the bringing men to the truth.

IF your moderate force be not that preciſe utmoſt means of grace, which when ineffectual, God will not afford his grace to any other, then your moderate force is not the competent means you talk of. This therefore you muſt prove, that preaching alone is not, but that your moderate force joined to it, is that means of grace, which when neglected or reſiſted, God will aſſiſt no other means with his grace to bring men into the obedience of the truth; and this let me tell you, you muſt prove by revelation. For it is impoſſible to know, but by revelation, the juſt meaſures of God's long-ſuffering, and what thoſe means are, which when men's corruptions have rendered ineffectual, his Spirit ſhall no longer ſtrive with them, nor his grace aſſiſt any other means for their converſion or ſalvation. When you have done this, there will be ſome ground for you to talk of your moderate force, as the means which God's wiſdom and goodneſs is engaged to furniſh men with; but to ſpeak of it, as you do now, as if it were that both neceſſary and competent means, that it would be an imputation to the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, if men were not furniſhed with it, when it is evident, that the greateſt part of mankind have always been deſtitute of it; will I fear be not eaſily cleared from that impiety you mention; for though the magiſtrate had the right to uſe it, yet wherever that moderate force was not made uſe of, there men were not furniſhed with your competent means of ſalvation.

IT is neceſſary for the vindication of God's juſtice and goodneſs, that thoſe who miſcarry ſhould do ſo by their own fault, that their deſtruction ſhould be from themſelves, and they be left inexcuſable: But pray how will you ſhew us, that it is neceſſary, that any who have reſiſted the truth tendered to them only by preaching, ſhould be ſaved, any more than it is neceſſary that thoſe who have reſiſted the truth when moderate force has been joined to the ſame preaching, ſhould be ſaved? They are inexcuſable one as well as the other, and thereby have incurred the wrath of God, under which he may juſtly leave the one as well as the other; and therefore he cannot be ſaid not to have been furniſhed with competent means of ſalvation, who having rejected the truth preached to him, has never any penalties laid on him by the magiſtrate to make him conſider the truths he before rejected.

ALL the ſtreſs of your hypotheſis for the neceſſity of force, lies on this, That the majority of mankind are not prevailed on by preaching, and therefore the goodneſs and wiſdom of God is obliged to furniſh them ſome more effectual means, as you think. But who told you that the majority of mankind ſhould ever be brought into the ſtrait way, and narrow gate? Or that force in your moderate degree was the neceſſary and competent, i. e. the juſt fit means to do it, neither over nor under, but that that only, and nothing but that could do it? If to vindicate his wiſdom and goodneſs, God muſt furniſh mankind with other means, as long as the majority, yet unwrought upon, ſhall give any forward demander occaſion to aſk, "What other "means is there left?" He muſt alſo after your moderate penalties have left the greater part of mankind unprevailed on, be bound to furniſh mankind with higher degrees of force upon this man's demand: and thoſe degrees of force proving ineffectual to the majority to make them truly and ſincerely Chriſtians; God muſt be bound to furniſh the world again with a new ſupply of miracles upon the demand of another wiſe controuler, who having ſet his heart upon miracles, as you have your's on force, will demand, what other means is there left but miracles? For it is like this laſt gentleman would take it very much amiſs of you, if you ſhould not allow this to be a good and unqueſtionable way of arguing; or if you ſhould deny that after the utmoſt force had been uſed, miracles might not do ſome ſervice at leaſt, indirectly and at a diſtance, towards the bringing men to embrace the truth. And if you cannot prove that miracles may not thus do ſome ſervice, he will conclude juſt as you do, that the cauſe is his.

LET us try your method a little farther. Suppoſe that when neither the gentleſt admonitions, nor the moſt earneſt intreaties will prevail, ſomething elſe is to be done as the only means left, What is it muſt be done? What is this neceſſary competent means that you tell us of? "It is to lay briars and "thorns in their way." This therefore being ſuppoſed neceſſary, you ſay, "there muſt ſomewhere be a right to uſe it." Let it be ſo. Suppoſe I tell you that right is in God, who certainly has a power to lay briars and thorns in the way of thoſe who are got into a wrong one, whenever he is graciouſly pleaſed that other means beſides inſtructions and admonitions ſhould be uſed to reduce them. And we may as well expect that thoſe thorns and briars laid in their way by God's providence, without telling them for what end, ſhould work upon them as effectually, though indirectly, and at a diſtance, as thoſe laid in their way by the magiſtrate, without telling them for what end. God alone knows where it is neceſſary, and on whom it will be uſeful, which no man being capable of knowing, no man, though he has coercive power in his hand, can be ſuppoſed to be authorized to uſe it by the commiſſion he has to do good, on whomſoever you ſhall judge it to be of great and even neceſſary uſe: no more than your judging it to be of great and even neceſſary uſe, would authorize any one who had got one of the inciſion-knives of the hoſpital in his hand, to cut thoſe for the ſtone with it, whom he could not know needed cutting, or that cutting would do them any good, when the maſter of the hoſpital had given him no expreſs order to uſe his inciſion-knife in that operation; nor was it known to any but the maſter, who needed, and on whom it would be uſeful; nor would he fail to uſe it himſelf wherever he found it neceſſary.

P. 10.

BE force of as great and neceſſary uſe as you pleaſe; let it be ſo the competent means for the promoting the honour of God in the world, and the good of ſouls, that the right to uſe it muſt neceſſarily be ſomewhere. This right cannot poſſibly be, where you would have it, in the civil ſovereigns, and that for the very reaſon you give, viz. becauſe it muſt be where the power of compelling reſides. For ſince civil ſovereigns cannot compel themſelves, nor can the compelling power of one civil ſovereign reach another civil ſovereign, it will not in the hands of the civil ſovereigns reach the moſt conſiderable part of mankind, and thoſe who both for their own and their ſubjects good, have moſt need of it. Beſides, if it go along with the power of compelling, it muſt be in the hands of all civil ſovereigns alike: which, by this, as well as ſeveral other reaſons I have given, being unavoidable to be ſo, this right will be ſo far from uſeful, that whatever efficacy force has, it will be employed to the doing more harm than good; ſince the greateſt part of civil ſovereigns being of falſe religions, force will be employed for the promoting of thoſe.

BUT let us grant what you can never prove, that though all civil ſovereigns have compelling power, yet only thoſe of the true religion have a right to uſe force in matters of religion: your own argument of mankind being unfurniſhed, which is impiety to ſay, with competent means for the promoting the honour of God, and the good of ſouls, ſtill preſſes you. For the compelling power of each civil ſovereign not reaching beyond his own dominions, the right of uſing force in the hands only of the orthodox civil ſovereigns, leaves the reſt, which is the far greater part of the world, deſtitute of this your neceſſary and competent means for promoting the honour of God in the world, and the good of ſouls.

SIR, I return you my thanks for having given me this occaſion to take a review of your argument, which you told me I had miſtaken; which I hope I now have not, and have anſwered to your ſatisfaction.

I CONFESS I miſtook when I ſaid that cutting being judged uſeful, could not authorize even a ſkilful ſurgeon to cut a man without any farther commiſſion: for it ſhould have been thus; that though a man has the inſtruments in his hand, and force enough to cut with, and cutting be judged by you of great and even neceſſary uſe in the ſtone; yet this, without any farther commiſſion, will not authorize any one to uſe his ſtrength and knife in cutting, who knows not who has the ſtone, nor has any light or meaſures to judge to whom cutting may be neceſſary or uſeful.

BUT let us ſee what you ſay in anſwer to my inſtance: 1. "That the ſtone P. 53.
"does not always kill, though it be not cured; but men do often live to a
"great age with it, and die at laſt of other diſtempers. But averſion to the
"true religion is certainly and inevitably mortal to the ſoul, if not cured, and ſo
"of abſolute neceſſity to be cured." Is it of abſolute neceſſity to be cured in all? If ſo, will you not here again think it requiſite that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, ſhould furniſh competent means for what is of abſolute neceſſity? For will it not be impiety to ſay, that God has left mankind unfurniſhed of competent, i. e. ſufficient means for what is abſolutely

neceſſary? For it is plain in your account men have not been furniſhed with ſufficient means for what is of abſolute neceſſity to be cured in all, if in any of them it be left uncured. P. 51. For as you allow none to be ſufficient evidence, but what certainly gains aſſent; ſo by the ſame rule you cannot call that ſufficient means, which does not work the cure. It is in vain to ſay, the means were ſufficient, had it not been for their own fault, when that fault of theirs is the very thing to be cured. P. 53. You go on; "and yet if we ſhould ſuppoſe "the ſtone as certainly deſtructive of this temporal life, as that averſion is of "mens eternal ſalvation: even ſo the neceſſity of curing it would be as much "leſs than the neceſſity of curing that averſion, as this temporal life falls ſhort "in value of that which is eternal." This is built upon a ſuppoſition, that the neceſſity of the means is increaſed by the value of the end, which being in this caſe the ſalvation of mens ſouls, that is of infinite concernment to them, you conclude ſalvation abſolutely neceſſary: which makes you ſay that averſion, &c. being inevitably mortal to the ſoul, is of abſolute neceſſity to be cured. Nothing is of abſolute neceſſity but God: whatſoever elſe can be ſaid to be of neceſſity, is ſo only relatively in reſpect to ſomething elſe; and therefore nothing can indefinitely thus be ſaid to be of abſolute neceſſity, where the thing it relates to is not abſolutely neceſſary. We may ſay, wiſdom and power in God are abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe God himſelf is abſolutely neceſſary: but we cannot crudely ſay, the curing in men their averſion to the true religion, is abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe it is not abſolutely neceſſary that men ſhould be ſaved. But this is very proper and true to be ſaid, that curing this averſion is abſolutely neceſſary in all that ſhall be ſaved. But I fear that would not ſerve your turn, though it be certain, that your abſolute neceſſity in this caſe reaches no farther than this, that to be cured of this averſion is abſolutely neceſſary to ſalvation, and ſalvation is abſolutely neceſſary to happineſs; but neither of them, nor the happineſs itſelf of any man can be ſaid to be abſolutely neceſſary.

THIS miſtake makes you ſay, that ſuppoſing "the ſtone certainly deſtructive "of this temporal life, yet the neceſſity of curing it would be as much leſs "than the neceſſity of curing that averſion, as this temporal life falls ſhort "in value of that which is eternal." Which is quite otherwiſe: for if the ſtone will certainly kill a man without cutting, it is as abſolutely neceſſary to cut a man for the ſtone for the ſaving of his life, as it is to cure the averſion for the ſaving of his ſoul. Nay, if you have but eggs to fry, fire is as abſolutely neceſſary as either of the other, though the value of the end be in theſe caſes infinitely different; for in one of them you loſe only your dinner, in the other your life, and in the other your ſoul. But yet in theſe caſes, fire, cutting, and curing that averſion, are each of them abſolutely and equally neceſſary to their reſpective ends, becauſe thoſe ends cannot be attained without them.

YOU ſay farther, "Cutting for the ſtone is not always neceſſary in order to "the cure: but the penalties you ſpeak of are altogether neceſſary (without "extraordinary grace) to cure that pernicious and otherwiſe untractable aver- "ſion." Let it be ſo; but do the ſurgeons know who has this ſtone, this averſion ſo, that it will certainly deſtroy him unleſs he be cut? Will you undertake to tell when the averſion is ſuch in any man, that it is incurable by preaching, exhortation and intreaty, if his ſpiritual phyſician will be inſtant with him in ſeaſon, and out of ſeaſon; but certainly curable, if moderate force be made uſe of? Till you are ſure of the former of theſe, you can never ſay your moderate force is neceſſary: Till you are ſure of the latter, you can never ſay, it is competent means. What you will determine concerning extraordinary grace, and when God beſtows that, I leave you to conſider, and ſpeak clearly of it at your leiſure.

YOU add, that even where "cutting for the ſtone is neceſſary, it is withal "hazardous by my confeſſion. But your penalties can no way endanger or "hurt the ſoul, but by the fault of him that undergoes them." If the magiſtrate uſe force to bring men to the true religion, he muſt judge which is the true religion; and he can judge no other to be it but that which he believes to be the true religion, which is his own religion. But for the magiſtrate to uſe force to bring men to his own religion, has ſo much danger in it to mens ſouls, that by your own confeſſion, none but an atheiſt will ſay that magiſtrates may uſe force to bring men to their own religion. P. 53.

THIS I ſuppoſe is enough to make good all that I aimed at in my inſtance of cutting for the ſtone, which was, that though it were judged uſeful, and I add now neceſſary to cut men for the ſtone, yet that was not enough to authorize a ſurgeon to cut a man, but he muſt have beſides that general one of doing good, ſome more ſpecial commiſſion; and that which I there mentioned, was the patient's conſent. But you tell me, "That though, as things "now ſtand, no ſurgeon has any right to cut his calculous patient without "his conſent; yet if the magiſtrate ſhould by a publick law appoint and au"thorize a competent number of the moſt ſkilful in that art, to viſit ſuch as "labour under that diſeaſe, and to cut thoſe (whether they conſent or not) "whoſe lives they unanimouſly judge it impoſſible to ſave otherwiſe: you are "apt to think I would find it hard to prove that in ſo doing he exceeded the "bounds of his power: and you are ſure it would be as hard to prove that "thoſe artiſts would have no right in that caſe to cut ſuch perſons." Shew ſuch a law from the great Governor of the univerſe, and I ſhall yield that your ſurgeons ſhall go to work as faſt as you pleaſe. But where is the publick law? "Where is the competent number of magiſtrates ſkilful in the art, "who muſt unanimouſly judge of the diſeaſe and its danger?" You can ſhew nothing of all this, yet you are ſo liberal of this ſort of cure, that one cannot take you for leſs than cutting Morecraft himſelf. But, Sir, if there were a competent number of ſkilful and impartial men, who were to uſe the inciſion-knife on all in whom they found this ſtone of averſion to the true religion; what do you think, would they find no work in your hoſpital? P. 54.

AVERSION to the true religion you ſay is of abſolute neceſſity to be cured: what I beſeech you is that true religion? that of the church of England? For that you own to be the only true religion, and whatever you ſay, you cannot upon your principles name any other national religion in the world, that you will own to be the true. It being then of abſolute neceſſity that mens P. 11.

averſion to the national religion of England ſhould be cured: has all mankind in whom it has been abſolutely neceſſary to be cured, been furniſhed with competent and neceſſary means for the cure of this averſion?

IN the next place, what is your neceſſary and ſufficient means for this cure that is of abſolute neceſſity? and that is moderate penalties made uſe of by the magiſtrate, where the national is the true religion, and ſufficient means are provided for all mens inſtruction in the true religion. And here again I aſk, have all men to whom this cure is of abſolute neceſſity, been furniſhed with this neceſſary means?

THIRDLY, How is your neceſſary remedy to be applied? And that is in a way wherein it cannot work the cure, though we ſhould ſuppoſe the true religion the national every where, and all the magiſtrates in the world zealous for it. To this true religion ſay you men have a natural and great averſion of abſolute neceſſity to be cured, and the only cure for it is force your way applied, i. e. penalties muſt be laid upon all that diſſent from the national religion, till they conform. Why are men averſe to the true? Becauſe it croſſes the profits and pleaſures of this life; and for the ſame reaſon they have an averſion to penalties: theſe therefore, if they be oppoſed one to another, and penalties be ſo laid that men muſt quit their luſts, and heartily embrace the true religion, or elſe endure the penalties, there may be ſome efficacy in force towards bringing men to the true religion: but if there be no oppoſition between an outward profeſſion of the true religion, and mens luſts; penalties laid on men till they outwardly conform, are not a remedy laid to the diſeaſe. Puniſhments ſo applied have no oppoſition to mens luſts, nor from thence can be expected any cure. Men muſt be driven from their averſion to the true religion by penalties they have a greater averſion to. This is all the operation of force. But if by getting into the communion of the national church they can avoid the penalties, and yet retain their natural corruption and averſion to the true religion, what remedy is there to the diſeaſe by penalties ſo applied? You would, you ſay, have men made uneaſy. This no doubt will work on men, and make them endeavour to get out of this uneaſy ſtate as ſoon as they can. But it will always be by that way wherein they can be moſt eaſy; for it is the uneaſineſs alone they fly from, and therefore they will not exchange one uneaſineſs for another; not for a greater, nor an equal, nor any at all, if they can help it. If therefore it be ſo uneaſy for men to mortify their luſts, as you tell us, which the true religion requires of them, if they embrace it in earneſt: but which outward conformity to the true religion, or any national church does not require; what need or uſe is there of force applied ſo, that it meets not at all with mens luſts, or averſion to the true religion, but leaves them the liberty of a quiet enjoyment of them, free from force and penalties in a legal and approved conformity? Is a man negligent of his ſoul, and will not be brought to conſider? obſtinate, and will not embrace the truth? is he careleſs, and will not be at the pains to examine matters of religion? corrupt, and will not part with his luſts, which are dearer to him than his firſt-born? It is but owning the national profeſſion, and he may be ſo ſtill: if he conform, the magiſtrate has done

P. 7. ]

puniſhing, he is a ſon of the church, and need not conſider any thing farther for fear of penalties, they are removed, and all is well. So that at laſt there neither being an abſolute neceſſity that averſion to the true religion ſhould in all men be cured: nor the magiſtrate being a competent judge who have this ſtone of averſion, or who have it to that degree as to need force to cure it, or in whom it is curable, were force a proper remedy as it is not: nor having any commiſſion to uſe it, notwithſtanding what you have anſwered: it is ſtill not only as, but more reaſonable for the magiſtrate, upon pretence of its uſefulneſs or neceſſity, to cut any one for the ſtone without his own conſent, than to uſe force your way to cure him of averſion to the true religion.

To my queſtion, in whoſe hands this right, we were a little above ſpeaking of, was in Turkey, Perſia or China? you tell me, "you anſwer roundly "and plainly, in the hands of the ſovereign, to uſe convenient penalties for "the promoting the true religion" I will not trouble you here with a queſtion P. 55. you will meet with elſewhere; who in theſe countries muſt be judge of the true religion? But I will aſk, whether you or any wiſe man would have put a right of uſing force into a Mohammedan, or Pagan prince's hand, for the promoting of Chriſtianity? Which of my Pagans or Mohammedans would have done otherwiſe?

BUT God, you ſay, has done it, and you make it good by telling me in the following words, "If this ſtartle me, then you muſt tell me farther, that you "look upon the ſupreme power to be the ſame all the world over, in what "hands ſoever it is placed, and this right to be contained in it: and if thoſe "that have it do not uſe it as they ought, but inſtead of promoting true religion by proper penalties ſet themſelves to inforce Mohammediſm or Paganiſm, or any other falſe religion: all that can, or that needs be ſaid to the "matter, is, that God will one day call them to an account for the neglect of "their duty, for the diſhonour they do to him, and for the ſouls that periſh by "their fault." Your taking this right to be a part of the ſupreme power of all civil ſovereigns, which is the thing in queſtion, is not, as I take it, proving it to be ſo. But let us take it ſo for once, what then is your anſwer? "God will "one day call thoſe ſovereigns to an account for the neglect of their duty." The queſtion is not, what God will do with the ſovereigns who have neglected their duty; but how mankind is furniſhed with your competent means of promoting God's honour in the world, and the good of ſouls in countries where the ſovereign is of a wrong religion? For there, how clearly ſoever the right of uſing it be in the ſovereign, yet as long as he uſes not force to bring his ſubjects to the true religion, they are deſtitute of your competent means. For I imagine you do not make the right to uſe that force, but the actual application of it by penal laws, to be your uſeful and neceſſary means. For if you think the bare having that right be enough, if that be your ſufficient means without the actual uſe of force we readily allow it you. And, as I tell you elſewhere, I ſee not then what need you had of miracles "to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, till Chriſtianity was ſupported and encouraged by the laws of the empire:" for, by your own rule, the magiſtrates of the world, during the three firſt centuries after the publiſhing the Chriſtian religion, had the ſame right, if that had been enough, that they have now in Turkey, Perſia, or China. That this is all that can be ſaid in this matter, I eaſily grant you; but that it is all that needs be ſaid to make good your doctrine, I muſt beg your pardon.

In the ſame ſentence wherein you tell me, I ſhould have added neceſſity to uſefulneſs, I call it neceſſary uſefulneſs, which I imagine is not much different. But that with the following words wherein my argument lay, had the ill luck to be overſeen; but if you pleaſe to take my argument, as I have now again laid it before you, it will ſerve my turn.

L. II. p. 419. In your next paragraph you tell me, that what is ſaid by me is with the ſame ingenuity I have uſed in other places; my words in that place are theſe: "The author having endeavoured to ſhew that no body at all, of any rank "or condition, had any power to puniſh, torment, or uſe any man ill for "matters of religion: you tell us, you do not yet underſtand why clergymen "are not as capable of ſuch power as other men:" which words of mine containing in them nothing but true matter of fact, give you no reaſon to tax my ingenuity: nor will what you alledge make it otherwiſe than ſuch power; for if the power you there ſpeak of, were externally coactive power, is not that the ſame power the author was ſpeaking of, made uſe of to thoſe ends he mentions of tormenting and puniſhing? And do not you own that thoſe who have that power, ought to puniſh thoſe who offend in rejecting the true religion? As to the remaining part of that paragraph, I ſhall leave the reader to judge whether I ſought any occaſion ſo much as to name the clergy; or whether the itching of your fingers to be handling the rod, guided not your pen to what was nothing to the purpoſe: for the author had not ſaid any thing ſo much as tending to exclude the clergy from ſecular employments, but only, if you will take your own report of it, that no eccleſiaſtical officer, as ſuch, has any externally coactive power; whereupon you cry out, that "you do "not yet underſtand why eccleſiaſticks or clergymen are not as capable of "ſuch power as other men." Had you ſtood to be conſtable of your pariſh, or of the hundred, you might have had cauſe to vindicate thus your capacity, if orders had been objected to you; or if your aim be at a juſtice of the peace, or lord chief juſtice of England, much more. However you muſt be allowed to be a man of forecaſt, in clearing the way to ſecular power, A. p. 17. if you know yourſelf, or any of your friends deſirous of it: otherwiſe I confeſs you have reaſon to be on this occaſion a little out of humour, as you are, for bringing this matter in queſtion ſo wholly out of ſeaſon. Nor will, I fear, the ill-fitted excuſe you bring, give yourſelf, or one who conſults the places in both yours and the author's Letter, a much better opinion of it. However I cannot but thank you for your wonted ingenuity, in ſaying, that "it ſeems I wanted an occaſion to ſhew my good will to the clergy, and ſo I "made myſelf one." And to find more work for the excellent gift you have this way, I deſire you to read over that paragraph of mine again, and tell me, whether you can find any thing ſaid in it not true? Any advice in it that you yourſelf would diſown; any thing that any worthy clergyman that adorns his function is concerned in? And when you have ſet it down in my words, the world ſhall be judge, whether I have ſhewed any ill will to the clergy. Till then I may take the liberty to own, that I am more a friend to them and their calling, than thoſe amongſt them who ſhew their forwardneſs to leave the word of God to ſerve other employments. The officeof a miniſter of the Goſpel requires ſo the whole man, that the very looking after their poor, was, by the joint voice of the twelve Apoſtles, called, "leaving the word of "God, and ſerving of tables," Acts iv. 2. But if you think no mens faults can be ſpoken of without ill will, you will make a very ill preacher: or if you think this to be ſo only in ſpeaking of miſtakes in any of the clergy, there muſt be in your opinion ſomething peculiar in their caſe, that makes it ſo much a fault to mention any of theirs; which I muſt be pardoned for, ſince I was not aware of it: and there will want but a little cool reflection to convince you, that had not the preſent church of England a greater number in proportion, than poſſibly any other age of the church ever had, of thoſe who by their pious lives and labours in their miniſtry adorn their profeſſion, ſuch buſy men as cannot be content to be divines without being laymen too, would ſo little keep up the reputation which ought to diſtinguiſh the clergy, or preſerve the eſteem due to a holy, i. e. a ſeparate order, that no body can ſhew greater good will to them than by taking all occaſions to put a ſtop to any forwardneſs, to be meddling out of their calling. This I ſuppoſe made a learned prelate of our church, out of kindneſs to the clergy, mind them of their ſtipulation and duty in a late treatiſe, and tell them that "the paſtoral care is to be a man's entire buſineſs, and to poſſeſs both his "thoughts and his time." Diſc. of Paſt. Care, p. 121.

To your ſaying, "That the magiſtrate may lay penalties upon thoſe who "refuſe to embrace the doctrine of the proper miniſters of religion, or are "alienated from the truth:" I anſwered, "God never gave the magiſtrate an "authority to be judge of truth for another man." This you grant; but withal ſay, "That if the magiſtrate knows the truth, though he has no authority to "judge of truth for another man; yet he may be judge whether other men be "alienated from the truth or no; and ſo may have authority to lay ſome penal-"ties upon thoſe whom he ſees to be ſo, to bring them to judge more ſin-"cerely for themſelves." For example, the doctrine of the proper miniſters of religion is, that the three creeds, Nice, Athanaſius's, and that commonly called the Apoſtles Creed, ought to be thoroughly received and believed: as alſo that the Old and New Teſtament contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation. The one of theſe doctrines a Papiſt ſubject embraces not; and a Socinian the other. What now is the magiſtrate by your commiſſion to do? He is to lay penalties upon them, and continue them: How long? Only till they conform, i. e. till they profeſs they embrace theſe doctrines for true. In which caſe he does not judge of the truth for other men: he only judges that other men are alienated from the truth. Do you not now admire your own ſubtility and acuteneſs? I that cannot comprehend this, tell you my dull ſenſe in the caſe. He that thinks another man in an error, judges him, as you phraſe it, alienated from the truth, and then judges of truth and falſhood only for himſelf. But if he lays any penalty upon others, which they are to lie under till they embrace for

A. p. 20.

L. II. p. 426.

P. 64.

for a truth what he judges to be ſo, he is then ſo far a judge of truth for thoſe others. This is what I think to judge of truth for another, means: If you will tell me what elſe it ſignifies, I am ready to learn.

"YOU grant, you ſay, God never gave the magiſtrate any authority to be "judge of truth for another man:" and then add, "But how does it follow "from thence that he cannot be judge, whether any man be alienated from "the truth or no?" And I aſk you, who ever ſaid any ſuch thing did follow from thence? That which I ſay, and which you ought to diſprove, is, that whoever puniſhes others for not being of the religion he judges to be true, judges of truth for others. But you prove that a man may be judge of truth, without having authority to judge of it for other men, or to preſcribe to them what they ſhall believe; which you might have ſpared, till you meet with ſome body that denies it. But yet your proof of it is worth remembring: "rectum, ſay "you, eſt index ſui & obliqui. And certainly whoever does but know the "truth, may eaſily judge whether other men be alienated from it or no." But though "rectum be index ſui & obliqui;" yet a man may be ignorant of that which is the right, and may take error for truth. The truth of religion, when known, ſhews what contradicts it is falſe: but yet that truth may be unknown to the magiſtrate, as well as to any other man. But you conclude, I know not upon what ground, as if the magiſtrate could not miſs it, or were ſurer to find it than other men. I ſuppoſe you are thus favourable only to the magiſtrate of your own profeſſion, as no doubt in civility a Papiſt or a Preſbyterian would be to thoſe of his. And then infer; "And therefore if the magiſtrate knows "the truth, though he has no authority to judge of truth for other men, yet "he may be judge whether other men be alienated from the truth or no." Without doubt! who denies it him? It is a privilege that he and all men have, that when they know the truth, or believe the truth, or have embraced an error for truth, they may judge whether other men are alienated from it or no, if thoſe other men own their opinions in that matter.

YOU go on with your inference, "and ſo may have authority to lay ſom epe-"nalties upon thoſe whom he ſees to be ſo." Now, Sir, you go a little too faſt. This he cannot do without making himſelf judge of truth for them: The magiſtrate, or any one, may judge as much as he pleaſes, of mens opinions and errors; he in that judges only for himſelf: but as ſoon as he uſes force to bring them from their own to his opinion, he makes himſelf judge of truth for them; let it be to bring them to judge more ſincerely for themſelves, as you here call it, or under what pretence or colour ſoever; for that, what you ſay, is but a pretence, the very expreſſion diſcovers. For does any one ever judge inſincerely for himſelf, that he needs penalties to make him judge more ſincerely for himſelf? A man may judge wrong for himſelf, and may be known or thought to do ſo: but who can either know or ſuppoſe another is not ſincere in the judgment he makes for himſelf, or, which is the ſame thing, that any one knowingly puts a mixture of falſhood into the judgment he makes? For as ſpeaking inſincerely is to ſpeak otherwiſe than one thinks, let what he ſays be true or falſe; ſo judging inſincerely muſt be to judge otherwiſe than one thinks, which I imagine is not very feaſible. But how improper ſoever it be to talk of judging inſincerely for one's ſelf, it was better for you in that place to ſay, penalties were to bring men to judge more ſincerely, rather than to ſay, more rightly, or more truly: for had you ſaid, the magiſtrate might uſe penalties to bring men to judge more truly, that very word had plainly diſcovered, that he made himſelf a judge of truth for them. You therefore wiſely choſe to ſay what might beſt cover this contradiction to yourſelf, whether it were ſenſe or no; which perhaps whilſt it ſounded well, every one would not ſtand to examine.

ONE thing give me leave here to obſerve to you, which is, that when you ſpeak of the entertainment ſubjects are to give to truth, i. e. the true religion, you call it believing; but this in the magiſtrate you call knowing. Now let me aſk you, whether any magiſtrate, who laid penalties on any who diſſented from what he judged the true religion, or as you call it here, were alienated from the truth, was or could be determined in his judging of that truth by any aſſurance greater than believing? When you have reſolved that, you will then ſee to what purpoſe is all you have ſaid here concerning the magiſtrate's knowing the truth; which at laſt amounting to no more than the aſſurance wherewith a man certainly believes and receives a thing for true, will put every magiſtrate under the ſame, if there be any obligation to uſe force, whilſt he believes his own religion. Beſides, if a magiſtrate knows his religion to be true, he is to uſe means not to make his people believe, but know it alſo; knowledge of them, if that be the way of entertaining the truths of religion, being as neceſſary to the ſubjects as the magiſtrate. I never heard yet of a maſter of mathematicks, who had the care of informing others in thoſe truths, who ever went about to make any one believe one of Euclid's propoſitions.

THE pleaſantneſs of your anſwer, notwithſtanding what you ſay, doth P. 65, 66. remain ſtill the ſame: for you making, as is to be ſeen, "the power of the A. p. 22. magiſtrate ORDAINED for the bringing men to take ſuch care as they ought of their ſalvation;" the reaſon why it is every man's intereſt to veſt this power in the magiſtrate, muſt ſuppoſe this power ſo ordained, before the people veſted it; or elſe it could not be an argument for their veſting it in the magiſtrate. For if you had not here built upon your fundamental ſuppoſition, that this power of the magiſtrate is ordained by God to that end, the proper and intelligible way of expreſſing your meaning had not been to ſay as you do; "As the power of the magiſtrate is ordained for bringing, &c. A. p. 22. ſo if we ſuppoſe this POWER veſted in the magiſtrate by the people:" in which way of ſpeaking, this power of the magiſtrate is evidently ſuppoſed already ordained. But a clear way of making your meaning underſtood, had been to ſay, That for the people to ordain ſuch a power of the magiſtrate, or to veſt ſuch a power in the magiſtrate, which is the ſame thing, was their true intereſt: but whether it were your meaning or your expreſſion that was guilty of the abſurdity, I ſhall leave it with the reader.

As to the other pleaſant thing of your anſwer, it will ſtill appear by barely reciting it: the pleaſant thing I charge on you is, that you ſay, That "the L. II. p. 246.

A. p. 22. “ power of the magiſtrate is to bring men to ſuch a care of their ſalvation, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any perſon, or their own luſts or paſſions, to preſcribe to them what faith or worſhip they ſhall embrace;” and yet that it is their beſt courſe “ to veſt a power in the magiſtrate,” liable to the ſame luſts and paſſions as themſelves, to chuſe for them. To this you anſwer, by aſking, where it is that you ſay that it is the peoples beſt courſe to veſt a power in the magiſtrate to chuſe for them? That you tell me I do not pretend to ſhew. If you had given yourſelf the pains to have gone on to the end of the paragraph, or will be pleaſed to read it as I have here again ſet it down for your peruſal, you will find that I at leaſt pretended to ſhew it: my words are theſe; “ If they veſt a power in the magiſtrate to puniſh them when they diſſent from his religion, to bring them to act even againſt their own inclination, according to reaſon and ſound judgment,” which is as you explain yourſelf in another place, “ to bring them to conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them; how far is this from leaving it to the choice of another man to preſcribe to them what faith or worſhip they ſhall embrace?” Thus far you cite my words, to which let me join the remaining part of the paragraph, to let you ſee that I pretended to ſhew that the courſe you propoſed to the people as beſt for them, was to veſt a power in the magiſtrate to chuſe for them. My words which follow thoſe L. II. p. 427. where you left off, are theſe; “ Eſpecially if we conſider, that you think it a ſtrange thing, that the author would have the care of every man's ſoul left to himſelf alone. So that this care being veſted in the magiſtrate, with a power to puniſh men to make them conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them of the truth of his religion; the choice is evidently in the magiſtrate, as much as it can be in the power of one man to chuſe for another what religion he ſhall be of; which conſiſts only in a power of compelling him by puniſhments to embrace it.” But all this you P. 66. tell me, “ is juſt nothing to the purpoſe:” Why I beſeech you? “ Becauſe you ſpeak not of the magiſtrate's religion, but of the true religion, and that propoſed with ſufficient evidence.”

THE caſe in ſhort is this; men are apt to be miſled by their paſſions, luſts, and other men in the choice of their religion. For this great evil you propoſe a remedy, which is, that men, for you muſt remember you are here ſpeaking of the people putting this power into the magiſtrate's hand, ſhould chuſe ſome of their fellow-men, and give them a power by force to guard them, that they might not be alienated from the truth by their own paſſions, luſts, or by other men. So it was in the firſt ſcheme; or, as you have it now, to puniſh them, whenever they rejected the true religion, and that propoſed with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it. A pretty remedy, and manifeſtly effectual at firſt ſight: that becauſe men were all promiſcuouſly apt to be miſled in their judgment, or choice of their religion, by paſſion, luſt, and other men, therefore they ſhould chuſe ſome amongſt themſelves, who might, they and their ſucceſſors, men made juſt like themſelves, puniſh them that rejected the true religion.

"IF the blind lead the blind, both ſhall fall into the ditch," ſays our Saviour. If men apt to be miſled by their paſſions and luſts, will guard themſelves from falling into error, by puniſhments laid on them, by men as apt to be miſled by paſſions and luſts as themſelves, how are they ſafer from falling into error? Now hear the infallible remedy for this inconvenience, and admire: the men to whom they have given this power, muſt not uſe it, till they find thoſe who gave it them in an error. A friend, to whom I ſhewed this expedient, anſwered, This is none: For why is not a man as fit to judge for himſelf when he is in an error, as another to judge for him, who is as liable to error himſelf? I anſwered, This power however in the other can do him no harm, but may indirectly, and at a diſtance do him good; becauſe the magiſtrate who has this power to puniſh him, muſt never uſe it but when he is in the right, and he that is puniſhed is in the wrong. But, ſaid my friend, who ſhall be judge whether he be in the right or no? For men in an error think themſelves in the right, and that as confidently as thoſe who are moſt ſo. To which I replied, No body muſt be judge; but the magiſtrate may know when he is in the right. And ſo may the ſubject too, ſaid my friend, as well as the magiſtrate, and therefore it was as good ſtill be free from a puniſhment, that gives a man no more ſecurity from error than he had without it. Beſides, ſaid he, who muſt be judge whether the magiſtrate knows or no? For he may miſtake, and think it to be knowledge and certainty, when it is but opinion and belief. It is no matter, for that in this ſcheme, replied I, the magiſtrate, we are told, may know which is the true religion, and he muſt not uſe force but to bring men to the true religion; and if he does, God will one day call him to an account for it, and ſo all is ſafe. As ſafe as beating the air can make a thing, replied my friend: for if believing, being aſſured, confidently being perſuaded that they know that the religion they profeſs is true, or any thing elſe ſhort of true knowledge will ſerve the turn, all magiſtrates will have this power alike, and ſo men will be well guarded, or recovered from falſe religions, by putting it into the magiſtrate's hand to puniſh them whom they have alienated themſelves from it.

IF the magiſtrate be not to puniſh men but when he knows, i. e. is infallibly certain: for ſo is a man in what he knows, that his national religion is all true, and knows alſo, that it has been propoſed to thoſe he puniſhes with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it: it would have been as good this power had never been given him, ſince he will never be in a condition to exerciſe it; and at beſt it was given him to no purpoſe, ſince thoſe who gave it him were one with another as little indiſpoſed to conſider impartially, examine diligently, ſtudy, find, and infallibly know the truth, as he. But, ſaid he at parting, to talk thus of the magiſtrate's puniſhing men that reject the true religion, without telling us, who thoſe magiſtrates are, who have a power to judge which is the true religion, is to put this power in all magiſtrate's hands alike, or none. For to ſay he only is to be judge which is the true religion, who is of it, is but to begin the round of enquiries again, which can at laſt end no where but in every one's ſuppoſing his own to be it. But,

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ſaid he, if you will continue to talk on thus, there is nothing more to be done with you, but to pity or laugh at you, and ſo he left me.

I ASSURE you, Sir, I urged this part of your hypotheſis, with all the advantage I thought your anſwer afforded me; and if I have erred in it, or there be any way to get out of the ſtrait, (if force muſt in your way be uſed,) either of the magiſtrate's puniſhing men for rejecting the true religion, without judging which is the true religion; or elſe that the magiſtrate ſhould judge which is the true religion; which way ever of the two you ſhall determine it, I ſee not of what advantage it can be to the people, to keep them from chuſing amiſs, that this power of puniſhing them ſhould be put into the magiſtrate's hands.

AND then, if the magiſtrate muſt judge which is the true religion, as how he ſhould without judging, puniſh any one who rejects it, is hard to find, and puniſh men who reject it till they do embrace it, let it be to make them conſider, or what you pleaſe, he does, I think, chuſe their religion for them. And if you have not the dexterity to chuſe the national religion wherever you are, I doubt not but that you would think ſo too if you were in France, though there were none but moderate penalties laid on you to bring you even againſt your own inclination to act according to what they there call reaſon and ſound judgment.

THAT paragraph and mine to which it is an anſwer, runs thus.

L. II. p. 427. “I do neither you nor the magiſtrate injury, when I ſay that the power you give the magiſtrate of puniſhing men to make them conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them, is to convince them of the truth of his religion, and to bring them to it. For men will never, in his opinion, act according to reaſon and ſound judgment, which is the thing you here ſay men ſhould be brought to by the magiſtrate, even againſt their own inclination, till they embrace his religion. And if you have the brow of an honeſt man, you will not ſay the magiſtrate will ever puniſh you, to bring you to conſider any

“ other

L. III. p. 67. “BUT it ſeems you have not done with this yet: For you ſay,” you do neither me nor the magiſtrate injury, when you ſay that the power I give the magiſtrate, of puniſhing men to make them conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them, is to convince them of the truth of his religion, whatever that be, and to bring them to it. “Which ſeems a little ſtrange and pleaſant too. But thus you prove it:” For men will never, in his opinion, act according to reaſon and ſound judgment, till they embrace his religion. And if you have the brow of an honeſt man, you will not ſay the magiſtrate will ever puniſh you, to bring you to conſider any other reaſons and arguments but ſuch as are proper to convince you of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Which (beſides the pleaſant talk of ſuch reaſons and arguments as are proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of the magiſtrate's religion, “though it be a falſe one) is juſt as much to ſay, It is ſo, becauſe in the magiſtrate's opinion it is ſo; and be-

“ cauſe

“other reaſons and arguments, but ſuch as are proper to convince you of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Thus you ſhift forwards and backwards. You ſay, the magiſtrate has no power to puniſh men to compel them to his religion; but only to compel them to conſider reaſons and arguments proper to convince them of the truth of his religion; which is all one as to ſay, no body has power to chuſe your way for you to Jeruſalem; but yet the lord of the manor has power to puniſh you, to bring you to conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince you. Of what? that the way he goes in, is the right, and ſo to make you join in company, and go along with him. So that, in effect, what is all your going about, but to come at laſt to the ſame place again; and put a power into the magſtrate's hands, under another pretence, to compel men to his religion; which uſe of force the author has ſufficiently overthrown, and you yourſelf have quitted. But I am tired to follow you ſo often round the ſame circle.”

“cauſe it is not to be expected that he will act againſt his opinion. As if the magiſtrate's opinion could change the nature of things, and turn a power to promote the true religion, into a power to promote a falſe one. No, Sir, the magiſtrate's opinion has no ſuch virtue. It may indeed keep him from exerciſing the power he has to promote the true religion; and it may lead him to abuſe the pretence of it to the promoting a falſe one: but it can neither deſtroy that power, nor make it any thing but what it is. And therefore, whatever the magiſtrate's opinion be, his power was given him (as the Apoſtles power was to them) for edification only, not for deſtruction: And it may always be ſaid of him, (what St. Paul ſaid of himſelf) that he can do nothing againſt the truth, but for the truth. And therefore if the magiſtrate puniſhes me to bring me to a falſe religion; it is not his opinion that will excuſe him, when he comes to anſwer for it to his judge. For certainly men are as accountable for their opinions (thoſe of them, I mean, which influence their practice) as they are for their actions.”

“Here is therefore no ſhifting forwards and backwards, as you pretend; nor any circle, but in your own imagination. For though it be true that I ſay,” the magiſtrate has no power to puniſh men, to compel them to his religion; “yet I no where ſay, nor will it follow from any thing I do ſay,” That he has power to compel them to conſider reaſons and arguments proper to covince them of the truth of his religion. “But I do not much wonder that you endeavour to put this upon me. For I think by this time it is pretty plain, that otherwiſe you would have but little to ſay: and it is an art very much in uſe amongſt ſome ſort of learned men, when they cannot confute what an adverſary does ſay, to make him ſay what he does not; that they may have ſomething which they can confute.”

The beginning of this anſwer is part of the old ſong of triumph: “What! reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth

" of falſhood?" Yes, Sir, the magiſtrate may uſe force to make men conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which he thinks proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of his religion, though his religion be a falſe one. And this is as poſſible for him to do, as for a man as learned as yourſelf, to write a book, and uſe arguments, as he thinks proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of his opinion, though it be a falſhood.

AS to the remaining part of your anſwer, the queſtion is not, whether the " magiſtrate's opinion can change the nature of things, or the power he has, or " excuſe him to his judge for miſuſing of it?" But this, that ſince all magiſtrates, in your opinion, have commiſſion, and are obliged to promote the true religion by force, and they can be guided in the diſcharge of this duty by nothing but their own opinion of the true religion, what advantage can this be to the true religion, what benefit to their ſubjects, or whether it amounts to any more than a commiſſion to every magiſtrate to uſe force for the promoting his own religion? To this queſtion therefore you will do well to apply your anſwer, which a man of leſs ſkill than you, will be ſcarce able to do.

YOU tell us indeed, that " whatever the magiſtrate's opinion be, his power " was given him (as the Apoſtles power was to them) for edification only, and " not for deſtruction." But if the Apoſtles power had been given them for one end, and St. Paul, St. Peter, and nine other of the Twelve had nothing to guide them but their own opinion, which led them to another end; I aſk you whether the edification of the church could have been carried on as it was?

YOU tell us farther, that " it may always be ſaid of the magiſtrate (what " St Paul ſaid of himſelf) that he can do nothing againſt the truth, but for " the truth." Witneſs the king of France. If you ſay this in the ſame ſenſe that St. Paul ſaid it of himſelf, who in all things requiſite for edification, had the immediate direction and guidance of the unerring ſpirit of God, and ſo was infallible, we need not go to Rome for an infallible guide, every country has one in their magiſtrate. If you apply theſe words to the magiſtrate in another ſenſe, than what St. Paul ſpoke them in of himſelf, ſober men will be apt to think, you have a great care to inſinuate into others a high veneration for the magiſtrate; but that you yourſelf have no over-great reverence for the Scripture, which you thus uſe; nor for truth, which you thus defend.

To deny the magiſtrate to have a power to compel men to his religion; but yet to ſay the magiſtrate has a power, and is bound to puniſh men to make them conſider, till they ceaſe to reject the true religion; of which true religion he muſt be judge, or elſe nothing can be done in diſcharge of this his duty; is ſo like going round about to come to the ſame place, that it will always be a circle in mine and other peoples imagination, and not only there, but in your hypotheſis.

ALL that you ſay turns upon the truth or falſhood of this propoſition; " That whoever puniſhes any one in matters of religion to make him conſider, takes upon him to be judge for another what is right in matters of religion." This you think plainly involves a contradiction; and ſo it would, if theſe general terms had in your uſe of them their ordinary and uſual meaning. But, Sir, be but pleaſed to take along with you, that whoever puniſhes any man your way in matters of religion, to make him conſider, as you uſe the word conſider, takes upon him to be judge for another what is right in matters of religion: and you will find it ſo far from a contradiction, that it is a plain truth. For your way of puniſhing is a peculiar way, and is this; that the magiſtrate, where the national religion is the true religion, ſhould puniſh thoſe who diſſent from it, to make them conſider as they ought, i. e. till they ceaſe to reject; or, in other words, till they conform to it. If therefore he puniſhes none but thoſe who diſſent from, and puniſhes them till they conform to that which he judges the true religion, does he not take on him to judge for them what is the true religion?

It is true indeed what you ſay, there is no other reaſon to puniſh another to make him conſider, but that he ſhould judge for himſelf: and this will always hold true amongſt thoſe, who when they ſpeak of conſidering, mean conſidering, and nothing elſe. But then theſe thtngs will follow from thence: 1. That in inflicting of penalties to make men conſider, the magiſtrate of a country, where the national religion is falſe, no more miſapplies his power, than he whoſe religion is true; for one has as much right to puniſh the negligent to make them conſider, ſtudy, and examine matters of religion, as the other. P. 29. 2. If the magiſtrate puniſhes men in matters of religion, truly to make them conſider, he will puniſh all that do not conſider, whether conformiſts or nonconformiſts. 3. If the magiſtrate puniſhes in matters of religion to make men conſider, it is, as you ſay, "to make men judge for themſelves: "for there is no uſe of conſidering, but in order to judging." But then when a man has judged for himſelf, the penalties for not conſidering are to be taken off: for elſe your ſaying "that a man is puniſhed to make him conſider, that "he may judge for himſelf," is plain mockery. So that either you muſt reform your ſcheme, or allow this propoſition to be true, viz. "Whoever pu-"niſhes any man in matters of religion, to make him in your ſenſe conſider, "takes upon him to judge for another what is right in matters of religion:" and with it the concluſion, viz. "Therefore whoever puniſhes any one in matters "of religion, to make him conſider, takes upon him to do what no man can "do, and conſequently miſapplies his power of puniſhing, if he has that "power. Which concluſion, you ſay, you ſhould readily admit as ſufficiently "demonſtrated, if the propoſition before-mentioned were true."

But further, if it could enter into the head of any law-maker but you, to puniſh men for the omiſſion of, or to make them perform any internal act of the mind, ſuch as is conſideration; whoever in matter of religion would lay an injunction on men to make them conſider, could not do it without judging for them in matters of religion, unleſs they had no religion at all, and then they come not within our author's toleration, which is a toleration only of men of different religions, or of different opinions in religion. For ſuppoſing you the magiſtrate with full power, and, as you imagined, right of puniſhing any one in matters of religion, how could you poſſibly puniſh any one to make him conſider, without judging for him what is right in matters of religion? I will ſuppoſe myſelf brought before your worſhip, under what character you pleaſe, and then I deſire to know what one or more queſtions you would aſk me, upon my anſwer to which you could judge me fit to be puniſhed to make me conſider, without taking upon you to judge for me what is right in matters of religion? For I conclude from the faſhion of my coat, or the colour of my eyes, you would not judge that I ought to be puniſhed in matters of religion to make me conſider. If you could, I ſhould allow you not only as capable, but much more capable of coactive power than other men.

BUT ſince you could not judge me to need puniſhment in matters of religion, to make me conſider, without knowing my thoughts concerning religion, we will ſuppoſe you, being of the church of England, would examine me in the catechiſm and liturgy of that church, which poſſibly I could neither ſay nor anſwer right to. It is like, upon this, you would judge me fit to be puniſhed to make me conſider. Wherein, it is evident, you judged for me, that the religion of the church of England was right; for without that judgment of yours you would not have puniſhed me. We will ſuppoſe you to go yet farther, and examine me concerning the Goſpel, and truth of the principles of the Chriſtian religion, and you find me anſwer therein not to your liking: here again no doubt you will puniſh me to make me conſider; but is it not becauſe you judge for me, that the Chriſtian religion is the right? Go on thus as far as you will, and till you find I had no religion at all, you could not puniſh me to make me to conſider, without taking upon you to judge for me what is right in matters of religion.

To puniſh without a fault, is injuſtice; and to puniſh a man without judging him guilty of that fault, is alſo injuſtice; and to puniſh a man who has any religion to make him conſider, or, which is the ſame thing, for not having ſufficiently conſidered, is no more nor leſs, but puniſhing him for not being of the religion you think beſt for him; that is the fault, and that is the fault you judge him guilty of, call it conſidering as you pleaſe: for let him fall into the hands of a magiſtrate of whoſe religion he is, he judgeth him to have conſidered ſufficient. From whence it is plain, it is religion is judged of, and not conſideration, or want of conſideration. And it is in vain to pretend that he is puniſhed to make him judge for himſelf: for he that is of any religion, has already judged for himſelf; and if you puniſh him after that, under pretence to make him conſider that he may judge for himſelf, it is plain you puniſh him to make him judge otherwiſe than he has already judged, and to judge as you have judged for him.

YOUR next paragraph complains of my not having contradicted the following words of yours, which I had cited out of your A. p. 26. which that the reader may judge of, I ſhall here ſet down again. "And all the hurt that " comes to them by it, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies, for " their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own " conſciences: which certainly is no ſuch miſchief to mankind, as to make it " more eligible, that there ſhould be no ſuch power veſted in the magiſtrate; " but the care of every man's ſoul ſhould be left to him alone, (as this author " demands it ſhould be:) that is, that every man ſhould be ſuffered quietly, " and without the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care at all of his ſoul, “if he be ſo pleaſed; or in doing it, to follow his own groundleſs prejudices, or unaccountable humour, or any crafty ſeducer, whom he may think fit to take for his guide.” To which I ſhall here ſubjoin my anſwer and your reply.

L. II. p. 432. “Why ſhould not the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf, rather than the magiſtrate? Is the magiſtrate like to be more concerned for it? Is the magiſtrate like to take more care of it? Is the magiſtrate commonly more careful of his own, than other men are of theirs? Will you ſay the magiſtrate is leſs expoſed, in matters of religion, to prejudices, humours, and crafty ſeducers, than other men? If you cannot lay your hand on your heart, and ſay all this, what then will be got by the change? And why may not the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf? Eſpecially, if a man be in ſo much danger to miſs the truth, who is ſuffered quietly, and without the leaſt mo-

L. III. p. 76. “Which words you ſet down at large; but inſtead of contradicting them, or offering to ſhew that the miſchief ſpoken of, is ſuch as makes it more eligible, &c. you only demand,” Why ſhould not the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf, rather than the magiſtrate? Is the magiſtrate like to be more concerned for it? Is the magiſtrate like to take more care of it, &c. “As if not to leave the care of every man's ſoul to himſelf alone, were, as you expreſs it afterwards, to take the care of mens ſouls from themſelves: or as if to veſt a power in the magiſtrate, to procure as much as in him lies (i. e. as far as it can be procured by convenient penalties) that men take ſuch care of their ſouls as they ought to do, were to leave the care of their ſouls “to the magiſtrate rather than to themſelves:” Which no man but yourſelf will imagine. I acknowledge as freely as you can do, that as every man is more concerned than any man elſe can be, ſo he is likewiſe more obliged to take care of his ſoul; and that no man can by any means be diſcharged of the care of his ſoul; which, when all is done, will never be ſaved but by his own care of it. But do I contradict any thing of this, when I ſay, that the care of every man's ſoul ought not to be left to himſelf alone? Or, that it is the intereſt of mankind, that the magiſtrate be intruſted and obliged to take care, as far as lies in him, that no man neglect his own ſoul? I thought, I confeſs, that every man was in ſome ſort charged with the care of his neignbour's ſoul. But in your way of reaſoning, he that affirms this, takes away the care of every man's ſoul from himſelf, and leaves it to his neighbour rather than to himſelf. But if this be plainly abſurd, as every one ſees it is, then ſo it muſt be likewiſe to ſay, that he that veſts ſuch a power as we here ſpeak of in the magiſtrate, “takes away the care of mens ſouls from themſelves, and places it in the magiſtrate, rather than in themſelves.”

“WHAT trifling then is it to ſay here,” If you cannot lay your hand upon your heart, and ſay all this, viz. that the magiſtrate is like to be more concerned for other mens ſouls than themſelves, &c. What then

“ leſtation, either to take no care of his ſoul, if he be ſo pleaſed, or to follow his own prejudices,” &c. For if want of moleſtation be the dangerous ſtate wherin men are likelieſt to miſs the right way, it muſt be confeſſed, that of all men, the magiſtrate is moſt in danger to be in the wrong, and ſo the unfitteſt, if you take the care of mens ſouls from themſelves, of all men, to be intruſted with it. For he never meets with that great and only antidote of yours againſt error, which you here call moleſtation. He never has the benefit of your ſovereign remedy, puniſhment, to make him conſider; which you think ſo neceſſary, that you look on it as a moſt dangerous ſtate for men to be without it; and therefore tell us,” It is every man's true intereſt, not to “ be

will be got by the change? “ For it is plain, here is no ſuch change as you would inſinuate: but the care of ſouls which I aſſert to the magiſtrate, is ſo far from diſcharging any man of the care of his own ſoul, or leſſening his obligation to it, that it ſerves to no other purpoſe in the world, but to bring men, who otherwiſe would not, to conſider and do what the intereſt of their ſouls obliges them to.

“ IT is therefore manifeſt, that the thing here to be conſidered, is not, whether the magiſtrate be” like to be more concerned for other mens ſouls, or to take more care of them than themſelves: nor, whether he be commonly more careful of his own ſoul, than other men are of theirs: nor, whether he be leſs expoſed, in matters of religion, to prejudices, humours, and crafty ſeducers, than other men: nor yet, whether he be not more in danger to be in the wrong than other men, in regard that he never meets with that great and only antidote of mine (as you call it) againſt error, which I here call moleſtation. “ But the point upon which this matter turns, is only this, whether the ſalvation of ſouls be not better provided for, if the magiſtrate be obliged to procure, as much as in him lies, that every man take ſuch care as he ought of his ſoul, than if he be not ſo obliged, but the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf alone? which certainly any man of common ſenſe may eaſily determine. For as you will not, I ſuppoſe, deny but God has more amply provided for the ſalvation of your own ſoul, by obliging your neighbour, as well as yourſelf, to take care of it; though it is poſſible your neighbour may not be more concerned for it than yourſelf; or may not be more careful of his own ſoul, than you are of yours; or may be no leſs expoſed, in matters of religion, to prejudices, &c. than you are; becauſe if you are yourſelf wanting to your own ſoul, it is more likely that you will be brought to take care of it, if your neighbour be obliged to admoniſh and exhort you to it, than if he be not; though it may fall out that he will not do what he is obliged to do in that caſe. So I think it cannot be denied, but the ſalvation of all mens ſouls is better provided for, if beſides the obligation which every man has to take care of his own ſoul (and that which every man's neighbour has likewiſe to do it), the magiſtrate alſo be intruſted and obliged to ſee that no man neglect his ſoul; than it would be, if every “ man

" be left wholly to " himſelf in mat- " ters of religion."

" man were left to himſelf in this matter: becauſe though " we ſhould admit that the magiſtrate is not like to be, " or is not ordinarily more concerned for other mens " ſouls, than they themſelves are, &c. it is nevertheleſs " undeniably true ſtill, that whoever neglects his ſoul, is more likely to be " brought to take care of it, if the magiſtrate be obliged to do what lies in " him to bring him to do it, than if he be not. Which is enough to ſhew, " that it is every man's true intereſt, that the care of his ſoul ſhould not be " left to himſelf alone, but that the magiſtrate ſhould be ſo far intruſted with " it as I contend that he is."

YOUR complaint of my not having formally contradicted the words abovecited out of A. p. 26. looking as if there were ſome weighty argument in them: I muſt inform my reader, that they are ſubjoined to thoſe, wherein you recommend the uſe of force in matters of religion, by the gain thoſe that are puniſhed ſhall make by it, though it be miſapplied by the magiſtrate to bring them to a wrong religion. So that theſe words of yours, " all the hurt that " comes to them by it," is all the hurt that comes to men by a miſapplication of the magiſtrate's power, when being of a falſe religion, he uſes force to bring men to it. And then your propoſition ſtands thus, " That the ſuffering " what you call tolerable inconveniencies for their following the light of their " own reaſons, and the dictates of their own conſciences, is no ſuch miſchief " to mankind as to make it more eligible, that there ſhould be no power veſted " in the magiſtrate" to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, though the magiſtrates miſapply this power, i. e. uſe it to bring men to their own religion when falſe.

THIS is the ſum of what you ſay, if it has any coherent meaning in it: for it being to ſhew the uſefulneſs of ſuch a power veſted in the magiſtrate, under the miſcarriages and miſapplications it is in common practice obſerved to be liable to; can have no other ſenſe. But I having proved, that if ſuch a power be by the law of nature veſted in the magiſtrate, every magiſtrate is obliged to uſe it for the promoting of his religion as far as he believes it to be true, ſhall not much trouble myſelf, if like a man of art you ſhould uſe your ſkill to give it another ſenſe: for ſuch is your natural talent, or great caution, that you love to ſpeak indefinitely, and, as ſeldom as may be, leave yourſelf accountable for any propoſitions of a clear determined ſenſe; but under words of doubtful, but ſeeming plauſible ſignification, conceal a meaning, which plainly expreſſed would, at firſt ſight, appear to contradict your own poſitions, or common ſenſe: inſtances whereof, more than one, we have here in this ſentence of yours. For, 1. The words tolerable inconveniencies carry a very fair ſhew of ſome very ſlight matter; and yet when we come to examine them, may comprehend any of thoſe ſeverities lately uſed in France. For theſe tolerable inconveniencies are the ſame you in this very page and elſewhere call convenient penalties. Convenient for what? In this very place they muſt be ſuch, as may keep men " from following their own " groundleſs prejudices, unaccountable humours, and crafty ſeducers." And

you

P. 16. you tell us, the magiſtrate may require men “ under convenient penalties to “ forſake their falſe religions, and embrace the true.” Who now muſt be judge, in theſe caſes, what are convenient penalties? Common ſenſe will tell us, the magiſtrate that uſes them: but beſides, we have your word for it, P. 15. that the magiſtrate's prudence and experience enables him to judge beſt what penalties do agree with your rule of moderation, which, as I have ſhewn, is no rule at all. So that at laſt your tolerable inconveniencies are ſuch as the magiſtrate ſhall judge convenient to oppoſe to mens prejudices, humours, and to ſeducers; ſuch as he ſhall think convenient to bring men from their falſe religions, or to puniſh their rejecting the true: which whether they will not reach mens eſtates and liberties, or go as far as any the king of France has uſed, is more than you can be ſecurity for. 2. Another ſet of good words we have here, which at firſt hearing are apt to engage mens concern, as if too much could not be done to recover men from ſo perilous a ſtate as they ſeem to deſcribe; and thoſe are “ men following their own groundleſs prejudices, un-“ accountable humours, or crafty ſeducers.” Are not theſe expreſſions to ſet forth a deplorable condition, and to move pity in all that hear them? Enough to make the unattentive reader ready to cry out, help for the Lord's ſake! do any thing rather than ſuffer ſuch poor prejudiced ſeduced people to be eternally loſt! Where he that examines what perſons theſe words can in your ſcheme deſcribe, will find they are only ſuch as any where diſſent from thoſe articles of faith, and ceremonies of outward worſhip, which the magiſtrate, or at leaſt you his director, approve of. For whilſt you talk thus of the true religion in general, and that ſo general, that you cannot allow yourſelf to deſcend ſo near to particulars, as to recommend the ſearching and ſtudy of the Scriptures to find it; and that the power in the magiſtrates hands to uſe force, is to bring men to the true religion; I aſk, whether you do not think, either he or you muſt be judge, which is the true religion, before he can exerciſe that power? and then he muſt uſe his force upon all thoſe who diſſent from it, who are then the prejudiced, humourſome, and ſeduced, you here ſpeak of. Unleſs this be ſo, and the magiſtrate be judge, I aſk, who ſhall reſolve which is the prejudiced perſon, the prince with his politicks, or he that ſuffers for his religion? Which the more dangerous ſeducer, Lewis XIV. with his dragoons, or Mr. Claud with his Sermons? It will be no ſmall difficulty to find out the perſons who are guilty of following groundleſs prejudices, unaccountable humours, or crafty ſeducers, unleſs in thoſe places where you ſhall be graciouſly pleaſed to decide the queſtion; and out of the plenitude of your power and infallibility to declare which of the civil ſovereigns now in being do, and which do not, eſpouſe the one only true religion; and then we ſhall certainly know that thoſe who diſſent from the religion of thoſe magiſtrates, are theſe prejudiced, humourſome, ſeduced perſons.

But truly as you put it here, you leave the matter very perplexed, when you defend the eligibleneſs of veſting a power in the magiſtrate's hands, to remedy by penalties mens following their own groundleſs prejudices, unaccountable humours, and crafty ſeducers; when in the ſame ſentence you ſuppoſe the magiſtrate who is veſted with this power, may inflict thoſe penalties on men, "for their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their "own conſciences;" which when you have conſidered, perhaps you will not think my anſwer ſo wholly beſide the matter, though it ſhewed you but that one abſurdity, without a formal contradiction to ſo looſe and undetermined a propoſition, that it required more pains to unravel the ſenſe of what was covered under deceitful expreſſions, than the weight of the matter contained in them was worth.

FOR beſides what is already ſaid to it: how is it poſſible for any one, who had the greateſt mind in the world to contradiction, to deny it to be more eligible that ſuch a power ſhould be veſted in the magiſtrate, till he knows, to whom you affirm it to be more eligible? Is it more eligible to thoſe who ſuffer by it, for following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own conſciences? for theſe you know are gainers by it, for they know better than they did before where the truth does lie. Is it more eligible to thoſe who have no other thoughts of religion, but to be of that of their country without any farther examination? Or is it more eligible to thoſe who think it their duty to examine matters of religion, and to follow that which upon examination appears to them the truth? The former of theſe two make, I think, the greater part of mankind, though the latter be the better adviſed: but upon what grounds it ſhould be more eligible to either of them, that the magiſtrate ſhould, than that he ſhould not, have a power veſted in him, to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, when it cannot be employed but to bring men to that which he thinks the true, i. e. to his own religion; is not eaſy to gueſs. Or is it more eligible to the prieſts and miniſters of national religions every where, that the magiſtrate ſhould be veſted with this power? who being ſure to be orthodox, will have right to claim the aſſiſtance of the magiſtrate's power to bring thoſe whom their arguments cannot prevail on, to embrace their true religion, and to worſhip God in decent ways preſcribed by thoſe to whom God has left the ordering of ſuch matters. Or laſt of all, is it more eligible to all mankind? And are the magiſtrates of the world ſo careful or ſo lucky in the choice of their religion, that it would be an advantage to mankind, that they ſhould have a right to do what in them lies, i. e. to uſe all the force they have, if they think convenient, to bring men to the religion they think true? When you have told us to which of theſe, or what other, it is more eligible; I ſuppoſe the reader will without my contradicting it, ſee how little truth there is in it, or how little to your purpoſe.

IF you will pardon me for not having contradicted that paſſage of yours we have been conſidering, I will endeavour to make you amends in what you ſay in reply to my anſwer to it, and tell you, that notwithſtanding all you ſay to the contrary, ſuch a power as you would have to be veſted in the magiſtrate, takes away the care of mens ſouls from themſelves, and places it in the magiſtrate, rather than in themſelves. For if when men have examined, and upon examination embrace what appears to them the true religion, the magiſtrate has a right to treat them as miſled by prejudice, humour, or ſeducers; if he may uſe what force, and inflict what puniſhments, he ſhall think convenient till they conform to the religion the magiſtrate judges the true; I think you will ſcarce deny, but that the care of their ſouls is by ſuch a power placed rather in the magiſtrate than in themſelves, and taken as much from them as by force and authority it can be. This, whatever you pretend, is the power which your ſyſtem places in the magiſtrate. Nor can he upon your principles exerciſe it otherwiſe, as I imagine I have ſhewed.

YOU ſpeak here, as if this power, which you would have to be veſted in the magiſtrate, did not at all diſcharge, but aſſiſt the care every one has or ought to have of his own ſoul. I grant, were the power you would place in the magiſtrate ſuch as every man has to take care of his neighbour's ſoul, which is to expreſs itſelf only by counſel, arguments and perſuaſion; it left him ſtill the free liberty of judging for himſelf; and ſo the care of his ſoul remained ſtill in his own hands. But if men be perſuaded, that the wiſe and good God has veſted a power in the magiſtrate, to be ſo far judge for them, what is the true religion, as to puniſh them for rejecting the religion which the magiſtrate thinks the true, when offered with ſuch evidence as he judges ſufficient to convince them; and to puniſh them on till they conſider ſo as to embrace it; what remains, but that they render themſelves to the care and conduct of a guide that God in his goodneſs has appointed them, who having authority and commiſſion from God to be judge for them, which is the true religion, and what are arguments proper and ſufficient to convince any one of it; and he himſelf being convinced of it, why ſhould they be ſo fooliſh, as to ſuffer puniſhments in oppoſition to a power which is in the right, and they ought to ſubmit to? To what purpoſe ſhould they, under the weight of penalties waſte time and pains in examining, ſince whatever they ſhould judge upon examination, the magiſtrate judging the arguments and reaſons he offers for the truth of his religion, proper and ſufficient to convince them, they muſt ſtill lie under the puniſhment the magiſtrate ſhall think convenient till they do comply?

BESIDES, when they are thus puniſhed by their magiſtrate for not conforming, what need they examine? Since you tell them, "It is not ſtrictly "neceſſary to ſalvation, that all that are of the true religion ſhould underſtand "the grounds of it." The magiſtrate being of the one only true religion, knows it to be ſo; and he knows that that religion was tendered to them with ſufficient evidence, and therefore is obliged to puniſh them for rejecting it. This is that which men muſt upon your ſcheme ſuppoſe; for it is, what you yourſelf muſt ſuppoſe, before the magiſtrate can exerciſe that power you contend to be veſted in him, as is evident to any one, who will put your ſyſtem together, and particularly weigh what you ſay.

P. 48. WHEN therefore men are put into ſuch a ſtate as this, that the magiſtrate may judge what is the true religion; the magiſtrate may judge what is ſufficient evidence of its truth; the magiſtrate may be judge to whom it is tendered with ſufficient evidence, and puniſh them that reject it ſo propoſed with ſuch penalties as he alſo ſhall judge convenient, and all this by God's appointment, and an authority received from the wiſe and benign Governor of all things; I aſk, whether the care of mens ſouls are not taken out of their own hands, and put into the magiſtrate's? Whether in ſuch a ſtate they can or will think there is any need, or that it is to any purpoſe for them to examine? And whether this be a cure for the natural averſion that is in men to conſider and weigh matters of religion; and the way to force, or ſo much as encourage them to examine?

BUT, ſay you, "the ſalvation of all mens ſouls is better provided for, if "beſides the obligation that every man has to take care of his own ſoul, the "magiſtrate alſo be entruſted and obliged to ſee that no man neglect his own "ſoul, than it would be if every man were left to himſelf in that matter." Whatever ground another may have to ſay this, you can have none: You who give ſo good reaſon why conformiſts, though ever ſo ignorant and negligent in examining matters of religion, cannot yet be puniſhed to make them conſider, muſt acknowledge that "ALL mens ſalvation is not the better provided "for by a power veſted in the magiſtrate," which cannot reach the far greateſt part of men, which are every-where the conformiſt to the national religion. You that plead ſo well for the magiſtrate's not examining whether thoſe that conform, do it upon reaſon and conviction, but ſay it is ordinary preſumable they do ſo; wherein I beſeech you do you put this care of mens ſalvation that is placed in the magiſtrate? even in bringing them to outward conformity to the national religion, and there leaving them. And are the ſouls of all mankind the better provided for, if the magiſtrates of the world are veſted with a power to uſe force to bring men to an outward profeſſion of what they think the true religion, without any other care of their ſalvation? For thither, and no farther, reaches their uſe of force in your way of applying it.

P. 78.

P. 64.

P. 22.

GIVE me leave therefore to trifle with you once again, and to deſire you to lay your hand upon your heart, and tell me what mankind ſhall gain by the change? For I hope by this time it is not ſo much a paradox to you, that if the magiſtrate be commiſſioned by God to take care of mens ſouls, in your way it takes away the care of mens ſouls from themſelves in all thoſe who have need of this aſſiſtance of the magiſtrate, i. e. all thoſe who neglect to conſider, and are averſe to examination.

ONE thing more give me leave to obſerve to you, and that is, that taking care of mens ſouls, or taking care that they neglect not their ſouls, and laying penalties on them to bring them in outward profeſſion to the national religion, are two very different things, though in this place and elſewhere you confound them, and would have penal laws, requiring church-conformity, paſs under the name of care of mens ſouls; for that is the utmoſt your way of applying force does or can reach to; and what care is therein taken of mens ſouls, may be ſeen by the lives and knowledge obſervable in not a few conformiſts. This is not ſaid to lay any blame on conformity, but to ſhew how improperly you ſpeak, when you call penal laws made to promote conformity, and force uſed to bring men to it, a care of mens ſouls; when even the exacteſt obſervers, and moſt zealous advancers of conformity may be as irreligious, ignorant, and vicious, as any other men.

IN the firſt treatiſe we heard not a ſyllable of any other uſe or end of force in matters of religion, but only to make men conſider. But in your ſecond, being forced to own bare-faced the puniſhing of men for their religion, you call it, "a vice to reject the true faith, and to refuſe to worſhip God in decent "ways preſcribed by thoſe to whom God has left the ordering it;" and tell us, that "it is a fault which may juſtly be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, not to "be of the national religion, where the true is the national religion." To make this doctrine of perſecution ſeem limited, and go down the better, to your telling us it muſt be only where the national religion is the true, and that the penalties muſt be moderate and convenient; both which limitations having no other judge but the magiſtrate, as I have ſhewed elſewhere, are no limitations at all; you in words add a third, that in effect ſignifies juſt as much as the other two: and that is, "If there be ſufficient means of inſtruction "provided for all for inſtructing them in the truth of it;" of which proviſion the magiſtrate alſo being to be judge, your limitations leave him as free to puniſh all diſſenters from his own religion, as any perſecutor can wiſh: For what he will think ſufficient means of inſtruction, it will be hard for you to ſay. P. 13. P. 20. P. 20.

IN the mean time, as far as may be gathered from what you ſay in another place, we will examine what you think ſufficient proviſion for inſtructing men, which you have expreſſed in theſe words; "For if the magiſtrate provides ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all his ſubjects in the true religion, and then "requires them all under convenient penalties to hearken to the teachers and "miniſters of it, and to profeſs and exerciſe it with one accord under their "direction in publick aſſemblies." That which ſtumbles one at the firſt view of this your method of inſtruction is, that you leave it uncertain, whether diſſenters muſt firſt be inſtructed, and then profeſs; or elſe firſt profeſs, and then be inſtructed in the national religion. This you will do well to be a little more clear in the next time; for your mentioning no inſtruction but in publick aſſemblies, and perhaps meaning it for a country where there is little other pains taken with diſſenters but the confutation and condemnation of them in aſſemblies, where they are not; they muſt ceaſe to be diſſenters before they can partake of this ſufficient means of inſtruction. P. 63.

AND now for thoſe who do with one accord put themſelves under the direction of the miniſters of the national, and hearken to theſe teachers of the true religion: I aſk whether one half of thoſe whereof moſt of the aſſemblies are made up, do or can, ſo ignorant as they are, underſtand what they hear from the pulpit? And then whether if a man did underſtand, what in many aſſemblies ordinarily is delivered once a week there for his inſtruction, he might not yet at threeſcore years end be ignorant of the grounds and principles of the Chriſtian religion? Your having ſo often in your letter mentioned ſufficient proviſion of inſtruction, has forced theſe two ſhort queſtions from me. But I forbear to tell you what I have heard very ſober people, even of the church of England, ſay upon this occaſion: For you have warned me already, that it ſhall be interpreted to be a quarrel to the clergy in general, if any thing ſhall be taken notice of in any of them worthy to be mended. I leave it to thoſe whoſe profeſſion it is to judge, whether divinity be a ſcience wherein men may be inſtructed by an harangue or two once a week, upon any ſubject at a venture, which has no coherence with that which preceded, or that which is to follow, and this made to people that are ignorant of the firſt principles of it, and are not capable of underſtanding ſuch ways of diſcourſes. I am ſure he that ſhould think this a ſufficient means of inſtructing people in any other ſcience, would at the end of ſeven or twenty years find them very little advanced in it. And bating perhaps ſome terms and phraſes belonging to it, would be as far, from all true and uſeful knowledge of it as when they firſt began. Whether it be ſo in matters of religion, thoſe who have the opportunity to obſerve muſt judge. And if it appear that amongſt thoſe of the national church there be very many ſo ignorant, that there is nothing more frequent than for the miniſters themſelves to complain of it, it is manifeſt from thoſe of the national church, whatever may be concluded from diſſenters, that the means of inſtruction provided by the law, are not ſufficient, unleſs that be ſufficient means of inſtruction, when men of ſufficient capacity for other things, may live under many years, and yet know very little by. If you ſay it is for want of conſideration, muſt not your remedy of force be uſed to bring them to it? Or how will the magiſtrate anſwer for it, if he uſe force to make diſſenters conſider, and let thoſe of his own church periſh for want of it?

This being all one can well underſtand by your ſufficient means of inſtruction, as you there explain it, I do not ſee but men who have no averſion to be inſtructed, may yet fail of it, notwithſtanding ſuch a proviſion. Perhaps by " exerciſing the true religion with one accord under the direction of " the miniſters of it in publick aſſemblies," you mean ſomething farther; but that not being an ordinary phraſe, will need your explication to make it underſtood.

## CHAP. II.

## Of the magiſtrate's commiſſion, to uſe force in matters of religion.

THOUGH in the foregoing chapter on examining your doctrine concerning the magiſtrates who may or who may not uſe force in matters of religion, we have in ſeveral places happened to take notice of the commiſſion whereby you authorize magiſtrates to act; yet we ſhall in this chapter more particularly conſider that commiſſion. You tell us, " to uſe force P. 35.
" in matters of religion, is a duty of the magiſtrate as old as the law of nature, " in which the magiſtrate's commiſſion lies: for the Scripture does not properly give it him, but ſuppoſes it." And more at large you give us an account of the magiſtrate's commiſſion in theſe words: " It is true indeed, the P. 31.
" author and finiſher of our faith has given the magiſtrate no new power or " commiſſion: nor was there any need that he ſhould (if himſelf had any temporal power to give:) for he found him already, even by the law of nature, " the miniſter of God to the people for good, and bearing the ſword not in

" vain, i. e. inveſted with coactive power, and obliged to uſe it for all the " good purpoſes which it might ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful; even for the reſtraining of falſe and corrupt religion: as Job long before " (perhaps before any of the Scriptures were written) acknowledged, when " he ſaid, chap. xxxi. 26, 27, 28. that the worſhipping the ſun or the moon, " was an iniquity to be puniſhed by the judge. But though our Saviour has " given the magiſtrates no new power; yet being king of kings, he expects " and requires that they ſhould ſubmit themſelves to his ſcepter, and uſe the " power which always belonged to them, for his ſervice, and for the advancing his ſpiritual kingdom in the world. And even that charity which our " great maſter ſo earneſtly recommends, and ſo ſtrictly requires of all his diſciples, as it obliges all men to ſeek and promote the good of others, as " well as their own, eſpecially their ſpiritual and eternal good, by ſuch means " as their ſeveral places and relations enable them to uſe; ſo does it eſpecially " oblige the magiſtrate to do it as a magiſtrate, i. e. by that power which " enables him to do it above the rate of other men.

" So far therefore is the Chriſtian magiſtrate, when he gives his helping " hand to the furtherance of the Goſpel, by laying convenient penalties upon " ſuch as reject it, or any part of it, from uſing any other means for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, than what the author and finiſher of our faith has " directed, that he does no more than his duty to God, to his Redeemer, and " to his ſubjects, requires of him.

" CHRIST, you ſay, has given no new power or commiſſion to the magiſtrate:" and for this you give ſeveral reaſons. 1. " There was no need " that he ſhould." Yet it ſeems ſtrange that the Chriſtian magiſtrates alone ſhould have an exercise of coactive power in matters of religion, and yet our Saviour ſhould ſay nothing of it, but leave them to that commiſſion which was common to them with all other magiſtrates. The Chriſtian religion in caſes of leſs moment is not wanting in its rules; and I know not whether you will not charge the New Teſtament with a great defect, if that law alone which teaches the only true religion, that law which all magiſtrates who are of the true religion, receive and embrace, ſhould ſay nothing at all of ſo neceſſary and important a duty to thoſe who alone are in a capacity to diſcharge it, but leave them only to that general law of nature, which others who are not qualified to uſe this force have in common with them.

THIS at leaſt ſeems needful, if a new commiſſion does not, that the Chriſtian magiſtrates ſhould have been inſtructed what degree of force they ſhould uſe, and been limited to your moderate penalties; ſince for above theſe twelve hundred years, though they have readily enough found out your commiſſion to uſe force, they never found out your moderate uſe of it, which is that alone which you aſſure us is uſeful and neceſſary.

2. YOU ſay, " If our Saviour had any temporal power to give;" whereby you ſeem to give this as a reaſon why he gave not the civil magiſtrate power to uſe force in matters of religion, that he had it not to give. You tell us in the ſame paragraph, that " he is king of kings;" and he tells us himſelf, " That all power is given unto him in heaven and in earth," Matt. xxviii. 18.

18. So that he could have given what power, to whom, and to what purpoſe he had pleaſed: and concerning this there needs no if.

3. "FOR he found him already by the law of nature inveſted with coactive "power, and obliged to uſe it for all the good purpoſes which it might ſerve, "and for which it ſhould be found needful." He found alſo fathers, huſbands, maſters, inveſted with the diſtinct powers by the ſame law, and under the ſame obligation; and yet he thought it needful to preſcribe to them in the uſe of thoſe powers. But there was no need he ſhould do ſo to the civil magiſtrates in the uſe of their power in matters of religion; becauſe though fathers, huſbands, maſters, were liable to exceſs in the uſe of theirs, yet Chriſtian magiſtrates were not, as appears by their having always kept to thoſe moderate meaſures, which you aſſure us to be the only neceſſary and uſeful.

AND what at laſt is their commiſſion? "Even that of charity, which "obliges all men to ſeek and promote the good of others, eſpecially their "ſpiritual and eternal good, by ſuch means as their ſeveral places and relations "enable them to uſe, eſpecially magiſtrates as magiſtrates." This duty of charity is well diſcharged by the magiſtrate as magiſtrate, is it not? in bringing men to an outward profeſſion of any, even of the true religion, and leaving them there? But, Sir, I aſk you who muſt be judge, what is for the ſpiritual and eternal good of his ſubjects, the magiſtrate himſelf or no? If not he himſelf, who for him? Or can it be done without any one's judging at all? If he, the magiſtrate, muſt judge every where himſelf what is for the ſpiritual and eternal good of his ſubjects, as I ſee no help for it; if the magiſtrate be every where by the law of nature obliged to promote their ſpiritual and eternal good, is not the true religion like to find great advantage in the world by the uſe of force in the magiſtrate's hands? And is not this a plain demonſtration that God has by the law of nature given commiſſion to the magiſtrate to uſe force for the promoting the true religion, ſince, as it is evident, the execution of ſuch a commiſſion will do ſo much more harm than good?

To ſhew that your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, with a general neceſſity of force, authorizes the civil power in the uſe of it, you uſe the following words, "That force does ſome ſervice towards the making of ſcholars and "artiſts, I ſuppoſe you will eaſily grant. Give me leave therefore to aſk, "how it does it? I ſuppoſe you will ſay, not by its direct and proper efficacy, "(for force is no more capable to work learning or arts, than the belief of "the true religion in men, by its direct and proper efficacy;) but by prevailing upon thoſe who are deſigned for ſcholars or artiſts, to receive inſtruction, and to apply themſelves to the uſe of thoſe means and helps which "are proper to make them what they are deſigned to be: that is, it does it "indirectly, and at a diſtance. Well then, if all the uſefulneſs of the force "towards the bringing ſcholars or apprentices to the learning or ſkill they "are deſigned to attain, be only an indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs; I "pray what is it that warrants and authorizes ſchoolmaſters, tutors or maſters, "to uſe force upon their ſcholars or apprentices, to bring them to learning, "or the ſkill of their arts and trade, if ſuch an indirect, and at a diſtance P. 17.

" uſefulneſs of force, together with that neceſſity of it which experience diſ-
" covers will not do it? I believe you will acknowledge that even ſuch an
" uſefulneſs, together with that neceſſity, will ſerve the turn in theſe caſes.
" But then I would fain know, why the ſame kind of uſefulneſs, joined with
" the like neceſſity, will not as well do it in the caſe before us? I confeſs I
" ſee no reaſon why it ſhould not; nor do I believe you can aſſign any. You
" aſk here, what authorizes ſchoolmaſters or maſters to uſe force on their
" ſcholars and apprentices, if ſuch an indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs,
" together with neceſſity, does not do it?" I anſwer, neither your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, nor the neceſſity you ſuppoſe of it. For I do not think you will ſay, that any ſchoolmaſter has a power to teach, much leſs to uſe force on any one's child without the conſent and authority of the father: but a father, you will ſay, has a power to uſe force to correct his child to bring him to learning or ſkill in that trade he is deſigned to; and to this the father is authorized by the uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force. This I deny, that the mere ſuppoſed uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force authorizes the father to uſe it; for then whenever he judged it uſeful and neceſſary for his ſon, to prevail with him to apply himſelf to any trade, he might uſe force upon him to that purpoſe; which I think neither you nor any body elſe will ſay, a father has a right to do on his idle and perhaps married ſon at thirty or forty years old.

THERE is then ſomething elſe in the caſe; and whatever it be that authorizes the father to uſe force upon his child, to make him a proficient in it, authorizes him alſo to chuſe that trade, art or ſcience he would have him a proficient in: for the father can no longer uſe force upon his ſon, to make him attain any art or trade, than he can preſcribe to him the art or trade he is to attain. Put your parallel now if you pleaſe: The father by the uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force is authorized to uſe it upon his child, to make him attain any art or ſcience; therefore the magiſtrate is authorized to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, becauſe it is uſeful and neceſſary. Thus far you have uſed it, and you think it does well. But let us go on with the parallel: this uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force authorizes the father to uſe it, to make his ſon apply himſelf to the uſe of the means and helps which are proper to make him what he is deſigned to be, no longer than it authorizes the father to deſign what his ſon ſhall be, and to chuſe for him the art or trade he ſhall be of: and ſo the uſefulneſs and neceſſity you ſuppoſe in force to bring men to any church, cannot authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force any farther, than he has a right to chuſe for any one what church or religion he ſhall be of. So that if you will ſtick to this argument, and allow the parallel between a magiſtrate and a father, and the right they have to uſe force for the inſtructing of their ſubjects in religion, and children in arts, you muſt either allow the magiſtrate to have power to chuſe what religion his ſubjects ſhall be of, which you have denied, or elſe that he has no power to uſe force to make them uſe means to be of it.

A father being intruſted with the care and proviſion for his child, is as well bound in duty, as fitted by natural love and tenderneſs, to ſupply the defects of his tender age. When it is born, the child cannot move itſelf for the eaſe and help of natural neceſſities, the parents hands muſt ſupply that inability, and feed, cleanſe and ſwaddle it. Age having given more ſtrength, and the exerciſe of the limbs, the parents are diſcharged from the trouble of putting meat into the mouth of the child, clothing or unclothing, or carrying him in their arms. The ſame duty and affection which required ſuch kind of helps to the infant, makes them extend their thoughts to other cares for him when he is grown a little bigger; it is not only a preſent ſupport, but a future comfortable ſubſiſtence begins to be thought on: to this ſome art or ſcience is neceſſary, but the child's ignorance and want of proſpect makes him unable to chuſe. And hence the father has a power to chuſe for him, that the flexible and docile part of life may not be ſquandered away, and the time of inſtruction and improvement be loſt for want of direction. The trade or art being choſen by the father, it is the exerciſe and induſtry of the child muſt acquire it to himſelf: but induſtry uſually wanting in children, the ſpur which reaſon and foreſight gives to the endeavours of grown men; the father's rod and correction is fain to ſupply that want, to make him apply himſelf to the uſe of thoſe means and helps which are proper to make him what he is deſigned to be. But when the child is once come to the ſtate of manhood, and to be the poſſeſſor and free diſpoſer of his goods and eſtate, he is then diſcharged from this diſcipline of his parents, and they have no longer any right to chuſe any art, ſcience, or courſe of life for him, or by force to make him apply himſelf to the uſe of thoſe means which are proper to make him be what he deſigns to be. Thus the want of knowledge to chuſe a fit calling, and want of knowledge of the neceſſity of pains and induſtry to attain ſkill in it, puts a power into the parents hands to uſe force where it is neceſſary to procure the application and diligence of their children in that, which their parents have thought fit to ſet them to; but it gives this power to the parents only, and to no other, whilſt they live; and if they die whilſt their children need it, to their ſubſtitutes; and there it is ſafely placed: for ſince their want of knowledge during their nonage, makes them want direction; and want of reaſon often makes them need puniſhment and force to excite their endeavours, and keep them intent to the uſe of thoſe means that lead to the end they are directed to, the tenderneſs and love of parents will engage them to uſe it only for their good, and generally to quit it too, when by the title of manhood they come to be above the direction and diſcipline of children. But how does this prove that the magiſtrate has any right to force men to apply themſelves to the uſe of thoſe means and helps which are proper to make them of any religion, more than it proves that the magiſtrate has a right to chuſe for them what religion they ſhall be of?

To your queſtion therefore, "what is it that warrants and authorizes "ſchoolmaſters, tutors and maſters to uſe force upon their ſcholars or ap-"prentices?" I anſwer, a commiſſion from the father or mother, or thoſe who ſupply their places; for without that no indirect, or at a diſtance uſefulneſs, or ſuppoſed neceſſity, could authorize them.

BUT then you will aſk, Is it not this uſefulneſs and neceſſity that gives this power to the father and mother? I grant it. "I would fain know then, ſay "you, why the ſame uſefulneſs joined with the like neceſſity, will not as well "do in the caſe before us?" And I, Sir, will as readily tell you: becauſe the underſtanding of the parents is to ſupply the want of it in the minority of their children; and therefore they have a right not only to uſe force to make their children apply themſelves to the means of acquiring any art or trade, but to chuſe alſo the trade or calling they ſhall be of. But when being come out of the ſtate of minority, they are ſuppoſed of years of diſcretion to chuſe what they will deſign themſelves to be, they are alſo at liberty to judge what application and induſtry they will uſe for the attaining of it; and then, how negligent ſoever they are in the uſe of the means, how averſe ſoever to inſtruction or application, they are paſt the correction of a ſchoolmaſter, and their parents can no longer chuſe or deſign for them what they ſhall be, nor "uſe force to prevail with them to apply themſelves to the uſe of thoſe means "and helps which are proper to make them what they are deſigned to be." He that imagines a father or tutor may ſend his ſon to ſchool at thirty or forty years old, and order him to be whipped there, or that any indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs will authorize him to be ſo uſed, will be thought fitter to be ſent thither himſelf, and there to receive due correction.

WHEN you have conſidered, it is otherwiſe in the caſe of the magiſtrate uſing force your way in matters of religion; that there his underſtanding is not to ſupply the defect of underſtanding in his ſubjects, and that only for a time; that he cannot chuſe for any of his ſubjects what religion he ſhall be of, as you yourſelf confeſs; and that this power of the magiſtrate, if it be, as is claimed by you, over men of all ages, parts and endowments, you will perhaps "ſee ſome reaſon why it ſhould not do in the caſe before us, as "well as in that of ſchoolmaſters and tutors, though you believe I cannot aſ"ſign any." But, Sir, will your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, together with your ſuppoſed neceſſity, authorize the maſter of the ſhoe-makers company to take any one who comes in his hands, and puniſh him for not being of the ſhoe-makers company, and not coming to their guild, when he, who has a right to chuſe of what trade and company he will be, thinks it not his intereſt to be a ſhoe-maker? Nor can he or any body elſe imagine that this force, this puniſhment is uſed to make him a good ſhoe-maker, when it is ſeen and avowed that the puniſhments ceaſe, and they are free from it who enter themſelves of the company, whether they are really ſhoe-makers, or in earneſt apply themſelves to be ſo or no. How much it differs from this, that the magiſtrate ſhould puniſh men for not being of his church, who chuſe not to be of it, and when they are once entered into the communion of it, are puniſhed no more, though they are as ignorant, unſkilful, and unpractiſed in the religion of it as before: how much, I ſay, this differs from the caſe I propoſed, I leave you to conſider. For after all your pretences of uſing force for the ſalvation of ſouls, and conſequently to make men really Chriſtians, you are fain to allow, and you give reaſons for it, that force is uſed only to thoſe who are out of your church: but whoever are once in it, are free from force, whether they be really Chriſtians, and apply themſelves to thoſe things which are for the ſalvation of their ſouls, or no.

As to what you ſay, that whether they chuſe it or no, they ought to chuſe it; for your magiſtrate's religion is the true religion, that is the queſtion between you and them: but be that as it will, if force be to be uſed in the caſe, I have proved that be the magiſtrate's religion true or falſe, he, whilſt he believes it to be true, is under an obligation to uſe force, as if it were true.

BUT ſince you think your inſtance of children ſo weighty and preſſing, give me leave to return you your queſtion; I aſk you then, are not parents as much authorized to teach their children their religion, as they are to teach them their trade, when they have deſigned them to it? May they not as lawfully correct them to make them learn their catechiſe, or the principles of their religion, as they may to make them learn Clenard's grammar? Or may they not uſe force to make them go to maſs, or whatever they believe to be the worſhip of the true religion, as to go to ſchool, or to learn any art or trade? If they may, as I think you will not deny, unleſs you will ſay, that none but orthodox parents may teach their children any religion: if they may, I ſay then, pray tell me a reaſon, if your arguments from the diſcipline of children be good, why the magiſtrate may not uſe force to bring men to his religion, as well as parents may uſe force to inſtruct children, and bring them up in theirs? When you have conſidered this, you will perhaps find ſome difference between the ſtate of children and grown men, betwixt thoſe under tutelage, and thoſe who are free and at their own diſpoſal; and be inclined to think that thoſe reaſons which ſubject children in their non-age to the uſe of force, may not, nor do concern men at years of diſcretion.

YOU tell us farther, “ that commonwealths are inſtituted for the attaining A: p. 18.
“ of all the benefits which political government can yield: and therefore if “ the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men may any way be procured or ad“ vanced by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts “ muſt in all reaſon be received amongſt the ends of civil ſociety, and ſo “ conſequently fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction.” Concerning the extent of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction, and the ends of civil ſociety, whether the author or you have begged the queſtion, which is the chief buſineſs of your 56th and two or three following pages, I ſhall leave it to the readers to judge, and bring the matter, if you pleaſe, to a ſhorter iſſue. The queſtion is, whether the magiſtrate has any power to interpoſe force in matters of religion, or for the ſalvation of ſouls? The argument againſt it is, that civil ſocieties are not conſtituted for that end, and the magiſtrate cannot uſe force for ends for which the commonwealth was not conſtituted.

THE end of a commonwealth conſtituted can be ſuppoſed no other, than what men in the conſtitution of, and entering into it propoſed; and that could be nothing but protection from ſuch injuries from other men, which they deſiring to avoid, nothing but force could prevent or remedy: all things but this being as well attainable by men living in neighbourhood without the bonds of a commonwealth, they could propoſe to themſelves no other thing but this in quitting their natural liberty, and putting themſelves under the

umpirage,

expreſſion of yours out of the foregoing leaf, " the for
" turn upon it." In the voluntary inſtitution, and be
is no abſurdity or inconvenience at all, that power, ſ
ſhould be limited by thoſe that give the power only
them. The power which a general, commanding a
be enough to take more towns than one from the e
domeſtick ſedition, and yet the power of attaining th
his hand, will not authorize him to employ the force
he be commiſſioned only to beſiege and take one cert
commonwealth. The power that is in the civil ſove
the ſubjects of the commonwealth, which ſuppoſin
ends, than the preſerving the members of the comm
injury and violence: yet if thoſe who gave him that
plication of it to that ſole end, no opinion of any oth
it can authorize him to uſe it otherwiſe.

OUR Saviour tells us expreſsly, that " all power w
" and earth," Mat. xxviii. 11. By which power I i
" that the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt" of thoſe men
the help of political force, and of all other men too, c
cured or advanced; and yet if you will hear him in
find this power, which being all power, could certai
men, limited to a certain number: he ſays, " thou ha
" Son] power over all fleſh, that he ſhould give etern
" haſt given him," John xvii. 2. Whether your u
maxim of logick be true enough to authorize you to
power was given him in vain, and to enable you to dra
you were beſt ſee.

BUT were your maxim ſo true that it proved, th
" directly and at a diſtance" do ſome ſervice towards
" vancing the ſpiritual intereſt" of ſome few ſubject
therefore force was to be employed to that end; yet th
this doctrine of yours; " doubtleſs, commonwealths
" taining all thoſe benefits which political governmen
" the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men may any
" vanced by political government, the procuring and
" muſt in all reaſon be reckoned among the ends of ci
" ſequently fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's
ing it true that " commonwealths are inſtituted for t
" nefits which political government can yield," it does
" curing and advancing the ſpiritual and eternal intere
of the commonwealth by an application of power, wh
diſtance, or by accident, may do ſome ſervice that w
time it prejudices a far greater number in their civil in
be reckoned among the ends of civil ſociety.

" THAT commonwealths are inſtituted for thoſe end
" preſerving, and advancing mens civil intereſts, you ſay

the ſortune of Europe does not
and beſtowing of power, there
ver, ſufficient for ſeveral ends,
r only to one or ſome part of
ding a potent army has, may
the enemy; or to ſuppreſs a
ing thoſe benefits, which is in
e force of the army therein, if
e certain place. So it is in a
l ſovereign is the force of all
ppoſing it ſufficient for other
commonwealth in peace from
that power, limited the ap-
ny other benefits attainable by

wer was given him in heaven
ver I imagine you will not ſay,
ſe men whom you think need
too, could not any way be pro-
im in another place, you will
certainly have wrought on all
hou haſt given him, [i. e. thy
eternal life to as many as thou
vour univerſally acknowledged
ou to ſay, that any part of this
to draw conſequences from it,

ed, that ſince it might " in-
owards the " procuring or ad-
ſubjects of a commonwealth,
yet that will ſcarce make good
ealths are inſtituted for the at- P. 56.
rnment can yield; therefore if
y any way be procured or ad-
g and advancing thoſe intereſts
s of civil ſocieties, and ſo con-
trate's juriſdiction." For grant-
d for the attaining all thoſe be-
t does not follow "that the pro-
intereſt" of ſome few members
er, which indirectly, and at a
that way, whilſt at the ſame
civil intereſts; can with reaſon

oſe ends, viz. for the procuring,
ou ſay, No man will deny." To P. 55.
ſacrifice

ſacrifice therefore theſe civil intereſts of a great number of people, which are the allowed ends of the commonwealths, to the uncertain expectation of ſome ſervice to be done indirectly and at a diſtance to a far leſs number, as experience has always ſhewed thoſe really converted to the true religion by force to be, if any at all; cannot be one of the ends of the commonwealth. Though the advancing of the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt be of infinite advantage to the perſons who receive that benefit, yet if it can be thought a benefit to the commonwealth when it is procured them with the diminiſhing or deſtroying the civil intereſts of great numbers of their fellow-citizens, then the ravaging of an enemy, the plague, or a famine, may be ſaid to bring a benefit to the commonwealth: for either of theſe may indirectly and at a diſtance do ſome ſervice towards the advancing or procuring the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt of ſome of thoſe who ſuffer in it.

P. 57. IN the two latter paragraphs you except againſt my want of exactneſs, in ſetting down your opinion I am arguing againſt. Had it been any way to take off the force of what you ſay, or that the reader could have been miſled by my words in any part of the queſtion I was arguing againſt, you had had reaſon to complain: if not, you had done better to have entertained the reader with a clearer anſwer to my argument, than ſpent your ink and his time needleſſly, to ſhew ſuch niceneſs.

MY argument is as good againſt your tenet in your own words, as in mine
A. p. 18. which you except againſt: your words are, "doubtleſs commonwealths are
" inſtituted for the attaining all the benefits which political government can
" yield; and therefore if the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt of men may any way
" be procured or advanced by political government, the procuring and ad-
" vancing thoſe intereſts muſt in all reaſon be reckoned amongſt the ends of
" civil ſocieties."

L.II. p. 420. To which I anſwered, that if this be ſo, "Then this poſition muſt be
" true, viz. That all ſocieties whatſoever are inſtituted for the attaining all
" the benefits that they may any way yield; there being nothing peculiar to
" civil ſociety in the caſe, why that ſociety ſhould be inſtituted for the attain-
" ing all the benefits it can any way yield, and other ſocieties not. By which
" argument it will follow, that all ſocieties are inſtituted for one and the
" ſame end, i. e. for the attaining all the benefits that they can any way yield.
" By which account there will be no difference between church and ſtate, a
" commonwealth and an army, or between a family and the Eaſt-India
" company; all which have hitherto been thought diſtinct ſorts of ſocieties,
" inſtituted for different ends. If your hypotheſis hold good, one of the
" ends of the family muſt be to preach the Goſpel, and adminiſter the ſa-
" craments; and one buſineſs of an army to teach languages, and propagate
" religion; becauſe theſe are benefits ſome way or other attainable by thoſe
" ſocieties: unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority to be a ſuffi-
P. 58. " cient impediment: and that will be ſo in other caſes." To which you reply,
" Nor will it follow from hence, that all ſocieties are inſtituted for one and
" the ſame end, (as you imagine it will) unleſs you ſuppoſe all ſocieties ena-
" bled by the power they are endued with to attain the ſame end, which I
" believe

" believe no man hitherto did ever affirm. And therefore, notwithſtanding " this poſition, there may be ſtill as great a difference as you pleaſe between " church and ſtate, a commonwealth and an army, or between a family and " the Eaſt-India company. Which ſeveral ſocieties, as they are inſtituted " for different ends, ſo are they likewiſe furniſhed with different powers pro" portionate to their reſpective ends." In which the reaſon you give to deſtroy my inference, I am to thank you for, if you underſtood the force of it, it being the very ſame I bring to ſhew that my inference from your way of arguing is good. I ſay, that from your way of reaſonings about the ends of government, " It would follow that all ſocieties were inſtituted for one and the ſame end; unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority to be a ſuf" ficient impediment." And you tell me here it will not follow, " unleſs I " ſuppoſe all ſocieties enabled by the power they are endued with, to attain the " ſame end;" which in other words is, unleſs I ſuppoſe all who have in their hands the force of any ſociety, to have all of them the ſame commiſſion.

THE natural force of all the members of any ſociety, or of thoſe who by the ſociety can be procured to aſſiſt it, is in one ſenſe called the power of that ſociety. This power or force is generally put into ſome one or few perſons hands with direction and authority how to uſe it; and this in another ſenſe is called alſo the power of the ſociety: and this is the power you here ſpeak of, and in theſe following words, viz. " Several ſocieties, as they are " inſtituted for different ends; ſo likewiſe are they furniſhed with different " powers proportionate to their reſpective ends." The power therefore of any ſociety in this ſenſe, is nothing but the authority and direction given to thoſe that have the management of the force or natural power of the ſociety, how and to what ends to uſe it, by which commiſſion the ends of ſocieties are known and diſtinguiſhed. So that all ſocieties wherein thoſe who are intruſted with the management of the force or natural power of the ſociety, have commiſſion and authority to uſe the force or natural power of the ſociety to attain the ſame benefits, are inſtituted for the ſame end. And therefore, if in all ſocieties, thoſe who have the management of the force or natural power of the ſociety, are commiſſioned or authorized to uſe that force to attain all the benefits attainable by it, all ſocieties are inſtituted to the ſame end: and ſo what I ſaid will ſtill be true, viz. " That a family and an army, a common" wealth and a church, have all the ſame end. And if your hypotheſis hold " good, one of the ends of a family muſt be to preach the Goſpel, and admi" niſter the ſacraments; and one buſineſs of an army to teach languages, " and propagate religion, becauſe theſe are benefits ſome way or other attain" able by thoſe ſocieties; unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority " to be a ſufficient impediment: and that will be ſo too in other caſes." To which you have ſaid nothing but what does confirm it, which you will a little better ſee, when you have conſidered that any benefit attainable by force or natural power of a ſociety, does not prove the ſociety to be inſtituted for that end, till you alſo ſhew, that thoſe to whom the management of the force of the ſociety is intruſted, are commiſſioned to uſe it to that end.

P. 58. AND therefore to your next paragraph, I ſhall think it anſwer enough to print here ſide by ſide with it, that paragraph of mine to which you intended it as an anſwer.

L. II. p. 421. “It is a benefit to have true knowledge and philoſophy embraced and aſſented to, in any civil ſociety or government. But will you ſay, therefore, that it is a benefit to the ſociety, or one of the ends of government, that all who are not peripateticks ſhould be puniſhed, to make men find out the truth, and profeſs it? This indeed might be thought a fit way to make ſome men embrace the peripatetick philoſophy, but not a proper way to find the truth. For perhaps the peripatetick philoſophy may not be true; perhaps a great many have not time, nor parts to ſtudy it; perhaps a great many who have ſtudied it, cannot be convinced of the truth of it: and therefore it cannot be a benefit to the commonwealth, nor one of the ends of it, that theſe members of the ſociety ſhould be diſturbed, and diſeaſed to no purpoſe, when they are guilty of no fault. For juſt the ſame reaſon, it cannot be a benefit to civil ſociety, that men ſhould be puniſhed in Denmark for not being Lutherans, in Geneva for not being Calviniſts, and in Vienna for not being Papiſts, as a means to make them find out the true religion. For ſo, upon your grounds, men muſt be treated in thoſe places as well as in England, for not being of the church of England. And then, I beſeech you, conſider the great benefit will accrue to men in ſociety by this method; and I ſuppoſe it will be a hard thing for you to prove, That ever civil governments were inſtituted to puniſh men for not being of this or that ſect in religion; however by accident, indirectly and at a diſtance, it may be an occaſion to one perhaps of a thouſand, or an hundred, to ſtudy that controverſy, which is all you expect from it.
“If

L. III. p. 58. To your next paragraph, after what has already been ſaid, I think it may ſuffice to ſay as follows. Though perhaps the peripatetick philoſophy may not be true, (and perhaps it is no great matter, if it be not) yet the true religion is undoubtedly true. And though perhaps a great many have not time, nor parts to ſtudy that philoſophy, (and perhaps it may be no great matter neither, if they have not) yet all that have the true religion duly tendered them, have time, and all, but idiots and madmen, have parts likewiſe to ſtudy it, as much as it is neceſſary for them to ſtudy it. And though perhaps a great many who have ſtudied that philoſophy cannot be convinced of the truth of it, (which perhaps is no great wonder) yet no man ever ſtudied the true religion with ſuch care and diligence as he might and ought to uſe, and with an honeſt mind, but he was convinced of the truth of it. And that thoſe who cannot otherwiſe be brought to do this, ſhall be a little diſturbed and diſeaſed to bring them to it, I take to be the intereſt, not only of thoſe particular perſons who by this means may be brought into the way of ſalvation, but of the commonwealth likewiſe, upon theſe two accounts.

1. Becauſe the true religion, which this method propagates, makes good men; and good men
are

“ If it be a benefit, pray tell me what benefit
“ it is. A civil benefit it cannot be. For
“ mens civil intereſts are diſturbed, injured,
“ and impaired by it. And what ſpiritual
“ benefit that can be to any multitude of
“ men to be puniſhed for diſſenting from a
“ falſe or erroneous profeſſion, I would have
“ you find out; unleſs it be a ſpiritual benefit
“ to be in danger to be driven into a
“ wrong way. For if in all differing ſects,
“ one is in the wrong, it is a hundred to
“ one but that from which any one diſſents,
“ and is puniſhed for diſſenting from, is the
“ wrong.”

are always the beſt ſubjects, or members of the commonwealth; not only as they do more ſincerely and zealouſly promote the publick good than other men; but likewiſe in regard of the favour of God, which they often procure to the ſocieties of which they are members. And,

2. Becauſe this care in any commonwealth, of God's honour and mens ſalvation, intitles it to his ſpecial protection and bleſſing. So that where this method is uſed, it proves both a ſpiritual and a civil benefit to the commonwealth.

YOU tell “ us, the true religion is undoubtedly true.” If you had told us too, who is undoubtedly judge of it, you had put all paſt doubt: but till you will be pleaſed to determine that, it would be undoubtedly true, that the king of Denmark is as undoubtedly judge of it at Copenhagen, and the emperor at Vienna, as the king of England in this iſland: I do not ſay they judge as right, but they are by as much right judges, and therefore have as much right to puniſh thoſe who diſſent from Lutheraniſm and Popery in thoſe countries, as any other civil magiſtrate has to puniſh any Diſſenters from the national religion any where elſe. And who can deny but theſe briars and thorns laid in their way by the penal laws of thoſe countries, may do ſome ſervice indirectly and at a diſtance, to bring men there ſeverely and impartially to examine matters of religion, and ſo to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, which the bare outward profeſſion of any religion in the world will not do?

“ THIS true religion which is undoubtedly true, you tell us too, never any
“ body ſtudied with ſuch care and diligence as he might and ought to uſe, and
“ with an honeſt mind, but he was convinced of the truth of it.”

IF you will reſolve it in your ſhort circular way, and tell me ſuch diligence as one ought to uſe, is ſuch diligence as brings one to be convinced, it is a queſtion too eaſy to be aſked. If I ſhould deſire to know plainly what is to be underſtood by it, it would be a queſtion too hard for you to anſwer, and therefore I ſhall not trouble you with demanding what this diligence which a man may and ought to uſe, is; nor what you mean by an honeſt mind. I only aſk you, whether force, your way applied, be able to produce them? that ſo the commonwealth may have the benefits you propoſe from mens being convinced of, and conſequently embracing, the true religion, which you ſay no body can miſs, who is brought to that diligence, and that honeſt mind.

The benefits to the commonwealth are, 1. "That the true religion that this method propagates, makes good men, and good men are always the beſt ſubjects, and often procure the favour of God to the ſociety they are members of." Being forward enough to grant that nothing contributes ſo much to the benefit of a ſociety, as that it be made up of good men, I began preſently to give into your method, which promiſes ſo ſure a way to make men ſo ſtudy the true religion, that they cannot miſs the being convinced of the truth of it, and ſo hardly avoid being really of the true religion, and conſequently good men. But that I might not miſtake in a thing of that conſequence, I began to look about in thoſe countries where force has been made uſe of to propagate what you allowed to be the true religion, and found complaints of as great a ſcarcity of good men there, as in other places. A friend whom I diſcourſed on this point, ſaid, It might poſſibly be that the world had not yet had the benefit of your method: becauſe law-makers had not yet been able to find that juſt temper of penalties on which your propagation of the true religion was built; and that therefore it was great pity you had not yet diſcovered this great ſecret, but it was to be hoped you would. Another, who ſtood by, ſaid he did not ſee how your method could make men it wrought on, and brought to conformity, better than others, unleſs corrupt nature with impunity were like to produce better men in one outward profeſſion than in another. To which I replied, That we did not look on conformiſts through a due medium; for if we did, with you, allow it preſumeable that all who conformed did it upon conviction, there could be no juſt complaint of the ſcarcity of good men: and ſo we got over that difficulty.

The ſecond benefit you ſay your uſe of force brings to the commonwealth, is, "That this care in any commonwealth, of God's honour and mens ſalvation, intitles it to his ſpecial protection and bleſſing." Then certainly all commonwealths, that have any regard to the protection and bleſſing of God, will not neglect to intitle themſelves to it, by uſing of force to promote that religion they believe to be true. But I beſeech you what care is this of the honour of God, and mens ſalvation, you ſpeak of? Is it, as you have owned it, a care by penalties to make men outwardly conform, and without any farther care or inquiry to preſume that they do it upon conviction, and with a ſincere embracing of, and obedience to the truth? But if the honour of God, and mens ſalvation, conſiſts not in an outward conformity to any religion, but in ſomething farther; what bleſſing they may expect whoſe care goes ſo far, and then preſume the reſt, which is the hardeſt part, and therefore leaſt to be preſumed, the Prophet Jeremy, Chap. xlviii. 10. will tell you, who ſays, "Curſed be he that does the work of the Lord negligently:" which thoſe who think it is the magiſtrate's buſineſs to uſe force to bring men heartily to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, were beſt ſeriouſly to conſider.

p. 65. Your next paragraph containing nothing but poſitions of yours, which you ſuppoſe elſewhere proved, and I elſewhere examined, it is not fit the reader ſhould be troubled any farther about them.

I once knew a gentleman, who having cracked himſelf with an ungovernable ambition, could never afterwards hear the place he aimed at mentioned,

tioned without ſhewing marks of his diſtemper. I know not what the matter is, that when there comes in your way but the mention of ſecular power in your or eccleſiaſticks hands, you cannot contain yourſelf: we have inſtances of it in other parts of your letter; and here again you fall into a fit, which P. 60. ſince it produces rather marks of your breeding, than arguments for your cauſe, I ſhall leave them as they are to the reader, if you can make them go down with him for reaſons from a grave man, or for a ſober anſwer to what I ſay in that and the following paragraph.

MUCH-WHAT of the ſome ſize is your ingenious reply to what I ſay in the P. 61. next paragraph, viz. “ That commonwealths, or civil ſocieties and govern“ ments, if you will believe the judicious Mr. Hooker, are, as St. Peter calls “ them, 1 Pet. ii. 13. ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, the contrivance and inſtitution of “ man.” To which your ſmartly reply, for your choler was up, “ it is well “ for St. Peter that he had the judicious Mr. Hooker on his ſide.” And it would have been well for you too to have ſeen that Mr. Hooker's authority was made uſe of not to confirm the authority of St. Peter, but to confirm that ſenſe I gave of St. Peter's words, which is not ſo clear in our tranſlation, but that there are thoſe who, as I doubt not but you know, do not allow of it. But this being ſaid when paſſion it ſeems rather employed your wit than your judgment, though nothing to the purpoſe, may yet perhaps indirectly and at a diſtance do ſome ſervice.

AND now, Sir, if you can but imagine that men in the corrupt ſtate of nature might be authorized and required by reaſon, the law of nature, to avoid the inconveniencies of that ſtate, and to that purpoſe to put the power of governing them into ſome one or more men's hands, in ſuch forms, and under ſuch agreements as they ſhould think fit; (which governors ſo ſet over them for a good end by their own choice, though they received all their power from thoſe, who by the law of nature had a power to confer it on them, may very fitly be called powers ordained of God, being choſen and appointed by thoſe who had authority from God ſo to do: for he that receives commiſſion, limited according to the diſcretion of him that gives it, from another who had authority from his prince ſo to do, may truly be ſaid, ſo far as his commiſſion reaches, to be appointed or ordained by the prince himſelf.) It may ſerve as an anſwer to your two next paragraphs, and to ſhew that there is no oppoſition or difficulty in all that St. Peter, St. Paul, or the judicious Mr. Hooker ſays, nor any thing, in what either of them ſays, to your purpoſe. And though it be true, thoſe powers that are, are ordained of God; yet it may nevertheleſs be true, that the power any one has, and the ends for which he has it, may be by the contrivance and appointment of men.

To my ſaying, “ the ends of commonwealths appointed by the inſtitutors “ of them, could not be their ſpiritual and eternal intereſt, becauſe they “ could not ſtipulate about thoſe one with another, nor ſubmit this intereſt “ to the power of the ſociety, or any ſovereign they ſhould ſet over them.” You reply, “ very true, Sir; but they can ſubmit to be puniſhed in their tem- P. 62. “ poral intereſt, if they deſpiſe or neglect thoſe greater intereſts.” How they can ſubmit to be puniſhed by any men in their temporal intereſt, for that which they cannot ſubmit to be judged by any man, when you can ſhew, I ſhall admire your politicks. Beſides, if the compact about matters of religion be, that thoſe ſhould be puniſhed in their temporal, who neglect or deſpiſe their eternal intereſt; who I beſeech you is by this agreement rather to be puniſhed, a ſober Diſſenter, who appears concerned for religion and his ſalvation, or an irreligious prophane or debauched Conformiſt? By ſuch as deſpiſe or neglect thoſe greater intereſts, you here mean only Diſſenters from the national religion: for thoſe only you puniſh, though you repreſent them under ſuch a deſcription as belongs not peculiarly to them; but that matters not, ſo long as it beſt ſuits your occaſion.

IN your next paragraph you wonder at my news from the Weſt-Indies, I ſuppoſe becauſe you found it not in your books of Europe or Aſia. But whatever you may think, I aſſure you all the world is not Mile-end. But that you may be no more ſurprized with news, let me aſk you, whether it be not poſſible that men, to whom the rivers and woods afforded the ſpontaneous proviſions of life, and ſo with no private poſſeſſions of land, had no enlarged deſires after riches or power, ſhould live together in ſociety, make one people of one language under one Chieftain, who ſhall have no other power but to command them in time of common war againſt their common enemies, without any municipal laws, judges, or any perſon with ſuperiority eſtabliſhed amongſt them, but ended all their private differences, if any aroſe, by the extempory determination of their neighbours, or of arbitrators choſen by the parties. I aſk you, whether in ſuch a commonwealth the Chieftain who was the only man of authority amongſt them, had any power to uſe the force of the commonwealth to any other end but the defence of it againſt an enemy, though other benefits were attainable by it?

THE paragraph of mine to which you mean your next for an anſwer, ſhall anſwer for itſelf.

L. II. p. 424. "You quote the author's argument, which he brings to prove that the care of ſouls is not committed to the magiſtrate, in theſe words: It is not committed to him by God, becauſe it appears not that God has ever given any ſuch authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. This, when firſt I read it, I confeſs I thought a good argument. But you ſay, this is quite beſide the buſineſs; and the reaſon you give, is, for the authority of the magiſtate is not authority to compel any one to his religion, but only an authority to procure all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and to procure withal, as much as in him lies, that none remain ignorant of it, &c. I fear, Sir, you forget yourſelf. The author was not writing againſt your new hypotheſis, before it was known in the world. He may be excuſed, if he had not the gift of prophecy, "to

L. III. p. 63. As to your next paragraph, I think I might now wholly paſs it over. I ſhall only tell you, that as I have often heard, ſo I hope I ſhall always hear of "religion eſtabliſhed by law." For though the magiſtrate's authority can "add no force or ſanction to any religion, whether true or "falſe,

“ to argue againſt a notion which was not yet ſtarted. He had in view only the laws hitherto made, and the puniſhments, in matters of religion, in uſe in the world. The penalties, as I take it, are laid on men for being of different ways of religion: which, what is it other but to compel them to relinquiſh their own, and to conform themſelves to that from which they differ? If this be not to compel them to the magiſtrate's religion, pray tell us what is? This muſt be neceſſarily ſo underſtood; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed that the law intends not to have that done, which with penalties it commands to be done; or that puniſhments are not compulſion, not that compulſion the author complains of. The law ſays, Do this, and live; embrace this doctrine, conform to this way of worſhip, and be at eaſe and free; or elſe be fined, impriſoned, baniſhed, burned. If you can ſhew among the laws that have been made in England concerning religion, and I think I may ſay any where elſe, any one that puniſhes men for not having impartially examined the religion they have embraced or refuſed, I think I may yield you the cauſe. Law-makers have been generally wiſer than to make laws that could not be executed: and therefore their laws were againſt Nonconformiſts, which could be known; and not for impartial examination, which could not. It was not then beſide the author's buſineſs, to bring an argument againſt the perſecutions here in faſhion. He did not know that any one, who was ſo free as to acknowledge that the magiſtrate has not an authority to compel any one to his religion, and thereby at once, as you have done, give up all the laws now in force againſt the Diſſenters, had yet rods in ſtore for them, and by a new trick would bring them under the laſh of the law, when the old pretences were too much exploded to ſerve any longer. Have you never heard of ſuch a thing as the religion eſtabliſhed by law? which is it ſeems the lawful religion of a country, and to be complied with as ſuch. There being ſuch things, ſuch notions yet in the world, it was not quite beſide the author's buſineſs to alledge, that God never gave ſuch authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. I will grant, if you pleaſe, religion eſtabliſhed by law is a pretty odd way of ſpeaking in the mouth of a Chriſtian, and yet it is much in faſhion, as if the magiſtrate's authority could add any force or ſanction to any religion, whether true or falſe. I am glad to find you have ſo far conſidered the magiſtrate's authority, that you agree with the author, that he hath none to compel men to his religion. Much leſs can he, by any eſtabliſhment of law, add any thing to the truth or validity of his own, or any religion whatſoever.”

“ falſe, nor any thing to the truth or validity of his own, or any religion whatſoever;” yet I think it may do much toward the upholding and preſerving the true religion within his juriſdiction; and in that reſpect may properly enough be ſaid to eſtabliſh it.

THAT above-annexed is all the anſwer you think this paragraph of mine deſerves. But yet in that little you ſay, you muſt give me leave to take notice,

" that if, as you ſay, the magiſtrate's authority may do much towards the " upholding and preſerving the true religion within his juriſdiction;" ſo alſo may it do much towards the upholding and preſerving of a falſe religion, and in that reſpect, if you ſay true, may be ſaid to eſtabliſh it. For I think I need not mind you here again, that it muſt unavoidably depend upon his opinion what ſhall be eſtabliſhed for true, or rejected as falſe.

AND thus you have my thoughts concerning the moſt material of what you ſay touching the magiſtrate's commiſſion to uſe force in matters of religion, together with ſome incident places in your anſwer, which I have taken notice of as they have come in my way.

# CHAP. III.

## Who are to be puniſhed by your ſcheme.

TO juſtify the largeneſs of the Author's Toleration, who would not have Jews, Mahometans and Pagans excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, becauſe of their religion; I ſaid, " I feared it will hardly be " believed, that we pray in earneſt for their converſion, if we exclude them " from the ordinary and probable means of it, either by driving them from, " or perſecuting them when they are amongſt us." You reply; " now I confeſs " I thought men might live quietly enough among us, and enjoy the protection " of the government againſt all violence and injuries, without being endenizoned, or made members of the commonwealth; which alone can entitle " them to the civil rights and privileges of it. But as to Jews, Mahometans " and Pagans, if any of them do not care to live among us, unleſs they may " be admitted to the rights and privileges of the commonwealth; the refuſing " them that favour is not, I ſuppoſe, to be looked upon as driving them from " us, or excluding them from the ordinary and probable means of converſion; " but as a juſt and neceſſary caution in a Chriſtian commonwealth, in reſpect to " the members of it: who, if ſuch as profeſs Judaiſm, or Mahometaniſm, or " Paganiſm, were permitted to enjoy the ſame rights with them, would be " much the more in danger to be ſeduced by them; ſeeing they would loſe no " worldly advantage by ſuch a change of their religion: whereas if they could " not turn to any of thoſe religions, without forfeiting the civil rights of the " commonwealth by doing it, it is likely they would conſider well before they " did it, what ground there was to expect that they ſhould get any thing by " the exchange, which would countervail the loſs they ſhould ſuſtain by it." I thought protection and impunity of men, not offending in civil things, might have been accounted the civil rights of the commonwealth, which the author meant: but you, to make it ſeem more, add the word privileges. Let it be ſo. Live amongſt you then Jews, Mahometans and Pagans may; but indenizoned they muſt not be. But why? Are there not thoſe who are members of your commonwealth, who do not embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, any more than they? What think you of Socinians, Papiſts, Anabaptiſts,

L. II. p. 386.

P. 2.

baptiſts, Quakers, Preſbyterians? If they do not reject the truth neceſſary to ſalvation, why do you puniſh them? Or if ſome that are in the way to perdition, may be members of the commonwealth, why muſt theſe be excluded upon the account of religion? For I think there is no great odds, as to ſaving of ſouls, which is the only end for which they are puniſhed, amongſt thoſe religions, each whereof will make thoſe who are of it miſs ſalvation. Only if there be any fear of ſeducing thoſe who are of the national church, the danger is moſt from that religion which comes neareſt to it, and moſt reſembles it. However, this you think “ but a juſt and neceſſary caution in a Chriſtian “ commonwealth in reſpect of the members of it.” I ſuppoſe, for you love to ſpeak doubtfully, theſe members of a Chriſtian commonwealth you take ſuch care of, are members alſo of the national church, whoſe religion is the true; and therefore you call them in the next paragraph, ſubjects of Chriſt's kingdom, to whom he has a ſpecial regard. For Diſſenters, who are puniſhed to be made good Chriſtians, to whom force is uſed “ to bring them to the “ true religion, and to the communion of the church of God,” it is plain are not in your opinion good Chriſtians, or of the true religion; unleſs you puniſh them to make them what they are already. The Diſſenters therefore who are already perverted, and reject the truth that muſt ſave them, you are not, I ſuppoſe ſo careful of, leſt they ſhould be ſeduced. Thoſe who have already the plague, need not be guarded from infection: nor can you fear that men ſo deſperately perverſe, that penalties and puniſhments, joined to the light and ſtrength of the truth, have not been able to bring from the opinions they have eſpouſed, into the communion of the church, ſhould be ſeduced to Judaiſm, Mahometiſm, or Paganiſm, neither of which has the advantage of truth or intereſt to prevail by. It is therefore thoſe of the national church, as I conclude alſo from the cloſe of this paragraph, where you ſpeak of God's own peculiar people, whom you think would be much the more in danger to be ſeduced by them, if they were endenizoned, ſince they would loſe no worldly advantage by ſuch a change of their religion, i. e. by quitting the national church, to turn Jews, Mahometans, or Pagans.

This ſhews, whatever you ſay of the ſufficient means of inſtruction provided by the law, how well you think the members of the national church are inſtructed in the true religion. It ſhews alſo, whatever you ſay of its being preſumable that they embrace it upon conviction, how much you are ſatisfied that the members of the national church are convinced of the truth of the religion they profeſs, or rather herd with; ſince you think them in great danger to change it for Judaiſm, Mahometiſm, or Paganiſm itſelf upon equal terms, and becauſe they ſhall loſe no worldly advantage by ſuch a change. But if the forfeiting the civil rights of the commonwealth, be the proper remedy to keep men in the communion of the church, why is it uſed to keep men from Judaiſm or Paganiſm, and not from Phanaticiſm? Upon this account why might not Jews, Pagans and Mahometans be admitted to the rights of the commonwealth, as far as Papiſts, Independents, and Quakers? But you diſtribute to every one according to your good pleaſure; and doubtleſs are fully juſtified by theſe following words: “ And whether this be not a rea-

" ſonable and neceſſary caution, any man may judge, who does but conſider " within how few ages after the flood, ſuperſtition and idolatry prevailed over " the world, and how apt even God's own peculiar people were to receive " that mortal infection notwithſtanding all that he did to keep them from " it."

WHAT the ſtate of religion was in the firſt ages after the flood, is ſo imperfectly known now, that as I have ſhewed you in another place, you can make little advantage to your cauſe from thence. And ſince it was the ſame corruption then, which as you own, withdraws men now from the true religion, and hinders it from prevailing by its own light, without the aſſiſtance of force; and it is the ſame corruption that keeps Diſſenters, as well as Jews, Mahometans and Pagans, from embracing of the truth: why different degrees of puniſhments ſhould be uſed to them, till there be found in them different degrees of obſtinacy, would need ſome better reaſon. Why this common pravity of human nature ſhould make Judaiſm, Mahometiſm or Paganiſm more catching than any ſort of nonconformity, which hinders men from embracing the true religion; ſo that Jews, Mahometans and Pagans muſt, for fear of infecting others, be ſhut out from the commonwealth, when others are not, I would fain know? Whatever it was that ſo diſpoſed the Jews to idolatry before the captivity, ſure it is, they firmly reſiſted it, and refuſed to change, not only where they might have done it on equal terms, but have had great advantage to boot; and therefore it is poſſible that there is ſomething in this matter, which neither you nor I do fully comprehend, and may with a becoming humility ſit down and confeſs, that in this, as well as other parts of his providence, God's ways are paſt finding out. But of this we may be certain from this inſtance of the Jews, that it is not reaſonable to conclude, that becauſe they were once inclined to idolatry, that therefore they, or any other people are in danger to turn Pagans, whenever they ſhall loſe no worldly advantage by ſuch a change. But if we may oppoſe nearer and known inſtances to more remote and uncertain, look into the world, and tell me, ſince Jeſus Chriſt brought life and immortality to light through the Goſpel, where the Chriſtian religion meeting Judaiſm, Mahometiſm or Paganiſm upon equal terms, loſt ſo plainly by it, that you have reaſon to ſuſpect the members of a Chriſtian commonwealth would be in danger to be ſeduced to either of them, if they ſhould loſe no worldly advantage by ſuch a change of their religion, rather than likely to increaſe among them? Till you can find then ſome better reaſon for excluding Jews, &c. from the rights of the commonwealth, you muſt give us leave to look on this as a bare pretence. Beſides, I think you are under a miſtake, which ſhews your pretence againſt admitting Jews, Mahometans and Pagans, to the civil rights of the commonwealth, is ill grounded; for what law I pray is there in England, that they who turn to any of thoſe religions, forfeit the civil rights of the commonwealth by doing it? Such a law I deſire you to ſhew me; and if you cannot, all this pretence is out of doors, and men of your church, ſince on that account they would loſe no worldly advantage by the change, are in as much danger to be ſeduced, whether Jews, Mahometans and Pagans are indenizoned or no.

BUT that you may not be thought too gracious, you tell us, "That as to P. 3.
"Pagans particularly, you are ſo far from thinking that they ought not to be "excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, becauſe of their religion, that you cannot ſee how their religion can be ſuffered by any commonwealth that knows and worſhips the only true God, if they would be "thought to retain any jealouſy for his honour, or even for that of human "nature." Thus then you order the matter; Jews and Mahometans may be permitted to live in a Chriſtian commonwealth with the exerciſe of their religion, but not be indenizoned: Pagans may alſo be permitted to live there, but not to have the exerciſe of their religion, nor be indenizoned.

THIS according to the beſt of my apprehenſion is the ſenſe of your words; for the clearneſs of your thoughts, or your cauſe, does not always ſuffer you to ſpeak plainly and directly; as here, having been ſpeaking a whole page before what uſage the perſons of Jews, Mahometans and Pagans were to have, you on a ſudden tell us their religion is not to be ſuffered, but ſay not what muſt be done with their perſons. For do you think it reaſonable that men who have any religion, ſhould live amongſt you without the exerciſe of that religion, in order to their converſion? which is no other but to make them down-right irreligious, and render the very notion of a deity inſignificant, and of no influence to them in order to their converſion. It being leſs dangerous to religion in general, to have men ignorant of a Deity, and ſo without any religion; than to have them acknowledge a ſuperior Being, but yet to teach or allow them to neglect or refuſe worſhipping him in that way, that they believe he requires, to render them acceptable to him: it being a great deal leſs fault, and that which we were every one of us once guilty of, to be ignorant of him, than acknowledging a God, and not to pay him the honour which we think due to him. I do not ſee therefore how thoſe who retain any jealouſy for the honour of God, can permit men to live amongſt them in order to their converſion, and require of them not to honour God, according to the beſt of their knowledge: unleſs you think it a preparation to your true religion, to require men ſenſibly and knowingly to affront the P. 62.
Deity; and to perſuade them that the religion you would bring them to, can allow men to make bold with the ſenſe they have of him, and to refuſe him the honour which in their conſciences they are perſuaded is due to him, and which muſt to them and every body elſe appear inconſiſtent with all religion. Since therefore to admit their perſons without the exerciſe of their religion, cannot be reaſonable, nor conducing to their converſion; if the exerciſe of their religion, as you ſay, be not to be ſuffered amongſt us till they are converted, I do not ſee how their perſons can be ſuffered amongſt us, if that exception muſt be added, till they are converted; and whether then they are not excluded from the ordinary means of converſion, I leave you to conſider.

I WONDER this neceſſity had not made you think on another way of their having the ordinary means of converſion, without their living amongſt us, that way by which in the beginning of Chriſtianity it was brought to the Heathen world by the travels and preaching of the Apoſtles. But the ſucceſſors of the Apoſtles are not, it ſeems, ſucceſſors to this part of the commiſſion, Go and teach all nations. And indeed it is one thing to be an ambaſſador from God to people that are already converted, and have provided good benefices, another to be an ambaſſador from heaven in a country where you have neither the countenance of the magiſtrate, nor the devout obedience of the people. And who ſees not how one is bound to be zealous for the propagating of the true religion, and the convincing, converting and ſaving of ſouls in a country where it is eſtabliſhed by law? who can doubt but that there thoſe who talk ſo much of it are in earneſt? Though yet ſome men will hardly forbear doubting, that thoſe men, however they pray for it, are not much concerned for the converſion of Pagans, who will neither go to them to inſtruct them, nor ſuffer them to come to us for the means of converſion.

IT is true what you ſay, "what Pagans call religion is abomination to the "Almighty." But if that requires any thing from thoſe who retain any jealouſy for the honour of God, it is ſomething more than barely about the place where thoſe abominations ſhall be committed. The true concern for the honour of God is not, that idolatry ſhould be ſhut out of England, but that it ſhould be leſſened every where, and by the light and preaching of the Goſpel be baniſhed out of the world. If Pagans and idolaters are, as you ſay, the "greateſt diſhonour conceivable to God almighty," they are as much ſo on the other ſide of Tweed, or the ſea, as on this; for he from his throne equally beholds all the dwellers upon earth. Thoſe therefore who are truly jealous for the honour of God, will not upon the account of his honour, be concerned for their being in this or that place, while there are idolaters in the world; but that the number of thoſe who are ſuch a diſhonour to him, ſhould every day be as much as poſſible diminiſhed, and they be brought to give him his due tribute of honour and praiſe in a right way of worſhip. It is in this that a jealouſy, which is in earneſt for God's honour, truly ſhews itſelf, in wiſhing and endeavouring to abate the abomination, and drive idolatry out of the world, not in driving idolaters out of any one country, or ſending them away to places and company, where they ſhall find more encouragement to it. It is a ſtrange jealouſy for the honour of God, that looks not beyond ſuch a mountain or river as divides a Chriſtian and Pagan country. Wherever idolatry is committed, there God's honour is concerned; and thither mens jealouſy for his honour, if it be ſincere indeed, will extend, and be in pain to leſſen and take away the provocation. But the place God is provoked and diſhonoured in, which is a narrow conſideration in reſpect of the Lord of all the earth, will no otherwiſe employ their zeal, who are in earneſt, than as it may more or leſs conduce to their converſion of the offenders.

BUT if your jealouſy for the honour of God, engages you ſo far againſt mens committing idolatry in certain places, that you think thoſe ought to be excluded from the rights of the commonwealth, and not to be ſuffered to be denizons, who according to that place in the Romans brought by you, are

“ without excuſe, becauſe when they knew God, they glorified him not as “ God, but became vain in their imaginations, and changed the glory of the “ incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man.” I ſhall only change ſome of the words in the text you cite of Iſaiah, “ I have baked “ part thereof on the coals, and eaten it, and ſhall I make the reſidue thereof “ a God? ſhall I fall down to that which comes of a plant?” and ſo leave them with you to conſider whether your jealouſy in earneſt carries you ſo far as you talk of; and whether when you have looked about you, you are ſtill of the mind, that thoſe who do ſuch things ſhould be disfranchiſed and ſent away, and the exerciſe of no ſuch religion be any where permitted amongſt us? for thoſe things are no leſs an abomination to God under a Chriſtian than Pagan name. One word more I have to ſay to your jealouſy for the honour of God, that if it be any thing more than in talk, it will ſet itſelf no leſs earneſtly againſt other abominations, and the practiſers of them, than againſt that of idolatry.

As to that in Job, xxxi. 26, 27, 28. where he ſays “ idolatry is to be pu-“ niſhed by the judge;” this place alone, were there no other, is ſufficient to confirm their opinion, who conclude that book writ by a Jew. And how little the puniſhing of idolatry in that commonwealth concerns our preſent caſe, I refer you for information to the author's letter. But how does your jealouſy for the honour of God, carry you to an excluſion of the Pagan religion from amongſt you, but yet admit of the Jewiſh and Mahometan? Or is not the honour of God concerned in their denying our Saviour?

If we are to look upon Job to have been writ before the time of Moſes, as the author would have it, p. 32. and ſo by a ſtranger to the commonwealth of Iſrael; it is plain the general apoſtacy he lays ſo much ſtreſs on, was not ſpread ſo far, but that there was a government by his own confeſſion, eſtabliſhed out of Judea, free from, nay zealous againſt idolatry: and why there might not be many more as well as this, which we hear of but by chance, it will concern him to ſhew.

You go on, “ But as to the converting Jews, Mahometans and Pagans P. 4
“ to Chriſtianity, I fear there will be no great progreſs made in it, till Chriſ-“ tians come to a better agreement and union among themſelves. I am “ ſure our Saviour prayed that all that ſhould believe in him, might be one “ in the Father and him,” (i. e. I ſuppoſe in that holy religion which he taught them from the Father) that the world might believe that the Father had ſent him: “ and therefore when he comes to make inquiſition, why no “ more Jews, Mahometans and Pagans have been converted to his religion; “ I very much fear, that a great part of the blame will be found to lie upon “ the authors and promoters of ſects and diviſions among the profeſſors of it: “ which therefore, I think, all that are guilty, and all that would not be “ guilty, ought well to conſider.”

I easily grant that “ our Saviour prayed that all might be one in that “ holy religion which he taught them,” and in that very prayer teaches what that religion is, “ This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true “ God, and Jeſus Chriſt whom thou haſt ſent.” John xvii. 3. But muſt it be expected, that therefore they ſhould all be of one mind in things not neceſſary to ſalvation? for whatever unity it was our Saviour prayed for here, it is certain the Apoſtles themſelves did not all of them agree in every thing: but even the chief of them have had differences amongſt them in matters of religion, as appears, Gal. ii. 11.

AN agreement in truths neceſſary to ſalvation, and the maintaining of charity and brotherly kindneſs with the diverſity of opinions in other things, is that which will very well conſiſt with Chriſtian unity, and is all poſſibly to be had in this world, in ſuch an incurable weakneſs and difference of mens underſtandings. This probably would contribute more to the converſion of Jews, Mahometans and Pagans, if there were propoſed to them and others, for their admittance into the church, only the plain ſimple truths of the Goſpel neceſſary to ſalvation, than all the fruitleſs pudder and talk about uniting Chriſtians in matters of leſs moment, according to the draught and preſcription of a certain ſet of men any where.

“WHAT blame will lie on the authors and promoters of ſects and diviſions,” and, let me add, animoſities amongſt Chriſtians, “when Chriſt comes to make inquiſition why no more Jews, Mahometans and Pagans were converted, they who are concerned ought certainly well to conſider.” And to abate in great meaſure this miſchief for the future, they who talk ſo much of ſects and diviſions, would do well to conſider too, whether thoſe are not moſt authors and promoters of ſects and diviſions, who impoſe creeds, and ceremonies and articles of mens making; and make things not neceſſary to ſalvation, the neceſſary terms of communion, excluding and driving from them ſuch as out of conſcience and perſuaſion cannot aſſent and ſubmit to them; and treating them as if they were utter aliens from the church of God, and ſuch as were deſervedly ſhut out as unfit to be members of it: who narrow Chriſtianity within bounds of their own making, which the Goſpel knows nothing of; and often for things by themſelves confeſſed indifferent, thruſt men out of their communion, and then puniſh them for not being of it.

WHO ſees not, but the bond of unity might be preſerved, in the different perſuaſions of men concerning things not neceſſary to ſalvation, if they were not made neceſſary to church communion? What two thinking men of the church of England are there, who differ not one from the other in ſeveral material points of religion, who nevertheleſs are members of the ſame church, and in unity one with another? Make but one of thoſe points the Shibboleth of a party, and erect it into an article of the national church, and they are preſently divided; and he of the two, whoſe judgment happens not to agree with national orthodoxy, is immediately cut off from communion. Who I beſeech you is it in this caſe that makes the ſect? Is it not thoſe who contract the church of Chriſt within limits of their own contrivance? who by articles and ceremonies of their own forming, ſeparate from their communion all that have not perſuaſions which juſt jump with their model?

IT is frivolous here to pretend authority. No man has or can have authority to ſhut any one out of the church of Chriſt, for that for which Chriſt himſelf will not ſhut him out of heaven. Whoſoever does ſo, is truly the author and promoter of ſchiſm and diviſion, ſets up a ſect, and tears in pieces the church of Chriſt, of which every one who believes, and practiſes what is neceſſary to ſalvation, is a part and member; and cannot, without the guilt of ſchiſm, be ſeparated from, or kept out of its external communion. In this "lording it over the heritage of God," 1 Pet. v. 2, 3. and thus overſeeing by impoſition on the unwilling, and not conſenting, which ſeems to be the meaning of St. Peter, moſt of the laſting ſects which ſo mangle Chriſtianity, had their original, and continue to have their ſupport: and were it not for theſe eſtabliſhed ſects under the ſpecious names of national churches, which by their contracted and arbitrary limits of communion, juſtify againſt themſelves the ſeparation and like narrowneſs of others, the difference of opinions which do not ſo much begin to be, as to appear and be owned under Toleration, would either make no ſect nor diviſion; or elſe, if they were ſo extravagant as to be oppoſite to what is neceſſary to ſalvation, and ſo neceſſitate a ſeparation, the clear light of the Goſpel, joined with a ſtrict diſcipline of manners, would quickly chaſe them out of the world. But whilſt needleſs impoſitions, and moot points in divinity are eſtabliſhed by the penal laws of kingdoms, and the ſpecious pretences of authority, what hopes is there, that there ſhould be ſuch an union amongſt Chriſtians any where, as might invite a rational Turk or Infidel to embrace a religion, whereof he is told they have a revelation from God, which yet in ſome places he is not ſuffered to read, and in no place ſhall he be permitted to underſtand for himſelf, or to follow according to the beſt of his underſtanding, when it ſhall at all thwart, though in things confeſſed not neceſſary to ſalvation, any of thoſe ſelect points of doctrine, diſcipline, or outward worſhip, whereof the national church has been pleaſed to make up its articles, polity, and ceremonies? And I aſk, what a ſober ſenſible heathen muſt think of the diviſions amongſt Chriſtians not owing to Toleration, if he ſhould find in an iſland, where Chriſtianity ſeems to be in its greateſt purity, the ſouth and north parts eſtabliſhing churches upon the differences of only whether fewer or more, thus and thus choſen, ſhould govern; though the revelation they both pretend to be their rule, ſay nothing directly one way or the other: each contending with ſo much eagerneſs, that they deny each other to be churches of Chriſt, that is, in effect, to be true Chriſtians? To which if one ſhould add tranſubſtantiation, conſubſtantiation, real preſence, articles and diſtinctions ſet up by men without authority from Scripture, and other leſs differences, which good Chriſtians may diſſent about without indangering their ſalvation, eſtabliſhed by law in the ſeveral parts of Chriſtendom: I aſk, whether the magiſtrates interpoſing in matters of religion, and eſtabliſhing national churches by the force and penalties of civil laws, with their diſtinct, and at home reputed neceſſary, confeſſions and ceremonies, do not by law and power authorize and perpetuate ſects among Chriſtians, to the great prejudice of Chriſtianity, and ſcandal to Infidels, more than any thing that can ariſe from a mutual Toleration, with charity and a good life?

THOSE who have ſo much in their mouths, "the authors of ſects and di-"viſions," with ſo little advantage to their cauſe, I ſhall deſire to conſider, whether national churches eſtabliſhed as now they are, are not as much ſects and diviſions in Chriſtianity, as ſmaller collections, under the name of diſtinct churches, are in reſpect of the national? Only with this difference, that theſe ſubdiviſions and diſcountenanced ſects, wanting power to enforce their peculiar doctrines and diſcipline, uſually live more friendly like Chriſtians, and ſeem only to demand Chriſtian liberty; whereby there is leſs appearance of unchriſtian diviſion among them: whereas thoſe national ſects, being backed by the civil power, which they never fail to make uſe of, at leaſt as a pretence of authority over their brethren, uſually breathe out nothing but force and perſecution, to the great reproach, ſhame, and diſhonour of the Chriſtian religion.

L. II. p. 388. I SAID, "that if the magiſtrates would ſeverely and impartially ſet them-"ſelves againſt vice in whomſoever it is found, and leave men to their own "conſciences in their articles of faith, and ways of worſhip, true religion "would ſpread wider, and be more fruitful in the lives of its profeſſors, "than ever hitherto it has done by the impoſing of creeds and ceremonies." Here I call only immorality of manners, vice; you on the contrary, in your P. 13. anſwer, give the name of vice to errors in opinion, and difference in ways of worſhip from the national church: for this is the matter in queſtion between us, expreſs it as you pleaſe. This being a conteſt only about the ſignification of a ſhort ſyllable in the Engliſh tongue, we muſt leave to the maſters of that language to judge which of theſe two is the proper uſe of it. But yet, from my uſing the word vice, you conclude preſently, taking it in your ſenſe, not mine, that the magiſtrate has a power in England, for England we are ſpeaking of, to puniſh Diſſenters from the national religion, becauſe it is a vice. I will, if you pleaſe, in what I ſaid, change the word vice into that I meant by it, and ſay thus, if the magiſtrates will ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt the diſhoneſty and debauchery of mens lives, and ſuch immoralities as I contra-diſtinguiſh from errors in ſpeculative opinions of religion, and ways of worſhip: and then pray ſee how your anſwer will look, for thus it runs; "It ſeems then with you the reject-"ing the true religion, and refuſing to worſhip God in decent ways preſcribed "by thoſe to whom God has left the ordering of thoſe matters, are not com-"prehended in the name vice." But you tell me, "If I except theſe things, "and will not allow them to be called by the name of vice, perhaps other "men may think it as reaſonable to except ſome other things [i. e. from being "called vices] which they have a kindneſs for: for inſtance, ſome may perhaps "except arbitrary divorce, polygamy, concubinage, ſimple fornication, or mar-"rying within degrees thought forbidden." Let them except theſe, and if you will, drunkenneſs, theft, and murder too, from the name of vice; nay, call them virtues: will they, by their calling them ſo, be exempt from the magiſtrate's power of puniſhing them? Or can they claim an impunity by what I have ſaid? Will theſe immoralities by the names any one ſhall give, or forbear to give them, "become articles of faith, or ways of worſhip?" Which is all, as I expreſly ſay in the words you here cite of mine, that I would have the magiſtrates leave men to their own conſciences in. But, Sir, you have, for me, liberty of conſcience to uſe words in what ſenſe you pleaſe; only I think, where another is concerned, it ſavours more of ingenuity and love of truth, rather to mind the ſenſe of him that ſpeaks, than to make a duſt and noiſe with a miſtaken word, if any ſuch advantage were given you.

YOU ſay, "that ſome men would through careleſſneſs never acquaint them-" ſelves with the truth which muſt ſave them, without being forced to do it, "which (you ſuppoſe) may be very true, notwithſtanding that (as I ſay) ſome" are called at the third hour, ſome at the ninth, and ſome at the eleventh "hour; and whenever they are called, they embrace all the truths neceſſary" to ſalvation. At leaſt I do not ſhew why it may not: and therefore this "may be no ſlip for any thing I have ſaid to prove it to be one." This I take not to be an anſwer to my argument, which was, that ſince ſome are not called till the eleventh hour, no body can know who thoſe are, "who would never "acquaint themſelves with thoſe truths that muſt ſave them, without force," which is therefore neceſſary, and may indirectly and at a diſtance do them ſome ſervice. Whether that was my argument or no, I leave the reader to judge: but that you may not miſtake it now again, I tell you here it is ſo, and needs another anſwer.

YOUR way of uſing puniſhments in ſhort is this, that all that conform not to the national church, where it is true, as in England, ſhould be puniſhed; what for? "to make them conſider." This I told you had ſomething of impracticable. To which you reply, that you uſed the word only in another P. 24. ſenſe, which I miſtook: whether I miſtook your meaning in the uſe of that word or no, or whether it was natural ſo to take it, or whether that opinion which I charged on you by that miſtake, when you tell us, "that not P. 45. "examining, is indeed the next end for which they are puniſhed," be not your opinion, let us leave to the reader: for when you have that word in what ſenſe you pleaſe, what I ſaid will be nevertheleſs true, viz. "That to "puniſh Diſſenters, as Diſſenters, to make them conſider, has ſomething "impracticable in it, unleſs not to be of the national religion, and not to "conſider, be the ſame thing." Theſe words you anſwer nothing to, having as you thought a great advantage of talking about my miſtake of your word only. But unleſs you will ſuppoſe, not to be of the national church, and not to conſider, be the ſame thing, it will follow, that to puniſh Diſſenters, as Diſſenters, to make them conſider, has ſomething of impracticable in it.

THE law puniſhes all Diſſenters: for what? To make them all conform, that's evident; to what end? To make them all conſider, ſay you: that cannot be, for it ſays nothing of it; nor is it certain that all Diſſenters have not conſidered; nor is there any care taken by the law to enquire whether they have conſidered, when they do conform; yet this was the end intended by the magiſtrate. So then with you it is practicable and allowable in making laws, for the legiſlator to lay puniſhments by law on men, for an end which they may be ignorant of, for he ſays nothing of it;

on men, whom he never takes care to enquire, whether they have done it or no, before he relax the puniſhment, which had no other next end, but to make them do it. But though he ſays nothing of conſidering, in laying on the penalties, nor aſks any thing about it, when he takes them off; yet every body muſt underſtand that he ſo meant it. Sir, Sancho Pancha in the government of his iſland, did not expect that men ſhould underſtand his meaning by his gaping: but in another iſland it ſeems, if you had the management, you would not think it to have any thing of impracticable or impolitick in it: for how far the proviſion of means of inſtruction takes this off, we ſhall ſee in another place. And laſtly, to lay puniſhments on men for an end which is already attained, for ſome among the Diſſenters may have conſidered, is what other law-makers look on as impracticable, or at leaſt P. 24. unjuſt. But to this you anſwer, in your uſual way of circle. That “ if” I “ ſuppoſe you are for puniſhing Diſſenters whether they conſider or no,” I “ am “ in a great miſtake; for the Diſſenters (which is my word, not your's) whom” you “ are for puniſhing, are only ſuch as reject the true religion propoſed to “ them, with reaſons and arguments ſufficient to convince them of the truth “ of it, who therefore can never be ſuppoſed to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments as they ought, whilſt they perſiſt in rejecting that religion, or (in “ my language) continue Diſſenters; for if they did ſo conſider them, they “ would not continue Diſſenters.” Of the fault for which men were to be puniſhed, diſtinguiſhed from the end for which they were to be puniſhed, we heard nothing, as I remember, in the firſt draught of your ſcheme, which we had in “ the argument conſidered,” &c. But I doubt not but in ſome of your general terms you will be able to find it, or what elſe you pleaſe: for now having ſpoken out, that men, who are of a different religion from the true, which has been tendered them with ſufficient evidence, (and who are they whom the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things has not furniſhed with competent means of ſalvation) are criminal, and are by the magiſtrate to be puniſhed as ſuch, it is neceſſary your ſcheme ſhould be compleated; and whither that will carry you, it is eaſy to ſee.

BUT pray, Sir, are there no Conformiſts that ſo reject the true religion? and would you have them puniſhed too, as you here profeſs? Make that practicable by your ſcheme, and you have done ſomething to perſuade us that your end in earneſt, in the uſe of force, is to make men conſider, underſtand, and be of the true religion; and that the rejecting the true religion tendered with ſufficient evidence, is the crime which bonâ fide you would have puniſhed; and till you do this, all that you may ſay concerning puniſhing men “ to make them conſider as they ought, to make them receive the true “ religion, to make them embrace the truth that muſt ſave them,” &c. will, with all ſober, judicious, and unbiaſſed readers, paſs only for the mark of great zeal, if it ſcape amongſt men as warm and as ſagacious as you are, a harſher name: whilſt thoſe Conformiſts, who neglect matters of religion, who reject the ſaving truths of the Goſpel, as viſibly and as certainly as any Diſſenters, have yet no penalties laid upon them.

YOU talk much "of conſidering and not conſidering as one ought; of em"bracing and rejecting the true religion," and abundance more to this purpoſe; which all, however very good and ſavoury words, that look very well, when you come to the application of force, to procure that end expreſſed in them, amount to no more but Conformity and Non-conformity. If you ſee not this, I pity you; for I would fain think you a fair man, who means well, though you have not light upon the right way to the end you propoſe: but if you ſee it, and perſiſt in your uſe of theſe good expreſſions to lead men into a miſtake in this matter; conſider what my Pagans and Mahometans could do worſe to ſerve a bad cauſe.

WHATEVER you may imagine, I write ſo in this argument, as I have before my eyes the account I ſhall one day render for my intention and regard to truth in the management of it. I look on myſelf as liable to error as others; but this I am ſure of, I would neither impoſe on you, myſelf, nor any body; and ſhould be very glad to have the truth in this point clearly eſtabliſhed: and therefore it is, I deſire you again to examine, whether all the ends you name to be intended by your uſe of force, do in effect, when force is to be your way put in practice, reach any farther than bare outward Conformity? Pray conſider whether it be not that which makes you ſo ſhy of the term Diſſenters, which you tell me is mine not your word. Since none are by your ſcheme to be puniſhed, but thoſe who do not conform to the national religion. Diſſenters, I think, is the proper name to call them by; and I can ſee no reaſon you have to boggle at it, unleſs your opinion has ſomething in it you are unwilling ſhould be ſpoke out, and called by its right name: but whether you like it or no, perſecution, and perſecution of Diſſenters, are names that belong to it as it ſtands now.

AND now I think I may leave you your queſtion, wherein you aſk, "But "cannot Diſſenters be puniſhed for not being of the national religion, as the "fault, and yet only to make them conſider, as the end for which they are "puniſhed?" to be anſwered by yourſelf, or to be uſed again, where you think there is any need of ſo nice a diſtinction, as between the fault for which men are puniſhed by laws, and the end for which they are puniſhed. For to me I confeſs it is hard to find any other immediate end of puniſhment in the intention of human laws, but the amendment of the fault puniſhed; though it may be ſubordinate to other and remoter ends. If the law be only to puniſh Non-conformity, one may truly ſay, to cure that fault, or to produce conformity, is the end of that law; and there is nothing elſe immediately aimed at by that law, but conformity; and whatever elſe it tends to as an end, muſt be only as a conſequence of conformity, whether it be edification, increaſe of charity, or ſaving of ſouls, or whatever elſe may be thought a conſequence of conformity. So that in a law, which with penalties require conformity, and nothing elſe; one cannot ſay, properly I think, that conſideration is the end of that law, unleſs conſideration be a conſequence of conformity, to which conformity is ſubordinate, and does naturally conduce, or elſe is neceſſary to it. P. 24.

To

P. 21. To my arguing that it is unjuſt as well as impracticable, you reply, “Where the national church is the true church of God, to which all men ought to join themſelves, and ſufficient evidence is offered to convince men that it is ſo: there it is a fault to be out of the national church, becauſe it is a fault not to be convinced that the national church, is that true church of God. And therefore ſince there mens not being ſo convinced, can only be imputed to their not conſidering as they ought, the evidence which is offered to convince them; it cannot be unjuſt to puniſh them to make them ſo to conſider it.” Pray tell me, which is a man's duty, to be of the national church firſt; or to be convinced firſt, that its religion is true, and then to be of it? If it be his duty to be convinced firſt, why then do you puniſh him for not being of it, when it is his duty to be convinced of the truth of its religion, before it is his duty to be of it? If you ſay it is his duty to be of it firſt; why then is not force uſed to him afterwards, though he be ſtill ignorant and unconvinced? But you anſwer, “It is his fault not to be convinced.” What, every one's fault every where? No, you limit it to places where “ſufficient evidence is offered to convince men that the national church is the true church of God.” To which pray let me add, the national church is ſo the true church of God, that no body out of its communion can embrace the truth that muſt ſave him, or be in the way to ſalvation. For if a man may be in the way to ſalvation out of the national church, he is enough in the true church, and needs no force to bring him into any other: for when a man is in the way to ſalvation, there is no neceſſity of force to bring him into any church of any denomination, in order to his ſalvation. So that not to be of the national church, though true, will not be a fault which the magiſtrate has a right to puniſh, until ſufficient evidence is offered to prove that a man P. 51. cannot be ſaved out of it. Now ſince you tell us, that by ſufficient evidence you mean ſuch as will certainly win aſſent; when you have offered ſuch evidence to convince men that the national church, any where, is ſo the true church, that men cannot be ſaved out of its communion, I think I may allow them to be ſo faulty as to deſerve what puniſhment you ſhall think fit. If you hope to mend the matter by the following words, where you ſay, that where ſuch “evidence is offered, there mens not being convinced, can only P. 25. be imputed to mens not conſidering as they ought,” they will not help you. For, “to conſider as they ought,” being by your own interpretation, “to conſider ſo as not to reject;” then your anſwer amounts to juſt thus much, P. 40. “That it is a fault not to be convinced that the national church is the true church of God, where ſufficient evidence is offered to convince men that it is ſo. Sufficient evidence is ſuch as will certainly gain aſſent with thoſe who conſider as they ought, i. e. who conſider ſo as not to reject, or to be moved heartily to embrace,” which I think is to be convinced. Who can have the heart now to deny any of this? Can there be any thing ſurer, than that mens not being convinced, is to be imputed to them if they are not convinced, where ſuch evidence is offered to them as does convince them? And to puniſh all ſuch, you have my free conſent.

WHETHER all you ſay have any thing more in it than this, I appeal to my readers: and ſhould willingly do it to you, did not I fear, that the jumbling of thoſe good and plauſible words in your head, "of ſufficient evidence, conſider as one ought," &c. might a little jargogle your thoughts, and lead you hoodwinked the round of your own beaten circle. This is a danger thoſe are much expoſed to, who accuſtom themſelves to relative and doubtful terms, and ſo put together, that though aſunder they ſignify ſomething, yet when their meaning comes to be caſt up as they are placed, it amounts to juſt nothing.

YOU go on, "What juſtice it would be for the magiſtrate to puniſh one P. 25.
"for not being a Carteſian, it will be time enough to conſider when I have "proved it to be as neceſſary for men to be Carteſians, as it is to be Chriſtians, "or members of God's church." This will be a much better anſwer to what I ſaid, when you have proved that to be a Chriſtian or a member of God's church, it is neceſſary for a Diſſenter to be of the church of England. If it be not juſtice to puniſh a man for not being a Carteſian, becauſe it is not as neceſſary to be a Carteſian, as to be a Chriſtian; I fear the ſame argument will hold againſt puniſhing a man for not uſing the croſs in baptiſm, or not kneeling at the Lord's Supper; and it will lie on you to prove, that it is as neceſſary to uſe the croſs in baptiſm, or kneeling at the Lord's Supper, as it is to be a Chriſtian: for if they are not as neceſſary as it is to be a Chriſtian, you cannot by your own rule, without injuſtice, puniſh men for not conforming to a church wherein they are made an indiſpenſible part of conformity; and by this rule it will be injuſtice to puniſh any man for not being of that church wherein any thing is required not neceſſary to ſalvation; for that, I think is the neceſſity of being a Chriſtian.

TO ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of puniſhing Diſſenters to make them examine, I ſaid, "that ſo they were puniſhed for not having offended againſt a L. II. p. 405.
"law; for there is no law of the land that requires them to examine." Your reply is, That "you think the contrary is plain enough: for where the laws P. 45.
"provide ſufficient means of inſtruction in the true religion, and then require "all men to embrace that religion; you think the moſt natural conſtruction "of thoſe laws is, that they require men to embrace it upon inſtruction and "conviction, as it cannot be expected they ſhould do without examining the "grounds upon which it ſtands." Your anſwer were very true, if they could not embrace without examining and conviction. But ſince there is a ſhorter way to embracing, which coſt no more pains than walking as far as the church, your anſwer no more proves that the law requires examining, than if a man at Harwich being ſubpœnaed to appear in Weſtminſter-Hall next term, you ſhould ſay the ſubpœna required him to come by ſea, becauſe there was ſufficient means provided for his paſſage in the ordinary boat that by appointment goes conſtantly from Harwich to London: but he taking it to be more for his eaſe and diſpatch, goes the ſhorter way by land, and finds that having made his appearance in court as was required, the law is ſatisfied, and there is no enquiry made, what way he came thither.

If therefore men can embrace ſo as to ſatisfy the law without examining, A. p. 6. and it be true that they ſo “fly from the means of right information, are ſo “negligent in, and averſe to examining,” that there is need of penalties to make them do it, as you tell us at large; how is it a natural conſtruction of thoſe laws, that they require men to examine, which having provided ſufficient means of inſtruction, require men only to conform, without ſaying any thing of examining? eſpecially when the cauſe aſſigned by you of mens neglecting to examine, is not want of “means of inſtruction, but want of penalties to over-balance their averſion” to the uſing thoſe means; which you P. 43. yourſelf confeſs, where you ſay, “When the beſt proviſion is made that can be, “for the inſtruction of the people, you fear a great part of them will ſtill need L. II. p. 406. “penalties to bring them to hear and receive inſtruction:” and therefore perhaps the remainder of that paragraph, when you have conſidered it again, will not appear ſo impertinent a declamation as you are pleaſed to think it: for it charged your method, as it then ſtood, of puniſhing men for not conſidering and examining with theſe abſurdities. That it puniſhed men for not doing that which the law did not require of them, nor declare the neglect of to be a fault, contrary to the ends of all laws, contrary to the common ſenſe of mankind, and the practice of all law-makers, who always firſt declared the fault, and then denounced penalties againſt thoſe who after a time ſet, ſhould be found guilty of it. It charged your method, that it allows not impunity to the innocent, but puniſhes whole tribes together, the innocent with the guilty; and that the thing deſigned in the law was not mentioned in it, but left to the people, whoſe fault was want of conſideration, to be by conſideration found out.

To avoid theſe abſurdities, you have reformed your ſcheme, and now in your reply own with the frankeſt perſecutors, that you puniſh men downright for their religion, and that to be a Diſſenter from the true religion, is a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. This indeed is plain dealing, and clears your method from theſe abſurdities as long as you keep to it: but wherever you tell us, that your laws are to make men hear, to make men conſider, to make men examine; whilſt the laws themſelves ſay nothing of hearing, conſidering and examining; there you are ſtill chargeable with all theſe abſurdities: nor will the diſtinction, which without any difference you would ſet up, between the fault for which men are to be puniſhed, and the end for which they are to be puniſhed, do you any ſervice herein, as I have ſhewed you in another place.

To what I ſaid L. II. from p. 406, to p. 411, concerning thoſe who by your ſcheme are to be puniſhed, you having thought fit not to anſwer any thing, I ſhall here again offer it to your conſideration.

“Let us enquire, firſt, Who it is you would have be puniſhed. In the “place above cited, they are thoſe who are got into a wrong way, and are “deaf to all perſuaſions. If theſe are the men to be puniſhed, let a law be “made againſt them: you have my conſent; and that is the proper courſe “to have offenders puniſhed. For you do not, I hope, intend to puniſh “any fault by a law, which you do not name in the law; nor make a law “againſt any fault you would not have puniſhed. And now, if you are ſincere, and in earneſt, and are, as a fair man ſhould be, for what your words plainly ſignify, and nothing elſe; what will ſuch a law ſerve for? Men in the wrong way are to be puniſhed: but who are in the wrong way, is the queſtion. You have no more reaſon to determine it againſt one, who differs from you, than he has to conclude againſt you, who differ from him: no, not though you have the magiſtrate and the national church on your ſide. For if to differ from them be to be in the wrong way; you who are in the right way in England, will be in the wrong way in France. Every one here muſt be judge for himſelf: and your law will reach no body, till you have convinced him he is the wrong way: and then there will be no need of puniſhment to make him conſider; unleſs you will affirm again what you have denied, and have men puniſhed for embracing the religion they believe to be true, when it differs from yours or the publick.

“BESIDES being in the wrong way, thoſe who you would have puniſhed, muſt be ſuch as are deaf to all perſuaſions. But any ſuch, I ſuppoſe, you will hardly find, who hearken to no body, not to thoſe of their own way. If you mean by deaf to all perſuaſions, all perſuaſions of a contrary party, or of a different church; ſuch, I ſuppoſe, you may abundantly find in your own church, as well as elſewhere; and I preſume to them you are ſo charitable, that you would not have them puniſhed for not lending an ear to ſeducers. For conſtancy in the truth, and perſeverance in the faith, is, I hope, rather to be encouraged, than by any penalties checked in the orthodox. And your church doubtleſs, as well as all others, is orthodox to itſelf in all its tenets. If you mean by all perſuaſion, all your perſuaſion, or all perſuaſion of thoſe of your communion; you do but beg the queſtion, and ſuppoſe you have a right to puniſh thoſe who differ from, and will not comply with you.

“Your next words are,—When men fly from the means of a right information, and will not ſo much as conſider how reaſonable it is throughly and impartially to examine a religion, which they embraced upon ſuch inducements as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no examination of the proper grounds of it; what human method can be uſed to bring them to act like men, in an affair of ſuch conſequence, and to make a wiſer and more rational choice, but that of laying ſuch penalties upon them, as may ballance the weight of thoſe prejudices which inclined them to prefer a falſe way before the true, and recover them to ſo much ſobriety and reflection, as ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves, Whether it be really worth the while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies for adhering to a religion, which, for any thing they know, may be falſe, or for rejecting another (if that be the caſe) which, for any thing they know, may be true, till they have brought it to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there?—Here you again bring in ſuch as prefer a falſe way before a true: to which having anſwered already, I ſhall here ſay no more, but, that ſince our church will not allow thoſe to be in a falſe way who are out

“ of the church of Rome, becauſe the church of Rome, which pretends infallibility, declares hers to be the only true way; certainly no one of our church, nor any other, which claims not infallibility, can require any one to take the teſtimony of any church, as a ſufficient proof of the truth of her own doctrine. So that true and falſe, as it commonly happens, when we ſuppoſe them for ourſelves, or our party, in effect, ſignify juſt nothing, or nothing to the purpoſe; unleſs we can think that true or falſe in England, which will not be ſo at Rome or Geneva; and vice verſâ. As for the reſt of the deſcription of thoſe, on whom you are here laying penalties; I beſeech you conſider whether it will not belong to any of your church, let it be what it will. Conſider, I ſay, if there be none in your church who have embraced her religion upon ſuch inducements as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no examination of the proper grounds of it; who have not been inclined by the prejudices; who do not adhere to a religion which for any thing they know may be falſe; and who have rejected another, which for any thing they know may be true. If you have any ſuch in your communion, and it will be an admirable, though I fear but a little flock, that has none ſuch in it, conſider well what you have done. You have prepared rods for them, for which I imagine they will con you no thanks. For to make any tolerable ſenſe of what you here propoſe, it muſt be underſtood that you would have men of all religions puniſhed, to make them conſider whether it be really worth the while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies for adhering to a religion, which for any thing they know may be falſe. If you hope to avoid that, by what you have ſaid of true and falſe; and pretend that the ſuppoſed preference of the true way in your church, ought to preſerve its members from your puniſhment; you manifeſtly trifle. For every church's teſtimony, that it has choſen the true way, muſt be taken for itſelf; and then none will be liable; and your new invention of puniſhment is come to nothing: or elſe the differing churches teſtimonies muſt be taken one for another; and then they will be all out of the true way, and your church need penalties as well as the reſt. So that, upon your principles, they muſt all or none be puniſhed. Chuſe which you pleaſe; one of them, I think, you cannot eſcape.

“ WHAT you ſay in the next words; Where inſtruction if ſtifly refuſed, and all admonitions and perſuaſions prove vain and ineffectual; differs nothing but in the way of expreſſing, from deaf to all perſuaſions: and ſo that is anſwered already.

“ IN another place, you give us another deſcription of thoſe you think ought to be puniſhed, in theſe words; Thoſe who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the ſpiritual government of the proper miniſters of religion, who by ſpecial deſignation, are appointed to exhort, admoniſh, reprove, &c. Here then, thoſe to be puniſhed, are ſuch who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of the proper miniſters of religion. Whereby we are as much ſtill at uncertainty as we were before, who thoſe are who, by your ſcheme, and laws ſuitable to it, are to

“ be puniſhed; ſince every church has, as it thinks, its proper miniſters of
“ religion: and if you mean thoſe that refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and
“ ſubmit to the government of the miniſters of another church; then all men
“ will be guilty, and muſt be puniſhed, even thoſe of your own church as
“ well as others. If you mean thoſe who refuſe, &c. the miniſters of their
“ own church, very few will incur your penalties: but if by theſe proper miniſters
“ of religion, the miniſters of ſome particular church are intended, why
“ do you not name it? Why are you ſo reſerved in a matter, wherein, if you
“ ſpeak not out, all the reſt that you ſay will be to no purpoſe? Are men to
“ be puniſhed for refuſing to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government
“ of the proper miniſters of the church of Geneva? For this time,
“ ſince you have declared nothing to the contrary, let me ſuppoſe you of that
“ church; and then I am ſure, that is it that you would name: for of
“ whatever church you are, if you think the miniſters of any one church
“ ought to be hearkened to, and obeyed, it muſt be thoſe of your own own.
“ There are perſons to be puniſhed, you ſay: this you contend for all
“ through your book, and lay ſo much ſtreſs on it, that you make the preſervation
“ and propagation of religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, to depend
“ on it: and yet you deſcribe them by ſo general and equivocal marks,
“ that, unleſs it be upon ſuppoſitions which no body will grant you, I dare
“ ſay, neither you nor any body elſe will be able to find one guilty. Pray
“ find me, if you can, a man whom you can judicially prove, for he that is to
“ be puniſhed by law, muſt be fairly tried, is in a wrong way, in reſpect of
“ his faith; I mean, who is deaf to all perſuaſions, who flies from all means
“ of a right information, who refuſes to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit
“ to the government of the ſpiritual paſtors. And when you have done
“ that, I think I may allow you what power you pleaſe to puniſh him,
“ without any prejudice to the toleration the author of the letter propoſes.

“ BUT why, I pray, all this boggling, all this looſe talking, as if you
“ knew not what you meant, or durſt not ſpeak it out? Would you be for
“ puniſhing ſome body, you know not whom? I do not think ſo ill of you.
“ Let me then ſpeak out for you. The evidence of the argument has convinced
“ you that men ought not to be perſecuted for their religion; That
“ the ſeverities in uſe amongſt Chriſtians cannot be defended; That the magiſtrate
“ has not authority to compel any one to his religion. This you
“ are forced to yield. But you would fain retain ſome power in the magiſtrate's
“ hands to puniſh Diſſenters, upon a new pretence, viz. not for
“ having embraced the doctrine and worſhip they believe to be true and
“ right, but for not having well conſidered their own and the magiſtrate's
“ religion. To ſhew you that I do not ſpeak wholly without book, give
“ me leave to mind you of one paſſage of yours: the words are,—Penalties
“ to put them upon a ſerious and impartial examination of the controverſy between
“ the magiſtrates and them.—Though theſe words be not intended to
“ tell us who you would have puniſhed, yet it may be plainly inferred from
“ them. And they more clearly point out whom you aim at, than all the
“ foregoing places, where you ſeem to, and ſhould, deſcribe them. For

“ they are ſuch as between whom and the magiſtrate there is a controverſy; that is, in ſhort, who differ from the magiſtrate in religion. And now indeed you have given us a note by which theſe you would have puniſhed, may be known. We have, with much ado, found at laſt whom it is we may preſume you would have puniſhed. Which in other caſes is uſually not very difficult: becauſe there the faults to be amended, eaſily deſign the perſons to be corrected. But yours is a new method, and unlike all that ever went before it.

“ IN the next place, let us ſee for what you would have them puniſhed. You tell us, and it will eaſily be granted you, that not to examine and weigh impartially, and without prejudice or paſſion, all which, for ſhortneſs ſake, we will expreſs by this one word conſider, the religion one embraces or refuſes, is a fault very common, and very prejudicial to true religion, and the ſalvation of mens ſouls. But penalties and puniſhments are very neceſſary, ſay you, to remedy this evil.

“ LET us ſee now how you apply this remedy. Therefore, ſay you, let all Diſſenters be puniſhed. Why? Have no Diſſenters conſidered of religion? Or have all conformiſts conſidered? That you yourſelf will not ſay. Your project therefore is juſt as reaſonable, as if a lethargy growing epidemical in England, you ſhould propoſe to have a law made to bliſter and ſcarify, and ſhave the heads of all who wear gowns; though it be certain that neither all who wear gowns are lethargick, nor all who are lethargick wear gowns.

——“ Dii te, Damaſippe, Deaeque
“ Verum ob conſilium donent tonſore.

“ For there could not be certainly a more learned advice, than that one man ſhould be pulled by the ears, becauſe another is aſleep. This, when you have conſidered of it again, for I find, according to your principle, all men have now and then need to be jogged, you will, I gueſs, be convinced is not like a fair phyſician, to apply a remedy to a diſeaſe; but, like an enraged enemy, to vent one's ſpleen upon a party. Common ſenſe, as well as common juſtice, requires, that the remedies of laws and penalties ſhould be directed againſt the evil that is to be removed, wherever it be found. And if the puniſhment you think ſo neceſſary, be, as you pretend, to cure the miſchief you complain of, you muſt let it purſue, and fall on the guilty, and thoſe only, in what company ſoever they are; and not, as you here propoſe, and is the higheſt injuſtice, puniſh the innocent conſidering Diſſenter, with the guilty; and on the other ſide, let the inconſiderate guilty Conformiſt ſcape, with the innocent. For one may rationally preſume that the national church has ſome, nay, more, in proportion of thoſe who little conſider or concern themſelves about religion, than any congregation of Diſſenters. For conſcience, or the care of their ſouls, being once laid aſide; intereſt, of courſe, leads men into that ſociety, where the protection and countenance of the government, and hopes of preferment, bid faireſt to all their remaining deſires. So that if “careleſs, negligent, inconſiderate men in matters of religion, who, without being forced, would not conſider, are to be rouzed into a care of their ſouls, and a ſearch after truth, by puniſhments; the national religion, in all countries, will certainly have a right to the greateſt ſhare of thoſe puniſhments, at leaſt, not to be wholly exempt from them.

“THIS is that which the author of the letter, as I remember, complains of, and that juſtly, viz. That the pretended care of mens ſouls always expreſſes itſelf, in thoſe who would have force any way made uſe of to that end, in very unequal methods; ſome perſons being to be treated with ſeverity, whilſt others guilty of the ſame faults, are not to be ſo much as touched. Though you are got pretty well out of the deep mud, and renounce puniſhments directly for religion; yet you ſtick ſtill in this part of the mire; whilſt you would have Diſſenters puniſhed to make them conſider, but would not have any thing done to Conformiſts, though ever ſo negligent in this point of conſidering. The author's letter pleaſed me, becauſe it is equal to all mankind, is direct, and will, I think, hold every-where; which I take to be a good mark of truth. For I ſhall always ſuſpect that neither to comport with the truth of religion, or the deſign of the Goſpel, which is ſuited to only ſome one country or party. What is true and good in England, will be true and good at Rome too, in China or Geneva. But whether your great and only method for the propagating of truth, by bringing the inconſiderate by puniſhments to conſider, would, according to your way of applying your puniſhments only to Diſſenters from the national religion, be of uſe in thoſe countries, or any where but where you ſuppoſe the magiſtrate to be in the right; judge you. Pray, Sir, conſider a little, whether prejudice has not ſome ſhare in your way of arguing. For this is your poſition; Men are generally negligent in examining the grounds of their religion. This I grant. But could there be a more wild and incoherent conſequence drawn from it, than this; therefore Diſſenters muſt be puniſhed?”—

ALL this you are pleaſed to paſs over without the leaſt notice: but perhaps
you think you have made me full ſatisfaction in your anſwer to my demand,
who are to be puniſhed? We will here therefore conſider that as it ſtands, where
you tell us, “Thoſe who are to be puniſhed according to the whole tenour of P. 48.
your anſwer, are no other but ſuch, as having ſufficient evidence tendered
them of the true religion, do yet reject it: whether utterly refuſing to conſider
that evidence, or not conſidering as they ought, viz. with ſuch care
and diligence as the matter deſerves and requires, and with honeſt and unbiaſſed
minds; and what difficulty there is in this, you ſay, you cannot imagine.”
You promiſed you would tell the world who they were, plainly and
directly. And though you tell us, you cannot imagine what difficulty there P. 46.
is in this your account of who are to be puniſhed, yet there are ſome things in
it, that make it to my apprehenſion not very plain and direct. For firſt they
muſt be only thoſe who have the true religion tendered them with ſufficient
evidence: wherein there appears ſome difficulty to me, who ſhall be judge
what is the true religion: and for that, in every country it is moſt probable

the magiſtrate will be. If you think of any other, pray tell us. Next there ſeems ſome difficulty to know, who ſhall be judge what is ſufficient evidence. For where a man is to be puniſhed by law, he muſt be convicted of being guilty; which ſince in this caſe he cannot be, unleſs it be proved he has had the true religion tendered to him with ſufficient evidence, it is neceſſary that ſome body there muſt be judge what is the true religion, and what is ſufficient evidence; and others to prove it has been ſo tendered. If you were to be of the jury, we know what would be your verdict concerning ſufficient evidence, P. 51. by theſe words of yours, "To ſay that a man who has the true religion propoſed to him with ſufficient evidence of its truth, may conſider it as he ought, or do his utmoſt in conſidering, and yet not perceive the truth of it, is neither more nor leſs, than to ſay that ſufficient evidence is not ſufficient: for what does any man mean by ſufficient evidence, but ſuch as will certainly win aſſent wherever it is duly conſidered?" Upon which his conforming, or not conforming, would without any farther queſtions determine the point. But whether the reſt of the jury could upon this be able ever to bring in any man guilty, and ſo liable to puniſhment, is a queſtion. For if ſufficient evidence be only that which certainly wins aſſent, wherever a man does his utmoſt in conſidering; it will be very hard to prove that a man who rejects the true religion has had it tendered with ſufficient evidence, becauſe it will be very hard to prove he has not done his utmoſt in conſidering it. So that notwithſtanding all you have here ſaid, to puniſh any man by your method is not yet ſo very practicable.

BUT you clear all in your following words, which ſay, "there is nothing more evident than that thoſe who reject the true religion, are culpable, and deſerve to be puniſhed." By whom? By men: that is ſo far from being evident, as you talk, that it will require better proofs than I have yet ſeen for it. Next you ſay, "It is eaſy enough to know when men reject the true religion." Yes, when the true religion is known, and agreed on what ſhall be taken to be ſo in judicial proceedings, which can ſcarce be till it is agreed who ſhall determine what is true religion, and what not. Suppoſe a penalty ſhould in the univerſity be laid on thoſe who rejected the true peripatetick doctrine, could that law be executed on any one, unleſs it were agreed who ſhould be judge what was the true peripatetick doctrine? If you ſay it may be known out of Ariſtotle's writings: then I anſwer, that it would be a more reaſonable law to lay the penalty on any one, who rejected the doctrine contained in the books allowed to be Ariſtotle's, and printed under his name. You may apply this to the true religion, and the books of the Scripture, if you pleaſe: though after all, there muſt be a judge agreed on, to determine what doctrines are contained in either of thoſe writings, before the law can be practicable.

P. 48. BUT you go on to prove, that "it is eaſy to know when men reject the true religion: for, ſay you, that requires no more than that we know that that religion was tendered to them with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it. And that it may be tendered to men with ſuch evidence, and that it may be known when it is ſo tendered, theſe things, you ſay, you take leave here

" to ſuppoſe." You ſuppoſe then more than can be allowed you. For that it can be judicially known that the true religion has been tendered to any one with ſufficient evidence, is what I deny, and that for reaſons abovementioned, which, were there no other difficulty in it, were ſufficient to ſhew the unpracticableneſs of your method.

You conclude this paragraph thus, " which is all that needs be ſaid upon " this head to ſhew the conſiſtency and practicableneſs of this method: and " what do you any where ſay againſt this?" Whether I ſay any thing or no againſt it, I will bring a friend of yours that will ſay that Diſſenters ought to be puniſhed for being out of the communion of the church of England. I will aſk you now, how it can be proved that ſuch an one is guilty of rejecting the one only true religion? Perhaps it is becauſe he ſcruples the croſs in baptiſm, or godfathers and godmothers as they are uſed, or kneeling at the Lord's Supper; perhaps it is becauſe he cannot pronounce all damned that believe not all Athanaſius's Creed; or cannot join with ſome of thoſe repetitions in our Common-Prayer; thinking them to come within the prohibition of our Saviour; each of which ſhuts a man out from the communion of the church of England, as much as if he denied Jeſus Chriſt to be the Son of God. Now, Sir, I beſeech you, how can it be known, that ever ſufficient evidence was tendered to ſuch a Diſſenter to prove, that what he rejects is a part of that one only true religion, which unleſs he be of, he cannot be ſaved? Or indeed how can it be known, that any Diſſenter rejects that one only true religion, when being puniſhed barely for not conforming, he is never aſked, what part it is he diſſents from or rejects? And ſo it may be ſome of thoſe things which I imagine will always want ſufficient evidence to prove them to be parts of that only one true religion, without the hearty embracing whereof no man can be ſaved.

## CHAP. IV.

## What degrees of puniſhment.

HOW much ſoever you have endeavoured to reform the doctrine of perſecution to make it ſerve your turn, and give it the colour of care and zeal for the true religion in the country where alone you are concerned it ſhould be made uſe of; yet you have laboured in vain, and done no more, but given the old engine a new varniſh to ſet it off the better, and make it look leſs frightful: for by what has been ſaid in the foregoing chapters, I think it will appear, that if any magiſtrate have power to puniſh men in matters of religion, all have; and that Diſſenters from the national religion muſt be puniſhed every where or no where. The horrid cruelties that in all ages, and of late in our view, have been committed under the name, and upon the account of religion, give ſo juſt an offence and abhorrence to all who have any remains, not only of religion, but humanity left, that the world is aſhamed to own it. This objection therefore, as much as words or profeſſions can do, you have laboured to fence againſt; and to exempt your deſign from the ſuſpicion of any ſeverities, you take care in every page almoſt to let us hear of moderate force, moderate penalties; but all in vain: and I doubt not but when this part too is examined, it will appear, that as you neither have, nor can limit the power of puniſhing to any diſtinct ſort of magiſtrates, nor exempt from puniſhment the Diſſenters from any national religion: ſo neither have, nor can you, limit the puniſhment to any degree ſhort of the higheſt, if you will uſe puniſhments at all in matters of religion. What you have done in this point beſides giving us good words, I will now examine.

You tell me, "I have taken a liberty which will need pardon," becauſe I ſay, "You have plainly yielded the queſtion by owning thoſe greater ſeverities "to be improper and unfit." But if I ſhall make it out, that thoſe are as proper and fit as your moderate penalties; and that if you will uſe one, you muſt come to the other, as will appear from what you yourſelf ſay; whatever you may think, I ſhall not imagine other readers will conclude I have taken too great liberty, or ſhall much need pardon. For if as you ſay in the next page, "authority may reaſonably and juſtly uſe ſome degrees of force "where it is needful;" I ſay they may alſo uſe any degree of force where it is needful. Now upon your grounds, fire and ſword, tormenting and undoing, and thoſe other puniſhments which you condemn, will be needful, even to torments of the higheſt ſeverity, and be as neceſſary as thoſe moderate penalties which you will not name. For I aſk you, to what purpoſe do you uſe any degrees of force? Is it to prevail with men to do ſomething that is in their power, or that is not? The latter I ſuppoſe you will not ſay, till your love of force is ſo increaſed, that you ſhall think it neceſſary to be made uſe of to produce impoſſibilities: if force then be to be uſed only to bring men to do what is in their power, what is the neceſſity you aſſign of it? only this, as I remember, viz. That "when gentle admonitions and earneſt "intreaties will not prevail, what other means is there left but force?" And I upon the ſame ground reply; If leſſer degrees of force will not prevail, what other means is there left but greater? If the loweſt degree of force be neceſſary where gentler means will not prevail, becauſe there is no other means left; higher degrees of force are neceſſary, where lower will not prevail, for the ſame reaſon. Unleſs you will ſay all degrees of force work alike; and that lower penalties prevail as much on men as greater, and will equally bring them to do what is in their power. If ſo, a phlip on the forehead, or a farthing mulct, may be penalty enough to bring men to what you propoſe. But if you ſhall laugh at theſe, as being for their ſmallneſs inſufficient, and therefore will think it neceſſary to increaſe them, I ſay, wherever experience ſhews any degree of force to be inſufficient to prevail, there will be ſtill the ſame neceſſity to increaſe it. For wherever the end is neceſſary, and force is the means, the only means left to procure it, both which you ſuppoſe in our caſe, there it will be found always neceſſary to increaſe the degrees of force, where the lower prove ineffectual, as well till you come to the higheſt as when you begin with the loweſt. So that in your preſent caſe I do not wonder you uſe ſo many ſhifts, as I ſhall ſhew by and by you do, to decline naming the higheſt degree of what you call moderate. If any degree be neceſſary, you cannot aſſign any one, condemn it in words as much as you pleaſe, which may not be ſo, and which you muſt not come to the uſe of. If there be no ſuch neceſſity of force as will juſtify thoſe higher degrees of it, which are ſeverities you condemn, neither will it juſtify the uſe of your lower degrees.

IF, as you tell us, "falſe religions prevail againſt the true, merely by the "advantage they have in the corruption and pravity of human nature left to "itſelf unbridled by authority;" if the not receiving the true religion be a mark and effect merely of the prevalency of the corruption of human nature; may not, nay, muſt not the magiſtrate, if leſs will not do, uſe his utmoſt force to bring men to the true religion? his force being given him to ſuppreſs that corruption; eſpecially ſince you give it for a meaſure of the force to be uſed, that it muſt be "ſo much, as without which ordinarily they will not embrace the "truth that muſt ſave them." What ordinarily ſignifies here to make any determinate meaſure, is hard to gueſs; but ſignify it what it will, ſo much force muſt be uſed, as "without which men will not embrace the truth;" which, if it ſignify any thing intelligible, requires, that where lower degrees will not do, greater muſt be uſed, till you come to what will ordinarily do; but what that ordinarily is, no man can tell. If one man will not be wrought on by as little force as another, muſt not greater degrees of force be uſed to him? Shall the magiſtrate who is obliged to do what lies in him, be excuſed, for letting him be damned, without the uſe of all the means was in his power? And it will be ſufficient for him to plead, that though he did not all what lay in him, yet he did what ordinarily prevailed, or what prevailed on ſeveral others. Force, if that be the remedy, muſt be proportioned to the oppoſition. If the doſe that has frequently wrought on others, will not purge a man whoſe life lies on it, muſt it not therefore be made ſufficient and effectual, becauſe it will be more than what is called ordinary? Or can any one ſay the phyſician has done his duty, who lets his patient in an extraordinary caſe periſh in the uſe of only moderate remedies, and pronounces him incurable, before he has tried the utmoſt he can with the powerfuleſt remedies which are in his reach? P. 7.

HAVING renounced loſs of eſtate, corporal puniſhments, impriſonment, and ſuch ſort of ſeverities, as unfit to be uſed in matters of religion; you aſk, "Will it follow from hence that the magiſtrate has no right to uſe any force "at all?" Yes, it will follow, till you give ſome anſwer to what I ſay in that place, viz. That if you give up puniſhments of a man in his perſon, li-"berty and eſtate, I think we need not ſtand with you for any puniſhments "may be made uſe of." But this you paſs by without any notice. I doubt not but you will here think you have a ready anſwer, by telling me, you mean only "depriving men of their eſtates, maiming them with corporal puniſh-"ments, ſtarving and tormenting them in noiſome priſons," and other ſuch ſeverities which you have by name excepted; but lower penalties may yet be P. 19.

P. 21. uſed, for penalties is the word you carefully uſe, and diſclaim that of puniſhment, as if you diſowned the thing. I wiſh you would tell us too by name what thoſe lower penalties are you would have uſed, as well as by name you tell us thoſe ſeverities you diſallow. They may not maim a man with corporal puniſhments; may they uſe any corporal puniſhments at all? They may not ſtarve and torment them in noiſome priſons for religion; that you condemn as much as I. May they put them in any priſon at all? They may not deprive men of their eſtates: I ſuppoſe you mean their whole eſtates: May they take away half, or a quarter, or an hundredth part? It is ſtrange you ſhould be able to name the degrees of ſeverity that will hinder more than promote the progreſs of religion, and cannot name thoſe degrees that will promote rather than hinder it; that thoſe who would take their meaſures by you, and follow your ſcheme, might know how to proceed ſo, as not to do more harm than good: for ſince you are ſo certain, that there are degrees of puniſhments or penalties that will do good, and other degrees of them that will do harm; ought you not to have told us, what that true degree is, or how it may be known, without which all your goodly ſcheme is of no uſe? For allowing all you have ſaid, to be as true as you would have it, no good can be done without ſhewing the juſt meaſure of puniſhment to be uſed.

IF the degree be too great, it will, you confeſs, do harm: can one then not err on the other hand, by uſing too little? If you ſay ſo, we are agreed, and I deſire no better Toleration. If therefore too great will do harm, and too little, in your opinion, will do no good, you ought to tell us the juſt mean. This I preſſed upon you; whereof that the reader may be judge, I ſhall here trouble him with the repetition.

L. II. p. 412. “ THERE is a third thing, that you are as tender and reſerved in, as either
“ naming the criminals to be puniſhed, or poſitively telling us the end for
“ which they ſhould be puniſhed; and that is, with what ſort of penalties,
“ what degree of puniſhment, they ſhould be forced. You are indeed ſo
“ gracious to them, that you renounce the ſeverities and penalties hitherto
A. p. 24. “ made uſe of. You tell us, they ſhould be but moderate penalties. But if
“ we aſk you what are moderate penalties, you confeſs you cannot tell us:
A. p. 15. “ ſo that by moderate here, you yet mean nothing. You tell us, the out-
“ ward force to be applied, ſhould be duly tempered. But what that due
“ temper is, you do not, or cannot ſay; and ſo, in effect, it ſignifies juſt
“ nothing. Yet if in this you are not plain and direct, all the reſt of your
“ deſign will ſignify nothing. For it being to have ſome men, and to ſome
“ end, puniſhed; yet if it cannot be found what puniſhment is to be uſed,
A. p. 12. “ it is notwithſtanding all you have ſaid, utterly uſeleſs. You tell us modeſtly,
“ That to determine preciſely the juſt meaſure of the puniſhment, will require
“ ſome conſideration. If the faults were preciſely determined, and could be
“ proved, it would require no more conſideration to determine the meaſure
“ of the puniſhment in this, than it would in any other caſe, where thoſe
“ were known. But where the fault is undefined, and the guilt not to be
“ proved, as I ſuppoſe it will be found in this preſent buſineſs of examining,
“ it will without doubt require conſideration to proportion the force to the

" deſign: juſt ſo much conſideration as it will require to fit a coat to the " moon, or proportion a ſhoe to the feet of thoſe who inhabit her. For to " proportion a puniſhment to a fault that you do not name, and ſo we in " charity ought to think you do not yet know, and a fault that when you " have named it, it will be impoſſible to be proved who are or are not guilty " of it, will, I ſuppoſe, require as much conſideration as to fit a ſhoe to feet " whoſe ſize and ſhape are not known.

" HOWEVER, you offer ſome meaſures whereby to regulate your puniſh- " ments; which when they are looked into, will be found to be juſt as " good as none, they being impoſſible to be any rule in the caſe. The firſt is, A. p. 14. " So much force, or ſuch penalties as are ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with " men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, to " weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially, and without which ordi- " narily they will not do this. Where it is to be obſerved:

" FIRST, That who are theſe men of common diſcretion, is as hard to know, " as to know what is a fit degree of puniſhment in the caſe; and ſo you do " but regulate one uncertainty by another. Some men will be apt to think, " that he who will not weigh matters of religion, which are of infinite con- " cernment to him, without puniſhment, cannot in reaſon be thought a " man of common diſcretion. Many women of common diſcretion enough to " manage the ordinary affairs of their families, are not able to read a page " in an ordinary author, or to underſtand and give an account what it means, " when read to them. Many men of common diſcretion in their callings, are " not able to judge when an argument is concluſive or no; much leſs " to trace it through a long train of conſequences. What penalties ſhall be " ſufficient to prevail with ſuch, who upon examination, I fear, will not be " found to make the leaſt part of mankind, to examine and weigh matters of " religion carefully and impartially? The law allows all to have common diſ- " cretion, for whom it has not provided guardians or Bedlam. So that, in " effect, your men of common diſcretion, are all men, not judged idiots or " madmen: and penalties ſufficient to prevail with men of common diſcretion, " are penalties ſufficient to prevail with all men but idiots and madmen, " which what a meaſure it is to regulate penalties by, let all men of com- " mon diſcretion judge.

" SECONDLY, You may be pleaſed to conſider, that all men of the ſame " degree of diſcretion, are not apt to be moved by the ſame degree of pe- " nalties. Some are of a more yielding, ſome of a more ſtiff temper; " and what is ſufficient to prevail on one, is not half enough to move the " other; though both men of common diſcretion. So that common diſcretion " will be here of no uſe to determine the meaſure of puniſhment: eſpecially, " when in the ſame clauſe you except men deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; " who are as hard to be known, as what you ſeek, viz. the juſt proportions " of puniſhments neceſſary to prevail with men to conſider, examine, and " weigh matters of religion: wherein, if a man tells you he has conſidered, " he has weighed, he has examined, and ſo goes on in his former courſe, it " is impoſſible for you ever to know whether he has done his duty, or whe-

“ther he be deſperately perverſe and obſtinate. So that this exception ſignifies juſt nothing.

“THERE are many things in your uſe of force and penalties, different from any I ever met with elſewhere. One of them, this clauſe of yours concerning the meaſure of puniſhments, now under conſideration, offers me: wherein you propotion your puniſhments only to the yielding and corrigible, not to the perverſe and obſtinate; contrary to the common diſcretion which has hitherto made laws in other caſes, which levels the puniſhments againſt refractory offenders, and never ſpares them becauſe they are obſtinate. This however I will not blame as an overſight in you. Your new method, which aims at ſuch impracticable and inconſiſtent things as laws cannot bear, nor penalties be uſeful to, forced you to it. The uſeleſſneſs, abſurdity, and unreaſonableneſs of great ſeverities, you had acknowledged in the foregoing paragraphs: Diſſenters you would have brought to conſider by moderate penalties. They lie under them; but whether they have conſidered or no, for that you cannot tell, A. p. 12. they ſtill continue Diſſenters. What is to be done now? Why, the incurable are to be left to God, as you tell us. Your puniſhments were not meant to prevail on the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, as you tell us here. And ſo whatever be the ſucceſs, your puniſhments are however juſtified.”

THE fulneſs of your anſwer to my queſtion, “With what puniſhments?” made you poſſibly paſs by theſe two or three pages without making any particular reply to any thing I ſaid in them: we will therefore examine that P. 49. anſwer of yours, where you tell us, “That having in your anſwer declared that you take the ſeverities ſo often mentioned (which either deſtroy men, or make them miſerable) to be utterly unapt and improper (for reaſons there given) to bring men to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them: but juſt how far within thoſe bounds that force extends itſelf, which is really ſerviceable to that end, you do not preſume to determine.” To determine how far moderate force reaches, when it is neceſſary to your buſineſs that it ſhould be determined, is not preſuming: you might with more reaſon have called it preſuming, to talk of moderate penalties, and not to be able to determine what you mean by them; or to promiſe, as you do, that you will tell plainly and directly, with what puniſhments; and here to tell us, you do not preſume to determine. But you give a reaſon for this modeſty of yours, in what follows, where you tell me, I have not ſhewn any cauſe why you ſhould. And yet you may find in what is above repeated to you, theſe words, “If in this you are not plain and direct, all the reſt of your deſign will ſignify nothing.” But had I failed in ſhewing any cauſe why you ſhould; and your charity would not inlighten us, unleſs driven by my reaſons, I dare ſay yet, if I have not ſhewn any cauſe why you ſhould determine in this point, I can ſhew a cauſe why you ſhould not. For I will be anſwerable to you, that you cannot name any degree of puniſhment, which will not be either ſo great, as to come among thoſe you condemn, and ſhew what your moderation, what your averſion to perſecution is; or elſe too little to attain thoſe ends for which you propoſe it. But whatever you tell me, that I have ſhewn no cauſe why you ſhould determine, I thought it might have paſſed for a cauſe why you ſhould determine more particularly, that, as you will find in thoſe pages, I had proved that the meaſures, you offer whereby to regulate your puniſhments, are juſt as good as none.

YOUR meaſures in your "argument conſidered," and which you repeat here again, are in theſe words; "ſo much force, or ſuch penalties as are ordinarily P. 49. "ſufficient to prevail with men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately "perverſe, to weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially, and without "which ordinarily they will not do this; ſo much force, or ſuch penalties may "fitly and reaſonably be uſed for the promoting true religion in the world, "and the ſalvation of ſouls. And what juſt exception this is liable to, you "do not underſtand." Some of the exceptions it is liable to, you might have ſeen in what I have here again cauſed to be reprinted, if you had thought them worth your notice. But you go on to tell us here, "that when you ſpeak of P. 49. "men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you "think it is plain enough, that by common diſcretion you exclude not idiots only, "and ſuch as we uſually call madmen, but likewiſe the deſperately perverſe "and obſtinate, who perhaps may well enough deſerve that name, though they "be not wont to be ſent to Bedlam."

WHETHER by this you have at all taken off the difficulty, and ſhewn your meaſure to be any at all in the uſe of force, I leave the Reader to judge. I aſked, ſince great ones are unfit, what degrees of puniſhment or force are to be uſed? You anſwer, "So much force, and ſuch penalties as are ordinarily "ſufficient to prevail with men of ordinary diſcretion." I tell you it is as hard to know who thoſe men of common diſcretion are, as what degree of puniſhment you would have uſed; unleſs we will take the "determination of the "law, which allows all to have common diſcretion, for whom it has not "provided guardians or Bedlam:" ſo that in effect, your men of common diſcretion are all men not judged idiots or madmen. To clear this, you tell us, "when you ſpeak of men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately "perverſe and obſtinate, you think it is plain enough, by common diſcretion "you exclude not idiots only, and ſuch as are uſually called madmen, but like"wiſe the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate." It may be you did, for you beſt know what you meant in writing: but if by men of common diſcretion, you excluded the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, let us put what you meant by the words, men of common diſcretion, in the place of thoſe words themſelves, and then according to your meaning, your rule ſtands thus; penalties ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with men not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, and with men not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate: ſo that at laſt, by men of common diſcretion, either you excluded only idiots and madmen; or if we muſt take your word for it, that by them you excluded likewiſe the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, and ſo meant ſomething elſe; it is plain, you meant only a very uſeleſs and inſignificant tautology.

YOU go on, and tell us, "If the penalties you ſpeak of, be intended for the P. 49. "curing mens unreaſonable prejudices and refractorineſs againſt the true religion,

“ gion, then the reaſon why the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate are not to “ be regarded in meaſuring theſe penalties, is very apparent. For as remedies “ are not provided for the incurable, ſo in the preparing and tempering them, “ regard is to be had only to thoſe for whom they are deſigned.” Which, true or falſe, is nothing to the purpoſe, in a place where you profeſs to inform us, what puniſhments are to be uſed. We are enquiring who are the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, and not whether they are to be puniſhed or no. You pretend to give us a rule to know what degrees of force are to be uſed, and tell us, “ it is ſo much as is ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with men of “ common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate.” We again aſk, who are your men of common diſcretion? You tell us, “ ſuch as are not “ madmen or idiots, or deſperately perverſe and obſtinate.” Very well, but who are thoſe deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, how ſhall we know them? and to this you tell us, “ they are not to be regarded in meaſuring theſe penal-“ ties.” Whereby certainly we have got a plain meaſure of your moderate penalties. P. 50. No, not yet, you go on in the next paragraph to perfect it, where you ſay, “ To prevent a little cavil, it may be needful to note that there are de-“ grees of perverſeneſs and obſtinacy, and that men may be perverſe and ob-“ ſtinate without being deſperately ſo.” So then now we have your meaſure compleat; and to determine the juſt degrees of puniſhments, and to clear up the doubt, who are the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, we need but be told that “ there are degrees of perverſeneſs and obſtinacy;” and that men may be perverſe and obſtinate without being deſperately ſo: and that therefore “ ſome perverſe and obſtinate perſons may be thought curable, though ſuch as “ are deſperately ſo, cannot.” But does all this tell us who are the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate? which is the thing we want to be informed in; nor till you have told us that, have you removed the objection.

BUT if by deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you will tell us, you meant thoſe, that are not wrought upon by your moderate penalties, as you ſeem to intimate in your reaſon why the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate are not P. 49. to be regarded in meaſuring theſe penalties: “ for, ſay you, as remedies are “ not provided for the incurable; ſo in preparing and tempering them, regard “ is to be had only to thoſe for whom they are deſigned.” So that by the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you will perhaps ſay it was plain you meant the incurable; for you ordinarily ſhift off the doubtfulneſs of one place, by appealing to as doubtful an expreſſion in another. If you ſay then, that by deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you mean incurable; I aſk you again by what incurable? by your lower degrees of force? For I hope where force is proper to work, thoſe who are not wrought on by lower degrees, may yet be by higher. If you mean ſo, then your anſwer will amount to thus much, moderate penalties are ſuch as are ſufficient to prevail on thoſe who are not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate. The deſperately perverſe and obſtinate are thoſe who are incurable, and the incurable are thoſe on whom moderate penalties are not ſufficient to prevail: whereby at laſt we have got a ſure meaſure of what are moderate penalties; juſt ſuch an one, as if having a ſovereign univerſal medicine put into your hand, which will never fail if you can hit the right doſe, which the inventor tells you muſt be moderate: you ſhould aſk him what was the moderate quantity it is to be given in; and he ſhould anſwer, in ſuch a quantity as was ordinarily ſufficient to work on common conſtitutions, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate. And to your aſking again, who were of deſperately perverſe and obſtinate conſtitutions? It ſhould be anſwered, thoſe that were incurable. And who were incurable? Thoſe whom a moderate quantity would not work on. And thus to your ſatisfaction, you know the moderate doſe by the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; and the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate by being incurable; and the incurable by the moderate doſe. For if, as you ſay, remedies are not provided for the incurable, and none but moderate penalties are to be provided, is it not plain, that you mean, that all that will not be wrought on by your moderate penalties, are in your ſenſe incurable?

To eaſe you, Sir, of juſtifying yourſelf, and ſhewing that I have miſtaken you, do but tell us poſitively what in penalties is the higheſt degree of moderate; who are deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; or who are incurable, without this relative and circular way of defining one by the other; and I will yield myſelf to have miſtaken you, as much as you pleaſe.

If by incurable you mean ſuch as no penalties, no puniſhments, no force is ſufficient to work on; then your meaſure of moderate penalties will be this, that they are ſuch, as are ſufficient to prevail with men not incurable, i. e. who cannot be prevailed on by any puniſhments, any force whatſoever; which will be a meaſure of moderate puniſhments, which, whatſoever you do, ſome will be very apt to approve of.

But let us ſuppoſe by theſe marks, ſince you will afford us no better, that we can find who are deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, we are yet as far as ever from finding the meaſures of your moderate puniſhments, till it can be known, what degree of force it is, that is ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with all that are men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; for you are told, that all men of the ſame degree of diſcretion are not apt to be moved with the ſame degree of penalties: but to this too you anſwer nothing, and ſo we are ſtill without any rule or means of knowing how to adjuſt your puniſhments, that being ordinarily ſufficient to prevail upon one, the double whereof is not ordinarily ſufficient to prevail on another.

I tell you in the ſame place, "that you have given us in another place, L. II. p. 414.
"ſomething like another boundary to your moderate penalties: but when
"examined, it proves juſt like the reſt, amuſing us only with good words,
"ſo put together as to have no direct meaning; an art very much in uſe
"amongſt ſome ſort of learned men: the words are theſe; ſuch penalties as
"may not tempt perſons who have any concern for their eternal ſalvation (and
"thoſe who have none, ought not to be conſidered) to renounce a religion which
"they believe to be true, or profeſs one which they do not believe to be ſo. If
"by any concern, you mean ſuch as men ought to have for their eternal
"ſalvation; by this rule you may make your puniſhments as great as you
"pleaſe; and all the ſeverities you have diſclaimed may be brought in play
"again:

" again: for none of thoſe will be able to make a man, who is truly concerned for his eternal ſalvation, renounce a religion he believes to be true, or profeſs one he does not believe to be ſo. If by thoſe who have any concern, you mean ſuch, who have ſome faint wiſhes for happineſs hereafter, and would be glad to have things go well with them in the other world, but will venture nothing in this world for it; theſe the moderateſt puniſhments you can imagine will make to change their religion. If by any concern, you mean whatever may be between theſe two; the degrees are ſo infinite, that to proportion your puniſhments by that, is to have no meaſure of them at all." To which all the reply I can find is only this, P. 50. "that there are degrees of careleſſneſs in men of their ſalvation, as well as of concern for it. So that ſuch as have ſome concern for their ſalvation, may yet be careleſs of it to a great degree. And therefore if thoſe who have any concern for their ſalvation, deſerve regard and pity; then ſo may ſome careleſs perſons: though thoſe who have no concern for their ſalvation, deſerve not to be conſidered, which ſpoils a little harangue you give us," P. 414. If you think this to be an anſwer to what I ſaid, or that it can ſatisfy any one concerning the way of knowing what degrees of puniſhment are to be uſed, pray tell us ſo. The enquiry is, "what degrees of puniſhment will tempt a man, who has any concern for his eternal ſalvation, to renounce a religion he believes to be true?" And it is anſwered, "There are degrees of careleſſneſs in men of their ſalvation, as well as concern for it." A happy diſcovery: what is the uſe of it? "So that ſuch as have ſome concern for their ſalvation, may yet be careleſs of it to a great degree." Very true: by this we may know what degree of force is to be uſed. No, not a word of that, but the inference is, "and therefore if thoſe who have any concern for their ſalvation, deſerve regard and pity, then ſo may ſome careleſs perſons; though thoſe who have no concern for their ſalvation, deſerve not to be conſidered." And by this time we know what degree of force will make a man, who has any concern for his ſalvation, renounce a religion he believes true, and profeſs one he does not believe to be ſo. This might do well at croſs queſtions: but you are ſatisfied with what you have done, and what that is, you tell me in the next words, "which ſpoils a little harangue of yours given us." P. 414. The harangue I ſuppoſe is contained in theſe words.

L. II. p. 414. "ONE thing I cannot but take notice of in this paſſage before I leave it: and that is that you ſay here, thoſe who have no concern for their ſalvation, deſerve not to be conſidered. In other parts of your letter you pretend to have compaſſion on the careleſs, and provide remedies for them: but here of a ſudden your charity fails you, and you give them up to eternal perdition, without the leaſt regard, the leaſt pity, and ſay, they deſerve not to be conſidered. Our Saviour's rule was, the ſick and not the whole need a phyſician: your rule here is; thoſe that are careleſs, are not to be conſidered, but are to be left to themſelves. This would ſeem ſtrange, if one did not obſerve what drew you to it. You perceived that if the magiſtrate was to uſe no puniſhments, but ſuch as would make no body change their religion, he was to uſe none at all: for the careleſs would "be brought to the national church with any ſlight puniſhments; and when "they are once there, you are it ſeems ſatisfied, and look no farther after "them. So that by your own meaſures, if the careleſs, and thoſe who have "no concern for their eternal ſalvation, are to be regarded and taken care of, "if the ſalvation of their ſouls is to be promoted, there is to be no puniſhments to be uſed at all: and therefore you leave them out as not to be "conſidered."

WHAT you have ſaid is ſo far from ſpoiling that harangue, as you are pleaſed to call it, that you having nothing elſe to ſay to it, allows what is laid to your charge in it.

YOU wind up all concerning the meaſures of your force in theſe words; "And as thoſe medicines are thought ſafe and adviſeable, which do ordinarily P. 50. "cure, though not always (as none do;) ſo thoſe penalties or puniſhments, "which are ordinarily found ſufficient (as well as neceſſary) for the ends for "which they are deſigned, may fitly and reaſonably be uſed for the compaſſing "theſe ends." Here your ordinarily comes to your help again; and here one would think that you meant ſuch as cure ſometimes, not always; ſome, though not all: and in this ſenſe will not the utmoſt ſeverities come within your rule? For can you ſay, if puniſhments are to be uſed to prevail on any, that the greater will, where lower fail, prevail on none? At leaſt can you be ſure of it till they have been tried for the compaſſing theſe ends? which as we ſhall ſee in another place, you have aſſigned various enough. I ſhall only take notice of two or three often repeated by you, and thoſe are to make men hear, to make men conſider, to make men conſider as they ought, i. e. as you explain it, to make men conſider ſo, as not to reject. The greatneſs of the force then according to this meaſure, muſt be ſufficient to make men hear, ſufficient to make men conſider, and ſufficient to make men embrace the true religion.

AND now the magiſtrate has all your rules about the meaſures of puniſhments to be uſed, and may confidently and ſafely go to work to eſtabliſh it by a law: for he having theſe marks to guide him, that they muſt be great enough ordinarily to prevail with thoſe who are not idiots or madmen, nor deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, great enough ordinarily to prevail with men to hear, conſider, and embrace the true religion, and yet not ſo great as might tempt perſons, who have any concern for their eternal ſalvation, to renounce a religion which they believe to be true, or profeſs one which they do not believe to be ſo: do you not think you have ſufficiently inſtructed him in your meaning, and enabled him to find the juſt temper of his puniſhments according to your ſcheme, neither too much, nor too little? But however you may be ſatisfied with them, I ſuppoſe others, when it comes to be put in practice, will by theſe meaſures, which are all I can find in your ſcheme, be ſcarce able to find, what are the puniſhments you would have uſed.

IN Eutopia there is a medicine called Hiera Picra, which it is ſuppoſed would cure a troubleſome diſeaſe of that country: but it is not to be given, but in the doſe preſcribed by the law, and in adjuſting the doſe lies all the ſkill: for if you give too much, it heightens the diſtemper, and ſpreads the mortal contagion; and if too little, it does no good at all. With this difficulty the law-makers have been perplexed theſe many ages, and could not light on the right doſe, that would work the cure, till lately there came an undertaker, who would ſhew them how they could not miſtake. He bid them then preſcribe ſo much, as would ordinarily be effectual upon all that were not idiots or madmen, or in whom the humour was not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, to produce the end for which it was deſigned; but not ſo much as would make a man in health, who had any concern for his life, fall into a mortal diſeaſe. Theſe were good words, and he was rewarded for them: but when by them they came to fix the doſe, they could not tell whether it ought to be a grain, a dram, or an ounce, or an whole pound, any more than before; and ſo the doſe of their Hiera Picra, notwithſtanding this gentleman's pains, is as uncertain, and that ſovereign remedy as uſeleſs as ever it was.

P. 50. IN the next paragraph you tell us, "You do not ſee what more can be required to juſtify the rule here given." So quick a ſight needs no ſpectacles. "For if I demand that it ſhould expreſs what penalties particularly are ſuch as it ſays may fitly and reaſonably be uſed; this I muſt give you leave to tell me is a very unreaſonable demand." It is an unreaſonable demand, if your rule be ſuch, that by it I may know without any more ado, the particular penalties that are fit; otherwiſe it is not unreaſonable to demand them by name, if your marks be not ſufficient to know them by. But let us hear your reaſon, "For what rule is there that expreſſes the particulars that agree with it?" And it is an admirable rule with which one can find no particulars that agree; for I challenge you to inſtance in one: "a rule, you ſay is intended for a common meaſure by which particulars are to be examined, and therefore muſt neceſſarily be general." So general, looſe, and inconſiſtent, that no particulars can be examined by it: for again I challenge you, or any man living, to meaſure out any puniſhment by this your common meaſure, and eſtabliſh it by a law. You go on; "And thoſe to whom it is given, are ſuppoſed to be able to apply it, and to judge of particulars by it. Nay it is often ſeen that they are better able to do this than thoſe who give it: and ſo it is in the preſent caſe, the rule hereby laid down is that by which you ſuppoſe governors and law-givers ought to examine the penalties they uſe for the promoting the true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls." Such a rule it ought to be I grant, and ſuch an one is deſired: but that yours is ſuch a rule as magiſtrates can take any meaſure by, for the puniſhments they are to ſettle by law, is denied, and you are again deſired to ſhew. You proceed; "But certainly no man doubts but their prudence and experience enables them to uſe and apply it better than other men, and to judge more exactly what penalties do agree with it, and what do not; and therefore you think I muſt excuſe you if you do not take upon you to teach them what it becomes you rather to learn from them." If we are not to doubt but their prudence and experience enables magiſtrates to judge beſt what penalties are fit, you have indeed given us at laſt a way to know the meaſure of puniſhments to be uſed: but it is ſuch an one as puts an end to your diſtinction of moderate penalties:

for

ſor no magiſtrates that I know, when they once began to uſe force to bring men to their religion, ever ſtopped till they came to ſome of thoſe ſeverities you condemn; and if you pretend to teach them moderation for the future, with hopes to ſucceed, you ought to have ſhewed them the juſt bounds, beyond which they ought not to go, in a model ſo wholly new, and beſides all experience. But if it be to be determined by their prudence and experience, whatever degrees of force they ſhall uſe, will always be the right.

LAW-MAKERS and governors however beholden to you for your good opinion of their prudence and experience; yet have no reaſon to thank you for your compliment, by giving ſuch an exerciſe to their prudence and experience as to put it upon them to find out the juſt meaſures of puniſhments, by rules you give them, which are ſuch, that neither yourſelf, nor any body elſe can find out any meaſures by. The other part of your compliment will be ſuſpected not to be ſo much out of your abundant reſpect to law-makers and governors, as out of the great regard you have to yourſelf; for you in vain pretend you forbear to name any particular puniſhments, becauſe you will not take upon you to teach governors and law-makers, when you yourſelf own in the ſame breath, that you are laying down rules by which they are to proceed in the uſe of penalties for promoting religion, which is little different from teaching: and your whole book is nothing elſe but about the magiſtrate's power and duty. I excuſe you therefore for your own ſake from naming any particular puniſhments by your rules: for you have a right to it, as all men have a right to be excuſed from doing what is impoſſible to be done.

SINCE therefore you grant that thoſe ſeverities you have named, "are more "apt to hinder than promote true religion;" and you cannot aſſign any meaſures of puniſhment, ſhort of thoſe great ones you have condemned, which are fit to promote it; I think it argument enough to prove againſt you, that no puniſhments are fit, till you have ſhewed ſome others, either by name, or ſuch marks as they may certainly be known by, which are fit to promote the true religion: and therefore nothing you have ſaid there, or any where elſe, will ſerve to ſhew that "it is with little reaſon, as you tell me, that I ſay, P. 19. "that if your indirect and at a diſtance ſerviceableneſs may authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force in religion, all the cruelties uſed by the Heathens "againſt Chriſtians, by Papiſts againſt Proteſtants, and all the perſecuting "of Chriſtians one amongſt another, are all juſtifiable." To which you add, "Not to take notice at preſent how oddly it ſounds, that that which authorizes the magiſtrates to uſe moderate penalties to promote the true religion, "ſhould juſtify all the cruelties that ever were uſed to promote Heatheniſm "or Popery."

As oddly as it ſounds to you, it will be evidently true, as long as that which authorizes one, authorizes all magiſtrates of any religion which they believe to be true, to uſe force to promote it; and as long as you cannot aſſign any bounds to your moderate puniſhments, ſhort of thoſe great ones; which you therefore are not able to do, becauſe your principles, whatever your words deny, will carry you to thoſe degrees of ſeverity, which in profeſſion you condemn: and this, whatever you do, I dare ſay every conſidering reader beſides you will plainly ſee. So that this imputation is not ſo unreaſonable, ſince it is evident, that you muſt either renounce all puniſhments whatſoever in religion, or make uſe of thoſe you condemn: for in the P. 20. next page you tell us, "That all who have ſufficient means of inſtruction "provided for them, may juſtly be puniſhed for not being of the national re- "ligion, where the true is the national religion; becauſe it is a fault in all "ſuch not to be of the national religion." In England then, for example, not to be of the national religion is a fault, and a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. The magiſtrate to cure this fault, lays, on thoſe who diſſent, a lower degree of penalties a fine of 1 d. per month. This proving inſufficient, what is the magiſtrate to do? If he be obliged, as you ſay, to amend this fault by penalties, and that low one of 1 d. per month be not ſufficient to procure its amendment, is he not to increaſe the penalty? He therefore doubles the fine to 2 d. per month. This too proves ineffectual, and therefore it is ſtill for the ſame reaſon doubled, till it come to 1 s. 5 s. 10 l. 100 l. 1000 l. None of theſe penalties working, but yet by being conſtantly levied, leaving the delinquents no longer able to pay, impriſonment and other corporal puniſhments follow to inforce an obedience, till at laſt this gradual increaſe of penalties and force, each degree whereof wrought on ſome few, riſes to the higheſt ſeverities againſt thoſe who ſtand out. For the magiſtrate, who is obliged to correct this vice, as you call it, and to do what in him lies to cure this fault, which oppoſes their ſalvation; and who if I miſtake not, you tell us, P. 8. is anſwerable for all that may follow from his neglect, had no reaſon to raiſe the fine from 1 d. to 2 d. but becauſe the firſt was ineffectual: and if that were a ſufficient reaſon for raiſing from the firſt to the ſecond degree, why is it not as ſufficient to proceed from the ſecond to the third, and ſo gradually on? I would fain have any one ſhew me, where, and upon what ground, ſuch a gradual increaſe of force can ſtop, till it come to the utmoſt extremities. If therefore diſſenting from the church of England be a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, I deſire you to tell me, where he ſhall hold his hand; to name the ſort or degree of puniſhment, beyond which he ought not to go in the uſe of force, to cure them of that fault, and bring them to conformity. Till you have done that, you might have ſpared that P. 19. paragraph, where you ſay, "With what ingenuity I draw you in to condemn "force in general, only becauſe you acknowledge the ill effects of proſecuting "men with fire and ſword, &c. you may leave every man to judge." And I leave whom you will to judge, whether from your own principles it does not unavoidably follow, that if you condemn any penalties, you muſt condemn all, as I have ſhewn; if you will retain any, you muſt retain all; you muſt either take or leave all together. For, as I have ſaid, and you deny not, L. II. p. 391. "Where there is no fault, there no puniſhment is moderate;" ſo I add, Where there is a fault to be corrected by the magiſtrate's force, there no degree of force, which is ineffectual, and not ſufficient to amend it, can be immoderate; eſpecially if it be a fault of great moment in its conſequences, as certainly that muſt be, which draws after it the loſs of mens eternal happineſs.

YOU will, it is likely, be ready to ſay here again, for a good ſubterfuge is never to be forſaken, that you except the “ deſperately perverſe and obſtinate.” I deſire to know for what reaſon you except them? Is it becauſe they ceaſe to be faulty? Next I aſk you, Who are in your ſenſe the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate? Thoſe that 1 s. or 5 s. or 5 l. or 100 l. or no fine will work upon? Thoſe who can bear loſs of eſtate, but not loſs of liberty? or loſs of liberty and eſtate, but not corporal pains and torments? or all this, but not loſs of life? For to theſe degrees do men differently ſtand out. And ſince there are men wrought on by the approaches of fire and faggot, which other degrees of ſeverity could not prevail with, where will you bound your deſperately perverſe and obſtinate? The king of France, though you will allow him not to have truth of his ſide, yet when he came to dragooning, found few ſo deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, as not to be wrought on. And why ſhould truth, which in your opinion, wants force, and nothing but force, to help it, not have the aſſiſtance of thoſe degrees of force, when leſs will not do to make it prevail, which are able to bring men over to falſe religions, which have no light and ſtrength of their own to help them? You will do well therefore to conſider whether your name of ſeverities, in oppoſition to the moderate puniſhments you ſpeak of, has or can do you any ſervice; whether the diſtinction between compelling and coactive power, be of any uſe or difference at all. For you deny the magiſtrate to have power to P. 41. compel: and you contend for his uſe of his coactive power; which will then P. 27. be a good diſtinction, when you can find a way to uſe coactive, or, which is the ſame, compelling power, without compulſion. I deſire you alſo to conſider, if in matters of religion, puniſhments are to be employed, becauſe they may be uſeful, whether you can ſtop at any degree that is ineffectual to the end which you propoſe, let that end be what it will. If it be barely to gain a hearing, as in ſome places you ſeem to ſay, I think for that ſmall puniſhments will generally prevail, and you do well to put that and moderate penalties together. If it be to make men conſider, as in other places you ſpeak, you cannot tell when you have obtained that end. But if your end be, which you ſeem moſt to inſiſt on, to make men conſider as they ought, i. e. till they embrace, there are many on whom all your moderate penalties, all under thoſe ſeverities you condemn, are too weak to prevail. So that you muſt either confeſs, not conſidering ſo as to “ embrace the true religion, i. e. not conſidering as one ought,” is no fault to be puniſhed by the coactive force of the magiſtrate; or elſe you muſt reſume thoſe ſeverities which you have renounced; Chuſe you whether of the two you pleaſe.

THEREFORE it was not ſo much at random that I ſaid, “ That thither at L. II. p. 932. “ laſt perſecution muſt come.” Indeed from what you had ſaid of falling under the ſtroke of the ſword, which was nothing to the purpoſe, I added, “ That if by that you meant any thing to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeem to A. p. 13. “ have a reſerve for greater puniſhments, when leſs are not ſufficient to bring

“ men to be convinced.” Which hath produced this warm reply of yours;
P. 21. “ And will you ever pretend to conſcience or modeſty after this? For I beſeech
“ you, Sir, what words could I have uſed more expreſs or effectual to
“ ſignify, that in my opinion no Diſſenters from the true religion ought to
“ be puniſhed with the ſword, but ſuch as chooſe rather to rebel againſt the
“ magiſtrate, than to ſubmit to leſſer penalties? (For how any ſhould refuſe
“ to ſubmit to thoſe penalties, but by rebelling againſt the magiſtrate, I ſuppoſe
“ you will not undertake to tell me.) It was for this very purpoſe that
“ I uſed thoſe words to prevent cavils, (as I was then ſo ſimple as to think I
“ might:) and I dare appeal to any man of common ſenſe and common honeſty,
“ whether they are capable of any other meaning. And yet the very
“ thing which I ſo plainly diſclaim in them, you pretend (without ſo much as
“ offering to ſhew how) to collect from them. Thither, you ſay, at laſt,
“ viz. to the taking away mens lives for the ſaving of their ſouls, perſecution
“ muſt come: as you fear, notwithſtanding my talk of moderate puniſhments,
“ I myſelf intimate in thoſe words: and if I mean any thing in them to the
“ buſineſs in hand, I ſeem to have a reſerve for greater puniſhments, when
“ leſſer are not ſufficient to bring men to be convinced. Sir, I ſhould expect
“ fairer dealing from one of your Pagans or Mahometans. But I ſhall only
“ add, that I would never wiſh that any man who has undertaken a bad cauſe
“ ſhould more plainly confeſs it than by ſerving it, as here (and not here only)
“ you ſerve yours.” Good Sir, be not ſo angry, leſt to obſerving men you
increaſe the ſuſpicion. One may, without forfeiture of modeſty or conſcience,
fear what mens principles threaten, though their words diſclaim it. Nonconformity
to the national, when it is the true religion, as in England, is a fault,
a vice, ſay you, to be corrected by the coactive power of the magiſtrate. If
ſo, and force be the proper remedy, he muſt increaſe it, till it be ſtrong
enough to work the cure; and muſt not neglect his duty, for ſo you make it,
when he has force enough in his hand to make this remedy more powerful.
For wherever force is proper to work on men, and bring them to a compliance,
its not producing that effect can only be imputed to its being too little:
and if ſo, whither at laſt muſt it come, but to the late methods of procuring
Conformity, and as his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty called it, ſaving of ſouls, in
France, or ſeverities like them, when more moderate ones cannot produce it?
For to continue inefficacious penalties, inſufficient upon trial to maſter the
fault they are applied to, is unjuſtifiable cruelty; and that which no body
can have a right to uſe, it ſerving only to diſeaſe and harm people, without
P. 44. amending them: for you tell us, they ſhould be ſuch penalties as ſhould make
them uneaſy.

He that ſhould vex and pain a ſore you had, with frequent dreſſing it with ſome moderate, painful, but inefficacious plaiſter, that promoted not the cure, would juſtly be thought, not only an ignorant, but a diſhoneſt ſurgeon. If you are in the ſurgeon's hands, and his help is requiſite, and the cure that way to be wrought, corroſives and fire are the moſt merciful, as well as only juſtifiable way of cure, when the caſe needs them. And therefore I hope I may ſtill pretend to modeſty and conſcience, though I ſhould have thought you ſo rational a man, as to be led by your own principles; and ſo honeſt, charitable, and zealous for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, as not to vex and diſeaſe them with inefficacious remedies to no purpoſe, and let them miſs of ſalvation, for want of more vigorous proſecutions. For if Conformity to the church of England be neceſſary to ſalvation, for elſe what neceſſity can you pretend of puniſhing men at all to bring them to it? it is cruelty to their ſouls, if you have authority for any ſuch means, to uſe ſome, and not to uſe ſufficient force to bring them to conform. And I dare ſay you are ſatisfied, that the French diſcipline of dragooning would have made many in England Conformiſts, whom your lower penalties will not prevail on to be ſo.

BUT to inform you that my apprehenſions were not ſo wholly out of the way, I beſeech you to read here what you have writ in theſe words; "For how "confidently ſoever you tell me here, that it is more than I can ſay for my "political puniſhments, that they were ever uſeful for the promoting true "religion; I appeal to all obſerving perſons, whether wherever true religion "or ſound Chriſtianity has been nationally received and eſtabliſhed by moderate "penal laws, it has not always loſt ground by the relaxation of thoſe "laws: whether ſects and hereſies, (even the wildeſt and moſt abſurd) and "even Epicuriſm and Atheiſm, have not continually thereupon ſpread them-"ſelves; and whether the very ſpirit and life of Chriſtianity has not ſenſibly "decayed, as well as the number of ſound profeſſors of it been daily leſſened "upon it: not to ſpeak of what at this time our eyes cannot but ſee, for "fear of giving offence; though I hope it will be none to any that have a "juſt concern for truth and piety, to take notice of the books and pamphlets "which now fly ſo thick about this kingdom, manifeſtly tending to the multiplying "of ſects and diviſions, and even to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in "religion among us." Here you bemoan the decaying ſtate of religion amongſt us at preſent, by reaſon of taking off the penalties from Proteſtant Diſſenters: and I beſeech you what penalties were they? Such whereby many have been ruined in their fortunes; ſuch whereby many have loſt their liberties, and ſome their lives in priſons; ſuch have ſent ſome into baniſhment, ſtripped of all they had. Theſe were the penal laws by which the national religion was eſtabliſhed in England; and theſe you call moderate: for you ſay, "Wherever true religion or ſound Chriſtianity has been nationally received "and eſtabliſhed by moderate penal laws;" and I hope you do not here exclude England from having its religion ſo eſtabliſhed by law, which we ſo often hear of; or if to ſerve the preſent occaſion, you ſhould, would you alſo deny, that in the following words you ſpeak of the preſent relaxation in England? where after your appeal to all obſerving people for the diſmal conſequences, which you ſuppoſe to have every where followed from ſuch relaxations, you add theſe pathetical words, "Not to ſpeak of what at this time our "eyes cannot but ſee, for fear of giving offence:" ſo heavy does the preſent relaxation ſit on the mind; which ſince it is of penal laws you call moderate, I ſhall ſhew you what they are. P. 34.

In the firſt year of queen Elizabeth, there was a penalty of 1 s. a Sunday and holiday laid upon every one, who came not to the common prayer then eſtabliſhed. This penalty of 1 s. a time not prevailing, as was deſired, in the twenty-third year of her reign was increaſed to 20 l. a month, and impriſonment for non-payment within three months after judgment given. In the twenty-ninth year of Elizabeth, to draw this yet cloſer, and make it more forcible, it was enacted, That whoever upon one conviction did not continue to pay on the 20 l. per month, without any other conviction or proceedings againſt him till he ſubmitted and conformed, ſhould forfeit all his goods, and two thirds of his land for his life. But this being not yet thought ſufficient, it was in the thirty-fifth year of that queen compleated, and the moderate penal laws, upon which our national religion was eſtabliſhed, and whoſe relaxation you cannot bear, but from thence date the decay of the very ſpirit and life of Chriſtianity, were brought to perfection. For then going to conventicles, or a month's abſence from church, was to be puniſhed with impriſonment, till the offender conformed; and if he conformed not within three months, then he was to abjure the realm, and forfeit all his goods and chattels for ever, and his lands and tenements during his life: and if he would not abjure, or abjuring, did not depart the realm within a time prefixed, or returned again, he was to ſuffer death as a felon. And thus your moderate penal laws ſtood for the eſtabliſhed religion, till their penalties were, in reſpect of Proteſtant Diſſenters, lately taken off. And now let the reader judge whether your pretence to moderate puniſhments, or my ſuſpicion of what a man of your principles might have in ſtore for Diſſenters, have more of modeſty or conſcience in it; ſince you openly declare your regret for the taking away ſuch an eſtabliſhment, as by the gradual increaſe of penalties reached mens eſtates, liberties and lives; and which you muſt be preſumed to allow and approve of, till you tell us plainly, where, according to your meaſures, thoſe penalties ſhould, or, according to your principles, they could, have ſtopped.

P. 11. You tell us, That where this only true religion, viz. of the church of England, is received, other religions ought "to be diſcouraged in ſome meaſure." A pretty expreſſion for undoing, impriſonment, baniſhment; for thoſe have been ſome of the diſcouragements given to Diſſenters here in England. You will again, no doubt, cry aloud, that you tell me you condemn theſe as much as I do. If you heartily condemn them, I wonder you ſhould ſay ſo little to diſcourage them; I wonder you are ſo ſilent in repreſenting to the magiſtrate the unlawfulneſs and danger of uſing them, in a diſcourſe where you are treating of the magiſtrate's power and duty in matters of religion; eſpecially this being the ſide on which, as far as we may gueſs by experience, their prudence is apteſt to err: but your modeſty, you know, leaves all to the magiſtrate's prudence and experience on that ſide, though you over and over again encourage them not to neglect their duty in the uſe of force, to which you ſet no bounds.

P. 50. You tell us, "Certainly no man doubts but the prudence and experience of governors and law-givers enables them to uſe and apply it," viz. your rule for the meaſure of puniſhments, which I have ſhewed to be no rule at all; “ And to “ judge more exactly what penalties do agree with it; and therefore you muſt “ be excuſed if you do not take upon you to teach them what it becomes you “ rather to learn from them.” If your modeſty be ſuch, and you then did what became you, you could not but learn from your governors and law-givers, and ſo be ſatisfied till within this year or two, that thoſe penalties which they meaſured out for the eſtabliſhment of the true religion, though they reached to mens eſtates, liberties and lives, were ſuch as were fit. But what you have learned of your law-makers and governors ſince the relaxation, or what opinion you have of their experience and prudence now, is not ſo eaſy to ſay.

PERHAPS you will ſay again, that you have in expreſs words declared againſt “ fire and ſword, loſs of eſtate, maiming with corporal puniſhments, ſtarving “ and tormenting in noiſome priſons;” and one cannot either in modeſty or conſcience diſbelieve you: yet in the ſame letter you with ſorrow and regret ſpeak of the relaxation of ſuch penalties laid on Nonconformity, by which men have loſt their eſtates, liberties, and lives too, in noiſome priſons, and in this too muſt we not believe you? I dare ſay, there are very few who read that paſſage of yours, ſo feelingly it is penned, who want modeſty or conſcience to believe you therein to be in earneſt; and the rather, becauſe what drops from men by chance, when they are not upon their guard, is always thought the beſt interpretation of their thoughts.

P. 34.

YOU name “ loſs of eſtate, of liberty, and tormenting, which is corporal “ puniſhment, as if you were againſt them:” certainly you know what you meant by theſe words, when you ſaid, you condemned them; was it any degree of loſs of liberty or eſtate, any degree of corporal puniſhment that you condemned, or only the utmoſt, or ſome degree between theſe? unleſs you had then ſome meaning, and unleſs you pleaſe to tell us, what that meaning was; where it is, that in your opinion the magiſtrate ought to ſtop, who can believe you are in earneſt? This I think you may and ought to do for our information in your ſyſtem, without any apprehenſion that governors and law-givers will deem themſelves much taught by you, which your modeſty makes you ſo cautious of. Whilſt you refuſe to do this, and keep yourſelf under the maſk of moderate, convenient, and ſufficient force and penalties, and other ſuch-like uncertain and undetermined puniſhments, I think a conſcientious and ſober Diſſenter might expect fairer dealing from one of my Pagans or Mahometans, as you pleaſe to call them, than from one, who ſo profeſſes moderation, that what degrees of force, what kind of puniſhments will ſatisfy him, he either knows not, or will not declare. For your moderate and convenient may, when you come to interpret them, ſignify what puniſhments you pleaſe: for the cure being to be wrought by force, that will be convenient, which the ſtubbornneſs of the evil requires; and that moderate, which is but enough to work the cure. And therefore I ſhall return your own compliment, “ That I would never wiſh that “ any man who has undertaken a bad cauſe, ſhould more plainly confeſs it than “ by ſerving it, as here (and not here only) you ſerve yours. I ſhould beg your pardon for this ſort of language, were it not your own. And what right you have to it, the ſkill you ſhew in the management of general and doubtful words and expreſſions, of uncertain and undetermined ſignification, will, I doubt not, abundantly convince the reader. An inſtance we have in the argument before us: for I appeal to any ſober man, who ſhall carefully read P. 49. what you write, where you pretend to tell the world plainly and directly what puniſhments are to be uſed by your ſcheme, whether after having weighed all you ſay concerning that matter, he can tell, what a Nonconformiſt is to expect from you, or find any thing but ſuch acuteneſs and ſtrength as lies in the uncertainty and reſerve of your way of talking; which whether it be any way ſuited to your modeſty and conſcience, where you have undertaken to tell us what the puniſhments are, whereby you would have men brought to embrace the true religion, I leave you to conſider.

P. 34. If having ſaid, "Wherever true religion or ſound Chriſtiany has been nationally received and eſtabliſhed by moderate penal laws;" you ſhall for your defence of the eſtabliſhment of the religion in England by law, ſay, which is all is left you to ſay, that though ſuch ſevere laws were made, yet it was only by the execution of moderate penal laws, that it was eſtabliſhed and ſupported: but that thoſe ſevere laws that touched mens eſtates, liberties and lives, were never put in execution. Why then do you ſo ſeriouſly bemoan the loſs of them? But I adviſe you not to make uſe of that plea, for there are examples in the memory of hundreds now living, of every one of thoſe laws of queen Elizabeth being put in execution; and pray remember, if by denying it you require this truth to be made good, it is you that force the publiſhing of a catalogue of men that have loſt their eſtates, liberties and lives in priſon, which it would be more for the advantage of the religion eſtabliſhed by law, ſhould be forgotten.

But to conclude this great accuſation of yours: if you were not conſcious to yourſelf of ſome tendency that way, why ſuch an outcry? Why was modeſty and conſcience called in queſtion? Why was it leſs fair dealing than you could have expected from a Pagan or Mahometan, for me to ſay, if in thoſe words "you meant any thing to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeemed to have a reſerve for greater puniſhments?" Your buſineſs there being to prove, that there was a power veſted in the magiſtrate to uſe force in matters of religion, what could be more beſides the buſineſs in hand, than to tell us, as you interpret your meaning here, that the magiſtrate had a power to uſe force againſt thoſe who rebelled, for who ever denied that, whether Diſſenters or not Diſſenters? Where was it queſtioned by the author or me, that "whoever rebelled, were to fall under the ſtroke of the magiſtrate's ſword?" And therefore without breach of modeſty or conſcience, I might ſay, what I again here repeat, "That if in thoſe words you meant any thing to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeemed to have a reſerve for greater puniſhments."

One thing more give me leave to add in defence of my modeſty and conſcience, or rather to juſtify myſelf from having gueſſed ſo wholly beſide the L. II. p. 399. matter, if I ſhould have ſaid, which I did not, "that I feared you had a reſerve for greater puniſhments." For I having brought the inſtances of Ananias and Sapphira, to ſhew that the Apoſtles wanted not power to puniſh, if they found it neceſſary to uſe it; you infer, that therefore "puniſhment may be ſometimes neceſſary." What puniſhments I beſeech you, for theirs coſt them their lives? He that, as you do, concludes from thence, that therefore "puniſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary," will hardly avoid, whatever he ſays, to conclude capital puniſhments neceſſary: and when they are neceſſary, it is you know the magiſtrate's duty to uſe them. You ſee how natural it is for men to go whither their principles lead them, though at firſt ſight perhaps they thought it too far. P. 38.

IF to avoid this, you now ſay you meant it of the puniſhment of the inceſtuous Corinthian, whom I alſo mentioned in the ſame place; I think, ſuppoſing yourſelf to lie under the imputation of a reſerve of greater puniſhments, you ought in prudence to have ſaid ſo there. Next you know not what puniſhment it was the inceſtuous Corinthian underwent, but it being "for the deſtruction of the fleſh," it ſeems to be no very light one: and if you will take your friend St. Auſtin's word for it, as he in the very epiſtle you quote tells you, it was a very ſevere one, making as much difference between it, and the ſeverities men uſually ſuffer in priſon, as there is between the cruelty of the devil and that of the moſt barbarous jailor: ſo that if your moderate puniſhments will reach to that laid on the inceſtuous Corinthian for the deſtruction of the fleſh, we may preſume them to be, what other people call ſeverities.

# CHAP. V.

## How long your puniſhments are to continue.

THE meaſure of puniſhments being to be eſtimated as well by the length of their duration, as the intenſeneſs of their degrees, it is fit we take a view alſo of your ſcheme in this part.

"I TOLD you, that moderate puniſhments that are continued, that men find no end of, know no way out of, ſit heavy, and become immoderately uneaſy. Diſſenters you would have puniſhed, to make them conſider. Your penalties have had the effect on them you intended; they have made them conſider; and they have done their utmoſt in conſidering. What now muſt be done with them? They muſt be puniſhed on, for they are ſtill Diſſenters. If it were juſt, and you had reaſon at firſt to puniſh a Diſſenter, to make him conſider, when you did not know but that he had conſidered already; it is as juſt, and you have as much reaſon to puniſh him on, even when he has performed what your puniſhment was deſigned for, and has conſidered, but yet remains a Diſſenter. For I may juſtly ſuppoſe, and you muſt grant, that a man may remain a Diſſenter after all the conſideration your moderate penalties can bring him to: when we ſee great puniſhments, even thoſe ſeverities you diſown as too great, are not able to make men conſider ſo far as to be convinced, L. II. p. 415.

"and brought over to the national church. If your puniſhments may not "be inflicted on men, to make them conſider, who have or may have con- "ſidered already, for ought you know; then Diſſenters are never to be once "puniſhed, no more than any other ſort of men. If Diſſenters are to be "puniſhed, to make them conſider, whether they have conſidered or no; "then their puniſhments, though they do conſider, muſt never ceaſe as long "as they are Diſſenters, which whether it be to puniſh them only to bring "them to conſider, let all men judge. This I am ſure; puniſhments in your "method, muſt either never begin upon Diſſenters, or never ceaſe. And "ſo pretend moderation if you pleaſe, the puniſhments which your me- "thod requires, muſt be either very immoderate, or none at all." But to this you ſay nothing, only for the adjuſting of the length of your puniſhments, and therein vindicating the conſiſtency and practicableneſs of your P. 51. ſcheme, you tell us, "that as long as men reject the true religion duly propoſed "to them, ſo long they offend and deſerve puniſhment, and therefore it is but "juſt that ſo long they ſhould be left liable to it." You promiſed to anſwer P. 46. to this queſtion, amongſt others, "plainly and directly." The queſtion is, how long they are to be puniſhed? And your anſwer is, "It is but juſt that ſo "long they ſhould be liable to puniſhment." This extraordinary caution in ſpeaking out, if it were not very natural to you, would be apt to make one ſuſpect, it was accommodated more to ſome difficulties of your ſcheme, than to your promiſe of anſwering plainly and directly; or poſſibly you thought, it would not agree to that character of moderation you aſſume, to own, that all the penal laws which were lately here in force, and whoſe relaxation you bemoan, ſhould be conſtantly put in execution. But your moderation in this point comes too late. For as your charity, as you tell us in the next paragraph, "requires that they be kept ſubject to penalties:" ſo the watchful charity of others in this age hath found out ways to encourage informers, and put it out of the magiſtrate's moderation to ſtop the execution of the law againſt Diſſenters, if he ſhould be inclined to it.

WE will therefore take it for granted, that if penal laws be made concerning religion, for more zeal uſually animates them than others, they will be put in execution: and indeed I have heard it argued to be very abſurd, to make or continue laws, that are not conſtantly put in execution. And now to ſhew you how well your anſwer conſiſts with other parts of your ſcheme, I ſhall need only to mind you, that if men muſt be puniſhed as long as they reject the true religion, thoſe who puniſh them, muſt be judges what is the true religion. But this objection, with ſome other, to which this part of your anſwer is obnoxious, having been made to you more at large elſewhere, I ſhall here omit, and proceed to other parts of your anſwer.

P. 50. YOU begin with your reaſon for the anſwer you afterwards give us in the words I laſt quoted: your reaſon runs thus; "For certainly nothing is more "reaſonable than that men ſhould be ſubject to puniſhment as long as they "continue to offend. And as long as men reject the true religion tendered "them with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it, ſo long it is certain they offend."

It is certainly very reaſonable, that men ſhould be ſubject to puniſhment from thoſe they offend as long as they continue to offend: but it will not from hence follow, that thoſe who offend God, are always ſubject to puniſhment from men. For if they be, why does not the magiſtrate puniſh envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableneſs? If you anſwer, becauſe they are not capable of judicial proofs: I think I may ſay it is as eaſy to prove a man guilty of envy, hatred or uncharitableneſs, as it is to prove him guilty of "rejecting the true "religion tendered him with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it." But if it be his duty to puniſh all offences againſt God, why does the magiſtrates never puniſh lying, which is an offence againſt God, and is an offence capable of being judicially proved? It is plain therefore that it is not the ſenſe of all mankind, that it is the magiſtates duty to puniſh all offences againſt God; and where it is not his duty to uſe force, you will grant the magiſtrate is not to uſe it in matters of religion, becauſe where it is neceſſary, it is his duty to uſe it; but where it is not neceſſary, you yourſelf ſay, it is not lawful. It would be convenient therefore for you to reform your propoſition from that looſe generality it now is in, and then prove it, before it can be allowed you to be to your purpoſe; though it be ever ſo true, that "you know not "a greater crime a man can be guilty of, than rejecting the true religion."

YOU go on with your proof, that ſo long as men reject the true religion, P. 51.
&c. ſo long they offend, and conſequently may juſtly be puniſhed; "Becauſe, "ſay you, it is impoſſible for any man, innocently to reject the true religion, "ſo tendered to him. For whoever rejects that religion ſo tendered, does "either apprehend and perceive the truth of it, or he does not. If he does, "I know not what greater crime any man can be guilty of. If he does not "perceive the truth of it, there is no account to be given of that, but either "that he ſhuts his eyes againſt the evidence which is offered him, and will not "at all conſider it; or that he does not conſider it as he ought, viz. with ſuch "care as is requiſite, and with a ſincere deſire to learn the truth; either of "which does manifeſtly involve him in guilt. To ſay here that a man who "has the true religion propoſed to him with ſufficient evidence of its truth, "may conſider it is he ought," or do his utmoſt in conſidering, "and yet "not perceive the truth of it; is neither more nor leſs, than to ſay, that ſufficient evidence is not ſufficient evidence. For what does any man mean "by ſufficient evidence, but ſuch as will certainly win aſſent wherever it is "duly conſidered?"

I SHALL not trouble myſelf here to examine when requiſite care, duly conſidered, and ſuch other words, which bring one back to the ſame place from whence one ſet out, are caſt up, whether all this fine reaſoning will amount to any thing, but begging what is in the queſtion: but ſhall only tell you, that what you ſay here and in other places about ſufficient evidence, is built upon this, that the evidence wherewith a man propoſes the true religion, he may know to be ſuch, as will not fail to gain the aſſent of whoſoever does what lies in him in conſidering it. This is the ſuppoſition, without which all your talk of ſufficient evidence will do you no ſervice, try it where you will. But it is a ſuppoſition that is far enough from carrying with it ſufficient evidence to make it be admitted without proof.

WHATEVER gains any man's aſſent, one may be ſure had ſufficient evidence in reſpect of that man: but that is far enough from proving it evidence ſufficient to prevail on another, let him conſider it as long and as much as he can. The tempers of mens minds; the principles ſettled there by time and education, beyond the power of the man himſelf to alter them; the different capacities of mens underſtandings, and the ſtrange ideas they are often filled with; are ſo various and uncertain, that it is impoſſible to find that evidence, eſpecially in things of a mixed diſquiſition, depending on ſo long a train of conſequences, as ſome points of the true religion may, which one can confidently ſay will be ſufficient for all men. It is demonſtration that 31876 is the product of 9467172 divided by 297, and yet I challenge you to find one man of a thouſand, to whom you can tender this propoſition with demonſtrative or ſufficient evidence to convince him of the truth of it in a dark room; or ever to make this evidence appear to a man, that cannot write and read, ſo as to make him embrace it as a truth, if another whom he hath more confidence in, tells him it is not ſo. All the demonſtrative evidence the thing has, all the tender you can make of it, all the conſideration he can employ about it, will never be able to diſcover to him that evidence which ſhall convince him it is true, unleſs you will at threeſcore and ten, for that may be the caſe, have him neglect his calling, go to ſchool, and learn to write and read, and caſt account, which he may never be able to attain to.

YOU ſpeak more than once of mens being brought to lay aſide their prejudices to make them conſider as they ought, and judge right of matters in religion; and I grant without doing ſo they cannot: but it is impoſſible for force to make them do it, unleſs it could ſhew them, which are prejudices in their minds, and diſtinguiſh them from the truths there. Who is there almoſt that has not prejudices, that he does not know to be ſo; and what can force do in that caſe? It can no more remove them, to make way for truth, than it can remove one truth to make way for another; or rather remove an eſtabliſhed truth, or that which is looked on as an unqueſtionable principle, for ſo are often mens prejudices, to make way for a truth not yet known, nor appearing to be one. It is not every one knows, or can bring himſelf to Des Cartes's way of doubting, and ſtrip his thoughts of all opinions, till he brings them to ſelf-evident principles, and then upon them builds all his future tenets.

Do not think all the world, who are not of your church, abandon themſelves to an utter careleſſneſs of their future ſtate. You cannot but allow there are many Turks who ſincerely ſeek truth, to whom yet you could never bring evidence ſufficient to convince them of the truth of the Chriſtian religion, whilſt they looked on it as a principle not to be queſtioned, that the Koran was of divine revelation. This poſſibly you will tell me is a prejudice, and ſo it is; but yet if this man ſhall tell you it is no more a prejudice in him, than it is a prejudice in any one amongſt Chriſtians, who having not examined it, lays it down as an unqueſtionable principle of his religion, that the Scripture is the word of God; what will you anſwer to him? And yet it would ſhake a great many Chriſtians in their religion, if they ſhould lay by that prejudice, and ſuſpend their judgment of it, until they had made it out to themſelves with evidence ſufficient to convince one who is not prejudiced in favour of it; and it would require more time, books, languages, learning and ſkill, than falls to moſt mens ſhare to eſtabliſh them therein, if you will not allow them, in this ſo diſtinguiſhing and fundamental a point, to rely on the learning, knowledge and judgment of ſome perſons whom they have in reverence or admiration. This though you blame it as an ill way, P. 42. yet you can allow in one of your own religion, even to that degree, that he may be ignorant of the grounds of his religion. And why then may you not allow it to a Turk, not as a good way, or as having led him to the truth; but as a way, as fit for him, as for one of your church to acquieſce in; and as fit to exempt him from your force, as to exempt any one of your church from it?

To prevent your commenting on this, in which you have ſhewn ſo much dexterity, give me leave to tell you, that for all this I do not think all religions equally true or equally certain. But this, I ſay, is impoſſible for you, or me, or any man, to know, whether another has done his duty in examining the evidence on both ſides, when he embraces that ſide of the queſtion, which we, perhaps upon other views, judge falſe: and therefore we can have no right to puniſh or perſecute him for it. In this, whether and how far any one is faulty, muſt be left to the Searcher of hearts, the great and righteous Judge of all men, who knows all their circumſtances, all the powers and workings of their minds; where it is they ſincerely follow, and by what default they at any time miſs truth: and he, we are ſure, will judge uprightly.

But when one man ſhall think himſelf a competent judge, that the true religion is propoſed with evidence ſufficient for another; and thence ſhall take upon him to puniſh him as an offender, becauſe he embraces not, upon evidence that he the propoſer judges ſufficient, the religion that he judges true; he had need be able to look into the thoughts of men, and know their ſeveral abilities; unleſs he will make his own underſtanding and faculties to be the meaſure of thoſe of all mankind, which if they be no higher elevated, no larger in their comprehenſion, no more diſcerning, than thoſe of ſome men, he will not only be unfit to be a judge in that, but in almoſt any caſe whatſoever.

But ſince, 1. You make it a condition to the making a man an offender in not being of the true religion, that it has been tendered him with ſufficient evidence. 2. Since you think it ſo eaſy for men to determine when the true religion has been tendered to any one with ſufficient evidence. And 3. Since you pronounce "it impiety to ſay that God hath not furniſhed mankind with A. p. 16. "competent means for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the "good of ſouls." Give me leave to aſk you a queſtion or two. 1. Can any one be ſaved without embracing the one only true religion? 2. Were any of the

Americans of that one only true religion, when the Europeans firſt came amongſt them? 3. Whether any of the Americans, before the Chriſtians came amongſt them, had offended in rejecting the true religion tendered with ſufficient evidence? When you have thought upon, and fairly anſwered theſe queſtions, you will be fitter to determine, how competent a judge man is, what is ſufficient evidence; who do offend in not being of the true religion; and what puniſhments they are liable to for it.

BUT methinks here, where you ſpend almoſt a whole page upon the crime of rejecting the true religion duly tendered, and the puniſhment that is juſtly due to it from the magiſtrate, you forget yourſelf, and the foundation of your plea for force; which is, that it is neceſſary: which you are ſo far from proving it to be in this caſe of puniſhing the offence of rejecting the true religion, that in this very page you diſtinguiſhed it from what is neceſſary; where you tell us, "your deſign does rather oblige you to conſider how long "men may need puniſhment, than how long it may be juſt to puniſh them." So that though they offend, yet if they do not need puniſhment, the magiſtrate cannot uſe it, if you ground, as you ſay you do, the lawfulneſs of force for promoting the true religion upon the neceſſity of it. Nor can you ſay, that by his commiſſion from the law of nature, of doing good, the magiſtrate beſides reducing his wandering ſubjects out of the wrong into the right way, is appointed alſo to be the avenger of God's wrath on unbelievers, or thoſe that err in matters of religion. This at leaſt you thought not fit to own in the firſt draught of your ſcheme; for I do not remember in all your "Argu"ment conſidered," one word of crime or puniſhment: nay, in writing this ſecond treatiſe, you were ſo ſhy of owning any thing of puniſhment, that to my remembrance, you ſcrupulouſly avoided the uſe of that word, till you came to this place; and always where the repeating my words did not oblige you to it, carefully uſed the term of penalties for it, as any one may obſerve, who reads the preceding part of this letter of yours, which I am now examining. And you were ſo nice in the point, that three or four leaves backwards, where I ſay, By your rule diſſenters muſt be puniſhed, you mend it, and ſay, "Or if I pleaſe, ſubjected to moderate penalties." But here when the enquiry, how long force was to be continued on men, ſhewed the abſurdity of that pretence, that they were to be puniſhed on without end, to make them conſider; rather than part with your beloved force, you open the matter a little farther, and profeſs directly the puniſhing men for their religion. For though you do all you can to cover it under the name of rejecting the true religion duly propoſed; yet it is in truth no more but being of a religion different from yours, that you would have them puniſhed for: for all that the author pleads for, and you can oppoſe in writing againſt him, is toleration of religion. Your ſcheme therefore being thus mended, your hypotheſis enlarged, being of a different religion from the national found criminal, and puniſhments found juſtly to belong to it; it is to be hoped, that in good time your puniſhments may grow too, and be advanced to all thoſe degrees you in the beginning condemned; when having conſidered a little farther, you cannot miſs finding, that the obſtinacy of the criminals does not leſſen their crime, and therefore juſtice will require ſeverer execution to be done upon them.

P. 51. BUT you tell us here, “ Becauſe your deſign does rather oblige you to conſider how long men may need puniſhment, than how long it may be juſt to “ puniſh them; therefore you ſhall add, that as long as men refuſe to em- “ brace the true religion, ſo long penalties are neceſſary for them to diſpoſe “ them to conſider and embrace it: and that therefore as juſtice allows, ſo “ charity requires, that they be kept ſubject to penalties, till they embrace “ the true religion.” Let us therefore ſee the conſiſtency of this with other parts of your hypotheſis, and examine it a little by them.

YOUR doctrine is, that where intreaties and admonitions upon trial do not prevail, puniſhments are to be uſed; but they muſt be moderate. Moderate puniſhments have been tried, and they prevail not; what now is to be done? Are not greater to be uſed? No. For what reaſon? Becauſe thoſe whom moderate penalties will not prevail on, being deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, remedies are not to be provided for the incurable, as you tell us in the page immediately preceding.

MODERATE puniſhments have been tried upon a man once, and again, and a third time, but prevail not at all, make no impreſſion; they are repeated as many times more, but are ſtill found ineffectual: pray tell me a reaſon why ſuch a man is concluded ſo deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, that greater degrees will not work upon him; but yet not ſo deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, but that the ſame degrees repeated may work upon him? I will not urge here, that this is to pretend to know the juſt degree of puniſhment that will or will not work on any one, which I ſhould imagine a pretty intricate buſineſs: but this I have to ſay, that if you can think it reaſonable and uſeful to continue a man ſeveral years, nay his whole life, under the ſame repeated puniſhments, without going any higher, though they work not at all, becauſe it is poſſible ſome time or other they may work on him; why is it not as reaſonable and uſeful, I am ſure it is much more juſtifiable and charitable, to leave him all his life under the means, which all agree God has appointed, without going any higher, becauſe it is not impoſſible that ſome time or other preaching, and a word ſpoken in due ſeaſon, may work upon him? For why you ſhould deſpair of the ſucceſs of preaching and perſuaſion upon a fruitleſs trial, and thereupon think yourſelf authorized to uſe force; and yet not ſo deſpair of the ſucceſs of moderate force, as after years of fruitleſs trial, to continue it on, and not to proceed to higher degrees of puniſhment; you are concerned for the vindication of your ſyſtem to ſhew a reaſon.

I MENTION the trial of preaching and perſuaſion, to ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of your hypotheſis, ſuppoſing ſuch a trial made: not that in yours, or the common method, there is or can be a fair trial made what preaching and perſuaſion can do. For care is taken by puniſhments and ill treatment, to indiſpoſe and turn away mens minds, and to add averſion to their ſcruples; an excellent way to ſoften mens inclinations, and temper them for the impreſſion of arguments and intreaties; though theſe too are only talked of: for

I cannot but wonder to find you mention, as you do, giving ear to admonitions, entreaties and perſuaſions, when theſe are ſeldom, if ever made uſe of, but in places, where thoſe, who are to be wrought on by them, are known to be out of hearing; nor can be expected to come there, till by ſuch means they have been wrought on.

It is not without reaſon therefore you cannot part with your penalties, and would have no end put to your puniſhments, but continue them on; ſince you leave ſo much to their operation, and make ſo little uſe of other means to work upon diſſenters.

# CHAP. VI.

## Of the end, for which force is to be uſed.

He that ſhould read the beginning of your "Argument conſidered," would think it in earneſt to be your deſign to have force employed to make men ſeriouſly conſider, and nothing elſe: but he that ſhall look a little farther into it, and to that add alſo your Defence of it, will find by the variety of ends you deſign your force for, that either you know not well what you would have it for, or elſe, whatever it was you aimed at, you called it ſtill by that name which beſt fitted the occaſion, and would ſerve beſt in that place to recommend the uſe of it

You aſk me, "Whether the mildneſs and gentleneſs of the Goſpel deſtroys P. 27. "the coactive power of the magiſtrate?" I anſwer, as you ſuppoſed, No: upon which you infer, "Then it ſeems the magiſtrate may uſe his coactive, "without offending againſt the mildneſs and gentleneſs of the Goſpel." Yes, where he has commiſſion and authority to uſe it. "And ſo, ſay you, it will "conſiſt well enough with the mildneſs and gentleneſs of the Goſpel for the "magiſtrate to uſe his coactive power to procure them" [I ſuppoſe you mean the miniſters and preachers of the national religion] "a hearing where their "prayers and intreaties will not do it." No, it will not conſiſt with the gentle and mild method of the Goſpel, unleſs the Goſpel has directed it, or ſomething elſe to ſupply its want, till it could be had. As for miracles, which you pretend to have ſupplied the want of force in the firſt ages of Chriſtianity, you will find that conſidered in another place. But, Sir, ſhew me a country where the miniſters and teachers of the national and true religion go about with prayers and intreaties to procure a hearing, and cannot obtain it, and there I think I need not ſtand with you for the magiſtrate to uſe force to procure it them; but that I fear will not ſerve your turn.

To ſhew the inconſiſtency and unpracticableneſs of your method, I had L. II. p. 411. ſaid, "Let us now ſee to what end they muſt be puniſhed:" ſometimes it is, A. p. 5. "To bring them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper "and ſufficient to convince them: of what? That it is not eaſy to ſet Grant"ham ſteeple upon Paul's church? Whatever it be you would have them "convinced of, you are not willing to tell us; and ſo it may be any thing.

“Sometimes it is, To incline them to lend an ear to thoſe who tell them A. p. 10. they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right. Which is, to lend an ear to all who differ from them in religion, as well crafty A. p. 27. ſeducers, as others. Whether this be for the procuring the ſalvation of their ſouls, the end for which you ſay this force is to be uſed, judge you. A. p. 23. But this I am ſure, whoever will lend an ear to all who will tell them they are out of the way, will not have much time for any other buſineſs.

“SOMETIMES it is, To recover men to ſo much ſobriety and reflection, A. p. 11. as ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves, whether it be really worth their while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion which, for any thing they know, may be falſe; or for rejecting another (if that be the caſe) which, for ought they know, may be true, till they have brought it to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there. Which in ſhort amounts to thus much, viz. To make them examine whether their religion be true, and ſo worth the holding, under thoſe penalties that are annexed to it. Diſſenters are indebted to you for your great care of their ſouls. But what, I beſeech you, ſhall become of thoſe of the national church, every where, which make far the greater part of mankind, who have no ſuch puniſhments to make them conſider; who have not this only remedy provided for them, but are left in that deplorable condition, you mention, of being ſuffered quietly, and without moleſtation, to take no A. p. 27. care at all of their ſouls, or in doing of it to follow their own prejudices, humours, or ſome crafty ſeducers? Need not thoſe of the national church, as well as others, bring their religion to the bar of reaſon, and give it a fair trial there? And if they need to do ſo, as they muſt, if all national religions cannot be ſuppoſed true, they will always need that which you ſay is the only means to make them do ſo. So that if you are ſure, as you tell A. p. 12. us, that there is need of your method; I am ſure, there is as much need of it in national churches as any other. And ſo, for ought I can ſee, you muſt either puniſh them, or let others alone; unleſs you think it reaſonable that the far greater part of mankind ſhould conſtantly be without that ſovereign and only remedy, which they ſtand in need of equally with other people.

“SOMETIMES the end for which men muſt be puniſhed is, to diſpoſe A. p. 13. them to ſubmit to inſtruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reaſons are offered for the enlightning their minds, and diſcovering the truth to them. If their own words may be taken for it, there are as few diſſenters as conformiſts, in any country, who will not profeſs they have done, and do this. And if their own words may not be taken, who, I pray, muſt be judge? You and your magiſtrates? If ſo, then it is plain you puniſh them not to diſpoſe them to ſubmit to inſtruction, but to your inſtruction; not to diſpoſe them to give a fair hearing to reaſons offered for the enlightning their minds, but to give an obedient hearing to your reaſons. If you mean this it had been fairer and ſhorter to have ſpoken out plainly, than thus in fair words, of indefinite ſignification, to ſay that which amounts to nothing. For what ſenſe is it, to puniſh a man to diſpoſe him to ſubmit to inſtruction, “and give a fair hearing to reaſons offered for the enlightning his mind, and diſcovering truth to him, who goes two or three times a week ſeveral miles on purpoſe to do it, and that with the hazard of his liberty or purſe; unleſs you mean your inſtructions, your reaſons, your truth? Which brings us but back to what you have diſclaimed, plain perſecution for differing in religion.

A. p. 14. “Sometimes this is to be done, To prevail with men to weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially. Diſcountenance and puniſhment put into one ſcale, with impunity and hopes of preferment put into the other, is as ſure a way to make a man weigh impartially, as it would be for a prince to bribe and threaten a judge to make him judge uprightly.

A. p. 20. “Sometimes it is, To make men bethink themſelves, and put it out of the power of any fooliſh humour, or unreaſonable prejudice, to alienate them from truth and their own happineſs. Add but this, to put it out of the power of any humour or prejudice of their own, or other mens, and I grant the end is good, if you can find the means to procure it. But why it ſhould not be put out of the power of other mens humour or prejudice, as well as their own, wants, and will always want, a reaſon to prove. Would it not I beſeech you, to an indifferent by-ſtander, appear humour or prejudice, or ſomething as bad; to ſee men who profeſs a religion revealed from heaven, and which they own contains all in it neceſſary to ſalvation, exclude men from their communion, and perſecute them with the penalties of the civil law, for not joining in the uſe of ceremonies, which are no where to be found in that revealed religion? Would it not appear humour or prejudice, or ſome ſuch thing, to a ſober impartial Heathen, to ſee Chriſtians exclude and perſecute one of the ſame faith, for things which they themſelves confeſs to be indifferent, and not worth the contending for? A. p. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Prejudice, humour, paſſion, luſts, impreſſions of education, reverence and admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, love of their own choice, and the like, to which you juſtly impute many mens taking up and perſiſting in their religion, are indeed good words; and ſo, on the other ſide, are theſe following, truth, the right way, enlightning, reaſon, ſound judgment; but they ſignify nothing at all to your purpoſe, till you can evidently and unqueſtionably ſhew the world, that the latter, viz. truth, and the right way, &c. are always, and in all countries, to be found only in the national church; and the former, viz. paſſion and prejudice, &c. only amongſt the diſſenters. But to go on:

A. p. 22. “Sometimes it is, To bring men to take ſuch care as they ought of their ſalvation. What care is ſuch as men ought to take, whilſt they are out of your church, will be hard for you to tell me. But you endeavour to explain yourſelf in the following words; that they may not blindly leave it to the choice neither of any other perſon, nor yet of their own luſts and paſſions, to preſcribe to them what faith or worſhip they ſhall embrace. You do well to make uſe of puniſhment to ſhut paſſion out of the choice; becauſe you know fear of ſuffering is no paſſion. But let that paſs. You would have men puniſhed, to bring them to take ſuch care of their ſalvation,

“ tion, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any other perſon to preſcribe to them. Are you ſincere? Are you in earneſt? Tell me then truly: did the magiſtrate or the national church, any where, or yours in particular, ever puniſh any man, to bring him to have this care, which, you ſay, he ought to take of his ſalvation? Did you ever puniſh any man, that he might not blindly leave it to the choice of his pariſh-prieſt, or biſhop, or the convocation, what faith or worſhip he ſhould embrace? It will be ſuſpected, care of a party, or any thing elſe, rather than care of the ſalvation of mens ſouls; if, having found out ſo uſeful, ſo neceſſary a remedy, the only method there is room left for, you will apply it but partially, and A. p. 12. make trial of it only on thoſe whom you have truly leaſt kindneſs for. This will unavoidably, give one reaſon to imagine, you do not think ſo well of your remedy as you pretend, who are ſo ſparing of it to your friends; but are very free of it to ſtrangers, who in other things are uſed very much like enemies. But your remedy is like the helleboraſter, that grew in the woman's garden, for the cure of worms in her neighbours children: for truly it wrought too roughly to give it to any of her own. Methinks your charity, in your preſent perſecution, is much-what as prudent, as juſtifiable as that good woman's. I hope I have done you no injury, that I here ſuppoſe you of the church of England; if I have, I beg your pardon. It is no offence of malice, I aſſure you: for I ſuppoſe no worſe of you, than I confeſs of myſelf.

“ SOMETIMES this puniſhment that you contend for, is, to bring men A. p. 22. to act according to reaſon and ſound judgment.

Tertius è cœlo cecidit Cato.

“ THIS is reformation indeed. If you can help us to it, you will deſerve ſtatues to be erected to you, as to the reſtorer of decayed religion. But if all men have not reaſon and ſound judgment, will puniſhment put it into them? Beſides, concerning this matter mankind is ſo divided, that he acts according to reaſon and ſound judgment at Augſburg, who would be judged to do quite the contrary at Edinburgh. Will puniſhment make men know what is reaſon and ſound judgment? If it will not, it is impoſſible it ſhould make them act according to it. Reaſon and ſound judgment are the elixir itſelf, the univerſal remedy: and you may as reaſonably puniſh men to bring them to have the philoſopher's ſtone, as to bring them to act according to reaſon and ſound judgment.

“ SOMETIMES it is, To put men upon a ſerious and impartial examinati- A. p. 26. on of the controverſy between the magiſtrate and them, which is the way for them to come to the knowledge of the truth. But what if the truth be on neither ſide, as I am apt to imagine you will think it is not, where neither the magiſtrate nor the diſſenter is either of them of your church, how will the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and him be the way to come to the knowledge of the truth? Suppoſe the controverſy between a Lutheran and a Papiſt; or if you pleaſe, between a Preſbyterian magiſtrate and a Quaker ſubject, will the examining the controverſy between

“ the magiſtrate and the diſſenting ſubject, in this caſe, bring him to the knowledge of the truth? If you ſay, Yes, then you grant one of theſe to have the truth on his ſide. For the examining the controverſy between a Preſbyterian and a Quaker, leaves the controverſy either of them has with the church of England, or any other church, untouched. And ſo one, at leaſt, of thoſe being already come to the knowledge of the truth, ought not to be put under your diſcipline of puniſhment; which is only to bring him to the truth. If you ſay, No, and that the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and the diſſenter, in this caſe, will not bring him to the knowledge of the truth; you confeſs your rule to be falſe, and your method to no purpoſe.

“ To conclude, your ſyſtem is, in ſhort, this. You would have all men, laying aſide prejudice, humour, paſſion, &c. examine the grounds of their religion, and ſearch for the truth. This, I confeſs, is heartily to be wiſhed. The means that you propoſe to make men do this, is, that diſſenters ſhould be puniſhed to make them do ſo. It is as if you had ſaid, men generally are guilty of a fault; therefore let one ſect, who have the ill luck to be of an opinion different from the magiſtrate, be puniſhed. This, at firſt ſight, ſhocks any one who has the leaſt ſpark of ſenſe, reaſon, or juſtice. But having ſpoken of this already, and concluding that upon ſecond thoughts, you yourſelf will be aſhamed of it; let us conſider it put ſo as to be conſiſtent with common ſenſe, and with all the advantage it can bear, and then let us ſee what you can make of it. Men are negligent in examining the religions they embrace, refuſe, or perſiſt in; therefore it is fit they ſhould be puniſhed to make them do it. This is a conſequence indeed which may, without defiance to common ſenſe be drawn from it. This is the uſe, the only uſe, which you think puniſhment can indirectly and at a diſtance have in matters of religion. You would have men by puniſhments driven to examine. What? Religion. To what end? To bring them to the knowledge of the truth. But I anſwer,

“ FIRST, Every one has not the ability to do this.

“ SECONDLY, Every one has not the opportunity to do it.

“ WOULD you have every poor Proteſtant, for example, in the Palatinate, examine throughly whether the pope be infallible, or head of the church; whether there be a purgatory; whether ſaints are to be prayed to, or the dead prayed for; whether the Scripture be the only rule of faith; whether there be no ſalvation out of the church; and whether there be no church without biſhops; and an hundred other things in controverſy between the Papiſts and thoſe Proteſtants: and when he had maſtered theſe, go on to fortify himſelf againſt the opinions and objections of other churches he differs from? This, which is no ſmall taſk, muſt be done, before a man can have brought his religion to the bar of reaſon, and given it fair trial there. And if you will puniſh men till this be done, the countryman muſt leave off plowing and ſowing, and betake himſelf to the ſtudy of Greek and Latin; and the artiſan muſt ſell his tools, to buy fathers and ſchoolmen, and leave his family to ſtarve. If ſomething leſs

“ than this will ſatisfy you, pray tell me what is enough. Have they con-
“ ſidered and examined enough, if they are ſatisfied themſelves where the
“ truth lies? If this be the limits of their examination, you will find few
“ to puniſh; unleſs you will puniſh them to make them do what they have
“ done already. For, however he came by his religion, there is ſcarce any
“ one to be found who does not own himſelf ſatisfied that he is in the
“ right. Or elſe, muſt they be puniſhed to make them conſider and ex-
“ amine, till they embrace that which you chuſe for truth? If this be ſo,
“ what do you but in effect chuſe for them, when yet you would have men
“ puniſhed, to bring them to ſuch a care of their ſouls that no other perſon
“ might chuſe for them? If it be truth in general you would have them A. p. 22.
“ by puniſhments driven to ſeek; that is to offer matter of diſpute, and
“ not a rule of diſcipline. For to puniſh any one to make him ſeek till
“ he find truth, without a judge of truth, is to puniſh for you know not
“ what; and is all one as if you ſhould whip a ſcholar to make him find
“ out the ſquare root of a number you do not know. I wonder not there-
“ fore that you could not reſolve with yourſelf what degree of ſeverity you
“ would have uſed, nor how long continued; when you dare not ſpeak out
“ directly whom you would have puniſhed, and are far from being clear to
“ what end they ſhould be under penalties.

“ CONSONANT to this uncertainty, of whom, or what, to be puniſhed;
“ you tell us, that there is no queſtion of the ſucceſs of this method. Force A. p. 12.
“ will certainly do, if duly proportioned to the deſign of it.

“ WHAT, I pray, is the deſign of it? I challenge you, or any man living,
“ out of what you have ſaid in your book, to tell me directly what it is.
“ In all other puniſhments that ever I heard of yet, till now that you have
“ taught the world a new method, the deſign of them has been to cure
“ the crime they are denounced againſt; and ſo I think it ought to be here.
“ What, I beſeech you, is the crime here? Diſſenting? That you ſay A. p. 21.
“ not, any where, is a fault. Beſides you tell us, that the magiſtrate hath A. p. 25.
“ not an authority to compel any one to his religion. And that you do not
“ require that men ſhould have no rule but the religion of the country. And A. p. 26.
“ the power you aſcribe to the magiſtrate is given him to bring men, not to
“ his own, but to the true religion. If diſſenting be not the fault; is it that
“ a man does not examine his own religion, and the grounds of it? Is that
“ the crime your puniſhments are deſigned to cure? Neither that dare you
“ ſay, leaſt you diſpleaſe more than you ſatisfy with your new diſcipline.
“ And then again, as I ſaid before, you muſt tell us how far you would
“ have them examine, before you puniſh them for not doing it. And I
“ imagine, if that were all we required of you, it would be long enough
“ before you would trouble us with a law, that ſhould preſcribe to every
“ one how far he was to examine matters of religion; wherein if he failed,
“ and came ſhort, he was to be puniſhed; if he performed, and went in
“ his examination to the bounds ſet by the law, he was acquitted and free.
“ Sir, when you conſider it again, you will perhaps think this a caſe re-
“ ſerved to the great day, when the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open.

“For I imagine it is beyond the power or judgment of man, in that variety of circumſtances, in reſpect of parts, tempers, opportunities, helps, &c. men are in, in this world, to determine what is every one's duty in this great buſineſs of ſearch, inquiry, examination, or to know when any one has done it. That which makes me believe you will be of this A. p. 12. mind, is, that where you undertake for the ſucceſs of this method, if rightly uſed, it is with a limitation, upon ſuch as are not altogether incurable. So that when your remedy is prepared according to art, which art is yet unknown, and rightly applied, and given in a due doſe, all which are ſecrets, it will then infallibly cure. Whom? All that are not incurable by it. And ſo will a pippin-poſſet, eating fiſh in Lent, or a Preſbyterian lecture certainly cure all that are not incurable by them. For I am ſure you do not mean it will cure all, but thoſe who are abſolutely incurable; becauſe you yourſelf allow one means left of cure, when yours will not A. p. 10. do, viz. The grace of God. Your words are, what means is there left (except the grace of God) to reduce them, but to lay thorns and briars in their A. p. 12. way. And here alſo, in the place we were conſidering, you tell us, the incurable are to be left to God. Whereby, if you mean they are to be left to thoſe means he has ordained for mens converſion and ſalvation, yours muſt never be made uſe of: for he indeed has preſcribed preaching, and hearing of his word; but as for thoſe who will not hear, I do not find any where that he has commanded that they ſhould be compelled or beaten to it.”

I MUST beg my reader's pardon for ſo long a repetition, which I was forced to, that he might be judge whether what I there ſaid, either deſerves no anſwer, or be fully anſwered in that paragraph, where you undertake to vindicate your method from all impracticableneſs and inconſiſtency chargeable upon it, in reference to the end for which you would have men puniſhed. P. 48. Your words are. For what? By which, you ſay, “you perceive I mean two things: for ſometimes I ſpeak of the fault, and ſometimes of the end for which men are to be puniſhed, (and ſometimes I plainly confound them.) Now if it be enquired, for what fault men are to be puniſhed? you anſwer, for rejecting the true religion, after ſufficient evidence tendered them of the truth of it: which certainly is a fault, and deſerves puniſhment. But if I enquire for what end ſuch as do reject the true religion, are to be puniſhed; you ſay, to bring them to embrace the true religion; and in order to that to bring them to conſider, and that carefully and impartially, the evidence which is offered to convince them of the truth of it: which are undeniably juſt and excellent ends; and which, through God's bleſſing, have often been procured, and may yet be procured by convenient penalties inflicted for that purpoſe. Nor do you know of any thing I ſay againſt any part of this, which is not already anſwered.” Whether I in this confound two things diſtinct, or you diſtinguiſh where there is no difference, the reader may judge by what I have ſaid elſewhere. I ſhall here only conſider the ends of puniſhing, you here again in your reply to me aſſign; and thoſe, as I find them ſcattered, are theſe.

SOMETIMES you ſpeak of this end, as if it were “ barely to gain a hearing P. 27.
“ to thoſe who by prayers and intreaty cannot:” And thoſe may
be the preachers of any religion. But I ſuppoſe you mean the preachers
of the true religion. And who I beſeech you muſt be judge of
that?

“ WHERE the law provides ſufficient means of inſtruction for all, as well P. 28.
“ as puniſhment for Diſſenters, it is plain to all concerned, that the puniſhment
“ is intended to make them conſider.” What? The means the law provides
for their inſtruction. Who then is judge of what they are to be inſtructed
in, and the means of inſtruction, but the law-maker?

“ IT is to bring men to hearken to inſtruction.” From whom? From any P. 37.
body? “ And to conſider and examine matters of religion as they ought to do,
“ and to bring thoſe who are out of the right way, to hear, conſider, and
“ embrace the truth.” When is this end attained, and the penalties which
are the means to this end taken off? When a man conforms to the national
church. And who then is judge of what is the truth to be embraced, but
the magiſtrate?

“ IT is to bring men to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper P. 26.
“ and ſufficient to convince them; but which, without being forced, they
“ would not conſider.” And when have they done this? When they have
once conformed: for after that there is no force uſed to make them conſider
farther.

“ IT is to make men conſider as they ought;” and that you tell us, is ſo to P. 40.
conſider, “ as to be moved heartily to embrace, and not to reject truth neceſſary P. 28.
“ to ſalvation.” And when is the magiſtrate, that has the care of mens
ſouls, and does all this for their ſalvation, ſatisfied that they have ſo conſidered?
As ſoon as they outwardly join in communion with the national
church.

“ IT is to bring men to conſider and examine thoſe controverſies which they P. 2.
“ are bound to conſider and examine, i. e. thoſe wherein they cannot err without
“ diſhonouring God, and indangering their own and other mens ſalvations. P. 58.
“ And to ſtudy the true religion with ſuch care and diligence as they might
“ and ought to uſe, and with an honeſt mind.” And when, in your opinion,
is it preſumable that any man has done all this? Even when he is in the communion
of your church.

“ IT is to cure mens unreaſonable prejudices and refractorineſs againſt, and P. 53.
“ averſion to, the true religion.” Whereof none retain the leaſt tincture or
ſuſpicion, who are once got within the pale of your church.

“ IT is to bring men into the right way, into the way of ſalvation,” which P. 30, 58.
force does, when it has conducted them within the church-porch, and there
leaves them.

“ IT is to bring men to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them.” And here, P. 26.
in the paragraph wherein you pretend to tell us for what force is to be uſed,
you ſay, “ It is to bring men to embrace the true religion, and in order to that P. 49.
“ to bring them to conſider, and that carefully and impartially, the evidence
“ which is offered to convince them of the truth of it, which, as you ſay,

P. 47. “ are undeniably juſt and excellent ends;” but yet ſuch as force in your method can never practically be made a means to, without ſuppoſing what you ſay you have no need to ſuppoſe, viz. That your religion is the true; unleſs you had rather every where leave it to the magiſtrate to judge which is the right way, what is the true religion; which ſuppoſition, I imagine, will leſs accommodate you than the other. But take which of them you will, you muſt add this other ſuppoſition to it, harder to be granted you than either of the former, viz. that thoſe who conform to your church here, if you make yourſelf the judge, or to the national church any where, if you make the magiſtrate judge of the truth that muſt ſave men, and thoſe only have attained theſe ends.

The magiſtrate, you ſay, is obliged to do what in him lies to bring all his ſubjects “ to examine carefully and impartially matters of religion, and to “ conſider them as they ought, i. e. ſo as to embrace the truth that muſt ſave “ them.” The proper and neceſſary means, you ſay, to attain theſe ends is force. And your method of uſing this force is to puniſh all the Diſſenters from the national religion, and none of thoſe who outwardly conform to it. Make this practicable now in any country in the world, without allowing the magiſtrate to be judge what is the truth that muſt ſave them, and without ſuppoſing alſo, that whoever do embrace the outward profeſſion of the national religion, do in their hearts embrace, i. e. believe and obey the truth that muſt ſave them; and then I think nothing in government can be too hard for your undertaking.

P. 49. You conclude this paragraph in telling me, “ You do not know of any “ thing I ſay againſt any part of this, which is not already anſwered.” Pray tell me where it is you have anſwered thoſe objections I made to thoſe ſeveral ends which you aſſigned in your “ Argument conſidered,” and for which you would have force uſed, and which I have here reprinted again, becauſe I do not find you ſo much as take notice of them: and therefore the reader muſt judge whether they needed any anſwer or no.

But to ſhew that you have not here, where you promiſe and pretend to do it, clearly and directly told us for what force and penalties are to be uſed, I ſhall in the next chapter examine what you mean “ by bringing men to “ embrace the true religion.”

## CHAP. VII.

## Of your bringing men to the true religion.

TRUE religion is on all hands acknowledged to be ſo much the concern and intereſt of all mankind, that nothing can be named, which ſo much effectually beſpeaks the approbation and favour of the publick. The very entitling one's ſelf to that, ſets a man on the right ſide. Who dares queſtion ſuch a cauſe, or oppoſe what is offered for the promoting the true religion? This advantage you have ſecured to yourſelf from unattentive readers as much as by the often repeated mention of the true religion is poſſible, there being ſcarce a page wherein the true religion does not appear, as if you had nothing elſe in your thoughts, but the bringing men to it for the ſalvation of their ſouls. Whether it be ſo in earneſt, we will now ſee.

You tell us, "Whatever hardſhips ſome falſe religions may impoſe, it will however always be eaſier to carnal and worldly-minded men, to give even their firſt-born for their tranſgreſſions, than to mortify the luſts from which they ſpring, which no religion but the true requires of them." P. 7. Upon this you ground the neceſſity of force to bring men to the true religion, and charge it on the magiſtrate as his duty to uſe it to that end. What now in appearance can expreſs greater care to bring men to the true religion? But let us ſee what you ſay in p. 64. and we ſhall find that in your ſcheme nothing, leſs is meant: there you tell us, "The magiſtrate inflicts the penalties only upon them that break the laws:" and that law requiring nothing but conformity to the national religion, none but Nonconformiſts are puniſhed. So that unleſs an outward profeſſion of the national religion be by the mortification of mens luſt harder than their giving their firſt-born for their tranſgreſſions, all the penalties you contend for concern not, nor can be intended to bring men effectually to the true religion; ſince they leave them before they come to the difficulty, which is to mortify their luſts, as the true religion requires. So that your bringing men to the true religion, being to bring them to Conformity to the national, for then you have done with force, how far that outward Conformity is from being heartily of the true religion, may be known by the diſtance there is between the eaſieſt and the hardeſt thing in the world. For there is nothing eaſier, than to profeſs in words; nothing harder, than to ſubdue the heart, and bring thoughts and deeds into obedience of the truth: the latter is what is required to be of the true religion; the other all that is required by penalties your way applied. If you ſay, Conformiſts to the national religion are required by the law civil and eccleſiaſtical, to lead good lives, which is the difficult part of the true religion: I anſwer, theſe are not the laws we are here ſpeaking of, nor thoſe which the defenders of Toleration complain of, but the laws that put a diſtinction between outward Conformiſts and Nonconformiſts: and thoſe they ſay, whatever may be talked of the true religion, can never be meant to bring men really to the true religion, as long as the true religion is, and is confeſſed to be, a thing of ſo much greater difficulty than outward Conformity.

MIRACLES, ſay you, ſupplied the want of force in the beginning of Chriſtianity; and therefore ſo far as they ſupplied that want, they muſt be ſubſervient to the ſame end. The end then was to bring men into the Chriſtian church, into which they were admitted and received as brethren, when they acknowledged that Jeſus was the Chriſt, the Son of God. Will that ſerve the turn? No: force muſt be uſed to make men embrace creeds and ceremonies, i. e. outwardly conform to the doctrine and worſhip of your church. Nothing more than that is required by your penalties; nothing leſs than that will excuſe from puniſhment: that, and nothing but that, will

will ſerve the turn; that therefore, and only that, is what you mean by the true religion you would have force uſed to bring men to.

L. II. p. 387. WHEN I tell you, “You have a very ill opinion of the religion of the church of England, and muſt own it can only be propagated and ſupported by force, if you do not think it would be a gainer by a general Toleration P. 10. all the world over:” You aſk, “Why you may not have as good an opinion of the church of England's, as you have of Noah's religion, notwithſtanding you think it cannot now be propagated or ſupported without uſing ſome kinds or degrees of force.” When you have proved that Noah's religion, that from eight perſons ſpread and continued in the world till the Apoſtles times, as I have proved in another place, was propagated and ſupported all that while by your kinds or degrees of force, you may have ſome reaſon to think as well of the religion of the church of England, as you have of Noah's religion, though you think it cannot be propagated and ſupported without ſome kinds or degrees of force. But till you can prove that, you cannot upon that ground ſay you have reaſon to have ſo good an opinion of it.

P. 11. YOU tell me, “If I will take your word for it, you aſſure me you think there are many other countries in the world beſides England, where my Toleration would be as little uſeful to truth as in England.” If you will name thoſe countries, which will be no great pains, I will take your word for it, that you believe Toleration there would be prejudicial to truth: but if you will not do that, neither I nor any body elſe can believe you. I will give you a reaſon why I ſay ſo, and that is, becauſe no body can believe that, upon your principles, you can allow any national religion, differing from that of the church of England, to be true; and where the national religion is not true, we have already your conſent, as in Spain and Italy, &c. for Toleration. Now that you cannot, without renouncing your own principles, allow any national religion, differing from that eſtabliſhed here by law, to be true, is evident: For why do you puniſh Nonconformiſts here? “To bring them, ſay you, to the true religion.” But what if they hold nothing, but what that other differing national church does, ſhall they be nevertheleſs puniſhed if they conform not? You will certainly ſay, yes: and if ſo, then you muſt either ſay, they are not of the true religion, or elſe you muſt own you puniſh thoſe, to bring them to the true religion, whom you allow to be the true religion already.

P. 11. YOU tell me, “If I own with our author, that there is but one true religion, and I owning myſelf to be of the church of England, you cannot ſee how I can avoid ſuppoſing, that the national religion now in England, backed by the publick authority of the law, is the only true religion.” If I own, as I do, all that you here expect from me, yet it will not ſerve to draw that concluſion from it, which you do, viz. That the national religion now in England is the only true religion; taking the true religion in the ſenſe that I do, and you ought to take it. I grant that there is but one true religion in the world, which is that whoſe doctrine and worſhip are neceſſary to ſalvation. I grant too that the true religion, neceſſary to ſalvation, is taught and profeſſed in the church of England: and yet it will not follow from hence, that the religion of the church of England, as eſtabliſhed by law, is the only true religion; if there be any thing eſtabliſhed in the church of England by law, and made part of its religion, which is not neceſſary to ſalvation, and which any other church, teaching and profeſſing all that is neceſſary to ſalvation, does not receive.

IF the national religion now in England, backed by the authority of the law, be as you would have it, the only true religion; ſo the only true religion, that a man cannot be ſaved without being of it; pray reconcile this, with what you ſay in the immediately preceding paragraph, viz. "That there are many "other countries in the world where my Toleration would be as little uſeful "as in England." For if there be other national religions differing from that of England, which you allow to be true, and wherein men may be ſaved, the national religion of England, as now eſtabliſhed by law, is not the only true religion, and men may be ſaved without being of it. And then the magiſtrate can upon your principles have no authority to uſe force to bring men to be of it. For you tell us, force is not lawful, unleſs it be neceſſary; and therefore the magiſtrate can never lawfully uſe it, but to bring men to believe and practiſe what is neceſſary to ſalvation. You muſt therefore either hold, that there is nothing in the doctrine, diſcipline and ceremonies of the church of England, as it is eſtabliſhed by law, but what is neceſſary to ſalvation: or elſe you muſt reform your terms of communion, before the magiſtrate upon your principles can uſe penalties to make men conſider till they conform; or you can ſay that the national religion of England is the only true religion, though it contain the only true religion in it; as poſſibly moſt, if not all, the differing Chriſtian churches now in the world do.

YOU tell us farther in the next paragraph, "That wherever this only true "religion, i. e. the national religion now in England, is received, all other "religions ought to be diſcouraged." Why I beſeech you diſcouraged, if they be true any of them? For if they be true, what pretence is there for force to bring men who are of them to the true religion? If you ſay all other religions, varying at all from that of the church of England, are falſe; we know then your meaſure of the one only true religion. But that your care is only of Conformity to the church of England, and that by the true religion you mean nothing elſe, appears too from your way of expreſſing yourſelf in this paſſage, where you own that you ſuppoſe that as this only true religion, to wit, the national religion now in England, backed with the publick authority of law, "ought to be received wherever it is preached; ſo wherever it is received, all other religions ought to be diſcouraged in ſome meaſure by the civil powers." If the religion eſtabliſhed by law in England, be the only true religion, ought it not to be preached and received every where, and all other religions diſcouraged throughout the world? and ought not the magiſtrates of all countries to take care that it ſhould be ſo? But you only ſay, wherever it is preached it ought to be received; and wherever it is received, other religions ought to be diſcouraged, which is well ſuited to your ſcheme for enforcing conformity in England, but could ſcarce drop from a man P. 11. Ibid.

whoſe thoughts were on the true religion, and the promoting of it in other parts of the world.

FORCE then muſt be uſed in England, and penalties laid on Diſſenters there. For what? "to bring them to the true religion," whereby it is plain you mean not only the doctrine but diſcipline and ceremonies of the church of England, and make them a part of the only true religion: why elſe do you puniſh all Diſſenters for rejecting the true religion, and uſe force to bring them to it? When yet a great, if not the greateſt part of Diſſenters in England own and profeſs the doctrine of the church of England, as firmly as thoſe in the communion of the church of England. They therefore, though they believe the ſame religion with you, are excluded from the true church of God, that you would have men brought to, and are amongſt thoſe who reject the true religion.

I ASK whether they are not in your opinion out of the way of ſalvation, who are not joined in communion with the true church? and whether there can be any true church without biſhops? If ſo, all but Conformiſts in England that are of any church in Europe, beſides the Lutherans and Papiſts, are out of the way of ſalvation, and ſo according to your ſyſtem have need of force to be brought into it: and theſe too, one for their doctrine of tranſubſtantiation, the other for that of conſubſtantiation, to omit other things vaſtly differing from the church of England, you will not, I ſuppoſe, allow to be of the true religion: and who then are left of the true religion but the church of England? For the Abyſſines have too wide a difference in many points for me to imagine, that is one of thoſe places you mean where Toleration would do harm as well as in England. And I think the religion of the Greek church can ſcarce be ſuppoſed by you to be the true. For if it ſhould, it would be a ſtrong inſtance againſt your aſſertion, that the true religion cannot ſubſiſt, but would quickly be effectually extirpated without the aſſiſtance of authority; ſince this has ſubſiſted without any ſuch aſſiſtance now above two hundred years. I take it then for granted, and others with me cannot but do the ſame, till you tell us, what other religion there is of any church, but that of England, which you allow to be the true religion, that all you ſay of bringing men to the true religion, is only bringing them to the religion of the church of England. If I do you an injury in this, it will be capable of a very eaſy vindication: for it is but naming that other church differing from that of England, which you allow to have the true religion, and I ſhall yield myſelf convinced, and ſhall allow theſe P. 11. words, viz. "The national religion now in England, backed by the publick "authority of law, being the only true religion," only as a little haſty ſally of your zeal. In the mean time I ſhall argue with you about the uſe of force to bring men to the religion of the church of England, as eſtabliſhed by law: ſince it is more eaſy to know what that is, than what you mean by the true religion, if you mean any thing elſe.

To proceed therefore; in the next place I tell you, by uſing force your way to bring men to the religion of the church of England, you mean only to bring them to an outward profeſſion of that religion; and that, as I have told you elſewhere, becauſe force uſed your way, being applied only to Diſſenters, and ceaſing as ſoon as they conform, whether it be intended by the law-maker for any thing more or no, which we have examined in another place; cannot be to bring men to any thing more than outward Conformity. For if force be uſed to Diſſenters, and them only, to bring men to the true religion, and always as ſoon as it has brought men to Conformity, it be taken off, and laid aſide, as having done all is expected from it; it is plain, that by bringing men to the true religion, and bringing them to outward Conformity, you mean the ſame thing. You uſe and continue force upon Diſſenters, becauſe you expect ſome effect from it: when you take it off, it has wrought that effect, or elſe being in your power, why do you not continue it on? The effect then that you talk of, being the embracing the true religion, and the thing you are ſatisfied with without any farther puniſhment, expectation, or enquiry, being outward Conformity, it is plain embracing the true religion and outward Conformity with you, are the ſame things.

NEITHER can you ſay it is preſumable that thoſe who outwardly conform do really underſtand, and inwardly in their hearts embrace with a lively faith and a ſincere obedience, the truth that muſt ſave them. 1. Becauſe it being, as you tell us, the magiſtrate's duty to do all that in him lies for the ſalvation of all his ſubjects, and it being in his power to examine, whether they know and live ſuitable to the truth that muſt ſave them, as well as conform, he can or ought no more to preſume, that they do ſo, without taking an account of their knowledge and lives, than he can or ought to preſume that they conform, without taking any account of their coming to church. Would you think that phyſician diſcharged his duty, and had, as was pretended, a care of mens lives, who having got them into his hands, and knowing no more of them, but that they come once or twice a week to the apothecary's ſhop, to hear what is preſcribed them, and ſit there a while, ſhould ſay it was preſumable they were recovered, without ever examining whether his preſcriptions had any effect, or what eſtate their health was in?

2. IT cannot be preſumable, where there are ſo many viſible inſtances to the contrary. He muſt paſs for an admirable preſumer, who will ſeriouſly affirm that it is preſumable that all thoſe who conform to the national religion where it is true, do ſo underſtand, believe and practiſe it, as to be in the way of ſalvation.

3. IT cannot be preſumable, that men have parted with their corruption and luſts to avoid force, when they fly to Conformity, which can ſhelter them from force without quitting their luſts. That which is dearer to men than their firſt-born, is, you tell us, their luſts; that which is harder than the hardſhips of falſe religions, is the mortifying thoſe luſts: here lies the difficulty of the true religion, that it requires the mortifying of thoſe luſts; and till that be done, men are not of the true religion, nor in the way of ſalvation: and it is upon this account only that you pretend force to be needful. Force is uſed to make them hear; it prevails, men hear: but that is not enough, becauſe the difficulty lies not in that; they may

P. 7.

hear arguments for the truth, and yet retain their corruption. They muſt do more, they muſt conſider thoſe arguments. Who requires it of them? The law that inflicts the puniſhment, does not; but this we may be ſure their love of their luſts, and their hatred of puniſhment requires of them, and will bring them to, viz. to conſider how to retain their beloved luſts, and yet avoid the uneaſineſs of the puniſhment they lie under; this is preſumable they do; therefore they go one eaſy ſtep farther, they conform, and then they are ſafe from force, and may ſtill retain their corruption. Is it therefore preſumable they have parted with their corruption, becauſe force has driven them to take ſanctuary againſt puniſhment in conformity, where force is no longer to moleſt them, or pull them from their darling inclinations? The difficulty in religion is, you ſay, for men to part with their luſts; this makes force neceſſary: men find out a way by conforming, to avoid force without parting with their luſts; therefore it is preſumable when they conform, that force which they can avoid without quitting their luſts, has made them part with them; which is indeed not to part with their luſts, becauſe of force, but to part with them gratis; which if you can ſay is preſumable, the foundation of your need of force, which you place in the prevalency of corruption, and mens adhering to their luſts, will be gone, and ſo there will be no need of force at all. If the great difficulty in religion be for men to part with or mortify their luſts, and the only counterbalance in the other ſcale, to aſſiſt the true religion, to prevail againſt their luſts, be force; which I beſeech you is preſumable, if they can avoid force, and retain their luſts, that they ſhould quit their luſts, and heartily embrace the true religion, which is incompatible with them; or elſe that they ſhould avoid the force, and retain their luſts? To ſay the former of theſe, is to ſay that it is preſumable, that they will quit their luſts, and heartily embrace the true religion for its own ſake: for he that heartily embraces the true religion, becauſe of a force which he knows he can avoid at pleaſure, without quitting his luſts, cannot be ſaid ſo to embrace it, becauſe of that force: ſince a force he can avoid without quitting his luſts, cannot be ſaid to aſſiſt truth in making him quit them: for in this truth has no aſſiſtance from it at all. So that this is to ſay there is no need of force at all in the caſe.

TAKE a covetous wretch, whoſe heart is ſo ſet upon money, that he would give his firſt-born to ſave his bags; who is purſued by the force of the magiſtrate to an arreſt, and compelled to hear what is alledged againſt him; and the proſecution of the law threatening impriſonment or other puniſhment, if he do not pay the juſt debt which is demanded of him: if he enters himſelf in the King's-bench, where he can enjoy his freedom without paying the debt, and parting with his money; will you ſay that it is preſumable he did it to pay the debt, and not to avoid the force of the law? The luſt of the fleſh and pride of life are as ſtrong and prevalent as the luſt of the eye: and if you will deliberately ſay again, that it is preſumable, that men are driven by force to conſider, ſo as to part with their luſts, when no more is known of them, but that they do what diſcharges them from the force, without any neceſſity of parting with their luſts; I think I ſhall have occaſion to ſend you to my Pagans and Mahometans, but ſhall have no need to ſay any thing more to you of this matter myſelf.

I agree with you, that there is but one only true religion; I agree too that that one only true religion is profeſſed and held in the church of England; and yet I deny, if force may be uſed to bring men to that true religion, that upon your principles it can lawfully be uſed to bring men to the national religion in England as eſtabliſhed by law; becauſe force, according to your own rule, being only lawful becauſe it is neceſſary, and therefore unfit to be uſed where not neceſſary, i. e. neceſſary to bring men to ſalvation, it can never be lawful to be uſed to bring a man to any thing, that is not neecſſary to ſalvation, as I have more fully ſhewn in another place. If therefore in the national religion of England, there be any thing put in as neceſſary to communion, that is, though true, yet not neceſſary to ſalvation, force cannot be lawfully uſed to bring men to that communion, though the thing ſo required in itſelf may perhaps be true.

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THERE be a great many truths contained in Scripture, which a man may be ignorant of, and conſequently not believe, without any danger to his ſalvation, or elſe very few would be capable of ſalvation: for I think I may truly ſay, there was never any one, but he that was the Wiſdom of the Father, who was not ignorant of ſome, and miſtaken in others of them. To bring men therefore to embrace ſuch truths, the uſe of force by your own rule cannot be lawful: becauſe the belief or knowledge of thoſe truths themſelves not being neceſſary to ſalvation, there can be no neceſſity men ſhould be brought to embrace them, and ſo no neceſſity to uſe force to bring men to embrace them.

THE only true religion which is neceſſary to ſalvation, may in one national church have that joined with it, which in itſelf is manifeſtly falſe and repugnant to ſalvation; in ſuch a communion no man can join without quitting the way to ſalvation. In another national church, with this only true religion may be joined, what is neither repugnant nor neceſſary to ſalvation; and of ſuch there may be ſeveral churches differing one from another in confeſſions, ceremonies and diſcipline, which are uſually called different religions, with either or each of which a good man, if ſatisfied in his own mind, may communicate without danger, whilſt another not ſatisfied in conſcience concerning ſomething in the doctrine, diſcipline, or worſhip, cannot ſafely, nor without ſin, communicate with this or that of them. Nor can force be lawfully uſed, on your principles, to bring any man to either of them, becauſe ſuch things are required to their communion, which not being requiſite to ſalvation, men may ſeriouſly and conſcientiouſly differ, and be in doubt about, without endangering their ſouls.

THAT which here raiſes a noiſe, and gives a credit to it, whereby many are miſled into an unwarrantable zeal, is, that theſe are called different religions; and every one thinking his own the true, the only true condemns all the reſt as falſe religions. Whereas thoſe who hold all things neceſſary to

ſalvation,

ſalvation, and add not thereto any thing in doctrine, diſcipline or worſhip, inconſiſtent with ſalvation, are of one and the ſame religion, though divided into different ſocieties or churches, under different forms: which whether the paſſion and polity of deſigning; or the ſober and pious intention of well-meaning men, ſet up, they are no other than the contrivances of men, and ſuch they ought to be eſteemed in whatſoever is required in them, which God has not made neceſſary to ſalvation, however in its own nature it may be indifferent, lawful or true. For none of the articles, or confeſſions of any church, that I know, containing in them all the truths of religion, though they contain ſome that are not neceſſary to ſalvation; to garble thus the truths of religion, and by their own authority take ſome not neceſſary to ſalvation, and make them the terms of communion, and leave out others as neceſſary to be known and believed; is purely the contrivance of men: God never having appointed any ſuch diſtinguiſhing ſyſtem: nor, as I have ſhewed, can force, upon your principles, lawfully be uſed to bring men to embrace it.

CONCERNING ceremonies, I ſhall here only aſk you whether you think kneeling at the Lord's Supper, or the croſs in baptiſm, are neceſſary to ſalvation? I mention theſe as having been matter of great ſcruple: if you will not ſay they are, how can you ſay that force can be lawfully uſed to bring men into a communion, to which theſe are made neceſſary? If you ſay, Kneeling is neceſſary to a decent uniformity, for of the croſs in baptiſm I have ſpoken elſewhere, though that ſhould be true, yet it is an argument you cannot uſe for it, if you are of the church of England: for if a decent uniformity may be well enough preſerved without kneeling at prayer, where decency requires it at leaſt as much as at receiving the Sacrament, why may it not well enough be preſerved without kneeling at the Sacrament? Now that uniformity is thought ſufficiently preſerved without kneeling at prayer, is evident by the various poſtures men are at liberty to uſe, and may be generally obſerved, in all our congregations, during the miniſter's prayer in the pulpit before and after his ſermon, which it ſeems can conſiſt well enough with decency and uniformity; though it be a prayer addreſſed to the great God of heaven and earth, to whoſe majeſty it is that the reverence to be expreſſed in our geſtures, is due, when we put up petitions to him, who is invariably the ſame, in what or whoſe words ſoever we addreſs ourſelves to him.

THE preface to the Book of Common-Prayer tell us, "That the rites and "ceremonies appointed to be uſed in divine worſhip, are things in their own "nature indifferent and alterable." Here I aſk you, whether any human power can make any thing in its own nature indifferent, neceſſary to ſalvation? If it cannot, then neither can any human power be juſtified in the uſe of force, to bring men to conformity in the uſe of ſuch things. If you think men have authority to make any thing, in itſelf indifferent, a neceſſary part of God's worſhip, I ſhall deſire you to conſider what our author ſays of this matter, which has not yet deſerved your notice.

“ THE miſapplying his power, you ſay, is a ſin in the magiſtrate, and lays “ him open to divine vengeance.” And is it not a miſapplying of his power, and a ſin in him to uſe force to bring men to ſuch a compliance in an indifferent thing, which in religious worſhip may be a ſin to them? Force, you ſay, may be uſed to puniſh thoſe who diſſent from the communion of the church of England. Let us ſuppoſe now all its doctrines not only true, but neceſſary to ſalvation; but that there is put into the terms of its communion ſome indifferent action which God has not injoined, nor made a part of his worſhip, which any man is perſuaded in his conſcience not to be lawful; ſuppoſe kneeling at the Sacrament, which having been ſuperſtitiouſly uſed in adoration of the bread, as the real body of Chriſt, may give occaſion of ſcruple to ſome now, as well as eating of fleſh offered to idols did to others in the Apoſtles time; which though lawful in itſelf, yet the Apoſtle ſaid, “ he would eat no fleſh while the world ſtandeth, rather than to make his “ weak brother offend,” 1 Cor. viii. 13. And if to lead, by example, the ſcrupulous into any action, in itſelf indifferent, which they thought unlawful, be a ſin, as appears at large, Rom. xiv. how much more is it to add force to our example, and to compel men by puniſhments to that, which, though indifferent in itſelf, they cannot join in without ſinning? I deſire you to ſhew me how force can be neceſſary in ſuch a caſe, without which you acknowledge it not to be lawful. Not to kneel at the Lord's Supper, God not having ordained it, is not a ſin; and the Apoſtles receiving it in the poſture of ſitting or lying, which was then uſed at meat, is an evidence it may be received not kneeling. But to him that thinks kneeling is unlawful, it is certainly a ſin. And for this you may take the authority of a very judicious and reverend prelate of our church, in theſe words; “ Where a man “ is miſtaken in his judgment, even in that caſe, it is always a ſin to act “ againſt it; by ſo doing, he wilfully acts againſt the beſt light which at “ preſent he has for the direction of his actions.” Diſc. of Conſcience, p. 18. I need not here repeat his reaſons, having already quoted him above more at large; though the whole paſſage, writ, as he uſes, with great ſtrength and clearneſs, deſerves to be read and conſidered. If therefore the magiſtrate enjoins ſuch an unneceſſary ceremony, and uſes force to bring any man to a ſinful communion with our church in it, let me aſk you, doth he ſin, or miſapply his power or no?

TRUE and falſe religions are names that eaſily engage mens affections on the hearing of them; the one being the averſion, the other the deſire, at leaſt as they perſuade themſelves, of all mankind. This makes men forwardly give into theſe names, wherever they meet with them; and when mention is made of bringing men from falſe to the true religion, very often without knowing what is meant by thoſe names, they think nothing can be done too much in ſuch a buſineſs, to which they intitle God's honour, and the ſalvation of mens ſouls.

I SHALL therefore deſire of you, if you are that fair and ſincere lover of truth you profeſs, when you write again, to tell us what you mean by true, and what by a falſe religion, that we may know which in your ſenſe are ſo:

for as you now have uſed theſe words in your treatiſe, one of them ſeems to ſtand only for the religion of the church of England, and the other for that of all other churches. I expect here you ſhould make the ſame outcries againſt me, as you have in your former Letter, for impoſing a ſenſe upon your words contrary to your meaning; and for this you will appeal to your own words in ſome other places: but of this I ſhall leave the reader to judge, and tell him, this is a way very eaſy and very uſual for men, who having not clear and conſiſtent notions, keep themſelves as much as they can, under the ſhelter of general, and variouſly applicable terms, that they may ſave themſelves from the abſurdities or conſequences of one place, by a help from ſome general or contrary expreſſion in another: whether it be a deſire of victory, or a little too warm zeal for a cauſe you have been hitherto perſuaded of, which hath led you into this way of writing; I ſhall only mind you, that the cauſe of God requires nothing, but what may be ſpoken out plainly in a clear determined ſenſe, without any reſerve or cover. In the mean time this I ſhall leave with you as evident, that force upon your ground cannot be lawfully uſed to bring men to the communion of the church of England, that being all that I can find you clearly mean by the true religion, till you have proved that all that is required of one in that communion, is neceſſary to ſalvation.

P. 21. HOWEVER therefore you tell us, "That convenient force uſed to bring "men to the true religion, is all that you contend for, and all that you allow." P. 17, 18. That it is for "promoting the true religion." That it is to "bring men to con- P. 28, 29. "ſider, ſo as not to reject the truth neceſſary to ſalvation. To bring men to P. 26. "embrace the truth that muſt ſave them." And abundance more to this purpoſe. Yet all this talk of the true religion amounting to no more but the national religion eſtabliſhed by law in England; and your bringing men to it, to no more than bringing them to an outward profeſſion of it; it would better have ſuited that condition, viz. without prejudice, and with an honeſt mind, which you require in others, to have ſpoke plainly what you aimed at, rather than prepoſſeſs mens minds in favour of your cauſe, by the impreſſions of a name that in truth did not properly belong to it.

L. II. p. 387. IT was not therefore without ground that I ſaid, "I ſuſpected you built "all on this lurking ſuppoſition, that the national religion now in England, "backed by the publick authority of the law, is the only true religion, and "therefore no other is to be tolerated; which being a ſuppoſition equally "unavoidable, and equally juſt in other countries; unleſs we can imagine, "that every where but in England, men believe what at the ſame time they "think to be a lie," &c. Here you erect your plumes, and to this your triumphant logick gives you not patience to anſwer, without an air of victory P. 11. in the enterance: "How, Sir, is this ſuppoſition equally unavoidable, and "equally juſt in other countries, where falſe religions are the national? (for "that you muſt mean, or nothing to the purpoſe.") Hold, Sir, you go too faſt; take your own ſyſtem with you, and you will perceive it will be enough to my purpoſe, if I mean thoſe religions which you take to be falſe: for if there be any other national churches, which agreeing with the church of England

land in what is neceſſary to ſalvation, yet have eſtabliſhed ceremonies different from thoſe of the church of England; ſhould not any one who diſſented here from the church of England upon that account, as preferring that to our way of worſhip, be juſtly puniſhed? If ſo, then puniſhment in matters of religion being only to bring men to the true religion, you muſt ſuppoſe him not to be yet of it, and ſo the national church he approves of, not to be of the true religion. And yet is it not equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, that that church ſhould ſuppoſe its religion the only true religion, as it is that yours would do ſo, it agreeing with yours in things neceſſary to ſalvation, and having made ſome things, in their own nature indifferent, requiſite to conformity for decency and order, as you have done? So that my ſaying, It is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt in other countries, will hold good, without meaning what you charge on me, that that ſuppoſition is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, where the national religion is abſolutely falſe.

But in that large ſenſe too, what I ſaid will hold good; and you would have ſpared your uſeleſs ſubtilties againſt it, if you had been as willing to take my meaning, and anſwer my argument, as you were to turn what I ſaid to a ſenſe which the words themſelves ſhew I never intended. My argument in ſhort was this, That granting force to be uſeful to propagate and ſupport religion, yet it would be no advantage to the true religion, that you a member of the church of England, ſuppoſing yours to be the true religion, ſhould thereby claim a right to uſe force; ſince ſuch a ſuppoſition to thoſe who were members of other churches, and believed other religions, was equally unavoidable, and equally juſt. And the reaſon I annexed, ſhews both this to be my meaning, and my aſſertion to be true: my words are, "Unleſs we can imagine that every where but in England, men believe "what at the ſame time they think to be a lie." Having therefore never ſaid, nor thought that it is equally unavoidable, or equally juſt, that men in every country ſhould believe the national religion of the country; but that it is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, that men believing the national religion of their country, be it true or falſe, ſhould ſuppoſe it to be true; and let me here add alſo, ſhould endeavour to propagate it: however you go on thus to reply; "If ſo, then I fear it will be equally true too, and "equally rational: for otherwiſe I ſee not how it can be equally unavoidable, "or equally juſt: for if it be not equally true, it cannot be equally juſt; and "if it be not equally rational, it cannot be equally unavoidable. But if it be "equally true, and equally rational, then either all religions are true, or "none is true: for if they be all equally true, and one of them be not true, "then none of them can be true." I challenge any one to put theſe four good words, unavoidable, juſt, rational, and true, more equally together, or to make a better-wrought deduction: but after all, my argument will nevertheleſs be good, that it is no advantage to your cauſe, for you or any one of it, to ſuppoſe yours to be the only true religion; ſince it is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt for any one, who believes any other religion, to ſuppoſe the ſame thing. And this will always be ſo, till you can ſhew, that men cannot receive falſe religions upon arguments that appear to them to be good; or that having received falſhood under the appearance of truth, they can, whilſt it ſo appears, do otherwiſe than value it, and be acted by it, as if it were true. For the equality that is here in queſtion, depends not upon the truth of the opinion embraced, but on this, that the light and perſuaſion a man has at preſent, is the guide which he ought to follow, and which in his judgment of truth he cannot avoid to be governed by. And therefore the terrible conſequences you dilate on in the following part of that page, I leave you for your private uſe on ſome fitter occaſion.

YOU therefore who are ſo apt, without cauſe, to complain of want of ingenuity in others, will do well hereafter to conſult your own, and another time change your ſtyle; and not under the undefined name of the true religion, becauſe that is of more advantage to your argument, mean only the religion eſtabliſhed by law in England, ſhutting out all other religions now profeſſed in the world. Though when you have defined what is the true religion, which you would have ſupported and propagated by force; and have told us it is to be found in the liturgy and thirty-nine articles of the church of England; and it be agreed to you, that that is the only true religion, your argument for force, as neceſſary to mens ſalvation, from the want of light and ſtrength enough in the true religion to prevail againſt mens luſts, and the corruption of their nature, will not hold; becauſe your bringing men by force, your way applied, to the true religion, be it what you will, is but bringing them to an outward conformity to the national church. But the bringing them ſo far, and no farther, having no oppoſition to their luſts, no inconſiſtency with their corrupt nature, is not on that account at all neceſſary, nor does at all help, where only, on your grounds, you ſay, there is need of the aſſiſtance of force towards their ſalvation.

## CHAP. VIII.

## Of ſalvation to be procured by force, your way.

THERE cannot be imagined a more laudable deſign than the promoting the ſalvation of mens ſouls, by any one who ſhall undertake it. But if it be a pretence made uſe of to cover ſome other bye-intereſt, nothing can be more odious to men, nothing more provoking to the great God of heaven and earth, nothing more miſbecoming the name and character of a Chriſtian. With what intention you took your pen in hand to defend and encourage the uſe of force in the buſineſs of mens ſalvation, it is fit in charity we take your word; but what your ſcheme, as you have delivered it, is guilty of, it is my buſineſs to take notice of, and repreſent to you.

To my ſaying, that "if perſecution, as is pretended, were for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, bare conformity would not ſerve the turn, but men "would be examined whether they do it upon reaſon and conviction:" you P. 22. anſwer, "Who they be that pretend that perſecution is for the ſalvation of mens “ſouls, you know not.” Whatever you know not, I know one, who in the Letter under conſideration pleads for force, as uſeful for the promoting P. 17. “the ſalvation of mens ſouls: and that the uſe of force is no other means for P. 31. the ſalvation of mens ſouls, than what the Author and Finiſher of our faith has directed. That ſo far is the magiſtrate, when he gives his helping hand to the furtherance of the Goſpel, by laying convenient penalties P. 32. upon ſuch as reject it, or any part of it, from uſing any other means for the ſalvation of mens ſouls than what the Author and Finiſher of our faith has directed, that he does no more than his duty for the promoting the ſalvation of ſouls. And as the means by which men may be brought into P. 58. the way of ſalvation.” Ay, but where do you ſay that perſecution is for the ſalvation of ſouls? I thought you had been arguing againſt my meaning, and againſt the things I ſay, and not againſt my words in your meaning, which is not againſt me. That I uſed the word perſecution for what you call force and penalties, you knew: for in p. 21. that immediately precedes this, you take notice of it, with ſome little kind of wonder, in theſe words, “perſecution, ſo it ſeems you call all puniſhments for religion.” That I do ſo then, whether properly or improperly, you could not be ignorant; and then, I beſeech you, apply your anſwer here to what I ſay: my words are, “If perſecution, as is pretended, were for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, men that conform would be examined whether they did ſo upon reaſon and conviction.” Change my word perſecution into puniſhment for religion, and then conſider the truth or ingenuity of your anſwer: for in that ſenſe of the word perſecution, do you know no body that pretends perſecution is for the ſalvation of mens ſouls? So much for your ingenuity, and the arts you allow yourſelf to ſerve a good cauſe. What do you think of one of my Pagans or Mahometans? Could he have done better? For I ſhall often have occaſion to mind you of them. Now to your argument. I ſaid, “That I thought thoſe who make laws, and uſe force, to bring men to church-conformity in religion, ſeek only the compliance, but concern themſelves not for the conviction of thoſe they puniſh, and ſo never uſe force to convince. For pray tell me, when any diſſenter conforms, and enters into the church communion, is he ever examined to ſee whether he does it upon reaſon and conviction, and ſuch grounds as would become a Chriſtian concerned for religion? If perſecution, as is pretended, were for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, this would be done, and men not driven to take the ſacrament to keep their places, or obtain licences to ſell ale, for ſo low have theſe holy things been proſtituted.” To this you here reply, “As to thoſe magiſtrates, who having P. 22. provided ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all under their care, in the true religion, do make laws, and uſe moderate penalties, to bring men to the communion of the church of God, and conformity to the rules and orders of it, I think their behaviour does plainly enough ſpeak them to ſeek and concern themſelves for the conviction of thoſe whom they puniſh, and for their compliance only as the fruit of their conviction.” If means of inſtruction were all that is neceſſary to convince people, the providing ſufficiently for inſtruction would be an evidence, that thoſe that did ſo, did ſeek and concern themſelves for mens conviction: but if there be ſomething as neceſſary for conviction as the means of inſtruction, and without which thoſe means will ſignify nothing, and that be ſevere and impartial examination; and if force be, as you ſay, ſo neceſſary to make men, thus examine, that they can by no other way but force be brought to do it: if magiſtrates do not lay their penalties on non-examination, as well as provide means of inſtruction, whatever you may ſay you think, few people will find reaſon to believe you think thoſe magiſtrates ſeek and concern themſelves much for the conviction of thoſe they puniſh, when that puniſhment is not levelled at that, which is a hinderance to their conviction, i. e. againſt their averſion to ſevere and impartial examination. To that averſion no puniſhment can be pretended to be a remedy, which does not reach and combat the averſion; which it is plain no puniſhment does, which may be avoided without parting with, or abating the prevalency of that averſion. This is the caſe, where men undergo puniſhments for not conforming, which they may be rid of, without ſeverely and imtially examining matters of religion.

P. 22. To ſhew that what I mentioned was no ſign of unconcernedneſs in the magiſtrate, for mens conviction; you add, "Nor does the contrary appear from "the not examining diſſenters when they conform, to ſee whether they do it "upon reaſon and conviction: for where ſufficient inſtruction is provided, it "is ordinarily preſumable that when diſſenters conform, they do it upon reaſon and conviction." Here if ordinarily ſignifies any thing, for it is a word you make much uſe of, whether to expreſs or cover your ſenſe, let the reader judge, then you ſuppoſe there are caſes wherein it is not preſumable; and I aſk you, whether in thoſe, or any caſes, it be examined whether diſſenters when they conform, do it upon reaſon and conviction? At beſt that it is ordinarily preſumable, is but gratis dictum, eſpecially ſince you ſuppoſe, that it is the corruption of their nature that hinders them from conſidering as they ought, ſo as upon reaſon and conviction to embrace the truth: which corruption of nature, that they may retain with conformity I think is very preſumable. But be that as it will, this I am ſure is ordinarily and always preſumable, that if thoſe who uſe force were as intent upon mens conviction, as they are on their conformity, they would not wholly content themſelves with the one, without ever examining and looking into the other.

Ibid. ANOTHER excuſe you make for this neglect, is, "That as to irreligious "perſons who only ſeek their ſecular advantage, how eaſy it is for them to "pretend conviction, and to offer ſuch grounds (if that were required) as would "become a Chriſtian concerned for religion; that is, what no care of man can "certainly prevent." This is an admirable juſtification of your hypotheſis. Men are to be puniſhed: to what end? To make them ſeverely and impartially conſider matters of religion, that they may be convinced, and thereupon ſincerely embrace the truth. But what need of force or puniſhment for this? Becauſe their luſts and corruptions will otherwiſe keep them both from conſidering as they ought, and embracing the true religion; and therefore they muſt lie under penalties till they have conſidered as they ought, which is when they have upon conviction embraced. But how ſhall the magiſtrate know when they upon conviction embrace, that he may then take off their penalties? That indeed cannot be known, and ought not to be enquired after, becauſe irreligious perſons who only ſeek their ſecular advantage; or, in other words, all thoſe who deſire at their eaſe to retain their beloved luſts and corruptions, may “eaſily pretend conviction, and offer ſuch grounds (if it were required) as would become a Chriſtian concerned for religion: this is what no care of man can certainly prevent.” Which is reaſon enough, why no buſy forwardneſs in man to diſeaſe his brother, ſhould uſe force upon pretence of prevailing againſt mens corruptions, that hinder their conſidering and embracing the truth upon conviction, when it is confeſſed, it cannot be known, whether they have conſidered, are convinced, or have really embraced the true religion or no. And thus you have ſhewn us your admirable remedy, which is not it ſeems for the irreligious, for it is eaſy, you ſay, for them to pretend to conviction, and ſo avoid puniſhment, but for thoſe who would be religious without it.

BUT here, in this caſe, as to the intention of the magiſtrate, how can it be ſaid, that the force he uſes is deſigned by ſubduing mens corruptions, to make way for conſidering and embracing the truth, when it is ſo applied, that it is confeſſed here, that a man may get rid of the penalties without parting with the corruptions, they are pretended to be uſed againſt? But you have a ready anſwer, “This is what no care of man can certainly prevent;” which is but in other words to proclaim the ridiculouſneſs of your uſe of force, and to avow that your method can do nothing. If by not certainly, you mean it may any way, or to any degree prevent, why is it not ſo done? If not, why is a word that ſignifies nothing put in, unleſs it be for a ſhelter on occaſion? A benefit you know how to draw from this way of writing: but this here taken how you pleaſe, will only ſerve to lay blame on the magiſtrate, or your hypotheſis, chuſe you whether. I for my part have a better opinion of the ability and management of the magiſtrate: what he aimed at in his laws, that I believe he mentions in them, and as wiſe men do in buſineſs, ſpoke out plainly what he had a mind ſhould be done. But certainly there cannot a more ridiculous character be put on law-makers, than to tell the world they intended to make men conſider, examine, &c. but yet neither required nor named any thing in their laws but conformity. Though yet when men are certainly to be puniſhed for not really embracing the true religion, there ought to be certain matters of fact, whereby thoſe that do, and thoſe that do not ſo embrace the truth, ſhould be diſtinguiſhed; and for that you have, it is true, a clear and eſtabliſhed criterion, i. e. conformity and nonconformity: which do very certainly diſtinguiſh the innocent from the guilty; thoſe that really and ſincerely do embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, from thoſe that do not.

BUT, Sir, to reſolve the queſtion, whether the conviction of mens underſtandings, and the ſalvation of their ſouls, be the buſineſs and aim of thoſe who uſe force to bring men into the profeſſion of the national religion; I aſk, whether if that were ſo, there could be ſo many as there are, not only in moſt country pariſhes, but, I think I may ſay, may be found in all parts

of England, groſly ignorant in the doctrines and principles of the Chriſtian
religion, if a ſtrict enquiry were made into it? If force be neceſſary to be
uſed to bring men to ſalvation, certainly ſome part of it would find out ſome
of the ignorant and unconſidering that are in the national church, as well as
it does ſo diligently all the nonconformiſts out of it, whether they have
conſidered, or are knowing or no. But to this you give a very ready
P. 64. anſwer; “Would you have the magiſtrate puniſh all indifferently, thoſe who
“obey the law as well as them that do not?” What is the obedience the law
P. 63. requires? That you tell us in theſe words, “If the magiſtrate provides ſufficiently
“for the inſtruction of all his ſubjects in the true religion, and then
“requires them all under convenient penalties to hearken to the teachers and
“miniſters of it, and to profeſs and exerciſe it with one accord under their direction
“in publick aſſemblies:” which in other words is but conformity,
P. 22. which here you expreſs a little plainer in theſe words; “But as to thoſe magiſtrates
“who having provided ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all under
“their care in the true religion do make laws, and uſe moderate penalties to
“bring men to the communion of the church of God, and to conform to the
“rules and orders of it.” You add, “Is there any pretence to ſay that in ſo
“doing, he [the magiſtrate] applies force only to a part of his ſubjects, when
“the law is general, and excepts none?” There is no pretence, I confeſs, to
ſay that in ſo doing he applies force only to a part of his ſubjects, to make
them conformiſts, from that it is plain the law excepts none. But if conformiſts
may be ignorant, groſly ignorant of the principles and doctrines of Chriſtianity;
if there be no penalties uſed to make them conſider as they ought,
ſo as to underſtand, be convinced of, believe and obey the truths of the Goſpel;
P. 37. are not they exempt from that force which you ſay “is to make men conſider
“and examine matters of religion as they ought to do?” Force is applied to
all indeed to make them conformiſts; but if being conformiſts once, and frequenting
the places of publick worſhip, and there ſhewing an outward compliance
with the ceremonies preſcribed, for that is all the law requires of all,
call it how you pleaſe, they are exempt from all force and penalties, though
they are ever ſo ignorant, ever ſo far from underſtanding, believing, receiving
the truth of the Goſpel; I think it is evident that then force is not applied
P. 16. to all “to procure the conviction of the underſtanding.—To bring men
P. 26. “to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper to convince the
P. 29. “mind, and which without being forced, they would not conſider.—To bring
“men to that conſideration, which nothing elſe but force (beſides the extraordinary
P. 23. “grace of God) would bring them to.—To make men good Chriſtians.—
P. 43. “To make men receive inſtruction.—To cure their averſion to the true religion.—
P. 58. “To bring men to conſider and examine the controverſies which they are bound
P. 2. “to conſider and examine, i. e. thoſe wherein they cannot err without diſhonouring
P. 16. “God, and endangering their own and other mens eternal ſalvation.—To
P. 13. “weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially.—To bring men to the
“true religion and to ſalvation.”—That then force is not applied to all the ſubjects
for theſe ends, I think you will not deny. Theſe are the ends for which
you tell us in the places quoted, that force is be uſed in matters of religion:

it is by its uſefulneſs and neceſſity to theſe ends, that you tell us the magiſtrate is authorized and obliged to uſe force in matters of religion. Now if all theſe ends be not attained by a bare conformity, and yet if by a bare conformity men are wholly exempt from all force and penalties in matters of religion, will you ſay that for theſe ends force is applied to all the magiſtrate's ſubjects? If you will, I muſt ſend you to my Pagans and Mohametans for a little conſcience and modeſty. If you confeſs force is not applied to all for theſe ends, notwithſtanding any laws obliging all to conformity, you muſt alſo confeſs, that what you ſay concerning the laws being general, is nothing to the purpoſe; ſince all that are under penalties for not conforming, are not under any penalties for ignorance, irreligion, or the want of thoſe ends for which you ſay penalties are uſeful and neceſſary.

YOU go on, "And therefore if ſuch perſons profane the ſacrament to keep P. 22. their places, or to obtain licences to ſell ale, this is an horrible wickedneſs." I excuſe them not. "But it is their own, and they alone muſt anſwer for it." Yes, and thoſe who threatened poor ignorant and irreligious ale-ſellers, whoſe livelihood it was, to take away their licences, if they did not conform and receive the ſacrament, may be thought perhaps to have ſomething to anſwer for. You add, "But it is very unjuſt to impute it to thoſe who make ſuch laws, P. 23. and uſe ſuch force, or to ſay that they proſtitute holy things, and drive men to profane them." Nor is it juſt to inſinuate in your anſwer, as if that had been ſaid which was not. But if it be true, that a poor ignorant, looſe, irreligious wretch ſhould be threatened to be turned out of his calling and livelihood, if he would not take the ſacrament: may it not be ſaid theſe holy things have been ſo low proſtituted? And if this be not profaning them, pray tell me what is?

THIS I think may be ſaid without injuſtice to any body, that it does not appear, that thoſe who make ſtrict laws for conformity, and take no care to have it examined upon what grounds men conform, are not very much concerned, that mens underſtandings ſhould be convinced: and though you go on to ſay, that "they deſign by their laws to do what lies in them to make men good Chriſtians:" that will ſcarce be believed, if what you ſay be true, P. 58. that force is neceſſary to bring "thoſe who cannot be otherwiſe brought to it, to ſtudy the true religion, with ſuch care and diligence as they might and ought to uſe, and with an honeſt mind." And yet we ſee a great part, or any of thoſe who are ignorant in the true religion, have no ſuch force applied to them, eſpecially ſince you tell us, in the ſame place, that "no man ever Ibid. ſtudied the true religion with ſuch care and diligence as he might and ought to uſe, and with an honeſt mind, but he was convinced of the truth of it." If then force and penalties can produce that ſtudy, care, diligence and honeſt mind, which will produce knowledge and conviction, and that, as you ſay in the following words, make good men; I aſk you, if there be found in the communion of the church, exempt from force upon the account of religion, ignorant, irreligious, ill men; and that to ſpeak moderately, not in great diſproportion fewer than amongſt the nonconformiſts, will you believe yourſelf, when you ſay "the magiſtrates do by their laws all that in them lies to make

“ them good Chriſtians;” when they uſe not that force to them which you, not I, ſay is neceſſary; and that they are, where it is neceſſary, obliged to uſe? And therefore I give you leave to repeat again the words you ſubjoin here, P. 23. “ But if after all they [i. e. the magiſtrates] can do, wicked and godleſs men will ſtill reſolve to be ſo, they will be ſo, and I know not who but God Almighty can help it.” But this being ſpoken of conformiſts, on whom the magiſtrates lay no penalties, uſe no force for religion, give me leave to mind you of the ingenuity of one of my Pagans or Mahometans.

YOU tell us, That the uſefulneſs of force to make ſcholars learn, authorizes ſchoolmaſters to uſe it. And would you not think a ſchoolmaſter diſcharged his duty well, and had a great care of their learning, who uſed his rod only to bring boys to ſchool; but if they come there once a week, whether they ſlept, or only minded their play, never examined what proficiency they made, or uſed the rod to make them ſtudy and learn, though they would not apply themſelves without it?

BUT to ſhew you how much you yourſelf are in earneſt for the ſalvation of ſouls in this your method, I ſhall ſet down what I ſaid, p. 428, of my Letter on that ſubject, and what you anſwer, p. 68, of yours.

L. II. p. 428. “ YOU ſpeak of it here as the moſt deplorable condition imaginable, that men ſhould be left to themſelves, and not be forced to conſider and examine the grounds of their religion, and ſearch impartially and diligently after the truth. This you make the great miſcarriage of mankind; and for this you ſeem ſolicitous, all through your treatiſe, to find out a remedy; and there is ſcarce a leaf wherein you do not offer yours. But what if after all, now you ſhould be found to prevaricate? Men have contrived to themſelves, ſay you, a great variety of religions. It is granted. They ſeek not the truth in this matter with that application of mind, and freedom of judgment which is requiſite: it is confeſſed. All the falſe religions now on foot in the world, have taken their riſe from the ſlight and partial conſideration, which men have contented themſelves with in ſearching after the true; and men take them up, and perſiſt in them for want of due examination: be it ſo. There is need of a remedy for this; and I have found one whoſe ſucceſs cannot be queſtioned: very well. What is it? Let us hear it. Why, Diſſenters muſt be puniſhed. Can any body that hears you ſay ſo, believe you

L. III. p. 68. YOUR next paragraph runs high, and charges me with nothing leſs than prevarication. For whereas, as you tell me, I ſpeak of it here as the moſt deplorable condition imaginable, that men ſhould be left to themſelves, and not be forced to conſider and examine the grounds of their religion, and ſearch impartially and diligently after the truth, &c. It ſeems all the remedy I offer, is no more than this, “ Diſſenters muſt be puniſhed.” Upon which thus you inſult; “ Can any body that hears you ſay ſo, believe you in earneſt,” &c. Now here I acknowledge, that though want or neglect of examination be a general fault, yet the method I propoſe for curing it, does not reach to all that are guilty of it, but is limited to thoſe who “you in earneſt; and that want of examination is the thing you would have amended, when want of examination, is not the thing you would have puniſhed? If want of examination be the fault, want of examination muſt be puniſhed; if you are, as you pretend, fully ſatisfied that puniſhment is the proper and only means to remedy it. But if in all your treatiſe you can ſhew me one place, where you ſay that the ignorant, the careleſs, the inconſiderate, the negligent in examining throughly the truth of their own and others religion, &c. are to be puniſhed, I will allow your remedy for a good one. But you have not ſaid any thing like this; and which is more, I tell you before-hand, you dare not ſay it. And whilſt you do not, the world has reaſon to judge, that however want of examination be a general fault, which you with great vehemency have exaggerated; yet you uſe it only for a pretence to puniſh Diſſenters; and either diſtruſt your remedy, that it will not cure this evil, or elſe care not to have it generally cured. This evidently appears from your whole management of the argument. And he that reads your treatiſe with attention, will be more confirmed in this opinion, when he ſhall find that you, who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed, to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may diſcover the way to ſalvation, have not ſaid one word of conſidering, ſearching, and hearkening to the Scripture: which had been as good a rule for a Chriſtian to have ſent them to, as to reaſons and arguments proper to convince them, of you know not what; as to the inſtruction and government of the proper miniſters of religion, which who they are, men are yet far from being agreed; or as to the information of thoſe, who tell them they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right; and to the like uncertain and dangerous guides; which were not thoſe that our Saviour and the Apoſtles ſent men to, but to the Scriptures. Search “the

who reject the true religion, propoſed to them with ſufficient evidence. But then to let you ſee how little ground you have to ſay that I prevaricate in this matter, I ſhall only deſire you to conſider, what it is that the author and myſelf were enquiring after: for it is not, what courſe is to be taken to confirm and eſtabliſh thoſe in the truth, who have already embraced it: nor, how they may be enabled to propagate it to others, (for both which purpoſes I have already acknowledged it very uſeful, and a thing much to be deſired, that all ſuch perſons ſhould, as far as they are able, ſearch into the grounds upon which their religion ſtands, and challenges their belief;) but the ſubject of our enquiry is only, what method is to be uſed, to bring men to the true religion. Now if this be the only thing we were enquiring after, (as you cannot deny it to be) then every one ſees that in ſpeaking to this point, I had nothing to do with any who have already embraced the true religion; becauſe they are not to be brought to that religion, but only to be confirmed and edified in it; but was only to conſider how thoſe who reject it, may be brought to embrace it. So that how much ſoever any of thoſe who own the true religion, may be guilty of neglect of examination;

“ the Scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life, ſays our Saviour to the unbelieving perſecuting Jews, John v. 39. And it is the Scriptures which St. Paul ſays, are able to make wiſe unto ſalvation, 2 Tim. iii. 15.

“ TALK no more therefore, if you have any care of your reputation, how much it is every man's intereſt not to be left to himſelf, without moleſtation, without puniſhment in matters of religion. Talk not of bringing men to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, by putting them upon examination. Talk no more of force and puniſhment, as the only way left to bring men to examine. It is evident you mean nothing leſs: for though want of examination be the only fault you complain of, and puniſhment be in your opinion the only way to bring men to it; and this the whole deſign of your book; yet you have not once propoſed in it, that thoſe who do not impartially examine, ſhould be forced to it. And that you may not think I talk at random, when I ſay you dare not; I will, if you pleaſe, give you ſome reaſons for my ſaying ſo.

“ FIRST, Becauſe if you propoſe that all ſhould be puniſhed, who are ignorant, who have not uſed ſuch conſideration as is apt and proper to manifeſt the truth; but have been determined in the choice of their religion by impreſſions of education, admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, prejudices, and the like incompetent motives; and have taken up their religion, without examining it as they ought; you will propoſe to have ſeveral of your own church, be it what it will, puniſhed; which would be a propoſition too apt to offend too many of it, for you to venture on. For whatever need there be of reformation, every one will not thank you for propoſing ſuch an one as muſt begin at, or at leaſt reach to, the houſe of God.

“ SECONDLY, Becauſe if you ſhould propoſe that all thoſe who are ignorant, careleſs and

“ neg-

nation; it is evident, I was only concerned to ſhew how it may be cured in thoſe, who by reaſon of it, reject the true religion, duly propoſed or tendered to them. And certainly to confine myſelf to this, is not to prevaricate, unleſs to keep within the bounds which the queſtion under debate preſcribes me, be to prevaricate.

IN telling me therefore that “ I dare not ſay that the ignorant, the careleſs, the inconſiderate, the negligent in examining, &c. (i. e. all that are ſuch) are to be puniſhed,” you only tell me that I dare not be impertinent. And therefore I hope you will excuſe me, if I take no notice of the three reaſons you offer in your next page for your ſaying ſo. And yet if I had a mind to talk impertinently, I know not why I might not have dared to do ſo, as well as other men.

THERE is one thing more in this paragraph, which though nothing more pertinent than the reſt, I ſhall not wholly paſs over. It lies in theſe words; “ He that reads your treatiſe with attention, will be more confirmed in this opinion,” (viz. That I uſe want of examination only for a pretence to puniſh Diſſenters, &c.) “ when he ſhall find that you, who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed, to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may

“ diſco-

" negligent in examining, ſhould be puniſhed, " you would have little to ſay in this queſtion " of Toleration: for if the laws of the ſtate " were made as they ought to be, equal to all " the ſubjects, without diſtinction of men " of different profeſſions in religion; and the " faults to be amended by puniſhments, were " impartially puniſhed in all who are guilty " of them; this would immediately produce " a perfect Toleration, or ſhew the uſeleſſneſs " of force in matters of religion. If there" fore you think it ſo neceſſary, as you ſay, " for the promoting of true religion, and the " ſalvation of ſouls, that men ſhould be " puniſhed to make them examine; do but find " a way to apply force to all that have not " throughly and impartially examined, and you " have my conſent. For though force be not " the proper means of promoting religion; " yet there is no better way to ſhew the uſe" leſſneſs of it, than the applying it equally " to miſcarriages, in whomſoever found, and " not to diſtinct parties or perſuaſions of men, " for the reformation of them alone, when " others are equally faulty.

" THIRDLY, Becauſe without being for as " large a Toleration as the author propoſes, " you cannot be truly and ſincerely for a free " and impartial examination. For whoever " examines, muſt have the liberty to judge, " and follow his judgment; or elſe you put " him upon examination to no purpoſe. And " whether that will not as well lead men " from, as to your church, is ſo much a ven" ture, that by your way of writing, it is " evident enough you are loath to hazard it; " and if you are of the national church, it is " plain your brethren will not bear with you " in the allowance of ſuch a liberty. You " muſt therefore either change your method; " and if the want of examination be that " great and dangerous fault you would have " corrected, you muſt equally puniſh all that " are equally guilty of any neglect in this " matter, and then take your only means, your " beloved force, and make the beſt of it; or " elſe " diſcover the way of ſalva" tion, have not ſaid one " word of conſidering, " ſearching and hearkening " to the Scripture; which " had been as good a rule " for a Chriſtian to have ſent " them to, as to reaſons and " arguments proper to con" vince them, of you know " not what, &c. How this confirms that opinion, I do not ſee; nor have you thought fit to inſtruct me. But as to the thing itſelf, viz. " my " not ſaying one word of " conſidering, ſearching, " and hearkening to the " Scripture;" whatever advantage a captious adverſary may imagine he has in it, I hope it will not ſeem ſtrange to any indifferent and judicious perſon, who ſhall but conſider that throughout my treatiſe I ſpeak of the true religion only in general, i. e. not as limited to any particular diſpenſation, or to the times of the Scriptures; but as reaching from the fall of Adam to the end of the world, and ſo comprehending the times which preceded the Scriptures; wherein yet God left not himſelf without witneſs, but furniſhed mankind with ſufficient means of knowing him and his will, in order to their eternal ſalvation. For I appeal to all men of art, whether, ſpeaking of the true religion under this generality, I could be allowed to deſcend to any ſuch rules of it, as belong only

“ elſe you muſt put off your maſk, and confeſs that you deſign not your puniſhments to bring men to examination, but to Conformity. For the fallacy you have uſed, is too groſs to paſs upon this age.”

only to ſome particular times, or diſpenſations; ſuch as you cannot but acknowledge the Old and New Teſtaments to be.

IN this your anſwer, you ſay, “ the ſubject of our enquiry is only what method is to be uſed to bring men to the true religion.” He that reads what P. 76, 77, 78. you ſay, again and again, “ That the magiſtrate is impowered and obliged to procure as much as in him lies, i. e. as far as by penalties it can be procured, that NO MAN neglect his ſoul,” and ſhall remember how many pages you employ, A. p. 6, &c. And here p. 6, &c. to ſhew that it is the corruption of human nature which hinders men from doing what they may and ought for the ſalvation of their ſouls, (and that therefore penalties, no other means being left, and force were neceſſary to be uſed by the magiſtrate to remove theſe great obſtacles of luſts and corruptions, that “ none of his ſubjects might remain ignorant of the way of ſalvation, or refuſe to embrace it.” One would think your enquiry had been after the means “ of CURING MENS averſion to the true religion, which” you tell us, p. 53. “ if not cured, is certainly deſtructive of mens eternal ſalvation”) that ſo they might heartily embrace it for their ſalvation. But here you tell us, “ your enquiry is only what method is to be uſed to bring men to the true religion:” whereby you evidently mean nothing but outward Conformity to that which you think the true church, as appears by the next following words; “ Now if this be the only thing we were enquiring after, then every one ſees that in ſpeaking to this point, I had nothing to do with any who have already embraced the true religion.” And alſo every one ſees that ſince amongſt thoſe with whom (having already embraced the true religion) you and your penalties have nothing to do; there are thoſe who have not conſidered and examined matters of religion as they ought, whoſe luſts and corrupt natures keep them as far alienated from believing, and as averſe to a real obeying the truth that muſt ſave them, as any other men: it is manifeſt that embracing the true religion in your ſenſe is only embracing the outward profeſſion of it, which is nothing but outward Conformity. And that being the fartheſt you would have your penalties purſue men, and there leave them with as much of their ignorance of the truth, and careleſſneſs of their ſouls, as they pleaſe; who can deny but that it would be impertinent in you to conſider how want of impartial examination, or averſion to the true religion, ſhould in them be cured? Becauſe they are none of thoſe ſubjects of the commonwealth, whoſe ſpiritual and eternal intereſts are by political government to be procured or advanced, none of thoſe ſubjects whoſe ſalvation the magiſtrate is to take care of.

AND therefore I excuſe you, as you deſire, for not taking notice of my three reaſons; but whether the reader will do ſo or no, is more than I can undertake. I hope you too will excuſe me for having uſed ſo harſh a word as prevaricate, and impute it to my want of ſkill in the Engliſh tongue. But when I find a man pretend to a great concern for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, and make it one of the great ends of civil government, that the magiſtrate ſhould make uſe of force to bring all his ſubjects to conſider, ſtudy and examine, believe and embrace the truth that muſt ſave them; when I ſhall have to do with a man, who to this purpoſe hath writ two books to find out and defend the proper remedies for that general backwardneſs and averſion, which depraved human nature keeps men in, to an impartial ſearch after, and hearty embracing the true religion; and who talks of nothing leſs than obligations on ſovereigns, both from their particular duty, as well as from common charity, to take care that none of their ſubjects ſhould want the aſſiſtance of this only means left for their ſalvation; nay, who has made it ſo neceſſary to mens ſalvation, that he talks as if the wiſdom and goodneſs of God would be brought in queſtion, if thoſe who needed it ſhould be deſtitute of it; and yet notwithſtanding all this ſhew of concern for mens ſalvation, contrives the application of this ſole remedy ſo, that a great many who lie under the diſeaſe, ſhould be out of the reach and benefit of his cure, and never have this only remedy applied to them: when this I ſay is ſo manifeſtly in his thoughts all the while, that he is forced to confeſs "that "though want or neglect of examination be a general fault, yet the method he "propoſes for curing it does not reach to all that are guilty of it;" but frankly owns, that he was not concerned to ſhew how the neglect of examination might be cured in thoſe who conform, but only in thoſe who by reaſon of it reject the true religion duly propoſed to them: which rejecting the true religion will require a man of art to ſhew to be here any thing but Nonconformity to the national religion: when, I ſay, I meet with a man another time that does this, who is ſo much a man of art, as to talk of all, and mean but ſome; talk of hearty embracing the true religion, and mean nothing but Conformity to the national: pretend one thing, and mean another; if you pleaſe to tell me what name I ſhall give it, I ſhall not fail: for who knows how ſoon again I may have an occaſion for it?

If I would puniſh men for Nonconformity without owning of it, I could not uſe a better pretence than to ſay it was to make them hearken to reaſons and arguments proper to convince them, or to make them ſubmit to the inſtruction and government of the proper miniſters of religion, without any thing elſe, ſuppoſing ſtill at the bottom the arguments for, and the miniſters of my religion to be theſe, that till they outwardly complied with, they were to be puniſhed. But if, inſtead of outward Conformity to my religion covered under theſe indefinite terms, I ſhould tell them, they were to examine the Scripture, which was the fixed rule for them and me; not examining could not give me a pretence to puniſh them, unleſs I would alſo puniſh Conformiſts, as ignorant and unverſed in Scripture as they, which would not do my buſineſs.

But what need I uſe arguments to ſhew, that your puniſhing to make men examine, is deſigned only againſt Diſſenters, when in your anſwer to this very paragraph of mine, you in plain words "acknowledge, that though "want of examination be a general fault, yet the method you propoſe for "curing does not reach to all that are guilty of it?" To which if you pleaſe P. 68.

P. 22. to add what you tell us, That when Diſſenters conform, the magiſtrate cannot know, and therefore never examines whether they do it upon reaſon and conviction or no, though it be certain that upon conforming, penalties, the neceſſary means ceaſe, it will be obvious, that whatever be talked, Conformity is all that is aimed at, and that want of examination is but the pretence to puniſh Diſſenters.

L. II. p. 428. AND this I told you, any one muſt be convinced of, who obſerves that you, who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may diſcover the way of ſalvation, have not ſaid one word of conſidering, ſearching, and hearkening to the Scripture, which, you were told, was as good a rule for a Chriſtian to have ſent men to, as to "the "inſtruction and government of the proper miniſters of religion, or to the in-"formation of thoſe who tell them they have miſtaken their way, and offer to "ſhew them the right." For this paſſing by the Scripture you give us this reaſon, that "throughout your treatiſe you ſpeak of the true religion only in ge-

P. 69. "neral, i.e. not as limited to any particular diſpenſation, or to the times of the "Scriptures, but as reaching from the fall of Adam to the end of the world, "&c. And then you appeal to all men of art, whether ſpeaking of the true re-"ligion, under this generality, you could be allowed to deſcend to any ſuch "rules of it as belong only to ſome particular times or diſpenſations, ſuch as "I cannot but acknowledge the Old and New Teſtaments to be."

THE author that you write againſt, making it his buſineſs, as no body can doubt who reads but the firſt page of his letter, to ſhew that it is the duty of Chriſtians to tolerate both Chriſtians and others who differ from them in religion, it is pretty ſtrange, in aſſerting againſt him that the magiſtrate might and ought to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, you ſhould mean any other magiſtrate than the Chriſtian magiſtrate, or any other religion than the Chriſtian religion. But it ſeems you took ſo little notice of the deſign of your adverſary, which was to prove, that Chriſtians were not to uſe force to bring any one to the Chriſtian religion; that you would prove, that Chriſtians now were to uſe force, not only to bring men to the Chriſtian, but alſo to the Jewiſh religion; or that of the true church before the law, or to ſome true religion ſo general that it is none of theſe. "For, "ſay you, throughout your treatiſe you ſpeak of the true religion only in gene-"ral, i. e. not as limited to any particular diſpenſation:" though one that were not a man of art would ſuſpect you to be of another mind yourſelf, when you told us, the ſhutting out of the Jews from the rights of the commonwealth,

P. 3. "is a juſt and neceſſary caution in a Chriſtian commonwealth:" which you ſay to juſtify your exception in the beginning of your "Argument," againſt the largeneſs of the author's Toleration, who would not have Jews excluded. But ſpeak of the true religion only in general as much as you pleaſe, if your true religion be that by which men muſt be ſaved, can you ſend a man to any better guide to that true religion now than the Scripture?

IF when you were in your altitudes, writing the firſt book, your men of

A. p. 13. art could not allow you to deſcend to any ſuch rule as the Scripture, though even there you acknowledge the ſeverities ſpoken againſt, are ſuch as are uſed to make men Chriſtians, becauſe there, by an art proper to yourſelf, you were to ſpeak of true religion under a generality, which had nothing to do with the duty of Chriſtians, in reference to Toleration. Yet when here in your ſecond book, where you condeſcend all along to ſpeak of the CHRISTIAN RELIGION, and tell us, "that the magiſtrates have authority to make laws "for promoting the Chriſtian religion; and do by their laws deſign to con-"tribute what in them lies to make men good CHRISTIANS;" and complain of Toleration as the very bane of the life and ſpirit of CHRISTIANITY, &c. and have vouchſafed particularly to mention the Goſpel; why here, having been called upon for it, you could not ſend men to the Scriptures, and tell them directly, that thoſe they were to ſtudy diligently, thoſe they were impartially and carefully to examine, to bring them to the true religion, and into the way of ſalvation; rather than talk to them as you do, of receiving inſtruction, and conſidering reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them; rather than propoſe, as you do all along, ſuch objects of examination and enquiry in general terms, as are hard to be found, as the thing itſelf for which they are to be examined: why, I ſay, you have here again avoided ſending men to examine the Scriptures; is juſt matter of enquiry. And for this you muſt apply yourſelf again to your men of art, to furniſh you with ſome other reaſon.

IF you will but caſt your eyes back to your next page, you will there find that you build upon this, that the ſubject of your and the author's enquiry "is only what method is to be uſed to bring men to the true religion." If this be ſo, your men of art, who cannot allow you to deſcend to any ſuch rule as the Scriptures, becauſe you ſpeak of the true religion in general, i. e. not as limited to any particular diſpenſation, or to the times of the Scriptures, muſt allow, that you deſerve to be head of their college; ſince you are ſo ſtrict an obſerver of their rules, that though your enquiry be, "What method "is to be uſed to bring men to the true religion," now under the particular diſpenſation of the Goſpel, and under Scripture-times, you think it an unpardonable fault to recede ſo far from your generality, as to admit the ſtudy and examination of the Scripture into your method; for fear, it is like, your method would be too particular, if it would not now ſerve to bring men to the true religion, who lived before the flood. But had you had as good a memory, as is generally thought needful to a man of art, it is believed you would have ſpared this reaſon, for your being ſo backward in putting men upon examination of the Scripture. And any one, but a man of art, who ſhall read what you tell us the magiſtrate's duty is; and will but conſider how convenient it would be, that men ſhould receive no inſtruction but from the miniſtry, that you there tell us the magiſtrate aſſiſts; examine no arguments, hear nothing of the Goſpel, receive no other ſenſe of the Scripture, but what that miniſtry propoſes; (who if they had but the coactive power, you think them as capable of as other men,) might aſſiſt themſelves; he, I ſay, who reflects but on theſe things, may perhaps find a reaſon that may better ſatisfy the ignorant and unlearned, who have not had the good luck to arrive P. 31.

at being of the number of theſe men of art, why you cannot deſcend to propoſe to men the ſtudying of the Scripture.

LET me for once ſuppoſe you in holy orders, for we that are not of the Adepti, may be allowed to be ignorant of the punctilios in writing obſerved by the men of art, and let me then aſk what art is this, whoſe rules are of that authority, that one, who has received commiſſion from heaven to preach the Goſpel in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, for the ſalvation of ſouls, may not allow himſelf to propoſe the reading, ſtudying, examining of the Scripture, which has for at leaſt theſe ſixteen hundred years contained the only true religion in the world; for fear ſuch a propoſal ſhould offend againſt the rules of this art, by being too particular, and confined to the Goſpel-Diſpenſation; and therefore could not paſs muſter, nor find admittance, in a treatiſe wherein the author profeſſes it his only buſineſs to "enquire what "method is to be uſed to bring men to the true religion?" Do you expect any other diſpenſation; that you are ſo afraid of being too particular, if you ſhould recommend the uſe and ſtudy of the Scripture, to bring men to the true religion now in the times of the Goſpel? Why might you not as well ſend them to the Scriptures, as to the miniſters and teachers of the true religion? Have thoſe miniſters any other religion to teach, than what is contained in the Scriptures? But perhaps you do this out of kindneſs and care, becauſe poſſibly the Scriptures could not be found; but who were the miniſters of the true religion, men could not poſſibly miſs. Indeed you have allowed yourſelf to deſcend to what belongs only to ſome particular times and diſpenſations, for their ſake, when you ſpeak of the miniſters of the Goſpel. But whether it be as fully agreed on amongſt Chriſtians, who are the miniſters of the Goſpel that men muſt hearken to, and be guided by; as which are the writings of the Apoſtles and Evangeliſts, that, if ſtudied, will inſtruct them in the way to heaven; is more than you or your men of art can be poſitive in. Where are the canons of this over-ruling art to be found, to which you pay ſuch reverence? May a man of no diſtinguiſhing character be admitted to the privilege of them? For I ſee it may be of notable uſe at a dead-lift, and bring a man off with flying colours, when truth and reaſon can do him but little ſervice. The ſtrong guard you have in the powers you write for; and when you have engaged a little too far, the ſafe retreat you have always at hand in an appeal to theſe men of art, made me almoſt at a ſtand, whether I were not beſt make a truce with one who had ſuch auxiliaries. A friend of mine finding me talk thus, replied briſkly, it is a matter of religion, which requires not men of art; and the aſſiſtance of ſuch art as ſavours ſo little of the ſimplicity of the Goſpel, both ſhews and makes the cauſe the weaker. And ſo I went on to your two next paragraphs.

IN them, to vindicate a pretty ſtrange argument for the magiſtrate's uſe of force, you think it convenient to repeat it out of your A. p. 26. and ſo, in compliance with you, ſhall I do here again. There you tell us, "The "power you aſcribe to the magiſtrate is given him to bring men, not to his "own, but to the true religion: and though (as our author puts us in mind) "the religion of every prince is orthodox to himſelf; yet if this power keep

“ within its bounds, it can ſerve the intereſt of no other religion but the true,
“ among ſuch as have any concern for their eternal ſalvation; (and thoſe that
“ have none, deſerve not to be conſidered) becauſe the penalties it enables him
“ that has it to inflict, are not ſuch as may tempt ſuch perſons either to re-
“ nounce a religion which they believe to be true, or to profeſs one which
“ they do not believe to be ſo; but only ſuch as are apt to put them upon a
“ ſerious and impartial examination of the controverſy between the magiſtrate
“ and them, which is the way for them to come to the knowledge of the truth.
“ And if, upon ſuch examination of the matter, they chance to find that the
“ truth does not lie on the magiſtrate's ſide, they have gained thus much how-
“ ever, even by the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power, that they know bet-
“ ter than they did before, where the truth doth lie; and all the hurt that
“ comes to them by it, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies for
“ their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own
“ conſciences; which certainly, is no ſuch miſchief to mankind as to make it
“ more eligible that there ſhould be no ſuch power veſted in the magiſtrate,
“ but the care of every man's ſoul ſhould be left to himſelf alone, (as this au-
“ thor demands it.)

To this I tell you, “ That here, out of abundant kindneſs, when Diſ- L. II. p. 430.
“ ſenters have their heads, without any cauſe, broken, you provide them a
“ plaiſter.” For, ſay you, “ if upon ſuch examination of the matter, (i. e.
“ brought to it by the magiſtrate's puniſhment) they chance to find that the
“ truth doth not lie on the magiſtrate's ſide; they have gained thus much
“ however, even by the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power, that they know
“ better than they did before, where the truth does lie. Which is as true as
“ if you ſhould ſay; Upon examination I find ſuch an one is out of the way
“ to York, therefore I know better than I did before that I am in the right.
“ For neither of you may be in the right. This were true indeed, if there
“ were but two ways in all, a right and a wrong.” To this you reply here;
“ That whoever ſhall conſider the penalties, will, you perſuade yourſelf, find P. 70.
“ no heads broken, and ſo but little need of a plaiſter. The penalties, as
“ you ſay, are to be ſuch as will not tempt ſuch as have any concern for their
“ eternal ſalvation, either to renounce a religion which they believe to be true,
“ or profeſs one which they believe not to be ſo, but only ſuch as, being
“ weighed in gold ſcales, are juſt enough, or as you expreſs it, are apt to
“ put them upon a ſerious and impartial examination of the controverſy be-
“ tween the magiſtrate and them.” If you had been pleaſed to have told us
what penalties thoſe were, we might have been able to gueſs whether there
would have been broken heads or no. But ſince you have not vouchſafed
to do it, and if I miſtake not, will again appeal to your men of art for another
diſpenſation rather than ever do it, I fear no body can be ſure theſe penalties
will not reach to ſomething worſe than a broken head: eſpecially if the ma- P. 7.
giſtrate ſhall obſerve that you impute the riſe and growth of falſe religions,
which it is the magiſtrate's duty to hinder, to the pravity of human nature,
unbridled by anthority; which by what follows, he may have reaſon to P. 8.
think is to uſe force ſufficient to counterbalance the folly, perverſeneſs, and
wickedneſs

wickedneſs of men: and whether then he may not lay on penalties ſufficient, if not to break mens heads, yet to ruin them in their eſtates and liberties, will be more than you can undertake. And ſince you acknowledge here, that the magiſtrate may err ſo far in the uſe of this his power, as to miſtake the perſons that he lays his penalties on; will you be ſecurity that he ſhall not alſo miſtake in the proportion of them, and not lay on ſuch as men would willingly exchange for a broken head? All the aſſurance you give us of this is, "If "this power keep within its bounds, i. e. as you here explain it, If the penalties the magiſtrate makes uſe of to promote a falſe religion, do not exceed the meaſure of thoſe which he may warrantably uſe for the promoting "the true." The magiſtrate may, notwithſtanding any thing you have ſaid, or can ſay, uſe any ſort of penalties, any degree of puniſhment; you having neither ſhewed the meaſure of them, nor will be ever able to ſhew the utmoſt meaſure which may not be exceeded, if any may be uſed.

BUT what is this I find here? "If the penalties the magiſtrate make uſe "of to promote a FALSE RELIGION." Is it poſſible that the magiſtrate can make uſe of penalties to promote a falſe religion; of whom you told us but three pages back, "That it may always be ſaid of him, (what St. Paul ſaid "of himſelf) That he can do nothing againſt the truth, but for the truth?" By that one would have thought you had undertaken to us, that the magiſtrate could no more uſe force to promote a falſe religion, than St. Paul could preach to promote a falſe religion. If you ſay, the magiſtrate has no commiſſion to promote a falſe religion, and therefore it may always be ſaid of him what St. Paul ſaid of himſelf, &c. I ſay, no miniſter was ever commiſſioned to preach falſhood; and therefore "it may always be ſaid of every miniſter, "(what St. Paul ſaid of himſelf) that he can do nothing againſt the truth, "but for the truth:" whereby we ſhall very commodiouſly have an infallible guide in every pariſh, as well as one in every commonwealth. But if you thus uſe Scripture, I imagine you will have reaſon to appeal again to your men of art, whether, though you may not be allowed to recommend to others the examination and uſe of Scripture, to find the true religion, yet you yourſelf may not uſe the Scripture to what purpoſe, and in what ſenſe you pleaſe, for the defence of your cauſe.

To the remainder of what I ſaid in that paragraph, your anſwer is nothing but an exception to an inference I made. The argument you were upon, was to juſtify the magiſtrate's inflicting penalties to bring men to a falſe religion, by the gain thoſe that ſuffered them would receive.

THEIR gain was this; "That they would know better than they did be"fore, where the truth does lie." To which I replied, "Which is as true, "as if you ſhould ſay, upon examination I find ſuch an one is out of the way "to York; therefore I know better than I did before, that I am in the right." This conſequence you find fault with, and ſay it ſhould be thus; "Therefore "I know better than I did before, where the right way lies." This, you tell me, "would have been true; which was not for my purpoſe." Theſe conſequences, one or the other, are much-what alike true. For he that of an hundred ways, amongſt which there is but one right, ſhuts out one that he

P. 70.

diſcovers certainly to be wrong, knows as much better than he did before, that he is in the right, as he knows better than before, where the right way lies. For before it was ninety-nine to one that he was not in the right; and now he knows it is but ninety-eight to one that he is not in the right; and therefore knows ſo much better than before, that he is in the right, juſt as much as he knows better than he did before, where the right way lies. For let him upon your ſuppoſition, proceed on; and every day, upon examination of a controverſy with ſome one of the remaining ways, diſcover him to be in the wrong; he will every day know better than he did before, equally, where the right way lies, and that he is in it; till at laſt he will come to diſcover the right way itſelf, and himſelf in it. And therefore your inference, whatever you think, is as much as the other for my purpoſe; which was to ſhew what a notable gain a man made in the variety of falſe opinions and religions in the world, by diſcovering that the magiſtrate had not the truth on his ſide; and what thanks he owed the magiſtrate, for inflicting penalties upon him ſo much for his improvement, and for affording him ſo much knowledge at ſo cheap a rate. And ſhould not a man have reaſon to boaſt of his purchaſe, if he ſhould by penalties be driven to hear and examine all the arguments that can be propoſed by thoſe in power for all their fooliſh and falſe religions? And yet this gain is what you propoſe, as a juſtification of magiſtrates inflicting penalties for promoting their falſe religions. And an P. 70.
“ impartial examination of the controverſy between them and the magiſtrate,
“ you tell us here, is the way for ſuch as have any concern for their eternal
“ ſalvation, to come to the knowledge of the truth.”

To my ſaying, “ He that is puniſhed may have examined before, and then “ I am ſure he gains nothing:” You reply, “ But neither does he loſe P. 71.
“ much, if it be true, which you there add, that all the hurt that befalls “ him, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconvenience for his following “ the light of his own reaſon, and the dictates of his conſcience.” So it is therefore you would have a man rewarded for being an honeſt man; (for ſo is he who follows the light of his own reaſon, and the dictates of his conſcience;) only with the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies. And yet thoſe tolerable inconveniencies are ſuch as are to counterbalance mens luſts, and the corruption of depraved nature; which you know any ſlight penalty is ſufficient to maſter. But that the magiſtrate's diſcipline ſhall ſtop at thoſe your tolerable inconveniencies, is what you are loth to be guarantee for: for all the ſecurity you dare give of it, is, “ If it be true which you there add.” But if it ſhould be otherwiſe, the hurt may be more I ſee than you are willing to anſwer for.

L. II. p. 430. “ However, “ you think you do well to en- “ courage the magiſtrate in pu- “ niſhing, and comfort the man “ who has ſuffered uujuſtly, by “ ſhewing what he ſhall gain by “ it. Whereas, on the contrary,

“ in

L. III. p. 71. As to what you ſay here of the nature of my diſcourſe, I ſhall only put you in mind that the queſtion there debated is; Whether the magiſtrate has any right or authority to uſe force for the promoting the true religion. Which plainly ſuppoſes the unlawfulneſs and in-

juſtice

"in a diſcourſe of this nature, where the bounds of right and wrong are enquired into, and ſhould be eſtabliſhed; the magiſtrate was to be ſhewed the bounds of his authority, and warned of the injury he did when he miſapplies his power, and puniſhed any man who deſerved it not; and not be ſoothed into injuſtice, by conſideration of gain that might thence accrue to the ſufferer. Shall we do evil, that good may come of it? There are a ſort of people who are very wary of touching upon the magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his power, and the injuſtice and ill conſequences of his miſapplying it; at leaſt, ſo long as it is miſapplied in favour of them, and their party. I know not whether you are of their number; but this I am ſure, you have the misfortune here to fall into their miſtake. The magiſtrate, you confeſs, may in this caſe miſapply his power: and inſtead of repreſenting to him the injuſtice of it, and the account he muſt give to his ſovereign one day of this great truſt put into his hands, for the equal protection of all his ſubjects, you pretend advantages which the ſufferer may receive from it: and ſo inſtead of diſheartning from, you give encouragement to the miſchief. Which, upon your principle, joined to the natural thirſt in man after arbitrary power, may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with ſome pretence of right."

juſtice of uſing force to promote a falſe religion, as granted on both ſides. So that I could no way be obliged to take notice of it in my diſcourſe, but only as occaſion ſhould be offered.

AND whether I have not ſhewed the bounds of the magiſtrate's authority, as far as I was any way obliged to do it, let any indifferent perſon judge. But to talk here of a "ſort of people who are very wary of touching upon the magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his power," where I tell the magiſtrate that the power I aſcribe to him in reference to religion, is given him to bring men, "not to his own, but to the true religion;" and that he miſapplies it, when he endeavours to promote a falſe religion by it, is, methinks at leaſt a little unſeaſonable.

NOR am I any more concerned in what you ſay of the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power in favour of a party. For as you have not yet proved that his applying his power to the promoting the true religion, (which is all that I contend for) is miſapplying it; ſo much leſs can you prove it to be miſapplying it in favour of a party.

BUT that "I encourage the magiſtrate in puniſhing men to bring them to a falſe religion, (for that is the puniſhing we here ſpeak of) and ſooth him into injuſtice, by ſhewing what thoſe who ſuffer unjuſtly ſhall gain by it," when in the very ſame breath I tell him that by ſo puniſhing, he miſapplies his power; is a diſcovery which I believe none but yourſelf could have made. When I ſay that the magiſtrate miſapplies his power by ſo puniſhing; I ſuppoſe all other men underſtand me to ſay, that he ſins in doing it, and lays himſelf open to divine vengeance by it. And can he be encouraged to this, by hearing what others may gain by what (without repentance) muſt coſt him ſo dear?

HERE your men of art will do well to be at hand again. For it may be ſeaſonable for you to appeal to them, whether the nature of your diſcourſe will allow you to deſcend to ſhew "the magiſtrate the bounds of his authority, and warn him of the injury he does, if he miſapplies his power."

YOU ſay, "the queſtion there debated, is, whether the magiſtrate has "any right or authority to uſe force for promoting the true religion; which "plainly ſuppoſes the unlawfulneſs and injuſtice of uſing force to promote a "falſe religion, as granted on both ſides." Neither is that the queſtion in debate; nor if it were, does it ſuppoſe what you pretend. But the queſtion in debate is, as you put it, Whether any body has a right to uſe force in matters of religion? You ſay indeed, "The magiſtrate has, to bring men to "the true religion." P. 78. If thereupon, you think the magiſtrate has none to bring men to a falſe religion, whatever your men of art may think, it is probable other men would not have thought it to have been beſides the nature of your diſcourſe, to have warned the magiſtrate, that he ſhould conſider well, and impartially examine the grounds of his religion before he uſe any force to bring men to it. This is of ſuch moment to mens temporal and eternal intereſts, that it might well deſerve ſome particular caution addreſſed to the magiſtrate; who might as much need to be put in mind of impartial examination as other people. And it might, whatever your men of art may allow, be juſtly expected from you; who think it no deviation from the rules of art, to tell the ſubjects that they muſt ſubmit to the penalties laid on them, or elſe fall under the ſword of the magiſtrate: which how true ſoever, will hardly by any body be found to be much more to your purpoſe in this diſcourſe, than it would have been to have told the magiſtrate of what ill conſequence it would be to him and his people; if he miſuſed his power, and warned him to be cautious in the uſe of it. But not a word that way. Nay even where you mention the account he ſhall give for ſo doing, it is ſtill to ſatisfy the ſubjects that they are well provided for, and not left unfurniſhed of the means of ſalvation, by the right God has put into the magiſtrate's hands to uſe his power to bring them to the true religion; and therefore, they ought to be well content, becauſe if the magiſtrate miſapply it, the Great Judge will puniſh him for it. Look, Sir, and ſee whether what you ſay, any where, of the magiſtrate's miſuſe of his power, have any other tendency: and then I appeal to the ſober reader, whether if you had been as much concerned for the bounding, as for the exerciſe, of force in the magiſtrate's hands, you would not have ſpoke of it after another manner.

THE next thing you ſay, is, "that the queſtion (being, whether the ma"giſtrate has any right to uſe force to bring men to the true religion,) ſup"poſes the unlawfulneſs of uſing force to promote a falſe religion as granted "on both ſides;" which is ſo far from true, that I ſuppoſe quite the contrary, viz. That if the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force to promote the true, he muſt have a right to uſe force to promote his own religion; and that for reaſons I have given you elſewhere. But the ſuppoſition of a ſuppoſition ſerves to excuſe you from ſpeaking any thing directly of ſetting bounds to the magiſtrate's power, or telling him his duty in that point; though you are very frequent in mentioning the obligation he is under, that men ſhould not want the aſſiſtance of his force; and how anſwerable he is if any body miſcarry for want of it; though there be not the leaſt whiſper of any care to be taken, that no body be miſled by it. And now I recollect myſelf, I think your method would not allow it: for if you ſhould have put the magiſtrate upon examining, it would have ſuppoſed him as liable to error as other men; whereas, to ſecure the magiſtrate's acting right, upon your foundation of never uſing force but for the true religion, I ſee no help for it, but either he or you, who are to licenſe him, muſt be got paſt the ſtate of examination, into that of certain knowledge and infallibility.

INDEED, as you ſay, "you tell the magiſtrate that the power you aſcribe to him in reference to religion, is given him to bring men not to his own, but to the true religion." But do you put him upon a ſevere and impartial examination which, amongſt the many falſe, is the only true religion he muſt uſe force to bring his ſubjects to, that he may not miſtake and miſapply his power in a buſineſs of that conſequence? Not a ſyllable of this. Do you then tell him which it is he muſt take, without examination, and promote with force, whether that of England, France, or Denmark? This, methinks, is as much as the Pope, with all his infallibility, could require of princes. And yet what is it leſs than this you do, when you ſuppoſe the religion of the church of England to be the only true; and upon this your ſuppoſition, tell the magiſtrate it is his duty, by force, to bring men to it; without ever putting him upon examining, or ſuffering him or any body elſe to queſtion, whether it be the only true religion or no? For if you will ſtick to what you in another place ſay; "That it is enough to ſuppoſe that there is one true religion, and but one, and that that religion may be known by thoſe who profeſs it;" what authority will this knowableneſs of the true religion, give to the king of England more than to the king of France, to uſe force, if he does not actually know the religion he profeſſes to be the true; or to the magiſtrate more than the ſubject, if he has not examined the grounds of his religion? But if he believes you when you tell him, your religion is the true, all is well; he has authority enough to uſe force, and he need not examine any farther. If this were not the caſe; why you ſhould not be careful to prepare a little advice to make the magiſtrate examine, as well as you are ſolicitous to provide force to make the ſubject examine, will require the ſkill of a man of art to diſcover.

WHETHER you are not of the number of thoſe men I there mentioned, for that there have been ſuch men in the world, inſtances might be given, one may doubt from your principles. For if upon a ſuppoſition that yours is the true religion, you can give authority to the magiſtrate to inflict penalties on all his ſubjects that diſſent from the communion of the national church, without examining whether theirs too may not be that only true religion which is neceſſary to ſalvation; is not this to demand, that the magiſtrate's power ſhould be applied only in favour of a party? And can any one avoid being confirmed in this ſuſpicion, when he reads that broad inſinuation of yours, p. 34. as if our magiſtrates were not concerned for truth or piety, becauſe they granted a relaxation of thoſe penalties, which you would have employed in favour of your party; for ſo it muſt be called, and not the church of God, excluſive of others; unleſs you will ſay men cannot be ſaved out of the communion of your particular church, let it be national where you pleaſe.

YOU do not, you ſay, encourage the magiſtrate to miſapply his power; becauſe "in the very ſame breath you tell him he miſapplies his power." I anſwer, let all men underſtand you, as much as you pleaſe, to ſay he that ſins in doing it; that will not excuſe you from encouraging him there, unleſs it be impoſſible that a man may be encouraged to ſin. If your telling the magiſtrate that his ſubjects gain by his miſapplying of force, be not an encouragement to him to miſapply it, the doing good to others muſt ceaſe to be an encouragement to any action. And whether it be not a great encouragement in this caſe to the magiſtrate, to go on in the uſe of force, without impartially examining whether his or his ſubjects be the true religion; when he is told that, be his religion true or falſe, his ſubjects, who ſuffer, will be ſure to be gainers by it; let any one judge. For the encouragement is not, as you put it, to the magiſtrate to uſe force to bring men to what he thinks a falſe religion; but it is an encouragement to the magiſtrate, who preſumes his to be the true religion, to puniſh his diſſenting ſubjects; without due and impartial examination on which ſide the truth lies. For having never told the magiſtrate, that neglect of examination is a ſin in him; if you ſhould tell him a thouſand times, that he who uſes his power to bring men to a falſe religion miſapplies it; he would not underſtand by it that he ſinned, whilſt he thought his the true; and ſo it would be no reſtraint to the miſapplying his power.

AND thus we have ſome proſpect of this admirable machine you have ſet up for the ſalvation of ſouls.

THE magiſtrate is to uſe force to bring men to the true religion. But what if he miſapplies it to bring men to a falſe religion? It is well ſtill for his ſubjects: they are gainers by it. But this may encourage him to a miſapplication of it. No; you tell him that he that uſes it to bring men to a falſe religion, miſapplies it; and therefore he cannot but underſtand that you ſay "he ſins, and lays himſelf open to divine vengeance." No; he believes himſelf in the right; and thinks as St. Paul, whilſt a perſecutor, that he does God good ſervice. And you aſſure him here, he makes his ſuffering ſubjects gainers; and ſo he goes on as comfortably as St. Paul did. Is there no remedy for this? Yes, a very ready one, and that is, that the "one only true religion may be known by thoſe who profeſs it to be the "only true religion."

To which, if we add how you moderate as well as direct the magiſtrate's hand in puniſhing; by making the laſt regulation of your convenient penalties to lie in the prudence and experience of magiſtrates themſelves; we ſhall find the advantages of your method. For are not your neceſſary means of

ſalvation,

ſalvation, which lie in moderate penalties uſed to bring men to the true religion, brought to an happy ſtate; when that which is to guide the magiſtrate in the knowledge of the true religion, is, that "the true religion may "be known by thoſe who profeſs it to be the only true religion;" and the convenient penalties to be uſed for the promoting of it, are ſuch as the magiſtrate ſhall in his prudence think fit; and that whether the magiſtrate applies it right or wrong, the ſubject will be a gainer by it? If in either of your diſcourſes, you have given the magiſtrate any better direction than this to know the true religion by, which he is by force to promote; or any other intelligible meaſure to moderate his penalties by; or any other caution to reſtrain the miſuſe of his power; I deſire you to ſhew it me: and then I ſhall think I have reaſon to believe, that in this debate you have had more care of the true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, than to encourage the magiſtrate to uſe the power he has, by your direction, and without examination, and to what degree he ſhall think fit, in favour of a party. For the matter thus ſtated, if I miſtake not, will ſerve any magiſtrate, to uſe any degree of force, againſt any that diſſent from his national religion.

HAVING recommended to the ſubjects the magiſtrate's perſecution by a ſhew of gain, which will accrue to them by it, you do well to bring in the example of Julian; who whatever he did to the Chriſtians, would, no more than you, own that it was perſecution, but for their advantage in the other world. But whether his pretending gain to them, upon grounds which he did not believe; or your pretending gain to them, which no body can believe to be one, be a greater mockery, you were beſt look. This ſeems reaſonable, that his talk of philanthropy, and yours of moderation, ſhould be bound up together. For till you ſpeak and tell them plainly what they may truſt to, the advantage the perſecuted are to receive from your clemency, may, I imagine, make a ſecond part to what the Chriſtians of that age received from his. But you are ſolicitous for the ſalvation of ſouls, and Diſſenters ſhall find the benefit of it.

## CHAP. IX.

## Of the uſefulneſs of force in matters of religion.

P. 10. YOU having granted that in all pleas for any thing, becauſe of its uſefulneſs, it is not enough to ſay that it may be ſerviceable; but it muſt be conſidered, not only what it may, but what it is likely to produce; and the greater good or harm likely to come from it ought to determine the uſe of it; I think there need nothing more to be ſaid to ſhew the uſefulneſs of force in the magiſtrate's hands for promoting the true religion, after it has been proved that, if any, then all magiſtrates, who believe their religion to be true, are under an obligation to uſe it. But ſince the uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force is the main foundation on which you build your hypotheſis, we will in the two remaining chapters examine particularly what you ſay for them.

To the author's ſaying, "That truth ſeldom hath received, and he fears "never will receive much aſſiſtance from the power of great men, to whom "ſhe is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome;" You anſwer, "And P. 10. "yet God himſelf foretold and promiſed that kings ſhould be nurſing fathers, "and queens nurſing mothers to his church." If we may judge of this prophecy by what is paſt or preſent, we ſhall have reaſon to think it concerns not our days; or if it does, that God intended not that the church ſhould have many ſuch nurſing fathers and nurſing mothers, that were to nurſe them up with moderate penalties, if thoſe were to be the ſwadling-clouts of this nurſery. Perhaps, if you read that chapter, you will think you have little reaſon to build much on this promiſe, till the reſtoring of Iſrael: and when you ſee the Gentiles bring thy, (i. e. as the ſtyle of the chapter ſeems to import the ſons of the Iſraelites) "ſons in their arms, and thy daughters be car"ried upon their ſhoulders," as is promiſed in the immediate preceding words; you may conclude that then "kings ſhall be thy (i. e. Iſrael's) nurſing fathers, "and queens thy nurſing mothers." This ſeems to me to be the time deſigned by that prophecy, and I gueſs to a great many others, upon an attentive reading that chapter in Iſaiah. And to all ſuch this text will do you little ſervice, till you make out the meaning of it better than by barely quoting of it; which will ſcarce ever prove, that God hath promiſed that ſo many princes ſhall be friends to the true religion, that it will be better for the true religion, that princes ſhould uſe force for the impoſing or propagating of their religions, than not. For unleſs it prove that, it anſwers not the author's argument, as an indifferent reader muſt needs ſee. For he ſays not "truth never, but ſhe ſeldom hath received, and he fears never will receive "(not any, but) much aſſiſtance from the power of great men, to whom ſhe is "BUT RARELY KNOWN, AND MORE RARELY WELCOME." And therefore to this of Iſaiah pray join that of St. Paul, 1 Cor. i. 26. "Not many "wiſe, not many mighty, not many noble."

But ſuppoſing many kings were to be nurſing fathers to the church, and that this prophecy were to be fulfilled in this age, and the church were now to be their nurſery; it is I think more proper to underſtand this figurative promiſe, that their pains and diſcipline was to be employed on theſe in the church, and that they ſhould feed and cheriſh them, rather than that theſe words meant that they ſhould whip thoſe that were out of it. And therefore this text will, I ſuppoſe, upon a juſt conſideration of it, ſignify very little againſt the known matter of fact which the author urges; unleſs you can find a country where the cudgel and the ſcourge are more the badges and inſtruments of a good nurſe, than the breaſt and the bib; and that ſhe is counted a good nurſe of her own child, who buſies herſelf in whipping children not hers, nor belonging to her nurſery.

"The fruits which give you no encouragement to hope for any advantage P. 13. "from the author's toleration, which almoſt all but the church of England "enjoyed in the times of the bleſſed reformation, as it was called, you tell us, "were ſects and hereſies." Here your zeal hangs a little in your light. It is not the author's toleration which here you accuſe. That, you know, is UNI-

VERSAL: and the univerſality of it is that which a little before you wondered at, and complained of. Had it been the author's toleration, it could not have been almoſt all but the church of England; but it had been the church of England and all others. But let us take it, that ſects and hereſies were, or will be the fruits of a free toleration, i. e. men are divided in their opinions and ways of worſhip. Differences in ways of worſhip, wherein there is nothing mixed inconſiſtent with the true religion, will not hinder men from ſalvation, who ſincerely follow the beſt light they have; which they are as likely to do under toleration as force. And as for difference of opinions, ſpeculative opinions in religion, I think I may ſafely ſay, that there are ſcarce any where three conſidering men, for it is want of conſideration you would puniſh, who are in their opinions throughout of the ſame mind. Thus far then, if charity be preſerved, which it is likelier to be where there is toleration, than where there is perſecution, though without uniformity, I ſee no great reaſon to complain of thoſe ill fruits of toleration.

BUT men will run, as they did in the late times, into "dangerous and deſtructive errors, and extravagant ways of worſhip." As to errors in opinion, if men upon toleration be ſo apt to vary in opinions, and run ſo wide one from another, it is evident they are not ſo averſe to thinking as you complain. For it is hard for men, not under force, to quit one opinion and embrace another, without thinking of them. But if there be danger of that, it is moſt likely the national religion ſhould ſweep and draw to itſelf the looſe and unthinking part of men, who without thought, as well as without any conteſt with their corrupt nature, may embrace the profeſſion of the countenanced religion, and join in outward communion with the great and ruling men of the nation. For he that troubles not his head at all about religion, what other can ſo well ſuit him as the national, with which the cry and preferments go; and where, it being, as you ſay, preſumable that he makes that his profeſſion upon conviction, and that he is in earneſt, he is ſure to be orthodox without the pains of examining, and has the law and government on his ſide to make it good that he is in the right?

BUT ſeducers, if they be tolerated, will be ready at hand, and diligent; and men will hearken to them. Seducers ſurely have no force on their ſide, to make people hearken. And if this be ſo, there is a remedy at hand, better than force, if you and your friends will uſe it, which cannot but prevail; and that is, let the miniſters of truth be as diligent; and they bringing
P. 29. truth with them, truth obvious and eaſy to be underſtood, as you ſay what is neceſſary to ſalvation is, cannot but prevail.

BUT ſeducers are hearkened to, becauſe they teach opinions favourable to mens luſts. Let the magiſtrate, as is his duty, hinder the practices which their luſts would carry them to, and the advantage will be ſtill on the ſide of truth.

AFTER all, Sir, if, as the Apoſtle tells the Corinthians, 1 Cor. xii. 19. "There muſt be hereſies amongſt you, that they which are approved may be made manifeſt;" which, I beſeech you, is beſt for the ſalvation of mens ſouls; that they ſhould enquire, hear, examine, conſider, and then have the liberty to profeſs what they are perſuaded of; or, that having conſidered, they ſhould be forced not to own nor follow their perſuaſions; or elſe, that being of the national religion, they ſhould go ignorantly on without any conſideration at all? In one caſe, if your penalties prevail, men are forced to act contrary to their conſciences, which is not the way to ſalvation; and if the penalties prevail not, you have the ſame fruits, ſects and hereſies, as under toleration: in the other, it is true, thoſe ignorant, looſe, unthinking conformiſts, do not break company with thoſe who embrace the truth that will ſave them; but I fear can no more be ſaid to have any ſhare in it, than thoſe who openly diſſent from it. For it is not being in the company, but having on the wedding-garment, that keeps men from being bound hand and foot, and caſt into the dreadful and eternal priſon.

P. 16. You tell us, "Force has a proper efficacy to procure the enlightning of the "underſtanding, and the production of belief," viz. by making men conſider. But your aſcribing mens averſion to examine matters of religion, to the corruption of their nature; force, your way applied, i. e. ſo that men avoid the penalties by an outward conformity, cannot have any proper efficacy to procure conſideration; ſince men may outwardly conform, and retain their corruption, and averſion to conſideration; and upon this account, force, your way applied, is abſolutely impertinent.

But further; if force has ſuch a proper efficacy to procure the production of belief, it will do more harm than good, employed by any but orthodox magiſtrates. But how to put it only into orthodox hands, is the difficulty. For I think I have proved, that if orthodox magiſtrates may, and ought to uſe force, for the promoting their religion, all that think themſelves orthodox are obliged to uſe it too. And this may ſerve for an anſwer to all that you have ſaid, p. 16.

L. II. p. 394. I having ſaid, "Whatever indirect efficacy there be in force applied by "the magiſtrate your way, it makes againſt you; force uſed by the magiſtrate "to bring men to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper and "ſufficient to convince them, but which, without being forced, they would "not conſider; may, ſay you, be ſerviceable indirectly and at a diſtance, to "make men embrace the truth which muſt ſave them. And thus, ſay I, it "may be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace falſhood, which will "deſtroy them." P. 25. To this you with great triumph reply,—How, Sir, may "force be uſed by the magiſtrate, to bring men to conſider thoſe reaſons and "arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince them, be ſerviceable "to bring men to embrace falſhood, ſuch falſhood as will deſtroy them? It "ſeems then there are reaſons and arguments which are proper and ſufficient "to convince men of the truth of falſhood, which will deſtroy. Which is "certainly a very extraordinary diſcovery, though ſuch as no man can have "any reaſon to thank you for."

In the firſt place, let me aſk you, Where did you find, or from what words of mine do you infer that notable propoſition, "That there are reaſons and "arguments proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of falſhood?" If a magiſtrate of the true religion may uſe force to make men conſider reaſons

ſons and arguments proper to convince men of the truth of his religion, may not a prince of a falſe religion uſe force to make men conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them of what he believes to be true? And may not force thus be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace falſhood?

IN the next place, did you, who argue with ſo much ſchool-ſubtilty, as if you drank it in at the very fountain, never hear of ſuch an ill way of arguing as "a conjunctis ad diviſa?" There are no arguments proper and ſufficient to bring a man into the belief of what is in itſelf falſe, whilſt he knows or believes it to be falſe; therefore there are no arguments proper and ſufficient to bring a man into the belief of what is in itſelf falſe, which he neither knows nor believes to be ſo. A ſenior ſophiſter would be laughed at for ſuch logick. And yet this is all you ſay in that ſentence you erect for a trophy, "to convince men of the truth of falſhood;" which though not my words, but ſuch as you in your way ſupply from what I ſaid, you are exceedingly pleaſed with, and think their very repeating a triumph. But though there are no arguments proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of falſehood, as falſhood; yet I hope you will allow that there are arguments proper and ſufficient to make men receive falſhoods for truths; why elſe do you complain of ſeducers? And thoſe who embrace falſhoods for truths, do it under the appearance of truth, miſled by thoſe arguments which make it appear ſo, and ſo convince them. And that magiſtrates, who take their religion to be true, though it be not ſo, may with force urge ſuch arguments, you will, I think, grant.

BUT you talk as if nobody could have arguments proper and ſufficient to convince another, but he that was of your way, or your church. This indeed is a new and very extraordinary diſcovery, and ſuch as your brethren, if you can convince them of it, will have reaſon to thank you for. For if any one was ever by arguments and reaſons brought off, or ſeduced from your church, to be a diſſenter, there were then, I think, reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince him. I will not name to you again Mr. Reynolds, becauſe you have charity enough to queſtion his ſincerity. Though his leaving his country, friends, and acquaintance, may be preſumed as great a mark of his being convinced and in earneſt, as it is for one to write for a national religion in a country where it is uppermoſt. I will not yet deny, but that, in you, it may be pure zeal for the true religion, which you would have aſſiſted with the magiſtrate's force. And ſince you ſeem ſo much concerned for your ſincerity in the argument, it muſt be granted you deſerve the character of a well-meaning man, who own your ſincerity in a way ſo little advantageous to your judgment.

BUT if Mr. Reynolds, in your opinion, was miſled by corrupt ends, or ſecular intereſt; what do you think of a prince [James II.] now living? Will you doubt his ſincerity, or that he was convinced of the truth of the religion he profeſſed, who ventured three crowns for it? What do you think of Mr. Chillingworth, when he left the church of England for the Romiſh profeſſion? Did he do it without being convinced that that was right? Or was he convinced with reaſons and arguments, not proper or ſufficient to convince him?

But certainly this could not be true, becauſe, as you ſay, p. 25. the Scripture does not teach any thing of it. Or perhaps thoſe that leave your communion do it always without being convinced, and only think they are convinced when they are not; or are convinced with arguments not proper and ſufficient to convince them. If no body can convince another, but he that has truth on his ſide, you do more honour to the "firſt and ſecond Letter concerning Toleration," than is for the advantage of your cauſe, when you impute to them the increaſe of ſects and hereſies amongſt us. And there are ſome, even of the church of England, have profeſſed themſelves ſo fully ſatisfied by the reaſons and arguments in the firſt of them, that though I dare not be poſitive to you, whoſe privilege it is to convince men that they are convinced; yet I may ſay, it is as preſumable they are convinced, having owned it, as it is preſumable that all that are conformiſts are made ſo upon reaſon and conviction.

THIS, I ſuppoſe, may ſerve for an anſwer to your next words, "That God P. 25. in his juſt judgment will ſend ſuch as receive not the love of truth, that they may be ſaved, but reject it for the pleaſure they have in unrighteouſneſs, ἐνέργειαν ϖλάνης, ſtrong deluſion, i. e. ſuch reaſons and arguments as will prevail with men, ſo diſpoſed, to believe a lie, that they may be damned; this you confeſs the Scripture plainly teaches us. But that there are any ſuch reaſons or arguments as are proper and ſufficient to convince or ſatisfy any, but ſuch reſolute and obdurate ſinners, of the truth of ſuch falſhood as will deſtroy them, is a poſition which you are ſure the Scripture doth not teach us; and which, you tell me, when I have better conſidered it, you hope I will not undertake to maintain. And yet if it be not maintainable, what I ſay here is to no purpoſe: for if there be no ſuch reaſons and arguments as here we ſpeak of, it is in vain to talk of the magiſtrate's uſing force to make men conſider them."

BUT if you are ſtill of the mind, that no magiſtrate but thoſe who are of the true religion, can have arguments backed with force, proper and ſufficient to convince; and that in England none but reſolute obdurate ſinners ever forſook or forbore the communion of the church of England, upon reaſons and arguments that ſatisfy or convince them; I ſhall leave you to enjoy ſo charitable an opinion.

BUT as to the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, I ſhall lay you down again the ſame argument I uſed before; though in words leſs fitted for your way of reaſoning on them, now I know your talent. If there be any efficacy in force to bring men to any perſuaſion, it will, your way applied, bring more men to error than to truth. Your way of uſing it is only to puniſh men for not being of the national religion; which is the only way you do or can apply force, without a toleration. Nonconformity is the fault that is puniſhed; which fault, when it ceaſes, the puniſhment ceaſes. But yet to make them conſider, is the end for which they are puniſhed; but whether it be or be not intended to make men conſider, it alters nothing in the caſe. Now I ſay, that ſince all magiſtrates who believe their religion to be true, are as much obliged to uſe force to bring their ſubjects to it, as if it were true; and ſince moſt of the national religions of the world are erroneous; if force made uſe of to bring men to the national religion, by puniſhing diſſenters, have any efficacy, let it be what it will, indirect and at a diſtance, if you pleaſe, it is like to do twenty times more harm than good; becauſe of the national religions of the world, to ſpeak much within compaſs, there are above twenty wrong for one that is right.

INDEED, could force be directed to drive all men indifferently, who are negligent and backward in it, to ſtudy, examine, and conſider ſeriouſly matters of religion, and ſearch out the truth; and if men were, upon their ſtudy and examination, permitted to follow what appears to them to be right; you might have ſome pretence for force, as ſerviceable to truth in making men conſider. But this is impoſſible, but under a toleration. And I doubt whether, even there, force can be ſo applied, as to make men conſider and impartially examine what is true in the profeſſed religions of the world, and to embrace it. This at leaſt is certain, that where puniſhments purſue men, like outlying deer, only to the pale of the national church; and when once they are within that, leave them free there, and at eaſe; it can do no ſervice to the true religion, even in a country where the national is the true. For the penalties ceaſing as ſoon as men are got within the pale and communion of the church, they help not men at all againſt that which you aſſign as the great hindrance to the true religion, and which therefore, in your opinion, makes force neceſſary to aſſiſt it.

FOR there being no neceſſity that men ſhould leave either their vices or corruption, or ſo much as their ignorance, to get within the pale of the church; force, your way applied, ſerves only to bring them, even in the few Chriſtian and orthodox countries, to the profeſſion, not to the knowledge, belief, or practice, of the true religion.

YOU ſay corrupt nature inclines men from the true religion to falſe ones; and moderate force is requiſite to make ſuch men conſider. But ſuch men as, out of corrupt nature, and for their eaſe and carnal pleaſures, chuſe an erroneous religion without conſidering, will again, as ſoon as they can find their choice incommoded by thoſe penalties, conſult the ſame corrupt nature and carnal appetites, and without conſidering any thing further, conform to that religion where they can beſt enjoy themſelves. It is only the conſcientious part of diſſenters, ſuch as diſſent not out of indulgence to corrupt nature, but out of perſuaſion, who will not conform without conſidering as they ought. And therefore your argument from corrupt nature, is out of doors. If moderate penalties ſerve only to work on thoſe who are led by corrupt nature, they are of no uſe but to fill the church with hypocrites; that is, to make thoſe men worſe hypocrites than they were before, by a new act of hypocriſy, and to corrupt the manners of the reſt of the church, by their converſe with theſe. And whether this be for the ſalvation of ſouls, as is pretended, or for ſome other end, that the prieſts of all religions have generally ſo earneſtly contended for it, I leave to be conſidered.

dered. For as for thoſe who diſſent out of perſuaſion, I ſuſpect your moderate penalties will have little effect upon them. For ſuch men being awed by the fear of hell fire, if that fear will not make them conſider better than they have done, moderate penalties will be too weak to work upon them. It is well if dragooning and martyring can do it.

BUT you add, "May it not be true nevertheleſs, that force your way ap- P. 26. plied may be ſerviceable indirectly, and at a diſtance, to bring men to embrace the truth which may ſave them? which is all you are concerned here to make good." So that if it may poſſibly happen that it ſhould ever bring two men to embrace the truth, you have gained your point, and overthrown toleration, by the uſefulneſs and neceſſity there is of force. For without being forced theſe two men would never have conſidered: which is more yet than you know, unleſs you are of his private council, who only can tell when the ſeaſon of grace is paſt, and the time come that preaching, intreaty, inſtruction and perſuaſion ſhall never after prevail upon a man. But whatever you are here concerned to make good, are you not alſo concerned to remember what you ſay; where declaring againſt the magiſtrate's having a power to uſe what may any way, at any time, upon any perſon, by any accident, be uſeful towards the promoting the true religion, you ſay, "Who ſees not that how- P. 18. ever ſuch means might chance to hit right in ſome few caſes, yet, upon the whole matter, they would certainly do a great deal more harm than good; and in all pleas (making uſe of my words) for any thing becauſe of its uſefulneſs, it is not enough to ſay that it may be ſerviceable, but it muſt be conſidered, not only what it may, but what it is likely to produce; and the greater good or harm like to come from it, ought to determine the uſe of it?"

YOU proceed and tell me, that I, "not content to ſay that force your way P. 26. applied, (i. e. to bring men to embrace the truth which muſt ſave them) may be ſerviceable to bring men to embrace falſhood which will deſtroy them; and ſo is proper to do as much harm as good, (which ſeems ſtrange enough;) I add (to increaſe the wonder) that in your indirect way it is much more proper and likely to make men receive and embrace error, than the truth: and that, 1. Becauſe men out of the right way are as apt, and I think I may ſay apter, to uſe force than others; which is doubtleſs an irrefragable demonſtration, that force uſed by the magiſtrate to bring men to receive and embrace the truth which muſt ſave them, is much more proper and likely to make men receive error than the truth." And then you aſk me, "How we come to talk here of what men out of the right way are apt to do, to bring others into their, i. e. a wrong, way; where we are only enquiring, what may be done to bring men to the right way. For you muſt put me in mind, you ſay, that this is our queſtion, viz. Whether the magiſtrate has any right to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion." Whether the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force in matters of religion, as you more truly ſtate it, p. 78. is the main queſtion between us, I confeſs. But the queſtion here between us is about the uſefulneſs of force your way applied; which being to puniſh diſſenters as diſſenters, to make them conſider, I ſhewed would do more harm than good. And to this, you were here anſwering. Whereby, I ſuppoſe, it is plain that the queſtion here is about the uſefulneſs of force, ſo applied. And I doubt not but my readers, who are not concerned, when the queſtion in debate will not ſerve your turn, to have another ſubſtituted, will take this for a regular and natural way of arguing, viz. "That force, your way applied, is more proper and likely to make men "embrace error than the truth; becauſe men out of the right way are as apt, "I think I may ſay apter, to uſe force than others." You need not then aſk as you do, "How we come to talk here of men out of the right way." You ſee how. If you do not, I know not what help there is for your eyes. And I muſt content myſelf that any other reader that has eyes, will not miſs it. And I wonder that you ſhould: ſince you know I have on ſeveral occaſions argued againſt the uſe of force in matters of religion upon a ſuppoſition, that if any one, then all magiſtrates, have a juſt pretence and right to uſe it; which has ſerved you in ſome places for matter of great reproof, and in others, of ſport and diverſion. But becauſe ſo plain a thing as that was ſo ſtrange to you, that you thought it a ridiculous paradox to ſay, "That for all magiſ"trates to ſuppoſe the religion they believed to be true, was equally juſt and "reaſonable;" and becauſe you took no notice of the words adjoined that proved it, viz. "Unleſs we can imagine every where but in England, [or "where the national religion is the true] men believe what at the ſame "time they think to be a lie," I have taken the pains to prove it to you more at large in another place, and therefore ſhall make bold to uſe it here as an argument againſt force, viz. That if it have any efficacy, it will do more harm than good; "Becauſe men out of the right way are as apt, or "apter to uſe it:" and I ſhall think it a good one till you have anſwered it.

It is a good and a ſure way, and ſhews a zeal to the cauſe, ſtill to hold faſt the concluſion, and whatever be in debate, return ſtill to one's old poſition.
A. p. 5. I arguing againſt what you ſay for the uſe of force, viz. "That force "uſed not to convince by its own proper efficacy, but only to make men conſider, "might indirectly and at a diſtance do ſome ſervice towards the bringing men
L. II. p. 394. "to embrace the truth;" after other aguments againſt it, I ſay, that "what"ever efficacy there is in force, your way applied, i. e. to puniſh all, and "none but, diſſenters from the national church, makes againſt you:" and the firſt reaſon I give for it, is in theſe words; "Becauſe men out of the "right way, are as apt or apter to uſe force than others." Which is what you are here anſwering. And what can be done better to anſwer it, than to
P. 26. the words I have above cited, to ſubjoin theſe following? "Now whereas "our author ſays, that penalties or force is abſolutely impertinent in this "caſe, becauſe it is not proper to convince the mind; to which, you anſwer, "that though force be not proper to convince the mind, yet it is not abſo"lutely impertinent in this caſe, becauſe it may however, do ſome ſervice "towards the bringing men to embrace the truth which muſt ſave them, by "bringing them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper to "convince the mind; and which, without being forced, they would not "conſider." Here I tell you, "No, but it is much more proper and likely "to

“ to make men receive and embrace error than truth; becauſe men out of the “ right way are as apt, and perhaps apter, to uſe force than others.” Which you tell me, “ is as good a proof you believe as the thing would admit: for “ otherwiſe, you ſuppoſe I would have given you a better.” And thus you have certainly gained the cauſe. For I having proved that force, your way applied, whatever efficacy it had, would do more harm than good, have not ſufficiently proved that it cannot do ſome ſervice towards the bringing men to embrace the truth; and therefore it is not abſolutely impertinent. But ſince you think this apt enough to prove the uſe of force in matters of religion impertinent, I ſhall farther ſhew you that force, applied your way to make people conſider, and ſo to make them embrace the truth, is impertinent.

YOUR way is to lay penalties on men for nonconformity, as you ſay, to make men conſider: now here let me aſk any one but you, whether it be not utterly impertinent ſo to lay penalties on men, to make them conſider, when they can avoid thoſe penalties without conſidering? But becauſe it is not enough to prove force, your way applied, utterly impertinent, I ſhall ſhew you in the next place, that were a law made to puniſh not barely nonconformity, but nonconſideration, thoſe penalties laid on not conſidering, would be utterly impertinent; becauſe it could never be proved that a man had not conſidered the arguments offered him. And therefore all law-makers till you, in all their penal laws about religion, laid all their penalties upon not embracing; and it was againſt that, that our author was arguing when he ſaid penalties, in this caſe, are abſolutely impertinent; becauſe they are not proper to convince the mind. For in that caſe, when penalties are laid on men for not embracing, it is plain they are uſed as a means to make men embrace: which, ſince thoſe who are careleſs in matters of religion can do without conſidering, and thoſe who are conſcientious cannot do without conviction; and ſince penalties can in no wiſe convince; this uſe of them is abſolutely impertinent, and will always be ſo till you can ſhew a way how they can be uſed in religion, not as motives to embrace, but as motives barely to make men conſider. For if you puniſh them on when they tell you they have conſidered your arguments, but are not convinced by them, and you judge of their having not conſidered, by nothing but their not embracing, it is plain you uſe penalties inſtead of arguments to convince them; ſince without conviction, thoſe whom our author pleads for, cannot embrace; and thoſe who do embrace without conviction, it is all one as if they did not embrace at all, they being not one jot the more in the way of ſalvation; and ſo penalties are abſolutely impertinent. But embracing in the ſenſe of the law, and yours too, when you ſay men have not conſidered as they ought as long as they reject, is nothing but outward conformity, or an outward profeſſion of embracing, wherewith the law is ſatisfied, and upon which the penalties ceaſe. Now penalties uſed to make men in this ſenſe embrace, are abſolutely impertinent to bring men to embrace in earneſt, or, as the author calls it, believe: becauſe an outward profeſſion, which in this caſe is the immediate end to which penalties are directed, and beyond which they do not reach, is no proper means to produce in men conſideration, conviction, or believing.

WHAT can be more impertinent than to vex and diſeaſe people with the uſe of force, to no purpoſe? and that force muſt needs be to no purpoſe, which is ſo applied as to leave the end for which it is pretended to be uſed, without the means which is acknowledged neceſſary for its attainment. That this is ſo in your way of uſing force, will eaſily appear from your hypo-
A. p. 6, to 12. theſis. You tell us at large in your "Argument conſidered," that mens luſts hinder them from even impartial conſideration and examination of matters in religion: and therefore force is neceſſary to remove this hindrance.
P. 6, 8. You tell us likewiſe at large in your Letter, that mens corrupt nature and beloved luſts hinder them alſo from embracing the true religion, and that force is neceſſary likewiſe to remove this obſtacle. Now in your way of uſing force, wherein penalties are laid on men till, and no longer than till, they are made outwardly to conform, force is ſo applied, that notwithſtanding the intention of the law-maker, let it be what it will, neither the obſtacle to impartial examination, riſing from mens luſts, nor the averſion to the embracing the true religion, ariſing from mens corrupt nature, can be removed: unleſs they can be removed without that, which you ſuppoſe neceſſary to their removal. For ſince a man may conform, without being under the neceſſity of impartial examining or embracing on the one hand, or ſuffering the penalties on the other; it is unavoidable, that he ſhould neither impartially examine nor embrace, if penalties are neceſſary to make him do either; becauſe penalties, which are the neceſſary remedies to remove thoſe hindrances, were never applied to them; and ſo thoſe obſtacles not being removed for want of their neceſſary remedy, muſt continue on to hinder both examining and embracing. For penalties cannot be uſed as a means to any end, or be applied to the procuring any action to be done, which a man from his luſts or any other cauſe, has an averſion to; but by putting them as it were in one ſcale as a counterbalance to that averſion, and the action in the other ſcale, and putting a man under the neceſſity of chuſing the one or the other: where that is not done, the penalty may be avoided, the averſion or obſtacle hath nothing to remove it, and ſo the action muſt remain undone. So that if penalties be neceſſary to make men impartially examine and really embrace; if penalties are not ſo laid on men as to make the alternative to be either ſuffering the penalties or conforming; it is impoſſible that men who without penalties would not impartially examine or really embrace, the true religion, ſhould ever do either; and then I beſeech you conſider whether penalties, your way applied, be impertinent or no.

THE neceſſity of penalties is only where there is ſome inclination or biaſs in a man, whenceſoever ariſing, that keeps him from doing ſomething in his power, which he cannot be brought to without the inconveniencies of ſome penal infliction. The efficacy of penalties lies in this, that the inconvenience to be ſuffered by the penalties overbalance the biaſs or inclination which leans the man the other way, and ſo removes the obſtacle;

and the application of this remedy lies only in putting a man under the neceſſary choice either of doing the action, or ſuffering the penalty: ſo that in whatever caſe a man has not been put under that neceſſity, there penalties have never been applied to the procuring that action: for the obſtacle or averſion to it, has never had its neceſſary remedy.

PERHAPS you will ſay, it is not abſolutely impertinent, becauſe it may poſſibly "do ſome ſervice indirectly and at a diſtance," and be the occaſion that ſome may conſider and embrace. If whatever may by accident contribute to any end, may be uſed not impertinently as a means to that end, nothing that I know can be impertinent; and a penalty of twelve pence a time laid on them for being drunk, may be ſaid, to be a pertinent means, to make men Carteſians, or conformiſts: becauſe it may indirectly and at a diſtance do ſome ſervice, by being an occaſion to make ſome men conſider their miſpending their time; whereby it may happen that one may betake himſelf to the ſtudy of philoſophy, where he may meet with arguments proper and fit to convince him of the truth of that philoſophy; as another betaking himſelf to the ſtudy of divinity, may conſider arguments proper and fit to make him, whether it be in England, Holland or Denmark, of the national profeſſion, which he was not of before.

JUST thus, and no otherwiſe, does twelve pence a Sunday, or any other penalty laid on nonconformity, make men ſtudy and embrace the true religion; and whatever you will call the ſervice it does, direct or indirect, near or at a diſtance, it is plain it produces that effect, and conduces to that end merely by accident; and therefore muſt be allowed to be impertinent to be uſed to that purpoſe.

THAT your way of uſing force in matters of religion, even in a country where the magiſtrate is of the true religion, is abſolutely impertinent; I ſhall further ſhew you from your own poſitions.

HERE in the entrance give me leave to obſerve to you, that you confound two things very different, viz. your way of applying force, and the end for which you pretend you uſe it. And this perhaps may be it which contributes to caſt that miſt about your eyes, that you always return to the ſame place, and ſtick to the ſame groſs miſtake. For here you ſay, "Force, your "way applied, i. e. to bring men to embrace the truth which muſt ſave them:" P. 26. but, Sir, to bring men to embrace the truth, is not your way of applying force, but the end for which you pretend it is applied. Your way to puniſh men, as you ſay, moderately for being diſſenters from the national religion; this is your way of uſing force. Now if in this way of uſing it, force does ſervice merely by accident, you will then, I ſuppoſe, allow it to be abſolutely impertinent. For you ſay, "If by doing ſervice by accident, I mean doing "it but ſeldom, and beſide the intention of the agent, you aſſure me, that it is "not the thing you mean when you ſay force may indirectly, and at a diſtance, "do ſome ſervice." P. 17. For in that uſe of force, which you defend, the effect is both intended by him that uſes it, and withal, you "doubt not, ſo often at"tained, as abundantly to manifeſt the uſefulneſs of it." Whereby it is plain the two marks, whereby you diſtinguiſhed your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs,

fulneſs, from that which is by accident, are that, that by accident does ſervice but ſeldom, and beſide the intention of the agent, but yours the contrary.

P. 17.

FIRST, as to the intention, you tell us, in the uſe of force, which you defend, “the effect is intended by him that uſes it;” that is, thoſe who made laws to puniſh nonconformiſts, deſigned thoſe penalties to make all men, under their power, “conſider ſo as to be convinced of, and embrace the truths that “ſhould ſave them.” If one ſhould aſk you how you knew it to be their intention, can you ſay, they ever told you ſo? If they did not, then ſo far you and I know their intentions alike. Did they ever ſay ſo in thoſe laws? nor that neither. Thoſe verſed then in the interpretation of laws, will tell you nothing can be known to be the intention of the law-makers in any law, of which the law is wholly ſilent: that way then you cannot know it to have been their intention, if the law ſays nothing of it. Whatever was the intention of former law-makers, if you had read with attention the laſt act of uniformity of Car. II. printed before the common-prayer book, I conclude you would have been better ſatisfied about the intention of the then law-makers in that law; for I think nothing can be plainer to any one who will look into that ſtatute, than that their only end in that law was, what they have expreſſed in theſe words. “And to the end that uniformity in the pub-“lick worſhip of God (which is ſo much deſired) may be ſpeedily effected;” which was driven with ſuch ſpeed, that if all concerned had opportunity to get and peruſe the then eſtabliſhed liturgy, it is certain they had not over-much time ſeriouſly and deliberately to conſider of all the parts of it before the day ſet for the uſe of it.

BUT you think, they ought to have intended, and therefore they did: and I think they neither ought, nor could, in making thoſe laws, intend ſo unpracticable a thing; and therefore they did not. Which being as certain a way of knowledge as yours, if you know it by that way; it is poſſible you and I may at the ſame time know contraries.

BUT you know it, by their “having provided ſufficient means of inſtruc-“tion for all under their care, in the true religion;” of this ſufficient means, we have ſomething to ſay in another place. Penalties laid expreſly on one fault, have no evidence that they were deſigned to mend another, though there are ſufficient means provided of mending it, if men would make a ſufficient uſe of them; unleſs thoſe two faults are ſo connected, as one cannot be mended without the other. Now if men cannot conform, without ſo conſidering as to be convinced of, and embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, you may know that penalties laid on nonconformity, were intended to make men ſo conſider: but if men may conform, without ſo conſidering, one cannot know nor conclude thoſe penalties were intended to make men ſo conſider, whatever proviſion there is made of means of inſtruction.

BUT you will ſay, it is evident that penalties on nonconformiſts, were intended to make them uſe theſe means of inſtruction, becauſe they are intended for the bringing men to church, the place of inſtruction. That they are intended to bring men to church, the place of preaching, that I grant; but that thoſe penalties that are laid on men, for not coming to church, can be known thereby to be intended to make men ſo conſider, as to be convinced and embrace the true religion, that I deny: and it is utterly impoſſible it ſhould be ſo, if what you ſay be true, where you tell us, that "the magiſtrates concern themſelves for compliance or conformity, only as the fruit of their conviction." P. 22. If therefore the magiſtrates are concerned for mens conformity, only as the fruit of their conviction, and coming to church be that conformity; coming to church cannot be intended as a means of their conviction: unleſs it be intended they ſhould be convinced, before they are convinced.

BUT to ſhew you, that you cannot pretend the penalty of laws for conformity, to proceed from a care of the ſouls of all under the magiſtrate's power, and ſo to be intended to make them all conſider, in any ſenſe: can you, or any one, know, or ſuppoſe, that penalties which are laid by the law on nonconformity, are intended to make all men conſider; where it is known that a great number, under the magiſtrate's power, are diſpenſed with, and privileged from thoſe penalties? How many, omitting the Jews, are there, for example, in the king of England's dominions, under his care and power, of the Walloon, and French church; to whom force is never applied, and they live in ſecurity from it? How many Pagans are there in the Plantations, many whereof born in his dominions, of whom there was never any care taken, that they ſhould ſo much as come to church, or be in the leaſt inſtructed in the Chriſtian religion? And yet muſt we believe, or can you pretend, that the magiſtrate's uſe of force, againſt nonconformiſts, is to make all his ſubjects conſider, "ſo as to be convinced of, and embrace the truth that muſt ſave them?" If you ſay, in your way you mean no ſuch indulgence: I anſwer, the queſtion is not of yours, but the magiſtrate's intention; though what your intention is, who would have the want of conſideration, or knowledge, in conformiſts, exempt from force, is viſible enough.

AGAIN, Thoſe penalties cannot be ſuppoſed, to be intended to make men conſider; which are laid on thoſe, who have, or may have already conſidered: and ſuch you muſt grant to be the penalties laid in England, on nonconformiſts; unleſs you will deny, that any nonconformiſt has, or can conſider, ſo as to be convinced, or believe, and embrace the truth that muſt ſave him. So that you cannot vouch the intention of the magiſtrate, where his laws ſay nothing; much leſs affirm, that force is intended to produce a certain end in all his ſubjects, which is not applied to them all, and is applied to ſome who have attained that end already: unleſs you have a privilege to affirm, againſt all appearance, whatſoever may ſerve your cauſe. But to learn ſome moderation in this, I ſhall ſend you to my Pagans and Mahometans. For whatever charitable wiſhes magiſtrates may ſometimes have in their thoughts, which I meddle not with; no body can ſay, that in making the laws, or in the uſe of force, we are ſpeaking of, they intended to make men conſider and examine, ſo as "to be convinced of, and heartily to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them," but he that gives himſelf the liberty to ſay any thing.

THE ſervice that force does, indirectly, and at a diſtance; you tell us in the following page, is to make people "apply themſelves to the uſe of thoſe means, and helps, which are proper to make them what they are deſigned to be." P. 18.

In the caſe before us, What are men deſigned to be? Holy believers of the Goſpel in this world, without which no ſalvation, no ſeeing of God in the next. Let us ſee now, whether force, your way applied, can be ſuited to ſuch a deſign, and ſo intended for that end.

You hold, that all out of the national church, where the religion of the national church is true, ſhould be puniſhed, and ought to have force uſed to them: and again, you grant that thoſe who are in the communion of the national church, ought not to be puniſhed, or be under the ſtroke of force; nor indeed in your way can they. If now the effect be to prevail with men, to conſider as they ought, ſo that they may become what they are deſigned to be: how can any one think, that you, and they who uſe force thus, intend, in the uſe of it, that men ſhould really be Chriſtians, both in perſuaſion and practice, without which there is no ſalvation; if they leave off force before they have attained that effect? Or how can it be imagined, that they intend any thing but conformity by their uſe of force, if they leave off the uſe of it as ſoon as men conform? unleſs you will ſay that an outward conformity to the national church, whoſe religion is the true religion, is ſuch an embracing of the truth as is ſufficient to ſalvation: or that an outward profeſſion of the Chriſtian religion is the ſame with being really a Chriſtian; which poſſibly you will not be very forward to do, when you recollect what you meet with in the ſermons, and printed diſcourſes, of divines of the church of England, concerning the ignorance and irreligion of conformiſts themſelves. For penalties can never be thought, by any one, but he that can think againſt common ſenſe, and what he pleaſes, to be intended for any end; which by that conſtitution, and law whereby they are impoſed, are to ceaſe before that end be attained. And will you ſay, that all who are conformable, have ſo well conſidered, that they believe, and heartily embrace the truths of the Goſpel, that muſt ſave them: when perhaps it will be found that a great many conformiſts do not ſo much as underſtand them? But the ignorance or irreligiouſneſs to be found amongſt conformiſts, which your way of talking forces me in ſome places to take notice of, let me here tell you once for all, I lay not the blame of upon conformity, but upon your uſe of force to make men conform. For whatever the religion be, true or falſe, it is natural for force, and penalty, ſo applied, to bring the irreligious, and thoſe who are careleſs and unconcerned for the true, into the national profeſſion: but whether it be fitter for ſuch to be kept out, rather than by force to be driven into, the communion of any church, and owned as members of it, thoſe who have a due care and reſpect for truly religious and pious conformiſts, were beſt conſider.

BUT farther, if, as you ſay, the oppoſition to the true religion lies only in mens luſts, it having light and ſtrength enough, were it not for that, to prevail: and it is upon that account only that force is neceſſary, there is no neceſſity at all to uſe force on men, only till they conform, and no farther: ſince I think you will not deny, but that the corruption of human nature is as great in conformiſts as in nonconformiſts; in the profeſſors of, as in the diſſenters from, the national religion. And therefore either force was not neceſſary before, or elſe it is neceſſary ſtill, after men are conformiſts; unleſs you will ſay, that it is harder for a man to be a profeſſor, than a Chriſtian indeed: and that the true religion, by its own light and ſtrength, can, without the help of force, prevail over a man's luſts, and the corruption of his nature; but it has need of the help of force, to make him a conformiſt, and an outward profeſſor. And ſo much for the effect, which is intended by him that uſes it in that uſe of force which you defend.

THE other argument you bring to ſhew, that your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs of force your way applied, is not by accident, is the frequent ſucceſs of it. Which I think is not the true mark of what is not by accident: for an effect may not be by accident, though it has never been produced but once; and is certainly as little by accident the firſt time, as when it has been produced a thouſand times. That then, by which any thing is excuſed from being by accident, is not the frequency of the event, but that whereon the frequency of the event depends, when frequent trials are made; and that is the proper, natural, direct efficacy of the cauſe or means, which produces the effect. As in the caſe before us, penalties are the cauſe or means uſed to produce an end; the proper and immediate effect of penalties, is to produce ſome pain or inconvenience; and the natural effect of that, is to make a man, who naturally flies from all pain or inconvenience, to endeavour to avoid; whereby it naturally and directly works upon the will of man, by propoſing to him this unavoidable choice of doing ſome action, or enduring the pain or inconvenience of the penalty annexed to its omiſſion. When the pain of doing the action is outweighed in the ſenſe of him that lies under the penalty, the pain, that by the law is annexed to the omiſſion, operates upon his will, as naturally, as thirteen ounces in one ſcale, laid againſt twelve ounces in the other, incline the balance, and bring it down on that ſide. And this is by a direct and natural efficacy, wherein there is nothing of chance.

Let us ſee then, how far this will go in your indirect, and at a diſtance, uſefulneſs. In your method, the action you propoſe to be done, is conſidering, or a ſevere and impartial examining matters of religion, which you tell us, men by their great negligence or averſion are kept from doing. What now is a proper means to produce this? "Penalties, without which, you tell "us, it will not be done." How now is it applied in your method? Conformity, and mens neglect or averſion to it, is laid in one ſcale, and the penalty joined to the omiſſion of it, laid in the other; and in this caſe, if the inconvenience of the penalty overweighs the pains of, or averſion to conformity, it does by a direct and natural efficacy produce conformity: but if it produces a ſevere and impartial examination, that is merely by accident; becauſe the inconvenience of the penalty is not laid againſt mens averſion or backwardneſs to examine impartially, as a counterbalance to that, but againſt their averſion or backwardneſs to conform; and ſo whatever it does, indirectly, and at a diſtance, it is certain its making men ſeverely and impartially examine, if ever that happens, is as much by accident, as it would be by accident, if a piece of lead laid in one ſcale as a counterpoiſe to feathers

thers in the oppoſite ſcale, ſhould move or weigh down gold that was put in the ſcale of another pair of balances, which had no counterpoiſe laid againſt it. Unleſs you will ſay there is a neceſſary connexion between conformity, and a ſevere and impartial examination.

But you will ſay, perhaps, that though it be not poſſible that penalties ſhould produce examination but by mere accident, becauſe examination has no neceſſary connexion with conformity, or the profeſſion of any religion; yet ſince there are ſome who will not take up any profeſſion without a ſevere and impartial examination, penalties for nonconformity will, by a direct and natural efficacy, produce examination in all ſuch. To which I anſwer, A. p. 6, &c. That thoſe are, if we may believe what you ſay, ſo very few, that this your remedy, which you put into the magiſtrate's hands to bring all his ſubjects to conſider and examine, will not work upon one in a thouſand; nay, it can work on none at all, to make them ſeverely and impartially examine, but merely by accident. For if they are men, whom a ſlight and partial examination, which upon your principles you muſt ſay, ſufficed to make nonconformiſts, a ſlight and partial examination will as well ſerve to make them conformiſts; and ſo penalties laid on them to make them conform, can only by accident produce a ſevere and impartial examination, in ſuch men, who can take up the profeſſion of any religion without a ſevere and impartial examination, no more than it can otherwiſe than by accident, produce any examination in thoſe who, without any examination, can take up the profeſſion of any religion.

And in thoſe very few, who take not up the profeſſion of any religion without a ſevere and impartial examination, that penalties can do any ſervice, to bring them either to the truth that muſt ſave them, or ſo much as to outward conformity, but merely by accident; that alſo is evident. Becauſe all ſuch in a country, where they diſſent from the national religion, muſt neceſſarily have ſeverely and impartially examined already, or elſe you deſtroy the ſuppoſition this argument is built on, viz. that they are men who do ſeverely and impartially examine before they chuſe. And if you lay, or continue your penalties on men, that have ſo examined, it is plain you uſe them inſtead of reaſons and arguments: in which uſe of them, you confeſs they have no proper efficacy, and therefore if they do any ſervice, it is merely by accident.

P. 17. But now let us ſee the ſucceſs you boaſt of, and for that you tell us, that you doubt not but it is "ſo often attained, as abundantly to manifeſt the uſefulneſs of it." You ſpeak here of it, as a thing tried, and ſo known, that you doubt not. Pray tell us where your moderate, for great ones you acknowledge to do harm, and to be uſeleſs, penalties have been uſed, with ſuch ſucceſs, that we may be paſt doubt too. If you can ſhew no ſuch place, do you not vouch experience where you have none? and ſhew a willingneſs not to doubt, where you have no aſſurance? In all countries, where any force is uſed to bring men to the profeſſion of the national religion, and to outward conformity, it is not to be doubted, but that force joining with their natural corruption, in bringing them into the way of preferment, countenance, protection, eaſe and impunity, ſhould eaſily draw in all the looſe and careleſs in matters of religion, which are every where the far greater number: but is it thoſe you count upon, and will you produce them as examples of what force has done to make men conſider, ſtudy, and embrace the true religion? Did the penalties laid on nonconformity make you “ conſider, ſo as to ſtudy, be convinced, and embrace the true religion?” Or can you give an inſtance of any one, in whom it produced this effect? If you cannot, you will have ſome reaſon to doubt of what you have ſaid, and not to be ſo confident that the effect you talk of, is ſo often attained. Not that I deny, but that God may ſometimes have made theſe puniſhments the occaſions to men of ſetting themſelves ſeriouſly on conſidering religion, and thence they may have come into the national religion upon a real conviction: but the inſtances of it I believe to be ſo few, that you will have reaſon to remember your own words, where you ſpeak of ſuch things as, “ Any way, at any time, upon any perſon, by any accident, may be uſeful P. 18. “ towards the promoting of true religion: if men ſhould thence take occaſion “ to apply ſuch things generally, who ſees not, that however they might “ chance to hit right in ſome few caſes, yet upon the whole matter, they would “ certainly do a great deal more harm than good.” You and I know a country wherein, not long ſince, greater ſeverities were uſed than you pretend to approve of. Were there not, for all that, great numbers of ſeveral profeſſions ſtood out, who, by your rule, ought now to have your moderate penalties tried upon them? And can you think leſs degrees of force can work, and often, as you ſay, prevail, where greater could not? But perhaps they might prevail on many of thoſe to return, who having been brought into the communion of the church by former penal laws, have now upon the relaxation left it again. A manifeſt demonſtration, is it not? That “ their compliance “ was the fruit of their conviction; and that the magiſtrate was concerned for “ their compliance only as the fruit of their conviction:” when they, as ſoon as any relaxation of thoſe laws took off the penalties, left again the communion of the national church? For the leſſening the number of Conformiſts, is, I ſuppoſe, one of thoſe things which you ſay your “ eyes cannot but ſee at “ this time;” and which you, with concern, impute to the late relaxation. A plain evidence how preſumable it is, even in your own opinion, that thoſe who conform, do it upon real conviction.

To conclude, theſe proofs, though I do not pretend to bring as good as the thing will admit, will ſerve my turn to ſhew, that force is impertinent; ſince by your own confeſſion it has no direct efficacy to convince men, and by its being indirect and at a diſtance uſeful, is not at all diſtinguiſhed from being barely ſo by accident: ſince you can neither prove it to be intended for that end, nor frequently to ſucceed, which are the two marks whereby you put a difference between indirect, and at a diſtance, and by accident: this, I ſay, is enough to ſhew what the author ſaid, is true, that the uſe of force is wholly impertinent. Which, whatever others do, you upon another reaſon, muſt be forced to allow.

YOU profeſs yourſelf of the church of England, and if I may gueſs, are ſo far of it, as to have ſubſcribed the XXXIX Articles, which if you have done, and aſſented to what you ſubſcribed, you muſt neceſſarily allow that all force, uſed for the bringing men to the true religion, is "abſolutely impertinent;" for that muſt be abſolutely impertinent to be uſed as a means, which can contribute nothing at all to the end for which it is uſed. The end here, is to make a man a true Chriſtian, that he may be ſaved; and he is then and then only, a true Chriſtian, and in the way of ſalvation, when he believes, and with ſincerity obeys the Goſpel. By the thirteenth article of the church of England, you hold, that WORKS DONE BEFORE THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AND THE INSPIRATION OF HIS SPIRIT, ARE NOT PLEASING TO GOD; FOR AS MUCH AS THEY SPRING NOT OF FAITH IN JESUS CHRIST, NEITHER DO THEY MAKE MEN MEET TO RECEIVE GRACE, OR AS THE SCHOOL-AUTHORS SAY, DESERVE GRACE OF CONGRUITY; YEA RATHER, FOR THAT THEY ARE NOT DONE AS GOD HAS WILLED AND COMMANDED THEM TO BE DONE, WE DOUBT NOT BUT THEY HAVE THE NATURE OF SIN. Now if it be impertinent to uſe force to make a man do more than he can, and a man can do nothing to procure grace, unleſs ſin can procure it; and without grace, a man cannot believe, or live ſo as to be a true Chriſtian; it is certainly wholly impertinent to uſe force to bring a man to be truly a Chriſtian. To hear and conſider, is in mens power, you will ſay, and to that force may be pertinent; I grant to make men hear, but not to make them conſider in your ſenſe, which you tell us, is to "conſider ſo as "to embrace;" if you mean by embracing any thing but outward Conformity: and that according to your article, contributes nothing to the attaining of grace; becauſe without grace, your article ſays it is a ſin; and to conform to, and outwardly profeſs a religion which a man does not underſtand and heartily believe, every one, I think, judges to be a ſin, and no fit means to procure the grace of God.

P. 31. BUT you tell us, "That God denies his grace to none who ſeriouſly aſk it." If that be ſo, methinks force ſhould moſt properly and pertinently be uſed to make men ſeriouſly pray to God for grace. But how, I beſeech you, will this ſtand with your thirteenth article? For if you mean by ſeriouſly, ſo as will make his ſeeking acceptable to God, that cannot be, becauſe he is ſuppoſed yet to want grace which alone can make it acceptable: and if his aſking has the nature of ſin, as in the article you do not doubt but it has, can you expect that ſinning ſhould procure the grace of God? You will I fear here, without ſome great help in a very nice diſtinction from the ſchool-authors, be forced either to renounce your article in the plain ſenſe of it, and ſo become a Diſſenter from the church of England, or elſe acknowledge force to be wholly impertinent to the buſineſs of true religion and ſalvation.

ANOTHER reaſon I gave againſt the uſefulneſs of force in matters of religion, was, "Becauſe the magiſtrates of the world, being few of them in the "right way, not one of ten, take which ſide you will, perhaps not one "of a hundred, being of the true religion; it is likely your indirect way

" of uſing force would do a hundred, or at leaſt ten times as much harm " as good." To which you reply, " Which would have been to the purpoſe P. 27. " if you had aſſerted that every magiſtrate may uſe force, your indirect way " (or any way) to bring men to his own religion, whatever that be. But if " you aſſert no ſuch thing, (as no man you think but an atheiſt will aſſert it) " then this is quite beſide the buſineſs." I think I have proved, that if magiſtrates of the true religion may uſe force to bring men to their religion, every magiſtrate may uſe force to bring men to his own religion, when he thinks it the true, and then do you look where the atheiſm will light.

IN the next paragraph, having quoted theſe following words of mine; where I ſay, " Under another pretence, you put into the magiſtrate's hands " as much power to force men to his religion, as any the openeſt perſecutors " can pretend to. I aſk what difference is there between puniſhing them " to bring them to maſs, and puniſhing them to bring them to conſider " thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince " them that they ought to go to maſs?" You reply; " A queſtion which Ibid. " you ſhall then think yourſelf obliged to anſwer, when I have produced " thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince " men that they ought to go to maſs." But if you had not omitted the three or four immediately preceding lines, an art to ſerve a good cauſe, which puts me in mind of my Pagans and Mahometans, the reader would have ſeen that your reply was nothing at all to my argument. My words were theſe,

" ESPECIALLY, if you conſider, that as the magiſtrate will certainly uſe " it [force] to force men to hearken to the proper miniſters of his religion, let " it be what it will; ſo you having ſet no time nor bounds to this conſideration of arguments and reaſons ſhort of being convinced, you under " another," &c. My argument is to ſhew of what advantage force, your way applied, is like to be to the true religion, ſince it puts as much force into the magiſtrate's hands as the openeſt perſecutors can pretend to, which the magiſtrates of wrong perſuaſions may and will uſe as well as thoſe of the true; becauſe your way ſets no other bounds to conſidering ſhort of complying. And then I aſk, " What difference there is between puniſhing you to bring " you to maſs, or puniſhing you to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments " which are proper and ſufficient to convince you that you ought to go to " maſs?" To which you reply, That it is a " queſtion you ſhall then think " yourſelf obliged to anſwer, when I have produced thoſe reaſons and arguments that are proper and ſufficient to convince men that they ought to go " to maſs." Whereas, the objection is the ſame, whether there be or be not, reaſons and arguments proper to convince men, that they ought to go to maſs; for men muſt be puniſhed on till they have ſo conſidered as to comply: and what difference is there then between puniſhing men to bring them to maſs, and puniſhing them to make them conſider ſo as to go to maſs? But though I pretend not to produce any reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince you or all men, that they ought to go to maſs; yet do you think there are none proper and ſufficient to convince any men? And that all the

Papiſts in the world go to maſs without believing it their duty? And whoſoever believes it to be his duty, does it upon reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince him, though perhaps not to convince another, that it is ſo, or elſe I imagine he would never believe at all. What think you of thoſe great numbers of Japaneſes, that reſiſted all ſorts of torments, even to death itſelf, for the Romiſh religion? And had you been in France ſome years ſince, who knows but the arguments the king of France produced might have been proper and ſufficient to have convinced you that you ought to go to maſs? I do not by this, think you leſs confident of the truth of your religion, than you profeſs to be. But arguments ſet on with force, have a ſtrange efficacy upon human frailty; and he muſt be well aſſured of his own ſtrength, who can peremptorily affirm, he is ſure he ſhould have ſtood, what above a million of people ſunk under: amongſt which, it is great confidence to ſay, there was not one ſo well perſuaded of the truth of his religion, as you are of yours; though ſome of them gave great proofs of their perſuaſion in their ſufferings for it. But what the neceſſary method of force may be able to do, to bring any one, in your ſenſe, to any religion, i. e. to an outward profeſſion of it, he that thinks himſelf ſecure againſt, muſt have a greater aſſurance of himſelf, than the weakneſs of decayed and depraved nature will well allow. If you have any ſpell againſt the force of arguments, driven with penalties and puniſhments, you will do well to teach it the world; for it is the hard luck of well meaning people to be often miſled by them, and even the confident themſelves have not ſeldom fallen under them, and betrayed their weakneſs.

To my demanding, if you meant "reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth, why did you not ſay ſo?" You reply, P. 27. "As if it were poſſible for any man that reads your anſwer, to think otherwiſe." Whoever reads that paſſage in your A. p. 5. cannot poſſibly think you meant to ſpeak out, and poſſibly you found ſome difficulty to add any thing to your words, (which are theſe, "Force uſed to bring men to conſider reaſons and "arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them") that might determine their ſenſe. For if you had ſaid, to convince them of truth; then the magiſtrate muſt have made laws, and uſed force to make men ſearch after truth in general, and that would not have ſerved your turn: if you had ſaid to convince them of the truth of the magiſtrate's religion, that would too manifeſtly have put the power in every magiſtrate's hands, which you tell us, "none but an atheiſt will ſay." If you had ſaid, to convince them of the truth of your religion, that had looked too ridiculous to be owned, though it were the thing you meant; and therefore in this ſtrait, where nothing you could ſay, would well fit your purpoſe, you wiſely chuſe to leave the ſenſe imperfect, and name nothing they were to be convinced of, but leave it to be collected by your reader out of your diſcourſe, rather than add three words to make it good grammar, as well as intelligible ſenſe.

To my ſaying, "That if you pretend it muſt be arguments to convince "men of the truth, it would in this caſe do you little ſervice; becauſe the "maſs in France is as much ſuppoſed the truth, as the liturgy here." You reply, "So that it ſeems, that in my opinion, whatſoever is ſuppoſed the truth, P. 28. it is the truth, for otherwiſe this reaſon of mine is none at all." If, in my opinion, the ſuppoſition of truth authorizes the magiſtrate to uſe the ſame means to bring men to it, as if it were true, my argument will hold good, without taking all to be true which ſome men ſuppoſe true. According to this anſwer of yours, to ſuppoſe or believe his religion the true, is not enough to authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force; he muſt know, i. e. be infallibly certain, that his is the true religion. We will for once ſuppoſe you our magiſtrate, with force promoting our national religion. I will not aſk you, whether you know that all required of conformiſts, is neceſſary to ſalvation: but will ſuppoſe one of my Pagans aſking you, whether you know Chriſtianity to be the true religion? If you ſay, Yes, he will aſk you how you know it? and no doubt, but you will give the anſwer, whereby our Saviour proved his miſſion, John v. 36. that "the works which our Saviour did, "bear witneſs of him, that the Father ſent him." The miracles that Chriſt did, are a proof of his being ſent from God, and ſo his religion the true religion. But then you will be aſked again, whether you know that he did thoſe miracles, as well as thoſe who ſaw them done? If you anſwer, Yes; then it is plain that miracles are not yet withdrawn, but do ſtill accompany the Chriſtian religion with all the efficacy and evidence, that they had upon the eye-witneſſes of them; and then upon your own grounds, there will be no neceſſity of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, miracles ſtill ſupplying the want of it. If you anſwer, that matter of fact done out of your ſight, at ſuch a diſtance of time and place, cannot be known to you as certainly, as it was to the eye witneſſes of it, but that you upon very good grounds firmly believe it; you are then come to believing, that yours is the true religion, and if that be ſufficient to authorize you to uſe force, it will authorize any other magiſtrate of any other religion to uſe force alſo. For whoever believes any thing, takes it to be true, and as he thinks upon good grounds; and thoſe often who believe on the weakeſt grounds, have the ſtrongeſt confidence: and thus all magiſtrates who believe their religion to be true, will be obliged to uſe force to promote it, as if it were the true.

To my ſaying that the uſefulneſs of force your way applied, amounts to no more but this, that it is not impoſſible but that it may be uſeful. You reply, "I leave it to be judged by what has been ſaid;" and I leave it to you Ibid. yourſelf to judge: only, that you may not forget, I ſhall here remind you in ſhort of ſome of the reaſons I have to ſay ſo: 1. You grant that force has no direct efficacy to bring men to embrace the truth. 2. You diſtinguiſh the indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs of your force, from that which is barely by accident; by theſe two marks, viz. Firſt, That puniſhment on diſſenters for nonconformity, is, by thoſe that uſe it, intended to make men conſider: and Secondly, That your moderate puniſhments, by experience, are found often ſucceſsful; and your having neither of theſe marks, it muſt be concluded to be uſeful only by accident: and ſuch an uſefulneſs, as I ſaid, "One cannot deny, to auricular confeſſion, doing of penance, going pil- L. II. p. 395.

“grimages to ſaints, and what not? Yet our church does not think fit to uſe them; though it cannot be denied but they may have ſome of your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs; that is, perhaps may do ſome ſervice indirectly, and by accident.” If the intention of thoſe that uſe them, and the ſucceſs they will tell you they find in the uſe of them, be a proof of doing ſervice more than by accident; that cannot be denied to them more than to penalties, your way applied. To which, let me add, that the niceneſs and difficulty there is, to hit that juſt degree of force, which according to your hypotheſis, muſt be neither ſo much as to do harm, nor ſo little as to be ineffectual; for you yourſelf cannot determine it; makes its uſefulneſs yet more uncertain and accidental. And after all, let its efficacy to work upon mens minds be what it will, great or little, it being ſure to be employed ten, or poſſibly, a hundred times to bring men to error, for once that it is employed to bring men to the truth; and where it chances to be employed, on the ſide of truth, it being liable to make a hundred, or perhaps a thouſand outward conformiſts, for one true and ſincere convert; I leave it alſo to be judged what uſefulneſs it is like to be of.

To ſhew the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, I ſaid, “Where the law puniſhed diſſenters without telling them it is to make them conſider, they may through ignorance and overſight neglect to do it.” Your anſwer P. 28. is, “But where the law provides ſufficient means of inſtruction for all, as well as puniſhment for diſſenters, it is ſo plain to all concerned, that the puniſhment is intended to make them conſider, that you ſee no danger of mens neglecting to do it, through ignorance or overſight.” I hope you mean by conſider, ſo to conſider as not only to embrace in an outward profeſſion, for then all you ſay is but a poor fallacy, for ſuch a conſidering amounts to no more but bare outward conformity; but ſo to conſider, ſtudy and examine matters of religion, as really to embrace, what one is convinced to be the true, with faith and obedience. If it be ſo plain and eaſy to underſtand, that a law, that ſpeaks nothing of it, ſhould yet be intended to make men conſider, ſearch and ſtudy, to find out the truth that muſt ſave them; I wiſh you had ſhewed us this plainneſs. For I confeſs many of all degrees, that I have purpoſely aſked about it, did not ever ſee, or ſo much as dream, that the act of uniformity, or againſt conventicles, or the penalties in either of them, were ever intended to make men ſeriouſly ſtudy religion, and make it their buſineſs to find the truth which muſt ſave them; but barely to make men conform. But perhaps you have met with handicrafts-men, and country-farmers, maid-ſervants, and day-labourers, who have quicker underſtandings, and reaſon better about the intention of the law, for theſe as well as others are concerned. If you have not, it is to be feared, your ſaying “it is ſo plain, that you ſee no danger of mens neglecting to do it, through ignorance or overſight,” is more for its ſerving your purpoſe, than from any experience you have that it is ſo.

WHEN you will enquire into this matter, you will, I gueſs, find the people ſo ignorant amidſt that great plainneſs you ſpeak of, that not one of twenty of any degree, amongſt the conformiſts or nonconformiſts, ever underſtood the penalty of twelve pence a Sunday, or any other of our penal laws againſt nonconformity, to be intended to ſet men upon ſtudying the true religion, and impartially examining what is neceſſary to ſalvation. And if you would come to Hudibras's deciſion, I believe he would have a good wager of it, who ſhould give you a guinea for each one who had thought ſo, and receive but a ſhilling for every one who had not. Indeed you do not ſay, it is plain every-where, but only "where the law provides ſufficient means of inſtruction for "all, as well as puniſhments for diſſenters." From whence, I think it will follow, that that contributes nothing to make it plain, or elſe that the law has not provided ſufficient means of inſtruction in England, where ſo very few find this to be ſo plain. If by this ſufficient proviſion of means of inſtruction for all, you mean perſons maintained at the publick charge to preach and officiate in the publick exerciſe of the national religion; I ſuppoſe you needed not this reſtriction, there being few places which have an eſtabliſhed national religion, where there is not ſuch means of inſtruction provided: if you intend any other means of inſtruction, I know none the law has provided in England but the XXXIX Articles, the Liturgy, and the Scripture; and how either of them by itſelf, or theſe altogether, with a national clergy, make it plain, that the penalties laid on nonconformity, are intended to make men conſider, ſtudy, and impartially examine matters of religion, you would do well to ſhew. For magiſtrates uſually know, and therefore make their laws accordingly, that the people ſeldom carry either their interpretation or practice beyond what the expreſs letter of the law requires of them. You would do well alſo to ſhew, that a ſufficient proviſion of means of inſtruction, cannot but be underſtood to require an effectual uſe of them, which the law that makes that proviſion ſays nothing of. But on the contrary, contents itſelf with ſomething very ſhort of it: for conformity or coming to church, is at leaſt as far from conſidering, ſtudying, and impartially examining matters of religion, ſo as to embrace the truth upon conviction and with an obedient heart; as being preſent at a diſcourſe concerning mathematicks, and ſtudying mathematicks, ſo as to become a knowing mathematician, are different one from the other.

PEOPLE generally think they have done their duties abundantly, if they have been at church, whether they mind any thing done there or no: this they call ſerving of God, as if it were their whole duty; ſo backward are they to underſtand more, though it be plain the law of God expreſsly requires more. But that they have fully ſatisfied the law of the land, nobody doubts; nor is it eaſy to anſwer what was replied to me on this occaſion, viz. If the magiſtrate intended any thing more in thoſe laws but conformity, would he not have ſaid it? To which let me add, if the magiſtrate intended conformity as the fruit of conviction, would he not have taken ſome care to have them inſtructed before they conformed, and examined when they did? But it is preſumable their ignorance, corruption and luſts, all drop off in the church-porch, and that they become perfectly good Chriſtians as ſoon as they have taken their ſeats in the church.

IF there be any whom your example or writing hath inſpired with acuteneſs enough to find out this; I ſuſpect the vulgar who have ſcarce time and thought enough to make inferences from the law, which ſcarce one of ten of them ever ſo much as reads, or perhaps underſtands when read; are ſtill, and will be ignorant of it: and thoſe who have the time and abilities to argue about it, will find reaſon to think that thoſe penalties were not intended to make men examine the doctrine and ceremonies of religion; ſince thoſe who ſhould examine, are prohibited by thoſe very laws, to follow their own judgments, which is the very end and uſe of examination, if they at all differ from the religion eſtabliſhed by law. Nor can it appear ſo "plain to all concerned, that the puniſhment is intended to make them conſider and examine," when they ſee the puniſhments you ſay are to make people conſider, ſpare thoſe who conſider and examine matters of religion, as little as any of the moſt ignorant and careleſs diſſenters.

To my ſaying, "Some diſſenters may have conſidered already, and then force employed upon them muſt needs be uſeleſs; unleſs you can think it uſeful to puniſh a man to make him do that which he has done already." P. 28. You reply, "No man who rejects truth neceſſary to his ſalvation, has conſidered already as he ought to conſider." The words "as he ought," are not, as I take it in the queſtion: and ſo your anſwer is, "No man who rejects the truth neceſſary to his ſalvation, hath conſidered, ſtudied or examined matters of religion." But we will let that go: and yet with that allowance, your anſwer will be nothing to the purpoſe, unleſs you will dare to ſay, that all diſſenters reject truth neceſſary to ſalvation. For without that ſuppoſition, that all diſſenters reject truth neceſſary to ſalvation, the argument and anſwer will ſtand thus. It may be uſeleſs to puniſh all diſſenters to make them conſider, becauſe ſome of them may have conſidered already. To which, the anſwer is, Yes, ſome of them may have conſidered already, but thoſe who reject truth neceſſary to the ſalvation, have not conſidered as they ought.

L. II. p. 395. I SAID, "The greateſt part of mankind, being not able to diſcern betwixt truth and falſhood, that depends upon long and many proofs, and remote conſequences; nor having ability enough to diſcover the falſe grounds, and reſiſt the captious and fallacious arguments of learned men verſed in controverſies; are ſo much more expoſed, by the force, which is uſed to make them hearken to the information and inſtruction of men appointed to it by the magiſtrate, or thoſe of his religion, to be led into falſhood and error, than they are likely this way to be brought to embrace the truth which muſt ſave them; by how much the national religions of the world are, beyond compariſon, more of them falſe or erroneous, than ſuch as have God for their author, and truth for their ſtandard." P. 29. You reply, "If the firſt part of this be true, then an infallible guide, and implicit faith, are more neceſſary than ever you thought them." Whether you conclude from thence or no, that then there will be a neceſſity of an infallible guide, and an implicit faith, it is nevertheleſs true, that the greateſt part of men are unable to diſcern, as I ſaid, between truth and falſhood depending, upon long and many proofs, &c. But whether that will make an infallible guide neceſſary or no, impoſition in matters of religion certainly will: ſince there can be nothing more abſurd imaginable, than that a man ſhould take upon him to impoſe on others in matters of their eternal concernment, without being, or ſo much as pretending to be, infallible: for colour it with the name of conſidering, as much as you pleaſe, as long as it is to make men conſider as they ought, and conſidering as they ought, is ſo to conſider, as to embrace; the uſing of force to make men conſider, and the uſing of force to make them embrace any doctrine or opinion, is the ſame thing: and to ſhew a difference betwixt impoſing an opinion, and uſing force to make it be embraced, would require ſuch a piece of ſubtilty, as I heard lately from a learned man out of the pulpit, who told us, that though two things, he named, were all one, yet for diſtinction's ſake he would divide them. Your reaſon for the neceſſity of an infallible guide, is, "For if the greateſt part of mankind be not able to " diſcern betwixt truth and falſhood, in matters concerning their ſalvation " (as I muſt mean if I ſpeak to the purpoſe) their condition muſt needs be " very hazardous, if they have not ſome guide or judge, to whoſe determina- " tion and direction they may ſecurely reſign themſelves." And therefore they muſt reſign themſelves to the determination and direction of the civil magiſtrate, or be puniſhed. Here it is like you will have ſomething again to ſay to my modeſty and conſcience, for imputing to you what you no where ſay. I grant it, in direct words, but in effect, as plainly as may be. The magiſtrate may impoſe ſound creeds and decent ceremonies, i. e. ſuch as he thinks fit, for what is ſound and decent he I hope muſt be judge; and if he be judge of what is ſound and decent, it amounts to no more but what he thinks fit: and if it be not what he thinks fit, why is one ceremony preferred to another? Why one doctrine of the Scripture put into the Creed and Articles, and another as ſound left out? They are truths neceſſary to ſalvation. We ſhall ſee that in good time: here only I aſk, does the magiſtrate only believe them to be truths and ceremonies neceſſary to ſalvation, or does he certainly know them to be ſo? If you ſay he only believes them to be ſo, and that that is enough to authorize him to impoſe them, you, by your own confeſſion, authorize magiſtrates to impoſe what they think neceſſary for the ſalvation of their ſubjects ſouls; and ſo the king of France did what he was obliged to, when he ſaid he would have all his ſubjects ſaved, and ſo fell to dragooning.

If you ſay the magiſtrate certainly knows them to be neceſſary to ſalvation, we are luckily come to an infallible guide. Well then, the ſound creeds are agreed on; the confeſſion and liturgy are framed; the ceremonies pitched on; and the terms of communion thus ſet up, you have religion eſtabliſhed by law: and what now is the ſubject to do? He is to conform. No; he muſt firſt conſider. Who bids him conſider? No body, he may, if he pleaſes, but the law ſays nothing to him of it: conſider or not conſider, if he conforms, it is well, and he is approved of, and admitted. He does conſider the beſt he can, but finds ſome things he does not underſtand, other things he cannot believe, aſſent or conſent to. What now is to be done with him? He muſt either be puniſhed on, or reſign himſelf up to the determination and direction of the civil magiſtrate; which till you can find a better name for it, we will call implicit faith. And thus you have provided a remedy for the hazardous condition of weak underſtandings, in that which you ſuppoſe neceſſary in the caſe, viz. an infallible guide and implicit faith, in matters concerning mens ſalvation.

P. 29. But you ſay, "For your part, you know of no ſuch guide of God's appointing." Let that be your rule, and the magiſtrate with his coactive power, will be left out too. You think there is no need of any ſuch; becauſe notwithſtanding the long and many proofs and remote conſequences, the falſe grounds, and the captious and fallacious arguments of learned men verſed in controverſies, "with which I (as well as thoſe of the Roman communion) endeavour to amuſe you; through the goodneſs of God the truth which is neceſſary to ſalvation, lies ſo obvious and expoſed to all that ſincerely and diligently ſeek it, that no ſuch perſon ſhall ever fail of attaining the knowledge of it." This then is your anſwer, that "truths neceſſary to ſalvation are obvious;" ſo that thoſe who ſeek them ſincerely and diligently, are not in danger to be miſled or expoſed in thoſe to error, by the weakneſs of their underſtandings. This will be a good anſwer to what I objected from the danger moſt are in to be led into error, by the magiſtrate's adding force to the arguments for their national eſtabliſhed religions; when you have ſhewn that nothing is wont to be impoſed in national religions, but what is neceſſary to ſalvation; or which will a little better accommodate your hypotheſis, when you can ſhew that nothing is impoſed, or required for communion with the church of England, but what is neceſſary to ſalvation; and conſequently, is very eaſy and obvious to be known, and diſtinguiſhed from falſhood. And indeed, beſides what you ſay here, upon your hypotheſis, that force is lawful only becauſe it is neceſſary to bring men to ſalvation, it cannot be lawful to uſe it, to bring men to any thing, but what is abſolutely neceſſary to ſalvation. For if the lawfulneſs of force be only from the need men have of it to bring them to ſalvation, it cannot lawfully be uſed, to bring men to that which they do not need, or is not neceſſary to their ſalvation; for in ſuch an application of it, it is not needful to their ſalvation. Can you therefore ſay, that there is nothing required to be believed and profeſſed in the church of England, but P. 29. what lies "ſo obvious and expoſed to all that ſincerely and diligently ſeek it, that no ſuch perſon ſhall ever fail of attaining the knowledge of it?" What think you of St. Athanaſius's creed? Is the ſenſe of that ſo obvious and expoſed to every one who ſeeks it, which ſo many learned men have explained ſo different ways, and which yet a great many profeſs they cannot underſtand? Or is it neceſſary to your or my ſalvation, that you or I ſhould believe and pronounce all thoſe damned who do not believe that creed, i. e. every propoſition in it? which I fear would extend to not a few of the church of England, unleſs we can think that people believe, i. e. aſſent to the truth of propoſitions, they do not at all underſtand. If ever you were acquainted with a country pariſh, you muſt needs have a ſtrange opinion of them, if you think all the plowmen and milkmaids at church, underſtood all the propoſitions in Athanaſius's creed; it is more, truly, than I ſhould be apt to think of any one of them, and yet I cannot hence believe myſelf authorized to judge or pronounce them all damned: it is too bold an intrenching on the prerogative of the Almighty; to their own maſter they ſtand or fall.

THE doctrine of original ſin, is that which is profeſſed and muſt be owned by the members of the church of England, as is evident from the XXXIX Articles, and ſeveral paſſages in the Liturgy: and yet I aſk you, whether this be "ſo obvious and expoſed to all that diligently and ſincerely "ſeek the truth," that one who is in the communion of the church of England, ſincerely ſeeking the truth, may not raiſe to himſelf ſuch difficulties concerning the doctrine of original ſin, as may puzzle him though he be a man of ſtudy; and whether he may not puſh his enquiries ſo far, as to be ſtaggered in his opinion?

IF you grant me this, as I am apt to think you will, then I enquire whether it be not true, notwithſtanding what you ſay concerning the plainneſs and obviouſneſs of truths neceſſary to ſalvation, that a great part of mankind may not be able to diſcern between truth and falſhood, in ſeveral points, which are thought ſo far to concern their ſalvation, as to be made neceſſary parts of the national religion?

IF you ſay it may be ſo, then I have nothing further to enquire; but ſhall only adviſe you not to be ſo ſevere hereafter in your cenſure of Mr. Reynolds, as you are, where you tell me, that "famous inſtance I give of the two Rey"nolds is not of any moment to prove the contrary; unleſs I can undertake, "that he that erred was as ſincere in his enquiry after that truth, as I ſuppoſe "him able to examine and judge."

YOU will, I ſuppoſe, be more charitable another time, when you have conſidered, that neither ſincerity, nor freedom from error, even in the eſtabliſhed doctrines of their own church, is the privilege of thoſe who join themſelves in outward profeſſion to any national church whatſoever. And it is not impoſſible, that one who has ſubſcribed the XXXIX Articles, may yet make it a queſtion, "Whether it may be truly ſaid that God imputes the firſt ſin of "Adam to his poſterity?" &c. But we are apt to be ſo fond of our own opinions, and almoſt infallibility, that we will not allow them to be ſincere, who quit our communion; whilſt at the ſame time we tell the world, it is preſumable, that all who embrace it do it ſincerely, and upon conviction; though we cannot but know many of them to be but looſe, inconſiderate, and ignorant people. This is all the reaſon you have, when you ſpeak of the Reynolds, to ſuſpect one of the brothers more than the other: and to think that Mr. Chillingworth had not as much ſincerity when he quitted, as when he returned to the church of England, is a partiality, which nothing can juſtify without pretending to infallibility.

TO ſhew that you do not fancy your force to be uſeful, but that you "judge "ſo upon juſt and ſufficient grounds, you tell us, the ſtrong probability of its "ſucceſs is grounded upon the conſideration of human nature, and the general "temper of mankind, apt to be wrought upon by the method you ſpeak of, "and upon the indiſputable atteſtation of experience." The conſideration of human nature, and the general temper of mankind, will teach one this, that P. 34.

men are apt, in things within their power, to be wrought upon by force, and the more wrought upon, the greater the force or puniſhments are: ſo that where moderate penalties will not work, great ſeverities will. Which conſideration of human nature, if it be a juſt ground to judge any force uſeful, will I fear neceſſarily carry you, in your judgment, to ſeverities beyond the moderate penalties, ſo often mentioned in your ſyſtem, upon a ſtrong probability of the ſucceſs of greater puniſhments, where leſs would not prevail.

But if to conſider ſo as you require, i. e. ſo as to embrace, and believe, be not in their power, then no force at all, great or little, is or can be uſeful. You muſt therefore, conſider it which way you will, either renounce all force as uſeful, or pull off your maſk, and own all the ſeverities of the crueleſt perſecutors.

The other reaſon of your judging force to be uſeful, you ſay, is grounded on the indiſputable atteſtation of experience. Pray tell us where you have this atteſtation of experience for your moderate, which is the only uſeful, force: name the country where true religion or ſound Chriſtianity has been nationally, received, and eſtabliſhed by moderate penal laws, that the obſerving perſons you appeal to, may know where to employ their obſervation: tell us how long it was tried, and what was the ſucceſs of it? And where there has been the relaxation of ſuch moderate penal laws, the fruits whereof have continually been epicuriſm and atheiſm? Till you do this, I fear, that all the world will think, there is a more indiſputable atteſtation of experience for the ſucceſs of dragooning, and the ſeverities you condemn, than of your moderate method; which we ſhall compare with the king of France's, and ſee which is moſt ſucceſsful in making proſelytes to church conformity, for yours as well as his reach no further than that, when you produce your examples: the confident talk whereof, is good to countenance a cauſe, though experience there be none in the caſe.

P. 34. But you "appeal, you ſay, to all obſerving perſons, whether wherever true "religion or ſound Chriſtianity have been nationally received and eſtabliſhed "by moderate penal laws, it has not always viſibly loſt ground by the relax- "ation of thoſe laws?" True or falſe religions, ſound or unſound Chriſtianity, wherever eſtabliſhed into national religions by penal laws, always have loſt, and always will loſe ground, i. e. loſe ſeveral of their conforming profeſſors upon the relaxation of thoſe laws. But this concerns not the true, more than other religions, nor is any prejudice to it; but only ſhews that many are, by the penalties of the law, kept in the communion of the national religion, who are not really convinced or perſuaded of it: and therefore, as ſoon as liberty is given, they own the diſlike they had many of them before, and out of perſuaſion, curioſity, &c. ſeek out and betake themſelves to ſome other profeſſion. This need not ſtartle the magiſtrates of any religion, much leſs thoſe of the true, ſince they will be ſure to retain thoſe, who more mind their ſecular intereſt than the truth of religion, who are every where the greater number, by the advantages of countenance and preferment: and if it be the true religion, they will retain thoſe alſo, who are in earneſt of it, by the ſtronger tie of conſcience and conviction.

YOU go on, "Whether ſects and hereſies (even the wildeſt and moſt abſurd, P. 34.
"and even epicuriſm and atheiſm) have not continually thereupon ſpread themſelves, and whether the very life of Chriſtianity has not ſenſibly decayed, as well as the number of ſound profeſſors of it been daily leſſened upon it?" As to atheiſm and epicuriſm, whether they more ſpread under Toleration, or national religions, eſtabliſhed by moderate penal laws; when you ſhew us the countries where fair trial hath been made of both, that we may compare them together, we ſhall better be able to judge.

"EPICURISM and atheiſm, ſay you, are found conſtantly to ſpread themupon the relaxation of moderate penal laws." We will ſuppoſe your hiſtory to be full of inſtances of ſuch relaxations, which you will in good time communicate to the world, that wants this aſſiſtance from your obſervation. But were this to be juſtified out of hiſtory, yet would it not be any argument againſt Toleration; unleſs your hiſtory can furniſh you with a new ſort of religion founded in atheiſm. However, you do well to charge the ſpreading of atheiſm upon Toleration in matters of religion, as an argument againſt thoſe who deny atheiſm, which takes away all religion, to have any right to Toleration at all. But perhaps, as is uſual for thoſe who think all the world ſhould ſee with their eyes, and receive their ſyſtems for unqueſtionable verities, zeal for your own way makes you call all atheiſm, that agrees not with it. That which makes me doubt of this, are theſe following words; "Not to ſpeak of what at this time our eyes cannot but ſee, for fear of giving P. 35.
"offence: though I hope it will be none to any that have a juſt concern for truth and piety, to take notice of the books and pamphlets which now fly ſo thick about this kingdom, manifeſtly tending to the multiplying of ſects and diviſions, and even to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion amongſt us. In which number, you ſay, you ſhall not much need my pardon, if you reckon the Firſt and Second Letter concerning Toleration." Wherein, by a broad inſinuation, you impute the ſpreading of atheiſm amongſt us, to the late relaxation made in favour of proteſtant diſſenters: and yet all that you can take notice of as a proof of this, is "the books and pamphlets which now fly ſo thick about this kingdom, manifeſtly tending to the multiplying of ſects and diviſions, and even to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion amongſt us;" and for inſtance, you name the Firſt and Second Letter concerning Toleration. If one may gueſs at the others by theſe, the atheiſm and ſcepticiſm you accuſe them of will have but little more in it, than an oppoſition to your hypotheſis; on which, the whole buſineſs of religion muſt ſo turn, that whatever agrees not with your ſyſtem, muſt preſently, by interpretation, be concluded to tend to the promoting of atheiſm or ſcepticiſm in religion. For I challenge you to ſhew in either of thoſe two Letters you mention, one word tending to epicuriſm, atheiſm, or ſcepticiſm in religion.

BUT, Sir, againſt the next time you are to give an account of books and pamphlets tending to the promoting ſcepticiſm in religion amongſt us, I ſhall mind you of the "Third Letter concerning Toleration," to be added to the catalogue,

P. 47. talogue, which aſſerting and building upon this, that "true religion, may "be known by thoſe who profeſs it, to be the only true religion," does not a little towards betraying the Chriſtian religion to ſcepticks. For what greater advantage can be given them, than to teach, that one may know the true religion? thereby putting into their hands a right to demand it to be demonſtrated to them, that the Chriſtian religion is true, and bringing on the profeſſors of it a neceſſity of doing it. I have heard it complained of as one great artifice of ſcepticks, to require demonſtrations where they neither could be had, nor were neceſſary. But if the true religion may be known to men to be ſo, a ſceptick may require, and you cannot blame him if he does not receive your religion, upon the ſtrongeſt probable arguments, without demonſtration.

And if one ſhould demand of you demonſtration of the truths of your religion, which I beſeech you, would you do, either renounce your aſſertion, that it may be known to be true, or elſe undertake to demonſtrate it to him?

And as for the decay of the very life and ſpirit of Chriſtianity, and the ſpreading of epicuriſm amongſt us: I aſk, what can more tend to the promoting of them than this doctrine, which is to be found in the ſame Letter, viz. That it is preſumable that thoſe who conform, do it upon reaſon and conviction? When you can inſtance in any thing ſo much tending to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion and epicuriſm, in the Firſt or Second Letter concerning Toleration, we ſhall have reaſon to think you have ſome ground for what you ſay.

As to epicuriſm, the ſpreading whereof you likewiſe impute to the relaxation of your moderate penal laws; that ſo far as it is diſtinct from atheiſm, I think regards mens lives more than their religions, i. e. ſpeculative opinions in religion and ways of worſhip, which is what we mean by religion, as concerned in Toleration. And for the toleration of corrupt manners, and the debaucheries of life, neither our author nor I do plead for it; but ſay it is properly the magiſtrate's buſineſs, by puniſhments to reſtrain and ſuppreſs them. I do not therefore blame your zeal againſt atheiſm and epicuriſm; but you diſcover a great zeal againſt ſomething elſe, in charging them on Toleration, when it is in the magiſtrate's power to reſtrain and ſuppreſs them by more effectual laws than thoſe for church conformity. For there are thoſe who will tell you, that an outward profeſſion of the national religion, even where it is the true religion, is no more oppoſite to, or inconſiſtent with, atheiſm or epicuriſm, than the owning of another religion, eſpecially any Chriſtian profeſſion, that differs from it. And therefore, you in vain impute atheiſm or epicuriſm to the relaxation of penal laws, that require no more than an outward conformity to the national church.

As to the ſects and unchriſtian diviſions, for other diviſions there may be without prejudice to Chriſtianity, at whoſe door they chiefly ought to be laid, I have ſhewed you elſewhere.

One thing I cannot but take notice of here, that having named "ſects, he"reſies, epicuriſm, atheiſm, and a decay of the ſpirit and life of Chriſtianity," as the fruits of relaxation, for which you had the atteſtation of former experience, you add theſe words, "Not to ſpeak of what our eyes at this time cannot P. 34. but ſee, for fear of giving offence." Whom is it, I beſeech you, you are ſo afraid of offending, if you ſhould ſpeak of the "epicuriſm, atheiſm, and decay of the ſpirit, and life of Chriſtianity," amongſt us? But I ſee, he that is ſo moderate in one part of his letter, that he will not take upon him to teach law-makers and governors, even what they cannot know without being taught by him, i. e. what he calls moderate penalties or force; may yet, in another part of the ſame letter, by broad inſinuations, uſe reproaches, wherein it is a hard matter to think law-makers and governors are not meant. But whoever be meant, it is at leaſt adviſeable in accuſations that are eaſier ſuggeſted than made out, to caſt abroad the ſlander in general, and leave others to apply it, for fear thoſe who are named, and ſo juſtly offended with a falſe imputation, ſhould be entitled to aſk, as in this caſe, how it appears "that ſects and heresies have multiplied, epicuriſm and atheiſm ſpread themſelves, and that the life and ſpirit of Chriſtianity is decayed" more within theſe two years, than it was before; and that all this miſchief is owing to the late relaxation of the penal laws againſt proteſtant diſſenters?

YOU go on, "And if theſe have always been the fruits of the relaxation of P. 35. moderate penal laws, made for the preſerving and advancing true religion; you think this conſideration alone is abundantly ſufficient to ſhew the uſefulneſs and benefit of ſuch laws. For if theſe evils have conſtantly ſprung from the relaxation of thoſe laws, it is evident they were prevented before by thoſe laws." One would think by your ſaying, "always been the fruits, and conſtantly ſprung," that moderate penal laws, for preſerving the true religion, had been the conſtant practice of all Chriſtian commonwealths; and that relaxations of them, in favour of a free toleration, had frequently happened; and that there were examples both of the one and the other, as common and known, as of princes that have perſecuted for religion, and learned men who have employed their ſkill to make it good. But till you ſhew us in what ages or countries your moderate eſtabliſhments were in faſhion, and where they were again removed to make way for our Author's Toleration, you to as little purpoſe talk of the fruits of them, as if you ſhould talk of the fruit of a tree which no body planted, or was no where ſuffered to grow till one might ſee what fruit came from it.

HAVING laid it down as one of the conditions for a fair debate of this controverſy, "That it ſhould be without ſuppoſing all along your church in the L. II. p. 416. right, and your religion the true;" I add theſe words: "Which can no more be allowed to you IN THIS CASE, whatever your church or religion be, than it can be to a Papiſt or a Lutheran, a Preſbyterian, or an Anabaptiſt; nay, no more to you, than it can be allowed to a Jew or Mahometan." To which you reply, "No, Sir? Not whatever your church or P. 47. religion be? That ſeems ſomewhat hard. And you think I might have given you ſome reaſon for what I ſay: for certainly it is not ſo ſelf-evident as to need no proof. But you think it is no hard matter to gueſs at my reaſon, though I did not think fit expreſly to own it. For it is obvious enough

“ there can be no other reaſon for this aſſertion of mine, but either the equal truth, or at leaſt the equal certainty (or uncertainty) of all religions. For whoever conſiders my aſſertion, muſt ſee, that to make it good I ſhall be obliged to maintain one of theſe two things: either, 1. That no religion is the true religion, in oppoſition to other religions: which makes all religions true or falſe, and ſo either way indifferent. Or, 2. That though ſome one religion be the true religion, yet no man can have any more reaſon than another man of another religion may have, to believe his to be the true religion. Which makes all religions equally certain, (or uncertain, whether I pleaſe) and ſo renders it vain and idle to enquire after the true religion, and only a piece of good luck if any man be of it, and ſuch good luck as he can never know that he has, till he come into the other world. Whether of theſe two principles I will own, you know not. But certainly one or other of them lies at the bottom with me, and is the lurking ſuppoſition upon which I build all that I ſay.”

CERTAINLY no, Sir, neither of theſe reaſons you have ſo ingenuouſly and friendly found out for me, lies at the bottom; but this, that whatever privilege or power you claim, upon your ſuppoſing yours to be the true religion, is equally due to another, who ſuppoſes his to be the true religion, upon the ſame claim: and therefore that is no more to be allowed to you than to him. For whoſe is really the true religion, yours or his, being the matter in conteſt betwixt you, your ſuppoſing can no more determine it on your ſide, than his ſuppoſing on his; unleſs you can think you have a right to judge in your own cauſe. You believe yours to be the true religion, ſo does he believe his: you ſay you are certain of it, ſo ſays he, he is: you think you have “ arguments proper and ſufficient” to convince him, if he would conſider them; the ſame thinks he of his. If this claim, which is equally on both ſides, be allowed to either, without any proof; it is plain he, in whoſe favour it is allowed, is allowed to be judge in his own cauſe, which no body can have a right to be, who is not at leaſt infallible. If you come to arguments and proofs, which you muſt do, before it can be determined whoſe is the true religion, it is plain your ſuppoſition is not allowed.

IN our preſent caſe, in uſing puniſhments in religion, your ſuppoſing yours to be the true religion, gives you or your magiſtrate no more advantage over a Papiſt, Preſbyterian, or Mahometan, or more reaſon to puniſh either of them for his religion, than the ſame ſuppoſition in a Papiſt, Preſbyterian, or Mahometan, gives any of them, or a magiſtrate of their religion, advantage over you, or reaſon to puniſh you for your religion: and therefore this ſuppoſition, to any purpoſe or privilege of uſing of force, is no more to be allowed to you, than to any one of any other religion. This the words, IN THIS CASE, which I there uſed, would have ſatisfied any other to have been my meaning: but whether your charity made you not to take notice of them, or the joy of ſuch an advantage as this, not to underſtand them, this is certain, you were reſolved not to loſe the opportunity, ſuch a place as this afforded you, of ſhewing your gift, in commenting and gueſſing ſhrewdly at a man's reaſons, when he does not think fit expreſsly to own them himſelf.

I MUST own you have a very lucky hand at it; and as you do it here upon the ſame ground, ſo it is juſt with the ſame ſucceſs, as you in another place have exerciſed your logick on my ſaying ſomething to the ſame purpoſe, as I do here. But, Sir, if you will add but one more to your plentiful ſtock of diſtinctions, and obſerve the difference there is between the ground of any one's ſuppoſing his religion is true, and the privilege he may pretend to by ſuppoſing it true, you will never ſtumble at this again; but you will find, that though upon the former of theſe accounts, men of all religions cannot be equally allowed to ſuppoſe their religions true, yet in reference to the latter, the ſuppoſition may and ought to be allowed, or denied equally to all men. And the reaſon of it is plain, viz. becauſe the aſſurance wherewith one man ſuppoſes his religion to be true, being no more an argument of its truth to another, than vice verſâ; neither of them can claim by the aſſurance, wherewith he ſuppoſes his religion the true, any prerogative or power over the other, which the other has not by the ſame title an equal claim to, over him. If this will not ſerve to ſpare you the pains another time of any more ſuch reaſonings, as we have twice had on this ſubject, I think I ſhall be forced to ſend you to my Mahometans or Pagans: and I doubt whether I am not leſs civil to your parts than I ſhould be, that I do not ſend you to them now.

YOU go on, and ſay, "But as unreaſonable as this condition is, you ſee no "need you have to decline it, nor any occaſion I had to impoſe it upon you. "For certainly the making what I call your new method, conſiſtent and prac"ticable, does no way oblige you to ſuppoſe all along your religion the true, "as I imagine." And as I imagine it does: for without that ſuppoſition, I would fain have you ſhew me, how it is in any one country practicable to puniſh men to bring them to the true religion. For if you will argue for force, as neceſſary to bring men to the true religion, without ſuppoſing yours to be it, you will find yourſelf under ſome ſuch difficulty as this, that then it muſt be firſt determined, and you will require it ſhould be, which is the true religion, before any one can have a right to uſe force to bring men to it; which, if every one did not determine for himſelf, by ſuppoſing his own the true, no body, I think, will deſire Toleration any longer than till that be ſettled. P. 47.

YOU go on: "No, Sir, it is enough for that purpoſe, that there is one true "religion, and but one." Suppoſe not the national religion eſtabliſhed by law in England to be that, and then even upon your principles of its being uſeful, and that the magiſtrate has a commiſſion to uſe force for the promoting the true religion, prove, if you pleaſe, that the magiſtrate has a power to uſe force to bring men to the national religion in England. For then you muſt prove the national religion, as eſtabliſhed by law in England, to be that one true religion, and ſo the true religion; that he rejects the true religion who diſſents from any part of it; and ſo rejecting the true religion, cannot be ſaved. But of this more in another place. Ibid.

P. 47. YOUR other two ſuppoſitions, which you join to the foregoing, are, "That "that religion may be known by thoſe who profeſs it, to be the only true re- "ligion; and may alſo be manifeſted to be ſuch by them to others, ſo far at "leaſt, as to oblige them to receive it, and to leave them without excuſe, if "they do not."

THESE, you ſay, are ſuppoſitions, "enough for the making your method "conſiſtent and practicable." They are, I gueſs, more than enough, for you, upon them, to prove any national religion in the world the only true religion. And till you have proved, for you profeſs here to have quitted the ſuppoſition of any one's being true, as neceſſary to your hypotheſis, ſome national religion to be that only true religion, I would gladly know how it is any where practicable to uſe force to bring men to the true religion.

YOU ſuppoſe "there is one true religion, and but one." In this we are both agreed: and from hence, I think, it will follow, ſince whoever is of this true religion ſhall be ſaved, and without being of it no man ſhall be ſaved, that upon your ſecond and third ſuppoſition, it will be hard to ſhew any national religion to be this only true religion. For who is it will ſay, he knows, or that it is knowable, that any national religion, wherein muſt be comprehended all that, by the penal laws, he is required to embrace, is that only true religion; which if men reject, they ſhall; and which, if they embrace, they ſhall not, miſs ſalvation? Or can you undertake that any national religion in the world can be manifeſted to be ſuch, i. e. in ſhort, to contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation, and nothing but what is ſo? For that, and that alone, is the one only true religion, without which no body can be ſaved; and which is enough for the ſalvation of every one who embraces it. And therefore whatever is leſs or more than this, is not the one only true religion, or that which there is a neceſſity for their ſalvation, men ſhould be forced to embrace.

I DO not hereby deny, that there is any national religion which contains all that is neceſſary to ſalvation, for ſo doth the Romiſh religion, which is not for all that, ſo much as a true religion. Nor do I deny, that there are national religions that contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation, and nothing inconſiſtent with it, and ſo may be called true religions. But ſince they all of them join with what is neceſſary to ſalvation, a great deal that is not ſo, and make that as neceſſary to communion, as what is neceſſary to ſalvation, not ſuffering any one to be of their communion, without taking all together; nor to live amongſt them free from puniſhment, out of their communion; will you affirm, that any of the national religions of the world, which are impoſed by penal laws, and to which men are driven with force, can be ſaid to be, that one only true religion, which if men embrace, they ſhall be ſaved; and which, if they embrace not, they ſhall be damned? And therefore your two ſuppoſitions, true or falſe, are not enough to make it practicable, upon your principles of neceſſity, to uſe force upon diſſenters from the national religion, though it contain in it nothing but truth; unleſs that which is required to communion be all neceſſary to ſalvation. For whatever is not neceſſary to ſalvation, there is no neceſſity any one ſhould embrace. So that whenever you ſpeak of the true religion, to make it to your purpoſe, you muſt ſpeak only of what is neceſſary to ſalvation; unleſs you will ſay, that in order to the ſalvation of mens ſouls, it is neceſſary to uſe force to bring them to embrace ſomething, that is not neceſſary to their ſalvation. I think that neither you, nor any body elſe, will affirm, that it is neceſſary to uſe force to bring men to receive all the truths of the Chriſtian religion, though they are truths God has thought fit to reveal. For then, by your own rule, you who profeſs the Chriſtian religion, muſt know them all, and muſt be able to manifeſt them to others; for it is on that here you ground the neceſſity and reaſonableneſs of penalties uſed to bring men to embrace the truth. But I ſuſpect it is the good word religion, as in other places other words, has miſled you, whilſt you content yourſelf with good ſounds, and ſome confuſed notions, that uſually accompany them, without annexing to them any preciſe determined ſignification. To convince you that it is not without ground I ſay this, I ſhall deſire you but to ſet down what you mean here by true religion, that we may know what in your ſenſe is, and what is not contained in it. Would you but do thus fairly, and define your words, or uſe them in in one conſtant ſettled ſenſe, I think the controverſy between you and me would be at an end, without any further trouble.

HAVING ſhewed of what advantage they are like to be to you for the making your method practicable, in the next place let us conſider your ſuppoſitions themſelves. As to the firſt, "there is one true religion, and but one," we are agreed. But what you ſay in the next place, that "that one true "religion may be known by thoſe who profeſs it," will need a little examination. As firſt, it will be neceſſary to inquire, what you mean by known; whether you mean by it knowledge properly ſo called, as contra-diſtinguiſhed to belief; or only the aſſurance of a firm belief? If the latter, I leave you your ſuppoſition to make your uſe of it, only with this deſire, that to avoid miſtakes, when you do make any uſe of it, you would call it believing. If you mean that the true religion may be known with the certainty of knowledge properly ſo called; I aſk you farther, whether that true religion be to be known by the light of nature, or needed a divine revelation to diſcover it? If you ſay, as I ſuppoſe you will, the latter; then I aſk whether the making out of that to be a divine revelation, depends not upon particular matters of fact, whereof you were no eye-witneſs; but were done many ages before you were born? and if ſo, by what principles of ſcience they can be known to any man now living?

THE articles of my religion, and of a great many other ſuch ſhort-ſighted people as I am, are articles of faith, which we think there are ſo good grounds to believe, that we are perſuaded to venture our eternal happineſs on that belief: and hope to be of that number of whom our Saviour ſaid, "Bleſſed are they that have not ſeen, and yet have believed." But we neither think that God requires, nor has given us faculties capable of knowing in this world ſeveral of thoſe truths which are to be believed to ſalvation. If you have a religion, all whoſe general truths are either ſelf-evident, or capable of demonſtration, for matters of fact are not capable of being any way known but to the by-ſtanders, you will do well to let it be known, for the ending of controverſies, and baniſhing of error, concerning any of thoſe points, out of the world. For whatever may be known, beſides matter of fact, is capable of demonſtration; and when you have demonſtrated to any one any point in religion, you ſhall have my conſent to puniſh him if he do not aſſent to it. But yet let me tell you, there are many truths even in mathematicks, the evidence whereof one man ſeeing is able to demonſtrate to himſelf, and ſo may know them; which evidence yet he not being able to make another ſee, which is to demonſtrate to him, he cannot make known to him, though his ſcholar be willing, and with all his power applies himſelf to learn it.

BUT granting your ſuppoſition, "that the one true religion may be known by thoſe who profeſs it to be the only true religon;" will it follow from hence, that becauſe it is knowable to be the true religion, therefore the magiſtrate who profeſſes it actually knows it to be ſo? Without which knowledge, upon your principles, he cannot uſe force to bring men to it. But if you are but at hand to aſſure him which is the true religion, for which he ought to uſe force, he is bound to believe you; and that will do as well as if he examined and knew himſelf, or perhaps better. For you ſeem not well ſatisfied with what the magiſtrates have lately done, without your leave, concerning religion in England. And I confeſs the eaſieſt way to remove all difficulties in the caſe, is for you to be the magiſtrates infallible guide in matters of religion. And therefore you do well here alſo to keep to your ſafe ſtile, leſt if your ſenſe were clear and determined, it might be more expoſed to exceptions; and therefore you tell us the true religion may be known by thoſe who profeſs it. For not ſaying by ſome of thoſe, or by all thoſe, the error of what you ſay is not ſo eaſily obſerved, and requires the more trouble to come at: which I ſhall ſpare myſelf here, being ſatisfied that the magiſtrate, who has ſo full an employment of his thoughts in the cares of his government, has not an overplus of leiſure to attain that knowledge which you require, and ſo uſually contents himſelf with believing.

YOUR next ſuppoſition is, that "the one true religion may alſo be manifeſted to be ſuch, by them, to others; ſo far, at leaſt, as to oblige them to receive it, and leave them without excuſe if they do not." That it can be manifeſted to ſome, ſo as to oblige, i. e. cauſe them to receive it, is evident, becauſe it is received. But becauſe this ſeems to be ſpoken more in reference to thoſe who do not receive it, as appears by theſe following words P. 48. of yours; "then it is altogether as plain, that it may be very reaſonable and neceſſary for ſome men to change their religion; and that it may be made appear to them to be ſo. And then, if ſuch men will not conſider what is offered to convince them of the reaſonableneſs and neceſſity of doing it; it may be very fit and reaſonable," you tell me, "for any thing I have ſaid to the contrary, in order to the bringing them to the conſideration, to require them, under convenient penalties, to forſake their falſe religions, and embrace the true." You ſuppoſe the true religion may be ſo manifeſted by a man that is of it, to all men ſo far as to leave them, if they do not embrace it, without excuſe. Without excuſe, to whom I beſeech you? To God indeed, but not to the magiſtrate, who can never know whether it has been ſo manifeſted to any man, that it has been through his fault that he has not been convinced, and not through the fault of him to whom the magiſtrate committed the care of convincing him: and it is a ſufficient excuſe to the magiſtrate, for any one to ſay to him, I have not neglected to conſider the arguments that have been offered me, by thoſe whom you have employed to manifeſt it to me, but that yours is the only true religion I am not convinced. Which is ſo direct and ſufficient an excuſe to the magiſtrate, that had he an expreſs commiſſion from heaven to puniſh all thoſe who did not conſider, he could not yet juſtly puniſh any one whom he could not convince had not conſidered. But you endeavour to avoid this, by what you infer from this ſuppoſition, viz. "That then it may be very fit and reaſonable, for any thing I have ſaid to the P 48. "contrary, to require men under convenient penalties to forſake their falſe "religions, to embrace the true, in order to the bringing them to conſide"ration." Whether I have ſaid any thing to the contrary, or no, the readers muſt judge, and I need not repeat. But now, I ſay, it is neither juſt nor reaſonable to require men under penalties, to attain one end, in order to bring them to uſe the means not neceſſary to that, but to another end. For where is it you can ſay, unleſs you will return to your old ſuppoſition, of yours being the true religion; which you ſay is not neceſſary to your method, that men are by the law "required to forſake their falſe religions, and embrace the P. 47. "true?" The utmoſt is this, in all countries where the national religion is impoſed by law, men are required under the penalties of thoſe laws outwardly to conform to it; which you ſay is in order to make them conſider. So that your puniſhments are for the attaining one end, viz. Conformity, in order to make men uſe conſideration, which is a means not neceſſary to that, but another end, viz. finding out and embracing the one true religion. For however conſideration may be a neceſſary means to find and embrace the one true religion, it is not at all a neceſſary means to outward conformity in the communion of any religion.

To manifeſt the conſiſtency and practicableneſs of your method, to the queſtion, what advantage would it be to the true religion, if magiſtrates did every where ſo puniſh? You anſwer, That "by the magiſtrates puniſhing, "if I ſpeak to the purpoſe, I muſt mean their puniſhing men for rejecting "the true religion, (ſo tendered to them, as has been ſaid) in order to the "bringing them to conſider and embrace it. Now before we can ſuppoſe "magiſtrates every where ſo to puniſh, we muſt ſuppoſe the true religion to be "every where the national religion. And if this were the caſe, you think it is "evident enough, what advantage to the true religion it would be, if magiſtrates "every where did ſo puniſh. For then we might reaſonably hope that all "falſe religions would ſoon vaniſh, and the true become once more the only "religon in the world: whereas if magiſtrates ſhould not ſo puniſh, it were "much to be feared (eſpecially conſidering what has already happened) that "on the contrary falſe religions, and atheiſm, as more agreeable to the ſoil,

" would daily take deeper root, and propagate themſelves, till there were no " room left for the true religion, which is but a foreign plant, in any corner " of the world."

IF you can make it practicable that the magiſtrate ſhould puniſh men for rejecting the true religion, without judging which is the true religion; or if true religion could appear in perſon, take the magiſtrate's ſeat, and there judge all that rejected her; ſomething might be done. But the miſchief of it is, it is a man that muſt condemn, men muſt puniſh, and men cannot do this but by judging who is guilty of the crime which they puniſh. An oracle, or an interpreter of the law of nature, who ſpeaks as clearly, tells the magiſtrate, he may and ought to puniſh thoſe, " who reject the true religion, tendered with ſufficient evidence:" the magiſtrate is ſatisfied of his authority, and believes this commiſſion to be good. Now I would know how poſſibly he can execute it, without making himſelf the judge firſt what is the true religion; unleſs the law of nature at the ſame time delivered into his hands the XXXIX Articles of the one only true religion, and another book wherein all the ceremonies and outward worſhip of it are contained. But it being certain, that the law of nature has not done this, and as certain, that the articles, ceremonies, and diſcipline of this one only true religion, have been often varied in ſeveral ages and countries, ſince the magiſtrate's commiſſion by the law of nature was firſt given: there is no remedy left, but that the magiſtrate muſt judge what is the true religion, if he muſt puniſh them who reject it. Suppoſe the magiſtrate be commiſſioned to puniſh thoſe who depart from right reaſon, the magiſtrate can yet never puniſh any one, unleſs he be judge what is right reaſon; and then judging that murder, theft, adultery, narrow cart-wheels, or want of bows and arrows in a man's houſe, are againſt right reaſon, he may make laws to puniſh men guilty of thoſe, as rejecting right reaſon.

So if the magiſtrate in England or France, having a commiſſion to puniſh thoſe who reject the one only true religion, judges the religion of his national church to be it, it is poſſible for him to lay penalties on thoſe who reject it, purſuant to that commiſſion; otherwiſe, without judging that to be the one only true religion, it is wholly impracticable for him to puniſh thoſe who embrace it not, as rejecters of the one only true religion.

To provide as good a ſalvo as the thing will bear, you ſay, in the following words, " Before we can ſuppoſe magiſtrates every where ſo to puniſh, we " muſt ſuppoſe the true religion to be every where the national." That is true of actual puniſhment, but not of laying on penalties by law; for that would be to ſuppoſe the national religion makes or chuſes the magiſtrate, and not the magiſtrate the national religion. But we ſee the contrary; for let the national religion be what it will before, the magiſtrate doth not always fall into it and embrace that; but if he thinks not that, but ſome other the true, the firſt opportunity he has, he changes the national religion into that which he judges the true, and then puniſhes the diſſenters from it; where his judgment, which is the true religion, always neceſſarily precedes, and is that which ultimately does, and muſt determine who are rejecters of the true religion,

ligion, and ſo obnoxious to puniſhment. This being ſo, I would gladly ſee how your method can be any way practicable to the advantage of the true religion, whereof the magiſtrate every where muſt be judge, or elſe he can puniſh no body at all.

You tell me that whereas I ſay, that to juſtify puniſhment it is requiſite P. 54. that it be directly uſeful for the procuring ſome greater good than that which it takes away; you "wiſh I had told you why it muſt needs be directly uſeful for that purpoſe." However exact you may be in demanding reaſons of what is ſaid, I thought here you had no cauſe to complain; but you let ſlip out of your memory the foregoing words of this paſſage, which together ſtands thus, "Puniſhment is ſome evil, ſome inconvenience, ſome ſuffering, L. p. 6, &c. by taking away or abridging ſome good thing, which he who is puniſhed has otherwiſe a right to. Now to juſtify the bringing any ſuch evil upon any man, two things are requiſite; 1. That he that does it has a commiſſion ſo to do. 2. That it be directly uſeful for the promoting ſome greater good." It is evident by theſe words, that puniſhment brings direct evil upon a man, and therefore it ſhould not be uſed but where it is directly uſeful for the procuring ſome greater good. In this caſe, the ſignification of the word directly, carries a manifeſt reaſon in it, to any one who underſtands what directly means. If the taking away any good from a man cannot be juſtified, but by making it a means to procure a greater, is it not plain it muſt be ſo a means as to have, in the operation of cauſes and effects, a natural tendency to that effect? and then it is called directly uſeful to ſuch an end: and this may give you a reaſon, "why puniſhment muſt be directly uſeful for that purpoſe." I know you are very tender of your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs of force, which I have in another place ſhewed to be, in your way, only uſeful by accident; nor will the queſtion you here ſubjoin, excuſe it from being ſo, viz. "Why penalties are not as directly uſe- P. 54. ful for the bringing men to the true religion, as the rod of correction is to drive fooliſhneſs from a child, or to work wiſdom in him?" Becauſe the rod works on the will of the child, to obey the reaſon of the father, whilſt under his tuition, and thereby makes it ſupple to the dictates of his own reaſon afterwards, and diſpoſes him to obey the light of that, when being grown to be a man, that is to be his guide, and this is wiſdom. If your penalties are ſo uſed, I have nothing to ſay to them.

Your way is charged to be impracticable to thoſe ends you propoſe, which you endeavour to clear, p. 63. That there may be fair play on both ſides, the reader ſhall have in the ſame view what we both ſay.

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| L. II. p. 425. "It remains now to examine, "whether the author's argument will not hold "good, even againſt puniſhments in your way. "For if the magiſtrate's authority be, as you here "ſay, only to procure all his ſubjects (mark what "you ſay, ALL HIS SUBJECTS) the means of diſ"covering the way of ſalvation, and to procure | L. III. p. 63. But how little to the purpoſe this requeſt of yours is, will quickly appear. For if the magiſtrate provides ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all his ſub- |

“ withal, as much as in him lies, that NONE remain
“ ignorant of it, or refuſe to embrace it, either for
“ want of uſing thoſe means, or by reaſon of any
“ ſuch prejudices as may render them ineffectual.
“ If this be the magiſtrate's buſineſs, in reference
“ to ALL HIS SUBJECTS; I deſire you, or any
“ man elſe, to tell me how this can be done, by
“ the application of force only to a part of them;
“ unleſs you will ſtill vainly ſuppoſe ignorance,
“ negligence or prejudice, only amongſt that part
“ which any where differs from the magiſtrate.
“ If thoſe of the magiſtrate's church may be ignorant
“ of the way of ſalvation; if it be poſſible
“ there may be amongſt them, thoſe who refuſe to
“ embrace it, either for want of uſing thoſe means,
“ or by reaſon of any ſuch prejudices as may render
“ them ineffectual; what in this caſe, becomes of
“ the magiſtrate's authority to procure all his ſubjects
“ the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation?
“ Muſt theſe of his ſubjects be neglected, and left
“ without the means he has authority to procure
“ them? Or muſt he uſe force upon them too?
“ And then, pray ſhew me how this can be done.
“ Shall the magiſtrate puniſh thoſe of his own religion,
“ to procure them the means of diſcovering
“ the way of ſalvation, and to procure, as much as
“ in him lies, that they remain not ignorant of it,
“ or refuſe not to embrace it? Theſe are ſuch contradictions
“ in practice, this is ſuch condemnation
“ of a man's own religion, as no one can expect
“ from the magiſtrate; and I dare ſay you deſire
“ not of him. And yet this is that he muſt do,
“ if his authority be to procure ALL his ſubjects the
“ means of diſcovering the way to ſalvation. And
“ if it be ſo needful, as you ſay it is, that he ſhould
“ uſe it; I am ſure force cannot do that till it be
“ applied wider, and puniſhment be laid upon
“ more than you would have it. For if the magiſtrate
“ be by force to procure, as much as in him
“ lies, that NONE remain ignorant of the way of
“ ſalvation; muſt he not puniſh all thoſe who are
“ ignorant of the way of ſalvation? And pray tell
“ me how is this any way practicable, but by ſuppoſing
“ none in the national church ignorant, and
“ all out of it ignorant, of the way of ſalvation?
“ Which what is it, but to puniſh men barely for
“ not

jects in the true religion; and then requires them all, under convenient penalties, to hearken to the teachers and miniſters of it, and to profeſs and exerciſe it with one accord, under their direction, in publick aſſemblies: is there any pretence to ſay, that in ſo doing he applies force only to a part of his ſubjects; when the law is general, and excepts none? It is true, the magiſtrate inflicts the penalties in that caſe, only upon them that break the law. But is that the thing you mean by his "applying "force only to a part "of his ſubjects?" Would you have him puniſh all indifferently? them that obey the law, as well as them that do not?

As to ignorance, negligence and prejudice. I deſire you, or any man elſe, to tell me what better courſe can be taken to cure them, than that which I have mentioned. For if after all that God's miniſters, and the magiſtrate can do, ſome will ſtill remain ignorant, negligent or prejudiced; I do not take that to be any diſparagement to it: for certainly that is a very

“ not being of the magiſtrate's religion; the very
“ thing you deny he has authority to do? So that
“ the magiſtrate having, by your own confeſſion,
“ no authority, thus to uſe force; and it being
“ otherways impracticable for the procuring all his
“ ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſal-
“ vation; there is an end of force. And ſo force
“ being laid aſide, either as unlawful, or unprac-
“ ticable, the author's argument holds good againſt
“ force, even in your way of applying it.”

very extraordinary remedy, which infallibly cures all diſeaſed perſons to whom it is applied.

THE backwardneſs and luſts that hinder an impartial examination, as you deſcribe it, is general. The corruption of nature which hinders a real embracing the true religion, that alſo you tell us here, is univerſal. I aſk a remedy for theſe in your way. You ſay the law for conformity is general, excepts none. Very likely, none that do not conform; but puniſhes none who conforming, do neither impartially examine nor really embrace the true religion. From whence I conclude there is no corruption of nature in thoſe, who are brought up or join in outward communion with the church of England. But as to ignorance, negligence and prejudice, you ſay “ you deſire “ me, or any man elſe, to tell what better courſe can be taken to cure them, “ than that which you have mentioned.” If your church can find no better way to cure ignorance and prejudice, and the negligence, that is in men, to examine matters of religion and heartily embrace the true, than what is impracticable upon conformiſts; then of all others, conformiſts are in the moſt deplorable eſtate. But, as I remember, you have been told of a better way, which is, the diſcourſing with men ſeriouſly and friendly about matters in religion, by thoſe whoſe profeſſion is the care of ſouls; examining what they do underſtand, and where, either through lazineſs, prejudice or difficulty, they do ſtick; and applying to their ſeveral diſeaſes proper cures; which it is as impoſſible to do by a general harangue, once or twice a week out of the pulpit, as to fit all mens feet with one ſhoe, or cure all mens ails with one, though very wholſome, diet-drink. To be thus “ inſtant in ſeaſon “ and out of ſeaſon,” ſome men have thought a better way of cure, than a deſire, only to have men driven by the whip, either in your, or the magiſtrate's hands, into the ſheepfold: where when they are once, whether they underſtand or no, their miniſters ſermons; whether they are, or can be better for them or no; whether they are ignorant and hypocritical conformiſts, and in that way like to remain ſo, rather than to become knowing and ſincere converts; ſome biſhops have thought is not ſufficiently enquired: but this no body is to mention, for whoever does ſo, “ makes himſelf an oc- “ caſion to ſhew his good-will to the clergy.”

A. p. 6, to 12.

A. p. 6, to 8.

THIS had not been ſaid by me here, now I ſee how apt you are to be put out of temper with any thing of this kind, though it be in every ſerious man's mouth, had not you deſired me to ſhew you a better way than force, your way applied. And to uſe your way of arguing, ſince bare preaching, as now uſed, it is plain, will not do, there is no other means left but this to deal with the corrupt nature of conformiſts; for miracles are now ceaſed, and penalties they are free from; therefore, by your way of concluding, no other being left, this of viſiting at home, conferring and inſtructing, and admoniſhing men there, and the like means, propoſed by the reverend author of the Paſtoral Care, is neceſſary; and men, whoſe buſineſs is the care of ſouls, are obliged to uſe it: for you "cannot prove, that it cannot do ſome "ſervice," I think I need not ſay, "indirectly and at a diſtance." And if this be proper and ſufficient to bring conformiſts, notwithſtanding the corruption of their nature, "to examine impartially, and really embrace the truth that "muſt ſave them," it will remain to ſhew, why it may not do as well on nonconformiſts, whoſe, I imagine, is the common corruption of nature, to bring them to examine and embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them? And though it be not ſo extraordinary a remedy as will infallibly cure all diſeaſed perſons, to whom it is applied: yet ſince the corruption of nature, which is the ſame diſeaſe, and hinders the "impartial examination, and hearty embracing the "truth that muſt ſave them," is equally in both, conformiſts and nonconformiſts, it is reaſonable to think it ſhould in both have the ſame cure, let that be what it will.

## CHAP. X.

## Of the neceſſity of force, in matters of religion.

P. 30. YOU tell us "you do not ground the lawfulneſs of ſuch force, as you take "to be uſeful for promoting the true religion, upon the bare uſefulneſs "of ſuch force, but upon the neceſſity as well as uſefulneſs of it; and there-"fore you declare it to be no fit means to be uſed, either for that purpoſe or "any other, where it is not neceſſary as well as uſeful."

How uſeful force in the magiſtrate's hand, for bringing men to the true religion, is like to be, we have ſhewn in the foregoing chapter, in anſwer to what you have ſaid for it. So that it being proved not uſeful, it is impoſſible it ſhould be neceſſary. However we will examine what you ſay to prove the neceſſity of it. The foundation you build on for its neceſſity we have in your Argument conſidered, p. 10. where having at large dilated on mens inconſiderateneſs in the choice of their religions, and their perſiſting in thoſe they have once choſen, without due examination, you conclude thus; "Now if this be the caſe, if men are ſo averſe to a due conſideration, if they "uſually take up their religion, without examining it as they ought, what "other means is there left?" Wherein you ſuppoſe force neceſſary, inſtead of proving it to be ſo; for preaching and perſuaſion not prevailing upon all men, you upon your own authority think fit ſomething elſe ſhould be done; and that being reſolved, you readily pitch on force, becauſe you ſay you can find nothing elſe; which in effect is only to tell us, if the ſalvation of mens ſouls were only left to your diſcretion, how you would order the matter.

AND

P. 7. AND in your anſwer to me, you very confidently tell us, "the true religion cannot prevail without the aſſiſtance either of miracles, or of authority." I ſhall here only obſerve one or two things, and then go on to examine how you make this good.

THE firſt thing I ſhall obſerve is, that in your "Argument conſidered," &c. you ſuppoſe force neceſſary only to maſter the averſion there is in men to conſidering and examination: and here in your anſwer to me, you make force neceſſary to conquer the averſion there is in men to embrace and obey the true religion. Which are ſo very different, that the former juſtifies the uſe of force only to make men conſider, the other juſtifies the uſe of force to make men embrace religion. If you meant the ſame thing when you writ your firſt treatiſe, it was not very ingenuous to expreſs yourſelf in ſuch words as were not proper to give your reader your true meaning; it being a far different thing to uſe force to make men conſider, which is an action in their power to do or omit; and to uſe force to make them embrace, i. e. believe any religion, which is not a thing in any one's power to do or forbear as he pleaſes. If you ſay you meant barely conſidering in your firſt paper, as the whole current of it would make one believe, then I ſee your hypotheſis may mend, as we have ſeen in other parts, and in time, may grow to its full ſtature.

ANOTHER thing I ſhall remark to you, is, that in your firſt paper, beſides preaching and perſuaſion, and the grace of God, nothing but force was neceſſary. Here in your ſecond, it is either miracles or authority, which how you make good, we will now conſider.

A. p. 2. L. II. p. 386. YOU having ſaid, you had "no reaſon from any experiment to expect that "the true religion ſhould be any way a gainer by Toleration," I inſtanced in the prevailing of the Goſpel, by its own beauty, force, and reaſonableneſs, in the firſt ages of Chriſtianity. P. 5. You reply, that it has not the ſame beauty, force and reaſonableneſs now, that it had then, unleſs "I include miracles too, P. 37. "which are now ceaſed; and as you tell us, were not withdrawn, till by "their help Chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of the empire, and to be encouraged and ſupported by the laws of it."

IF therefore we will believe you upon your own word, force being neceſſary, for prove it neceſſary you never can, you have entered into the counſel of God, and tell us, when force could not be had, miracles were employed to ſupply its want. "I cannot but think, ſay you, it is highly probable (if "we may be allowed to gueſs at the counſels of infinite wiſdom) that God "was pleaſed to continue them till then," i. e. till the laws of the empire ſupported Chriſtianity, "not ſo much for any neceſſity there was of them all "that time, for the evincing the truth of the Chriſtian religion, as to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." You allow yourſelf to gueſs very freely, when you will make God uſe miracles to ſupply a means he no where authorized or appointed. How long miracles continued we ſhall ſee anon.

SAY you, "If we may be allowed to gueſs:" this modeſty of yours where you confeſs you gueſs, is only concerning the time of the continuing of miracles;

racles; but as to their ſupplying the want of coactive force, that you are P. 38. poſitive in, both here and where you tell us, "Why penalties were not neceſ-"ſary at firſt, to make men to give ear to the Goſpel, has already been ſhewn;" and a little after, "the great and wonderful things which were to be done for "the evidencing the truth of the Goſpel, were abundantly ſufficient to pro-"cure attention," &c. How you come to know ſo undoubtedly that miracles were made uſe of to ſupply the magiſtrate's authority, ſince God no where tells you ſo, you would have done well to ſhew.

P. 36. BUT in your opinion force was neceſſary, and that could not then be had, and ſo God muſt uſe miracles. For, ſay you, "Our Saviour was no magiſ-"trate, and therefore could not inflict political puniſhments upon any man, "ſo much leſs could he impower his Apoſtles to do it." Could not our Saviour impower his Apoſtles to renounce or inflict puniſhments on carele ſs or obſtinate unbelievers, to make them hear and conſider? You pronounce very boldly methinks of Chriſt's power, and ſet very narrow limits to what at another time you would not deny to be infinite: but it was convenient here for your preſent purpoſe, that it ſhould be ſo limited. But, they not being magiſtrates, "he could not impower his Apoſtles to inflict political puniſhments." How is it of a ſudden, that they muſt be political puniſhments? You tell us all that is neceſſary, is to "lay briars and thorns in mens ways, to trouble and "diſeaſe them to make them conſider." This I hope our Saviour had power to do, if he had found it neceſſary, without the aſſiſtance of the magiſtrate's; he could have always done by his Apoſtles and miniſters, if he had ſo thought fit, what he did once by St. Peter, have dropped thorns and briars into their very minds, that ſhould have pricked, troubled and diſeaſed them ſufficiently. But ſometimes it is briars and thorns only that you want, ſometimes it muſt be human means, and ſometimes, as here, nothing will ſerve your turn but political puniſhments; juſt as will beſt ſuit your occaſion, in the argument you have then before you.

THAT the Apoſtles could lay on puniſhments, as troubleſome and as great as any political ones when they were neceſſary, we ſee in Ananias and Sapphira: and he that had "all power given him in heaven and in earth," could, if he had thought fit, have laid briars and thorns in the way of all that received not his doctrine.

Ibid. YOU add, "But as he could not puniſh men to make them hear him, ſo "neither was there any need that he ſhould. He came as a prophet ſent from "God to reveal a new doctrine to the world; and therefore to prove his miſ-"ſion, he was to do ſuch things as could only be done by a divine power: and "the works which he did were abundantly ſufficient both to gain him a hear-"ing, and to oblige the world to receive his doctrine." Thus the want of force and puniſhments are ſupplied. How far? ſo far as they are ſuppoſed neceſſary to gain a hearing, and ſo far as to oblige the world to receive Chriſt's doctrine; whereby, as I ſuppoſe, you mean ſufficient to lay an obligation on them to receive his doctrine, and render them inexcuſable if they did not: but that they were not ſufficient to make all that ſaw them effectually to receive and embrace the Goſpel, I think is evident, and you will not I imagine ſay, that all who ſaw Chriſt's miracles believed on him. So that miracles were not to ſupply the want of ſuch force, as was to be continued on men to make them conſider as they ought, i. e. till they embraced the truth that muſt ſave them. For we have little reaſon to think that our Saviour, or his Apoſtles, contended with their neglect or refuſal by a conſtant train of miracles, continued on to thoſe who were not wrought upon by the Goſpel preached to them. St. Matthew tells us, chap. xiii. 58. that he did not many mighty works in his own country, becauſe of their unbelief; Lightfoot, Harm. of the N. T. Sect. 41, 51. much leſs were miracles to ſupply the want of force in that uſe you make of it, where you tell us it is to puniſh the fault of not being of the true religion: for we do not find any miraculouſly puniſhed to bring them in to the Goſpel. So that the want of force to either of theſe purpoſes not being ſupplied by miracles, the Goſpel it is plain ſubſiſted and ſpread itſelf without force ſo made uſe of, and without miracles to ſupply the want of it; and therefore it ſo far remains true, that the Goſpel having the ſame beauty, force, and reaſonableneſs now as it had at the beginning, it wants not force to ſupply the defect of miracles, to that for which miracles were no where made uſe of. And ſo far, at leaſt, the experiment is good, and this aſſertion true, that the Goſpel is able to prevail by its own light and truth, without the continuance of force on the ſame perſon, or puniſhing men for not being of the true religion.

You ſay, "Our Saviour being no magiſtrate, could not inflict political puniſhments; P. 36. much leſs could he impower his Apoſtles to do it." I know not what need there is, that it ſhould be political; ſo there were ſo much puniſhment uſed, as you ſay, is ſufficient to make men conſider, it is not neceſſary it ſhould come from this or that hand: or if there be any odds in that, we ſhould be apt to think it would come beſt, and moſt effectually, from thoſe who preached the Goſpel, and could tell them it was to make them conſider, than from the magiſtrate, who neither doth, nor according to your ſcheme can, tell them it is to make them conſider. And this power, you will not deny, but our Saviour could have given to the Apoſtles.

But if there were ſuch abſolute need of political puniſhments, Titus or Trajan might as well have been converted, as Conſtantine. For how true it is, that miracles ſupplied the want of force from thoſe days till Conſtantine's, and then ceaſed, we ſhall ſee by and by. I ſay not this to enter boldly into the counſels of God, or to take upon me to cenſure the conduct of the Almighty, or to call his providence to an account; but to anſwer your ſaying, "Our Saviour was no magiſtrate, and therefore could not inflict "political puniſhments." For he could have had both magiſtrates and political puniſhments at his ſervice, if he had thought fit, and needed not to have continued miracles longer "than there was neceſſity for evincing the truth of P. 37. "the Chriſtian religion, as you imagine, to ſupply the want of the magiſ"trate's aſſiſtance, by force, which is neceſſary."

But how come you to know that force is neceſſary? Has God revealed it in his word? no where. Has it been revealed to you in particular? that you will not ſay. What reaſon have you for it? none at all but this, That A. p. 6 to 12 having ſet down the grounds, upon which men take up and perſiſt in their religion, you conclude, "what means is there left but force?" Force therefore you conclude neceſſary, becauſe without any authority, but from your own imagination, you are peremptory, that other means, beſides preaching and perſuaſion, is to be uſed; and therefore is it neceſſary, becauſe you can think of no other.

WHEN I tell you there is other means, and that by your own confeſſion the grace of God is another means, and therefore force is not neceſſary: you reply, "Though the grace of God be another means, and you thought fit to "mention it, to prevent cavils; yet it is none of the means of which you "were ſpeaking, in the place I refer to; which any one who reads that paragraph will find to be only human means: and therefore though the grace "of God be both a proper and ſufficient means, and ſuch as can work by itſelf, and without which neither penalties nor any other means can do any "thing; yet it may be true however, that when admonitions and intreaties "fail, there is no human means left, but penalties, to bring prejudiced perſons to hear and conſider, what may convince them of their errors, and diſcover the truth to them. And then penalties will be neceſſary in reſpect to "that end as an human means." P. 39.

IN which words, if you mean an anſwer to my argument, it is this, that force is neceſſary, becauſe to bring men into the right way there is other human means neceſſary, beſides admonitions and perſuaſions. For elſe what have we to do with human in the caſe? But it is no ſmall advantage one owes to logick, that where ſenſe and reaſon fall ſhort, a diſtinction ready at hand may ech it out. Force, when perſuaſions will not prevail, is neceſſary, ſay you, becauſe it is the only means left. When you are told it is not the only means left, and ſo cannot be neceſſary on that account: you reply, that "when admonitions and intreaties fail, there is no human means left, but penalties, "to bring prejudiced perſons to hear and conſider what may convince them "of their errors, and diſcover the truth to them: and then penalties will be "neceſſary in reſpect to that end, as an human means." P. 40.

SUPPOSE it be urged to you, when your moderate lower penalties fail, there is no human means left but dragooning and ſuch other ſeverities; which you ſay you condemn as much as I, "to bring prejudiced perſons to "hear and conſider what may convince them of their errors, and diſcover the "truth to them." And then dragooning, impriſonment, ſcourging, fining, &c. will be neceſſary in reſpect to that end, as a human means. What can you ſay but this? that you are impowered to judge what degrees of human means are neceſſary, but others are not. For without ſuch a confidence in your own judgment, where God has neither ſaid how much, nor that any force is neceſſary, I think this is as good an argument for the higheſt, as yours is for the lower penalties. When "admonitions and intreaties will not prevail, then "penalties, lower pnalties, ſome degrees of force will be neceſſary, ſay you, "as a human means." And when your lower penalties, your ſome degrees of force will not prevail, then higher degrees will be neceſſary, ſay I, as a human means. And my reaſon is the ſame with yours, becauſe there is no other means, i. e. human means, left. Shew me how your argument concludes for lower puniſhments being neceſſary, and mine not for higher, even to dragooning, " & eris mihi magnus Apollo."

BUT let us apply this to your ſuccedaneum of miracles, and then it will be much more admirable. You tell us, admonitions and intreaties not prevailing to bring men into the right way, " force is neceſſary, becauſe there is " no other means left." To that it is ſaid, yes, there is other means left, the grace of God. Ay, but, ſay you, that will not do; becauſe you ſpeak only of human means. So that according to your way of arguing, ſome other human means is neceſſary: for you yourſelf tell us, that the means you were ſpeaking of, where you ſay, that when admonitions and intreaties will not do, what other means is there left but force? were human means. Your words are, " which any one, who reads that paragraph, will find to be only " human means." By this argument then other human means are neceſſary beſides preaching and perſuaſion, and thoſe human means you have found out to be either force, or miracles: the latter are certainly notable human means. And your diſtinction of human means ſerves you to very good purpoſe, having brought miracles to be one of your human means. Preaching and admonitions, ſay you, are not ſufficient to bring men into the right way, ſomething elſe is neceſſary; yes, the grace of God; no, ſay you, that will not do, it is not human means: it is neceſſary to have other human means, therefore in the three or four firſt centuries after Chriſtianity, the inſufficiency of preaching and admonitions was made up with miracles, and thus the neceſſity of other human means is made good. But to conſider a little farther your miracles as ſupplying the want of force.

THE queſtion between us here is, whether the Chriſtian religion did not prevail in the firſt ages of the church, by its own beauty, force and reaſonableneſs, without the aſſiſtance of force? I ſay it did, and therefore external force is not neceſſary. To this you reply, " that it cannot prevail by its P. 7. " own light, and ſtrength, without the aſſiſtance either of miracles, or of " authority; and therefore the Chriſtian religion not being ſtill accompanied " with miracles, force is now neceſſary." So that to make your equivalent of miracles correſpond with your neceſſary means of force, you ſeem to require an actual application of miracles, or of force, to prevail with men to receive the Goſpel, i. e. men could not be prevailed with to receive the Goſpel without actually ſeeing of miracles. For when you tell us, that " you are P. 6. " ſure I cannot ſay the Chriſtian religion is ſtill accompanied with miracles, as " it was at its firſt planting;" I hope you do not mean that the Goſpel is not ſtill accompanied with an undoubted teſtimony that miracles were done by the firſt publiſhers of it, which was as much of miracles, as I ſuppoſe the greateſt part of thoſe had, with whom the Chriſtian religion prevailed, till it was " ſupported and encouraged, as you tell us, by the laws of the empire:" P. 37. for I think you will not ſay, or if you ſhould, you could not expect to be believed, that all, or the greateſt part of thoſe, that embraced the Chriſtian religion, before it was ſupported by the laws of the empire, which was not till the fourth century, had actually miracles done before them, to work upon them. And all thoſe, who were not eye-witneſſes of miracles done in their preſence, it is plain had no other miracles than we have, that is upon report; and it is probable not ſo many, nor ſo well atteſted as we have. The greateſt part then, of thoſe who were converted, at leaſt, in ſome of thoſe ages, before Chriſtianity was ſupported by the laws of the empire, I think you muſt allow, were wrought upon by bare preaching, and ſuch miracles as we ſtill have, miracles at a diſtance, related miracles. In others, and thoſe the greater number, prejudice was not ſo removed, that they were prevailed on to conſider, to conſider as they ought, i. e. in your language, to conſider ſo as to embrace. If they had not ſo conſidered in our days, what, according to your ſcheme, muſt have been done to them, that did not conſider as they ought? Force muſt have been applied to them. What therefore in the primitive church was to be done to them? Why! your ſuccedaneum miracles, actual miracles, ſuch as you deny the Chriſtian religion to be ſtill accompanied with, muſt have been done in their preſence, to work upon them. Will you ſay this was ſo, and make a new church-hiſtory for us, and outdo thoſe writers who have been thought pretty liberal of miracles? If you do not, you muſt confeſs miracles ſupplied not the place of force, and ſo let fall all your fine contrivance about the neceſſity either of force or miracles; and perhaps you will think it at laſt a more becoming modeſty, not to ſet the divine power and providence on work, by rules, and for the ends of your hypotheſis, without having any thing in authentick hiſtory, much leſs in divine and unerring revelation to juſtify you. But force and power deſerve ſomething more than ordinary and allowable arts or arguments, to get and keep them: “ſi violandum ſit jus, regnandi cauſa “violandum eſt.”

If the teſtimony, of miracles having been done, were ſufficient to make the Goſpel prevail, without force, on thoſe, who were not eye-witneſſes of them, we have that ſtill, and ſo upon that account need not force to ſupply the want of it: but if truth muſt have either the law of the country, or actual miracles to ſupport it, what became of it after the reign of Conſtantine the great, under all thoſe emperors that were erroneus or heretical? It ſupported itſelf in Piedmont, and France, and Turkey, many ages without force or miracles: and it ſpread itſelf in divers nations and kingdoms of the North and Eaſt, without any force, or other miracles than thoſe that were done many ages before. So that I think you will, upon ſecond thoughts, not deny, but that the true religion is able to prevail now, as it did at firſt, and has done ſince in many places, without aſſiſtance from the powers in being, by its own beauty, force, and reaſonableneſs, whereof well-atteſted miracles is a part.

But the account you give us of miracles will deſerve to be a little examined. P. 37. We have it in theſe words, “Conſidering that thoſe extraordinary means were “not withdrawn, till by their help Chriſtianity had prevailed to be received “for the religion of the empire, and to be ſupported and encouraged by the “laws of it, you cannot, you ſay, but think it highly probable, (if we may “be allowed to gueſs at the counſels of infinite wiſdom) that God was pleaſed “to continue them till then, not ſo much for any neceſſity there was of them

“ all that while, for the evincing the truth of the Chriſtian religion, as to “ ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance.” Miracles then, if what you ſay be true, were continued till “ Chriſtianity was received for the religion of “ the empire, not ſo much to evince the truth of the Chriſtian religion, as to “ ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance.” But in this the learned author, whoſe teſtimony you quote, fails you. For he tells you that the chief uſe of miracles, in the church, after the truth of the Chriſtian religion had been ſufficiently confirmed by them in the world, was to oppoſe the falſe and pretended miracles of hereticks and heathens; and anſwerable hereunto miracles ceaſed and returned again, as ſuch oppoſitions made them more or leſs neceſſary. Accordingly miracles, which before had abated, in Trajan's and Hadrian's time, which was in the latter end of the firſt, or beginning of the ſecond century, did again revive to confound the magical deluſions of the hereticks of that time. And in the third century the hereticks uſing no ſuch tricks, and the faith being confirmed, they by degrees ceaſed, of which there then, he ſays, could be no imaginable neceſſity. His words are, “ Et quidem eo “ minus neceſſaria ſunt pro veterum principiis, recentiora illa miracula, quod “ hæreticos, quos appellant, nullos adverſarios habeant, qui contraria illis “ dogmata aſtruant miraculis. Sic enim vidimus, apud veteres, dum nulli “ eccleſiam exercerent adverſarii, ſeu hæretici, ſeu Gentiles; aut ſatis illi “ præteritis miraculis fuiſſent refutati; aut nullas ipſi præſtigias opponerent quæ veris eſſent miraculis oppugnandæ; ſubductam deinde paulatim “ eſſe mirificam illam ſpiritus virtutem. Ortos ſub Trajano Hadrianoque “ hæreticos oſtendimus præſtigiis magicis fuiſſe uſos, & proinde miraculorum verorum in eccleſia uſum una REVIXISSE. Ne dicam præſtigiatores “ etiam Gentiles eodem illo ſeculo ſane frequentiſſimos, Apuleium in Africa, in Aſia Alexandrum Pſeudomantim, multoſque alios quorum meminit Ariſtides. Tertio ſeculo orto, hæretici Hermogenes, Praxeas, Noetus, Theodotus, Sabellius, Novatianus, Artemas, Samoſatenus, nulla, ut “ videtur, miracula ipſi venditabant, nullis propterea miraculis oppugnandi. “ Inde vidimus, apud ipſos etiam Catholicos, ſenſim defeciſſe miracula. Et “ quidem, hæreticis nulla in contrarium miracula oſtentantibus, quæ tandem “ fingi poteſt miraculorum neceſſitas traditam ab initio fidem, miraculiſque “ adeo jamdudum confirmatam prædicantibus? Nulla certe prorſus pro “ primævo miraculorum exemplo. Nulla denique conſciis vere privævam “ eſſe fidem quam novis miraculis ſuſcipiunt confirmandam.” Dodwell, Diſſertat. in Iræn. Diſſ. II. Sect. 65.

THE hiſtory therefore you have from him, of miracles, ſerves for his hypotheſis, but not at all for yours. For if they were continued to ſupply the want of force, which was to deal with the corruption of depraved human nature, that being without any great variation in the world, conſtantly the ſame, there could be no reaſon why they ſhould abate and fail, and then return and revive again. So that there being then, as you ſuppoſe, no neceſſity of miracles for any other end, but to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, they muſt, to ſuit that end, be conſtant and regularly the ſame as you would have force to be, which is ſteadily and uninterruptedly to be applied, as a conſtantly neceſſary remedy, to the corrupt nature of mankind.

IF you allow the learned Dodwell's reaſons, for the continuation of miracles, till the fourth century, your hypotheſis, that they were continued to ſupply the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, will be only precarious. For if there was need of miracles till that time to other purpoſes, the continuation of them in the church, though you could prove them to be as frequent and certain as thoſe of our Saviour and the Apoſtles, it would not advantage your cauſe: ſince it would be no evidence, that they were uſed for that end, which as long as there were other viſible uſes of them, you could not, without revelation, aſſure us were made uſe of by Divine Providence "to ſupply the want "of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." You muſt therefore confute his hypotheſis, before you can make any advantage of what he ſays, concerning the continuation of miracles, for the eſtabliſhing of yours. For till you can ſhew, that that which he aſſigns was not the end, for which they were continued in the church; the utmoſt you can ſay, is, that it may be imagined, that one reaſon of their continuation was to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance: but what you can without proof imagine poſſible, I hope you do not expect ſhould be received as an unqueſtionable proof, that it was ſo. I can imagine it poſſible they were not continued for that end, and one imagination will be as good a proof as another.

To do your modeſty right therefore, I muſt allow, that you do faintly offer at ſome kind of reaſon, to prove that miracles were continued to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance: and ſince God has no where declared, that it was for that end, you would perſuade us in this paragraph, that it was ſo, by two reaſons. One is, that the truth of the Chriſtian religion being ſufficiently evinced by the miracles done by our Saviour and his Apoſtles, and perhaps their immediate ſucceſſors, there was no other need of miracles to be continued till the fourth century; and therefore they were uſed by God to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance. This I take to be the meaning of theſe words of yours, "I cannot but think it highly probable that "God was pleaſed to continue them till then, not ſo much for any neceſſity "there was of them all that while for the evincing the truth of the Chriſtian "religion, as to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." Whereby, I ſuppoſe, you do not barely intend to tell the world what is your opinion in the caſe, but uſe this as an argument, to make it probable to others, that this was the end for which miracles were continued, which at the beſt will be but a very doubtful probability to build ſuch a bold aſſertion on, as this of yours is, viz. That "the Chriſtian religion is not able to ſubſiſt and prevail in the world, "by its own light and ſtrength, without the aſſiſtance either of force, or "actual miracles." And therefore you muſt either produce a declaration from heaven that authorizes you to ſay, that miracles were uſed to ſupply the want of force, or ſhew that there was no other uſe of them but this. For if any other uſe can be aſſigned of them, as long as they continued in the church, one may ſafely deny, that they were to ſupply the want of force: and it will lie upon you to prove it by ſome other way than by ſaying you think it highly probable.

bable. For I ſuppoſe you do not expect that your thinking any thing highly probable, ſhould be a ſufficient reaſon for others to acquieſce in, when perhaps, the hiſtory of miracles conſidered, no body could bring himſelf to ſay he thought it probable, but one whoſe hypotheſis ſtood in need of ſuch a poor ſupport.

THE other reaſon you ſeem to build on is this, that when Chriſtianity was received for the religion of the empire, miracles ceaſed; becauſe there was then no longer any need of them: which I take to be the argument inſinuated in theſe words, "Conſidering that thoſe extraordinary means were not withdrawn till by their help Chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of the empire." P. 37. If then you can make it appear that miracles laſted till Chriſtianity was received for the religion of the empire, without any other reaſon for their continuation, but to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance; and that they ceaſed as ſoon as the magiſtrates became Chriſtians; your argument will have ſome kind of probability, that within the Roman empire this was the method God uſed for the propagating the Chriſtian religion. But it will not ſerve to make good your poſition, "that the Chriſtian religion cannot ſubſiſt and prevail by its own ſtrength and light, without the aſſiſtance of miracles or authority," unleſs you can ſhew, that God made uſe of miracles to introduce and ſupport it in other parts of the world, not ſubject to the Roman empire, till the magiſtrates there alſo became Chriſtians. For the corruption of nature being the ſame without, as within the bounds of the Roman empire; miracles, upon your hypotheſis, were as neceſſary to ſupply the want of the magiſtrates aſſiſtance in other countries as in the Roman empire. For I do not think you will find the civil ſovereigns were the firſt converted in all thoſe countries, where the Chriſtian religion was planted after Conſtantine's reign: and in all thoſe it will be neceſſary for you to ſhew us the aſſiſtance of miracles.

BUT let us ſee how much your hypotheſis is favoured by church-hiſtory. If the writings of the fathers of greateſt name and credit are to be believed, miracles were not withdrawn when Chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of the empire. Athanaſius, the great defender of the catholick orthodoxy, writ the life of his contemporary St. Anthony, full of miracles; which though ſome have queſtioned, yet the learned Dodwell allows to be writ by Athanaſius: and the ſtile evinces it to be his, which is alſo confirmed by other eccleſiaſtical writers.

"PALLADIUS tells us, That Ammon did many miracles: but that particularly St. Athanaſius related in the life of Athony, that Ammon going with ſome monks Anthony had ſent to him, when they came to the river Lycus, which they were to paſs, was afraid to ſtrip for fear of ſeeing himſelf naked; and whilſt he was in diſpute of this matter, he was taken up, and in an extaſy carried over by an angel, the reſt of the monks ſwimming the river. When he come to Anthony, Anthony told him he had ſent for him, becauſe God had revealed many things to him concerning him, and particularly his tranſlation. And when Ammon died, in his retire-

"ment, Anthony ſaw his ſoul carried into heaven by angels." Palladius in vita Ammonis.

L. 4. c. 3. "SOCRATES tells us, That Anthony ſaw the ſoul of Ammon, taken up "by angels, as Athanaſius writes in the life of Anthony."

L. 1. c. 21. AND again, ſays he, "It ſeems ſuperfluous for me to relate the many miracles Anthony did; how he fought openly with devils, diſcovering all "their tricks and cheats: for Athanaſius biſhop of Alexandria has prevented "me on that ſubject, having writ a book particularly of his life."

"ANTHONY was thought worthy of the viſion of God, and led a life perfectly conformable to the laws of Chriſt. This, whoever reads the book, "wherein is contained the hiſtory of his life, will eaſily know; wherein he "will alſo ſee prophecy ſhining out: for he propheſied very clearly of thoſe "who were infected with the Arian contagion, and foretold what miſchief "from them was threatened to the churches, God truly revealing all theſe "things to him, which is certainly the principal evidence of the catholick faith, "no ſuch man being to be found amongſt the hereticks. But do not take this "upon my word, but read and ſtudy the book itſelf."

Chryſoſt. Hom. 8. in Matt. ii. THIS account you have from St. Chryſoſtom, whom Mr. Dodwell calls the contemner of fables.

ST. Hierom, in his treatiſe "De viro perfecto," ſpeaks of the frequency of miracles done in his time, as a thing paſt queſtion: beſides thoſe, not a few which he has left upon record, in the lives of Hilarion and Paul, two monks, whoſe lives he has writ. And he that has a mind to ſee the plenty of miracles of this kind, need but read the collection of the lives of the fathers, made by Roſweydus.

RUFFIN tells us, That Athanaſius lodged the bones of St. John Baptiſt in the wall of the church, knowing by the ſpirit of prophecy, the good they were to do to the next generation: and of what efficacy and uſe they were, may be concluded from the church with the golden roof, built to them ſoon after, in the place of the temple of Serapis.

Cœcum illuminatum fuiſſe jam noveram. Nec ea quæ cognoſcimus, enumerate poſſumus. Aug. Retract. lib. 1. c. 13.

ST. Auſtin tells us, "That he knew a blind man reſtored to ſight, by the "bodies of the Milan martyrs, and ſome other ſuch things; of which kind "there were ſo many done in that time, that many ſcaped his knowledge; "and thoſe which he knew, were more than he could number." More of this you may ſee Epiſt. 137.

HE further aſſures us, that by the ſingle reliques of St. Stephen, "a blind "woman received her ſight. Lucullus was cured of an old fiſtula; Eucharius of the ſtone; three gouty men recovered; a lad killed with a cart-wheel "going over him, reſtored to life ſafe and ſound, as if he had received no hurt: "a nun lying at the point of death, they ſent her coat to the ſhrine, but ſhe "dying before it was brought back, was reſtored to life by its being laid on "her dead body. The like happened at Hippo to the daughter of BASSUS; "and two others," whoſe name he ſets down, were by the ſame reliques raiſed from the dead.

AFTER theſe and other particulars there ſet down, of miracles done in his time by thoſe reliques of St. Stephen, the holy father goes on thus; "what

“ ſhall I do? preſſed by my promiſe of diſpatching this work, I cannot here ſet down all: and without doubt many, when they ſhall read this, will be troubled that I have omitted ſo many particulars, which they truly know as well as I. For if I ſhould, paſſing by the reſt, write only the miraculous cures which have been wrought by this moſt glorious martyr Stephen, in the colony of Calama, and this of ours, I ſhould fill many books, and yet ſhould not take in all of them: but only thoſe of which there are collections publiſhed, which are read to the people: for this I took care ſhould be done, when I ſaw that ſigns of divine power, like thoſe of old, were FREQUENT alſo in our times. It is not now two years ſince that ſhrine has been at Hippo: and many of the books, which I certainly knew to be ſo, not being publiſhed, thoſe which are publiſhed concerning thoſe miraculous operations, amounted to near fifty when I writ this. But at Calama, where this ſhrine was before, there are more publiſhed, and their number is incomparably greater. At Uzal alſo a colony, and near Utica, we know many famous things to have been done by the ſame martyr.”

Quæ utique mecumſciunt.

Libelli dati ſunt.

Cumviderimus antiquis ſimilia divinarum ſigna virtutum etiam noſtris temporibus frequentari. Aug. de Civ. Dei, lib. xxii. c. 8.

Two of thoſe books he mentions, are printed in the Appendix of the tenth tome of St. Auſtin's works of Plantin's edit. One of them contains two miracles; the other, as I remember, about ſeventeen. So that at Hippo alone, in two years time, we may count, beſides thoſe omitted, there were publiſhed above 600 miracles, and as he ſays, incomparably more at Calama: beſides what were done by other reliques of the ſame St. Stephen, in other parts of the world, which cannot be ſuppoſed to have had leſs virtue than thoſe ſent to this part of Africa. For the reliques of St. Stephen, diſcovered by the dream of a monk, were divided and ſent into diſtant countries, and there diſtributed to ſeveral churches.

These may ſuffice to ſhew, that if the fathers of the church of greateſt name and authority are to be believed, miracles were not withdrawn, but continued down to the latter end of the fourth century, long after “Chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of the empire.”

But if theſe teſtimonies of Athanaſius, Chryſoſtom, Palladius, Ruffin, St. Hierom, and St. Auſtin, will not ſerve your turn, you may find much more to this purpoſe in the ſame authors; and, if you pleaſe, you may conſult alſo St. Baſil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory Nyſſen, St. Ambroſe, St. Hilary, Theodoret, and others.

This being ſo, you muſt either deny the authority of theſe fathers, or grant that miracles continued in the church after “Chriſtianity was received for the religion of the empire: and then they could not be to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance,” unleſs they were to ſupply the want of what was not wanting; and therefore they were continued for ſome other end. Which end of the continuation of miracles, when you are ſo far inſtructed in as to be able to aſſure us, that it was different from that for which God made uſe of them in the ſecond and third centuries: when you are ſo far admitted into the ſecrets of Divine providence, as to be able to convince the world that the miracles between the Apoſtles and Conſtantine's time, or any other period you ſhall pitch on, were to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, and thoſe after, for ſome other purpoſe, what you ſay may deſerve to be conſidered. Until you do this, you will only ſhew the liberty you take to aſſert with great confidence, though without any ground, whatever will ſuit your ſyſtem; and that you do not ſtick to make bold with the counſels of infinite wiſdom, to make them ſubſervient to your hypotheſis.

AND ſo I leave you to diſpoſe of the credit of eccleſiaſtical writers, as you ſhall think fit; and by your authority to eſtabliſh, or invalidate theirs as you pleaſe. But this, I think, is evident, that he who will build his faith or reaſonings upon miracles delivered by church-hiſtorians, will find cauſe to go no farther than the Apoſtles time, or elſe not to ſtop at Conſtantine's: ſince the writers after that period, whoſe word we readily take as unqueſtionable in other things, ſpeak of miracles in their time with no leſs aſſurance, than the fathers before the fourth century; and a great part of the miracles of the ſecond and third centuries ſtand upon the credit of the writers of the fourth. So that that ſort of argument which takes and rejects the teſtimony of the ancients at pleaſure, as may beſt ſuit with it, will not have much force with thoſe who are not diſpoſed to embrace the hypotheſis, without any arguments at all.

P. 7. YOU grant, "That the true religion has always light and ſtrength of its "own, i. e. without the aſſiſtance of force or miracles, ſufficient to prevail "with all that conſider it ſeriouſly, and without prejudice: that therefore, for "which the aſſiſtance of force is wanting, is to make men conſider ſeriouſly, "and without prejudice." Now whether the miracles that we have ſtill, miracles done by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, atteſted, as they are, by undeniable hiſtory, be not fitter to deal with mens prejudices, than force, and than force which requires nothing but outward conformity, I leave the world to judge. All the aſſiſtance the true religion needs from authority, is only a liberty for it, to be truly taught; but it has ſeldom had that, from the powers in being, in its firſt entry into their dominions, ſince the withdrawing of miracles: and yet I deſire you to tell me, into what country the Goſpel, accompanied, as now it is, only with paſt miracles, hath been brought by the preaching of men, who have laboured in it after the example of the Apoſtles, where it did not ſo prevail over mens prejudices, that "as many as were ordained to "eternal life," conſidered and believed it. Which, as you may ſee, Acts xiii. 48. was all the advance it made, even when aſſiſted with the gift of miracles: for neither then were all, or the majority wrought on to conſider, and embrace it.

BUT yet the Goſpel "cannot prevail by its own light and ſtrength;" and therefore miracles were to ſupply the place of force. How was force uſed? A law being made, there was a continued application of puniſhment to all thoſe whom it brought not to embrace the doctrine propoſed. Were miracles ſo uſed till force took place? For this we ſhall want more new church-hiſtory, and I think contrary to what we read in that part of it which is unqueſtionable; I mean in the Acts of the Apoſtles, where we ſhall find, that the then promulgators of the Goſpel, when they had preached, and done what miracles the Spirit of God directed, if they prevailed not, they often left them: "Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and ſaid it was neceſſary that the word of God ſhould firſt have been ſpoken to you: but ſeeing you put it from you, and judge yourſelves unworthy, we turn to the Gentiles, Acts xiii. 46. They ſhook off the duſt of their feet againſt them, and came unto Iconium, Acts xiii. 51. But when divers were hardened, and believed not, but ſpake evil of that way before the multitude, he departed from them, and ſeparated the diſciples, Acts xix. 9. Paul was preſſed in ſpirit, and teſtified to the Jews that Jeſus was Chriſt; and when they oppoſed themſelves, and blaſphemed, he ſhook his raiment, and ſaid unto them, Your blood be upon your own heads, I am clean, from henceforth I will go unto the Gentiles." Acts xviii. 6. Did the Chriſtian magiſtrates ever do ſo, who thought it neceſſary to ſupport the Chriſtian religion by laws? Did they ever, when they had a while puniſhed thoſe whom perſuaſions and preaching had not prevailed on, give off, and leave them to themſelves, and make trial of their puniſhment upon others? Or is this your way of force and puniſhment? If it be not, yours is not what miracles came to ſupply the room of, and ſo is not neceſſary. For you tell us, they are puniſhed to make them conſider, and they can never be ſuppoſed to conſider "as P. 24, 25. they ought, whilſt they perſiſt in rejecting;" and therefore they are juſtly puniſhed to make them ſo conſider: ſo that not ſo conſidering, being the fault for which they are puniſhed, and the amendment of that fault the end which is deſigned to be attained by puniſhing, the puniſhment muſt continue. But men were not always beat upon with miracles. To this, perhaps you will reply, that the ſeeing of a miracle or two, or half a dozen, was ſufficient to procure a hearing; but that being puniſhed once or twice, or half a dozen times, is not; for you tell us, "the power of miracles communicated to the P. 36. Apoſtles, ſerved altogether, as well as puniſhment, to procure them a hearing:" where, if you mean by hearing, only attention, who doubts but puniſhment may alſo procure that? If you mean by hearing, receiving and embracing what is propoſed, that even miracles themſelves did not effect upon all eye-witneſſes. Why then, I beſeech you, if one be to ſupply the place of the other, is one to be continued on thoſe who do reject when the other was never long continued, nor as I think we may ſafely ſay, often repeated to thoſe, who perſiſted in their former perſuaſions?

AFTER all therefore, may not one juſtly doubt, whether miracles ſupplied the place of puniſhment; nay, whether you yourſelf, if you be true to your own principles, can think ſo? You tell us, that not to join "themſelves to P. 25. the true church, where ſufficient evidence is offered to convince men that it is ſo, is a fault that it cannot be unjuſt to puniſh." Let me aſk you now; did the Apoſtles by their preaching and miracles, offer ſufficient evidence to convince men that the church of Chriſt was the true church; or, which is, in this caſe, the ſame thing, that the doctrine they preached was the true religion? If they did, were not thoſe, who perſiſted in unbelief, guilty of a fault? And if ſome of the miracles done in thoſe days, ſhould now be repeated, and yet men ſhould not embrace the doctrine, or join themſelves to the church which thoſe miracles accompanied, would you not think them guilty of a fault which the magiſtrate might juſtly, nay, ought to puniſh? If you would anſwer truly and ſincerely to this queſtion, I doubt you would think your beloved puniſhments neceſſary notwithſtanding miracles, "there being no other "human means left." I do not make this judgment of you from any ill opinion I have of your good nature, but it is conſonant to your principles: for if not profeſſing the true religion, where ſufficient evidence is offered by bare preaching, be a fault, and a fault juſtly to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, you will certainly think it much more his duty to puniſh a greater fault, as you muſt allow it is, to reject truth propoſed with arguments and miracles, than with bare arguments: ſince you tell us, that the magiſtrate is "obliged P. 77. "to procure, as much as in him lies, that every man take care of his own "ſoul, i. e. conſider as he ought; which no man can be ſuppoſed to do, "whilſt he perſiſts in rejecting:" as you tell us, p. 24.

MIRACLES, ſay you, ſupplied the want of force, "till by their help "Chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of the empire." Not that the magiſtrates had not as much commiſſion then, from the law of nature, to uſe force, for promoting the true religion, as ſince: but becauſe the magiſtrates then, not being of the true religion, did not afford it the aſſiſtance of their political power. If this be ſo, and there be a neceſſity either of force or miracles, will there not be the ſame reaſon for miracles ever ſince, even to this day, and ſo on to the end of the world, in all thoſe countries where the magiſtrate is not of the true religion? "Unleſs, as you urge it, A. p. 16. "you will ſay, what without impiety cannot be ſaid, that the wiſe and benign "Diſpoſer of all things, has not furniſhed mankind with competent means "for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls."

BUT to put an end to your pretence to miracles, as ſupplying the place of force. Let me aſk you, whether ſince the withdrawing of miracles, your moderate degree of force has been made uſe of, for the ſupport of the Chriſtian religion? If not, then miracles were not made uſe of to ſupply the want of force, unleſs it were for the ſupply of ſuch force as Chriſtianity never had, which is for the ſupply of juſt no force at all; or elſe for the ſupply of the ſeverities which have been in uſe amongſt Chriſtians, which is worſe than none at all. Force, you ſay, is neceſſary: what force? "not fire and ſword, "not loſs of eſtates, not maiming with corporal puniſhments, not ſtarving "and tormenting in noiſome priſons:" thoſe you condemn. "Not compul- "ſion: theſe ſeverities, you ſay, are apter to hinder, than promote the true "religion; but moderate lower penalties, tolerable inconveniencies, ſuch as "ſhould a little diſturb and diſeaſe men." This aſſiſtance not being to be had from the magiſtrates, in the firſt ages of Chriſtianity, miracles, ſay you, were continued till "Chriſtianity became the religion of the empire, not ſo "much for any neceſſity there was of them, all that while, for the evincing "the truth of the Chriſtian religion, as to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's "aſſiſtance. For the true religion not being able to ſupport itſelf by its own "light, and ſtrength, without the aſſiſtance either of miracles, or of autho- "rity," there was a neceſſity of the one or the other; and therefore, whilſt he the powers in being aſſiſted not with neceſſary force, miracles ſupplied that want. Miracles then being to ſupply neceſſary force, and neceſſary force being only "lower moderate penalties, ſome inconveniencies, ſuch as only diſ- "turb and diſeaſe a little;" if you cannot ſhew that in all countries, where the magiſtrates have been Chriſtian, they have aſſiſted with ſuch force, it is plain that miracles ſupplied not the want of neceſſary force; unleſs to ſupply the want of your neceſſary force, for a time, were to ſupply the want of an aſſiſtance, which true religion had not upon the withdrawing of miracles, and I think I may ſay, was never thought on by any authority, in any age or country, till you now, above thirteen hundred years after, made this happy diſcovery. Nay, Sir, ſince the true religion, as you tell us, cannot prevail or ſubſiſt without miracles or authority, i. e. your moderate force; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the Chriſtian religion has, in all ages and countries, been accompanied either with actual miracles, or ſuch force: which, whether it be ſo or no, I leave you and all ſober men to conſider. When you can ſhew, that it has been ſo, we ſhall have reaſon to be ſatisfied with your bold aſſertion: that the Chriſtian religion, as delivered in the New Teſtament, cannot "prevail by its own light and ſtrength, without the aſſiſtance" of your moderate penalties, or of actual miracles accompanying it. But if ever ſince the withdrawing of miracles in all Chriſtian countries, where force has been thought neceſſary by the magiſtrate to ſupport the national, or, as every where it is called, the true religion, thoſe ſeverities have been made uſe of, which you, for a good reaſon, "condemn, as apter to hinder, than promote the "true religion;" it is plain that miracles ſupplied the want of ſuch an aſſiſtance from the magiſtrate, as was apter to hinder, than promote the true religion. And your ſubſtituting of miracles, to ſupply the want of moderate force will ſhew nothing, for your cauſe, but the zeal of a man ſo fond of force, that he will without any warrant from Scripture, enter into the counſels of the Almighty; and without authority from hiſtory, talk of miracles, and political adminiſtrations, as may beſt ſuit his ſyſtem.

To my ſaying, a religion that is from God, wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority to make it prevail; you anſwer, "This is not ſimply nor P. 8. "always true. Indeed when God takes the matter wholly into his own hands, "as he does at his firſt revealing any religion, there can be no need of any "aſſiſtance of human authority; but when God has once ſufficiently ſettled "his religion in the world, ſo that if men from thenceforth will do what "they may and ought, in their ſeveral capacities, to preſerve and propagate "it, it may ſubſiſt and prevail without that extraordinary aſſiſtance from him, "which was neceſſary for its firſt eſtabliſhment." By this rule of yours, how long was there need of miracles to make Chriſtianity ſubſiſt and prevail? If you will keep to it, you will find there was no need of miracles, after the promulgation of the Goſpel by Chriſt and his Apoſtles; for I aſk you, was it not then ſo "ſufficiently ſettled in the world, that if men would from "thenceforth have done what they might and ought, in their ſeveral capa- "cities," it would have ſubſiſted and prevailed without that extraordinary aſſiſtance of miracles? unleſs you will on this occaſion retract what you ſay in other places, viz. that it is a fault not to receive the "true religion, where "ſufficient evidence is offered to convince men that it is ſo." If then, from the times of the Apoſtles, the Chriſtian religion has had ſufficient evidence that it is the true religion, and men did their duty, i. e. receive it, it would certainly have ſubſiſted and prevailed, even from the Apoſtles times, without that extraordinary aſſiſtance, and then miracles after that were not neceſſary.

BUT perhaps you will ſay, that by men in their ſeveral capacities, you mean the magiſtrates. A pretty way of ſpeaking, proper to you alone: but even in that ſenſe, it will not ſerve your turn. For then there will be need of miracles, not only in the time you propoſe, but in all times after. For if the magiſtrate, who is as much ſubject as other men to that corruption of human nature, by which you tell us falſe religions prevail againſt the true, ſhould not do what he may and ought, ſo as to be of the true religion, as it is the odds he will not; what then will become of the true religion, which according to you cannot ſubſiſt or prevail without either the aſſiſtance of miracles or authority? Subjects cannot have the aſſiſtance of authority, where the magiſtrate is not of the true religion; and the magiſtrate wanting the aſſiſtance of authority to bring him to the true religion, that want muſt be ſtill ſupplied with miracles, or elſe, according to your hypotheſis, all muſt go to wreck; and the true religion, that cannot ſubſiſt by its own ſtrength and light, muſt be loſt in the world. For, I preſume, you are ſcarce yet ſuch an adorer of the powers of the world, as to ſay, that magiſtrates are privileged from that common corruption of mankind, whoſe oppoſition to the true religion you ſuppoſe cannot be overcome, without the aſſiſtance of miracles or force. The flock will ſtray, unleſs the bell-weather conduct them right; the bell-weather himſelf will ſtray, unleſs the ſhepherd's crook and ſtaff, which he has as much need of as any ſheep of the flock, keep him right: ergo, the whole flock will ſtray, unleſs the bell-weather have that aſſiſtance which is neceſſary to conduct him right. The caſe is the ſame here. So that by your own rule, either there was no need of miracles to ſupply the want of force, after the Apoſtles time, or there is need of them ſtill.

BUT your anſwer, when looked into, has ſomething in it more excellent. I ſay, a religion that is of God, wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority to make it prevail. Your anſwer, "True, when God takes the matter into "his own hands. But when once he has ſufficiently ſettled religion, ſo that "if men will but do what they may and ought, it may ſubſiſt without that "extraordinary aſſiſtance from heaven; then he leaves it to their care." Where you ſuppoſe, if men will do their duties in their ſeveral capacities, true religion, being once eſtabliſhed, may ſubſiſt without miracles. And is it not as true, that if they will, in their ſeveral capacities, do what they may and ought, true religion will alſo ſubſiſt without force? But you are ſure magiſtrates will do what they may and ought, to preſerve and propagate the true religion, but ſubjects will not. If you are not, you muſt bethink yourſelf how to anſwer that old queſtion,

——“ Sed quis cuſtodiet ipſos
“ Cuſtodes?”——

To my having ſaid, that prevailing without the aſſiſtance of force, I thought was made uſe of as an argument for the truth of the Chriſtian religion. You reply, that you hope “ I am miſtaken, for ſure this is a very bad argument, P. 6. “ That the Chriſtian religion, ſo contrary in the nature of it, as well to fleſh “ and blood, as to the powers of darkneſs, ſhould prevail as it did, and that “ not only without any aſſiſtance from authority, but even in ſpight of all “ the oppoſition which authority and a wicked world, joined with thoſe in- “ fernal powers, could make againſt it. This, I acknowledge, has deſervedly “ been inſiſted upon by Chriſtians as a very good proof of their religion. But “ to argue the truth of the Chriſtian religion, from its mere prevailing in the “ world, without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in be- “ ing; as if whatever religion ſhould ſo prevail, muſt needs be the true re- “ ligion, whatever may be intended, is really not to defend the Chriſtian re- “ ligion, but to betray it.” How you have mended the argument by putting in “ mere,” which is not any where uſed by me, I will not examine. The queſtion is, whether the Chriſtian religion, ſuch as it was then, for I know not any other Chriſtian religion, and is ſtill, “ contrary to fleſh and blood, and to “ the powers of darkneſs,” prevailed not without the aſſiſtance of human force, by thoſe aids it has ſtill? This, I think, you will not deny to be an argument uſed for its truth by Chriſtians, and ſome of our church. How far any one in the uſe of this argument pleaſes or diſpleaſes you, I am not concerned. All the uſe I made of it was to ſhew, that it is confeſſed that the Chriſtian religion did prevail, without that human means of the coactive power of the magiſtrate, which you affirmed to be neceſſary; and this, I think, makes good the experiment I brought. Nor will your ſeeking, your way, a refuge in miracles, help you to evade it; as I have already ſhewn.

BUT you give a reaſon for what you ſay, in theſe following words; “ for Ibid. “ neither does the true religion always prevail without the aſſiſtance of the “ powers in being; nor is that always the true religion, which does ſo ſpread “ and prevail.” Thoſe who uſe the argument of its prevailing without force, for the truth of the Chriſtan religion, it is like will tell you, that, if it be true, as you ſay, that the Chriſtian religion, which at other times does, ſometimes does not, prevail without the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, it is, becauſe when it fails, it wants the due aſſiſtance and diligence of the miniſters of it. “ How ſhall they hear without a preacher?” How ſhall the Goſpel be ſpread and prevail, if thoſe who take on them to be the miniſters and preachers of it, either neglect to teach it others as they ought, or confirm it not by their lives? If therefore you will make this argument of any uſe to you, you muſt ſhew, where it was, that the miniſters of the Goſpel, doing their duty by the purity of their lives, and their uninterrupted labour, in being inſtant in ſeaſon, and out of ſeaſon, have not been able to make it prevail. An inſtance of this, it is believed you will ſcarce find: and if this be the caſe, that it fails not to prevail where thoſe, whoſe charge it is, neglect not to teach and ſpread it with that care, aſſiduity, and application which they ought, you may hereafter know where to lay the blame; not on the want of ſufficient light and ſtrength in the Goſpel to prevail, wherein methinks, you make very bold with it, but on the want of what the Apoſtle requires in the miniſters of it; ſome part whereof you may read in theſe words to Timothy; "But thou, "O man of God, follow after righteouſneſs, godlineſs, faith, love, patience, "meekneſs: give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine: preach "the word, be inſtant in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon; reprove, rebuke, exhort, "with all long-ſuffering and doctrine;" and more to this purpoſe in his epiſtles to Timothy and Titus.

THAT the Chriſtian religion has prevailed, and ſupported itſelf in the world now above theſe ſixteen hundred years, you muſt grant, and that it has not been by force, is demonſtration. For wherever the Chriſtian religion prevailed, it did it, as far as we know any thing of the means of its propagation and ſupport, without the help of that force, moderate force, which you ſay, is alone uſeful and neceſſary. So that if the ſeverities you condemn, be, as you confeſs, apter to hinder than promote the Goſpel, and it has no where had the aſſiſtance of your moderate penalties, it muſt follow, that it prevailed without force, only by its own ſtrength and light, diſplayed and brought home to the underſtandings and hearts of the people, by the preachings, intreaties, and exhortations of its miniſters. This at leaſt you muſt grant, that force can be by no means neceſſary to make the Goſpel prevail any where, till the utmoſt has been tried. that can be done by arguments and exhortations, prayers and intreaties, and all the friendly ways of perſuaſion.

As to the other part of your aſſertion, "Nor is that always the true reli-"gion that does ſo ſpread and prevail," it is like they will demand inſtances of you, where falſe religions ever prevailed againſt the Goſpel, without the aſſiſtance of force on the one ſide, or the betraying of it by the negligence and careleſſneſs of its teachers, on the other? So that if the Goſpel any where wants the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, it is only to make the miniſters of it do their duty. I have heard of thoſe, and poſſibly there are inſtances of it now not wanting, who by their pious lives, peaceable and friendly carriage, and diligent application to the ſeveral conditions and capacities of their pariſhioners, and ſcreening them as much as they could from the penalties of the law, have in a ſhort time ſcarce left a diſſenter in a pariſh, where notwithſtanding the force had been before uſed, they ſcarce found any other. But how far this has recommended ſuch miniſters to thoſe who ought to encourage or follow the example, I wiſh you would inform yourſelf, and then tell me. But who ſees not that a juſtice of peace's warrant is a ſhorter, and much eaſier way for the miniſter, than all this ado of inſtruction, debates, and particular application. Whether it be alſo more Chriſtian, or more effectual to make real converts, others may be apt to enquire. This, I am ſure, it is not juſtifiable, even by your very principles, to be uſed till the other has been throughly tried.

See Paſt. Care, p. 202.

HOW far our Saviour is like to approve of this method in thoſe whom he ſends; what reward he is like to beſtow on miniſters of his word, who are forward to bring their brethren under ſuch correction; thoſe who call themſelves ſucceſſors of the Apoſtles, will do well to conſider from what he himſelf ſays to them, Luke xii. 42. For that that was ſpoken particularly to the Apoſtles and preachers of the Goſpel, is evident not only from the words themſelves, but from St. Peter's queſtion. Our Saviour having in the foregoing verſes declared in a parable, the neceſſity of being watchful, St. Peter, verſe 41. aſks him, "Lord, ſpeakeſt thou this parable unto us, or even to all?" To this demand, our Saviour replies in theſe words. "Who then is that faithful and wiſe ſteward whom his lord ſhall make ruler over his houſhold, to give them their portion of meat in due ſeaſon? Bleſſed is that ſervant whom the Lord, when he cometh, ſhall find ſo doing. Of a truth, I ſay unto you, he will make him ruler over all that he hath. But, and if that ſervant ſay in his heart, my lord delayeth his coming; and ſhall begin to beat the men-ſervants, and maidens, and to eat and drink, and to be drunken: the lord of that ſervant will come in a day when he looketh not for him, and at an hour when he is not aware; and will cut him in ſunder, and will appoint him his portion with unbelievers, or with hypocrites," as it is, Matt. xxiv. 51.

BUT if there be any thing in the argument for the truth of Chriſtianity, as God forbid there ſhould not, that it has, and conſequently can prevail without force, I think it can ſcarce be true in matter of fact, that falſe religions do alſo prevail againſt the Chriſtian religion, when they come upon equal terms in competition; and as much diligence and induſtry is uſed by the teachers of it, as by ſeducers to falſe religions, the magiſtrate uſing his force on neither ſide. For if in this caſe, which is the fair trial, Chriſtianity can prevail, and falſe religions too, it is poſſible contrarities may prevail againſt one another both together. To make good therefore your aſſertion, you muſt ſhew us, where ever any other religion ſo ſpread and prevailed, as to drive Chriſtianity out of any country without force, where the miniſters of it did their duty to teach, adorn and ſupport it.

As to the following words, "Nor is that always the true religion which P. 6.
"does ſo ſpread and prevail; as I doubt not but you will acknowledge with me, when you have but conſidered within how few generations after the flood, the worſhip of falſe gods prevailed againſt that which Noah profeſſed and taught his children, which was undoubtedly the true religion, almoſt to the utter excluſion of it, though that at firſt was the only religion in the world, without any aid from force, or aſſiſtance from the powers in being." This will need ſomething more than a negative proof, as we ſhall ſee by and by.

Where I ſay, "The inventions of men need the force and help of men: L. II. p. 387.
"a religion that is from God, wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority." The firſt part of thoſe words you take no notice of; neither grant nor deny it to be ſo, though perhaps it will prove a great part of the controverſy between us.

To my queſtion, "Whether if ſuch a Toleration as is propoſed by the "Author of the Firſt Letter, were eſtabliſhed in France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, &c. the true religion would not be a gainer by it?" You anſwer, P. 8. That the "true religion would be a loſer by it in thoſe few places where it is "now eſtabliſhed as the national religion;" and particularly, you name England. It is then, it ſeems, by your way of moderate force and lower penalties, that in all countries where it is national, the true religion hath prevailed and ſubſiſts. For the controverſy is between the author's univerſal Toleration, and your new way of force; for greater degrees of force, you condemn as hurtful. Say then that in England, and wherever the true religion is national, it has been beholden to your force for the advantages and ſupport it has had, and I will yield you the cauſe. But of national religions, and particularly that of England, I have occaſion to ſpeak more in another place.

P. 9. IN the next place you anſwer, That you ſuppoſe I do not hope I ſhall perſuade the world to conſent to my Toleration. I think by your logick, a propoſition is not leſs true or falſe, becauſe the world will or will not be perſuaded to conſent to it. And therefore, though it will not conſent to a general Toleration, it may nevertheleſs be true that it would be advantageous to the true religion: and if no body muſt ſpeak truth till he thinks all the world will be perſuaded by it, you muſt have a very good opinion of your oratory, or elſe you will have a very good excuſe to turn your parſonage, when you have one, into a ſine-cure. But though I have not ſo good an opinion of my gift of perſuaſion, as perhaps you have of yours; yet I think I may without any great preſumption hope, that I may as ſoon perſuade England, the world, or any government in it, to conſent to my Toleration, as you perſuade it to content itſelf with moderate penalties.

YOU farther anſwer, If ſuch a Toleration eſtabliſhed there, would permit the doctrine of the church of England to be truly preached, and its worſhip ſet up in any Popiſh, Mahometan or Pagan country, you think true reli- P. 10. gion would be a "gainer by it, for ſome time; but you think withal, that "an univerſal Toleration would ruin it both there and every where elſe, in "the end." You grant it then poſſible, notwithſtanding the corruption of human nature, that the true religion may gain ſomewhere, and for ſome time, by Toleration: it will gain under a new Toleration you think, but decay un- P. 9. der an old one; would you had told us the reaſon why you think ſo. "But "you think there is great reaſon to fear, that without God's extraordinary "providence, it would in a much ſhorter time, than any one, who does not "well conſider the matter, will imagine, be moſt effectually extirpated by "it throughout the world." If you have conſidered right, and the matter be really ſo, it is demonſtration, that the Chriſtian religion, ſince Conſtantine's time, as well as the true religion before Moſes's time, muſt needs have been totally extinguiſhed out of the world, and have ſo continued, unleſs by miracle and immediate revelation reſtored. For thoſe men, i. e. the magiſtrates, upon whoſe being of the true religion, the preſervation of it, according to you, depends, living all of them under a free Toleration, muſt needs loſe the true religion effectually and ſpeedily, from among them; and they quitting the true religion, the aſſiſtance of force, which ſhould ſupport it againſt a general defection, be utterly loſt.

THE princes of the world are, I ſuppoſe, as well infected with the depraved nature of man, as the reſt of their brethren. Theſe, whether a hundred or a thouſand, ſuppoſe they lived together in one ſociety, wherein, with the true religion, there were a free Toleration, and no coactive power of the magiſtrate employed about matters of religion; would the true religion be ſoon extirpated amongſt them? If you ſay it would not, you muſt grant Toleration not to be ſo deſtructive of the true religion, as you ſay; or you muſt think them of another race, than the reſt of corrupt men, and free from that general taint. If you grant that the true religion would be quickly extirpated amongſt them, by Toleration, living together in one ſociety, the ſame will happen to them, living as princes, where they are free from all coactive power of the magiſtrate in matters of religion, and have as large a Toleration as can be imagined. Unleſs you will ſay, that depraved human nature works leſs in a prince than a ſubject; and is moſt tame, moſt mortified, where it has moſt liberty and temptation. Muſt not then, if your maxim be true, Toleration quickly deprive the few orthodox princes that are in the world, take it when you will, of the true religion; and with them, take away the aſſiſtance of authority, which is neceſſary to ſupport it amongſt their ſubjects? Toleration then does not, whatever your fears are, make that woeful wreck on true religion which you talk of.

I SHALL give you another evidence of it, and then come to examine your great reaſon taken from the corruption of human nature, and the inſtance you ſo often repeat, and build ſo much on, the apoſtacy after the flood. Toleration, you ſay, would quickly, and effectually extirpate the true religion throughout the world. What now is the means to preſerve true religion in the world? If you may be believed, it is force, but not all force, great ſeverities, fire, faggot, impriſonment, loſs of eſtate, &c. Theſe will do more harm than good; it is only lower and moderate penalties, ſome tolerable inconveniencies, can do the buſineſs. If then moderate force hath not been all along, no, nor any where, made uſe of for the preſervation of the true religion, the maintenance and ſupport of the true religion in the world, has not been owing to what you oppoſe to Toleration; and ſo your argument againſt Toleration is out of doors.

YOU give us in this and the foregoing pages, the grounds of your fear, it is the corruption of human nature which oppoſes the true religion. You expreſs it thus, "Idolatry prevailing againſt it [the true religion] not by its own "light and ſtrength, for it could have nothing of either, but merely by the "advantage it had in the corruption and pravity of human nature, finding "out to itſelf more agreeable religions than the true. For, ſay you, what- "ever hardſhips ſome falſe religions may impoſe, it will however, always be "eaſier to carnal worldly-minded men, to give even their firſt-born for their "tranſgreſſions, than to mortify their luſts from which they ſpring, which no "religion but the true, requires of them." I wonder, ſaying this, how you could any longer miſtake the magiſtrate's duty, in reference to religion, and not ſee wherein force truly can and ought to be ſerviceable to it. What you have ſaid, plainly ſhews you, that the aſſiſtance the magiſtrate's authority can give to the true religion, is in the ſubduing of luſts, and its being directed againſt pride, injuſtice, rapine, luxury and debauchery, and thoſe other immoralities which come properly under his cognizance, and may be corrected by puniſhments; and not by the impoſing of creeds and ceremonies, as you tell us. Sound and decent, you might have left out, whereof P. 13. their fancies, and not the law of God, will always be judge and conſequently the rule.

THE caſe between the true and falſe religions, as you have ſtated it, in P. 7. ſhort, ſounds thus, "True religion has always light and ſtrength of its own, "ſufficient to prevail with all that ſeriouſly conſider it, and without prejudice. "Idolatry, or falſe religions have nothing of light or ſtrength to prevail with." Why then does not the true religion prevail againſt the falſe, having ſo much the advantage in light and ſtrength? The counterbalance of prejudice hinders. And wherein does that conſiſt? The drunkard muſt part with his cups and companions, and the voluptuous man with his pleaſures. The proud and vain muſt lay by all exceſs in apparel, furniture and attendance; and money, the ſupport of all theſe, muſt be got only by the ways of juſtice, honeſty, and fair induſtry: and every one muſt live peaceably, uprightly, and friendly with his neighbour. Here then the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance is wanting: here they may and ought to interpoſe their power, and by ſeverities againſt drunkenneſs, laſciviouſneſs, and all ſorts of debauchery; by a ſteady and unrelaxed puniſhment of all the ways of fraud and injuſtice; and by their adminiſtration, countenance, and example, reduce the irregularities of mens manners into order, and bring ſobriety, peaceableneſs, induſtry and honeſty into faſhion. This is their proper buſineſs every where; and for this they have a commiſſion from God, both by the light of nature and revelation; and by this, removing the great counterpoiſe, which lies in ſtrictneſs of life, and is ſo ſtrong a bias, with the greateſt part, againſt the true religion, they would caſt the balance on that ſide. For if men were forced by the magiſtrate to live ſober, honeſt and ſtrict lives, whatever their religion were, would not the advantage be on the ſide of truth, when the gratifying of their luſts were not to be obtained by forſaking her? In mens lives lies the main obſtacle to right opinions in religion: and if you will not believe me, yet what a very rational man of the church of England ſays in the caſe, [Dr. Bentley, in his ſermon of the folly of atheiſm, p. 16.] will deſerve to be remembered. "Did religion beſtow heaven, without any forms and conditions, "indifferently upon all; if the crown of life was hereditary, and free to good "and bad, and not ſettled by covenant upon the elect of God only, ſuch as "live ſoberly, righteouſly and godly in this preſent world; I believe there "would be no ſuch thing as an infidel among us. And without controverſy "it is the way and means of attaining to heaven, that makes profane ſcoffers ſo willing to let go the expectation of it. It is not the articles of the "creed, but their duty to God and their neighbour, that is ſuch an inconſiſtent incredible legend. They will not practiſe the rules of religion,

“ and therefore they cannot believe the “ doctrines” of it.” The ingenious author will pardon me the change of one word, which I doubt not but ſuits his opinion, though it did not ſo well that argument he was then on.

You grant the true religion has always light, and ſtrength to prevail; falſe religions have neither. Take away the ſatisfaction of mens luſts, and which then, I pray, hath the advantage? Will men, againſt the light of their reaſon, do violence to their underſtandings, and forſake truth, and ſalvation too, gratis? You tell us here, “ No religion but the true, requires of men the difficult taſk of mortifying their luſts.” This being granted you, what ſervice will this do you to prove a neceſſity of force to puniſh all diſſenters in England? Do none of their religions require the mortifying of luſts as well as yours?

And now, let us conſider your inſtance whereon you build ſo much, that we hear of it over and over again. For you tell us, “ Idolatry prevailed, but P. 7. yet not by the help of force, as has been ſufficiently ſhewn. And again, That truth left to ſhift for herſelf will not do well enough, has been ſuffi- P. 10. ciently ſhewn.” What you have done to ſhew this, is to be ſeen, where you tell us, “ Within how few generations after the flood, the worſhip of P. 6. falſe Gods prevailed againſt the religion which Noah profeſſed, and taught his children, (which was undoubtedly the true religion) almoſt to the utter excluſion of it, (though that at firſt was the only religion in the world) without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, for any thing we find in the hiſtory of thoſe times, as we may reaſonably believe, conſidering that it found an entrance into the world, and entertainment in it, when it could have no ſuch aid, or aſſiſtance. Of which (beſides the corruption of human nature) you ſuppoſe there can no other cauſe be aſſigned, or none more probable than this, that the powers then in being, did not do what they might and ought to have done, towards the preventing or checking that horrible apoſtacy.” Here you tell us, that the “ worſhip of falſe gods, within a very few generations after the flood, prevailed againſt the true religion, almoſt to the utter excluſion of it.” This you ſay indeed, but without any proofs; and unleſs that be ſhewing, you have not, as you pretend, any way ſhewn it. Out of what records, I beſeech you, have you it, that the true religion was almoſt wholly extirpated out of the world, within a few generations after the flood? The Scripture, the largeſt hiſtory we have of thoſe times, ſays nothing of it; nor does, as I remember, mention any as guilty of idolatry, within two or three hundred years after the flood. In Canaan itſelf, I do not think that you can out of any credible hiſtory ſhew, that there was any idolatry within ten or twelve generations after Noah; much leſs that it had ſo overſpread the world, and extirpated the true religion, out of that part of it, where the ſcene lay of thoſe actions recorded in the hiſtory of the Bible. In Abraham's time, Melchiſedeck who was king of Salem, was alſo the prieſt of the moſt high God. We read that God, with an immediate hand, puniſhed miraculouſly, firſt mankind, at the confuſion of Babel, and afterward Sodom, and four other cities; but in neither of theſe places is there any the leaſt mention of idolatry, by which they provoked God, and drew down vengeance on themſelves. So that truly you have ſhewn nothing at all, and what the Scripture ſhews is againſt you. For beſides, that it is plain by Melchiſedeck the king of Salem, and prieſt of the moſt high God, to whom Abraham paid tithes, that all the land of Canaan was not yet overſpread with idolatry, though afterwards in the time of Joſhua, by the forfeiture was therefore made of it to the Iſraelites, one may have reaſon to ſuſpect it were more defiled with it, than any part of the world: beſides, Salem, I ſay, he that reads the ſtory of Abimelech, Gen. xx, xxi, xxvi. will have reaſon to think, that he alſo and his kingdom, though Philiſtines, were not then infected with idolatry.

YOU think they, and almoſt all mankind were idolaters, but you may be miſtaken; and that which may ſerve to ſhew it, is the example of Elijah the prophet, who was at leaſt as infallible a gueſſer as you, and was as well inſtructed in the ſtate and hiſtory of his own country, and time, as you can be in the ſtate of the whole world three or four thouſand years ago. Elijah thought that idolatry had wholly extirpated the true religion out of Iſrael, and complains thus to God. "The children of Iſrael have forſaken thy covenant, "thrown down thy altars, and ſlain thy prophets with the ſword: and I, "even I alone, am left, and they ſeek my life, to take it away," 1 Kings xix. 10. And he is ſo fully perſuaded of it, that he repeats it again, verſe 14. and yet God tells him, that he had there yet ſeven thouſand knees that had not bowed to Baal, ſeven thouſand that were not idolaters: though this was in the reign of Ahab, a king zealous for idolatry; and in a kingdom ſet up in an idolatrous worſhip, which had continued the national religion, eſtabliſhed and promoted by the continued ſucceſſion of ſeveral idolatrous princes. And though the national religions ſoon after the flood were falſe, which you are far enough from proving; how does it thence follow, that the true religion was near extirpated? which it muſt needs quite have been, before St. Peter's P. 9. time, if there were ſo great reaſon to fear, as you tell us, that the true religion, without the aſſiſtance of force, "would in a much ſhorter time, than any "one that does not well conſider the matter would imagine, be moſt effectually "extirpated throughout the world." For above two thouſand years after Noah's time, St. Peter tells us, "that in every nation, he that feareth God, and work"eth righteouſneſs, is accepted by him," Acts x. 35. By which words, and by the occaſion on which they were ſpoken, it is manifeſt, that in countries where for two thouſand years together no force had been uſed for the ſupport of Noah's true religion, it was not yet wholly extirpated. But that you may not think it was ſo near, that there was but one left, only Cornelius, if you will look into Acts xvii. 4. you will find a great multitude of them at Theſſalonica, "And of the devout Greeks a great multitude believed, and con"ſorted with Paul and Silas." And again, verſe 17. more of them in Athens, a city wholly given to idolatry. For that thoſe Σεϐόμενοι which we tranſlate devout, and whereof many are mentioned in the Acts, were Gentiles, who worſhipped the true God, and kept the precepts of Noah, Mr. Mede has abundantly proved. So that whatſoever you, "who have well conſidered the "matter," may imagine of the ſhortneſs of time, wherein Noah's religion would be "effectually extirpated throughout the world," without the aſſiſtance of force, we find it at Athens, at Philippi, at Corinth, amongſt the Romans, in Antioch of Piſidia, in Theſſalonica, above two thouſand years after, and that not ſo near being extinguiſhed, but that in ſome of thoſe places the profeſſors of it were numerous; at Theſſalonica they are called a great multitude: at Antioch many: and how many of them were in other parts of the world, whereof there was no occaſion to make mention in that ſhort hiſtory of the Acts of the Apoſtles, who knows? If they anſwered, in other places, to what were found in theſe, as what reaſon is there to ſuppoſe they ſhould not? I think we may imagine them to be as many, as there were effectually of the true religion Chriſtians in Europe, a little before the reformation, notwithſtanding the aſſiſtance the Chriſtian religion had from authority, after the withdrawing of miracles.

BUT you have a ſalvo, for you write warily, and endeavour to ſave yourſelf on all hands; you ſay, "There is great reaſon to fear, that without God's P. 9. "EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, it would in a much ſhorter time, than "any one, who does not well conſider the matter, would imagine, be moſt "effectually extirpated by it, throughout the world." It is without doubt, the providence of God which governs the affairs both of the world and his church; and to that, whether you call it ordinary or extraordinary, you may truſt the preſervation of his church, without the uſe of ſuch means, as he has no where appointed or authorized. You fancy force neceſſary to preſerve the true religion, and hence you conclude the magiſtrate authorized, without any farther commiſſion from God, to uſe it, "if there be no other means "left;" and therefore that muſt be uſed: if religion ſhould be preſerved without it, it is by the extraordinary providence of God; where extraordinary ſignifies nothing, but begging the thing in queſtion. The true religion has been preſerved many ages, in the church, without force. Ay, ſay you, that was by the "extraordinary providence of God." His providence which over-rules all events, we eaſily grant it: but why extraordinary providence? becauſe force was neceſſary to preſerve it. And why was force neceſſary? becauſe otherwiſe, without "extraordinary providence," it cannot be preſerved. In ſuch circles, covered under good words, but miſapplied, one might ſhew you taking many a turn in your anſwer, if it were fit to waſte others time to trace your wanderings. God has appointed preaching, teaching, preſuaſion, inſtruction, as a means to continue and propagate his true religion in the world; and if it were any where preſerved and propagated without that, we might call it his "extraordinary providence;" but the means he has appointed being uſed, we may conclude, that men have done their duties, and ſo may leave it to his providence, however we will call it, to preſerve the little flock, which he bids not to fear, to the end of the world.

BUT let us return again to what you ſay, to make good this hypotheſis of yours, That idolatry entered firſt into the world by the contrivance, and ſpread itſelf by the endeavours of private men, without the aſſiſtance of the magiſtrates, and thoſe in power. To prove this, you tell us, "that it found entrance P. 6. "into the world, and entertainment in it, when it could have no ſuch aid

“ or aſſiſtance.” When was this, I beſeech you, that idolatry found this entrance into the world? Under what king's reign was it, that you are ſo poſitive it could have no ſuch aid or aſſiſtance? If you had named the time, the thing, though of no great moment to you, had been ſure. But now we may very juſtly queſtion this bare aſſertion of yours. For ſince we find, as far back as we have any hiſtory of it, that the great men of the world were always forward to ſet up and promote idolatry and falſe religions, you ought to have given us ſome reaſon why, without authority from hiſtory, you affirm that idolatry, at its entrance into the world, had not that aſſiſtance from men in power, which it never failed of afterwards. Who they were that made Iſrael to ſin, the Scripture tells us. Their kings were ſo zealous promoters of idolatry, that there is ſcarce any one of them, that has not that brand left upon him in holy writ.

One of the firſt falſe religions, whoſe riſe and way of propagating we have an account of in ſacred hiſtory, was by an ambitious uſurper, who, having rebelled againſt his maſter, with a falſe title ſet up a falſe religion, to ſecure his power and dominion. Why this might not have been done before Jeroboam's days, and idols ſet up at other places, as well as at Dan and Bethel, to ſerve politick ends, will need ſome other proof, than barely ſaying, it could not be ſo at firſt. The devil, unleſs much more ignorant, was not leſs buſy in thoſe days to engage princes in his favour, and to weave religion into affairs of ſtate, the better to introduce his worſhip, and ſupport idolatry, by accommodating it to the ambition, vanity, or ſuperſtition, of men in power: and therefore, you may as well ſay, that the corruption of human nature, as that the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, did not, in thoſe days, help forward falſe religions; becauſe your reading has furniſhed you with no particular mention of it out of hiſtory. But you need but ſay, that the “ worſhip of falſe gods “ prevailed without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, “ for any thing we find in the hiſtory of thoſe times,” and then you have ſufficiently ſhewn, what? even that you have juſt nothing to ſhew for your aſſertion.

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But whatever that any thing is, which you find in hiſtory, you may meet with men, whoſe reading yet I will not compare with yours, who think they have found in hiſtory, that princes, and thoſe in power, firſt corrupted the true religion, by ſetting up the images and ſymbols of their predeceſſors in their temples; which, by their influence, and the ready obedience of the prieſts they appointed, were in ſucceſſion of time propoſed to the people as objects of their worſhip. Thus they think they find in hiſtory that Iſis, queen of Egypt, with her counſellor Thoth, inſtituted the funeral rites of king Oſiris, by the honour done to the ſacred ox. They think they find alſo in hiſtory, that the ſame Thoth, who was alſo king of Egypt in his turn, invented the figures of the firſt Egyptian gods, Saturn, Dagon, Jupiter Hammon, and the reſt: that is, the figures of their ſtatues or idols; and that he inſtituted the worſhip and ſacrifices of theſe gods: and his inſtitutions were ſo well aſſiſted by thoſe in authority, and obſerved by the prieſts they ſet up, that the worſhip of thoſe gods ſoon became the religion of that, and a pattern to other nations. And here we may perhaps, with good reaſon, place the riſe and original of idolatry after the flood, there being nothing of this kind more ancient. So ready was the ambition, vanity, or ſuperſtition of princes, to introduce their predeceſſors into the divine worſhip of the people, to ſecure to themſelves the greater veneration from their ſubjects, as deſcended from the gods; or to erect ſuch a worſhip, and ſuch a prieſthood, as might awe the blinded and ſeduced people into that obedience they deſired. Thus Ham, by the authority of his ſucceſſors, the rulers of Egypt, is firſt brought for the honour of his name and memory into their temples, and never left, till he is erected into a god, and made Jupiter Hammon, &c. which faſhion took afterwards with the princes of other countries.

WAS not the great god of the Eaſtern nations, Baal, or Jupiter Belus, one of the firſt kings of Aſſyria? And which, I pray, is the more likely, that courts, by their inſtruments the prieſts, ſhould thus advance the honour of kings amongſt the people for the ends of ambition and power; or the people find out theſe refined ways of doing it, and introduce them into courts for the enſlaving themſelves? What idolatry does your hiſtory tell you of among the Greeks, before Phoroneus and Danaus, kings of the Argives, and Cecrops and Theſeus kings of Attica, and Cadmus king of Thebes, introduced it? An art of rule it is probable they borrowed from the Egyptians. So that if you had not vouched the ſilence of hiſtory, without conſulting it, you would poſſibly have found, that in the firſt ages, princes, by their influence and aid, by the help and artifice of the prieſts they employed, their fables of their gods, their myſteries and oracles, and all the aſſiſtance they could give it by their authority, did ſo much againſt the truth, before direct force was grown into faſhion, and appeared openly, that there would be little reaſon of putting the guard and propagation of the true religion into their hands now, and arming them with force to promote it.

THAT this was the original of idolatry in the world, and that it was borrowed by other magiſtrates from the Egyptians, is farther evident, in that this worſhip was ſettled in Egypt, and grown the national religion there, before the gods of Greece, and ſeveral other idolatrous countries were born. For though they took their pattern of deifying their deceaſed princes, from the Egyptians, and kept, as near as they could, to the number and genealogies of the Egyptian gods; yet they took the names ſtill of ſome great men of their own, which they accommodated to the mythology of the Egyptians. Thus, by the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, idolatry entered into the world after the flood. Whereof, if there were not ſo clear footſteps in hiſtory, why yet ſhould you not imagine princes and magiſtrates, engaged in falſe religions, as ready to employ their power for the maintaining and promoting their falſe religions in thoſe days, as we find them now? And therefore, what you ſay in the next words, of the entrance of idolatry into the world, and the entertainment it found in it, will not paſs for ſo very evident, without proof, though you tell us ever ſo confidently, that you "ſuppoſe, beſides the corruption P. 6. of human nature, there can no other cauſe be aſſigned of it, or none more probable than this, that the powers then in being, did not what they might and ought to have done," i. e. if you mean it to your purpoſe, uſe force your way, to make men conſider, or to "impoſe creeds and ways "of worſhip, towards the preventing that horrible apoſtacy."

I GRANT that the entrance and growth of idolatry, might be owing to the negligence of the powers in being, in that they did not do what they might and ought to have done, in uſing their authority to ſuppreſs the enormities of mens manners, and correct the irregularity of their lives. But this was not all the aſſiſtance they gave to that horrible apoſtacy: they were, as far as hiſtory gives us any light, the promoters of it, and leaders in it, and did what they ought not to have done, by ſetting up falſe religions, and uſing their authority to eſtabliſh them, to ſerve their corrupt and ambitious deſigns.

NATIONAL religions, eſtabliſhed by authority, and inforced by the powers in being, we hear of every where, as far back as we have any account of the riſe and growth of the religions of the world. Shew me any place, within thoſe few generations, wherein you ſay the apoſtacy prevailed after the flood, where the magiſtrates, being of the true religion, the ſubjects by the liberty of a Toleration, were led into falſe religions, and then you will produce ſomething againſt liberty of conſcience. But to talk of that great apoſtacy, as wholly owing to Toleration, when you cannot produce one inſtance of Toleration then in the world, is to ſay what you pleaſe.

THAT the majority of mankind were then, and always have been, by the corruption and pravity of human nature, led away, and kept from embracing the true religion, is paſt doubt. But whether this be owing to Toleration, in matters of religion, is the queſtion. David deſcribes an horrible corruption and apoſtacy in his time, ſo as to ſay, "There is none that doeth good, "no not one," Pſal. xiv. and yet I do not think you will ſay a Toleration then in that kingdom was the cauſe of it. If the greateſt part cannot be ill without a Toleration, I am afraid you muſt be fain to find out a Toleration in every country, and in all ages of the world. For I think it is true, of all times and places, that the broad way, that leadeth to deſtruction, has had moſt travellers. I would be glad to know where it was that force, your way applied, i. e. with puniſhments only upon non-conformiſts, ever prevailed to bring the greater number into the narrow way, that leads unto life; which our Saviour tells us, there are few that find.

THE corruption of human nature, you ſay, oppoſes the true religion. I grant it you. There was alſo, ſay you, an horrible apoſtacy after the flood; let this alſo be granted you: and yet from hence it will not follow, that the true religion cannot ſubſiſt and prevail in the world without the aſſiſtance of force, your way applied, till you have ſhewn, that the falſe religions, which were the inventions of men, grew up under Toleration, and not by the encouragement and aſſiſtance of the powers in being.

HOW near ſoever therefore, the true religion was to be extinguiſhed within a few generations after the flood, which whether more in danger then, than in moſt ages ſince, is more than you can ſhew. This will be ſtill the queſtion, whether the liberty of Toleration, or the authority of the powers in being, contributed moſt to it? And whether there can be no other, nor more probable cauſe aſſigned, than the want of force your way applied, I ſhall leave the reader to judge. This I am ſure, whatever cauſes any one elſe ſhall aſſign, are as well proved as yours, if they offer them only as their conjectures.

NOT but that I think men could run into falſe and fooliſh ways of worſhip, without the inſtigation or aſſiſtance of human authority; but the powers of the world, as far as we have any hiſtory, having been always forward enough, true religion as little ſerving princes as private mens luſts, to take up wrong religions, and as forward to employ their authority to impoſe the religion, good or bad, which they had once taken up; I can ſee no reaſon why the not uſing of force, by the princes of the world, ſhould be aſſigned as the ſole, or ſo much as the moſt probable cauſe of propagating the falſe religions of the world, or extirpating the true; or how you can ſo poſitively ſay, idolatry prevailed without any aſſiſtance from the powers in being.

SINCE therefore hiſtory leads us to the magiſtrates, as the authors and promoters of idolatry in the world, to which we may ſuppoſe their not ſuppreſſing of vice, joined as another cauſe of the ſpreading of falſe religions, you were beſt conſider, whether you can ſtill ſuppoſe there can no other cauſe be aſſigned of the prevailing of the worſhip of falſe gods, but the magiſtrate's not interpoſing his authority in matters of religion. For that that cannot with any probability at all be aſſigned as any cauſe, I ſhall give you this farther reaſon. You impute the prevailing of falſe religions to "the corruption and "pravity of human nature, left to itſelf, unbridled by authority." Now if force, your way applied, does not at all bridle the corruption and pravity of human nature, the magiſtrate's not ſo interpoſing his authority, cannot be aſſigned as any cauſe at all of that apoſtacy. So that let that apoſtacy have what riſe, and ſpread as far as you pleaſe, it will not make one jot for force, your way applied, or ſhew that that can receive any aſſiſtance your way from authority. For your uſe of authority and force, being only to bring men to an outward conformity to the national religion, it leaves the corruption and pravity of human nature as unbridled as before; as I have ſhewn elſewhere.

YOU tell us, "that it is not true, that the true religion will prevail by "its own light and ſtrength, without miracles, or the aſſiſtance of the pow"ers in being, becauſe of the corruption of human nature." And for this you give us an inſtance in the apoſtacy preſently after the flood. And you tell us, that without the aſſiſtance of force it would preſently be extirpated out of the world. If the corruption of human nature be ſo univerſal, and ſo ſtrong, that, without the help of force, the true religion is too weak to ſtand it, and cannot at all prevail, without miracles or force; how come men ever to be converted, in countries where the national religion is falſe? If you ſay by extraordinary providence, what that amounts to, has been ſhewn. If you ſay this corruption is ſo potent in all men, as to oppoſe and prevail againſt the Goſpel, not aſſiſted by force or miracles, that is not true. If in moſt men, ſo it is ſtill, even where force is uſed. For I deſire you to name me a country, where the greateſt part are really and truly Chriſtians, ſuch P. 7.

as you confidently believe Chriſt, at the laſt day, will own to be ſo. In England having, as you do, excluded all the diſſenters, or elſe why would you have them puniſhed, to bring them to embrace the true religion? you muſt, I fear, allow yourſelf a great latitude in thinking, if you think that the corruption of human nature, does not ſo far prevail, even amongſt conformiſts, as to make the ignorance, and lives, of great numbers amongſt them, ſuch as ſuits not at all with the ſpirit of true Chriſtianity. How great their ignorance may be, in the more ſpiritual and elevated parts of the Chriſtian religion, may be gueſſed, by what the reverend biſhop, before cited, ſays of it, in reference to a rite of the church; the moſt eaſy and obvious to be inſtructed in, and underſtood. His words are, "In the common management of that holy rite [confirmation] it is but too viſible, that of thoſe multitudes that croud to it, the far greater part come merely as if they were to receive the biſhop's bleſſing, without any ſenſe of the vow made by them, and of their renewing their baptiſmal engagements in it," Paſt. Care, p. 189. And if Origen were now alive, might he not find many in our church, to whom theſe words of his might be applied, "Whoſe faith ſignifies only thus much, and goes no farther than this, viz. that they come duly to the church, and bow their heads to the prieſts," &c. Hom. in Joſ. IX. For it ſeems it was then the faſhion to bow to the prieſt as it is now to the altar. If therefore you ſay force is neceſſary, becauſe without it no men will ſo conſider as to embrace the true religion, for the ſalvation of their ſouls, that I think is manifeſtly falſe. If you ſay it is neceſſary to uſe ſuch means as will make the greateſt part ſo embrace it, you muſt uſe ſome other means than force, your way applied, for that does not ſo far work on the majority. If you ſay it is neceſſary, becauſe poſſibly it may work on ſome, which bare preaching, and perſuaſion, will not; I anſwer, if poſſibly your moderate puniſhments may work on ſome, and therefore they are neceſſary, it is as poſſible, that greater puniſhments may work on others, and therefore they are neceſſary, and ſo on to the utmoſt ſeverities.

P. 25. THAT the corruption of human nature is every where ſpread, and that it works powerfully in the children of diſobedience, "who receive not the love of the truth, but have pleaſure in unrighteouſneſs;" and therefore God gives them up to believe a lie, no body, I think, will deny. But that this corruption of human nature works equally in all men, or in all ages; and ſo, that God will, or ever did, give up all men, not reſtrained by force, your way modified and applied, to believe a lie, as all falſe religions are, that I yet ſee no reaſon to grant. Nor will this inſtance of Noah's religion, you ſo much rely on, ever perſuade, till you have proved, that from thoſe eight men which brought the true religion with them into the new world, there were not eight thouſand, or eighty thouſand, which retained it in the world in the worſt times of the apoſtacy. And ſecondly, till you have proved that the falſe religions of the world prevailed, without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being. And thirdly, that the decay of the true religion was for want of force, your moderate force, neither of which you have at all proved, as I think it manifeſt.

ONE conſideration more touching Noah, and his religion, give me leave to ſuggeſt, and that is, if force were ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of true religion, as you make it, it is ſtrange, God, who gave him precepts about other things, ſhould never reveal this to him, nor any body elſe, that I know. To this, you, who have confeſſed the "Scripture not to have given the magiſtrate this commiſſion," muſt ſay, that it is plain enough in the commiſſion that he has from the law of nature, and ſo needed not any revelation, to inſtruct the magiſtrate in the right he has to uſe force. I confeſs the magiſtrates have uſed force in matters of religion, and have been as confidently and conſtantly put upon it by their prieſts, as if they had as clear a commiſſion from heaven, as St. Peter had to preach the Goſpel to the Gentiles. But yet it is plain, notwithſtanding that commiſſion from the law of nature, there needs ſome farther inſtruction from revelation, ſince it does not appear, that they have found out the right uſe of force, ſuch as the true religion requires for its preſervation; and though you have after ſeveral thouſands of years, at laſt, diſcovered it, yet it is very imperfectly, you not being able to tell, if a law were now to be made againſt thoſe who have not conſidered as they ought, what are thoſe moderate penalties which are to be employed againſt them, though yet without that all the reſt ſignifies nothing. But however doubtful you are in this, I am glad to find you ſo direct, in putting mens rejecting the true religion, upon the difficulty they have to "mortify their P. 7. luſts, which the true religion requires of them," and I deſire you to remember it in other places, where I have occaſion to mind you of it.

TO conclude, That we may ſee the great advantage your cauſe will receive from that inſtance, you ſo much rely on, of the apoſtacy after the flood, I ſhall oppoſe another to it. You ſay, that "idolatry prevailed in the world, P. 6. in a few generations, almoſt to the utter excluſion of the true religion, without any aid from force, or aſſiſtance of the powers in being, by reaſon of Toleration." And therefore, you think there is great reaſon to fear, that P. 9. "the true religion would, by Toleration, quickly be moſt effectually extirpated throughout the world." And I ſay, that after Chriſtianity was received for the religion of the empire, and whilſt political laws, and force, interpoſed in it, an horrible apoſtacy prevailed, to almoſt the utter excluſion of true religion, Mede, Diſc. xxx. p. 194. and Apoſt. of the later times. and a general introducing of idolatry. And therefore I think there is great reaſon to fear more harm than good, from the uſe of force in religion.

THIS I think as good an argument againſt, as yours for, force, and ſomething better; ſince what you build on is only preſumed by you, not proved from hiſtory: whereas the matter of fact here is well known, nor will you deny it, when you conſider the ſtate of religion in Chriſtendom under the aſſiſtance of that force, which you tell us ſucceeded and ſupplied the place of withdrawn miracles, which in your opinion, are ſo neceſſary in the abſence of force, that you make that the reaſon of their continuance; and tell us, they "were continued till force could be had; not ſo much for evincing P. 37. the truth of the Chriſtian religion, as to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." So that whenever force failed, there according to your hypotheſis, are miracles to ſupply its want; for without one of them, the true religion, if we may believe you, will ſoon be utterly extirpated; and what force, in the abſence of miracles, produced in Chriſtendom ſeveral ages before the reformation, is ſo well known, that it will be hard to find what ſervice your way of arguing will do any but the Romiſh religion.

BUT to take your argument in its full latitude, you ſay, but you ſay it without book, that there was once a Toleration in the world to the almoſt utter extirpation of the true religion; and I ſay to you, that as far as records authorize either opinion, we may ſay force has been always uſed in matters of religion, to the great prejudice of the true religion, and the profeſſors of it. And there not being an age wherein you can ſhew me, upon a fair trial of an eſtabliſhed national Toleration, that the true religion was extirpated, or indangered, ſo much as you pretend by it: whereas there is no age, whereof we have ſufficient hiſtory to judge of this matter, wherein it will not be eaſy to find that the true religion, and its followers, ſuffered by force, you will in vain endeavour, by inſtances, to prove the ill effects, or uſeleſſneſs of Toleration, ſuch as the author propoſed, which I challenge you to ſhew me was ever ſet up in the world, or that the true religion ſuffered by it; and it is to the want of it, and the reſtraints and diſadvantages the true religion has laboured under, its ſo little ſpreading in the world will juſtly be imputed; until, from better experiments, you have ſomething to ſay againſt it.

OUR Saviour has promiſed that he will build his church on this fundamental truth, that he is "Chriſt the ſon of God; ſo that the gates of hell "ſhall not prevail aginſt it:" and this I believe, though you tell us the true religion is not able to ſubſiſt without the aſſiſtance of force, when miracles ceaſe. I do not remember that our Saviour any where promiſes any other aſſiſtance but that of his Spirit, or gives his little flock any encouragement to expect much countenance or help from the great men of the world, or the coercive power of the magiſtrates, nor any where authorizes them to uſe it for the ſupport of his church; "not many wiſe men after the fleſh, not many "mighty, not many noble," 1 Cor. i. 26. is the ſtyle of the Goſpel; and I believe will be found to belong to all ages of the church militant, paſt and to come, as well as to the firſt: for God, as St. Paul tells us, has choſen the "fooliſh things of the world to confound the wiſe, and the weak things of the "world to confound the mighty;" and this not only till miracles ceaſed, but ever ſince. "To be hated for Chriſt's name ſake, and by much tribulation "to enter into the kingdom of heaven," has been the general and conſtant lot of the people of God, as well as it ſeems to be the current ſtrain of the New Teſtament; which promiſes nothing of ſecular power or greatneſs; ſays nothing of "kings being nurſing fathers, or queens nurſing mothers:" which prophecy, whatever meaning it have, it is like our Saviour would not have omitted to ſupport his church with ſome hopes and aſſurance of ſuch aſſiſtance, if it were to have any accompliſhment before his ſecond coming; when Iſrael ſhall come in again, and with the Gentiles make up the fulneſs of his glorious kingdom. But the tenor of the New Teſtament is, "All that will live godly in Jeſus Chriſt, ſhall ſuffer perſecution," 2 Tim. iii. 12.

In your "Argument conſidered," you tell us, "that no man can fail of A. p. 7.
"finding the way of ſalvation that ſeeks it as he ought." In my anſwer, I
take notice to you, that the places of Scripture you cite to prove it, point out
this way of ſeeking as we ought, to be a good life: as particularly that of St.
John, "If any one will do his will, he ſhall know of the doctrine whether
"it be of God:" upon which I uſe theſe words. "So that theſe places, if L. II. p. 388.
"they prove what you cite them for, that no man can fail of finding the
"way of ſalvation, who ſeeks it as he ought; they do alſo prove, that a
"good life is the only way to ſeek as we ought; and that therefore, the
magiſtrates, if they would put men upon ſeeking the way of ſalvation as they
"ought, ſhould by their laws and penalties force them to a good life; a good
"converſation being the ſureſt and readieſt way to a right underſtanding.
"And that if magiſtrates will ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt
"vice, in whomſoever it is found, true religion will be ſpread wider—than
"ever hitherto it has been by the impoſition of creeds and ceremonies." To
this you reply, "Whether the magiſtrates ſetting themſelves ſeverely and impartially P. 13.
"againſt what you ſuppoſe I call vice, or the impoſition of ſound
"creeds and decent ceremonies, does more conduce to the ſpreading the true
"religion, and rendering it fruitful in the lives of its profeſſors, we need not
"examine; you confeſs, you think, both together do beſt; and this, you
"think, is as much as needs be ſaid to that paragraph." If it had been put
to you, whether a good living, or a good prebend would more conduce to the
enlarging your fortune, I think it would be allowed you as no improper or
unlikely anſwer, what you ſay here, "I think both together would do beſt;"
but here the caſe is otherwiſe: your thinking determines not the point: and
other people of equal authority, may, and I will anſwer for it, do think
otherwiſe: but becauſe I pretend to no authority, I will give you a reaſon,
why your thinking is inſufficient. You tell us, that "force is not a fit P. 30.
"means, where it is not neceſſary as well as uſeful;" and you prove it to be
neceſſary, becauſe there is no other means left. Now if the ſeverity of the
magiſtrate, againſt what I call vice, will, as you will not deny, promote a
good life, and that be the right way to ſeek the truths of religion, here is
another means beſides impoſing of creeds and ceremonies, to promote true
religion, and therefore your argument for its neceſſity, becauſe of no other
means left, being gone, you cannot ſay "both together are beſt," when one
of them being not neceſſary, is therefore, by your own confeſſion, not to
be uſed.

I HAVING ſaid, That if ſuch an indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs were
ſufficient to juſtify the uſe of force, the magiſtrate might make his ſubjects
eunuchs for the kindom of heaven: you reply, that you "ſuppoſe I will not P. 31.
"ſay caſtration is neceſſary, becauſe you hope I acknowledge, that marriage,
"and that grace which God denies to none, who ſeriouſly aſk it, are ſufficient
"for that purpoſe." And I hope you acknowledge, that preaching, admonitions
and inſtructions, and that grace which God denies to none, who
ſeriouſly aſk it, are ſufficient for ſalvation. So that by this anſwer of yours,
there being no more neceſſity of force to make men of the true religion, than
there

there is of caſtration to make men chaſte, it will ſtill remain that the magiſtrate, when he thinks fit, may, upon your principles, as well caſtrate men to make them chaſte, as uſe force to make them embrace the truth that muſt ſave them.

IF caſtration be not neceſſary, "becauſe marriage and the grace of God is "ſufficient," without it: nor will force be neceſſary, becauſe preaching, and the grace of God is ſufficient without it; and this, I think, by your own P. 34. rule, where you tell us, "Where there are many uſeful means, and ſome of "them are ſufficient without the reſt, there is no neceſſity of uſing them all." So that you muſt either quit your neceſſity of force, or take in caſtration too: which, however it might not go down with the untractable and deſperately perverſe and obſtinate people in theſe Weſtern countries, yet is a doctrine, you may hope, may meet with a better reception in the Ottoman empire, and recommend you to ſome of my Mahometans.

L. II. p. 398. To my ſaying, "If what we are apt to think uſeful, were thence to be "concluded ſo, we might be in danger to be obliged to believe the pretended "miracles of the church of Rome, by your way of reaſoning; unleſs we will "ſay, that which without impiety cannot be ſaid, that the wiſe and benign "Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, does not uſe all uſeful means for pro-"moting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls." This, I P. 33. think, will conclude as much for miracles as for force: you reply, "you think "it will not; for in the place I intend, you ſpeak not of uſeful, but of com-"petent, i. e. ſufficient means. Now competent, or ſufficient means are "neceſſary; but you think no man will ſay that all uſeful means are ſo: and "therefore though, as you affirm, it cannot be ſaid without impiety, that "the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things has not furniſhed "mankind with competent means for the promoting his own honour in the "world, and the good of ſouls; yet it is very agreeable with piety, and with "truth too, to ſay that he does not now uſe all uſeful means: becauſe as none "of his attributes obliges him to uſe more than ſufficient means; ſo he may "uſe ſufficient means, without uſing all uſeful means. For where there are "many uſeful means, and ſome of them are ſufficient without the reſt, there "is no neceſſity of them all. So that from God's not uſing miracles now, to "promote the true religion, I cannot conclude that he does not think them "uſeful now, but only that he does not think them neceſſary. And there-"fore, though what we are apt to think uſeful, were thence to be concluded "ſo; yet if whatever is uſeful, be not likewiſe to be concluded neceſſary, "there is no reaſon to fear that we ſhould be obliged to believe the miracles "pretended to by the church of Rome. For if miracles be not now neceſſary, "there is no inconvenience in thinking the miracles pretended to by the "church of Rome, to be but pretended miracles." To which I anſwer, Put it how you will, for competent means, or uſeful means, it will conclude A. p. 26. for miracles ſtill as much as for force, Your words are theſe, "If ſuch a de-"gree of outward force, as has been mentioned, be really of great and ne-"ceſſary uſe for the advancing theſe ends, as taking the world as we find it, "you ſay, you think it appears to be; then it muſt be acknowledged there

“ is a right ſomewhere to uſe it for the advancing thoſe ends; unleſs we will “ ſay, what without impiety cannot be ſaid, that the wiſe and benign Diſpo- “ ſer of all things, has not furniſhed mankind with competent means for the “ promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls.” What, I beſeech you, now is the ſum of this argument, but this,” “ force is of great “ and neceſſary uſe; therefore, the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer of all things, “ who will not leave mankind unfurniſhed, which it would be impiety to ſay, “ of competent means for the promoting his honour in the world, and the “ good of ſouls, has given ſomewhere a right to uſe it?”

LET us try it now, whether it will not do as well for miracles. Miracles “ are of great and neceſſary uſe, as great and neceſſary at leaſt as force, there- “ fore the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer of all things, who will not leave man- “ kind unfurniſhed, which it would be impiety to ſay, of competent means “ for the promoting his honour in the world, and the good of ſouls,” has given ſomewhere a power of miracles. I aſk you, when I in the ſecond Letter uſed your own words, applied to miracles inſtead of force, would they not conclude then as well for miracles as for force. For you muſt remember there was not then in all your ſcheme one word of miracles to ſupply the place of force. Force alone was mentioned, force alone was neceſſary, all was laid on force. Nor was it eaſy to divine, that miracles ſhould be taken in, to mend the defects of your hypotheſis, which in your anſwer to me, you now have done, and I eaſily allow it, without holding you to any thing you have ſaid, and ſhall always do ſo. For ſeeking truth, and not triumph, as you frequently ſuggeſt, I ſhall always take your hypotheſis as you pleaſe to reform it, and either embrace it, or ſhew you why I do not.

LET us ſee therefore, whether this argument will do any better now your ſcheme is mended, and you make force or miracles neceſſary. If force or miracles are “ of great and neceſſary uſe for the promoting true religion, and “ the ſalvation of ſouls, then it muſt be acknowledged, that there is ſome- “ where a right to uſe the one, or a power to do the other, for the advan- “ cing thoſe ends; unleſs we will ſay, what without impiety cannot be ſaid, “ that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things has not fur- “ niſhed mankind with competent means for the promoting his own honour, “ and the good of ſouls.” From whence it will follow, if your argument be good, that where men have not a right to uſe force, there ſtill we are to expect miracles, unleſs we will ſay, &c. Now where the magiſtrates are not of the true religion, there by this part of your ſcheme, there is a right in nobody to uſe force; for if there were, what need of miracles, as you tell us there was, in the firſt ages of Chriſtianity, to ſupply that want? Since the magiſtrates, who were of falſe religions then, were furniſhed with as much right, if that were enough, as they are now. So that where the magiſtrates are of falſe religions, there you muſt, upon your principles, affirm miracles are ſtill to ſupply the want of force; “ unleſs you will ſay, what without im- “ piety cannot be ſaid, that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of “ all things, hath not furniſhed mankind with competent means for the pro- “ moting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls.” Now how far this will favour the pretences of the church of Rome to miracles in the Eaſt and Weſt-Indies, and other parts not under popiſh governments, you were beſt conſider. This is evident, that in all countries where the true religion is not received for the religion of the ſtate, and ſupported and encouraged by the laws of it, you muſt allow miracles to be as neceſſary now, as ever they were any where in the world, for the ſupply of the want of force, before the magiſtrates were Chriſtians. And then what advantage your doctrine gives to the church of Rome, is very viſible. For they, like you, ſuppoſing theirs the one only true religion, are ſupplied by you with this argument for it, P. 73. viz. That the "true religion will not prevail by its own light and ſtrength, without the aſſiſtance of miracles or authority. Which are the competent means, which, without impiety, it cannot be ſaid, that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, has not furniſhed mankind with." From whence they will not think it hard to draw this conſequence; that therefore the wiſe and benign Governor of all things, has continued in their church the power of miracles, which yours does not ſo much as pretend to, to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, where that cannot be had to make the true religion prevail. And if a Papiſt ſhould preſs you with this argument, I would gladly know what you would reply to him.

THOUGH this be enough to make good what I ſaid, yet ſince I ſeek truth, more than my own juſtification, let us examine a little, what it is you here ſay of "competent means. Competent means, you ſay, are neceſſary; but you think no man will ſay, all uſeful means are ſo." If you think you ſpeak plain, clear determined ſenſe, when you uſed this good Engliſh word competent, I pity you: if you did it with ſkill, I ſend you to my Pagans and Mahometans. But this ſafe way of talking, though it be not altogether ſo clear, yet it ſo often occurs in you, that it is hard to judge, whether it be art or P. 33. nature. Now pray what do you mean by "mankind's being furniſhed with competent means?" If it be ſuch means as any are prevailed on by to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, preaching is a competent means; for by preaching alone, without force, many are prevailed on, and become truly Chriſtians; and then your force, by your own confeſſion, is not neceſſary. If by competent, you underſtand ſuch means, by which all men are prevailed on, or the majority, to become truly Chriſtians, I fear your force is no competent means.

WHICH way ever you put it, you muſt acknowledge mankind to be deſtitute of competent means, or your moderate force not to be that neceſſary competent means: ſince whatever right the magiſtrates may have had any where to uſe it, wherever it has not been uſed, let the cauſe be what it will that kept this means from being uſed, there the people have been deſtitute of that means.

BUT you will think there is little reaſon to complain of obſcurity, you having abundantly explained what you mean by competent, in ſaying competent, i. e. ſufficient means. So that we have nothing to do but to find out what you mean by ſufficient: and the meaning of that word, in your uſe of it, you P. 51. happily give us in theſe following, "What does any man mean by ſufficient

" evidence, but ſuch as will certainly win aſſent wherever it is duly conſider-" ed?" Apply this to your means, and then tell me, whether your force be ſuch competent, i. e. ſufficient means, that it certainly produced embracing the truth, wherever it was duly, i. e. your way applied; if it did not, it is plain it is not your competent ſufficient means, and ſo the world, without any ſuch imputation to the divine wiſdom and benignity, might be without it. If you will ſay it was ſufficient, and did produce that end wherever it was applied, I deſire you then to tell me whether mankind hath been always furniſhed with competent means. You have it now in your choice, either to talk impiouſly, or renounce force, and diſown it to be competent means; one of the two I do not ſee how, by your own argument, you can avoid.

BUT to lay by your competent and ſufficient means, and to eaſe you of the uncertainty and difficulty you will be in to determine what is ſo, in reſpect of mankind; I ſuppoſe it will be little leſs " impious to ſay, that the wiſe and be-" nign Diſpoſer and Governor hath not furniſhed mankind with neceſſary " means, as to ſay he hath not furniſhed them with competent means." Now, Sir, if your moderate penalties, and nothing elſe, be, ſince the withdrawing of miracles, this neceſſary means, what will be left you to ſay, by your argument, of the wiſdom and benignity of God in all thoſe countries, where moderate penalties are not made uſe of? where men are not furniſhed with this means to bring them to the true religion? For unleſs you can ſay, that your moderate penalties have been conſtantly made uſe of in the world for the ſupport and encouragement of the true religion, and to bring men to it, ever ſince the withdrawing of miracles, you muſt confeſs, that not only ſome countries, which yet were enough againſt you, but mankind in general, have been unfurniſhed of the " neceſſary means for the promoting the honour of God in " the world, and the ſalvation of mens ſouls." This argument out of your own mouth, were there no other, is ſufficient to ſhew the weakneſs and unreaſonableneſs of your ſcheme; and I hope the due conſideration of it will make you cautious another time, how you intitle the wiſdom and benignity of God to the ſupport of what you once fancy to be of great and neceſſary uſe.

I HAVING thereupon ſaid, " Let us not therefore be more wiſe than our " Maker in that ſtupendous and ſupernatural work of our ſalvation. The " Scripture," &c. L. II. p 398.

YOU reply, " Though the work of our ſalvation be, as I juſtly call it, ſtu-" pendous and ſupernatural; yet you ſuppoſe no ſober man doubts, but it " both admits and ordinarily requires the uſe of natural and human means, " in ſubordination to that grace which works it." P. 35.

IF you had taken notice of theſe immediately following words of mine, " The Scripture that reveals it to us, contains all that we can know or do, " in order to it; and where that is ſilent, it is preſumption in us to direct;" you would not have thought what you here ſay a ſufficient anſwer: for though God does make uſe of natural and human means in ſubordination to grace, yet it is not for man to make uſe of any means, in ſubordination to his grace, which God has not appointed, out of a conceit it may do ſome ſervice indirectly and at a diſtance.

THE whole covenant and work of grace, is the contrivance of God's infinite wiſdom. What it is, and by what means he will diſpenſe his grace, is known to us by revelation only; which is ſo little ſuited to human wiſdom, that the Apoſtle calls it "the fooliſhneſs of preaching." In the Scripture is contained all that revelation, and all things neceſſary for that work, all the means of grace; there God has declared all what he would have done for the ſalvation of ſouls; and if he had thought force neceſſary to be joined with the fooliſhneſs of preaching, no doubt but he would ſomewhere or other have revealed it, and not left it to the wiſdom of man: which how diſproportioned and oppoſite it is to the ways and wiſdom of God in the Goſpel, and how unfit to be truſted in the buſineſs of ſalvation, you may ſee, 1 Cor. i. from verſe 17, to the end.

P. 35. "THE work of grace admits, and ordinarily requires the uſe of natural and "human means." I deny it not: let us now hear your inference; "Therefore till I have ſhewn that no penal laws, that can be made, can do any ſervice towards the ſalvation of mens ſouls in ſubordination to God's grace, or "that God has forbidden the magiſtrate" to uſe force, for ſo you ought to put it, but you rather chuſe, according to your ordinary way, to uſe general and doubtful words; and therefore you ſay, "To ſerve him in that great work with "the authority which he has given him, there will be no occaſion for the "caution I have given," not to be wiſer than our Maker in that ſtupendous work of our ſalvation. By which way of arguing, any thing that I cannot ſhew, cannot poſſibly, cannot indirectly and at a diſtance, or by accident, do any ſervice, or God has not forbidden, may be made uſe of for the ſalvation of ſouls. I ſuppoſe you mean expreſsly forbidden, for elſe I might think theſe words, "[Who has required this at your hands?"] a ſufficient prohibition of it. The ſum of your argument is, "what cannot be ſhewed not to do any ſervice, may "be uſed as a human means in ſubordination to grace, in the work of ſalvation." To which I reply, That what may, through the grace of God, ſometimes do ſome ſervice, cannot, without a farther warrant from revelation than ſuch uſefulneſs, be required, or made uſe of as a ſubordinate means to grace. For if ſo, then auricular confeſſion, penance, pilgrimages, proceſſions, &c. which no body can ſhew do not ever do any ſervice, at leaſt, indirectly and at a diſtance, towards the ſalvation of ſouls, may all be juſtified.

IT is not enough that it cannot be ſhewn that it cannot do any ſervice to juſtify its uſefulneſs; for what is there that may not, indirectly and at a diſtance, or by accident, do ſome ſervice? To ſhew that it is a human means, that God has no where appointed, in ſubordination to grace, in the ſupernatural work of ſalvation, is enough to prove it an unwarrantable boldneſs to uſe it: and much more ſo in the preſent caſe of force, which, if put into the magiſtrate's hands with power to uſe it in matters of religion, will do more harm than good; as I think I have ſufficiently ſhewn.

And therefore, ſince according to you, the magiſtrate's commiſſion, to uſe force for the ſalvation of ſouls, is from the law of nature; which commiſſion reaches to none, ſince the revelation of the Goſpel, but Chriſtian magiſtrates; it is more natural to conclude, were there nothing elſe in the caſe but the ſilence of Scripture, that the Chriſtian magiſtrate has no ſuch power, becauſe he has no ſuch commiſſion any where in the Goſpel, wherein all things are appointed neceſſary to ſalvation; than that there was ſo clear a commiſſion given to all magiſtrates by the law of nature, that it is neceſſary to ſhew a prohibition from revelation, if one will deny Chriſtian magiſtrates to have that power. Since the commiſſion of the law of nature to magiſtrates, being only that general one, of doing good according to the beſt of their judgments: if that extends to the uſe of force in matters of religion, it will abundantly more oppoſe than promote the true religion, if force in the caſe has any efficacy at all, and ſo do more harm than good: which though it ſhews not, what you here demand, that it cannot do any ſervice towards the ſalvation of mens ſouls, for that cannot be ſhewn of any thing; yet it ſhews the diſſervice it does, is ſo much more, than any ſervice can be expected from it, that it can never be proved, that God has given power to magiſtrates to uſe it by the commiſſion they have of doing good, from the law of nature.

BUT whilſt you tell me, "Till I have ſhewn that force and penalties cannot "do any ſervice towards the ſalvation of ſouls, there will be no occaſion for "the caution I gave you," not to be wiſer than our Maker in that ſtupendous and ſupernatural work, you have forgot your own confeſſion, that it is not enough to authorize the uſe of force, that it may be uſeful, if it be not alſo neceſſary. And when you can prove ſuch means neceſſary, which though it cannot be ſhewn, never upon any occaſion, to do any ſervice; yet may be, and is abundantly ſhewn to do ſo little ſervice, and ſo uncertainly, that if it be uſed, it will, if it has any efficacy, do more harm than good: if you can, I ſay, prove ſuch a means as that neceſſary, I think I may yield you the cauſe. But the uſe of it has ſo much certain harm, and ſo little and uncertain good in it, that it can never be ſuppoſed included or intended in the general commiſſion to the magiſtrates, of doing good; which may ſerve for an anſwer to your next paragraph. P. 30.

ONLY let me take notice, that you here make this commiſſion of the law of nature to extend the uſe of force, only to "induce thoſe, who would not "otherwiſe, to hear what may and ought to move them to embrace the "truth." They have heard all that is offered to move them to embrace, i. e. believe, but are not moved: is the magiſtrate by the law of nature commiſſioned to puniſh them for what is not in their power? for faith is the gift of God, and not in a man's power: or is the magiſtrate commiſſioned by the law of nature, which impowers him in general, only to do them good? Is he, I ſay, commiſſioned to make them lie, and profeſs that which they do not believe? And is this for their good? If he puniſh them till they embrace, i. e. believe, he puniſhes them for what is not in their power; if till they embrace, i. e. barely profeſs, he puniſhes them for what is not for their good: to neither of which, can he be commiſſioned by the law of nature. P. 35.

To my ſaying, "Till you can ſhew us a commiſſion in Scripture, it will "be fit for us to obey that precept of the Goſpel, Mark iv. 24. which bids us "take heed what we hear." You reply, That this "you ſuppoſe is only in- P. 36.

“ tended for the vulgar reader; for it ought to be rendered, Attend to what “ you hear;” which you prove out of Grotius. What if I or my readers are not ſo learned, as to underſtand either the Greek original, or Grotius's Latin comment? Or if we did, are we to be blamed for underſtanding the Scripture in that ſenſe, which the national, i. e. as you ſay, the true religion authorizes, and which you tell us, would be a fault in us if we did not believe?

P. 20. For if, as you ſuppoſe, there be ſufficient proviſion made in England for inſtructing all men in the truth, we cannot then but take the words in this ſenſe, it being that which the publick authority has given them; for if we are not to follow the ſenſe as it is given us in the tranſlation authorized by our governors, and uſed by our worſhip eſtabliſhed by law, but muſt ſeek it elſewhere, it will be hard to find, how there is any other proviſion made for inſtructing men in the ſenſe of the Scripture, which is the truth that muſt ſave them, but to leave them to their own enquiry and judgment, and to themſelves, to take whom they think beſt for interpreters and expounders of Scripture, and to quit that of the true church, which ſhe has given in her tranſlation. This is the liberty you take to differ from the true church, when you think fit, and it will ſerve your purpoſe. “ She ſays, take heed “ what you hear;” but you ſay, the true ſenſe is, “ Attend to what you hear.” Methinks you ſhould not be at ſuch variance with diſſenters; for after all, NOTHING IS SO LIKE A NONCONFORMIST AS A CONFORMIST. Though it be certainly every one's right to underſtand the Scripture in that ſenſe which appears trueſt to him, yet I do not ſee how you, upon your principles, can depart from that which the church of England has given it: but you, I find, when you think fit, take that liberty; and ſo much liberty as that, would, I think, ſatisfy all the diſſenters in England.

As to your other place of Scripture; if St. Paul, as it ſeems to me, in that tenth to the Romans, were ſhewing that the Gentiles were provided with all things neceſſary to ſalvation, as well as the Jews; and that by having men ſent to them to preach the Goſpel, that proviſion was made; what you ſay in the two next paragraphs will ſhew us, that you underſtand, that
P. 37. the Greek word ἀκοὴ, ſignifies both hearing and report, but does no more anſwer the force of thoſe two verſes, againſt you, than if you had ſpared all you ſaid with your Greek criticiſm. The words of St. Paul are theſe; “ How “ then ſhall they call on him on whom they have not believed? And how ſhall “ they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how ſhall they hear “ without a preacher? And how ſhall they preach, except they be ſent? So “ then faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God,” Rom. x. 14, 15, 17. In this deduction of the means of propagating the Goſpel, we may well ſuppoſe St. Paul would have put in miracles or penalties, if, as you ſay, one of them had been neceſſary. But whether or no every reader will think St. Paul ſet down in that place all neceſſary means, I know not; but this, I am confident, he will think, that the New Teſtament does; and then I aſk, Whether there be in it one word of force to be uſed to bring men to be Chriſtians, or to hearken to the good tidings of ſalvation, offered in the Goſpel?

To my aſking, "What if God, for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, would "not have men compelled?" You anſwer, "If he would not have them P. 38. "compelled now miracles are ceaſed, as far as moderate penalties compel, "(otherwiſe you are not concerned in the demand) he would have told us ſo." Concerning miracles ſupplying the want of force, I ſhall need to ſay nothing more here but to your anſwer, that "God would have told us ſo." I ſhall in few words ſtate the matter to you. You firſt ſuppoſe force neceſſary to compel men to hear, and thereupon ſuppoſe the magiſtrate inveſted with a power to compel them to hear, and from thence peremptorily declare, that if God would not have force uſed, he would have told us ſo. You ſuppoſe alſo, that it muſt be only moderate force. Now may we not aſk one, that is ſo far of the council of the Almighty, that he can poſitively ſay what he would or would not have, to tell us, whether it be not as probable that God, who knows the temper of man that he has made, who knows how apt he is not to ſpare any degree of force when he believes he has a commiſſion to compel men to do any thing in their power, and who knows alſo how prone man is to think it reaſonable to do ſo: whether, I ſay, it is not as probable that God, if he would have the magiſtrate to uſe none but moderate force to compel men to hear, would alſo have told us ſo? Fathers are not more apt than magiſtrates to ſtrain their power beyond what is convenient for the education of their children; and yet it has pleaſed God to tell them in the New Teſtament, of this moderation, by a precept more than once repeated.

To my demanding, "What if God would have men left to their freedom "in this point, if they will hear, or if they will forbear; will you conſtrain "them? Thus we are ſure he did with his own people," &c. You anſwer, "But thoſe words, whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear, P. 38. "which we find thrice uſed in the prophet Ezekiel, are nothing at all to my "purpoſe. For by hearing there, no man underſtands the bare giving an "ear to what was to be preached, nor yet the conſidering it only; but the "complying with it, and obeying it, according to the paraphraſe which "Grotius gives of the words." Methinks, for this once, you might have allowed me to have hit upon ſomething to the purpoſe, you having denied me it in ſo many other places: if it were but for pity, and one other reaſon; which is, that all you have to ſay againſt it, is, that "by hearing there, no man "underſtands the bare giving an ear to what was to be preached, nor yet the "conſidering it, but the complying with it, and obeying it." If I miſremember not, your hypotheſis pretends the uſe of force to be not barely to make men give an ear, nor yet to conſider, but to make them conſider as they ought, i. e. ſo as not to reject; and therefore, though this text out of Ezekiel, be nothing to the purpoſe againſt bare giving an ear, yet if you pleaſe, let it ſtand as if it were to the purpoſe againſt your hypotheſis, till you can find ſome other anſwer to it.

If you will give yourſelf the pains to turn to Acts xxviii. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28. you will read theſe words, "And ſome believed the things that were ſpoken, "and ſome believed not. And when they agreed not among themſelves "they departed, after that Paul had ſpoken one word; Well ſpake the Holy

"Ghoſt by Eſaias the prophet, unto our fathers, ſaying, Go unto this people, and ſay, hearing, ye ſhall hear, and ſhall not underſtand; and ſeeing, ye ſhall ſee, and not perceive. For the heart of this people is waxed groſs, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they cloſed; leſt they ſhould ſee with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and underſtand with their heart, and ſhould be converted, and I ſhould heal them. Be it known therefore unto you, that the ſalvation of God is ſent unto the Gentiles, and that they will hear it."

If one ſhould come now, and out of your treatiſe, called "The Argument of the Letter concerning Toleration conſidered and anſwered," reaſon thus, A. p. 7. &c. "It is evident that theſe Jews have not ſought the truth in this matter, with that application of mind, and freedom of judgment which was requiſite, whilſt they ſuffered their luſts and paſſions to ſit in judgment, and manage the enquiry. The impreſſions of education, the reverence and admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, and the like incompetent motives, have determined them. Now if this be the caſe; if theſe men are averſe to a due conſideration of things, where they are moſt concerned to uſe it, WHAT MEANS IS THERE LEFT (beſides the grace of God) to reduce them out of the wrong way they are in, but to lay thorns and briars in it?" Would you not think this a good argument to ſhew the neceſſity of uſing force and penalties upon theſe men in the Acts, who refuſed to be brought to embrace the true religion upon the preaching of St. Paul? "For what other means was left, what human method could be uſed to bring them to make a wiſer and more rational choice, but laying ſuch penalties upon them as might balance the weight of ſuch prejudices, which inclined them to prefer a falſe way before the true?" Tell me, I beſeech you, would you not, had you been a Chriſtian magiſtrate in thoſe days, have thought yourſelf obliged A. p. 11. to try, by force, "to overbalance the weight of thoſe prejudices which inclined them to prefer a falſe way to the true?" For there was no other human means left; and if that be not enough to prove the neceſſity of uſing it, you have no proof of any neceſſity of force at all.

If you would have laid penalties upon them, I aſk you, what if God for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, thought it not neceſſary to uſe any other human means but preaching and perſuaſion? You have a ready anſwer, there is no other human means but force, and ſome other human means beſides preaching, is neceſſary, i. e. in your opinion: and is it not fit your authority ſhould carry it? For as to miracles, whether you think fit to rank them amongſt human means or no; or whether or no there were any ſhewed to theſe unbelieving Jews, to ſupply the want of force, I gueſs, in this caſe, you will not be much helped, which ever you ſuppoſe: though to one unbiaſſed, who reads that chapter, it will, I imagine, appear moſt probable that St. Paul, when he thus parted with them, had done no miracles amongſt them.

P. 38. But you have, at the cloſe of the paragraph before us, provided a ſalvo for all, in telling us, "However the penalties you defend, are not ſuch as can any way be pretended to take away mens freedom in this point." The queſtion

tion is, whether there be a neceſſity of uſing other human means but preaching, for the bringing men to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them; and whether force be it? God himſelf ſeems, in the places quoted, and others, to teach us, that he would have men left to their freedom from any conſtraint of force in that point; and you anſwer, “ The penalties you defend are not “ ſuch as can any ways be pretended to take away mens freedom in this point.” Tell us what you mean by theſe words of yours, “ take away mens freedom “ in this point;” and then apply it. I think it pretty hard to uſe penalties and force to any man, without taking away his freedom from penalties and force. Farther, the penalties you think neceſſary, if we may believe you yourſelf, are to “ be ſuch as may balance the weight of thoſe prejudices, which A. p. 11. “ incline men to prefer a falſe way before a true:” whether theſe be ſuch as you will defend, is another queſtion. This, I think, is to be made plain, that you muſt go beyond the lower degrees of force, and moderate penalties, to balance thoſe prejudices.

To my ſaying, “ That the method of the Goſpel is to pray and beſeech, L. II. p. 399. “ and that if God had thought it neceſſary to have men puniſhed to make “ them give ear, he could have called magiſtrates to be ſpreaders of the “ Goſpel, as well as poor fiſhermen, or Paul a perſecutor, who yet wanted “ not power to puniſh Ananias and Sapphira, and the inceſtuous Corinthian.” You reply, “ Though it be the method of the Goſpel, for the miniſters of it P. 38. “ to pray and beſeech men; yet it appears from my own words here, both “ that puniſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary; and that puniſhing, and that “ even by thoſe who are to pray and beſeech, is conſiſtent with that method.” I fear, Sir, you ſo greedily lay hold upon any examples of puniſhment, when on any account they come in your way, that you give yourſelf not liberty to conſider whether they are for your purpoſe or no; or elſe you would ſcarce infer, as you do from my words, that in your caſe, “ puniſhments may be “ ſometimes neceſſary.” Ananias and Sapphira were puniſhed; “ therefore it “ appears, ſay you, that puiſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary.” For what, I beſeech you? For the only end, you ſay, puniſhments are uſeful in religion, i. e. to make men conſider. So that Ananias and Sapphira were ſtruck dead: for what end? To make them conſider. If you had given yourſelf the leiſure to have reflected on this, and the other inſtance of the inceſtuous Corinthian, it is poſſible you would have found neither of them to have ſerved very well to ſhew puniſhment neceſſary to bring men to embrace the true religion; for both theſe were puniſhments laid on thoſe who had already embraced the true religion, and were in the communion of the true church, and ſo can only ſhew, if you will infer any thing concerning the neceſſity of puniſhments from them, that puniſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary for thoſe who are in the communion of the true church. And of that you may make your advantage.

As to your other inferences from my words, viz. “ That puniſhing, and that “ even by thoſe who are, as ambaſſadors, to pray and beſeech, is conſiſtent with “ that method:” when they can do it as the Apoſtles did, by the immediate direction and aſſiſtance of the ſpirit of God, I ſhall eaſily allow it to be conſiſtent with the method of the Goſpel. If that will not content you, it is plain, you have an itch to be handling the ſecular ſword; and ſince Chriſt has not given you the power you deſire, you would be executing the magiſtrate's pretended commiſſion from the law of nature. One thing more let me mind you of, and that is, that if, from the puniſhments of Ananias and Sapphira, and the inceſtuous Corinthian, you can infer a neceſſity of puniſhment to make men conſider, it will follow that there was a neceſſity of puniſhment to make men conſider, notwithſtanding miracles; which cannot therefore be ſuppoſed, to ſupply the want of puniſhments.

L. II. p. 399. To my aſking, "What if God, foreſeeing this force would be in the hands "of men, as paſſionate, as humourſome, as liable to prejudice and error, "as the reſt of their brethren, did not think it a proper means to bring men "into the right way?" You reply, "But if there be any thing of an argu- P. 39. "ment in this, it proves that there ought to be no civil government in the "world; and ſo proving too much, proves nothing at all." This you ſay; but you being one of thoſe mortals which is liable to error as well as your brethren, you cannot expect it ſhould be received for infallible truth, till you have proved it; and that you will never do, till you can ſhew, that there is as abſolute a neceſſity of force in the magiſtrate's hand for the ſalvation of ſouls, as there is of force in the magiſtrate's hands for the preſervation of civil ſociety; and next, till you have proved that force, in the hands of men, as paſſionate and humourſome, or liable to prejudice and error as their brethren, would contribute as much to the bringing men, and keeping them in the right way to ſalvation, as it does to the ſupport of civil ſociety, and the keeping men at peace in it.

WHERE men cannot live together without mutual injuries, not to be avoided without force, reaſon has taught them to ſeek a remedy in government, which always places power ſomewhere in the ſociety to reſtrain and puniſh ſuch injuries; which power, whether placed in the community itſelf, or ſome choſen by the community to govern it, muſt ſtill be in the hands of men; and where, as in ſocieties of civilized and ſettled nations, the form of the government places this power out of the community itſelf, it is unavoidable, that out of men, ſuch as they are, ſome ſhould be made magiſtrates, and have coercive power or force put into their hands, to govern and direct the ſociety for the publick good; without which force, ſo placed in the hands of men, there could be no civil ſociety, nor the ends for which it is inſtituted, to any degree attained. And thus government is the will of God.

IT is the will of God alſo, that men ſhould be ſaved; but to this, it is not neceſſary that force or coactive power ſhould be put into mens hands; becauſe God can, and hath provided other means to bring men to ſalvation: to which, you indeed ſuppoſe, but can never prove force neceſſary.

THE paſſions, humours, liableneſs to prejudices and errors, common to magiſtrates with other men, do not render force in their hands ſo dangerous and unuſeful, to the ends of ſociety, which is the publick peace, as to the ends of religion, which is the ſalvation of mens ſouls. For though men of all ranks could be content to have their own humours, paſſions, and prejudices ſatisfied, yet when they come to make laws, which are to direct their force in civil matters, they are driven to oppoſe their laws to the humours, paſſions and prejudices of men in general, whereby their own come to be reſtrained: for if law-makers, in making of laws, did not direct them againſt the irregular humours, prejudices and paſſions of men, which are apt to miſlead them: if they did not endeavour with their beſt judgment, to bring men from their humours and paſſions, to the obedience and practice of right reaſon; the ſociety could not ſubſiſt, and ſo they themſelves would be in danger to loſe their ſtation in it, and be expoſed to the unreſtrained humours, paſſions, and violence of others. And hence it comes, that be men as humourſome, paſſionate, and prejudiced as they will, they are ſtill by their own intereſt obliged to make uſe of their beſt ſkill, and with their moſt unprejudiced and ſedateſt thoughts, take care of the government, and endeavour to preſerve the commonwealth; and therefore, notwithſtanding their humours and paſſions, their liableneſs to error and prejudice, they do provide pretty well for the ſupport of ſociety, and the power in their hands is of uſe to the maintenance of it.

BUT in matters of religion it is quite otherwiſe; you had told us, about the latter end of your "Argument," p. 22. how liable men were in chuſing their religion, to be miſled by humour, paſſion and prejudice; and therefore, it was not fit that in a buſineſs of ſuch concernment they ſhould be left to themſelves: and hence, in this matter of religion, you would have them ſubjected to the coactive power of the magiſtrate. But this contrivance is viſibly of no advantage to the true religion, nor can ſerve at all to ſecure men from a wrong choice. For the magiſtrates, by their humours, prejudices and paſſions, which they are born to like other men, being as liable, and likely to be miſled in the choice of their religion, as any of their brethren, as conſtant experience hath always ſhewn, what advantage could it be to mankind, for the ſalvation of their ſouls, that the magiſtrates of the world ſhould have power to uſe force to bring men to that religion which they, each of them, by whatſoever humour, paſſion or prejudice influenced, had choſen to themſelves as the true? For whatſoever you did, I think with reverence we may ſay, that God foreſaw, that whatever commiſſion one magiſtrate had by the law of nature, all magiſtrates had: and that commiſſion, if there were any ſuch, could be only to uſe their coactive power to bring men to the religion they believed to be true, whether it were really the true or no: and therefore I ſhall, without taking away government out of the world, or ſo much as queſtioning it, ſtill think this a reaſonable queſtion; "What if God, foreſeeing this force would be in the hands of men, as paſſionate, as humourſome, as liable to prejudice and error, as the reſt of their brethren, did not think it a proper means, in ſuch hands, to bring men into the right way?" And that it needs a better anſwer than you have given to it: and therefore, you might have ſpared the pains you have taken in this paragraph, to prove that the magiſtrates, being liable as much as other men to humour, prejudice, paſſion and error, makes not force, in his hand, wholly unſerviceable to the adminiſtration of civil government. Which is what no body denies: and you would have better employed it to prove, that if the magiſtrate's being as liable to paſſion, humour, prejudice and error, as other men, made force, in his hands, improper to bring men to the true religion, this would take away government out of the world: which is a conſequence, I think, I may deny.

To which let me now add, what if God foreſaw, that if force, of any kind or degree whatſoever, were allowed in behalf of truth, it would be uſed by erring, paſſionate, prejudiced men, to the reſtraint and ruin of truth, as conſtant experience in all ages has ſhewn, and therefore commanded that the tares ſhould be ſuffered to grow with the wheat, till the harveſt, when the infallible Judge ſhall ſever them. That parable of our Saviour's plainly tells us, if force were once permitted, even in favour of the true religion, what miſchief it was like to do in the miſapplication of it, by forward, buſy miſtaken men, and therefore he wholly forbid it; and yet, I hope, this does not take away civil government out of the world.

To my demanding, "What if there be other means?" and ſaying, "Then "yours ceaſes to be neceſſary upon that account, that there is no other means "left; for the grace of God is another means." You anſwer, That "though "the grace of God is another means, yet it is none of the means of which "you were ſpeaking in the place I refer to, which any one, who reads that "paragraph, will find to be only human means." In that place you were endeavouring to prove force neceſſary to bring men to the true religion, as appears; and there having dilated for four or five pages together upon the "careleſſneſs, prejudices, paſſions, luſts, impreſſions of education, worldly "reſpects," and other the like cauſes, which you think miſlead and keep men from the true religion, you at laſt, conclude force neceſſary to bring men to it, becauſe admonitions and intreaties not prevailing, there is no other means left. To this, grace being inſtanced in as another means, you tell us here you mean no other human means left. So that to prove force neceſſary, you muſt prove that God would have other human means uſed beſides praying, preaching, perſuaſion and inſtruction; and for this, you will need to bring a plain direction from revelation for your moderate puniſhments; unleſs you will pretend to know, by your own natural wiſdom, what means God has made neceſſary; without which, thoſe whom he hath foreknown and predeſtinated, and will in his good time call, Romans viii. 29. by ſuch means as he thinks fit, according to his purpoſe, cannot be brought into the way of ſalvation. Perhaps you have ſome warrant we know not of, to enter thus boldly into the counſel of God; without which, in another man, a modeſt Christian would be apt to think it preſumption.

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A. p. 6.

YOU ſay, there are many who are not prevailed on by prayers, intreaties and exhortations, to embrace the true religion. What then is to be done? "Some degrees of force are neceſſary" to be uſed. Why? Becauſe there is no other human means left. Many are not prevailed on by your moderate force; What then is to be done? Greater degrees of force are neceſſary, becauſe there is no other human means left. No, ſay you, God has made moderate

force neceſſary, becauſe there is no other human means left where preaching and intreaties will not prevail: but he has not made greater degrees of force neceſſary, becauſe there is no other human means left where moderate force will not prevail. So that your rule changing, where the reaſon continues the ſame, we muſt conclude you have ſome way of judging concerning the purpoſes and ways of the Almighty in the work of ſalvation, which every one underſtands not. You would not elſe, upon ſo ſlight ground as you have yet produced for it, which is nothing but your own imagination, make force, your moderate force ſo neceſſary, that you bring in queſtion the wiſdom and bounty of the Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, as if he "had A. p. 16.
"not furniſhed mankind with competent means for the promoting his own "honour in the world, and the good of ſouls," if your moderate force were wanting to bring them to the true religion; whereas you know, that moſt of the nations of the world always were deſtitute of this human means to bring them to the true religion. And I imagine you would be put to it, to name me one now, that is furniſhed with it.

BESIDES, if you pleaſe to remember what you ſay in the next words. "And P. 39.
"therefore, though the grace of God be both a proper and ſufficient means, "and ſuch as can work by itſelf, and without which, neither penalties nor "any other means can do any thing;" and by conſequence, can make any means effectual: how can you ſay any human means, in this ſupernatural work, unleſs what God has declared to be ſo, is neceſſary? Preaching and inſtruction, and exhortation, are human means that he has appointed: theſe, therefore, men may and ought to uſe; they have a commiſſion from God, and may expect his bleſſing and the aſſiſtance of his grace; but to ſuppoſe, when they are uſed and prevail not, that force is neceſſary, becauſe theſe are not ſufficient, is to exclude grace, and aſcribe this work to human means; as in effect you do, when you call force competent and ſufficient means, as you have done. For if bare preaching, by the aſſiſtance of grace, can and will certainly prevail: and moderate penalties, as you confeſs, or any kind of force, without the aſſiſtance of grace, can do nothing, how can you ſay, that force is in any caſe a more neceſſary, or a more competent, or ſufficient means, than bare preaching and inſtruction? unleſs you can ſhew us, that God hath promiſed the co-operation and aſſiſtance of his grace to force, and not to preaching? The contrary whereof, has more of appearance. Preaching and perſuaſion are not competent means, you ſay; Why? becauſe, without the co-operation of grace, they can do nothing: but by the aſſiſtance of grace, they can prevail even without force. Force too, without grace, you acknowledge can do nothing; but joined with preaching and grace, it can prevail. Why then, I pray, is it a more competent means than preaching, or why neceſſary, where preaching prevails not? ſince it can do nothing without that, which, if joined to preaching, can make preaching effectual without it.

YOU go on, "Yet it may be true however, that when admonitions and P. 40.
"intreaties fail, there is no HUMAN means left but penalties, to bring pre-"judiced perſons to hear and conſider what may convince them of their er-

"rors, and diſcover the truth to them: and then penalties will be neceſſary "in reſpect to that end, as an HUMAN means." Let it be true or not true, that when intreaties, &c. fail, there is no HUMAN means left but penalties: your inference I deny, that then penalties will be neceſſary as an HUMAN means. For I aſk you, ſince you lay ſo much ſtreſs to ſo little purpoſe on HUMAN means, is ſome human means neceſſary? if that be your meaning, you have human means in the caſe, viz. admonitions, intreaties, being inſtant in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon. I aſk you again, Are penalties neceſſary becauſe the end could not be obtained by preaching, without them? that you cannot ſay, for grace co-operating with preaching will prevail: are penalties then neceſſary, as ſure to produce that end? nor ſo are they neceſſary; for without the aſſiſtance of grace, you confeſs, they can do nothing. So that penalties, neither as human means, nor as any means, are at all neceſſary. And now you may underſtand what I intend, by ſaying that the grace of God is the only means, which is the enquiry of your next paragraph, viz. this I intend, that it is the only efficacious means, without which all human means is ineffectual. P. 40. You tell me, If by it "I intend that it does either always, or ordinarily ex-"clude all other means; you ſee no ground I have to ſay it." And I ſee no ground you have to think I intended, that it excludes any other means that God in his goodneſs will be pleaſed to make uſe of: but this I intend by it, and this, I think, I have ground to ſay, that it excludes all the human means of force from being neceſſary, or ſo much as lawful to be uſed, unleſs God hath required it by ſome more authentick declaration than your bare ſaying or imagining it is neceſſary. And you muſt have more than human confidence, if you continue to mix this poor and human contrivance of yours, with the wiſdom and counſel of God in the work of ſalvation; ſince he having declared the means and methods to be uſed for the ſaving mens ſouls, has in the revelation of the Goſpel, by your own confeſſion, preſcribed no ſuch human means.

Ibid. To my ſaying, "God alone can open the ear that it may hear, and open "the heart that it may underſtand." You reply, "But by your favour, "this does not prove that he makes uſe of no means in doing of it." Nor needs it: it is enough for me, if it proves, that if preaching and inſtruction doth not open the ear, or the heart, it is not neceſſary any one ſhould try his ſtrength with a hammer or an auger. Man is not in this buſineſs, where no means can be effectual, without the aſſiſtance and co-operation of his grace, to make uſe of any means which God hath not preſcribed. You here ſet up a way of propagating Chriſtianity according to your fancy, and tell us how you would have the work of the Goſpel carried on: you commiſſion the magiſtrate by the arguments of congruity; you find an efficacy in puniſhment towards the converting of men: you limit the force, to be uſed to low and moderate degrees; and to countries where ſufficient means of inſtruction are provided by the law. And where the magiſtrate's religion is the true, i. e. where it pleaſes you; and all this without any direction from God, or any authority ſo much as pretended from the Goſpel; and without its being truly for the propagation of Chriſtianity, but only ſo much of it as you think fit, and what elſe you are pleaſed to join to it. Why elſe, in the religion you are content to have eſtabliſhed by law, and promoted by penalties, is any thing more or leſs required, than is expreſsly contained in the New Teſtament?

THIS indeed is well ſuited to any one, who would have a power of puniſhing thoſe that differ from his opinion, and would have men compelled to conformity in England. But in this your fair contrivance, what becomes of the reſt of mankind, left to wander in darkneſs out of this Goſhen, who neither have, nor, according to your ſcheme, can have, your neceſſary means of force and penalties to bring them to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them: for if that be neceſſary, they cannot without a miracle, either prince or people, be wrought on without it. If a Papiſt at Rome, a Lutheran at Stockholm, or a Calviniſt at Geneva, ſhould argue thus for his church, would you not ſay, that ſuch as theſe looked like the thoughts of a poor prejudiced mind? But they may miſtake, and you cannot; they may be prejudiced, but you cannot. Say too, if you pleaſe, you are confident you are in the right, but they cannot be confident they are ſo. This I am ſure, God's thoughts are not as man's thoughts, nor his ways as man's ways, Iſaiah lv. 8. And it may abate any one's confidence of the neceſſity or uſe of puniſhments, for not receiving our Saviour, or his religion, when thoſe who had the power of miracles were told, that "they knew not what manner of ſpirit they were of," when they would have commanded down fire from heaven, Luke ix. 55. But you do well to take care to have the church you are of, ſupported by force and penalties, whatever becomes of the propagation of the Goſpel, or the ſalvation of mens ſouls, in other parts of the world, as not coming within your hypotheſis.

IN your next paragraph, to prove that God does bleſs the uſe of force, you ſay you ſuppoſe I mean, by the words you there cite, that the "magiſtrate "has no ground to hope that God will bleſs any penalties that he may uſe to "bring men to hear and conſider the doctrine of ſalvation; or (which is the "ſame thing) that God does not (at leaſt not ordinarily) afford his grace and "aſſiſtance to them who are brought by ſuch penalties to hear and conſider "that doctrine, to enable them to hear and conſider it as they ought, i. e. "ſo as to be moved heartily to embrace it." You tell me, "If this be my "meaning, then to let me ſee that it is not true, you ſhall only deſire me to tell "you, whether they that are ſo brought to hear and conſider, are bound to "believe the Goſpel or not? If I ſay there are; (and you ſuppoſe I dare not "ſay otherwiſe;) then it evidently follows, that God does afford them that "grace which is requiſite to enable them to believe the Goſpel: becauſe with-"out that grace, it is impoſſible for them to believe it; and they cannot be "bound to believe what it is impoſſible for them to believe." To which, I ſhall only anſwer, that by this irrefragable argument, it is evident, that wherever due penalties have been uſed, for thoſe you tell us are ſufficient and competent means, to make men hear and conſider as they ought, there all men were brought to believe the Goſpel: which, whether you will reſolve with yourſelf to be true or falſe, will be to me indifferent, and on either hand P. 40.

equally advantage your cauſe. Had you appealed to experience for the ſucceſs of the uſe of force by the magiſtrate, your argument had not ſhewn half ſo much depth of theological learning: but the miſchief is, that if you will not make it all of a piece ſcholaſtick, and by arguing that all whom the magiſtrates uſe force upon, "are brought to conſider as they ought, and to all "that are ſo wrought upon, God does afford that grace which is requiſite;" and ſo roundly conclude for a greater ſucceſs of force, to make men believe the Goſpel, than ever our Saviour and the Apoſtles had by their preaching and miracles, for that wrought not on all; your unanſwerable argument comes to nothing. And in truth, as you have in this paragraph ordered the matter, by being too ſparing of your abſtract metaphyſical reaſoning, and employing it but by halves, we are fain, after all, to come to the dull way of experience; and muſt be forced to count, as the parſon does his communicants, by his Eaſter-book, how many thoſe are ſo brought to hear and conſider, to know how far God bleſſes penalties. Indeed, were it to be meaſured by conforming, the Eaſter-book would be a good regiſter to determine it. But ſince you put it upon believing, that will be of ſomewhat a harder diſquiſition.

To my ſaying, upon that place out of Iſaiah, vi. 10. "Make the heart of "this people fat, leſt they underſtand, and convert, and be healed; will all "the force you can uſe be a means to make ſuch people hear and underſtand, P. 41. "and be converted?" You reply, "No, Sir, it will not. But what then? "What if God declares that he will not heal thoſe who have long reſiſted all "his ordinary methods, and made themſelves, morally ſpeaking, incurable by "them? (which is the utmoſt, you ſay, I can make of the words I quote.) "Will it follow from thence, that no good can be done by penalties upon "others, who are not ſo far gone in wickedneſs and obſtinacy? If it will not, "as it is evident it will not, to what purpoſe is this ſaid?" It is ſaid to this purpoſe, viz. to ſhew that force ought not to be uſed at all. Thoſe ordinary methods which, reſiſted, are puniſhed with a reprobate ſenſe, are the ordinary methods of inſtruction, without force; as is evident by this place and many others, particularly Romans i. From whence I argue; that what ſtate ſoever you will ſuppoſe men in, either as paſt, or not yet come to the day of grace, no body can be juſtified in uſing force to work upon them. For till the ordinary methods of inſtruction and perſuaſion can do no more, force is not neceſſary, for you cannot ſay, what other means is there left, and ſo by your own rule not lawful. For till God hath pronounced this ſentence here, on any one, "make his heart fat," &c. the ordinary means of inſtruction and perſuaſion, may by the aſſiſtance of God's grace, prevail. And when this ſentence is once paſſed upon them, and "God will not afford them his grace to "heal them;" I take it, you confeſs in this place, I am ſure you muſt confeſs, your force to be wholly uſeleſs, and ſo utterly impertinent, unleſs that can be pertinent to be uſed, which you own can do nothing. So that whether it will follow or no, from mens being given up to a reprobate mind, for having reſiſted the preaching of ſalvation, "that no good can be done by penalties upon others;" this will follow, that not knowing whether preaching may not, by the grace of God, yet work upon them; or whether the day of grace be paſt with them; neither you nor any body elſe can ſay that force is neceſſary; and if it be not neceſſary, you yourſelf tell us it is not to be uſed.

IN your next paragraph, you complain of me, as repreſenting your argument, as you ſay, "I commonly do, as if you allowed any magiſtrate, of P. 41. "what religion ſoever, to lay penalties upon all that diſſent from him." Unhappy magiſtrates that have not your allowance! But to conſole them, I imagine they will find that they are all under the ſame obligation, one as another, to propagate the religion they believe to be the true, whether you allow it them or no. For to go no farther then the firſt words of your argument, which you complain I have miſrepreſented, and which you tell me runs thus, "When men fly from the means of right information;" I aſk you here, who ſhall be judge of thoſe means of right information, the magiſtrate who joins force with them to make them be hearkened to, or no? When you have anſwered that, you will have reſolved a great part of the queſtion, what magiſtrates are to uſe force?

BUT that you may not complain again of my miſrepreſenting, I muſt beg my readers leave to ſet down your argument at large in your own words, and all you ſay upon it. "When men fly from the means of a right information, A. p. 11. "and will not ſo much as conſider how reaſonable it is, throughly and impartially to examine a religion, which they embraced upon ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no examination of the proper grounds of it; what human method can be uſed to bring them to act like men in an affair of ſuch conſequence, and to make a wiſer and more rational choice, but that of laying ſuch penalties upon them, as may balance the weight of thoſe prejudices, which inclined them to prefer a falſe way before the true?" &c. Now this argument, you tell me, I pretend to retort in this manner: "and I ſay, I ſee no P. 41. "other means left, taking the world as we now find it, wherein the magiſtrate never lays penalties, for matters of religion, upon thoſe of his own church, nor is it to be expected they ever ſhould, to make men of the national church, any where, throughly and impartially examine a religion, which they embraced upon ſuch inducements as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no examination of the proper grounds of it: and therefore, I conclude the uſe of force by diſſenters upon conformiſts neceſſary. I appeal to all the world, whether this be not as juſt and natural a concluſion as yours?" And you ſay you are "well content the world ſhould judge. And when it determines, that there is the ſame reaſon to ſay, that to bring thoſe who conform to the national church, to examine their religion, it is neceſſary for diſſenters (who cannot poſſibly have the coactive power, becauſe the national church has that on its ſide, and cannot be national without it) to uſe force upon conformiſts, as there is to ſay, that where the national church is the true church, there to bring diſſenters (as I call them) to examine their religion, it is neceſſary for the magiſtrate (who has the coactive power) to lay moderate penalties upon them for diſſenting: you ſay, when the world determines thus, you will never pretend any more to judge what is reaſonable, in any caſe whatſoever.

“ For you doubt not but you may ſafely preſume, that the world will eaſily admit theſe two things. 1. That though it be very fit and deſirable, that all that are of the true religion, ſhould underſtand the true grounds of it; that ſo they may be the better able, both to defend themſelves againſt the aſſaults of ſeducers, and to reduce ſuch as are out of the way; yet this is not ſtrictly neceſſary to their ſalvation: becauſe experience ſhews (as far as men are capable to judge of ſuch matters) that many do heartily believe and profeſs the true religion, and conſcientiouſly practiſe the duties of it, who yet do not underſtand the true grounds upon which it challenges their belief: and no man doubts, but whoſoever does ſo believe, profeſs, and practiſe the true religion, if he perſeveres to the end, ſhall certainly attain ſalvation by it. 2. That how much ſoever it concerns thoſe who reject the true religion (whom I may call diſſenters if I pleaſe) to examine and conſider why they do ſo; and how needful ſoever penalties may be to bring them to this; it is, however, utterly unreaſonable, that ſuch as have not the coactive power, ſhould take upon them to inflict penalties for that purpoſe: becauſe, as that is not conſiſtent with order and government, which cannot ſtand, where private perſons are permitted to uſurp the coactive power; ſo there is nothing more manifeſt, than that the prejudice which is done to religion, and to the intereſt of mens ſouls, by deſtroying government, does infinitely outweigh any good that can poſſibly be done by that which deſtroys it. And whoever admits and conſiders theſe things, you ſay, you are very ſecure will be far enough from admitting, that there is any parity of reaſon in the caſes we here ſpeak of, or that mine is as juſt and natural a concluſion as yours.”

THE ſum of what you ſay, amounts to thus much. Men being apt to take up their religion, upon inducements that ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and ſo, with little or no examination of the grounds of it; therefore penalties are neceſſary to be laid on them, to make them throughly and impartially examine. But yet penalties need not be laid on conformiſts, in England, to make them examine; becauſe they, and you, believe yours to be the true religion: though it muſt be laid on Preſbyterians and Independents, &c. to make them examine, though they believe theirs to be the true religion; becauſe you believe it not to be ſo. But you give another very ſubſtantial reaſon, why penalties cannot be laid on conformiſts, to make them examine; and that is, “ becauſe the national church has the coactive power on its ſide,” and therefore they have no need of penalties to make them examine. The national church of France too, has the coactive power on its ſide, and therefore, they who are of it have no need of penalties, any of them, to make them examine.

A. p. 11. IF your argument be good, that men take up their religions upon wrong inducements, and without due examination of the proper grounds of it; and that therefore they have need of penalties to be laid on them to make them examine, as they ought, the grounds of their religion; you muſt confeſs there are ſome in the church of England, to whom penalties are neceſſary: unleſs you will affirm, that all, who are in the communion of the church of England,

land, have ſo examined: but that I think you will not do, however you endeavour to palliate their ignorance and negligence in this matter. There being therefore a need of penalties, I ſay, it is as neceſſary that Preſbyterians ſhould lay penalties on the conformiſts of the church of England to make them examine, as for the church of England to lay penalties on the Preſbyterians to make them do ſo: for they each equally believe their religion to be true; and we ſuppoſe, on both ſides, there are thoſe who have not duly examined. But here you think you have a ſure advantage, by ſaying "it is not conſiſtent with the order of government, and ſo is impracticable." I eaſily grant it. But is yours more practicable? When you can make your way practicable, for the end for which you pretend it neceſſary, viz. to make "all, who have taken up their religion upon ſuch inducements, as "ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, to examine throughly and im-"partially the proper grounds of it;" when, I ſay, you can ſhew your way practicable, to this end, you will have cleared it of one main objection, and convinced the world that yours is a more juſt and natural concluſion than mine.

If your cauſe were capable of any other defence, I ſuppoſe we ſhould not have had ſo long and elaborate an anſwer as you have given us in this paragraph, which at laſt bottoms only on theſe two things: 1. That there is in you, or thoſe of your church, ſome approaches towards infallibility in your belief that your religion is true, which is not to be allowed thoſe of other churches, in the belief of theirs. 2. That it is enough if any one does but conform to it, and remain in the communion of your church: or elſe one would think there ſhould be as much need for conformiſts too of your church to examine the grounds of their religion, as for any others,

"To underſtand the true grounds of the true religion, is not, you ſay, P. 42. "ſtrictly neceſſary to ſalvation." Yet, I think, you will nor deny, but it is as ſtrictly neceſſary to ſalvation, as it is to conform to a national church in all thoſe things it impoſes: ſome whereof are not neceſſary to ſalvation; ſome whereof, are acknowledged by all to be indifferent; and ſome whereof, to ſome conſcientious men, who thereupon decline communion, appear unſound or unlawful. If not being ſtrictly neceſſary to ſalvation, will excuſe from penalties in the one caſe, why will it not in the other? And now I ſhall excuſe the world from determining my concluſion to be as natural as yours: for it is pity ſo reaſonable a diſputant as you are, ſhould take ſo deſperate a reſolution as "never to pretend any more to judge what is reaſonable in any caſe "whatſoever."

Whether you have proved that force, uſed by the magiſtrate, be a means preſcribed by God to procure the gift of faith from him, which is all you ſay in the next paragraph, others muſt judge.

In that following; you quote theſe words of mine. "If all the means "God has appointed to make men hear and conſider, be exhortation in ſea-"ſon and out of ſeaſon, &c. together with prayer for them, and the ex-"ample of meekneſs, and a good life; this is all ought to be done, whether "they will hear, or whether they will forbear." To which you thus reply,

P. 43. " But if theſe be not all the means God has appointed, then theſe things are " not all that ought to be done." But if I aſk you, How do you know that this is not all God has appointed; you have nothing to anſwer, to bring it to your preſent purpoſe, but that you know it by the light of nature. For all you ſay is but this; that by the light of nature you know force to be uſeful and neceſſary to bring men into the way of ſalvation; by the light of nature you know the magiſtrate has a commiſſion to uſe force to that purpoſe; and by the ſame light of nature, you know that miracles were appointed to ſupply the want of force till the magiſtrates were Chriſtians. I imagine, Sir, you would ſcarce have thought this a reaſonable anſwer, if you had taken notice of my words in the ſame paragraph immediately preceding thoſe you have cited; which, that you may ſee the ſcope of my argument, I will here trouble you with again; and they are theſe: L. II. p. 400. " It is not for you and me " out of an imagination that they may be uſeful, or are neceſſary, to pre- " ſcribe means in the great and myſterious work of ſalvation, other than " what God himſelf has directed. God has appointed force as uſeful and " neceſſary, and therefore it is to be uſed; is a way of arguing becoming " the ignorance and humility of poor creatures. But I think force uſeful " or neceſſary, and therefore it is to be uſed, has methinks a little too much " preſumption in it. You aſk what means elſe is there left? None, ſay I, " to be uſed by man, but what God himſelf has directed in the Scriptures, " wherein are contained all the means and methods of ſalvation. Faith is the " gift of God. And we are not to uſe any other means to procure this gift " to any one, but what God himſelf has preſcribed. If he has there ap- " pointed, that any ſhould be forced to hear thoſe who tell them they have " miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right; and that they " ſhould be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, if they did not; it will be paſt " doubt, it is to be made uſe of. But till that can be done, it will be in " vain to ſay, what other means is there left."

MY argument here lies plainly in this; That all the means and methods of ſalvation are contained in the Scripture: which either you were to have denied, or elſe have ſhewn where it was, in Scripture, that force was appointed. But inſtead of that, you tell us, that God appointed miracles in the beginning of the Goſpel. And though, when theſe ceaſed, the means I mention were all the miniſters had left, yet this proves not that the magiſtrate was not to uſe force. P. 43. Your words are, " As to the firſt ſpreaders of the " Goſpel, it has already been ſhewn, that God appointed other means beſides " theſe for them to uſe, to induce men to hear and conſider: and though, " when thoſe extraordinary means ceaſed, theſe means which I mention (viz. " Preaching, &c.) were the only means left to the miniſters of the Goſpel; " yet that is no proof that the magiſtrate, when he became Chriſtian, could " not lawfully uſe ſuch means as his ſtation enabled him to uſe, when they " became needful." I ſaid, in expreſs words, " No means was to be uſed by " man, but what God himſelf has directed in the Scripture." And you anſwer, This is no proof that the Chriſtian magiſtrate may not uſe force. Perhaps when they ſo peremptorily interpoſe their deciſive decrees in the buſineſs of ſalvation, eſtabliſh religions by laws and penalties, with what articles, creeds, ceremonies, and diſcipline, they think fit; for this we ſee done almoſt in all countries, when they force men to hear thoſe, and thoſe only, who by their authority are choſen and allowed to tell men they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right; it may be thought neceſſary to prove magiſtrates to be men. If that needs no proof, what I ſaid needs ſome other anſwer.

BUT let us examine a little the parts of what you here ſay. "As to the "firſt ſpreaders of the Goſpel, ſay you, it has already been ſhewn, that God "appointed other means beſides exhortation in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, "prayer, and the example of a good life, for them to uſe to induce men to "hear and conſider." What were thoſe other means? To that you anſwer readily, miracles. Ergo, men are directed now by Scripture to uſe miracles. Or elſe what anſwer do you make to my argument, which I gave you in theſe words, "No means is to be uſed by man, but what God himſelf has di"rected in the Scriptures, wherein are contained all the means and methods "of ſalvation." No, they cannot uſe miracles now as a means, ſay you, for they have them not. What then? Therefore the magiſtrate, who has it, muſt uſe force to ſupply the want of thoſe extraordinary means which are now ceaſed. This indeed is an inference of yours, but not of the Scriptures. Does the Scripture ſay any thing of this? Not a word; not ſo much as the leaſt intimation towards it in all the New Teſtament. Be it then true or falſe, that force is a means to be uſed by men in the abſence of miracles, this is yet no anſwer to my argument; this is no proof that is appointed in Scripture; which is the thing my argument turns on.

REVELATION then fails you. Let us ſee now how reaſon and common ſenſe, that common light of nature, will help you out.

You then reaſon thus: bare preaching, &c. will not prevail on men to hear and conſider; and therefore ſome other means is neceſſary to make them do ſo. Pray what do you mean by men, or any other of thoſe indefinite terms, you have always uſed in this caſe? Is it that bare preaching will prevail on no men? Does reaſon, under which I comprehend experience too, and all the ways of knowledge, contra-diſtinguiſhed to revelation, diſcover any ſuch thing to you? I imagine you will not ſay that; or pretend that no body was ever brought, by preaching and perſuaſion, to hear and conſider the truths of the Goſpel, mean by conſidering what you will, without other means uſed by thoſe who applied themſelves to the care of converting them. To ſuch therefore as may be brought to hear and conſider, without other means, you will not ſay that other means are neceſſary.

IN the next place, therefore, When you ſay bare preaching, will not prevail on men, do you mean that it will not prevail on all men, and therefore it is neceſſary that men ſhould uſe other means? Neither, I think, will reaſon authorize you to draw ſuch a conſequence: becauſe neither will preaching alone, nor preaching aſſiſted with force, or any other means man can uſe, prevail on all men. And therefore no other means can be pretended to be neceſſary to be uſed by man, to do what men by thoſe means never did, nor ever can do.

THAT ſome men ſhall be ſaved, and not all, is, I think, paſt queſtion to all that are Chriſtians: and thoſe that ſhall be ſaved, it is plain, are the elect. If you think not this plain enough in Scripture, I deſire you to turn to the ſeventeenth of the XXXIX articles of the church of England, where you will read theſe words: "Predeſtination to life is the everlaſting purpoſe of God, "whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) he hath conſtantly "decreed by his counſel ſecret to us, to deliver from curſe and damnation thoſe "whom he has choſen in Chriſt out of mankind, and to bring them by Chriſt "to everlaſting ſalvation, as veſſels made to honour. Wherefore they which "be indued with ſo excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God's "purpoſe by his Spirit working in due ſeaſon: they through grace obey the calling; they be juſtified freely; they be made ſons of God by adoption; they "be made like the image of his only begotten Son Jeſus Chriſt; they walk "religiouſly in good works; and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to "everlaſting felicity." Now pray tell me whether bare preaching will not prevail on all the elect to hear and conſider without other means to be uſed by men. If you ſay it will; the neceſſity of your other means, I think, is out of doors. If you ſay it will not; I deſire you to tell me how you do know it without revelation? And whether by your own reaſon you can tell us, whether any, and what means God has made neceſſary, beſides what he has appointed in Scripture for the calling his elect? When you can do this, we ſhall think you no ordinary divine, nor a ſtranger to the ſecret counſels of the infinitely wiſe God. But till then, your mixing your opinion with the divine wiſdom in the great work of ſalvation, and from arguments of congruity, taking upon you to declare the neceſſity or uſefulneſs of means, which God has not expreſsly directed, for the gathering in of his elect, will ſcarce authorize the magiſtrate to uſe his coactive power for the edifying and compleating the body of Chriſt, which is his church. "Thoſe whom God hath choſen "in Chriſt out of mankind, before the foundations of the world, are called, "according to God's purpoſe, by his Spirit, working in due ſeaſon, and "through grace obey the calling;" ſay you in your article. The outward means that God has appointed for this, is preaching. Ay, but preaching is not enough; that is, is not ſufficient means, ſay you. And I aſk you how you know it; ſince the Scripture, which declares all that we can know in this matter, ſays nothing of the inſufficiency of it, or of the neceſſity of any other? Nor can there be a neceſſity of any other means than what God expreſsly appoints, in a matter wherein no means can operate effectually, without the aſſiſtance of his grace; and where the aſſiſtance of his grace can make any outward means, he appoints, effectual.

I MUST deſire you here to take notice, that by preaching, which I uſe for ſhortneſs, I mean exhortation, inſtruction, intreaty, praying for, and in fine, any outward means of perſuaſion in the power of man, ſeparate from force.

P. 43. YOU tell us here, "as to the firſt ſpreaders of the Goſpel, God appointed "other means, viz. miracles, for them to uſe to induce men to hear and conſider." If by the firſt ſpreaders of the Goſpel, you mean the twelve Apoſtles and ſeventy Diſciples, whom Chriſt himſelf ſent to preach the Goſpel; they indeed were appointed by his immediate command, to ſhew miracles by the power which he had beſtowed upon them. But will you ſay, all the miniſters and preachers of the Goſpel had ſuch a commiſſion, and ſuch a power, all along from the Apoſtles time; and that they, every one, did actually ſhew miracles, to induce men to hear and conſider, quite down, till Chriſtianity was ſupported by the law of the empire? Unleſs you could ſhew this, though you could produce ſome well-atteſted miracles, done by ſome men in every age till that time, yet it would not be ſufficient to prove that miracles were appointed to be conſtantly uſed to induce men to hear and conſider; and ſo by your reaſoning, to ſupply the want of force, till that neceſſary aſſiſtance could be had from the authority of the magiſtrate become Chriſtian. For ſince it is what you build upon, that men will not hear and conſider upon bare preaching, and I think you will forwardly enough agree, that till Chriſtianity was made the religion of the empire, there were thoſe every where that heard the preachers of it ſo little, or ſo little conſidered what they ſaid, that they rejected the Goſpel; and that therefore miracles or force are neceſſary means to make men hear and conſider; you muſt own that thoſe who preached without the power of miracles, or the coactive power of the magiſtrate accompanying them, were unfurniſhed of competent and ſufficient means to make men hear and conſider; and ſo to bring them to the true religion. If you will ſay the miracles done by others were enough to accompany their preaching, to make it be heard and conſidered; the preaching of the miniſters at this day is ſo accompanied, and ſo will need no aſſiſtance of force from the magiſtrate. If the report of miracles done by one miniſter of the Goſpel ſome time before, and in another place, were ſufficient to make the preaching of ten or a thouſand others, be heard and conſidered, why is it not ſo now? For the credibility and atteſtation of the report is all that is of moment; when miracles done by others, in other places, are the argument that prevails. But this, I fear, will not ſerve your turn in the buſineſs of penalties; and whatever might ſatisfy you in the caſe of miracles, I doubt you would not think the ſalvation of ſouls ſufficiently provided for, if the report of the force of penalties, uſed ſome time ſince on one ſide of the Tweed, were all that ſhould aſſiſt the preachers of the true religion on the other, to make men hear and conſider.

ST. Paul, in his epiſtle to Titus, inſtructs him what he, and the Preſbyters he ſhould ordain in the cities of Crete, were to do for the propagating of the Goſpel, and bringing men heartily to embrace it. His directions are, that they ſhould be "blameleſs, not rioters, not ſelf-willed, not ſoon angry, not "given to wine or filthy lucre, not ſtrikers, not unruly; lovers of hoſpitality, "and of good men; ſober, juſt, holy, temperate; to be able by ſound doc-"trine, both to exhort and convince gainſayers; in all things to be a pattern "of good works; in doctrine ſhewing uncorruptedneſs, gravity, ſincerity, "ſound ſpeech that cannot be condemned, that he that is of the contrary part "may be aſhamed, having no evil to ſay of you. Theſe things ſpeak, and "exhort, and rebuke, with all authority. Avoid fooliſh queſtions, and ge-

“ nealogies, and contentions. A man that is an heretick after the firſt and ſe-“ cond admonition, reject.” To repay you the favour of your Greek, it is ϖαραιτȣ͂; which, if I may take your liberty of receding from our tranſlation, I would read “ avoid.”

The Cretans, by the account St. Paul gives of them, were a people that would require all the means that were needful to prevail with any ſtrangers to the Goſpel, to hear and conſider. But yet we find nothing directed for the ſupport and propagation of the Goſpel in this iſland, but preaching, exhortation, reproof, &c. with the example of a good life. In all this epiſtle, writ on purpoſe to inſtruct the preachers of the Goſpel, in the means they were to uſe among the Cretans, for their converſion, not a word about miracles, their power or uſe: which one would think ſtrange, if they were the means appointed, and neceſſary to make men hear and conſider, and without which they would not do it. Preaching, admonition, exhortation, intreaties, inſtruction, by the common light of reaſon, were known, and natural to be uſed, to perſuade men. There needed not much be ſaid to convince men of it. But if miracles were a neceſſary means, it was a means wholly new, unexpected, and out of the power of other teachers. And therefore one would think, if they were appointed for the ends you propoſe, one ſhould hear ſomething of that appointment: ſince that they were to be uſed; or how, and when; was farther from common apprehenſion, and ſeems to need ſome particular direction.

If you ſay the ſame Spirit that gave them the power of miracles, would alſo give them the knowledge both that they had it, and how to uſe it; I am far enough from limiting the operations of that infinitely wiſe Spirit, who will not fail to bring all the elect of God into the obedience of truth, by thoſe means, and in that manner he ſhall think neceſſary. But yet our Saviour, when he ſent abroad his diſciples, with the power of miracles, not only put it in their commiſſion, whereby they were informed that they had that extraordinary gift, but added inſtructions to them in the uſe of it. “ Freely you have received, freely give;” a caution as neceſſary to the Cretan elders, in the uſe of miracles, if they had that power; there being nothing more liable to be turned to the advantage of filthy lucre.

I do not queſtion but the Spirit of God might give the power, and ſtir up the mind of the firſt ſpreaders of the Goſpel to do miracles on ſome extraordinary occaſion. But if they were a neceſſary means to make men hear and conſider what was preached to them, till force ſupplied their place, and ſo were ordinarily to accompany the preaching of the Goſpel, unleſs it ſhould be preached without the means appointed and neceſſary to make it prevail, I think, in that caſe, we may expect it ſhould expreſsly have made a part of the preacher's commiſſion; it making a neceſſary part of the effectual execution of his function.

But the Apoſtle, it ſeems, thought fit to lay the ſtreſs upon inſtructing others, and living well themſelves; upon “ being inſtant in ſeaſon, and out “ of ſeaſon;” and therefore directs all his advices for the ordering the Cretan church, and the propagating the Goſpel there, to make them attend to thoſe neceſſary things of life and doctrine, without ſo much as mentioning the appointment, need, or uſe of miracles.

I SAID, "But whatever neglect or averſion there is in ſome men, impartially L. II. p. 84. and throughly to be inſtructed; there will, upon a due examination, I fear, be found no leſs a neglect and averſion in others, impartially and throughly to inſtruct them. It is not the talking even general truths in plain and clear language; much leſs a man's own fancies in ſcholaſtical or uncommon ways of ſpeaking, an hour or two, once a week, in publick; that is enough to inſtruct even willing hearers in the way of ſalvation, and the grounds of their religion:" and that politick diſcourſes and invectives from the pulpit, inſtead of friendly and Chriſtian debates with people at their houſes, were not the proper means to inform men in the foundations of religion; and that if there were not a neglect in this part, I thought there would be little need of any other means. To this, you tell me, in the next paragraph, "you do not ſee how pertinent my diſcourſe, about this matter, Ibid. is to the preſent queſtion." If the ſhewing the neglects, obſervable in the uſe of what is agreed to be neceſſary means, will not be allowed by you to be pertinent, in a debate about neceſſary means; when poſſibly thoſe very neglects may ſerve to make other means ſeem requiſite, which really are not ſo; yet if you are not of thoſe who will never think any ſuch diſcourſe pertinent, you will allow me to mind you of it again, as not impertinent in anſwer to your laſt letter, wherein you ſo often tell us of the ſufficient proviſion made for inſtruction. For wherever the neglect be, it can ſcarce be ſaid there is ſufficient proviſion made for inſtruction in a Chriſtian country, where great numbers of thoſe, who are in the communion of the national church, are groſly ignorant of the grounds of the Chriſtian religion. And I aſk you, whether it be in reſpect of ſuch conformiſts you ſay, as you do in the ſame paragraph, that "when the beſt proviſion is made that can be, for the inſtruction of the P. 43. people, you fear a great part of them will ſtill need ſome moderate penalties to bring them to hear and receive inſtruction?"

BUT what if all the means that can, be not uſed for their inſtruction? That there are neglects of this kind, you will, I ſuppoſe, take the word of a reverend prelate of our church, who thought he could not better ſhew his good-will to the clergy, than by a ſeaſonable Diſcourſe of the Paſtoral Care, to cure that neglect for the future. There he tells you, p. 115, 118. that "miniſters ſhould watch over and feed their flock, and not enjoy their benefices as farms, &c. Which reproach, ſays he, whatever we may be, our church is free of; which he proves by the ſtipulation and covenant they make with Chriſt, that they will never ceaſe their labour, care, and diligence, till they have done all that lieth in them, according to their bounden duty, towards all ſuch as are, or ſhould be committed to their care, to bring them to a ripeneſs of age in Chriſt." And a page or two after, having repeated part of the promiſe made by thoſe who take orders, he adds. "In this is expreſſed the ſo much NEGLECTED, but ſo neceſſary duty, which incumbents owe their flock in a private way; viſiting, inſtructing and admoniſhing; which is one of the moſt uſeful and important parts of their duty, how generally ſoever it may be diſuſed or forgotten. P. 187. He ſays, Every prieſt that minds his duty will find, that no part of it is ſo uſeful as catechiſtical diſcourſes; by means whereof, his people will underſtand all his ſermons the better, when they have once had a clear notion of all thoſe terms that muſt run through them; for thoſe not being underſtood, renders them all unintelligible. Another part of the prieſt's duty, he tells you, p. 201. is with relation to them that are without, who are of the ſide of the church of Rome, or among the diſſenters. Other churches and bodies are noted for their zeal in making proſelytes; for their reſtleſs endeavours, as well as their unlawful methods in it: they reckoning perhaps that all will be ſanctified by the increaſing their PARTY; which is the true name of making converts, except they become at the ſame time good men, as well as votaries to a ſide or cauſe. We are certainly very REMISS in this of both hands. Little pains is taken to gain either upon Papiſts or Nonconformiſts: the LAW HAS BEEN SO MUCH TRUSTED TO, that that method only was thought ſure; it was much valued, and others at the ſame time as much NEGLECTED. And whereas, at firſt, WITHOUT FORCE OR VIOLENCE, in forty years time, Popery, from being the prevailing religion, was reduced to a handful, we have now, in above twice that number of years, made very little progreſs," &c.

PERHAPS here again you will tell me, you "do not ſee how this is pertinent to the preſent queſtion;" which, that you may ſee, give me leave to put you in mind, that neither you, nor any body elſe, can pretend force neceſſary, till all the means of perſuaſion have been uſed, and nothing neglected that can be done by all the ſofter ways of application. And ſince it is your own doctrine, that force is not lawful, unleſs where it is neceſſary; the magiſtrate, upon your principles, can neither lawfully uſe force, nor the miniſters of any national church plead for it any where, but where they themſelves have firſt done their duties: a draught whereof, adapted to our preſent circumſtances, we have in the newly publiſhed Diſcourſe of the Paſtoral Care. And he that ſhall preſs the uſe of force as neceſſary, before he can anſwer it to himſelf and the world, that thoſe who have taken on them the care of ſouls have performed their duties; were beſt conſider, whether he does not draw up an accuſation againſt the men of that holy order, or againſt the magiſtrate who ſuffers them to neglect any part of their duty. For whilſt what that learned biſhop, in the paſſages above-cited, and in other places, mentions, is neglected, it cannot be ſaid, that no other means but force is left; thoſe, which are on all hands acknowledged neceſſary and uſeful means, not having yet been made uſe of.

To vindicate your method from novelty, you tell me, it is as old as St. Auſtin. Whatever he ſays in the place you quote, it ſhews only his opinion, but not that it was ever uſed. Therefore, to ſhew it not to be new in practice, you add, that you "think it has been made uſe of by all thoſe magiſtrates, who having made all requiſite proviſions for the inſtructing their people in the truth, have likewiſe required them under convenient penalties to embrace it." Which is as much as to ſay, that thoſe magiſtrates who uſed your method, did uſe your method. And that certainly you may think ſafely, and without fear of being gainſaid.

BUT now I will tell you what I think, in my turn: and that is, if you could have found any magiſtrates who had made uſe of your method, as well as you think you have found a divine that approves of it, you would have named thoſe magiſtrates as forwardly as you do St. Auſtin. If I think amiſs, pray correct me yet, and name them.

THAT which makes me imagine you will hardly find any examples of it, is what I there ſaid in theſe words: "All other law-makers have conſtantly L. II. p. 406. "taken this method; that where any thing was to be amended, the fault "was firſt declared, and then penalties denounced againſt all thoſe, who "after a time ſet, ſhould be found guilty of it. This the common ſenſe "of mankind, and the very reaſon of laws, which are intended not for "puniſhment, but correction, has made ſo plain, that the ſubtileſt and moſt "refined law-makers have not gone out of this courſe, nor have the moſt "ignorant and barbarous nations miſſed it. But you have outdone Solon "and Lycurgus, Moſes and our Saviour, and are reſolved to be a law-maker "of a way by yourſelf. It is an old and obſolete way, and will not ſerve "your turn, to begin with warnings and threats of penalties, to be inflicted "on thoſe who do not reform, but continue to do that which you think "they fail in. To allow of impunity to the innocent, or the opportunity "of amendment to thoſe who would avoid the penalties, are formalities "not worth your notice. You are for a ſhorter and ſurer way. Take a "whole tribe, and puniſh them at all adventures, whether guilty or no of "the miſcarriage which you would have amended; or without ſo much as "telling them what it is you would have them do, but leaving them to find "it out if they can. All theſe abſurdities are contained in your way of "proceeding, and are impoſſible to be avoided by any one, who will puniſh "diſſenters, and only diſſenters, to make them conſider and weigh the "grounds of their religion, and impartially examine whether it be true or no, "and upon what grounds they took it up; that ſo they may find and embrace "the truth that muſt ſave them." Theſe abſurdities, I fear, muſt be removed, before any magiſtrates will find your method practicable.

I HAVING ſaid, "your method is not altogether unlike the plea made uſe "of to excuſe the late barbarous uſage of the Proteſtants in France, "from being a perſecution for religion, viz. That it was not a puniſhment "for religion but for diſobeying the king's laws, which required them to "come to maſs: ſo by your rule, diſſenters muſt be puniſhed, not for the "religion they have embraced, and the religion they have rejected." In anſwer to this, in the next paragraph, you take abundance of pains to prove, P. 44. that the king of France's laws, that require going to maſs, are no laws. You were beſt to ſay ſo on the other ſide of the water. It is ſure the puniſhments were puniſhments, and the dragooning was dragooning. And if you think that plea excuſed them not, I am of your mind. But nevertheleſs am of opinion, as I was, that it will prove as good a plea as yours; which is what you argue againſt in your next paragraph, in the words fol-

P. 44. lowing, wherein you examine the likeneſs of your new method to this plea. You tell me, "I ſay, by your rule, the diſſenters (from the true religion, for "you ſpeak of no other) muſt be puniſhed (or if I pleaſe, ſubjected to moderate penalties, ſuch as ſhall make them uneaſy, but neither deſtroy or undo "them:) for what?" Indeed I thought by your firſt book, you meant not for their religion, but to make them conſider; but here you aſk me "where "it is you ſay that diſſenters from the true religion, are not to be puniſhed for "their religion? So then, it ſeems, in your opinion now, diſſenters from the "true religion are to be puniſhed," or, as you are pleaſed to mollify the expreſſion, for the thing is the ſame, "ſubjected to moderate penalties for their "religion." I think I ſhall not need to prove, to any one but one of your nice ſtyle, that the execution of penal laws, let the penalties be great or ſmall, are puniſhments.

IF therefore the religion of diſſenters from the true, be a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate; who is to judge who are guilty of that fault? Muſt it be the magiſtrate every where, or the magiſtrate in ſome countries, and not in others, or the magiſtrate no where? If the magiſtrate no where is to be judge who are diſſenters from the true religion, he can no where puniſh them. If he be to be every where judge, then the king of France, or the Great Turk, muſt puniſh thoſe whom they judge diſſenters from the true religion, as well as other potentates. If ſome magiſtrates have a right to judge, and others not: That yet, I fear, how abſurd ſoever it be, ſhould I grant it, will not do your buſineſs. For beſides that, they will hardly agree to make you their infallible umpire in the caſe, to determine who of them have, and who have not this right to judge which is the true religion; or if they ſhould, and you ſhould declare the king of England had that right, viz. whilſt he complied to ſupport the orthodoxy, eccleſiaſtical polity, and thoſe ceremonies which you approve of; but that the king of France, and the Great Turk, had it not, and ſo could have no right to uſe force on thoſe they judged diſſenters from the true religion; you ought to bethink yourſelf what you will reply to one that ſhould uſe your
A. p. 16. own words; "If ſuch a degree of outward force, as has been mentioned, be "really of great and even neceſſary uſe, for the advancing of the true religion, "and ſalvation of ſouls, then it muſt be acknowledged, that in France and "Turkey, &c. there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it, for the advancing thoſe "ends; unleſs we will ſay (what without impiety cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe "and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, has not in France and Turkey furniſhed mankind with competent means for the promoting his own "honour, and the good of ſouls."

YOU go on, and tell us, they are to be puniſhed, not for following the light of their own reaſon, nor for obeying the dictates of their own conſciences, "but rather for the contrary. For the light of their own reaſon,
P. 44. "and the dictates of their own conſcience (if their reaſon and their conſciences "were not perverted and abuſed) would undoubtedly lead them to the ſame "thing, to which the method you ſpeak of is deſigned to bring them;" i. e. to the ſame thing to which your reaſon and your conſcience leads you. For

if you were to argue with a Papiſt, or a Preſbyterian, in the caſe, what privilege have you to tell him, that his reaſon, and conſcience is perverted, more than he has to tell you that yours is ſo? Unleſs it be this inſupportable preſumption, that your reaſon and conſcience ought to be the meaſure of all reaſon and conſcience in all others, which how you can claim, without pretending to infallibility, is not eaſy to diſcern.

THE diverſion you give yourſelf about the likeneſs and unlikeneſs of thoſe two pleas, I ſhall not trouble myſelf with; ſince, when your fit of mirth was over, you were forced to confeſs, That "as I have made your plea for P. 45. "you, you think there is no conſiderable difference, as to the fairneſs of them, "excepting what ariſes from the different degrees of puniſhment, in the "French diſcipline, and your method. But if the French plea be not true; "and that which I make to be yours, be not yours;"——I muſt beg your pardon, Sir, I did not think it was your opinion, nor do I yet remember that you any where ſaid in your "Argument," &c. that men were to be puniſhed for their religion; but that it was purely to make men "examine the religion they had embraced, and the religion that they had rejected." And if that were of moment, I ſhould think myſelf ſufficiently juſtified for this my miſtake, by what you ſay in your "Argument," &c. from p. 6 to 12. But ſince you explain yourſelf otherwiſe here, I am not unwilling to take your hypotheſis, as you from time to time ſhall pleaſe to reform it. You anſwer then, that "to make them examine, is indeed the next end for which they are Ibid. "to be puniſhed." But what is that to my queſtion? Which, if it be pertinent, demands for what fault, not for what end, they are to be puniſhed: as appears even by my next words. "So that they are puniſhed, not for having "offended againſt a law, i. e. not for any fault; for there is no law in Eng- "land that requires them to examine." This, I muſt confeſs, was to ſhew, that here, as in France, whatever was pretended, yet the true reaſon why people were puniſhed, was their religion. And it was for this agreement, that in both places religion was meant, though ſomething elſe was talked of, that I ſaid your plea was like that made uſe of in France. But I ſee I might have ſpared my pains to prove that you puniſh diſſenters for their religion, ſince you here own it.

YOU tell me, in the ſame place, I was impertinent in my queſtion, which was this, "For what then are they to be puniſhed?" that I demanded for what end, and not for what fault they are to be puniſhed. In good earneſt, Sir, I was not ſo ſubtile as to diſtinguiſh them. I always thought that the end of all laws was to amend thoſe faults which were forbidden; and that when any one was puniſhed, the fault for which he was puniſhed, was the tranſgreſſion of the law, in that particular which was by the law commanded or forbidden; and the end of the puniſhment, was the amendment of that fault for the future. For example; if the law commanded to hear, not hearing was the fault puniſhed; and the end of that puniſhment, was to make the offenders hear. If the law commanded to examine, the fault puniſhed, when that law was put in execution, was not examining; and the end of the puniſhment, to make the offenders examine. If the law commanded conformity,

formity, the fault was nonconformity, and the end of it to make men conform.

THIS was my apprehenſion concerning laws, and ends of puniſhments. And I muſt own myſelf ſtill ſo dull as not to diſtinguiſh otherwiſe between "the fault for which men are to be puniſhed, and the end for which they are "to be puniſhed;" but only as the one is paſt, the other future. The tranſgreſſion, or fault, is an omiſſion or action that a man is already guilty of; the end of the puniſhment, that it be not again repeated. So that if a man be puniſhed for the religion he profeſſes, I can ſee no other end for which he is puniſhed, but to make him quit that religion. No other immediate end I mean; for other remote ends, to which this is ſubordinate, it may have. So that if not examining the religion which men have embraced, and the religion they have rejected, be not the fault for which men are puniſhed; I would be glad you would ſhew me how it can be the next end, as you ſay it is, of their being puniſhed. And that you may not think my dulneſs gives you a labour without ground, I will tell you the reaſon why I cannot find any other next end of puniſhment, but the amendment of the fault forbidden; and that is, becauſe that ſeems to me to be the end, the next end, of any action; which, when obtained, the action is to ceaſe, and not ceaſe till it be attained. And thus, I think, it is in puniſhments ordained by the law. When the fault forbidden is amended, the puniſhment is to ceaſe, and not till then. This is the only way I have to know the end, or final cauſe for which any action is done. If you have any other, you will do me a kindneſs to inſtruct me. This it is which makes me conclude, and I think with me all thoſe who have not had the leiſure and happineſs to attain the utmoſt refining of the ſchools, that if their religion be the fault for which diſſenters are puniſhed, examining is not the end for which they are puniſhed, but the change of their religion: though examining may, perhaps, in ſome men, precede their change, and help to it. But that is not neceſſary. A man may change his religion without it: and when he has changed, let the motive be what it will, the end the law aims at, is obtained, and the puniſhment ceaſes. So on the other ſide, if not hearing, not examining, be the fault for which men are puniſhed, conformity is not the next end for which they are puniſhed, though it may perhaps, in ſome, be a conſequence of it; but hearing and examining muſt be underſtood to be the ends for which they are puniſhed. If they are not the ends, why does the puniſhment ceaſe, when thoſe ends are attained? And thus you have my thoughts concerning this matter, which perhaps will not be very pertinent, as mine have not the good luck always to be to you, to a man of nicer diſtinctions.

BUT let us conſider your hypotheſis as it now ſtands, and ſee what advantage you have got to your cauſe by this new explication. "Diſſenters from "the true religion are to be puniſhed, ſay you, for their religion." Why? Becauſe it is a fault. Againſt whom? Againſt God. Thence it follows indeed, that God, if he pleaſes, may puniſh it. But how will you prove that God has given the magiſtrates of the earth a power to puniſh all faults againſt himſelf? Covetouſneſs, or not loving our neighbour as ourſelves, are faults or ſins againſt God Ought the magiſtrate to puniſh theſe? But I ſhall not need to trouble you much with that queſtion. This matter, I think, will be decided between us without going ſo far.

If the magiſtrate may puniſh any one for not being of the true religion, muſt the magiſtrate judge what is that true religion, or no? If he muſt not, what muſt guide him in the puniſhing of ſome, and not of others? For ſo it is in all places where there is a national religion eſtabliſhed by penal laws. If the magiſtrate be commiſſioned by the ſame law of nature, for that is all the commiſſion you pretend to, to judge what is the true religion, by which he is authorized to puniſh thoſe who diſſent from it; muſt not all magiſtrates judge, and accordingly puniſh thoſe who diſſent from that, which they judge the true religion, i. e. in effect, thoſe who diſſent from theirs? And if all magiſtrates have a power to puniſh thoſe who are not of their religion, I aſk you, whether it be of more uſe or diſadvantage to the promoting true religion, and ſalvation of ſouls? And when you have reſolved that queſtion, you will then be able to tell me, whether the uſefulneſs of it, which muſt be determined by the greater good or harm it is like to do, is ſuch as to juſtify your doctrine about it, or the magiſtrate's uſe of it.

Besides, your making the diſſenting from the true religion a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, puts an end to your pretence to moderate puniſhments; which, in this place, you make uſe of to diſtinguiſh yours from the French method; ſaying, that "your method puniſhes men with puniſhments "which do not deſerve to be called ſo, when compared with thoſe of the French "diſcipline." But if the diſſenting from the true religion, be a fault that the magiſtrate is to puniſh, and a fault of that conſequence, that it draws with it the loſs of a man's ſoul; I do not ſee how other magiſtrates, whoſe duty it is to puniſh faults under their cognizance, and by puniſhing to amend them, can be more remiſs than the king of France has been, and forbear declaring that they will have all their people ſaved, and endeavour by ſuch ways as he has done to effect it: eſpecially ſince you tell us, that "God now P. 8. "leaves religion to the care of men, under his ordinary providence, to try "whether they will do their duties in their ſeveral capacities or not, leaving "them anſwerable for all that may follow from their neglect." In the correcting of faults, "malo nodo malus cuneus," is not only what is juſtifiable, but what is requiſite. But of this more fully in another place.

In the next place; I do not ſee how, by your method, as you explain it here, the magiſtrate can puniſh any one for not being of the true religion, though we ſhould grant him to have a power to do it, whilſt you tell us, that "your method puniſhes men for rejecting the true religion, propoſed to them P. 45. "with ſufficient evidence, which certainly is a fault." By this part of your ſcheme it is plain, that you allow the magiſtrate to puniſh none but thoſe to whom the true religion is propoſed with ſufficient evidence; and ſufficient evidence, you tell us, "is ſuch as will certainly win aſſent wherever it is duly con- P. 52. "ſidered." Now by this rule, there will be very few that the magiſtrate will have right to puniſh; ſince he cannot know whether thoſe who diſſent, do it for want of due conſideration in them, or want of ſufficient evidence in what is propoſed; unleſs you mean by due conſideration, ſuch conſideration that always does bring men actually to aſſent; which is in effect to ſay nothing at all. For then your rule amounts to thus much, "that ſufficient evidence "is ſuch as will certainly win aſſent wherever it is conſidered duly," i. e. ſo as to win aſſent. This being like ſome of thoſe other rules we have met with, and ending in a circle, which after you have traced, you at laſt find yourſelf juſt where you were at ſetting out; I leave it to you to own as you think fit: and tell you, if by duly conſidering, you mean conſidering to his utmoſt; that then, that which is propoſed to one with ſufficient evidence to win aſſent, may not be ſo to another.

THERE are propoſitions extant in geometry, with their demonſtrations annexed, and that with ſuch ſufficient evidence to ſome men of deep thought and penetration, as to make them ſee the demonſtration, and give aſſent to the truth: whilſt there are many others, and thoſe no novices in mathematicks, who with all the conſideration and attention they can uſe, are never able to attain unto it. It is ſo in other parts of truth. That which hath evidence enough to make one man certain, has not enough to make another ſo much as gueſs it to be true, though he has ſpared no endeavour or application in examining it. And therefore, if the magiſtrate be to puniſh none but thoſe who reject the true religion, when it has been offered with ſufficient evidence, I imagine he will not have many to puniſh, if he will, as he ought, diſtinguiſh between the innocent and the guilty.

UPON your forwardneſs to encourage the magiſtrate's uſe of force in matters of religion, by its uſefulneſs, even ſo far as to pretend advantages from L. II. p. 431, 432. what yourſelf acknowledge the miſapplication of it, I ſay that "So inſtead of "diſheartning from, you give encouragement to the miſchief; which, upon "your principle, joined to the natural thirſt in man after arbitrary power, "may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with ſome pretence of right." P. 73. To which your reply is, That you "ſpeak no where but of the uſe and neceſ"ſity of force." What think you in the place mentioned, of the gain that you tell the ſufferers they ſhall make by the magiſtrate's puniſhing them to bring them to a wrong religion? You do not, as I remember, there ſay, that force is neceſſary in that caſe; though they gaining, as you ſay, by it this advantage, "that they know better than they did before, where the "truth does lie," you cannot but allow, that ſuch a miſapplication of force "may do ſome ſervice indirectly and at a diſtance, towards the ſalvation of "ſouls."

BUT that you may not think, whilſt I had under conſideration the dangerous encouragement you gave to men in power, to be very buſy with their force in matters of religion, by all the ſorts of uſefulneſs you could imagine of it, however applied, right or wrong, that I declined mentioning the neceſſity you pretend of force, becauſe it would not as well ſerve to the purpoſe for which I mention its uſefulneſs; I ſhall here take it ſo, that the reader may ſee what reaſon you had to complain of my not doing it before.

THUS then ſtands your ſyſtem. "The procuring and advancing any way of the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men, is one of the ends of civil ſociety." And force is put into the magiſtrate's hands, as neceſſary for the attaining thoſe ends, where no other means are left, "Who then upon your grounds may quickly find reaſon, where its ſuits his inclination, or ſerves his turn, to puniſh men directly to bring them to his religion." For if he may uſe force becauſe it is neceſſary, as being the only means left to make men conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which otherwiſe they would not conſider, why may he not by the ſame rule uſe force, as the only means left to procure men degrees of glory, which otherwiſe they would not attain, and ſo to advance their eternal intereſts? For St. Paul aſſures us, that "the afflictions of this life work for us a far more exceeding weight of glory." So that whether the magiſtrate may not, when it may ſerve his turn, argue thus from your principles, judge you: diſſenters from my religion muſt be puniſhed, if in the wrong, to bring them into the right way; if in the right, to make them by their ſufferings gainers of a far more exceeding weight of glory.

P. 73.

BUT you ſay, "unleſs it be as neceſſary for men to attain any greater degree of glory, as it is to attain glory, it will not follow, that if the magiſtrate may uſe force, becauſe it may be indirectly, &c. uſeful towards the procuring any degree of glory, he may by the ſame rule uſe where it may be in that manner uſeful towards the procuring a greater degree of glory. But that there is the ſame neceſſity of mens attaining a greater degree of glory, as there is of their attaining glory, no man will affirm. For without attaining glory, they cannot eſcape the damnation of hell, which yet they may eſcape, without any greater degree of glory." One of the ends of a commonwealth is, ſay you, the advancing mens eternal intereſts. The procuring greater degrees of glory, is the advancing a man's eternal intereſt. The uſe of force to make men ſuffer for the truth, what otherwiſe they would not ſuffer, is as neceſſary for the attaining a higher degree of glory, as uſing force to make men conſider, what otherwiſe they would not conſider, is neceſſary for the attaining any degree of glory. But you will ſay, "Attaining glory is abſolutely neceſſary, but the attaining any greater degree of glory, however deſirable, is not ſo neceſſary. Now if there be not the ſame neceſſity of the one of theſe, as there is of the other, there can be no pretence to ſay, that whatever is lawful in reſpect of one of them, is likewiſe ſo in reſpect of the other." But there will always be a juſt pretence to ſay, if advancing the eternal intereſts of men be one of the ends of a commonwealth, and that the force in the magiſtrates hands be neceſſary to the attaining that end, that then the magiſtrate is obliged to uſe it; whether you will think that end abſolutely neceſſary, or as neceſſary as another, or no. I ſhall not here trouble you again with your miſtake about what is abſolutely neceſſary, having taken notice of it in another place. Only I ſhall deſire you to ſhew me, that the attaining of glory is abſolutely neceſſary, when next time you have occaſion to affirm it. Attaining of glory is neceſſary in order to happineſs: and attaining a greater degree of glory, is neceſſary in order to greater

Ibid.

happineſs: but neither of them is abſolutely neceſſary, but in order to their reſpective ends.

AND now, though, as you ſay, "you do not think yourſelf bound to take "notice of all that may be done with ſome pretence of right:" yet, I ſuppoſe, upon cooler thoughts, when you have conſidered of what dangerous conſequence an argument, managed as yours is, may be to the true religion, and the ſincere profeſſors of it; and what occaſion or encouragement it may give to men in power warmed with zeal, and excited by the proper miniſters of their own religion, to make a wrong and exorbitant uſe of force in matters of religion, you will another time think yourſelf bound not to let it go abroad again without ſome caution to the magiſtrate in the uſe of it; without one word of advice at leaſt, that ſince it is given him, as you ſay, only for promoting the true religion, he ſhould take care, and examine impartially whether what he employs it for, be the one only true religion. It being your opinion, whenever he makes uſe of force in matters of religion, for the promoting any thing but that, he goes beyond his commiſſion, injures his ſubjects, and endangers his own ſoul.

BY this time, Sir, I ſuppoſe you ſee upon what grounds I think you have not cleared thoſe difficulties which were charged by me on your method: and my reader will ſee what reaſon there was for thoſe imputations, which, with ſo loud an outcry, you laid upon me of unfair dealing; ſince there is not one of them which cannot be made good to be contained either in your book, or in your hypotheſis; and ſo clearly, that I could not imagine that a man who had ſo far conſidered government, as to engage in print, in ſuch a controverſy as this, could miſs ſeeing it as ſoon as mentioned to him. One of them which very much offends you, and makes you ſo often tell me what I ſay is impertinent, and nothing to the purpoſe, and ſometimes to uſe warmer expreſſions, is, that I argue againſt a power in the magiſtrate to bring men to his own religion: for I could not imagine that, to a man of any thought, it could need proving, that if there were a commiſſion given to all magiſtrates by the law of nature, which obliged them to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, it was not poſſible for them to put this commiſſion in execution, without being judges what was the true religion; and then there needed no great quickneſs to perceive, that every magiſtrate, when your commiſſion came to be put in execution, would, one as well as another, find himſelf obliged to uſe force to bring men to that which he believed to be the true religion. But ſince this was ſo hard for you to ſee, I now have been at the pains to prove it, and thereby to clear all thoſe imputations. I ſhall not inſtance in any other: they are all of a like kind. Only where you complain I have not cited your words fairly, if you can ſhew that I have done it any where in this or the Second Letter, to the advantage of my cauſe; or to avoid any argument in them, not anſwered; if you pleaſe to ſhew it me, I ſhall either let you ſee your miſtake, or acknowledge mine.

P. 78. AND now, whether you ſhall think what I have ſaid worth that conſideration you promiſe, or take it all for cavils and impertinencies, to me is very indifferent. Enjoy, if you pleaſe, that ſhort and eaſy way of anſwering.

But if the party you write for, be, as you ſay, God, and the ſouls of men, it will require you ſeriouſly to weigh your ſcheme, examine and put together the parts of it, obſerve the tendency and conſequences; and in a word, conſider things, and not words. For the party of God and ſouls needs not any help from obſcurity or uncertainty of general and equivocal terms, but may be ſpoke out clearly and diſtinctly; needs no retreat in the round of equivalent, or the uncertainty of miſapplied expreſſions, that may ſerve to amuſe and deceive the unwary, but inſtruct no body; and laſtly, needs no leave nor allowance from men of art, to direct both ſubjects and magiſtrates to the examination of the Scriptures, wherein God has revealed to the world the ways and means of ſalvation. In doing of this, in a treatiſe where you profeſs "the ſubject of your enquiry is only what method is to be uſed to bring "men to the true religion," the party you profeſs to write for, would have juſtified you againſt the rules of any lawful art; and no Chriſtian man, of what art ſoever, would have denied you that liberty: and if I miſtake not, the party, you ſay you write for, demands it of you. P. 68.

If you find upon a review of the whole, that you have managed your cauſe for God and the ſouls of men, with that ſincerity and clearneſs that ſatisfies your own reaſon, and you think may ſatisfy that of other men, I ſhall congratulate to you ſo happy a conſtitution. But if all your magnified and neceſſary means of force, in the way you contend for, reaches no further than to bring men to a bare outward conformity to the church of England, wherein you can ſedately affirm, that it is preſumable that all that are of it are ſo upon reaſon and conviction; I ſuppoſe there needs no more to be ſaid to convince the world what party you write for.

The party you write for is God, you ſay. But if all you have ſaid aims or amounts to nothing more, than that the church of England, as now eſtabliſhed by law, in its doctrines, ceremonies and diſcipline, ſhould be ſupported by the power of the magiſtrate, and men by force be driven into it; I fear the world will think you have very narrow thoughts of God: or that that is not the party you write for. It is true, you all along ſpeak of bringing men to the true religion. But to evidence to you, that by the one only true religion, you mean only that of the church of England, I tell you, that upon your principles, you cannot name any other church now in the world, and I again demand of you to do it, for the promoting whereof, or puniſhing diſſenters from it, the magiſtrate has the ſame right to uſe force, as you pretend he has here in England. Till you therefore name ſome ſuch other true church and true religion, beſides that of England, your ſaying, that God is the party you write for, will rather ſhew that you make bold with his name, than that you do not write for another party.

You ſay too, you write not for any party, but the ſouls of men. You write indeed, and contend earneſtly, that men ſhould be brought into an outward conformity to the church of England. But that they embrace that profeſſion upon reaſon and conviction, you are content to have it preſumable, without any farther enquiry or examination. And thoſe who are once in the outward communion of the national church, however ignorant or irreligious they are, you leave there unaſſiſted by your only competent means, force; without which, you tell us, the true religion, by its own light and ſtrength, is not able to prevail againſt mens luſts, and the corruption of nature, ſo as to be conſidered as it ought, and heartily embraced. And this dropped not from your pen by chance; but you profeſſedly make excuſes for thoſe of the national religion, who are ignorant of the grounds of it, and give us reaſons why force cannot be uſed to thoſe who outwardly conform, to make them conſider ſo as ſincerely to embrace, believe and obey the truth that muſt ſave them. But the reverend author of the Paſtoral Care tells you, p. 201. "PARTY is the true name of making converts, except they become at the "ſame time good men."

IF the uſe of force be neceſſary for the ſalvation of ſouls, and mens ſouls be the party you write for: you will be ſuſpected to have betrayed your party, if your method and neceſſary means of ſalvation reach no further, than to bring men to outward conformity, though to the true church; and after that abandons them to their luſts and depraved natures, deſtitute of the help of force, your neceſſary and competent means of ſalvation.

THIS way of managing the matter, whatever you intend, ſeems rather, in the fitneſs of it, to be for another party. But ſince you aſſure us, you write for nothing but God and mens ſouls, it can only be ſaid you had a good intention, but ill luck; ſince your ſcheme, put into the language of the country, will fit any national church and clergy in the world, that can but ſuppoſe itſelf the true; and that I preſume none of them will fail to do.

YOU were more than ordinary reſerved and gracious, when you tell me,
P. 79. That "what party you write for, you will not undertake to ſay." But having told me, that my Letter tends to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion, you thought, it is like, that was ſufficient to ſhew the party I write for; and ſo you might ſafely end your Letter with words that looked like civil. But that you may another time be a little better informed what party I write for, I will tell you. They are thoſe who in every nation fear God, work righteouſneſs, and are accepted with him; and not thoſe who in every nation are zealous for human conſtitutions, cry up nothing ſo much as outward conformity to the national religion, and are accepted by thoſe who are the promoters of it. Thoſe that I write for are thoſe, who, according to the light of their own conſciences, are every where in earneſt in matters of their own ſalvation, without any deſire to impoſe on others; a party ſo ſeldom favoured by any of the powers or ſects of the world; a party that has ſo few preferments to beſtow; ſo few benefices to reward the endeavour of any one who appears for it, that I conclude I ſhall eaſily be believed when I ſay, that neither hopes of preferment, nor a deſign to recommend myſelf to thoſe I live amongſt, has biaſſed my underſtanding, or miſled me in my undertaking. So much truth as ſerves the turn of any particular church, and can be accommodated to the narrow intereſt of ſome human conſtitution, is indeed often received with applauſe, and the publiſher finds his account in it. But I think I may ſay, truth, in its full latitude of thoſe generous principles of the Goſpel,

Goſpel, which ſo much recommend and inculcate univerſal charity, and a freedom from the inventions and impoſitions of men in the things of God, has ſo ſeldom had a fair and favourable hearing any where, that he muſt be very ignorant of the hiſtory and nature of man, however dignified and diſtinguiſhed, who propoſes to himſelf any ſecular advantage by writing for her at that rate.

As to your requeſt in the cloſe of your letter, I hope this will ſatisfy you, that you might have ſpared it; and you, with the reſt of the world, will ſee that all I writ in my former was ſo true, that you need not have given me any caution for the future. As to the pertinence of what I ſay, I doubt whether I ſhall pleaſe you; becauſe I find by your laſt Letter, that what is brought by me to ſhew the weakneſs, abſurdities, or inſignificancy of what you write, you are very apt to call impertinent, and nothing to the purpoſe. You muſt pardon me therefore, if I have endeavoured more to pleaſe other readers than you in that point. I hope they will find, in what I have ſaid, not much beſides the matter. But to a man who, ſuppoſing himſelf in the right builds all upon that ſuppoſition, and takes it for an injury to have that privilege denied him; to a man who would ſovereignly decide for all the world, what is the true religion, and thereby impower what magiſtrates he thinks fit, and what not, to uſe force; to ſuch a man, not to ſeem impertinent, would be really to be ſo. This makes me pleaſed with your reply to ſo many paſſages of my Letter, that they were nothing to the purpoſe: and it is in your choice whether in your opinion any thing in this ſhall be ſo.

But ſince this depends upon your keeping ſteadily to clear and ſettled notions of things, ſeparate from words and expreſſions uſed in a doubtful and undetermined ſignification, wherewith men of art often amuſe themſelves and others; P. 78; I ſhall not be ſo unreaſonable as to expect, whatever you promiſe, that you ſhould lay by your learning to embrace truth, and own what will not perhaps ſuit very well with your circumſtances and intereſt.

I see, my deſign not to omit any thing that you might think looks like an argument in yours, has made mine grow beyond the ſize of a letter. But an anſwer to any one being very little different from a letter, I ſhall let it go under that title. I have in it alſo endeavoured to bring the ſcattered parts of your ſcheme into ſome method, under diſtinct heads, to give a fuller and more diſtinct view of them; wherein, if any of the arguments, which give ſupport to your hypotheſis, have eſcaped me unawares, be pleaſed to ſhew them me, and I ſhall either acknowledge their force, or endeavour to ſhew their weakneſs. I am,

SIR,

June 20, 1692. Your moſt humble ſervant,

Philanthropus.

# A FOURTH

# LETTER

# FOR

# TOLERATION.

# *A FOURTH LETTER FOR TOLERATION.

SIR,

A Freſh revival of the controverſy formerly between you and me, is what I ſuppoſe no body did expect from you after twelve years ſilence. But reputation, a ſufficient cauſe for a new war, as you give the world to underſtand, hath put a reſolution into your heart, and arms into your hands to make an example of me, to the ſhame and confuſion of all thoſe who could be ſo injurious to you, as to think you could quit the opinion you had appeared for in print, and agree with me in the matter of Toleration. It is viſible how tender even men of the moſt ſettled calmneſs are in point of reputation, and it is allowed the moſt excuſable part of human frailty; and therefore no body can wonder to ſee a report thought injurious laboured againſt with might and main, and the aſſiſtance and cauſe of religion itſelf taken in and made uſe of to put a ſtop to it. But yet for all this there are ſober men who are of opinion, that it better becomes a Chriſtian temper, that diſputes, eſpecially of religion, ſhould be waged purely for the ſake of truth, and not for our own: ſelf ſhould have nothing to do in them. But ſince as we ſee it will croud itſelf in, and be often the principal agent, your ingenuity in owning what has brought you upon the ſtage again, and ſet you on work, after the eaſe and quiet you reſolutely maintained yourſelf in ſo many years, ought to be commended, in giving us a view of the diſcreet choice you have made of a method ſuited to your purpoſe, which you publiſh to the world in theſe words, p. 2. “ Being deſirous to put a ſtop to a report ſo injurious, as well “ as groundleſs, as I look upon this to be, I think it will be no improper way “ of doing it, if I thus ſignify to you and the reader, that I find nothing more “ convincing in this your long letter, than I did in your two former; giving “ withal a brief SPECIMEN of the anſwerableneſs of it: which I chooſe to “ do upon a few pages at the beginning, where you have placed your great-

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* In anſwer to “ A Second Letter to the Author of the Three Letters for Toleration. From the “ Author of the Argument of the Letter concerning Toleration briefly conſidered and anſwered. “ And of the Defence of it. With a Poſtſcript, taking ſome notice of two paſſages in The Rights “ of the Proteſtant Diſſenters.”

" eſt ſtrength, or at leaſt ſo much of it, as you think ſufficient to put an end " to this controverſy."

HERE we have your declaration of war, of the grounds that moved you to it, and of your compendious way to aſſured victory, which I muſt own is very new and very remarkable. You chooſe a few pages out of the beginning of my Third Letter; in theſe, you ſay, " I have placed my greateſt ſtrength." So, that what I have there ſaid being baffled, it gives you a juſt triumph over my whole long Letter; and all the reſt of it being but pitiful, weak, impertinent ſtuff, is by the overthrow of this forlorn hope fully confuted.

THIS is called anſwering by SPECIMEN. A new way, which the world owes to your invention, an evidence that whilſt you ſaid nothing you did not ſpare thinking. And indeed it was a noble thought, a ſtrategem, which I believe ſcarce any other but yourſelf would have found out in a meditation of twice twelve years, how to anſwer arguments without ſaying a word to them, or ſo much as reciting them; and, by examining ſix or ſeven pages in the beginning of a book, reduce to nothing above three hundred pages of it that follow. This is indeed a deciſive ſtroke that lays all flat before you. Who can ſtand againſt ſuch a conqueror, who, by barely attacking of one, kills an hundred? This would certainly be an admirable way, did it not degrade the conqueror, whoſe buſineſs is to do; and turn him into a meer talking gazetteer, whoſe boaſts are of no conſequence. For after ſlaughter of foes, and routing of armies by ſuch a dead-doing hand, no body thinks it ſtrange to find them all alive again ſafe and ſound upon their feet, and in a poſture of defending themſelves. The event, in all ſorts of controverſies, hath often better inſtructed thoſe who have, without bringing it to trial, preſumed on the weakneſs of their adverſaries. However, this which you have ſet up, of confuting without arguing, cannot be denied to be a ready way, and well thought on to ſet you up high, and your reputation ſecure in the thoughts of your believing readers, if that be, as it ſeems it is, your buſineſs; but, as I take it, tends not at all to the informing their underſtandings, and making them ſee the truth and grounds it ſtands on. That perhaps is too much for the profane vulgar to know; it is enough for them that you know it for them, and have aſſured them, that you can, when you pleaſe to condeſcend ſo far, confound all that any one offers againſt your opinion. An implicit faith of your being in the right, and aſcribing victory to you, even in points whereof you have ſaid nothing, is that which ſome ſort of men think moſt uſeful, and ſo their followers have but tongues for their champion to give him the praiſe and authority he aims at, it is no matter whether they have any eyes for themſelves to ſee on which ſide the truth lies. Thus methinks you and I both find our account in this controverſy under your management; you in ſetting your reputation ſafe from the blemiſh it would have been to it that you were brought over to my opinion; and I in ſeeing, if you will forgive me ſo preſumptuous a word, that you have left my cauſe ſafe in all thoſe parts you have ſaid nothing to, and not very much damaged in that part you have attacked, as I hope to ſhew the indifferent reader. You enter upon your ſpecimen, p. 2. by minding me that I tell you, " That I doubt

“ not but to let you ſee, that if you will be true to your own principles, and “ ſtand to what you have ſaid, you muſt carry your ſome degrees of force to “ all thoſe degrees which in words you declare againſt, even to the diſcipline “ of fire and faggot.” And you ſay, “ if I make my word good, you aſſure “ me you will carry a faggot yourſelf to the burning what you have written “ for ſo unmerciful and outrageous a diſcipline: but till I have done that, “ you ſuppoſe the diſcipline you have endeavoured to defend, may remain “ ſafe and unhurt, as it is, in its own nature, harmleſs and ſalutary to the “ world.”

To promiſe fairly is then the part of an honeſt man, when the time of performance is not yet come. But it falls out unluckily here, for you who have undertaken, by anſwering ſome parts of my ſecond Letter, to ſhew the anſwerableneſs of the whole, that inſtead of anſwering, you promiſe to retract, “ if I make good my word, in proving upon your own principles you muſt “ carry your ſome degrees of force to fire and faggot.”

Sir, my endeavours to make my word good, have lain before you a pretty competent time, the world is witneſs of it, and will, as I imagine, think it time for you, ſince you yourſelf have brought this queſtion upon the ſtage, either to acknowledge that I have made my word good, or by invalidating my arguments, ſhew that I have not. He that after a debt of ſo many years, only promiſes what brave things he will do hereafter, is hardly thought upon the Exchange to do what he ought. The account in his hand requires to be made up and balanced; and that will ſhew, not what he is to promiſe, but, if he be a fair man, what he is to perform. If the ſchools make longer allowances of time, and admit evaſions for ſatisfaction, it is fit you uſe your privilege, and take more time to conſider; only I crave leave in the mean while to refer my reader to what I have ſaid on this argument, Chap. iv. of my third Letter, that he may have a view of your way of anſwering by ſpecimen, and judge whether all that I have there urged be anſwered by what you ſay here, or what you promiſe here be ever like to be performed.

The next ſample you give to ſhew the anſwerableneſs of my Letter, is not much more lucky than the former; it may be ſeen, p. 3, and 4. where you ſay, that I tell you, p. 119. “ That you have altered the queſtion;” for it ſeems, p. 26. you tell me the queſtion between us is, “ Whether the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion? Whereas, “ p. 76. you yourſelf, I ſay, own the queſtion to be, whether the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force in matters of religion?” “ Which affirmation, of mine, you muſt take leave to tell me, is a meer fiction, for neither p. 76. nor any where elſe, do you own the queſtion to be what I ſay “ you do.”

“ And as to uſing force in matters of religion, which you ſay are my “ words not yours, if I mean by it the uſing force to bring men to any other “ religion beſides the true; you are ſo far from owning the queſtion to be, “ whether the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force for ſuch a purpoſe, that “ you have always thought it out of queſtion, that no man in the world, magiſtrate or other, can have any right to uſe either force, or any other means

“ that I can name, to bring men to any falſe religion, how much ſoever he “ may perſuade himſelf that it is true.”

“ It is not therefore from any alteration, but from the true ſtate of the “ queſtion, that you take occaſion, as I complain without cauſe, to lay load “ on me, for charging you with the abſurdities of a power in the magiſtrates “ to puniſh men, to bring them to their religion.” “ But it ſeems, having “ little to ſay aginſt what you do aſſert, you ſay, I find it neceſſary myſelf to “ alter the queſtion, and to make the world believe that you aſſert what you “ do not, that I may have ſomething before me which I can confute.”

In this paragraph you poſitively deny, that it is any where owned by you as the queſtion between us, “ Whether the magiſtrate has a right of uſing “ force in matters of religion?” Indeed theſe words are not as they are cited in p. 76. of your former Letter; but he that will turn over the leaf, may, in p. 78. read theſe words of yours, viz. that “ You refer it to me, whether “ I, in ſaying no body has a right, or you, in ſaying the magiſtrate has a “ right, to uſe force in matters of religion, have moſt reaſon:” though you poſitively tell me, “ that neither p. 76. nor any where elſe, do you own the “ queſtion to be what I ſay you do.” And now let the reader judge between us. I ſhould not perhaps have ſo much as taken notice of this, but that you who are ſo ſparing of your anſwer, that you think a brief ſpecimen upon ſome few pages of the beginning of my Letter, ſufficient to confute all I have ſaid in it, do yet ſpend the better part of two pages on this; which if I had been miſtaken in, it had been of no great conſequence; of which I ſee no other uſe you have, but to caſt on me ſome civil reflections of your faſhion, and fix on me the imputation of fiction, meer fiction; a compliment which I ſhall not return you, though you ſay, “ USING FORCE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION,” are my words, not yours. Whether they are your words or not, let p. 78. of your former Letter decide, where you own yourſelf to ſay, that “ the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force in matters of religion.” So that this, as I take it, is a ſpecimen of your being very poſitive in a miſtake, and about a plain matter of fact, about an action of your own, and ſo will ſcarce prove a ſpecimen of the anſwerableneſs of all I ſay in my Letter, unleſs we muſt allow that truth and falſhood are equally anſwerable, when you declare againſt either of them.

The next part of your ſpecimen we have, p. 4, 5. where you tell me that I undertake to prove, that “ if upon your grounds the magiſtrate be obliged “ to uſe force to bring men to the true religion; it will neceſſarily follow, that “ every magiſtrate, who believes his religion to be true, is obliged to uſe force “ to bring men to his.”

“ Now becauſe this undertaking is ſo neceſſary for me; and my whole “ cauſe ſeems to depend upon the ſucceſs of it: you ſhall the more carefully “ conſider how well I perform it. But before you do this, it will be fit to “ let me know, in what ſenſe you grant my inference, and in what ſenſe you “ deny it. Now that every magiſtrate, who upon juſt and ſufficient grounds “ believes his religion to be true, is obliged to uſe ſome moderate penalties, “ which is all the force you ever contended for, to bring men to his religion,

" you freely grant; becauſe that muſt needs be the true religion; ſince no " other can, upon ſuch grounds, be believed to be true. But that any magiſtrate, who upon weak and deceitful grounds, believes a falſe religion to " be true, and he can never do it upon better grounds, is obliged to uſe the " ſame, or any other, means, to bring men to his religion, this you flatly deny; " nor can it by any rules of reaſoning, be inferred from what you aſſert."

Here you tell me you grant my inference, in this ſenſe, viz. "That " every magiſtrate, who upon juſt and ſufficient grounds believes his religion " to be true, is bound to uſe force to bring men to it."

Here you grant that every magiſtrate, without knowing that his religion is true, is obliged, upon his believing it to be true, to uſe force to bring men to it; indeed you add, " who believes it to be true upon juſt and ſufficient grounds." So you have got a diſtinction, and that always ſets off a diſputant, though many times it is of no uſe to his argument. For here let me aſk you, who muſt be judge, whether the grounds upon which he believes his religion to be true, be juſt and ſufficient? Muſt the magiſtrate himſelf judge for himſelf, or muſt you judge for him? A third competitor in this judgment I know not where you will find for your turn. If every magiſtrate muſt judge for himſelf, whether the grounds upon which he believes his religion to be true, are juſt and ſufficient grounds, your limitation of the uſe of force to ſuch only as believe upon juſt and ſufficient grounds, bating that it is an ornament to your ſtyle and learning, might have been ſpared, ſince it leaves my inference untouched in the full latitude I have expreſſed it concerning every magiſtrate; there not being any one magiſtrate excluded thereby from an obligation to uſe force to bring men to his own religion, by this your diſtinction. For if every magiſtrate, who upon juſt and ſufficient grounds believes his religion to be true, be obliged to uſe force to bring men to his religion, and every magiſtrate be himſelf judge, whether the grounds he believes upon be juſt and ſufficient; it is viſible every magiſtrate is obliged to uſe force to bring men to his religion; ſince any one, who believes any religion to be true, cannot but judge the grounds, upon which he believes it to be true, are juſt and ſufficient; for if he judged otherwiſe, he could not then believe it to be true. If you ſay, you muſt judge for the magiſtrate, then what you grant is this; That every magiſtrate who upon grounds that you judge to be juſt and ſufficient, believes his religion to be true, is obliged to uſe force to bring men to his religion. If this be your meaning, as it ſeems not much remote from it, you will do well to ſpeak it out, that the magiſtrates of the world may know who to have recourſe to in the difficulty you put upon them, in declaring them under an obligation to uſe force to bring men to the true religion; which they can neither certainly know, nor muſt venture to uſe force to bring men to, upon their own perſuaſion of the truth of it, when they have nothing but one of theſe two, viz. knowledge, or belief that the religion they promote is true, to determine them. Neceſſity has at laſt, unleſs you would have the magiſtrate act in the dark and uſe his force wholly at random, prevailed on you to grant, that the magiſtrate may uſe force to bring men to that religion which he believes to be true; but ſay you, “his belief muſt be upon juſt and ſufficient grounds.” The ſame neceſſity remaining ſtill, muſt prevail with you to go one ſtep further, and tell me whether the magiſtrate himſelf muſt be judge, whether the grounds upon which he believes his religion to be true, be juſt and ſufficient, or whether you are to be judge for him. If you ſay the firſt, my inference ſtands good, and this queſtion, I think, is yielded, and at an end. If you ſay you are to be judge for the magiſtrates, I ſhall congratulate to the magiſtrates of the world the way you have found out for them to acquit themſelves of their duty, if you will but pleaſe to publiſh it, that they may know where to find you; for in truth, Sir, I prefer you, in this caſe, to the Pope; though you know that old gentleman at Rome has long ſince laid claim to all deciſions of this kind, and alledges infallibility for the ſupport of his title; which indeed will ſcarce be able to ſtand at Rome, or any where elſe, without the help of infallibility. But of this perhaps more in the next paragraph.

You go on with your ſpecimen in your next paragraph, p. 5. which I ſhall crave leave of my reader to ſet down at large, it being a moſt exact and ſtudied piece of artificial fencing, wherein, under the cover of good words, and the appearance of nice thinking, nothing is ſaid; and therefore may deſerve to be kept not as a ſpecimen of your anſwering, for, as we ſhall ſee, you anſwer nothing, but as a ſpecimen, of your ſkill in ſeeming to ſay ſomething where you have nothing to anſwer. You tell me that I ſay, p. 120. that “I ſuppoſe that you will grant me (what he muſt be a hard man indeed that will not grant) that any thing laid upon the magiſtrate as a duty, is ſome way or other practicable. Now the magiſtrate being obliged to uſe force in matters of religion, but yet ſo as to bring men only to the true religion, he will not be in any capacity to perform this part of his duty, unleſs the religion he is to promote, be what he can certainly know, or elſe what it is ſufficient for him to believe to be the true: either his knowledge, or his opinion muſt point out that religion to him, which he is by force to promote.” “Where, if by knowing, or knowledge, I mean the effect of ſtrict demonſtration; and by believing or opinion, any ſort of aſſent or perſuaſion how ſlightly ſoever grounded: then you muſt deny the ſufficiency of my diviſion; becauſe there is a third ſort or degree of perſuaſion which though not grounded upon ſtrict demonſtration; yet in firmneſs and ſtability, does far exceed that which is built upon ſlight appearances of probability; being grounded upon ſuch clear and ſolid proof, as leaves no reaſonable doubt in an attentive and unbiaſſed mind: ſo that it approaches very near to that which is produced by demonſtration, and is therefore as it reſpects religion, very frequently and familiarly called in Scripture not faith or belief only, but knowledge, and in divers places full aſſurance; as might eaſily be ſhewn, if that were needful. Now this kind of perſuaſion, this knowledge, this full aſſurance men may, and ought to have of the true religion: but they can never have it of a falſe one. And this it is, that muſt point out that religion to the magiſtrate, which he is to promote by the method you contend for.”

HERE the firſt thing you do is to pretend an uncertainty of what I mean by "knowing or knowledge, and by believing or opinion." Firſt, As to knowledge, I have ſaid "certainly know." I have called it "viſion, knowledge "and certainty, knowledge properly ſo called." And for believing or opinion, I ſpeak of believing with aſſurance, and ſay, that believing in the higheſt degree of aſſurance, is not knowledge. That whatever is not capable of demonſtration, is not, unleſs it be ſelf-evident, capable to produce knowledge, how well grounded and great ſoever the aſſurance of faith may be wherewith it is received. That I grant, that a ſtrong aſſurance of any truth, ſettled upon prevalent and well-grounded arguments of probability, is often called knowledge in popular ways of talking; but being here to diſtinguiſh between knowledge and belief, to what degrees of confidence ſoever raiſed, their boundaries muſt be kept, and their names not confounded, with more to the ſame purpoſe, p. 120, 121. whereby it is ſo plain, that by knowledge I mean the effect of ſtrict demonſtration; and by believing or opinion, I mean any degree of perſuaſion even to the higheſt degree of aſſurance; that I challenge you yourſelf to ſet it down in plainer and more expreſs terms. But no body can blame you for not finding your adverſary's meaning, let it be ever ſo plain, when you can find nothing to anſwer to it. The reaſon therefore which you alledge for the denying the ſufficiency of my diviſion, is no reaſon at all. Your pretended reaſon is becauſe there is "a third ſort or degree of perſua-"ſion; which though not grounded upon ſtrict demonſtration; yet in firm-"neſs and ſtability does far exceed that which is built upon ſlight appear-"ances of probability," &c. Let it be ſo, that there is a degree of perſuaſion not grounded upon ſtrict demonſtration, far exceeding that which is built upon ſlight appearances of probability. But let me aſk you what reaſon can this be to deny the ſufficiency of my diviſion, becauſe there is, as you ſay, a third ſort or degree of perſuaſion, when even that which you call this third ſort or degree of perſuaſion is contained in my diviſion. This is a ſpecimen indeed, not of anſwering what I have ſaid, but of not anſwering; and for ſuch I leave it to the reader. "A degree of perſuaſion, though not grounded "on ſtrict demonſtration, yet in firmneſs and ſtability far exceeding that which "is built upon ſlight appearances of probability, you call here a third ſort or "degree of perſuaſion." Pray tell me which are the two other ſorts; for knowledge upon ſtrict demonſtration, is not belief or perſuaſion, but wholly above it. Beſides, if the degrees of firmneſs in perſuaſion make different ſorts of perſuaſion, there are not only three, but three hundred ſorts of perſuaſion; and therefore the naming of your third ſort was with little ground, and to no purpoſe or tendency to an anſwer; though the drawing in ſome thing like a diſtinction be always to the purpoſe of a man who hath nothing to anſwer, it giving occaſion for the uſe of many good words; which, though nothing to the point, ſerve to cover the diſputants ſaying nothing under the appearance of learning, to thoſe who will not be at the pains to examine what he ſays.

YOU ſay, "every magiſtrate is by the law of nature under an obligation to "uſe force to bring men to the true religion." To this I urge, that the magiſtrate hath nothing elſe to determine him in the uſe of force, for promotion of any religion one before another, but only his own belief or perſuaſion of the truth of it. Here you had nothing to do, but fairly to grant or deny; but inſtead thereof you firſt raiſe a groundleſs doubt as I have ſhewn about my meaning, whereof there could be no doubt at all to any one who would but read what I had ſaid; and thereupon having got a pretence for a diſtinction, you ſolemnly tell the world "there is a third ſort of perſuaſion, which, though " not grounded on ſtrict demonſtration; yet in firmneſs and ſtability, does " far exceed that which is built upon ſlight appearances of probability, leaving no doubt, approaching near to knowledge, being full aſſurance." Well, the magiſtrate hath a "perſuaſion of firmneſs and ſtability, has full aſſurance;" muſt he be determined by this his full aſſurance in the promoting of that religion by force, of whoſe truth he is in ſo high a degree of perſuaſion ſo fully aſſured? "No, ſay you, it muſt be grounded upon ſuch clear and ſolid proof " as leaves no reaſonable doubt in an attentive and unbiaſſed mind." To which the magiſtrate is ready to reply, that he, upon his grounds, can ſee no reaſonable doubt, and that his is an attentive and unbiaſſed mind, of all which he himſelf is to be judge, till you can produce your authority to judge for him; though, in the concluſion, you actually make yourſelf judge for him. "It " is ſuch a kind of perſuaſion, ſuch a full aſſurance muſt point out to the magiſtrate that religion he is to promote by force, which can never be had " but of the true religion:" which is in effect, as every one may ſee, the religion that you judge to be true, and not the religion the magiſtrate judges to be true. For pray tell me, muſt the magiſtrate's full aſſurance point out to him the religion which he is by force to promote, or muſt he by force promote a religion, of whoſe truth he hath no belief, no aſſurance at all? If you ſay the firſt of theſe, you grant that every magiſtrate muſt uſe force to promote his own religion, for that is the religion whereof he has ſo full aſſurance, that he ventures his eternal ſtate upon it. Ay, ſay you, that is for want of attention, and becauſe he is not unbiaſſed. It is like he will ſay the ſame of you, and then you are quits. And that he ſhould by force promote that religion which he believes not to be true, is ſo abſurd, that I think you can neither expect it, nor bring yourſelf to ſay it. Neither of theſe therefore being anſwers that you can make uſe of, that which lies at the bottom, though you give it but covertly, is this, "That the magiſtrate ought by force to promote the religion " that you believe with full aſſurance to be true." This would do admirably well for your purpoſe, were not the magiſtrate intitled to aſk, "who made " you a judge for him in the caſe?" And ready to retort your own words upon you, that it is want of attention and unbiaſſedneſs in you, that puts your religion paſt doubt with you upon your proofs of it. Try when you pleaſe with a Bramin, a Mahometan, a Papiſt, Lutheran, Quaker, Anabaptiſt, Preſbyterian, &c. you will find if you argue with them, as you do here with me, that the matter will reſt here between you, and that you are no more a judge for any of them than they are for you. Men in all religions have equally ſtrong perſuaſions, and every one muſt judge for himſelf; nor can any one judge for another, and you laſt of all for the magiſtrate, that the ground you build upon, that "firmneſs and ſtability of perſuaſion in the higheſt degree of aſſur-

“ ance leaves no doubt, can never be had of a falſe religion” being falſe, all your talk of full aſſurance, pointing out to the magiſtrate the true religion that he is obliged by force to promote, amounts to no more, but his own religion, and can point out no other to him.

However, in the next paragraph you go on with your ſpecimen, and tell me, “Hence appears the impertinency of all I diſcourſe, p. 436, 437. concerning the difference between faith and knowledge: where the thing I was concerned to make out, if I would ſpeak to the purpoſe, was no other but this, that there are as clear and ſolid grounds for the belief of falſe religions, as there are for the belief of the true: or, that men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace falſe religions as they can the true. This, you confeſs, is a point, which, you ſay, when I have well cleared and eſtabliſhed it, will do my buſineſs, but nothing elſe will. And therefore my talk of faith and knowledge, however it may amuſe ſuch as are prone to admire all that I ſay, will never enable me, before better judges, from the duty of every magiſtrate to uſe moderate penalties for promoting the true religion, to infer the ſame obligation to lie upon every magiſtrate in reſpect to his religion, whatever it be.”

Where the impertinency lies will be ſeen when it is remembered, that the queſtion between us is not what religion has the moſt clear and ſolid grounds for the belief of it, much leſs whether “there are as clear and ſolid grounds for the belief of falſe religions, as there are for the belief of the true,” i. e. whether falſhood has as much truth in it as truth itſelf? A queſtion, which, I gueſs, no man, but one of your great pertinency could ever have propoſed. But the queſtion here between you and me, is what muſt point out to the magiſtrate that religion which he is by force to promote, that ſo he may be able to perform the duty that you pretend is incumbent on him by the law of nature; and here I proved, that having no certain demonſtrative knowledge of the true religion, all that was left him to determine him in the application of force, (which you make the proper inſtrument of promoting the true religion) for the promoting the true religion, was only his perſuaſion, belief, or aſſurance of the true religion, which was always his own; and ſo in this ſtate, the religion, which by force the magiſtrates of the world muſt of neceſſity promote, muſt be either their own, or none at all. Thus the argument ſtanding between us, I am apt to think the world may be of opinion, that it had been pertinent to your cauſe to have anſwered my argument, if you had any thing to anſwer; which ſince you have not done, this ſpecimen alſo of the facility, wherewith you can anſwer all I have ſaid in the third Letter, may be joined to the former, and be a ſpecimen of ſomething elſe than what you intended it. For in truth, Sir, the endeavouring to ſet up a new queſtion abſurd in itſelf, and nothing at all to the purpoſe, without offering any thing to clear the difficulty you were preſſed with, will to underſtanding readers appear pertinent in one who ſets himſelf up for an arrant Drawcanſir, and is giving ſpecimens of himſelf, that nothing can ſtand in his way.

It is with the ſame pertinency, that to this propoſition, "that there are "as clear and ſolid grounds for the belief of a falſe religion as there are for "the belief of the true," you join this following as an equivalent, "Or that "men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace falſe religions "as they can the true;" and you would fain have it thought that your cauſe is gained, unleſs I will maintain theſe two abſurd propoſitions, which my argument has nothing to do with.

And you ſeem to me to build upon theſe two falſe propoſitions.

I. THAT in the want of knowledge and certainty of which is the true religion, nothing is fit to ſet the magiſtrate upon doing his duty in employing of force to make men conſider and embrace the true religion, but the higheſt perſuaſion and full aſſurance of its truth. Whereas his own perſuaſion of the truth of his own religion, in what degree ſoever it be, ſo he believes it to be true, will, if he thinks it his duty by force to promote the true, be ſufficient to ſet him on work. Nor can it be otherwiſe, ſince his own perſuaſion of his own religion, which he judges ſo well grounded as to venture his future ſtate upon it, cannot but be ſufficient to ſet him upon doing what he takes to be his duty in bringing others to the ſame religion.

II. ANOTHER falſe ſuppoſition you build upon is this, that the true religion is always embraced with the firmeſt aſſent. There is ſcarce any one ſo little acquainted with the world, that hath not met with inſtances of men moſt unmoveably confident, and fully aſſured in a religion which was not the true. Nor is there among the many abſurd religions of the world, almoſt any one that does not find votaries to lay down their lives for it: and if that be not firm perſuaſion and full aſſurance that is ſtronger than the love of life, and has force enough to make a man throw himſelf into the arms of death, it is hard to know what is firm perſuaſion and full aſſurance. Jews and Mahometans have frequently given inſtances of this higheſt degree of perſuaſion. And the Bramins religion in the Eaſt is entertained by its followers with no leſs aſſurance of its truth, ſince it is not unuſual for ſome of them to throw themſelves under the wheels of a mighty chariot, wherein they on ſolemn days draw the image of their God about in proceſſion, there to be cruſhed to death, and ſacrifice their lives in honour of the God they believe in. If it be objected, that thoſe are examples of mean and common men; but the great men of the world, and the heads of ſocieties, do not ſo eaſily give themſelves up to a confirmed bigotry. I anſwer, The perſuaſion they have of the truth of their own religion, is viſibly ſtrong enough to make them venture themſelves, and uſe force to others upon the belief of it. Princes are made like other men, believe upon the like grounds that other men do, and act as warmly upon that belief, though the grounds of their perſuaſion be in themſelves not very clear, or may appear to others to be not of the utmoſt ſolidity. Men act by the ſtrength of their perſuaſion, though they do not always place their perſuaſion and aſſent on that ſide on which, in reality the ſtrength of truth lies. Reaſons that are not thought of, nor heard of, nor rightly apprehended, nor duly weighed, make no impreſſion on the mind: and truth, how richly ſoever ſtored with them, may not be aſſented to, but lie neglected. The only difference between princes and other men herein, is this, that PRINCES ARE USUALLY MORE POSITIVE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION, BUT LESS INSTRUCTED. The ſoftneſs and pleaſures of a court, to which they are uſually abandoned when young, and affairs of ſtate which wholly poſſeſs them when grown up, ſeldom allow any of them time to conſider and examine that they may embrace the true religion. And here your ſcheme, upon your own ſuppoſition, has a fundamental error that overturns it. For you affirming that force, your way applied, is the neceſſary and competent means to bring men to the true religion, you leave magiſtrates deſtitute of theſe neceſſary and competent means of being brought to the true religion, though that be the readieſt way, in your ſcheme the only way, to bring other men to it, and is contended for by you as the only method.

BUT further, you will perhaps be ready to reply, that you do not ſay barely, that men may not as firmly, but that they cannot as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace falſe religions as they can the true. This, be it as true as it will, is of no manner of advantage to your cauſe. For here the queſtion, neceſſary to be conſidered in your way of arguing, returns upon you, who muſt be judge whether the magiſtrate believes and embraces his religion rationally or no? If he himſelf be judge, then he does act rationally, and it muſt have the ſame operation on him, as if it were the moſt rational in the world: if you muſt be judge for him, whether his belief be rational or no, why may not others judge for him as well as you? or at leaſt he judge for you, as well as you for him; at leaſt till you have produced your patent of infallibility and commiſſion of ſuperintendency over the belief of the magiſtrates of the earth, and ſhewn the commiſſion whereby you are appointed the director of the magiſtrates of the world in their belief, which is or is not the true religion? Do not think this ſaid without cauſe, your whole diſcourſe here has no other tendency, but the making yourſelf judge of what religion ſhould be promoted by the magiſtrate's force; which, let me tell you by the way, every warm zealot in any religion, has as much a right to be as you, I beſeech you tell me, are you not perſuaded, nay, fully aſſured, that the church of England is in the right, and all that diſſent from her are in the wrong; Why elſe would you have force uſed to make them conſider and conform? If then the religion of the church of England be, as you are fully aſſured, the only true religion, and the magiſtrate muſt ground his perſuaſion of the truth of his religion on ſuch clear and ſolid proofs as the true religion alone has, and no falſe one can have, and by that perſuaſion the magiſtrate muſt be directed in the uſe of force, (for all this in effect, you ſay, in the ſixth and beginning of the ſeventh pages) what is this but covertly to ſay, that it is the duty of all magiſtrates to uſe force to bring men to embrace the religion of the church of England? Which, ſince it plainly follows from your doctrine, and I think you cannot deny to be your opinion, and what in effect you contend for, you will do well to ſpeak it out in plain words, and then there will need no more to be ſaid in the queſtion.

AND now I deſire it may be conſidered, what advantage this ſuppoſition of force, which is ſuppoſed put into the magiſtrate's hands by the law of nature to be uſed in religion, brings to the true religion, when it arms five hundred magiſtrates againſt the true religion, who muſt unavoidably in the ſtate of things in the world act againſt it, for one that uſes force for it. I ſay that this uſe of force in the magiſtrate's hand, is barely ſuppoſed by you from the benefit it is like to produce; but it being demonſtration, that the prejudice that will accrue to the true religion from ſuch a uſe of force, is five hundred times more than the advantage can be expected from it, the natural and unavoidable inference from your own ground of benefit, is, that God never gave any ſuch power to the magiſtrate; and there it will reſt till you can, by ſome better argument prove the magiſtrate to have ſuch a power: to which give me leave to add one word more.

YOU ſay the magiſtrate is obliged by the law of nature to uſe force to promote the true religion; muſt he ſtand ſtill and do nothing till he certainly know which is the true religion? If ſo, the commiſſion is loſt, and he can never do his duty; for to certain knowledge of the true religion, he can in this world never arrive. May he then act upon “firm perſuaſion and full aſſurance, “grounded upon ſuch clear and ſolid proofs as the true religion alone has, “and no falſe one can have?” And then indeed you have diſtinguiſhed yourſelf into a ſafe retreat. For who can doubt but your third ſort or degree of perſuaſion, if that be your meaning, will determine the magiſtrate to the true religion, when it is grounded on thoſe which are the proofs only of the true religion, which if it be all that you intend by your full aſſurance, which is the title you give to this your third ſort or degree of perſuaſion, I muſt deſire you to apply this in anſwer to my argument. I ſay, magiſtrates in general have nothing to determine them in their application of force but their own perſuaſion; and your anſwer is, the magiſtrates of the true religion have their own perſuaſion to determine them; but of all the other magiſtrates, which are above an hundred, I might ſay a thouſand to one, you ſay nothing at all; and thus, by the help of a diſtinction, the queſtion is reſolved. I ſay the magiſtrates are not in a capacity to perform their duty, if they be obliged to uſe force to promote the true religion, ſince they have nothing to determine them but their own perſuaſion of the truth of any religion; which, in the variety of religions which the magiſtrates of the world have embraced, cannot direct them to the true. Yes, ſay you, their perſuaſion, who have embraced the true religion, will direct them to the true religion. Which amounts at laſt to no more but this, That the magiſtrate that is in the right, is in the right. A very true propoſition without doubt; but whether it removes the difficulty I propoſed any better than begging the queſtion, you were beſt conſider. There are five hundred magiſtrates of falſe religions for one that is of the true; I ſpeak much within compaſs; it is a duty incumbent on them all, ſay you, to uſe force to bring men to the true religion. My queſtion is, how can this be compaſſed by men who are unavoidably determined by the perſuaſion of the truth of their own religion? It is anſwered, they who are of the true religion will perform their duty. A great advantage ſurely to true religion, and worth the contending for, that it ſhould be the magiſtrate's duty to uſe force for promoting the true religion, when in the ſtate of things that is at preſent in the world, and always hitherto has been, one magiſtrate in five hundred will uſe force to promote the true religion, and the other four hundred ninety nine to promote falſe ones!

BUT perhaps you will tell me, That you do not allow that magiſtrates, who are of falſe religions, ſhould be determined by their own perſuaſions, which are "built upon ſlight appearances of probability; but ſuch as are "grounded upon clear and ſolid proofs," which the true religion alone has. In anſwer to this, I aſk, Who muſt be judge whether his perſuaſion be grounded on clear and ſolid proofs, the magiſtrate himſelf, or you for him? If the magiſtrate himſelf, then we are but where we were; and all that you ſay here, with the diſtinction that you have made about ſeveral ſorts of perſuaſion, ſerves only to lead us round about to the ſame place: for the magiſtrate, of what religion ſoever, muſt, notwithſtanding all you have ſaid, be determined by his own perſuaſion. If you ſay you muſt be judge of the clearneſs and ſolidity of the proofs upon which the magiſtrate grounds the belief of his own religion, it is time you ſhould produce your patent, and ſhew the commiſſion whereby you act.

THERE are other qualifications you aſſign of the proof, on which you tell us "your third ſort or degree of perſuaſion is grounded; and that is ſuch, as "leaves no reaſonable doubt in an attentive and unbiaſſed mind:" which unleſs you muſt be judge what is a reaſonable doubt, and which is an attentive and unbiaſſed mind, will do you no manner of ſervice. If the magiſtrate muſt be judge for himſelf in this caſe, you can have nothing to ſay to him; but if you muſt be judge, then any doubt about your religion will be unreaſonable, and his not embracing and promoting your religion will be want of attention and an unbiaſſed mind. But let me tell you, give but the ſame liberty of judging for the magiſtrate of your religion to the men of another religion, which they have as much right to as you have to judge for the magiſtrate of any other religion in the points mentioned, all this will return upon you. Go into France and try whether it be not ſo. So that your plea for the magiſtrate's uſing force for promoting the true religion, as you have ſtated it, gives as much power and authority to the king of France to uſe it againſt his diſſenting ſubjects, as to any other prince in Chriſtendom to uſe it againſt theirs; name which you pleaſe.

THE fallacy in making it the magiſtrate's duty to promote by force the only true religion, lies in this, that you allow yourſelf to ſuppoſe the magiſtrate, who is of your religion, to be well-grounded, attentive and unbiaſſed, and fully and firmly aſſured that his religion is true; but that other magiſtrates of other religions different from yours are not ſo: which, what is it but to erect yourſelf into a ſtate of infallibility above all other men of different perſuaſions from yours, which yet they have as good a title to as yourſelf?

HAVING thus advanced yourſelf into the chair, and given yourſelf the power of deciding for all men which is, and which is not, the true religion, it is not to be wondered that you ſo roundly pronounce all my diſcourſe, p. 436,

437. "concerning the difference between faith and knowledge to be impertinency;" and ſo magiſterially to tell me, "that the thing I was there concerned to make out, if I would ſpeak to the purpoſe, was no other but this, that there are as clear and as ſolid grounds for the belief of falſe religions, as there are for belief of the true: or, that men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace falſe religions as they can the true."

The impertinency in theſe two or three pages, I ſhall leave to ſhift for itſelf in the judgment of any indifferent reader; and will only, at preſent, examine what you tell "I was concerned to make out, if I would ſpeak to the purpoſe."

My buſineſs there was to prove, That the magiſtrate being taught that it was his duty to uſe force to promote the true religion, it would thence unavoidably follow, that not having knowledge of the truth of any religion, but only belief that it was true, to determine him in his application of force, he would take himſelf in duty bound to promote his own religion by force; and thereupon force would inevitably be uſed to promote falſe religions, upon thoſe very grounds upon which you pretend to make it ſerviceable only to the true: and this, I ſuppoſe, I have in thoſe pages evidently proved, though you think not fit to give any other anſwer to what I there ſay, but that it is impertinent; and I ſhould have proved ſomething elſe, which you would have done well, by a plain and clear deduction, to have ſhewn from my words.

[THE TWO FOLLOWING LEAVES OF THE COPY ARE EITHER LOST OR MISLAID.]

After this new invention of yours, "of anſwering by ſpecimen," ſo happily found out for the eaſe of yourſelf and other diſputants of renown, that ſhall pleaſe to follow it, I cannot preſume you ſhould take notice of any thing I have to ſay: you have aſſumed the privilege, by ſhewing your ſtrength againſt one argument, to pronounce all the reſt baffled; and therefore to what purpoſe is it to offer difficulties to you, who can blow them all off with a breath? But yet to apologize for myſelf to the world, for being of opinion that it is not always from want of conſideration, attention, or being unbiaſſed, that men with firmneſs of perſuaſion embrace, and with full aſſurance adhere, to the wrong ſide in matters of religion, I ſhall take the liberty to offer the famous inſtance of the two Reynolds, brothers, both men of learning and parts; whereof the one being of the church of England, and the other of the church of Rome, they both deſiring each other's converſion to the religion which he himſelf was of, that they writ to one another about it; and that with ſuch appearance of ſolid and clear grounds on both ſides, that they were wrought upon by them: each changed his religion, and that with ſo firm a perſuaſion and full an aſſurance of the truth of that which he turned to, that no endeavours or arguments of either of them could ever after move the other, or bring him back from what he had perſuaded him to. If now I ſhould aſk to which of theſe two, full aſſurance pointed out the true religion, you no doubt, if you would anſwer at all, would ſay, To him that embraced that of the church of England, and a Papiſt would ſay the other: but if an indifferent man were aſked whether this full aſſurance was ſufficient to point out the true religion to either of them, he muſt anſwer, No; for if it were, they muſt neceſſarily have been both of the ſame religion.

To ſum up then what you anſwer to my ſaying, “It cannot be the magiſtrate's duty to uſe force to promote the true religion, becauſe he is not in a capacity to perform that duty; for not having a certain knowledge, but only his own perſuaſion to point out to him which is the true religion, if he be ſatisfied it is his duty to uſe force to promote the true religion, it will inevitably follow, that he muſt always uſe it to promote his own.” To which you anſwer, That a perſuaſion of a low degree is not ſufficient to point out that religion to the magiſtrate which he is to promote by force; but that a “firmneſs and ſtability of perſuaſion, a full aſſurance, is that which is to point out to the magiſtrate that religion which he is by force to promote.” Where if by firmneſs and ſtability of perſuaſion and full aſſurance, you mean what the words import, it is plain you confeſs the magiſtrate's duty is to promote his own religion by force; for that is the religion which his firm perſuaſion and full aſſurance points out to him. If by full aſſurance you mean any thing but the ſtrength of perſuaſion, you contradict all that you have ſaid about firmneſs and ſtability, and degrees of perſuaſion; and having in that ſenſe allowed the ſufficiency of my diviſion, where I ſay, “knowledge or opinion muſt point out that religion to him, which he is by force to promote;” retract it again, and inſtead thereof, under the name of full aſſurance, you ſubſtitute and put in true religion, and ſo firmneſs of perſuaſion is in effect laid by, and nothing but the name made uſe of: for pray tell me, is firmneſs of perſuaſion, or being of the true religion, either of them by itſelf, ſufficient to point out to the magiſtrate that religion which it is his duty to promote by force? For they do not always go together. If being of the true religion by itſelf may do it, your mentioning firmneſs of perſuaſion, grounded on ſolid proof that leaves no doubt, is to no purpoſe, but to miſlead your reaſon; for every one that is of the true religion, does not arrive at that high degree of perſuaſion, that full aſſurance which approaches that which is very near to that which is produced by demonſtration. And in this ſenſe of full aſſurance, which you ſay men may have of the true religion, and can never have of a falſe one, your anſwer amounts to this, that full aſſurance, in him that embraces the true religion, will point out the religion he is by force to promote: where it is plain, that by fulneſs of aſſurance you do mean not the firmneſs of his perſuaſion that points out to him the religion which he is by force to promote, (for any lower degree of perſuaſion to him that embraces the true religion would do it as certainly, and to one that embraces not the true religion, the higheſt degree of perſuaſion would even in your opinion do nothing at all) but his being of the true religion, is that which alone guides him to his duty of promoting the true religion by force. So that to my queſtion, how ſhall a magiſtrate who is perſuaded that it is his, and every magiſtrate's duty to promote the true religion by force, be determined in his uſe of force, you ſeem to ſay his firm perſuaſion or full aſſurance of the truth of the religion he ſo promotes muſt determine him; and preſently, in other words, you ſeem to lay the ſtreſs upon his actually being of the true religion. The firſt of theſe anſwers is not true; for I have ſhewn, that firmneſs of perſuaſion may and does point out to magiſtrates falſe religions as well as the true: and the ſecond is muchwhat the ſame, as if to one, who ſhould aſk what ſhould enable a man to find the right way who knows it not, it ſhould be anſwered, the being in it. One of theſe muſt be your meaning, chooſe which you pleaſe of them, if you have any meaning at all in your ſixth, and beginning of the ſeventh page, to which I refer the reader; where, if he find nothing elſe, he cannot fail to find a ſpecimen of ſchool-play, of talking uncertainly in the utmoſt perfection, nicely and artificially worded, that it may ſerve for a ſpecimen of a maſter-piece in that kind; but a ſpecimen of the anſwerableneſs of my Letter will require, as I imagine, a little more plain dealing. And to ſatiſfy readers, that have not attained to the admiration of ſkilfully ſaying nothing, you muſt directly inform them, whether firmneſs of perſuaſion be or be not ſufficient in a magiſtrate to enable him to do his duty in promoting the true religion by force; or elſe this you have pitched on will ſcarce be a ſample of the anſwerableneſs of all I have ſaid.

BUT you ſtand poſitive in it, and that is like a maſter, that it cannot be inferred from the magiſtrate's being obliged to promote by force the true religion, that every magiſtrate is obliged to promote by force his own religion. And that for the ſame reaſon you had given before, more perplexed and obſcurely, viz. "Becauſe there is this perpetual advantage on the ſide of the true religion, that it may and ought to be believed on clear and ſolid grounds, ſuch as will appear the more ſo, the more they are examined: whereas no other religion can be believed ſo, but upon ſuch appearances only, as will not bear a juſt examination."

THIS would be an anſwer to what I have ſaid, if it were ſo that all magiſtrates ſaw the preponderancy of the grounds of belief, which are on the ſide of the true religion; but ſince it is not the grounds and reaſons of a truth that are not ſeen, that do or can ſet the magiſtrate upon doing his duty in the caſe; but it is the perſuaſion of the mind, produced by ſuch reaſons and grounds as do affect it, that alone does, or is capable, to determine the magiſtrate in the uſe of force, for performing of his duty; it neceſſarily follows, that if two magiſtrates have equally ſtrong perſuaſions concerning the truth of their religions reſpectively, they muſt both be ſet on work thereby, or neither; for though one be of a falſe, and the other of the true religion, yet the principle of operation, that alone which they have to determine them, being equal in both, they muſt both be determined by it; unleſs it can be ſaid, that one of them muſt act according to that principle, which alone can determine, and the other muſt act againſt it; that is, do what he cannot do; be determined to one thing, by what at the ſame time determines him to another. From which incapacity in magiſtrates to perform their duty by force to promote the true religion, I think it may juſtly be concluded, that to uſe force for the promoting any religion, cannot be their duty.

YOU tell us, it is by the law of nature magiſtrates are obliged to promote the true religion by force. It muſt be owned, that if this be an obligation of the law of nature, very few magiſtrates overlook it, ſo forward are they to promote that religion by force which they take to be true. This being the caſe, I beſeech you tell me what was Huaina Capac, emperor of Peru obliged to do? Who, being perſuaded of his duty to promote the true religion, was not yet within diſtance of knowing or ſo much as hearing of the Chriſtian religion, which really is the true, (ſo far was he from a poſſibility to have his belief grounded upon the ſolid and clear proofs of the true religion.) Was he to promote the true religion by force? That he neither did nor could know any thing of, ſo that that was morally impoſſible for him to do. Was he to ſit ſtill in the neglect of his duty incumbent on him? That is in effect to ſuppoſe it a duty and no duty at the ſame time. If upon his not knowing which is the true religion, you allow it his duty to promote it by force, the queſtion is at an end: you and I are agreed, that it is not the magiſtrate's duty by force to promote the true religion. If you hold it in that caſe to be his duty, what remains for him to do, but to uſe force to promote that religion which he himſelf is ſtrongly, nay perhaps to the higheſt degree of firmneſs, perſuaded is the true? Which is the granting what I contend for, that, if the magiſtrate be obliged to promote by force the true religion, it will thence follow, that he is obliged to promote by force that religion which he is perſuaded is the true; ſince, as you will have it, force was given him to that end, and it is his duty to uſe it, and he hath nothing elſe to determine it to that end but his own perſuaſion. So that one of theſe two things muſt follow, either that in that caſe it ceaſes to be his duty, or elſe he muſt promote his own religion, chooſe you which you pleaſe * *

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MVSEVM BRITANNICVM